

Conspiracy Thinking and Electoral Trust During Tumultuous Times: The Case of Israel

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Abstract

Recent research reveals the association between conspiracy thinking, i.e., one's predisposition to believe in conspiracy theories, and trust in elections and election outcomes. This research, however, has thus far only examined single election cycles. In this letter, we examine whether citizens' conspiracy thinking, across electoral winners and losers, predicts electoral mistrust in the polarized, crisis-laden state of Israel. We test our expectation using four nationally representative samples fielded in 2022—before the electoral campaign started, during the campaign, and after the November national election, when a change in government took place. We show that conspiracy thinking predicts electoral mistrust and that this effect is independent of the effect of being an electoral loser. We also demonstrate that losing or winning the election does not meaningfully moderate the effect of conspiracy thinking on electoral mistrust.

On January 6, 2021, thousands of supporters of President Donald Trump stormed the U.S. Capitol building in an attempt to stop Congress from certifying the electoral victory of then-presidential candidate Joe Biden. Many of them did so believing the “big lie” that the November 2020 presidential election was rigged, a belief that is still widespread among Republicans, despite scant evidence of any widespread electoral fraud (e.g., Samuels, 2021). Two years later, on January 8, 2023, supporters of the recently ousted President Jair Bolsonaro stormed government buildings in Brasilia, alleging election fraud in the October 2022 Brazilian election and intending to overthrow the newly-elected government (Bowman, 2023).

These instances emphasize the importance of perceptions of election integrity and electoral trust. Indeed, scholars have noted that perceptions of electoral integrity “matter for liberal democracies” (Norris, Garnett, & Grömping, 2020, p. 106), with trust in elections considered important “for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power in deeply divided societies” (Norris, 2019, p. 6) as well as for satisfaction with democracy and trust in the political system (Norris et al., 2020).

Beliefs in voter fraud are rather common in many countries, even when no substantive evidence of widespread electoral fraud exists. While there are several explanations for citizens' electoral mistrust (Norris et al., 2020, pp. 106–110), one prominent explanation concerns conspiracy theories. In recent years, several studies have shown that one's general tendency to believe in conspiracy theories—or “conspiracy thinking” (Uscinski et al., 2021; 2022)—is a strong predictor of lack of trust in the integrity of elections, even when

controlling for partisanship and various personality traits (Edelson, Alduncin, Krewson, Sieja, & Uscinski, 2017; Enders et al., 2021). To date, however, most of these studies were conducted in a single country, the US (for recent exceptions, see Adam-Troian et al., 2023; Mari et al., 2022), and, more importantly, did not account for multiple election cycles where we see electoral winners and losers swap positions.

In this note, we test whether conspiracy thinking predicts electoral trust in Israel during one of the most contested, polarized and crisis-laden electoral cycles in the country's history. Using four cross-sectional surveys fielded in 2022—surveys conducted during the time of the Bennett-Lapid government, following the collapse of the Bennett-Lapid government, and after the electoral victory of its opposition—we show that conspiracy thinking strongly and consistently predicts electoral mistrust, and that this effect goes beyond the effect of losing elections, which in itself is associated with lower electoral trust. We further show that one's electoral status does not meaningfully moderate the effect of conspiracy thinking on electoral mistrust—the effect is manifested among both electoral winners and losers. We conclude with a discussion of the importance and limitations of our findings.

Conspiracy Thinking and Electoral Trust

In recent years, scholars have examined the importance of a person's general tendency to believe in conspiracy theories, termed “conspiracy thinking.” This tendency is defined as “an underlying world view in which events and circumstances are more or less the product of conspiracy” (Edelson et al., 2017,

p. 936), or simply “the mindset that secret sinister forces are at play” (Imhoff et al., 2022, p. 394). This disposition is rather stable, but it can fluctuate—heighten or diminish—following major political events or large-scale societal events, such as a global pandemic (Enders et al., 2023). Several studies have shown that people with high levels of conspiracy thinking tend to endorse populist and anti-elitist attitudes, support political violence, spread misinformation, and, most pertinent to the present study, mistrust the government as well as various political and social institutions (e.g., Armaly & Enders, 2022; Enders et al., 2021; 2023; Uscinski, Klofstad, & Atkinson, 2016; 2022).¹

Notably, Edelson et al. (2017) and Enders et al. (2021) have shown that conspiracy thinking strongly predicts beliefs in electoral fraud in US elections, while Norris et al. (2020) have shown that a belief in a specific conspiracy theory concerning the 9/11 terror-attacks predicts lack of trust in the fairness of the vote in the US (relatedly, see also Lyons & Workman, 2022). This predictive power of conspiracy thinking was tested mostly in the US, but recent multi-country studies have documented similar correlations in various other countries (Adam-Troian et al., 2023; Mari et al., 2022). The suggested mechanism is that people with high levels of conspiracy thinking hold an underlying tendency to mistrust official bodies and institutions and treat innocent mistakes in the administration of the election “as proof of a conspiracy taking place” (Norris et al., 2020, p. 108).

To date, however, it remains unclear whether a dispositional factor such as conspiracy thinking is a stronger predictor of electoral trust compared to a situational factor such as being the electoral winner or loser, as winning (losing) the election leads to higher (lower) trust in institutions and in democratic processes, i.e., the well-known “legitimacy gap” (e.g., Banducci & Karp, 2003; Lelkes, 2016).

It is also unclear whether this situational factor of winning/losing the election moderates the effect of conspiracy thinking on electoral trust. Following the literature showing that beliefs in conspiracy theories are more common among political “losers,” i.e., those losing the election or out of office (e.g., Douglas et al., 2019; Imhoff et al., 2022; Uscinski & Parent, 2014; but see also Czech, 2018; Wang & van Prooijen, 2023), we test whether the effect of conspiracy thinking is more pronounced among electoral losers. An electoral loss might make it more likely that one’s predisposition to believe in conspiracy theories will be “activated,” as electoral losers are arguably more likely to attribute the loss to sinister, hidden forces. In contrast, among electoral winners such conspiracy thinking might be less pronounced, as an electoral victory is less likely to “activate” one’s conspiracy thinking. That said, we are unaware of any previous studies that examined such a moderating effect.

These questions are even more important in times of severe political turmoil in polarized societies, where losing an election to a hated rival group might fuel unwillingness to accept the legitimacy of the election. This is amplified when rival groups swap positions as electoral winners and losers, as was the case in Israel in 2021–2022.

The Israeli Case Study: Electoral Trust Amid Political Instability and Polarization

Following two years of unprecedented political turmoil and disfunction, which included four national elections, a national

unity government took office on June 13, 2021. Benjamin Netanyahu, who served as Prime Minister for 12 consecutive years, was replaced by Naftali Bennett, who headed an unlikely coalition of diverse parties from the left, right, and center, including the first Arab party to ever join a coalition in Israel history (Ra’am). This dramatic change in government led to tensions in the Israeli parliament (Knesset) between members of the newly-founded coalition and members of the disgruntled opposition, including a monthslong opposition boycott of committees in the Knesset (Shlezinger, 2022). After a year of intense political fights, the Bennett-Lapid government collapsed, leading to the fifth election in less than four years, on November 1, 2022. In that election, Netanyahu and his political allies won a majority of seats, and on December 29, 2022, Netanyahu formed a new, homogenous right-wing government.

The Israeli political crisis can be at least partially attributed to increasing political polarization in Israel in recent decades, with supporters of right-wing and left-wing ideologies becoming increasingly hostile toward each other over the last 15 years (Amitai, Gidron, & Yair, 2023). Notably, a recent study has shown that in 2022, partisan bias in classification of news statements as factual or opinion between Israeli coalition and opposition voters was much larger compared to the partisan bias in classification of statements between Democrats and Republicans in the US (Graham & Yair, 2024). The latter study attests to the severe coalition-opposition polarization that existed while our surveys were fielded; and the government change in such a tumultuous and polarized political landscape presents an excellent case for testing the independent effect of conspiracy thinking while accounting for the situational factor of winning or losing an election.

Electoral trust has seen little study in Israel. Yet in recent years this issue received public prominence in light of multiple claims of electoral fraud, mostly from the right. For example, in the 2020, 2021, and 2022 national elections, right-wing elites claimed that the Israeli Central Elections Committee—the government agency in charge of conducting elections in Israel nationwide—tried to steal the election and hand the “left” an electoral victory (Danieli, 2020; Kabir, 2021, 2022). Of note, several recent surveys have shown that many Israelis mistrust the election results: in nine surveys conducted between February 2019 and October 2022, between 27 and 44% of Israelis reported having low trust in the integrity of the election (Hermann & Anabi, 2022). These beliefs notwithstanding, Israel is considered a country where widespread election fraud is rare, and the most recent Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) project ranked Israel’s electoral integrity as very high (Garnett et al., 2022).²

Using the Israeli case, we test whether electoral mistrust in Israel is associated with conspiracy thinking that is independent of electoral outcomes. We expect perceptions of electoral mistrust to be positively correlated with conspiracy thinking and that this effect would be independent of the situational factors of winning/losing elections, political affiliation, and conventional demographic covariates. In addition, following the abovementioned literature suggesting that “conspiracy theories are for losers” (e.g., Uscinski & Parent, 2014), we further examine whether one’s electoral status moderates the effect of conspiracy thinking on electoral trust.

¹ Indeed, in another project we show that the Conspiracy Thinking scale used in this study strongly predicts political trust in Israel (Yair, 2023).

² Of the 146 countries ranked by the 2022 PEI project on the raw index of electoral integrity (‘PEIIndexp’), Israel was ranked 2nd (Garnett, James, & MacGregor, 2022).

Table 1. Share of Respondents Who Agree With Each of the Four Items of the Conspiracy Thinking Scale

The item	April 2022	September 2022	October 2022	December 2022
(1) Even though we live in a democratic country, at the end of the day a small number of people always runs things	63%	72%	69%	64%
(2) The people who really run the country are unknown to the public	41%	46%	44%	40%
(3) Big events like wars, economic crises, and the outcomes of elections are controlled by small groups of people who are working in secret against most citizens	37%	37%	36%	35%
(4) Much of our lives are being controlled by plots hatched in secret place.	46%	49%	49%	42%
Mean (SD) Conspiracy Thinking scale	0.56 (0.25)	0.57 (0.25)	0.58 (0.24)	0.55 (0.25)

Note. Each cell presents the share of respondents who agreed—answered “somewhat agree” or “strongly agree”—with each item. The Conspiracy Thinking scale varies 0–1, with higher values denote higher levels.

Methodology

We fielded four nationally representative online surveys during 2022 (total $N = 6,280$). All surveys were fielded to a representative sample of Israelis, offering Hebrew and Arabic versions to respondents. The first survey was fielded on April 10–14, 2022, while the Bennett-Lapid government was in office ($N = 1,559$). The second survey was fielded between September 22 and October 2, 2022 (henceforth “September 2022”), after the Bennett-Lapid government collapsed and the Knesset voted to disperse itself ($N = 1,671$). The third survey was fielded on October 24–27, 2022, shortly before the November 1 election ($N = 1,507$). Finally, the fourth survey was fielded on December 6–18, 2022 ($N = 1,543$), more than a month after the election, when it was clear the Netanyahu-led coalition will soon take office. [Supplementary Figure A1 in Appendix Section A](#) summarizes the political timeline and surveys in our data. For information on the different samples, see [Supplementary Appendix Section A](#).

Research Variables

Electoral trust.

As our dependent variable, we used a survey item asking respondents the following four-point scale question: “To what extent do you have trust in the integrity of the Knesset election, meaning that the results perfectly reflect the public’s vote?”³ This question has been asked previously in surveys in Israel ([Hermann & Anabi, 2022](#)) and is rather similar to the outcome variable used by [Norris et al. \(2020\)](#).

The question reveals that the level of trust in elections has increased over time: From 45.5% reporting low trust in the elections (i.e., answered “not at all” or “to a small extent”) in April, through 42.8% in September and 35.7% in October, to 27.3% in December. For the empirical analyses, we rescaled this 4-point item to vary 0 to 1, with higher values denoting higher electoral trust.

Conspiracy thinking.

In our surveys, we used the four-item Conspiracy Thinking Scale, which was validated in various studies in the US (e.g., [Uscinski et al., 2022](#)). [Table 1](#) presents the exact wording (translated to English) of the four items. Each item was

measured using a five-point scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The percentage of respondents agreeing—answering “somewhat agree” or “strongly agree”—with each item, in each survey, is also presented in [Table 1](#).

In each survey, the Conspiracy Thinking items demonstrated high reliability ($\alpha = 0.82$ – 0.84), and in an exploratory factor analysis the proportion of variance explained by the only factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1 (eigenvalues = 2.2–2.3) ranged from 0.95 to 0.97. The items were averaged and rescaled to vary 0 to 1, with higher values denoting greater conspiracy thinking. The bottom of [Table 1](#) presents the mean Conspiracy Thinking score in each survey, ranging from 0.55 to 0.58.

Voting groups.

This categorical variable comprises of five voting “groups,” including the two main voting “blocs” during the 2021–2022 period in Israel. We use this variable to test the impact of an important situational factor—being the electoral winner/loser. The first group is the “Netanyahu-bloc,” comprised of different right-wing parties that opposed the Bennett–Lapid government and supported Netanyahu’s bid for the Prime Minister position, from June 2021 up to the November 2022 election. Voters of these parties were in the opposition during that time, i.e., the electoral losers, and following their electoral victory in the November 2022 election, they became the electoral winners. These voters constitute 35.6% of our entire sample. The second group is the “Change-bloc,” i.e., voters for parties that supported the Bennett-Lapid government. These parties were considered the electoral winners until the November election, after which they became the opposition—the electoral losers. These voters constitute 46.8% of our sample.

The third group is the “Joint List” party. This party is comprised of three Arab parties that joined forces back in 2019, until splitting shortly before the November 2022 election. Both before and after the November election they were in the opposition. These voters constitute 5.1% of the sample. The fourth group is comprised of voters of parties that did not gain more than 1% of the total vote in the 2021 and 2022 elections. They constitute 0.8% of our sample. Finally, the fifth group is comprised of respondents who reported that they did not vote in the last election or answered “don’t know” to the voting item. They constitute 12.8% of the sample.

Control variables.

We control for respondents’ age group, gender, college education, religion (Jewish/Arab), religiosity, and right-left

³ Response options: (1) to a very large extent; (2) to a large extent; (3) to a small extent; (4) not at all. A fifth “don’t know” option was also presented to the respondents and those who chose it (between 6.2% and 7.7% in all surveys) were excluded from the analyses.

ideological self-placement (right/center/left). The last three variables are consistently considered important in predicting vote choice and political attitudes in Israel (Oshri, Yair, & Huddy, 2022; Shamir & Arian, 1999; Yair, 2021). All variables were rescaled to vary 0–1. [Supplementary Online Appendix Section B](#) presents detailed information on all variables in our analyses.

Notably, and similar to studies in the US (Enders et al., 2023; Uscinski et al., 2021), our Conspiracy Thinking scale is only weakly predicted by vote choice, ideology, or different demographic variables. We fully report these results in [Supplementary Appendix Section E](#).

Results

[Table 2](#) presents the results of OLS regression models predicting the *electoral trust* item.⁴ The first four models correspond to each of the four surveys, while the fifth model combines all observations.⁵ As expected, the Conspiracy Thinking scale is consistently negative and significantly associated with electoral trust ($ps < .001$; two-tailed tests throughout). In each model, the discrete change translates to a decrease of 0.30–0.37 units in the *electoral trust* item. The results of dominance analyses (Enders et al., 2021, p. 6), presented in [Supplementary Appendix Section C](#), confirm that the Conspiracy Thinking scale is the most important, or “dominant” predictor in each of the five models.

As expected, being the electoral loser is significantly associated with electoral mistrust in most surveys. To allow comparison between the two major blocs, we use the “Netanyahu-bloc” as our reference group. In the April and September surveys, both during a “Change-bloc” coalition, voters of the “Change-bloc” were significantly more trusting of the election results than voters of the “Netanyahu-bloc” ($b = 0.09$ and $b = 0.05$, respectively; $ps < .004$). In the October survey, a mere week prior to the election, there were no significant differences between voters of the two main blocs ($b = 0.00$; $p = .855$). However, after the November 2022 election, voters of the “Change-bloc,” now the electoral losers, were significantly *less* trusting of the election results than voters of the “Netanyahu-bloc” ($b = -0.10$; $p < .001$). In line with the abovementioned “legitimacy gap” literature, our results suggest that losing the election significantly lowers electoral trust.

We also see that the other voting groups are also consistently associated with electoral mistrust: compared to voters of the “Netanyahu-bloc” and “Change-bloc,” voters of the Arab “Joint List” party as well as voters of other parties and those who did not vote, rather consistently report lower electoral trust. Males, Jewish, and college educated respondents reported higher levels of electoral trust.

In [Supplementary Appendix Section D](#), we report the results of several robustness tests, namely employing ordered logistic (ordinal) regression; controlling for political interest; and controlling for a populist attitude item (in the December 2022 survey). Results are very similar to the [Table 2](#) results.

Does electoral status moderate the effect of conspiracy thinking? We suggested earlier that the situational factor of winning/losing the election might moderate the effect of conspiracy thinking on electoral trust. In [Supplementary](#)

[Appendix Table D4](#) we report the results of models similar to the models in [Table 2](#), except we include an interaction between the Conspiracy Thinking scale and a winner/loser status.⁶ In only one survey, December 2022 (Model 4), the Conspiracy Thinking X ‘electoral winner’ interaction term is statistically significant ($b = 0.14$; $p = .031$), such that the negative effect of Conspiracy Thinking is stronger among electoral losers. The Conspiracy Thinking X “electoral winner” interaction terms in the other three surveys are rather small ($bs = 0.02$ – 0.06) and insignificant ($ps > .3$). And when combining the four surveys, substantially increasing power to detect an interactive effect (Sommet, Weissman, Cheutin, & Elliot, 2023), we still find that the interaction effect is rather modest ($b = 0.06$) and only marginally significant ($p = .079$).

Notably, the effect of Conspiracy Thinking scale on electoral trust is meaningful and statistically significant ($ps < .001$) among both electoral losers and winners in all models in [Supplementary Appendix Table D4](#). This can be seen clearly in [Figure 1](#), which presents the marginal effects of Conspiracy Thinking scale for electoral losers and electoral winners separately. These results clearly show that winning or losing the election does not meaningfully moderate the effect of Conspiracy Thinking scale: The predisposition to believe in conspiracy theories is important for our understanding of citizens’ trust in elections among both electoral losers and winners. These results underscore the importance of conspiracy thinking to our understanding of trust in societal and political institutions.

Discussion

Using four surveys conducted during the height of a political crisis in Israel, with much at stake for the winners and losers of the electoral competition, we show that one’s general tendency to believe conspiracy theories, i.e., conspiracy thinking, is an important predictor of electoral mistrust in Israel. These results strongly comport with several recent studies conducted in the US and elsewhere (e.g., Enders et al., 2021; Mari et al., 2022). We also show that conspiracy thinking strongly predicts electoral mistrust regardless of the situational factor of being the electoral “loser” or “winner,” further demonstrating the importance of conspiracy thinking. Thus, while conspiracy theories might be mostly “for losers” (e.g., Uscinski & Parent, 2014), the effect of conspiracy thinking is not.

Our results also provide further evidence that electoral losers are less trusting of the election results than electoral winners, which comports well with the “legitimacy gap” literature (e.g., Lelkes, 2016). Prior to the November 2022 Israeli election, voters of parties in the coalition had significantly higher electoral trust than voters of the opposition parties; but about a month following the election, after the tables turned and the coalition voters were headed to the opposition, they had significantly *lower* electoral trust than the opposition voters now headed to the coalition. Thus, situational factors can certainly contribute to one’s electoral (mis)trust. That said, the effect of our Conspiracy Thinking scale is consistently stronger than the effect of one’s electoral status, and this scale strongly predicts electoral trust among both electoral winners and losers, attesting to its importance for our understanding of trust in institutions.

⁶ Full results, which include individual-level controls as well as the interaction terms of the Conspiracy Thinking scale with the other “voting blocs,” are shown in [Supplementary Appendix Table D4](#).

⁴ Replication materials are available at <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/IHP3UW>.

⁵ All results reported are unweighted. Using weights for religiosity and religion hardly affects the results.

Table 2. Predicting Trust in the Integrity of the Election

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	April 2022	September 2022	October 2022	December 2022	Combining all four surveys
Conspiracy Thinking	-0.31*** (0.03)	-0.37*** (0.03)	-0.37*** (0.03)	-0.30*** (0.03)	-0.35*** (0.01)
<u>“Voting bloc”:</u>					
The “Change-bloc”	0.09*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Joint list	0.03 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.06** (0.02)
Other party	-0.30*** (0.05)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.18* (0.09)	-0.15* (0.07)	-0.15*** (0.04)
Didn’t vote/Don’t know	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.01)
<u>Ideological camp:</u>					
Center	0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
Left	0.07** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02* (0.01)
<u>Age group:</u>					
Ages 30–44	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
Ages 45–59	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Ages 60+	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)
Gender (female = 1)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Jewish	0.14*** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.07* (0.03)	0.06*** (0.01)
College education	0.02 (0.02)	0.03* (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03*** (0.01)
Religiosity	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
Survey 2 (September ‘22)					0.03** (0.01)
Survey 3 (October ‘22)					0.07*** (0.01)
Survey 4 (December ‘22)					0.12*** (0.01)
Constant	0.52*** (0.04)	0.73*** (0.04)	0.82*** (0.04)	0.84*** (0.04)	0.68*** (0.02)
Observations	1,426	1,485	1,365	1,368	5,644
R-squared	0.18	0.17	0.19	0.17	0.17

Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$ (two-tailed test). The dependent variable varies 0–1, with higher values denoting greater electoral trust. All regressors vary 0–1. The reference category for the voting blocs is the “Netanyahu-bloc.” The reference category for the *Center* and *Left* ideological camps is *Right*. Ages 18–29 are the reference category for the different age group. The April 2022 survey is the reference category for the different surveys in Model 5.

This study is not without limitations. First, unlike some previous studies (e.g., Enders et al., 2021), our analyses lack control variables that tap individual-level dispositions and personality traits that correlate with conspiracy thinking, e.g., the “dark triad” personality traits, a combination of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Future

studies could use such additional items when predicting electoral trust, in Israel and elsewhere. More importantly, similar to previous studies (e.g., Edelson et al., 2017; Norris et al., 2020), our results are purely observational, vulnerable to the risk of reverse causality. Future studies, ideally using panel studies, are essential to further buttress the




Figure 1. Marginal effect of conspiracy thinking on electoral trust—among electoral winners and electoral losers. Note. OLS coefficients. Whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals. Full circles denote the estimates among the electoral winners while hollow diamonds denote the estimates among the electoral losers. In surveys 1–3, the “Netanyahu-bloc” is the losing bloc while the “Change-bloc” is the winning bloc; in survey 4, the “Netanyahu-bloc” is the winning bloc while the “Change-bloc” is the losing bloc.

importance of conspiracy thinking in understanding citizens’ electoral trust and their trust in other institutions—in Israel and elsewhere.

Finally, a recent study has documented the role of country context—specifically, the actions of different governmental actors—in moderating the association between conspiracy thinking and political trust (Schlippach, Isani, & Back, 2022). Since the results we obtained in this study are based on a single case (Israel), we acknowledge the need for replication of our results in other countries. At the same time, the Israeli setting allowed us to demonstrate the conspiracy thinking-electoral mistrust association during a period of repeated elections and a change of government.

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility for providing the financial support for conducting the surveys.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Supplementary Data

Supplementary data are available at International Journal of Public Opinion Research online.

Biographical Notes

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