



Lauder School
of Government,
Diplomacy & Strategy

Program on
Democratic Resilience
& Development



Political Extremism in Israel

Prof. Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, Dr. Julia Elad-Strenger and Mabelle Kretchner

Four waves report

[June 2023]

Content

1. Introduction	4
2. Samples	5
3. Method and measures	7
4. The "least liked" social group.....	7
5. Political Violence.....	12
6. Activism.....	28
Measures	28
7. Anti-democratic attitudes	35
8. Correlations and descriptive statistics of study variables by least liked group choice	44
9. Correlations and descriptive statistics of study variables by population and wave.....	73
10. Perceptions, Attitudes and feelings towards least liked group choice	93
11. Differences between general support for civil rights and support for civil right for the least liked group	151
12. Differences between support for the use of physical force in general and support for the use of physical force against the least liked group	153
13. Differences in support for alternatives for the Israeli Palestinian conflict.....	155
14. Differences in norm perceptions and feeling towards least liked group.....	162
15. Differences in in meta feelings and feeling towards least liked group	163

1. INTRODUCTION

Extremism has become a very common term nowadays, both in social science and outside the academic sphere. However, its usage is rather abstract, and nobody has arrived at a satisfactorily comprehensive definition (Caiani 2013). The concept refers to individuals or groups who advocate or resort to measures that lie beyond the moral and political center of society (Eatwell & Goodwin 2010: 8). It can be associated with ideologies or behaviors. Political extremism is commonly defined by the elements anti-constitutionalism and antidemocracy; it is the rejection of the fundamental values, procedures, and institutions of the democratic state (Carter 2005; Downs et al. 2009).

One common feature of extremism is interpreting the world through “black or white” categories (Mandel 2002). In practice, political extremists divide the world between friends (the in-group) and enemies (the out-group), without seeking a common ground among contending parties, nor does extremism seek common perspectives, as liberalism does (Downs et al. 2009: 153). The “in-group” is usually seen as treated unfairly or deprived of what they otherwise deserve, whereas the “out-group” is considered to be benefiting directly by this injustice (Mandel 2002). Therefore, feelings of anger and revenge as well as threat perceptions are considered the main mechanisms which prompt extremists to support exclusionary and anti-liberal attitudes and even the use of violence.

There is not a single explanation of extremism and that in order to shed light on the phenomenon, it is necessary to consider the context of both structural and group. Relying on public surveys we extensively study some of the prominent features of political extremism, namely xenophobia, political intolerance, political exclusionism, and anti-democracy, keeping in mind their inevitable link to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Public attitudes toward minorities are hotly debated, yet the empirical evidence is often mixed. This ongoing research, which received the support of the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, is seeking to augment our understanding of psychosocial processes associated with exclusionary reactions to minorities (“the other”) from both empirical and normative perspectives, with the goal, in part, of developing ‘best practices’ for government bodies and NGOs seeking to weaken the pull of extremism. Drawing upon a rich literature in social we seek to inform the political science debate by highlighting the unique role of individual characteristics, intergroup relations and emotions, and threat perceptions in promoting extremist attitudes and behaviors toward minorities.

2. SAMPLES

We conducted 4 survey studies using nationally representative samples of Israelis ($N_{\text{wave 1}}=2016$; Israeli Jews = 1609, Arab citizens of Israel =407; $N_{\text{wave 2}}=2010$; Israeli Jews = 1610, Arab citizens of Israel =400; $N_{\text{wave 3}}=1381$; Israeli Jews = 963, Arab citizens of Israel =418; $N_{\text{wave 4}}=987$; Israeli Jews = 764, Arab citizens of Israel =223) via ipanel company, the largest online panel in Israel. Data was collected online in either Arabic or Hebrew. Wave 1 was collected between December 6, 2021, to January 13, 2022, six months into "Bennet-Lapid" unity government which was established following a two-year period of political gridlock of four rounds of national elections. During that period, the relations between leftists and rightists in Israel has been identified as particularly tense (Elad-Strenger et al., 2020) where both sides are fighting over the ways Israel should deal with issues such as the surge of Omicron variant (Time of Israel, 2022a), security/terrorist attacks (Time of Israel, 2022b) and violence by the Bedouin in the Negav dessert, (Time of Israel, 2022c). Wave 2 was collected between May 23, to June 24, 2022, a period which followed a spike in terrorists attacks (Kingsley, 2022) and months of political instability (Time of Israel, 2022d) which gave rise to the disperse of the Knesset in the End June 2022. Wave 3 and Wave 4 were pre- and post-election panel studies. Wave 3 was collected between October 24, to October 31, 2022 days before Israeli elections on November first, a period characterized by tensions among both side over the election results and image (for example in relation to the rise of far-right party led by Itamar Ben Gvir). Wave 4 was collected between January 12, to January 25, 2023 two and a half months after Israeli elections and two weeks after the swearing in of the 37th government/ the sixth Netanyahu government -characterized by its right-wing/religious composition. At the time of data collection, the Knesset member Aryeh Deri was fired from all his positions as a minister in the government following the High Court ruling that stated that Deri cannot serve as a minister in the government. As well as the introduction of Yariv Levin of the reform of the judicial system, which planted the seed for the widespread protest in Israel.

Wave 1

The sample included 54% women and 46% men (among Jews: 50.8% women and 49.2% men) with an average age of 39 (median = 37). In terms of religious affiliation, 80% of the sample was Jewish, 16% Muslim, 3% Christian, and 2% Druze. In terms of income level, 32% of the sample reported their household income to be "way below average," 22% "slightly below the average," 24% "average," 16% "slightly above the average," and 5.7% "way above the average." In terms of ethnic origin among Jewish participants, 40% were Ashkenazi, 41% Mizrahi, 15% mixed, 3% other, and 1% indicated they do not know. Regarding the level of religiosity, among Jewish participants: 43% were secular, 37% traditional, 4% religious-nationalist, 7% religious, 10% ultra-Orthodox, and less than 1% nationalist ultra-Orthodox. In terms of the level of education completed (among the entire sample), 1% completed Elementary school, 26% completed High School, 21% completed higher education which is non-Academic, 49% completed academic education, 2% completed Yeshiva, and 1% Other. In terms of political affiliation, 47% identified as rightists, 30% as centrists, and 23% as leftists (among Jews: 56% identified as rightists, 29% as centrists, and 15% as leftists).

Wave 2

The sample included 50% women and 50% men (among Jews: 50.1% women and 49.8% men) with an average age of 42 (median = 39). In terms of religious affiliation, 80% of the sample was Jewish, 15% Muslim, 2% Christian, and 2% Druze. In terms of income level, 31% of the sample reported their household income to be "way below average," 22% "slightly below the average," 22% "average," 19% "slightly above the average," and 6% "way above the average." In terms of ethnic origin among Jewish participants, 40% were Ashkenazi, 40% Mizrahi, 13% mixed, 4% Russian, 0.5% Ethiopians, 2% other, and 0.5% indicated they do not know. Regarding the level of religiosity, among Jewish participants: 46% were secular, 34% traditional, 3% religious-nationalist, 8% religious, 9% ultra-Orthodox, and 1% nationalist ultra-Orthodox. In terms of the level of education completed (among the entire sample), 1% completed Elementary school, 28% completed High School, 23% completed higher education which is non-Academic, 45% completed academic education, 1% completed Yeshiva, and 1% Other. In terms of political affiliation, 46% identified as rightists, 30% as centrists, and 24% as leftists (among Jews: 55% identified as rightists, 30% as centrists, and 15% as leftists).

Wave 3

The sample included 53% women and 47% men (among Jews: 51.2% women and 48.8% men) with an average age of 40 (median = 38). In terms of religious affiliation, 70% of the sample was Jewish, 22% Muslim, 5% Christian, and 3% Druze. In terms of income level, 33% of the sample reported their household income to be "way below average," 21% "slightly below the average," 24% "average," 16% "slightly above the average," and 6% "way above the average." In terms of ethnic origin among Jewish participants, 39% were Ashkenazi, 39% Mizrahi, 15% mixed, 5% Russian, 0.2% Ethiopians, 2% other, and 1% indicated they do not know. Regarding the level of religiosity, among Jewish participants: 44% were secular, 35% traditional, 5% religious-nationalist, 6% religious, 9% ultra-Orthodox, and 0.5% nationalist ultra-Orthodox. In terms of the level of education completed (among the entire sample), 1% completed Elementary school, 25% completed High School, 22% completed higher education which is non-Academic, 50% completed academic education, 2% completed Yeshiva, and 0.5% Other. In terms of political affiliation, 43% identified as rightists, 31% as centrists, and 26% as leftists (among Jews: 57% identified as rightists, 28% as centrists, and 15% as leftists).

Wave 4

The sample included 53% women and 47% men (among Jews: 50.2% women and 49.8% men) with an average age of 42.44 (median = 40). In terms of religious affiliation, 77% of the sample was Jewish, 16.5% Muslim, 3% Christian, and 3% Druze. In terms of income level, 28.5% of the sample reported their household income to be "way below average," 22% "slightly below the average," 24% "average," 19% "slightly above the average," and 6.3% "way above the average." In terms of ethnic origin among Jewish participants, 40% were Ashkenazi, 39% Mizrahi, 14% mixed, 4.7% Russian, 0.3% Ethiopians, 1.6% other, and 0.4% indicated they do not know. Regarding the level of religiosity, among Jewish participants: 44% were secular, 35% traditional, 4.5% religious-nationalist, 7% religious, 9% ultra-

Orthodox, and 0.4% nationalist ultra-Orthodox. In terms of the level of education completed (among the entire sample), 1% completed Elementary school, 24.6% completed High School, 21.6% completed higher education which is non-Academic, 50% completed academic education, 2% completed Yeshiva, and 0.3% Other. In terms of political affiliation, 44.6% identified as rightists, 28.6% as centrists, and 26.8% as leftists (among Jews: 56% identified as rightists, 26.6% as centrists, and 17.5% as leftists).

3. METHOD AND MEASURES

We used a structured questionnaire drawn from several measures that was completed by most participants in approximately 20 minutes. All items were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), unless indicated otherwise. All scales were computed by calculation of the average of all items in each scale.


4. THE "LEAST LIKED" SOCIAL GROUP

Participants were asked to identify among a variety of groups in Israel their "least liked group" (i.e. the group which they feel is the most distant from them or the one that elicits the most opposition in them) (Sullivan et al. 1993). The groups were Jewish settlers, Arab citizens of Israel, Secular, Ultra-orthodox, Leftists, Rightists, Ashkenazi, Mizrahi, Russians, Ethiopians, Immigrants/refugees from Africa. The first wave included also the group of foreign workers, which was replaced by LGBT members in waves 2 and 3.

4.1 LEAST LIKED GROUP CHOICE OF ISRAELI JEWS BY WAVE

As seen in Figure 1, the groups that Jewish Israelis mainly chose as their least liked group are immigrants/refugees from Africa, Arab citizens of Israel, Ultra-orthodox, Leftists, Jewish settlers and LGBT.

Figure 1. Least liked group choice of Israeli Jews by wave




There was a significant difference between waves in the percentage of Jewish Israelis who chose immigrants/refugees from Africa as their least-liked group. While 23% to 27% of Jewish Israelis chose this group in the first, third and fourth waves, in the second wave only 18% of Israeli Jews chose this group (all $p < .01$). A similar difference between waves (but in an opposite trend) was found in the percentage of Jewish Israelis who chose Arab citizens of Israel as their least liked group. While 20-22% of Jewish Israelis chose this group in the first, third and fourth waves, in the second wave 34% of Jewish Israelis chose this group as their least liked group (all $p < .001$). This increase in wave 2, may be a result of a wave of terrorist attacks which began in late March 2022 (Kingsley, 2022). Significant difference between waves was also found in the percentage of Jewish Israelis who chose LGBT as their least liked group, such that the percent of people who chose LGBT group in wave 3 was significantly higher than waves 2 and 4 (all $p < .01$).

4.2 LEAST LIKED GROUP CHOICE OF ARAB CITIZENS BY WAVE

As seen in Figure 2, the groups that Arab citizens of Israel mainly chose as their least liked group are Jewish settlers, Ultra-orthodox, LGBT and Rightists. There was a significant difference between the first wave and the third wave in the percentage of Arab citizens of

Israel who chose Ultra-orthodox as their least liked group ($p < .01$). While 25% of Arabs chose this group in the first wave, only 15% chose this group in the third wave.


Figure 2. Arab citizens of Israel least liked group choice by wave



4.3 DIFFERENCES IN LEAST LIKED GROUP CHOICE BY WAVE AND NATIONALITY: ISRAELI JEWS/ ARAB CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel differed significantly across waves in their least liked group choice of the Jewish settler (all $p < .001$). As illustrated in Figure 3, While 37% to 42% of Arab citizens chose Jewish settler as their least-liked group, only 6-7% of Israeli Jews chose this group. Similarly, a significant difference was found in choosing rightists as least-liked group (all $p < .001$), such that greater percentage of Arabs chose this group across waves (9-13%) compared to Israeli Jews (2-4%). In choosing leftists as the least-liked group, however, the percentage of Israeli Jews who chose this group (13-15%) was significantly higher than the percentage of Arabs citizens who chose this group (3-4%) across waves (all $p < .001$). The Israeli Jewish population also significantly differed from the Arab population in choosing immigrants as their least-liked group across waves (all $p < .001$), such that the Jewish population chose immigrants significantly more (18-27%) than the Arab population (1-4%). A significant difference between Arabs citizens of Israel and Israeli Jews was found in the choice of LGBT (all $p < .001$), such that the Arab population chose this group significantly more (20-24%) compared to the Jewish population (4-7%). Last, across waves Israeli Jews chose Arab Israelis significantly more (20-34%) than Arab citizens (all $p < .001$). No other significant differences were found between nationalities and least liked group choice.

Figure 3. Differences in the least liked group choice by wave and nationality



4.4 DIFFERENCES IN THE LEAST LIKED GROUP CHOICE BY WAVE AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION (JEWS ONLY)


The political left and right camps differed across waves in their least liked group choice. In a broader sense, while the left camp mainly chose Ultra-Orthodox, Jewish settlers and as their least liked group, the right camp mainly chose Israeli Arabs, leftists and immigrants as their least liked group. Specifically, and as seen in Figure 4, the political left and right camps differed significantly in their least liked group choice of Ultra-Orthodox across waves (all $p < .001$), such that 40-50% of leftists chose Ultra-Orthodox as their least-liked group, while only 6-13% of the rightists chose this group. Similarly, a significant difference was found in the choice of the settler group as the least liked group across waves (all $p < .001$), while a quarter to third (24-34%) of the leftists chose the settler group as the least liked group, only a 1% of the rightists chose this group. Further, a significant difference was found across waves in choosing Israeli Arabs as least-liked group (all $p < .001$), such that greater percentage rightists chose Israeli Arabs as the least liked group (28-46%), compared to leftists (3-9%) who chose this group. Likewise, across waves rightists chose immigrants as their least popular group (18-27%) significantly more (all $p < .01$) than leftists who chose this group (8-11%). Differences between the political camps across waves were also found in choosing the ideological outgroup as their least-liked group (all $p < .001$); while about quarter of rightists (20-24%) chose the leftists, only 9-14% of leftists chose rightists as their least-liked group. The left and right camps also differed significantly in the choice of LGBT as their least liked group choice (all $p < .01$). While 6-9% of rightists chose this group, only 1% of leftists chose this group.¹

In examining the political center least liked group choice compared to the political right and left, the political center across waves chose the Jewish settlers (5-10%) and the Ultra-Orthodox groups (26%-32%) significantly more than rightists but also significantly less than leftists. An opposite trend in the difference between camps was found in the choice of Arab Israelis as the least liked group, such that the political center (14%-24%) chose this group significantly more than the political left, and significantly less than the political right across waves. In the choice of immigrants as the least liked group, the political center (as seen

¹ In terms of the political camps choice of Russian group as the least liked group by wave, leftists: 0%, 0.8%, 0.7%, 0.7% respectively; rightists: 1.8%, 1.5%, 0.4%, 1.4% respectively. In choosing the secular group as the least liked group by wave, leftists: 0.4%, 0%, 1.4%, 0% respectively; rightists: 0.3%, 0.6%, 0.7%, 0.5% respectively. In choosing Ashkenazi as the least liked group by wave, leftists: 0%, 0%, 1.4%, 0% respectively; rightists: 0%, 0.6%, 1.4%, 1.6% respectively. In choosing the Mizrahi group as their least liked group less than 1% of both leftists and rightists chose this group across wave (leftists: 0.4%, 0.3%, 0.8%, 0%; rightists: 0.5%, 0.0%, 0.2%, 0.7% respectively). In choosing the Ethiopians group by wave, leftists: 0.4%, 0.6%, 0.4%, 1.5% respectively; rightists: 0.3%, 0.7%, 0.4%, 0.7% respectively.

among the right camp) chose this group significantly more than the political left (21%-31% across waves) across waves.

Figure 4. Least liked group by political affiliation



5. POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Political violence is conceptualized as support for the use of force (or threat thereof) against political actors (i.e., individuals and institutions representing the state and its bodies) in an attempt to change a political situation or attain political goals (Feierabend et al. 1972). Violent behavior is juxtaposed against moderate (i.e., non-violent) or “normative” political action (Wright et al. 1990), where “normative” relates to the norms of the dominant social system (as expressed in, e.g., laws and regulations) rather than the norms of the group undertaking the action (Shuman et al. 2016),

One of the strongest and most widely used predictors of support for political aggression is *political orientation* (e.g. Benjamin 2006; Jost 2006). Specifically, right-wing ideologies are generally associated with higher hostility and prejudice toward out-groups and minorities, and higher support for the use of military force (e.g. Hirsch-Hoefler et al. 2010).

There is also an extensive empirical literature that argues that both in active participation in political violence and in support for the use of force in domestic and foreign policy, there exists a *gender gap*: Men are more involved, numerically, than women as participants in political violence, and women tend to be less supportive of policies advocating the use of violence (Pratto et al. 1997; Wilcox et al. 1996). Further, studies addressing aggression in general (not only in the political realm) have shown that men and women express aggression differently, such that men are more physically aggressive while women may find other non-physical outlets for aggression (Card et al. 2008; McDermott 2015). Yet women’s active

involvement in various forms of violent conflict has challenged the widespread stereotype of aggressive men and pacifist women (Ben-shitrit et al 2021).

5.1 SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Measures

Support for political violence was measured using a four-item scale adapted from Pedahzur et al (2000), tapping participants' support for (1) using arms, (2), physically injuring politicians in pursuit of political ends (3) engaging in a violent struggle against the government (4) Sending threats and hate letters to public figures.² Questions were rated on a 1-7 scale (1 = "strongly disagree" to 7 = "strongly agree") Cronbach's alpha ranged between .82 to .88 across waves.

The following section discusses significant differences between various groups in their support for political violence. Specifically, we present mean agreement with each question in each wave filtered by groups based on *gender* (men vs. women in the entire sample), *nationality* (Israeli Jews vs. Arab citizens of Israel) and *political affiliation* (right, center, and left within the Jewish sample).


It is important to note that the measures of political violence in this study did not assess actual participation in acts of political violence, but rather the attitudinal support of such acts. Although correlations between attitudes and behaviors are often far from absolute, research in the social sciences has come to rely on attitudinal measures particularly when the direct measurement of behavior is difficult, sensitive or impossible, as is the case with participation in acts of political violence (Ajzen, 2001; Pedahzur et al. 2000).

5.1.1 "There are situations where there is no choice but to use weapons to prevent the government from carrying out its policies."

As shown in figure 5, the support for this statement across political camps and waves was relatively low, such that the mean support was below 2 (in the "disagree" range, 1-3 on scale). Further, while there was no significant difference in support for this statement between the political center and the political left across waves, the political right supported this statement significantly more than the political left in waves 1-3 (*all p's* <.05). In the first and the second waves, the political right supported this statement significantly more than the political center (*all p's* <.05), however in the fourth wave, the political center supported this statement significantly more than the political right (*p* <.05). This significant difference may be related to the center reaction to the judicial reform.


² The fourth item of sending threat letters was measured only from the second wave.

Figure 5. Mean support for Political Violence question 1, filtered by political affiliation (Jews).




In the comparison between Jewish Israelis and Arab citizens of Israel (see Figure 6), while both groups generally disagree with this statement (mean in the range of disagreement, 1-3 on scale), Arab citizens of Israel show across waves significantly more support compared to Jewish Israelis (all p 's < .001).

Figure 6. Mean support for Political Violence question 1, filtered by nationality.



Further, in the comparison between men and women (see Figure 7), in all waves except wave 1, men supported this statement significantly more than women (all p 's $<.01$).


Figure 7. Mean support for Political Violence question 1, filtered by gender.



5.1.2 “When a political catastrophe is imminent and all means of protest are exhausted to no avail, physical harm towards politicians may be forgiven.”


As shown in Figure 8, the support for this statement was across political camps and waves relatively low (in the disagreement range, 1-3 on scale). In the comparison between the political camps, the political right showed significantly higher support for this statement compared to the political left in waves 1-3 (all p 's $<.01$) and were also significantly higher than the political center in the second wave ($p<.001$). A significant difference between the political center and the political left was seen in the third wave, such that the political center supported this statement more than the political left ($p<.05$).

Figure 8. Mean Political Violence question 2, filtered by political affiliation.




Significant differences between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel were also found (see Figure 9), such that across waves the support for this statement was significantly higher among Arab citizens of Israel compared to Israeli Jews (*all p's* <.01).

Figure 9. Mean support for Political Violence question 2, filtered by nationality.



A significant difference between men and women was also found (all p 's $<.05$), such that men supported this statement significantly more than women across waves (see Figure 10).


Figure 10. Mean support for Political Violence question 2, filtered by gender.



5.1.3 "In the Israeli reality, a violent struggle (against the government) may sometimes be justified to achieve political goals."


As shown in figure 11, the support for this statement was also relatively low across political camps and waves (in the disagreement range, 1-3 on scale). In the comparison between the political camps, the political right supported this statement significantly more than the political left and center across waves 1-3 (all p 's $<.05$) with no significant differences between the political groups in wave 4. No significant differences were found between the political center and left across waves.

Figure 11. Mean support for Political Violence question 3, filtered by political affiliation.




Significant differences were also found between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel (see Figure 12), such that in the first and the third waves (but not in the second or fourth waves) Arabs' support for this statement was significantly higher compared to Jews, (all p 's <.01).

Figure 12. Mean support for Political Violence question 3, filtered by nationality.



Significant differences between men and women were also found (see Figure 13), such that in the first and the second waves (but not in the third or fourth waves) men supported this statement significantly more than women (all p 's < .01).

Figure 13. Mean support for Political Violence question 3, filtered by gender.




5.1.4 “Sending threats and hate letters to public figures may sometimes be necessary to stop a dangerous policy”.³

As shown in Figure 14, across political camps and waves the support for this statement was relatively low (in the disagreement range, 1-3 on scale). In examining the differences between the political camps and waves, across waves 1-3 (all p 's < .01) but not in wave 4 the political right supported this statement significantly more than the political left. Similar difference was also found between the political center and political left, such that the support for this statement was significantly higher among the political center compared to the political left across waves 1-3 but not in wave 4 (all p 's < .05). In the second wave, there was also a significant difference between the political center and the political right (p < .01), such that the support for this statement was higher among the political right compared to the center.


³ This statement was not examined in the first wave.

Figure 14. Mean support for Political Violence question 4, filtered by political affiliation.




Significant differences were also found between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens (see Figure 15), such that Arab citizens supported this statement significantly more than Israeli Jews across waves (*all p's* < .001).

Figure 15. Mean support for Political Violence question 4, filtered by nationality



Significant differences between men and women were also found (see Figure 16), such that across waves men supported this statement more than women (all p 's $< .05$).


Figure 16. Mean support for Political Violence question 4, filtered by gender.



5.1.5 A composite scale


In the comparison between the political camps (see Figure 17), the mean support for political violence of the political right was significantly higher than that of political left and the political center across waves 1-3 (*all p*'s <.05) but not in wave 4. Further, in the second wave the mean support for political violence of the political center was significantly higher than that of the political left (*p* <.05).

Figure 17. Mean support for Political Violence scale, filtered by political affiliation.




Significant differences were also found between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel (see Figure 18), such that across waves Arabs' mean support for political violence was significantly higher than Jews mean support for political violence (*all p*'s <.001).

Figure 18. Mean support for Political Violence scale, filtered by nationality.



Significant differences between men and women were also found (see Figure 19), such that across waves men's support for political violence was significantly higher than women's (*all p's <.01*).

Figure 19. Mean Political Violence scale, filtered by gender.



5.2. WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE


Measures

Willingness to participate in political violence was measured using a 2-item scale adapted from Tausch et al. 2011; van Zomeren et al. 2004) tapping participants' agreement with the steps they are willing to take personally in order to end a dangerous government policy: (1) damage to property and public equipment of public employees or of the security forces; and (2) Use of physical force against public employees or the security forces. Questions were rated on a 1-7 scale (1 = "strongly disagree" to 7 = "strongly agree)." The following section discusses significant differences between various groups in their willingness to participate in political violence. Specifically, we present mean agreement with each question filtered by groups based on gender (men vs. women in the entire sample), nationality (Israeli Jews vs. Arab citizens of Israel) and political affiliation (right, center, and left within the Jewish sample).

5.2.1 "Damage to property and public equipment of public employees or of the security forces."


As shown in Figure 20, the agreement to do damage to property and public equipment across political groups and waves was relatively low (in the disagreement range) with no significant differences between the camps in any of the waves.

Figure 20. Mean agreement with Participating in Political Violence question 1, filtered by political affiliation.




There were significant differences between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens in their mean agreement to this statement (see Figure 21), such that across waves Arab's agreement was significantly higher than that of Jews (all p 's $<.001$).

Figure 21. Mean agreement with Participating in Political Violence question 1, filtered by nationality.



Significant differences between men and women were also found (see Figure 22), such that across waves men agreed to this statement significantly more than women (all p 's $<.01$).


Figure 22. Mean agreement with Participating in Political Violence question 1, filtered by gender.



5.2.2 “Use of physical force against public employees or the security forces.”


As shown in Figure 23, all political camps showed disagreement with using force against public employees or against security forces (all means lower than 2). In the comparison between the political camps, no significant differences were found in the first, third and fourth waves. In the second wave, however, the political right agreed to this statement significantly more than the political left ($p < .05$).

Figure 23. Mean agreement with Participating in Political Violence question 2, filtered by political affiliation.




Significant differences were found between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens in their agreement to this statement (see Figure 24), such that across waves Arabs agreed to this statement significantly more than Jews (all p 's $< .01$).

Figure 24. Mean agreement with Participating in Political Violence question 2, filtered by nationality.



Similarly, a significant difference between men and women was also found across waves (see Figure 25), such that men agreed to this statement significantly more than women (all p 's $< .05$).

Figure 25. Mean agreement with Participating in Political Violence question 2, filtered by gender.



6. ACTIVISM


Measures

Political activism was measured using a 4-item scale adapted from (Tausch et al. 2011; van Zomeren et al. 2004) tapping participants' agreement with the steps they are willing to take personally in order to end a dangerous government policy (1) Participation in demonstrations or political rallies (2), Participation in blocking roads or closing streets, and the two items used for measuring willingness to participate in political violence (i.e., damage to property and public equipment of public employees or of the security forces, Use of physical force against public employees or the security forces) Questions were rated on a 1-7 scale (1 = "strongly disagree" to 7 = "strongly agree)." The following section discusses significant differences between various groups in their willingness to participate in political activism. Cronbach's alpha ranged between .66 to .73 across waves. Specifically, we present mean agreement with each statement in each wave filtered by groups based on gender (men vs. women in the entire sample), nationality (Israeli Jews vs. Arab citizens of Israel) and political affiliation (right, center, and left within the Jewish sample).

6.1 “Participation in demonstrations or political rallies.”


As shown in Figure 26, the agreement to participate in demonstrations or rallies among the political left was across waves significantly higher than the agreement of the political right and political center (*all p*'s <.001). Further, while there were no differences between the political center and the political right in the first and the second waves, in the third wave the mean agreement of the political right was significantly higher than that of the political center (*p* <.05) and the opposite trend was seen the fourth wave (*p* <.05). This change may be related to the center reaction to the juridical reform.

Figure 26. Mean agreement with Participating in activism question 1, filtered by political affiliation.




In the comparison between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel in agreement to this statement, no significant differences were found in any of the waves (see Figure 27.)

Figure 27. Mean agreement with Participating in activism question 1, filtered by nationality.



In examining differences between men and women in the mean agreement to participate in demonstrations or rallies (see Figure 28), men showed significantly higher agreement than women across waves (all p 's $< .01$).


Figure 28. Mean agreement with Participating in activism question 1, filtered by gender.



6.2 “Participation in blocking roads or closing streets”


As shown in Figure 29, the agreement of the political left to participate in blocking roads or closing streets was significantly higher than the agreement of the political center in all waves except wave 2 (all p 's $<.01$). Further, in the third and the fourth waves the agreement of the political left was significantly higher than the agreement of the political right (all p 's $<.01$). Furthermore while there were no differences between the political center and right in the first two waves, the agreement of the political right in the third wave was significantly higher than the agreement of the political center ($p<.05$), and in the fourth wave the agreement of the political center was significantly higher than the agreement of the political right ($p<.01$). The significant increase in the left and center between waves 3 and 4 may be related to their reaction to the juridical reform presented at wave 4.

Figure 29. Mean agreement with Participating in activism question 2, filtered by political affiliation.




In the comparison between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel, significant differences were found in the first and the second and fourth waves (all p 's $<.01$) and a marginally significant difference in the third wave ($p = .058$). As seen in Figure 30, Arab's mean agreement to participate in blocking roads or closing streets was higher than Jews agreement.

Figure 30. Mean agreement with Participating in activism question 2, filtered by nationality.



Similarly, significant differences between men and women were also found (see Figure 31), such that men mean agreement to participate in blocking roads or closing streets was significantly higher than women across waves (all p 's $< .05$).


Figure 31. Mean agreement with Participating in activism question 2, filtered by gender



6.3 a composite scale


As shown in Figure 32, the mean agreement to participate in activism of the political left was significantly higher than that of the political center across waves (all p 's $<.01$). Further, in all waves except the second wave the mean agreement of the political left was significantly higher than that of the political right (all p 's $<.01$). In the second wave, the mean activism of the political right was significantly than that of the political center ($p<.05$).

Figure 32. Mean Activism scale filtered by political affiliation.




In the comparison between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel, significant differences were found across waves (see Figure 33), such that the mean activism of Arab citizens of Israel was significantly higher than that of Israeli Jews (all p 's $<.001$).

Figure 33. Mean Activism scale filtered by nationality.



Similarly, significant differences were found by gender (see Figure 34), such that men across waves were significantly more willing to participate in activism compared to women (all p 's $< .001$).

Figure 34. Mean Activism scale filtered by gender.



7. ANTI-DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES

Anti-democracy refers to the rejection of the fundamental principle of sovereignty of the people (e.g. Mudde 2005), and the equality of citizens (Mudde 1995). It also refers to a tendency to cancel and/or to postpone democratic principles and to prefer strong leadership over parliamentarism (Hirsch-Hoefler et al. 2010). In Europe, this reflects and is motivated by the desire for strong, authoritarian leadership. In Israel, it reflects the desire to contain the potential power of the country's Arab electorate and/or the desire to impose a Jewish theocracy or a 'Zionist democracy' (Peled 1992), in which democratic principles would be secondary to nationalist principles.

Measures

Anti-democratic attitudes were measured using a three-item scale based on Peres and Yuchtman-Yaar (1998).⁴ Israeli respondents were asked: (1) I prefer a government which was chosen democratically, even if I do not agree with its policies; (2); A slight threat to the security of the state is enough to justify limitation of democratic rights; and (3) I prefer the idea of a whole/complete Land of Israel over the democratic image of the state. In all cases, respondents rated their agreement on a scale from 1 ('Strongly object') to 7 ('Strongly support'). The ratings on the three items were averaged to create a single score (Cronbach's alpha ranged between .48 to .56 across waves). For the purpose of analysis, negatively worded items were reversed (R).

Below, we present the mean agreement with each question in each wave, filtered by groups based on *gender* (men vs. women in the entire sample), *nationality* (Israeli Jews vs. Arab citizens of Israel) and *political affiliation* (right-wing, center, and left-wing within the Jewish sample),


7.1 "I prefer a government which was chosen democratically, even if I do not agree with its policies"

As shown in Figure 35, the mean support for this statement was relatively high across waves and political camps (in the "support" range, 5-7 on the scale). In the comparison between camps, the political left supported this statement significantly more than the political right across waves 1-3 (all p 's $<.001$) but no significant difference between these groups in wave 4. In the first wave the political left supported this statement significantly more than the political center ($p <.01$) with no other significant differences between these groups.

⁴ Item 3 was measured from the second wave.


Furthermore, while in waves 1-3 the political center supported this statement significantly more than the political right (*all p's <.05*), in wave 4 the political right supported this statement significantly more than the political center. The change in the political from all first 3 waves to wave 4 may be related to the change in political power following the elections in wave 4 took elections in which the political right had greater power in the government.

Figure 35. Mean support for Democratic state values question 1, filtered by political affiliation.




Significant differences were also found between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel across waves (see Figure 36), such that Arabs' support for this statement was significantly lower compared than the support of Israeli Jews (*all p's <.001*).

Figure 36. Mean support for Democratic state values question 1, filtered by nationality.



Significant differences between men and women were also found (see Figure 37), such that men's support for this statement was significantly higher than women's support for this statement in waves 1-3 (all p's <.05) but no significant difference between men and women in wave 4.


Figure 37. Mean support for Democratic state values question 1, filtered by gender.



7.2 “A slight threat to the security of the state is enough to justify limitation of democratic rights”


As shown in Figure 38, whereas the political left and center generally opposed this statement across waves (means around the “object range”, 1-3 on the scale). The political right was more neutral to this statement across waves (mean closer to the neutral range of 4). Further, the support for this statement among the political right was significantly higher than the political left and the political center across waves (all p 's <.001). The support for this statement among political center was significantly higher than the support of the political left across waves (all p 's <.001).

Figure 38. Mean support for Democratic state values question 2, filtered by political affiliation.




Further, while both Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel generally opposed this statement, no significant differences were found between these groups across waves 1-3, while in wave 4, the support of the Arab citizens was significantly higher than that of Jews, p <.01 (see Figure 39).

Figure 39. Mean support for Democratic state values question 2, filtered by nationality.



No significant differences were found between men and women in support for this statement across waves (see Figure 40).


Figure 40. Mean support for Democratic state values question 2, filtered by gender.



7.3 “I prefer the idea of a whole/complete Land of Israel over the democratic image of the state.”⁵

As seen in statement 2, the political left and center generally opposed this statement (means around the object range, 1-3 on the scale) and the political right was generally neutral towards this statement across waves (mean around 4, see Figure 41). Further, the support for this statement among the political right was significantly higher than the support of the political left and the political center across waves (all p 's <.001) and the support of political center was significantly higher than the support of the political left across waves (all p 's <.001).


Figure 41. Mean support for Democratic state values question 3, filtered by political affiliation.



Further, while both Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel generally opposed this statement (see Figure 42), significant differences were found between these groups across waves, such that Arabs' support for this statement was significantly lower compared to the support of Jews (all p 's <.05).


⁵ Measured from the second wave.

Figure 42. Mean support for Democratic state values question 3, filtered by nationality.




In the comparison between the support of Israeli men and women for this statement (see Figure 43), men supported this statement significantly more than women in the second and third waves (all p 's $< .05$), with no significant difference between them in the fourth wave.

Figure 43. Mean support for Democratic state values question 3, filtered by gender.



7.4 Anti-democratic attitudes (a composite scale)⁶


As shown in Figure 44, the support of the political right for undemocratic state values was significantly higher than that of the political center and the political left across waves (all p 's <.001). The center's support for undemocratic state values was significantly higher than that of the political left across waves (all p 's <.001). Further, among the political right there was a significant increase between wave 1 and 2 which may be related to the spike in terrorists attacks around wave 2. This increase followed by a significant decrease among the political right in waves 3 and 4 which maybe related to the shift in political power towards the right.



Significant differences were also found between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel, such that Arabs' support for undemocratic values was significantly higher than that of Jews in the first wave and the fourth waves (all p 's <.001) no differences were found between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel in the second and the third waves (see Figure 45).


⁶ The item "I prefer a democratically elected government even if I find its policies unacceptable" was reversed, such as higher values indicate less support for democratic values (and more support for undemocratic values).

Figure 45. Mean support for undemocratic state composite scale, filtered by nationality.



Last, Israeli men and women did not significantly differ in their support for undemocratic values across waves (see Figure 46).

Figure 46. Mean support for undemocratic state composite scale, filtered by gender.



8. CORRELATIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF STUDY VARIABLES BY LEAST LIKED GROUP CHOICE

8.1 JEWISH SETTLERS

Waves 1 N=263

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1 Capabilities	4.04	1.74																									
2 Warmth	2.91	1.75	.43**																								
3 Morality	2.38	1.49	.32**	.65**																							
4 Loyalty to the country	3.69	1.95	.41**	.32**	.42**																						
5 Feeling Thermometer	24.52	24.17	.18**	.38**	.48**	.22**																					
6 Hatred	3.79	2.08	-.25**	-.28**	-.29**	-.18**	-.35**																				
7 Contempt	4.00	2.14	-.19**	-.38**	-.35**	-.23**	-.39**	.70**																			
8 Anger	5.06	1.84	-.09	-.28**	-.44**	-.16**	-.53**	.52**	.55**																		
9 Fear	3.86	2.15	-.07	-.27**	-.23**	-.11	-.25**	.42**	.41**	.36**																	
10 Disgust	4.34	2.21	-.21**	-.36**	-.39**	-.27**	-.43**	.70**	.76**	.54**	.37**																
11 Disappointment	4.81	2.07	-.09	-.21**	-.23**	-.18**	-.33**	.35**	.35**	.48**	.35**	.28**															
12 Openness to Political Other	3.11	1.89	.38**	.61**	.48**	.38**	.41**	-.44**	-.48**	-.30**	-.29**	-.52**	-.15**														
13 Threat Perceptions	4.85	1.72	-.09	-.20**	-.33**	-.22**	-.37**	.28**	.28**	.35**	.25**	.31**	.18**	-.27**													
14 Civil Rights least liked	3.48	1.80	-.20**	-.41**	-.36**	-.34**	-.27**	.53**	.53**	.30**	.34**	.58**	.15**	-.56**	.45**												
15 Indirect Exclusion	3.39	1.83	-.24**	-.43**	-.35**	-.34**	-.28**	.56**	.55**	.31**	.35**	.59**	.14**	-.58**	.43**	.98**											
16 Exclusion	3.70	1.81	-.29**	-.47**	-.36**	-.33**	-.33**	.49**	.52**	.23**	.34**	.56**	.07	-.68**	.48**	.83**	.85**										
17 Unti-democratic	2.87	1.32	-.16**	-.27**	-.07	-.13*	-.02	.21**	.21**	.02	.13*	.24**	.01	-.39**	.00	.40**	.42**	.45**									
18 Democracy	6.09	0.98	.05	-.09	-.12	.07	-.17**	-.14*	-.10	.10	-.02	-.08	.04	-.04	.09	-.09	-.10	-.08	-.20**								
19 Civil Rights	6.15	1.03	.05	-.09	-.13*	.07	-.19**	-.13*	-.10	.11	-.03	-.07	.04	-.03	.10	-.09	-.10	-.09	-.22**	.98**							
20 Political violence	1.75	1.21	-.12**	-.01	.10	-.10	.30**	.24**	.17**	-.07	.05	.15**	-.09	-.11	-.14*	.21**	.24**	.15**	.28**	-.39**	-.39**						
21 Activism	2.79	1.16	-.12**	-.04	.02	-.01	.07	.25**	.26**	.12	.13*	.24**	.03	-.08	.03	.26**	.28**	.16**	.13*	-.13*	-.12	.37**					
22 Halacha	3.00	1.92	-.28**	-.27**	-.10	-.21**	.12	.20**	.14*	.05	.11	.16**	.03	-.34**	.05	.31**	.34**	.30**	.41**	-.12	-.13*	.32**	.23**				
23 Dogmatism	2.66	1.08	-.05	-.01	.06	-.04	.12*	.28**	.24**	.02	.17**	.23**	-.01	-.13*	.02	.27**	.30**	.28**	.42**	-.31**	-.30**	.47**	.31**	.28**			
24 RWA	3.83	1.61	-.02	-.21**	-.03	-.20**	.12	.07	.07	-.05	.12	.07	.11	-.29**	.01	.30**	.31**	.32**	.44**	-.05	-.09	.19**	-.05	.43**	.24**		
25 LWA	4.46	1.93	.12	.25**	.07	.13*	-.09	.06	.04	.11	-.01	.07	.04	.24**	.00	-.09	-.11	-.11	-.31**	.07	.06	.00	.09	-.31**	-.06	-.23**	
26 SDO	2.46	1.24	-.07	.12	.24**	.00	.34**	.05	.00	-.24**	-.05	-.01	-.08	.02	-.14*	.05	.08	.08	.27**	-.40**	-.42**	.44**	.20**	.25**	.38**	.16**	-.14**

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Waves 2 N=275

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29
1 Capabilities	4.19	1.78																													
2 Warmth	3.25	1.83	.52**																												
3 Morality	2.64	1.53	.41**	.70**																											
4 Loyalty to the country	3.78	1.91	.40**	.36**	.39**																										
5 Feeling Thermometer	28.43	24.17	.03	.32**	.48**	.11																									
6 Hatred	3.64	2.03	-.32**	-.33**	-.30**	-.13	-.33**																								
7 Contempt	3.88	2.08	-.27**	-.36**	-.34**	-.17**	-.40**	.68**																							
8 Anger	5.01	1.81	.09	-.12	-.26**	.09	-.52**	.39**	.47**																						
9 Fear	3.46	2.00	-.03	-.17**	-.15**	.01	-.15**	.37**	.36**	.25**																					
10 Disgust	4.04	2.12	-.21**	-.42**	-.40**	-.16**	-.50**	.67**	.74**	.49**	.38**																				
11 Disappointment	4.77	1.98	.03	-.13	-.19**	-.08	-.28**	.22**	.36**	.50**	.17**	.37**																			
12 Treatment	55.83	27.45	.09	.08	.01	.07	.11	-.06	-.09	-.02	.01	-.11	-.02																		
13 Justified	3.67	1.97	-.13**	-.04	-.01	-.09	.17**	.02	.09	-.08	-.06	.03	-.08	-.31**																	
14 Openness to Political Other	3.40	1.76	.36**	.57**	.52**	.28**	.37**	-.44**	-.42**	-.20**	-.19**	-.54**	-.13	-.14	-.08																
15 Threat Perceptions	4.65	1.61	.01	-.19	-.30**	-.13	-.35**	.23**	.31**	.38**	.24**	.37**	.30**	.10	-.07	-.24**															
16 Dehumanization	3.90	1.81	-.32**	-.58**	-.51**	-.25**	-.40**	.48**	.52**	.30**	.28**	.62**	.26**	-.09	.07	-.66**	.46**														
17 Policy Least Liked	3.61	1.40	-.35**	-.46**	-.44**	-.23**	-.27**	.54**	.55**	.28**	.30**	.60**	.22**	-.09	.12	-.60**	.35**	.72**													
18 Civil Rights least liked	4.57	1.69	.35**	.44**	.41**	.19**	.24**	-.56**	-.57**	-.22**	-.29**	-.60**	-.18**	.02	-.07	.57**	-.43**	-.72**	-.72**												
19 Indirect Exclusion	3.30	1.73	-.36**	-.42**	-.39**	-.19**	-.20**	.57**	.57**	.19**	.28**	.59**	.16**	-.03	.09	-.55**	.41**	.71**	.72**	-.98**											
20 Exclusion	3.60	1.79	-.34**	-.52**	-.47**	-.27**	-.31**	.54**	.59**	.23**	.25**	.63**	.21**	-.19**	.13	-.67**	.46**	.72**	.73**	-.78**	.79**										
21 Unti-democratic	2.68	1.31	-.30**	-.25**	-.08	-.18**	.21**	.22**	.22**	-.16**	.17**	.23**	-.05	-.21**	.17**	-.27**	-.10	.28**	.24**	-.31**	.34**	.35**									
22 Democracy	5.91	1.14	.16**	-.09	-.19**	.05	-.36**	-.01	.06	.31**	-.02	.12	.16**	.11	-.12	.02	.21**	.06	-.06	.01	-.05	-.02	-.32**								
23 Civil Rights	5.97	1.19	.17**	-.08	-.18**	.05	-.35**	-.03	.04	.31**	-.03	.09	.14	.13	-.12	.05	.22**	.04	-.10	.04	-.08	-.06	-.35**	.98**							
24 Political violence	1.89	1.25	-.17**	-.02	.08	-.09	.20**	.35**	.25**	-.02	.29**	.18**	.06	-.12	.03	-.10	.04	.15	.34**	-.38**	.42**	.29**	.43**	-.33**	-.35**						
25 Activism	2.69	1.28	.04	.10	.16**	.11	.10	.26**	.19**	.07	.16**	.12	.07	.07	-.01	.03	.12	.13	.19**	-.27**	.30**	.11	.17**	-.17**	-.17**	.50**					
26 Halacha	2.76	1.74	-.34**	-.40**	-.26**	-.19**	-.07	.44**	.44**	.09	.21**	.41**	.07	-.08	.15	-.51**	.21**	.52**	.49**	-.62**	.65**	.56**	.37**	-.09	-.11	.40**	.24**				
27 Dogmatism	2.84	1.10	-.18**	-.13**	.01	-.17**	.21**	.27**	.25**	-.07	.19**	.20**	.09	-.06	.06	-.13**	.05	.22**	.30**	-.34**	.37**	.29**	.41**	-.29**	-.32**	.49**	.26**	.38**			
28 RWA	3.79	1.47	-.10	-.25**	-.17**	-.22**	.02	.03	.07	-.11	.08	.15	-.02	-.05	.09	-.28**	.12	.29**	.16**	-.24**	.22**	.33**	.33**	.07	.02	.05	-.13	.24**	.19**		
29 LWA	4.84	1.74	.35**	.28**	.13	.24**	-.22**	-.19**	-.16**	.21**	-.11	-.12	.10	.15	-.18**	.34**	.16**	-.23**	-.35**	.27**	-.31**	-.29**	-.44**	.27**	.29**	-.32**	-.09	-.39**	-.34**	-.06	
30 SDO	2.57	1.22	-.14**	.07	.16**	-.11	.35**	.11	.00	-.28**	.10	.01	-.15**	-.10	.13**	.04	-.14**	-.11	.06	-.04	.07	.03	.34**	-.44**	-.47**	.41**	.09	.13	.41**	.12	-.28**

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Waves 3 N=215

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29		
1 Capabilities	3.93	1.63																															
2 Warmth	3.04	1.63	.55**																														
3 Morality	2.57	1.60	.42**	.69**																													
4 Loyalty to the country	3.47	1.81	.25**	.49**	.54**																												
5 Feeling Thermometer	23.01	23.98	.21**	.43**	.51**	.31**																											
6 Hatred	3.80	2.13	-.36**	-.40**	-.30**	-.18**	-.44**																										
7 Contempt	3.96	2.08	-.29**	-.33**	-.34**	-.22**	-.47**	.70**																									
8 Anger	5.07	1.72	-.13*	-.28**	-.35**	-.27**	-.59**	.56**	.54**																								
9 Fear	3.85	2.03	-.04	-.04	-.01	-.03	-.27**	.37**	.35**	.37**																							
10 Disgust	4.30	2.07	-.24**	-.42**	-.43**	-.26**	-.55**	.75**	.72**	.66**	.37**																						
11 Disappointment	4.84	1.96	-.01	-.17*	-.24**	-.26**	-.32**	.22**	.32**	.39**	.27**	.33**																					
12 Treatment	51.34	32.13	.07	.09	.01	.09	.07	-.07	-.08	.05	-.05	-.01	-.10																				
13 Justified	3.49	1.94	.16*	.01	.13	.03	.11	-.01	.00	-.08	.05	-.05	.00	-.20**																			
14 Openness to Political Other	3.13	1.84	.39**	.59**	.45**	.34**	.40**	-.50**	-.45**	-.28**	-.15*	-.49**	-.13	.17*	.03																		
15 Threat Perceptions	4.96	1.67	-.20**	-.32**	-.37**	-.28**	-.40**	.28**	.30**	.40**	.17*	.37**	.24**	.17*	-.20**	-.25**																	
16 Dehumanization	4.18	1.84	-.32**	-.51**	-.47**	-.32**	-.43**	.58**	.53**	.41**	.17*	.60**	.32**	-.10	-.02	-.65**	.36**																
17 Policy Least Liked	3.71	1.43	-.35**	-.40**	-.38**	-.30**	-.34**	.60**	.54**	.37**	.22**	.59**	.19**	-.07	-.11	-.60**	.34**	.72**															
18 Civil Rights least liked	4.46	1.68	.33**	.43**	.38**	.31**	.30**	-.59**	-.50**	-.37**	-.22**	-.60**	-.21**	.03	.07	.57**	-.38**	-.71**	-.75**														
19 Indirect Exclusion	3.41	1.73	-.34**	-.42**	-.36**	-.30**	-.29**	.60**	.49**	.36**	.22**	.60**	.18**	-.03	-.06	-.57**	.35**	.70**	.76**	-.99**													
20 Exclusion	3.80	1.76	-.38**	-.50**	-.40**	-.32**	-.29**	.56**	.52**	.33**	.14*	.56**	.20**	-.10	.02	-.71**	.36**	.75**	.74**	-.80**	.81**												
21 Unti-democratic	2.72	1.23	-.14	-.08	.04	-.09	.25**	.07	.11	-.21**	.00	.01	-.09	-.28**	.12	-.18*	-.13	.10	.18*	-.27**	.29**	.37**											
22 Democracy	6.04	0.97	.08	-.12	-.19**	-.08	-.35**	-.09	.00	.12	-.10	.02	.13	.02	.01	.01	.09	.02	-.12	.18*	-.18*	-.10	-.30**										
23 Civil Rights	6.10	1.03	.09	-.08	-.19**	-.07	-.34**	-.10	-.01	.13	-.09	.01	.13	.03	-.02	.02	.10	.01	-.13	.18*	-.20**	-.12	-.32**	.98**									
24 Political violence	1.91	1.19	-.11	-.03	.06	-.02	.20**	.22**	.19**	.01	.10	.21**	-.01	-.10	-.05	-.07	.03	.19**	.34**	-.35**	.37**	.32**	.37**	-.33**	-.36**								
25 Activism	2.78	1.12	-.11	.04	.01	.08	.07	.09	.09	.16**	.09	.11	.00	.13	-.13	.07	.07	.06	.13	.19**	.19**	.08	.08	-.23**	-.23**	.36**							
26 Halacha	2.88	1.7	-.26**	-.14*	-.05	-.02	.10	.14*	.19**	-.04	-.17*	.10	-.08	-.20**	.06	-.26**	-.14*	.31**	.29**	-.18*	.20**	.35**	.30**	-.13	-.17*	.25**	.02						
27 Dogmatism	2.78	1.04	-.10	-.07	-.05	-.04	.06	.15**	.10	-.01	.05	.16**	-.05	-.16*	-.06	-.21**	.08	.27**	.38**	-.37**	.39**	.36**	.39**	-.33**	-.35**	.39**	.18*	.27**					
28 RWA	3.96	1.46	-.12	-.18*	-.08	-.10	.04	.19**	.25**	-.01	-.05	.17*	.15*	-.23**	.13	-.31**	-.09	.36**	.27**	-.20**	.20**	.35**	.37**	-.01	-.06	.14	-.12	.33**	.13				
29 LWA	4.50	1.89	.21**	.10	-.01	-.09	-.09	-.11	-.12	.18**	-.12	-.09	.12	.12	-.11	.31**	.11	-.15*	-.13	.13	-.13	-.26**	-.29**	.15*	.15*	-.08	.13	-.33**	-.17*	-.02			
30 SDO	2.40	1.13	.03	.14*	.28**	.17*	.34**	-.05	-.09	-.24**	.01	-.15*	-.17*	-.07	.02	-.23**	-.13	-.02	.03	-.01	.02	.30**	-.50**	-.52**	.29**	.15*	.11	.31**	.17*	-.03			

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

8.2 ISRAELI ARABS

Wave 1 N=366

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1 Capabilities	3.74	1.68																									
2 Warmth	4.09	1.74	.35**																								
3 Morality	2.37	1.49	.40**	.30**																							
4 Loyalty to the country	1.74	1.20	.32**	.20**	.55**																						
5 Feeling Thermometer	23.21	20.84	.33**	.21**	.59**	.49**																					
6 Hatred	4.21	1.93	-.31**	-.24**	-.31**	-.24**	-.44**																				
7 Contempt	3.82	2.01	-.35**	-.24**	-.30**	-.21**	-.40**	.65**																			
8 Anger	5.28	1.71	-.23**	-.14**	-.34**	-.35**	-.46**	.54**	.42**																		
9 Fear	4.93	1.84	-.08	-.02	-.19**	-.19**	-.21**	.31**	.24**	.40**																	
10 Disgust	4.15	2.06	-.33**	-.30**	-.39**	-.28**	-.48**	.72**	.68**	.50**	.29**																
11 Disappointment	4.87	2.15	-.04	-.07	-.18**	-.14**	-.12**	.24**	.15**	.41**	.16**	.18**															
12 Openness to Political Other	2.70	1.37	.33**	.38**	.43**	.32**	.52**	-.50**	-.46**	-.37**	-.16**	-.55**	-.05														
13 Threat Perceptions	5.39	1.52	-.14**	-.04	-.29**	-.28**	-.41**	.33**	.27**	.39**	.40**	.37**	.14**	-.26**													
14 Civil Rights least liked	4.02	1.74	-.29**	-.29**	-.30**	-.17**	-.44**	.61**	.55**	.40**	.25**	.56**	.08	-.61**	.47**												
15 Indirect Exclusion	3.95	1.77	-.29**	-.30**	-.30**	-.17**	-.44**	.61**	.55**	.40**	.24**	.57**	.08	-.61**	.47**	.98**											
16 Exclusion	4.32	1.49	-.30**	-.28**	-.37**	-.25**	-.42**	.56**	.50**	.36**	.19**	.53**	.09	-.65**	.49**	.79**	.79**										
17 Unti-democratic	3.33	1.35	-.15**	-.16**	-.15**	.00	-.16**	.34**	.31**	.17**	.08	.32**	.03	-.30**	.10	.33**	.33**	.30**									
18 Democracy	5.30	1.10	.15**	.14**	.12**	.02	.16**	-.32**	-.27**	-.20**	-.07	-.27**	-.03	.34**	.01	-.32**	-.33**	-.31**	-.31**								
19 Civil Rights	5.15	1.26	.17**	.14**	.16**	.05	.19**	-.34**	-.28**	-.23**	-.08	-.29**	-.04	.37**	-.01	-.34**	-.35**	-.33**	-.32**	.98**							
20 Political violence	1.85	1.27	-.11**	-.19**	.12**	.11**	-.02	.26**	.23**	.03	.00	.24**	.00	-.12**	.04	.30**	.30**	.19**	.31**	-.17**	-.13**						
21 Activism	2.43	1.22	.04	-.06	.13**	.16**	.11**	.06	.12**	-.03	-.14**	.07	.07	.11**	.02	.08	.08	.00	.11**	.04	.05	.41**					
22 Halacha	3.61	2.10	.02	-.01	-.18**	-.04	-.31**	.24**	.20**	.11**	.09	.25**	-.12**	-.34**	.26**	.37**	.36**	.35**	.26**	-.07	-.08	.18**	.12**				
23 Dogmatism	2.83	1.16	-.28**	-.24**	-.09	.09	-.16**	.28**	.34**	.06	-.03	.26**	-.04	-.25**	.00	.28**	.27**	.24**	.24**	-.22**	-.22**	.31**	.11**	.12**			
24 RWA	4.35	1.34	-.07	-.07	-.10	-.03	-.05	.17**	.16**	.17**	.18**	.21**	.10	-.29**	.15**	.28**	.26**	.27**	.29**	-.03	-.05	.04	-.04	.27**	.10		
25 LWA	4.70	1.66	.01	-.02	.18**	.12**	.23**	-.14**	-.12**	-.01	.00	-.15**	.18**	.25**	-.08	-.13**	-.14**	-.17**	-.12**	.17**	.15**	-.02	.06	-.35**	-.14**	.11**	
26 SDO	3.16	1.14	-.16**	.04	-.15**	-.05	-.19**	.24**	.28**	.04	-.02	.24**	-.09	-.26**	.05	.21**	.21**	.17**	.22**	-.26**	-.25**	.17**	.03	.15**	.26**	-.09	-.33**

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Wave 3 N=208

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29		
1 Capabilities	3.93	1.51																															
2 Warmth	4.07	1.75	.51**																														
3 Morality	2.68	1.59	.46**	.53**																													
4 Loyalty to the country	1.89	1.30	.33**	.27**	.59**																												
5 Feeling Thermometer	27.39	24.46	.37**	.41**	.63**	.43**																											
6 Hatred	4.29	1.93	-.36**	-.35**	-.39**	-.12	-.51**																										
7 Contempt	3.87	1.93	-.29**	-.37**	-.31**	-.02	-.38**	.65**																									
8 Anger	5.15	1.81	-.25**	-.27**	-.39**	-.30**	-.47**	.64**	.42**																								
9 Fear	4.70	1.90	.01	-.08	-.30**	-.31**	-.30**	.24**	.08	.43**																							
10 Disgust	4.08	2.07	-.32**	-.31**	-.36**	-.09	-.41**	.69**	.68**	.43**	.10																						
11 Disappointment	4.76	2.10	-.09	-.20**	-.23**	-.12	-.30**	.32**	.32**	.46**	.30**	.28**																					
12 Treatment	49.93	26.69	.06	-.05	-.04	-.02	.01	.14*	.07	.06	.01	.14*	.05																				
13 Justified	4.18	1.96	-.01	.14*	.05	-.02	.07	-.09	-.04	.05	.01	-.09	.00	-.50**																			
14 Openness to Political Other	2.85	1.50	.37**	.44**	.52**	.34**	.59**	-.51**	-.35**	-.40**	-.30**	-.44**	-.21**	-.22**	.10																		
15 Threat Perceptions	5.03	1.73	-.16*	-.19*	-.39**	-.26*	-.39**	.33**	.20**	.46**	.34**	.18*	.20**	.03	.03	-.36**																	
16 Dehumanization	4.41	1.73	-.33**	-.38**	-.52**	-.28**	-.53**	.53**	.44**	.49**	.26**	.48**	.16*	.19*	-.05	-.54**	.51**																
17 Policy Least Liked	3.71	1.59	-.35**	-.44**	-.43**	-.19**	-.52**	.60**	.55**	.42**	.16*	.57**	.15*	.25**	-.18*	-.54**	.43**	.73**															
18 Civil Rights least liked	4.16	1.84	.34**	.45**	.44**	.16*	.45**	-.54**	-.51**	-.37**	-.17*	-.52**	-.15*	-.31**	.19*	.56**	-.42**	-.71**	-.84**														
19 Indirect Exclusion	3.75	1.86	-.35**	-.44**	-.43**	-.15*	-.45**	.56**	.52**	.38**	.16*	.53**	.14*	.29**	-.17*	-.55**	.43**	.72**	.85**	-.99**													
20 Exclusion	4.21	1.61	-.33**	-.45**	-.43**	-.19**	-.44**	.56**	.50**	.41**	.16*	.46**	.19*	.26**	-.13*	-.60**	.49**	.65**	.77**	-.84**	.84**												
21 Anti-democratic	3.61	1.27	-.18**	-.24**	-.20**	.01	-.16*	.37**	.32**	.12	.09	.45**	.05	.15*	-.13*	-.21**	.16*	.33**	.40**	-.45**	.45**	.39**											
22 Democracy	5.14	1.23	.25**	.35**	.21**	.04	.27**	-.33**	-.37**	-.14*	.06	-.36**	-.08	-.21**	.19*	.37**	-.06	-.29**	-.47**	.44**	-.44**	-.40**	-.33**										
23 Civil Rights	5.01	1.36	.25**	.36**	.24**	.06	.30**	-.35**	-.39**	-.16*	.04	-.38**	-.07	-.22**	.20**	.38**	-.10*	-.34**	-.51**	.49**	-.48**	-.44**	-.34**	.98**									
24 Political violence	1.89	1.18	-.02	-.01	.18*	.34**	.18*	.07	.14*	-.11*	-.18*	.14*	-.11*	.01	.00	.12	-.11*	.01	.17*	-.20**	.21**	.16*	.29**	-.20**	-.17**								
25 Activism	2.39	1.22	.03	.05	.13	.20**	.11*	.03	.02	.05	.01	.09	-.01	.07	-.04	.14*	-.05	-.02	.06	-.05	.04	.00	.14*	-.03	-.02	.35**							
26 Halacha	3.18	1.89	.05	-.10	-.05	.05	-.09	.20**	.15*	.09	.19**	.25**	-.06	.21**	-.16*	-.18*	.07	.27**	.26**	-.33**	.31**	.27**	.33**	-.17*	-.18*	.24**	.24**						
27 Dogmatism	2.86	1.07	-.15*	-.18*	-.01	.14*	-.06	.21**	.25**	.07	-.06	.20**	-.01	.13	-.12	-.06	.03	.21**	.23**	-.31**	.31**	.23**	.39**	.22**	.22**	.47**	.14*	.31**					
28 RWA	4.16	1.37	-.02	-.18**	-.06	.01	-.05	.18**	.18**	.13	.14	.20**	.16*	.11	-.11	-.21**	.13	.26**	.22**	-.35**	.32**	.31**	.31**	-.15*	-.17*	.12	-.05	.34**	.22**				
29 LWA	4.71	1.63	.09	.07	.14*	.09	.22**	-.11*	-.09	-.02	.02	-.15*	.09	-.23**	.13	.25**	-.08	-.28**	-.24**	.26**	-.26**	-.25**	-.18*	.30**	.31**	-.06	.04	-.28**	-.24**	-.01			
30 SDO	3.29	1.32	-.09	-.17**	-.19**	-.01	-.19**	.20**	.30**	.14*	.08	.19**	.03	-.03	-.04	-.13	-.01	.16*	.22**	-.23**	.23**	.19*	.18*	.36**	-.37**	.16*	.06	.04	.22**	-.12	-.24**		

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

8.3 LEFTISTS

Wave 1 N=253

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25		
1 Capabilities	4.26	1.75																											
2 Warmth	2.46	1.50	.29**																										
3 Morality	2.47	1.53	.27**	.60**																									
4 Loyalty to the country	2.06	1.50	.21**	.51**	.58**																								
5 Feeling Thermometer	23.59	21.86	.21**	.54**	.54**	.55**																							
6 Hatred	3.53	2.11	-.23**	-.40**	-.32**	-.30**	-.43**																						
7 Contempt	4.29	2.23	-.19**	-.41**	-.41**	-.36**	-.54**	.64**																					
8 Anger	5.32	1.84	-.07	-.38**	-.39**	-.36**	-.49**	.48**	.53**																				
9 Fear	2.86	2.04	.02	-.08	-.23**	-.16**	-.13**	.27**	.30**	.24**																			
10 Disgust	4.43	2.15	-.16**	-.45**	-.49**	-.40**	-.50**	.67**	.71**	.54**	.35**																		
11 Disappointment	5.49	1.88	.06	-.18**	-.22**	-.22**	-.24**	.28**	.33**	.49**	.18**	.37**																	
12 Openness to Political Other	4.12	1.76	.30**	.28**	.25**	.25**	.29**	-.43**	-.31**	-.11	-.11	-.34**	.06																
13 Threat Perceptions	5.21	1.55	-.03	-.29**	-.37**	-.47**	-.40**	.34**	.38**	.41**	.29**	.42**	.28**	-.13*															
14 Civil Rights least liked	2.82	1.68	-.26**	-.35**	-.34**	-.25**	-.30**	.47**	.41**	.31**	.24**	.46**	.08	-.49**	.33**														
15 Indirect Exclusion	2.67	1.64	-.27**	-.33**	-.30**	-.24**	-.29**	.47**	.41**	.30**	.23**	.45**	.07	-.50**	.32**	.98**													
16 Exclusion	3.16	1.64	-.25**	-.26**	-.23**	-.25**	-.24**	.47**	.35**	.28**	.19**	.43**	.08	-.63**	.37**	.77**	.79**												
17 Anti-democratic	3.36	1.24	-.11	-.14**	-.10	-.10	-.09	.23**	.22**	.09	.16**	.26**	-.02	-.32**	.10	.34**	.37**	.40**											
18 Democracy	5.62	1.11	.11	.10	.02	.06	.03	-.18**	-.19**	-.07	-.05	-.20**	-.03	.32**	-.04	-.26**	-.28**	-.34**	-.22**										
19 Civil Rights	5.51	1.24	.12	.16**	.06	.12	.09	-.23**	-.24**	-.12	-.07	-.24**	-.06	.34**	-.09	-.28**	-.30**	-.36**	-.20**	.98**									
20 Political violence	1.76	1.16	-.18**	-.14**	-.14**	-.09	-.01	.30**	.23**	.07	.12	.22**	-.05	-.28**	.07	.36**	.40**	.41**	.35**	-.29**	-.28**								
21 Activism	2.39	1.08	.10	-.16**	-.08	-.13**	-.12	.26**	.20**	.10	.13**	.19**	.02	-.10	.08	.28**	.27**	.18**	.14**	-.05	-.07	.27**							
22 Halacha	3.75	1.92	.11	-.26**	-.26**	-.24**	-.15	.20**	.24**	.21**	.21**	.29**	.08	-.14**	.22**	.26**	.23**	.16**	.27**	.07	.04	.09	.19**						
23 Dogmatism	2.67	1.10	-.14**	-.18**	-.21**	-.14**	-.13**	.25**	.26**	.09	.20**	.27**	-.03	-.30**	.15	.33**	.34**	.36**	.37**	-.22**	-.24**	.34**	.31**	.22**					
24 RWA	4.54	1.42	-.11	-.15**	-.14**	-.04	-.13**	.20**	.18**	.15**	.13**	.18**	.05	-.28**	.06	.28**	.28**	.36**	.32**	-.10	-.10	.18**	.08	.29**	.23**				
25 LWA	4.70	1.70	.01	-.02	.08	.08	-.05	.07	-.02	.07	-.06	-.07	.14**	.07	-.04	-.09	-.07	-.03	-.19**	.19**	.18**	-.01	.05	-.27**	-.15**	.05			
26 SDO	2.92	1.16	-.08	-.01	.02	-.05	-.02	.13**	.09	.08	.15**	.14**	-.01	-.06	.06	.07	.09	.11	.23**	-.25**	-.27**	.25**	.15**	.11	.22**	-.08	-.29**		

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Wave 2 N=212

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	
Capabilities	4.29	1.69																														
Warmth	2.73	1.55	.28**																													
Morality	2.63	1.71	.20**	.49**																												
Loyalty to the country	2.02	1.55	.18**	.55**	.62**																											
Feeling Thermometer	21.74	21.2	.09	.48**	.51**	.55**																										
Hatred	3.83	1.96	-.19**	-.41**	-.38**	-.41**	-.46**																									
Contempt	4.64	2.03	-.12	-.48**	-.40**	-.49**	-.49**	.62**																								
Anger	5.47	1.70	-.05	-.40**	-.39**	-.44**	-.52**	.61**	.55**																							
Fear	2.81	1.88	-.06	-.05	-.15*	-.12	-.10	.26**	.16*	.12																						
Disgust	4.63	2.06	-.14*	-.41**	-.52**	-.47**	-.59**	.68**	.67**	.65**	.26**																					
Disappointment	5.67	1.65	-.01	-.34**	-.30**	-.37**	-.43**	.32**	.45**	.55**	.10	.44**																				
Treatment	52.52	29.71	.08	.10	-.06	.07	.10	-.17*	-.09	-.14*	.17*	-.05	.00																			
Justified	3.86	2.27	-.03	-.02	.11	-.03	-.06	.25**	.14*	.20**	-.11	.11	.09	-.68**																		
Openness to Political Other	4.06	1.69	.26**	.22**	.40**	.35**	.27**	-.34**	-.22**	-.20**	-.16*	-.34**	-.04	.10	-.08																	
Threat Perceptions	5.24	1.62	-.11	-.34**	-.42**	-.45**	-.46**	.38**	.44**	.49**	.13	.43**	.44**	.02	.03	-.21**																
Dehumanization	3.90	1.82	-.30**	-.45**	-.49**	-.45**	-.38**	.44**	.47**	.33**	.29**	.53**	.30**	.05	.04	-.47**	.49**															
Policy Least Liked	3.51	1.52	-.30**	-.38**	-.44**	-.39**	-.39**	.47**	.46**	.36**	.24**	.55**	.17**	.00	.03	-.51**	.34**	.71**														
Civil Rights least liked	4.87	1.73	.28**	.25**	.41**	.33**	.28**	-.41**	-.37**	-.27**	-.24**	-.46**	-.18**	-.01	-.08	.53**	-.30**	-.67**	-.76**													
Indirect Exclusion	3.00	1.71	-.30**	-.26**	-.38**	-.32**	-.26**	.40**	.36**	.26**	.25**	.46**	.17**	.01	.07	-.55**	.29**	.67**	.78**	-.98**												
Exclusion	3.72	1.55	-.33**	-.32**	-.52**	-.41**	-.33**	.44**	.34**	.31**	.20**	.51**	.18**	-.01	.10	-.62**	.39**	.67**	.72**	-.80**	.79**											
Unti-democratic	4.03	1.09	-.03	-.19**	-.26**	-.25**	-.21**	.26**	.29**	.29**	.16*	.38**	.13	.01	.05	-.19**	.24**	.36**	.39**	-.39**	.39**	.40**										
Democracy	5.26	1.22	.13	.06	.16*	.16*	.13	-.22**	-.14*	-.14*	-.17**	-.20**	.05	.05	-.03	.38**	-.04	-.22**	-.32**	.39**	-.39**	-.34**	-.27**									
Civil Rights	5.11	1.36	.11	.08	.16*	.18*	.14*	-.22**	-.17**	-.17**	-.15**	-.21**	.01	.03	-.02	.36**	-.08	-.21**	-.32**	.40**	-.40**	-.35**	-.30**	.98**								
Political violence	2.11	1.35	-.08	.04	-.03	-.01	.08	.29**	.13	.05	.10	.17**	-.07	.01	.11	-.22**	-.02	.14*	.25**	-.35**	.34**	.26**	.21**	-.10	-.10							
Activism	2.42	1.14	-.09	-.04	.01	.00	.02	.15*	.18**	.15*	.19**	.13	.10	-.12	.11	.05	.08	.09	.13	-.15*	.17*	.14*	.12	.09	.08	.30**						
Halacha	3.75	1.90	.09	-.12	-.27**	-.27**	-.16*	.28**	.16*	.25**	.03	.21**	.17**	-.03	.02	-.24**	.23**	.15*	.21**	-.18**	.18**	.22**	.30**	-.06	-.08	.23**	.13					
Dogmatism	2.96	1.14	-.07	-.15**	-.19**	-.14*	-.05	.37**	.30**	.18**	.14*	.30**	.10	.00	.13	-.25**	.07	.32**	.31**	-.36**	.35**	.29**	.36**	-.17**	-.16*	.36**	.16*	.31**				
RWA	4.81	1.39	-.09	-.18**	-.19**	-.07	-.04	.13	.10	.18**	.03	.13	.11	-.07	.12	-.09	.17*	.28**	.21**	-.26**	.24**	.34**	.32**	.01	-.02	.11	.01	.26**	.16*			
LWA	4.94	1.54	-.10	-.08	.12	-.02	-.03	-.05	.11	.03	.06	.02	.20**	.01	.03	.08	.11	.17**	.03	-.03	.03	.07	.04	.21**	.19**	.06	.10	-.11	-.07	.24**		
SDO	3.03	1.25	-.14*	-.03	-.07	.00	-.03	.18*	.14*	.07	.23**	.16*	-.12	.05	.02	-.22**	.05	.12	.21**	-.25**	.27**	.20**	.18**	-.45**	-.46**	.13	.04	.00	.15*	-.02	-.18**	

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Wave 3 N=156

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29					
Capabilities	4.28	1.71																																		
Warmth	2.6	1.58	.28**																																	
Morality	2.73	1.66	.40**	.62**																																
Loyalty to the country	2.19	1.56	.35**	.58**	.67**																															
Feeling Thermometer	22.29	21.36	.19**	.54**	.56**	.53**																														
Hatred	4.03	2.13	-.30**	-.27**	-.43**	-.38**	-.40**																													
Contempt	4.57	2.04	-.24**	-.29**	-.41**	-.40**	-.40**	.70**																												
Anger	5.24	1.84	-.27**	-.43**	-.47**	-.57**	-.52**	.59**	.68**																											
Fear	3.30	2.12	-.10	-.08	-.14	-.09	-.06	.33**	.24**	.27**																										
Disgust	4.64	2.06	-.26**	-.37**	-.50**	-.46**	-.45**	.77**	.74**	.68**	.26**																									
Disappointment	5.54	1.86	-.13	-.41**	-.49**	-.48**	-.44**	.40**	.44**	.66**	.24**	.50**																								
Treatment	47.75	28.47	.21**	.02	.00	.11	.10	-.02	-.06	-.08	.15	.00	.12																							
Justified	4.01	2.16	-.02	-.08	-.01	-.04	-.05	.00	.04	.10	.02	.04	.01	-.52**																						
Openness to Political Other	4.11	1.72	.29**	.32**	.38**	.40**	.43**	-.55**	-.48**	-.49**	-.08	-.51**	-.31**	.16**	.02																					
Threat Perceptions	5.11	1.62	-.15	-.31**	-.45**	-.48**	-.37**	.35**	.40**	.48**	.18	.48**	.42**	-.10	.19	-.36**																				
Dehumanization	4.18	1.82	-.08	-.35**	-.44**	-.44**	-.42**	.50**	.40**	.47**	.16	.57**	.34**	-.04	.12	-.48**	.55**																			
Policy Least Liked	3.46	1.56	-.15	-.24**	-.34**	-.32**	-.32**	.58**	.48**	.45**	.26**	.53**	.28**	-.01	.08	-.58**	.44**	.65**																		
Civil Rights least liked	4.97	1.71	.12	.15	.32**	.28**	.31**	-.52**	-.43**	-.40**	-.18	-.51**	-.27**	.05	-.11	.50**	-.47**	-.69**	-.76**																	
Indirect Exclusion	2.92	1.72	-.12	-.13	-.30**	-.26**	-.28**	.54**	.44**	.39**	.16	.52**	.24**	-.09	.11	-.52**	.45**	.67**	.78**	-.98**																
Exclusion	3.50	1.54	-.21**	-.18	-.36**	-.36**	-.35**	.58**	.51**	.48**	.08	.56**	.33**	-.07	.07	-.66**	.51**	.58**	.71**	-.77**	.78**															
Anti-democratic	3.9	1.22	-.11	-.18	-.15	-.08	-.23**	.22**	.11	.13	.14	.29**	.18**	.18**	-.18	-.36**	.14	.27**	.24**	-.27**	.26**	.32**														
Democracy	5.45	1.18	.15	.06	.11	.16	.08	-.31**	-.27**	-.28**	-.11	-.33**	-.11	.05	-.02	.35**	-.24**	-.28**	-.42**	.45**	-.44**	-.44**	-.21**													
Civil Rights	5.36	1.26	.18	.08	.15	.21	.11	-.33**	-.30**	-.31**	-.11	-.35**	-.12	.06	-.01	.36**	-.28**	-.31**	-.42**	.46**	-.45**	-.44**	-.23**	.98**												
Political violence	1.94	1.23	-.13	.15	.12	.16	.13	.27**	.16**	-.01	.12	.14	-.09	-.08	-.02	-.19	.03	.13	.28**	-.30**	.32**	.30**	.25**	-.29**	-.28**											
Activism	2.50	1.26	-.04	.07	.14	.19	.10	.20	.10	.02	.22**	.04	-.08	-.02	.06	-.07	.03	.08	.15	-.18	.22**	.11	.10	-.10	-.10	.52**										
Halacha	3.25	1.75	-.08	-.05	-.09	-.09	-.05	.18	.32**	.21**	.18	.20	.20	.07	.02	-.24**	.10	.10	.25**	-.32**	.30**	.31**	.18	-.13	-.13	.33**	.23**									
Dogmatism	2.86	1.22	.01	.00	.11	.06	-.01	.20**	.14	.12	.22**	.10	.03	.05	-.12	-.17	.10	.21**	.37**	-.21**	.22**	.22**	.11	-.29**	-.30**	.35**	.33**	.09								
RWA	4.56	1.45	-.02	-.09	-.17**	-.26**	-.08	.12	.14	.25**	.11	.22**	.21**	.15	-.01	-.16	.19	.22**	.34**	-.15	.15	.27**	.32**	-.02	-.06	-.09	-.10	.14	.16**							
LWA	4.71	1.69	.08	-.03	.02	-.09	-.15	.01	-.02	.10	-.10	.07	.05	.00	.17**	.07	.15	.11	.04	-.02	.03	.00	-.04	.10	.05	-.10	.00	-.24**	-.12	.17**						
SDO	3.05	1.17	.07	.07	.12	.17	-.01	.07	.14	-.04	.07	-.01	-.04	.13	-.05	-.05	-.01	-.06	.18**	-.10	.12	.09	.22**	-.25**	-.23**	.27**	.25**	.14	.28**	-.06	-.23**					

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

8.4 RIGHTISTS

Wave 1 N=84

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1 Capabilities	4.55	1.51																									
2 Warmth	3.54	1.85	.26*																								
3 Morality	3.08	1.58	.30**	.62**																							
4 Loyalty to the country	4.75	1.59	.37**	.42**	.31**																						
5 Feeling Thermometer	33.94	23.34	.20	.36**	.66**	.33**																					
6 Hatred	3.07	1.91	-.30**	-.20	-.38**	-.18	-.42**																				
7 Contempt	3.70	1.99	-.20	-.14	-.39**	-.24*	-.45**	.69**																			
8 Anger	4.73	1.87	-.21	-.21	-.51**	-.03	-.50**	.52**	.50**																		
9 Fear	3.38	1.93	-.01	-.17	-.20	-.18	-.27*	.52**	.50**	.47**																	
10 Disgust	3.93	2.10	-.21	-.16	-.55**	-.15	-.54**	.68**	.70**	.70**	.56**																
11 Disappointment	4.86	1.99	-.09	-.30**	-.36**	.04	-.38**	.29**	.28**	.45**	.20	.32**															
12 Openness to Political Other	4.58	1.88	.31**	.56**	.48**	.37**	.38**	-.47**	-.20	-.20	-.14	-.26*	-.34**														
13 Threat Perceptions	4.19	1.76	-.15	-.39**	-.50**	-.19	-.44**	.37**	.31**	.58**	.41**	.49**	.49**	-.49**													
14 Civil Rights least liked	2.40	1.50	-.31**	-.39**	-.31**	-.19	-.14	.57**	.35**	.26*	.30**	.33**	.22*	-.67**	.38**												
15 Indirect Exclusion	2.35	1.57	-.34**	-.37**	-.33**	-.19	-.17	.60**	.39**	.28*	.32**	.37**	.22*	-.66**	.38**	.99**											
16 Exclusion	2.87	1.68	-.27*	-.38**	-.39**	-.17	-.26*	.48**	.29**	.28**	.32**	.35**	.28*	-.71**	.51**	.82**	.84**										
17 Anti-democratic	2.92	1.4	.05	-.18	-.07	-.13	.04	.19	.16	-.03	.18	.14	-.17	-.39**	.07	.52**	.52**	.44**									
18 Democracy	6.12	1.04	-.11	-.18	-.28**	-.05	-.24*	.07	-.01	.05	-.03	-.01	.22*	.00	.15	-.16	-.14	-.11	-.29**								
19 Civil Rights	6.21	1.09	-.07	-.17	-.28**	-.06	-.25*	.07	.03	.07	.00	.01	.19	.04	.13	-.17	-.15	-.13	-.28*	.98**							
20 Political violence	1.67	1.24	-.04	.07	.12	-.12	.17	.26*	.19	.01	.18	.08	-.10	-.12	.02	.48**	.47**	.26*	.34**	-.39**	-.38**						
21 Activism	2.58	1.16	-.25**	-.16	-.09	-.16	.03	.32**	.33**	.23*	.37**	.20	.12	-.20	.18	.45**	.46**	.30**	.21	-.27*	-.27*	.57**					
22 Halacha	2.76	1.72	-.12	-.22*	-.16	-.17	-.07	.40**	.11	.12	.20	.13	.26*	-.57**	.41**	.62**	.66**	.32**	-.05	-.08	.38**	.26*					
23 Dogmatism	2.58	1.16	-.20	-.05	-.04	-.08	-.05	.33**	.17	.08	.13	.18	.17	-.36**	.31**	.56**	.56**	.42**	.21	-.18	-.19	.33**	.28*	.46**			
24 RWA	3.59	1.44	.00	-.06	.04	-.04	.06	-.03	-.15	-.16	.00	-.12	-.01	-.31**	.24*	.32**	.28*	.37**	.37**	-.05	-.09	.06	-.14	.49**	.21		
25 LWA	4.63	1.99	.13	.30**	.18	.12	.06	-.12	.02	-.01	.06	-.11	-.21	.58**	-.34**	-.45**	-.43**	-.52**	-.27*	.04	.09	-.16	.05	-.33**	-.30**	-.25*	
26 SDO	2.29	1.23	-.09	.29**	.46**	.03	.46**	-.04	-.20	-.30**	-.07	-.18	-.20	.00	-.26*	.11	.11	.08	.19	-.46**	-.47**	.19	.17	.10	.28**	.01	-.11

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Wave 4 N=45

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29
1 Capabilities	4.73	1.54																													
2 Warmth	4.20	2.01	.71**																												
3 Morality	3.44	1.84	.53**	.57**																											
4 Loyalty to the country	4.82	1.85	.27	.41**	.18																										
5 Feeling Thermometer	32.42	28.51	.49**	.59**	.63**	.39**																									
6 Hatred	3.71	2.14	-.43**	-.24	-.36**	-.28	-.48**																								
7 Contempt	4.16	2.04	-.34*	-.12	-.24	-.34*	-.48**	.77**																							
8 Anger	5.00	1.77	-.24	-.19	-.33*	-.26	-.60**	.52**	.70**																						
9 Fear	3.98	2.09	.03	.21	-.04	.13	.07	-.06	.05	-.13																					
10 Disgust	4.27	2.17	-.49**	-.39**	-.38**	-.40**	-.54**	.86**	.80**	.57**	-.16																				
11 Disappointment	5.07	1.91	-.22	-.01	-.22	-.20	-.38**	.51**	.48**	.13	.51**																				
12 Treatment	62.24	29.14	.16	.13	-.09	.18	.00	-.08	-.02	.15	-.02	-.08	.09																		
13 Justified	3.64	1.79	.18	.07	.20	.40**	.10	-.24	-.23	-.20	-.14	-.24	-.51**	-.16																	
14 Openness to Political Other	4.87	1.86	.61**	.56**	.38**	.32	.48**	-.41**	-.26	-.15	.18	-.44**	-.11	.18	-.08																
15 Threat Perceptions	4.9	1.61	-.25	-.43**	-.30	-.39**	-.38**	.31	.36	.26	-.17	.46**	.29	-.02	-.23	-.45**															
16 Dehumanization	3.89	1.88	-.56**	-.66**	-.42**	-.46**	-.57**	.58**	.41**	.32	-.36**	.64**	.08	-.15	-.02	-.66**	.64**														
17 Policy Least Liked	3.02	1.53	-.48**	-.58**	-.25	-.43**	-.41**	.43**	.25	.25	-.23	.41**	-.03	-.01	.12	-.74**	.34**	.71**													
18 Civil Rights least liked	5.36	1.80	.52**	.52**	.14	.42**	.30**	-.50**	-.33**	-.13	.16	-.51**	-.06	.22	-.07	.75**	-.39**	-.67**	-.82**												
19 Indirect Exclusion	2.58	1.81	-.51**	-.49**	-.13	-.39**	-.27	.52**	.33**	.13	-.20	.52**	.05	-.24	.08	-.74**	.37**	.68**	.81**	-.99**											
20 Exclusion	3.02	1.78	-.53**	-.64**	-.18	-.43**	-.36**	.33**	.18	.13	-.34**	.38**	-.06	-.27	.24	-.75**	.47**	.76**	.82**	-.85**	.84**										
21 Anti-democratic	2.70	1.39	-.22	-.14	.30*	-.11	.26	.18	-.02	-.22	-.29	.09	-.17	-.34**	.01	-.36**	.16	.31	.37**	-.51**	.48**	.49**									
22 Democracy	6.16	0.88	-.14	-.25	-.37**	-.01	-.33**	.01	.13	.28	.03	.14	.11	.30*	-.15	.06	.21	.20	-.18	.14	-.15	-.09	-.37**								
23 Civil Rights	6.18	0.93	-.10	-.19	-.26	.02	-.26	-.09	.10	.23	.05	.07	.05	.34*	-.11	.09	.21	.17	-.19	-.19	-.20	-.14	-.37**	.96**							
24 Political violence	1.99	1.34	-.07	.13	.31*	-.18	.31*	.25	.07	-.07	-.11	.20	-.03	-.41**	-.02	-.14	.01	.18	.30*	-.41**	.45**	.33*	.55**	-.57**	-.55**						
25 Activism	2.91	1.25	.02	-.01	-.01	-.22	-.18	.36**	.41**	.40**	.10	.39**	.47**	.11	-.09	-.16	.21	.08	.24	-.25	.19	.15	.01	-.16	-.21	.13					
26 Halacha	3.17	1.81	-.15	-.22	.11	-.17	.19	.23	.03	-.20	-.21	.20	-.06	-.15	.10	-.41**	.26	.37**	.53**	-.60**	.62**	.61**	.47**	-.25	-.24	.49**	.05				
27 Dogmatism	2.93	1.24	-.01	.18	.44**	-.11	.30*	.02	.15	-.10	.06	.03	-.02	-.18	-.08	.00	-.05	.02	.12	-.19	.21	.02	.36**	-.35**	-.18	.45**	.03	.32*			
28 RWA	3.66	1.62	-.19	-.22	.07	-.20	.21	.03	-.19	-.31**	-.30**	.02	-.22	-.13	-.04	-.24	.14	.35**	.27	-.24	.25	.35**	.67**	-.26	-.24	.42**	-.16	.42**	-.16	.42**	.29
29 LWA	4.77	2.13	.27	.41**	-.06	.08	-.02	-.17	.03	.13	.23	-.24	.08	.32*	-.17	.48**	-.47**	-.53**	-.43**	.56**	-.57**	-.59**	-.48**	.03	.03	-.35**	.01	-.58**	-.12	-.39**	
30 SDO	2.19	1.06	-.01	.23	.51**	.01	.43**	-.01	-.14	-.30**	-.05	-.15	-.32**	-.18	.09	-.08	-.31**	-.07	.15	-.22	.24	.07	.55**	-.56**	-.47**	.58**	-.07	.19	.53**	.39**	-.04

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

8.5 ULTRA-ORTHODOX

Wave 1 N=452

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1 Capabilities	3.87	1.63																									
2 Warmth	3.56	1.62	.47**																								
3 Morality	3.34	1.56	.47**	.62**																							
4 Loyalty to the country	2.46	1.41	.12**	.18**	.24**																						
5 Feeling Thermometer	30.34	19.17	.27**	.31**	.41**	.33**																					
6 Hatred	2.98	1.79	-.26**	-.30**	-.38**	-.10*	-.43**																				
7 Contempt	3.46	1.83	-.28**	-.28**	-.33**	-.20**	-.45**	.59**																			
8 Anger	4.71	1.80	-.11*	-.22**	-.36**	-.33**	-.45**	.50**	.51**																		
9 Fear	3.10	1.92	-.09	-.27**	-.29**	-.05	-.17**	.39**	.36**	.28**																	
10 Disgust	3.64	1.95	-.27**	-.37**	-.43**	-.21**	-.49**	.65**	.69**	.55**	.39**																
11 Disappointment	4.85	1.88	-.04	-.11*	-.30**	-.19*	-.32**	.33**	.38**	.58**	.19*	.37**															
12 Openness to Political Other	4.10	1.68	.48**	.45**	.46**	.17**	.42**	-.37**	-.33**	-.17**	-.25**	-.41**	-.07														
13 Threat Perceptions	3.64	1.53	-.23**	-.28**	-.42**	-.26**	-.40**	.43**	.43**	.39**	.36**	.47**	.36**	-.30**													
14 Civil Rights least liked	2.72	1.14	-.33**	-.31**	-.35**	-.05	-.24**	.41**	.37**	.26**	.31**	.39**	.21**	-.42**	.43**												
15 Indirect Exclusion	2.45	1.11	-.35**	-.33**	-.34**	-.03	-.22**	.43**	.37**	.24**	.32**	.39**	.19**	-.44**	.42**	.97**											
16 Exclusion	2.59	1.30	-.34**	-.37**	-.38**	-.07	-.24**	.42**	.35**	.19**	.27**	.43**	.17**	-.53**	.41**	.71**	.74**										
17 Unti-democratic	2.63	1.21	-.30**	-.31**	-.23**	.09	-.07	.28**	.21**	.05	.22**	.25**	.00	-.38**	.17**	.36**	.38**	.45**									
18 Democracy	6.05	0.86	.05	.03	-.02	.00	-.06	-.06	-.10*	.08	-.01	-.05	.05	.16**	.03	-.14**	-.15**	-.22**	-.25**								
19 Civil Rights	6.10	0.92	.10*	.06	.01	.01	-.04	-.08	-.13**	.06	-.02	-.09	.04	.19**	.01	-.18**	-.18**	-.26**	-.28**	.97**							
20 Political violence	1.61	1.05	-.13**	-.14**	-.11*	.07	.07	.18**	.14**	-.04	.13**	.13**	-.08	-.18**	.12**	.35**	.40**	.40**	.32**	-.25**	-.26**						
21 Activism	2.49	1.08	.00	.10*	.05	.09	.10*	.00	.02	.06	.01	.05	-.03	.06	.05	.12**	.15**	.06	.08	.07	.09	.31**					
22 Halacha	2.12	1.51	-.30**	-.34**	-.25**	.15**	-.01	.22**	.15**	-.06	.22**	.19**	-.07	-.33**	.07	.35**	.40**	.38**	.47**	-.12**	-.13**	.38**	.15**				
23 Dogmatism	2.46	1.05	-.23**	-.15**	-.13**	.11**	.03	.26**	.19**	.01	.16**	.19**	-.07	-.23**	.09	.30**	.36**	.33**	.34**	-.18**	-.19**	.42**	.16**	.40**			
24 RWA	3.55	1.42	-.32**	-.29**	-.25**	.03	-.03	.17**	.12**	.03	.12**	.22**	.04	-.41**	.09	.27**	.30**	.41**	.45**	-.06	-.09	.17**	-.08	.46**	.27**		
25 LWA	5.08	1.86	.19**	.32**	.20**	-.11*	.03	-.12**	-.10**	.10*	-.22**	-.11*	.07	.36**	.02	-.16**	-.19**	-.23**	-.40**	.16**	.16**	-.13**	.14**	-.42**	-.28**	-.33**	
26 SDO	2.54	1.13	-.10*	.06	.03	.04	.07	.09	.13**	-.01	.02	.04	-.08	-.04	.01	.07	.10*	.06	.20**	-.32**	-.35**	.25**	.02	.11*	.29**	.02	-.13**

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Wave 4 N=195

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29		
1 Capabilities	3.79	1.65																															
2 Warmth	3.49	1.57	.46**																														
3 Morality	3.17	1.56	.43**	.51**																													
4 Loyalty to the country	2.41	1.55	.19**	.21**	.34**																												
5 Feeling Thermometer	25.25	19.86	.26**	.39**	.47**	.33**																											
6 Hatred	3.3	1.90	-.27**	-.21**	-.42**	-.14*	-.33**																										
7 Contempt	3.85	1.94	-.33**	-.32**	-.43**	-.19**	-.39**	.68**																									
8 Anger	5.07	1.79	-.05	-.04	-.34**	-.32**	-.27**	.52**	.44**																								
9 Fear	3.33	1.99	-.18*	-.18*	-.25**	-.12	-.13	.41**	.41**	.25**																							
10 Disgust	3.88	1.96	-.36**	-.33**	-.47**	-.18*	-.43**	.68**	.69**	.45**	.38**																						
11 Disappointment	5.13	1.87	-.13	-.11	-.26**	-.16*	-.26**	.30**	.35**	.46**	.09	.32**																					
12 Treatment	42.72	25.83	.01	.04	.06	.15*	.25**	-.04	-.06	.01	-.01	-.05	-.10																				
13 Justified	4.26	1.87	.01	-.02	-.01	-.17*	-.21**	.05	.07	.17*	-.05	.13	.20**	-.39**																			
14 Openness to Political Other	3.95	1.73	.40**	.33**	.43**	.14	.39**	-.40**	-.37**	-.10	-.20**	-.45**	-.16*	.15*	-.14*																		
15 Threat Perceptions	4.27	1.63	-.18*	-.23**	-.31**	-.36**	-.42**	.43**	.33**	.43**	.33**	.48**	.33**	-.08	.26**	-.31**																	
16 Dehumanization	3.65	1.60	-.33**	-.29**	-.37**	-.28**	-.39**	.50**	.45**	.35**	.25**	.50**	.34**	.01	.08	-.55**	.50**																
17 Policy Least Liked	2.73	1.37	-.38**	-.33**	-.33**	-.10	-.28**	.46**	.45**	.15*	.28**	.45**	.17*	-.04	.04	-.64**	.32**	.64**															
18 Civil Rights least liked	5.2	1.22	.33**	.33**	.31**	.17*	.30**	-.45**	-.41**	-.21**	-.27**	-.38**	-.11	.02	-.01	.45**	-.44**	-.57**	-.62**														
19 Indirect Exclusion	2.51	1.21	-.36**	-.33**	-.30**	-.16*	-.26**	.47**	.41**	.18*	.30**	.37**	.08	-.02	-.03	-.47**	.41**	.55**	.66**	-.98**													
20 Exclusion	2.70	1.44	-.38**	-.35**	-.29**	-.16*	-.37**	.39**	.35**	.06	.21**	.44**	.18*	-.15*	.13	-.67**	.44**	.58**	.69**	-.67**	.69**												
21 Anti-democratic	2.66	1.20	-.27**	-.15*	-.16*	-.04	-.04	.18*	.17*	-.07	.14*	.25**	.09	-.19**	.06	-.49**	.11	.32**	.44**	-.36**	.40**	.47**											
22 Democracy	5.89	0.89	.06	.07	.08	.06	.04	-.06	-.15*	-.05	-.14	-.11	-.07	.01	-.08	.17*	-.07	-.03	-.15*	.11	-.10	-.18*	-.20**										
23 Civil Rights	5.91	0.97	.09	.11	.11	.07	.08	-.10	-.19**	-.06	-.16*	-.15*	-.11	.01	-.08	.17*	-.08	-.05	-.16*	.13	-.12	-.19**	-.19**	.97**									
24 Political violence	1.68	1.06	-.13	-.03	-.04	-.02	.12	.23**	.15*	.04	.23**	.11	.00	-.06	.08	-.20**	.11	.19**	.28**	-.29**	.32**	.23**	.30**	-.08	-.05								
25 Activism	2.68	1.11	.02	.04	.00	.05	.06	.08	.02	.11	.09	.00	.05	.08	.03	.09	.09	.04	.06	-.01	.03	-.01	-.09	.06	.06	.33**							
26 Halacha	1.99	1.44	-.27**	-.21**	-.17**	.06	-.13	.29**	.15*	-.04	.15*	.23**	.00	-.16*	-.02	-.39**	.08	.29**	.44**	-.31**	.35**	.39**	.40**	-.07	-.05	.26**	.04						
27 Dogmatism	2.61	1.04	-.22**	-.15*	-.18**	.03	-.07	.35**	.28**	.09	.19**	.30**	.03	-.01	.05	-.36**	.23**	.31**	.45**	-.38**	.40**	.35**	.29**	-.27**	-.25**	.31**	.23**	.31**					
28 RWA	3.4	1.5	-.20**	-.13	-.07	.04	-.07	.19**	.15*	-.06	.11	.23**	.16*	-.14	.07	-.35**	.14	.32**	.36**	-.32**	.31**	.37**	.51**	-.13	-.14	.17*	-.12	.37**	.28**				
29 LWA	5.51	1.65	.25**	.23**	.11	-.03	.11	-.09	-.01	.21**	-.10	-.10	-.03	.13	.10	.28**	.07	-.12	-.26**	.21**	-.25**	-.25**	-.32**	.13	.13	-.03	.12	-.36**	-.26**	-.24**			
30 SDO	2.63	1.13	-.16*	.01	-.03	.07	.14	.15*	.08	-.13	.06	.05	-.16*	-.07	.00	-.11	-.08	-.07	.12	-.09	.10	.06	.26**	-.28**	-.27**	.11	-.09	.19**	.33**	.15*	-.21**		

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

8.6 IMMIGRANTS/REFUGEES FROM AFRICA⁷

Wave 1 N=407

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25			
1 Capabilities	3.57	1.59																												
2 Warmth	3.75	1.46	.53**																											
3 Morality	2.82	1.50	.53**	.54**																										
4 Loyalty to the country	1.90	1.27	.37**	.38**	.58**																									
5 Feeling Thermometer	27.79	23.03	.40**	.45**	.58**	.48**																								
6 Hatred	2.47	1.75	-.26**	-.39**	-.34**	-.16**	-.42**																							
7 Contempt	2.57	1.81	-.24**	-.32**	-.32**	-.12**	-.39**	.70**																						
8 Anger	3.60	2.08	-.25**	-.32**	-.44**	-.30**	-.44**	.55**	.53**																					
9 Fear	4.47	1.94	-.18**	-.25**	-.40**	-.33**	-.38**	.42**	.38**	.51**																				
10 Disgust	3.05	1.94	-.33**	-.37**	-.42**	-.22**	-.44**	.69**	.67**	.56**	.45**																			
11 Disappointment	3.42	2.18	-.18**	-.29**	-.39**	-.20**	-.35**	.41**	.49**	.58**	.45**	.41**																		
12 Openness to Political Other	2.56	1.47	.38**	.40**	.55**	.44**	.51**	-.36**	-.26**	-.33**	-.32**	-.44**	-.27**																	
13 Threat Perceptions	4.20	1.76	-.23**	-.28**	-.39**	-.25**	-.42**	.37**	.36**	.44**	.33**	.38**	.38**	-.44**																
14 Civil Rights least liked	3.92	1.79	-.29**	-.34**	-.52**	-.36**	-.53**	.44**	.41**	.53**	.35**	.47**	.39**	-.56**	.60**															
15 Indirect Exclusion	4.14	1.76	-.29**	-.34**	-.53**	-.40**	-.55**	.44**	.40**	.54**	.37**	.48**	.40**	-.60**	.63**	.98**														
16 Exclusion	4.46	1.58	-.26**	-.31**	-.45**	-.35**	-.48**	.37**	.33**	.42**	.30**	.45**	.30**	-.64**	.59**	.72**	.75**													
17 Anti-democratic	2.88	1.25	-.11**	-.16**	-.14**	-.03**	-.12**	.17**	.19**	.13**	.12**	.18**	.11**	-.22**	.15**	.22**	.19**	.24**												
18 Democracy	5.73	1.02	.16**	.22**	.21**	.03**	.09**	-.23**	-.22**	-.13**	-.11**	-.19**	-.13**	.22**	-.13**	-.22**	-.21**	-.22**	-.34**											
19 Civil Rights	5.70	1.13	.18**	.24**	.24**	.05**	.13**	-.26**	-.26**	-.16**	-.13**	-.21**	-.14**	.23**	-.16**	-.24**	-.23**	-.25**	-.34**	.98**										
20 Political violence	1.48	0.96	-.04**	-.10**	-.04**	.06**	-.08**	.17**	.19**	.07**	.04**	.15**	.08**	-.05**	.08**	.09**	.07**	.04**	.19**	-.16**	-.17**									
21 Activism	2.23	1.05	.08**	.02**	.13**	.12**	.08**	.10**	.09**	.08**	.06**	.02**	.08**	.17**	.01**	.03**	.01**	-.06**	-.01**	.03**	.03**	.43**								
22 Halacha	2.85	1.82	-.11**	-.05**	-.09**	-.03**	-.15**	.15**	.14**	.15**	.07**	.15**	.08**	-.19**	.23**	.21**	.21**	.19**	.35**	-.04**	-.04**	.18**	.10**							
23 Dogmatism	2.43	1.01	-.18**	-.13**	-.10**	-.02**	-.18**	.29**	.35**	.18**	.12**	.30**	.20**	-.15**	.14**	.21**	.19**	.18**	.32**	-.26**	-.28**	.33**	.17**	.19**						
24 RWA	3.99	1.41	-.14**	-.13**	-.20**	-.07**	-.21**	.17**	.17**	.21**	.10**	.22**	.17**	-.28**	.30**	.33**	.33**	.36**	.42**	-.12**	-.13**	.09**	-.12**	.41**	.27**					
25 LWA	4.87	1.69	.14**	.09**	.12**	.06**	.14**	-.05**	-.03**	-.03**	-.02**	-.08**	.04**	.18**	-.10**	-.13**	-.13**	-.11**	-.20**	.16**	.15**	-.05**	.04**	-.37**	-.19**	-.08**				
26 SDO	2.81	1.18	-.24**	-.14**	-.22**	-.17**	-.22**	.12**	.12**	.14**	.08**	.17**	.04**	-.18**	.18**	.25**	.24**	.20**	.12**	-.25**	-.25**	.21**	.01**	.09**	.29**	.06**	-.21**			

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

⁷ In the first wave this group was referred as “asylum seekers/refugees”

Wave 2 N=293

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29		
1 Capabilities	3.40	1.34																															
2 Warmth	3.77	1.32	.36**																														
3 Morality	2.85	1.27	.40**	.41**																													
4 Loyalty to the country	1.90	1.14	.31**	.24**	.46**																												
5 Feeling Thermometer	28.97	22.37	.30**	.16**	.39**	.36**																											
6 Hatred	2.59	1.62	-.20**	-.28**	-.29**	-.15**	-.18**																										
7 Contempt	2.60	1.68	-.22**	-.21**	-.25**	-.10**	-.07**	.71**																									
8 Anger	3.61	1.95	-.22**	-.30**	-.33**	-.22**	-.32**	.54**	.48**																								
9 Fear	4.42	1.85	-.21**	-.16**	-.32**	-.18**	-.15**	.33**	.28**	.43**																							
10 Disgust	3.15	1.88	-.29**	-.26**	-.37**	-.22**	-.26**	.66**	.64**	.52**	.39**																						
11 Disappointment	3.51	2.01	-.19**	-.25**	-.36**	-.22**	-.18**	.51**	.45**	.62**	.37**	.47**																					
12 Treatment	39.92	23.86	.11	.00	-.06	.01	-.02	.08	.05	.15	-.04	.06	.17**																				
13 Justified	4.06	1.75	-.08	.00	-.14*	-.15*	-.15*	.06	.09	.05	.16**	.12*	.14*	-.39**																			
14 Openness to Political Other	2.53	1.40	.35**	.30**	.43**	.47**	.37**	-.28**	-.22**	-.33**	-.22**	-.30**	-.34**	-.11	-.16**																		
15 Threat Perceptions	4.31	1.68	-.27**	-.24**	-.52**	-.37**	-.37**	.40**	.33**	.46**	.43**	.45**	.41**	.17**	.08	-.48**																	
16 Dehumanization	3.39	1.70	-.36**	-.40**	-.52**	-.33**	-.29**	.49**	.46**	.48**	.38**	.52**	.47**	.19**	.12*	-.53**	.63**																
17 Policy Least Liked	3.81	1.34	-.33**	-.27**	-.44**	-.40**	-.33**	.43**	.38**	.44**	.28**	.38**	.41**	.19**	.18**	-.60**	.56**	.67**															
18 Civil Rights least liked	3.94	1.74	.32**	.25**	.48**	.41**	.39**	-.43**	-.36**	-.46**	-.32**	-.44**	-.43**	-.28**	-.14*	.63**	-.67**	-.75**	-.80**														
19 Indirect Exclusion	4.27	1.67	-.33**	-.23**	-.49**	-.44**	-.44**	.43**	.35**	.47**	.32**	.45**	.44**	.27**	.15**	-.65**	.69**	.73**	.81**	-.98**													
20 Exclusion	4.55	1.58	-.27**	-.28**	-.46**	-.41**	-.35**	.36**	.27**	.37**	.25**	.37**	.36**	.26**	.10	-.65**	.64**	.64**	.68**	-.81**	.82**												
21 Anti-democratic	3.17	1.34	-.17**	-.26**	-.25**	-.09	-.13*	.26**	.28**	.24**	.18**	.27**	.27**	.15**	.06	-.34**	.34**	.41**	.35**	-.42**	.40**	.36**											
22 Democracy	5.63	1.07	.11	.08	.09	.02	.00	-.21**	-.14*	-.15*	-.15*	-.21**	-.14*	.00	-.02	.17**	-.13*	-.19**	-.19**	.20**	-.19**	-.22**	-.32**										
23 Civil Rights	5.56	1.20	.13*	.11	.13*	.07	.03	-.23**	-.15**	-.18**	-.18**	-.23**	-.16**	-.02	-.04	.23**	-.19**	-.24**	-.22**	.26**	-.25**	-.27**	-.36**	.98**									
24 Political violence	1.59	1.01	-.03	-.08	-.07	.12*	.13*	.24**	.32**	.08	.00	.22**	.14*	.08	.07	-.05	.18**	.23**	.22**	-.19**	.18**	.13*	.28**	-.19**	-.21**								
25 Activism	2.18	0.98	.05	-.14*	-.02	.07	.04	.22**	.19**	.16**	-.04	.09	.18**	.09	-.01	-.02	.07	.14*	.14*	-.06	.06	.08	.08	-.03	-.04	.30**							
26 Halacha	2.72	1.63	-.17**	-.07	-.22**	-.06	-.14*	.13*	.10	.09	.05	.16**	.03	.14*	.07	-.17**	.23**	.26**	.22**	-.25**	.24**	.22**	.36**	-.08	-.11	.10	.13*						
27 Dogmatism	2.58	1.02	-.18**	-.24**	-.08	.06	-.02	.35**	.29**	.26**	.06	.32**	.26**	.15**	.00	-.17**	.18**	.37**	.28**	-.25**	.22**	.15**	.39**	-.20**	-.19**	.32**	.25**	.20**					
28 RWA	4.22	1.56	-.18**	-.17**	-.23**	-.08	-.06	.10	.13*	.11	.23**	.17**	.25**	.04	.18**	-.36**	.31**	.39**	.31**	-.40**	.37**	.38**	.47**	-.10	-.14*	.13*	.01	.31**	.20**				
29 LWA	4.99	1.59	.14*	.12*	.10	.06	.19**	-.21**	-.16**	-.12*	-.02	-.12*	.02	-.13*	.07	.16**	-.16**	-.14*	-.20**	.18**	-.18**	-.11	-.20**	.11	.12*	-.10	-.06	-.34**	-.11	.05			
30 SDO	2.82	1.21	-.03	-.04	-.04	-.01	-.05	.20**	.17**	.08	.03	.19**	.07	.13*	.05	-.08	.08	.13*	.15*	-.12*	.11	.07	.20**	-.24**	-.25**	.17**	.13*	.10	.28**	-.01	-.26**		

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Wave 3 N=231

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29				
Capabilities	3.46	1.35																																	
Warmth	4.03	1.32	.28**																																
Morality	2.91	1.46	.50**	.36**																															
Loyalty to the country	2.20	1.41	.45**	.26**	.60**																														
Feeling Thermometer	28.23	20.17	.36**	.28**	.49**	.50**																													
Hatred	2.73	1.79	-.18**	-.35**	-.34**	-.15**	-.35**																												
Contempt	2.75	1.80	-.29**	-.33**	-.29**	-.19**	-.34**	.62**																											
Anger	3.68	1.96	-.16**	-.20**	-.42**	-.31**	-.36**	.60**	.49**																										
Fear	4.55	1.90	-.20**	-.17**	-.40**	-.35**	-.34**	.33**	.37**	.43**																									
Disgust	3.24	1.93	-.29**	-.37**	-.43**	-.28**	-.46**	.72**	.63**	.53**	.48**																								
Disappointment	3.5	2.05	-.04	-.28**	-.25**	-.18**	-.14**	.39**	.34**	.51**	.32**	.36**																							
Treatment	34.92	23.58	.14**	-.01	.02	.20**	.20**	-.04	-.03	.04	-.07	-.04	.13																						
Justified	4.14	1.69	-.06	.03	-.15**	-.12	-.16**	.14**	.14**	.11	.18**	.14**	.03	-.30**																					
Openness to Political Other	2.68	1.47	.36**	.36**	.52**	.40**	.52**	-.34**	-.33**	-.33**	-.38**	-.46**	-.25**	-.01	-.15**																				
Threat Perceptions	4.33	1.73	-.18**	-.19**	-.32**	-.30**	-.34**	.25**	.24**	.29**	.38**	.37**	.22**	.14**	.16**	-.38**																			
Dehumanization	3.31	1.64	-.32**	-.46**	-.47**	-.28**	-.40**	.42**	.46**	.36**	.35**	.49**	.28**	.17**	.17**	-.54**	.53**																		
Policy Least Liked	3.71	1.31	-.35**	-.38**	-.54**	-.38**	-.52**	.38**	.45**	.47**	.38**	.49**	.29**	.19**	.20**	-.59**	.49**	.71**																	
Civil Rights least liked	4.10	1.64	.28**	.30**	.50**	.38**	.52**	-.37**	-.44**	-.50**	-.39**	-.43**	-.34**	-.19**	-.20**	.55**	-.57**	-.69**	-.80**																
Indirect Exclusion	4.09	1.64	-.28**	-.29**	-.52**	-.40**	-.55**	.38**	.44**	.51**	.39**	.45**	.33**	.18**	.23**	-.57**	.59**	.68**	.82**	-.98**															
Exclusion	4.35	1.55	-.25**	-.40**	-.39**	-.33**	-.47**	.34**	.37**	.36**	.28**	.42**	.27**	.16**	.09	-.67**	.55**	.62**	.67**	-.73**	.74**														
Anti-democratic	3.11	1.12	-.05	-.26**	-.23**	-.13**	-.16**	.33**	.19**	.23**	.33**	.28**	.28**	.00	.15**	-.21**	.16**	.30**	.30**	-.28**	.26**	.24**													
Democracy	5.61	1.08	.04	.13**	.13**	.00	.11	-.14**	-.18**	-.15**	-.10	-.27**	-.07	.07	-.09	.22**	-.14**	-.29**	-.25**	.21**	-.19**	-.24**	-.36**												
Civil Rights	5.55	1.20	.04	.14**	.17**	.03	.16**	-.17**	-.18**	-.18**	-.13	-.29**	-.09	.06	-.10	.27**	-.16**	-.32**	-.28**	.24**	-.23**	-.27**	-.36**	.98**											
Political violence	1.56	0.93	.05	-.20**	.01	.13	.10	.24**	.28**	.11	.01	.21**	.08	.06	.03	-.03	.05	.25**	.13**	-.11	.10	.08	.22**	-.27**	-.24**										
Activism	2.18	0.98	.08	.05	.05	.03	.01	.08	.10	.17**	-.03	.06	.03	.04	.07	.07	.01	-.03	.05	-.03	.05	.00	-.10	.03	.01	.14**									
Halacha	2.81	1.76	-.07	-.12	-.28**	-.22**	-.13	.04	.07	.09	.18**	.19**	.16**	.06	.14**	-.20**	.23**	.21**	.21**	-.29**	.30**	.25**	.38**	-.21**	-.20**	.08	.03								
Dogmatism	2.51	1.06	-.12	-.25**	-.16**	.00	-.08	.27**	.26**	.19**	.06	.28**	.11	.13**	.14**	-.16**	.10	.30**	.28**	-.28**	.25**	.18**	.27**	-.29**	-.27**	.41**	.13	.22**							
RWA	4.01	1.47	-.05	-.24**	-.15**	-.09	-.08	.19**	.17**	.16**	.23**	.17**	.25**	.10	.12	-.29**	.15**	.31**	.25**	-.32**	.30**	.29**	.40**	-.13	-.14**	.13**	-.16**	.30**	.21**						
LWA	4.98	1.53	.00	-.04	.15**	.03	.11	.00	.02	.03	.05	-.04	.07	-.06	-.09	.07	-.11	-.06	-.08	.14**	-.15**	.00	-.03	.12	.10	-.09	.00	-.27**	-.19**	.12					
SDO	3.03	1.18	-.09	-.02	-.01	.01	-.04	.10	.14**	.03	.07	.13	.01	-.10	.11	-.08	.16**	.10	.13	-.08	.07	-.01	.20**	-.22**	-.21**	.18**	.00	.08	.23**	.03	-.15**				

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Wave 3 N=150

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29				
1 Capabilities	3.65	1.80																																	
2 Warmth	3.59	1.82	.67**																																
3 Morality	2.45	1.80	.50**	.53**																															
4 Loyalty to the country	3.56	1.76	.64**	.70**	.63**																														
5 Feeling Thermometer	15.55	21.19	.39**	.40**	.61**	.45**																													
6 Hatred	3.42	2.29	-.27**	-.31**	-.25**	-.35**	-.23**																												
7 Contempt	4.32	2.21	-.29**	-.16	-.35**	-.27**	-.38**	.63**																											
8 Anger	4.41	2.26	-.25**	-.19	-.35**	-.21**	-.35**	.63**	.58**																										
9 Fear	3.47	2.35	-.24**	-.22**	-.23**	-.16	-.20	.52**	.43**	.50**																									
10 Disgust	5.41	1.94	-.23**	-.14	-.42**	-.21**	-.47**	.41**	.63**	.56**	.36**																								
11 Disappointment	5.00	2.15	-.23**	-.14	-.37**	-.12	-.34**	.37**	.51**	.56**	.40**	.55**																							
12 Treatment	48.64	30.02	.22**	.13	.03	.11	.09	-.21*	-.10	-.15	-.07	.06	-.14																						
13 Justified	3.65	2.18	.00	-.03	.07	.11	.03	.03	-.02	.09	-.02	.04	.11	-.33**																					
14 Openness to Political Other	2.34	1.63	.42**	.36**	.53**	.43**	.59**	-.29**	-.35**	-.39**	-.23**	-.35**	-.27**	.08	.04																				
15 Threat Perceptions	3.65	2.04	-.26**	-.19	-.34**	-.24**	-.39**	.43**	.51**	.53**	.48**	.45**	.52**	-.05	-.06	-.33**																			
16 Dehumanization	3.87	1.95	-.39**	-.36**	-.47**	-.36**	-.38**	.50**	.43**	.59**	.37**	.40**	.51**	-.12	-.07	-.36**	.57**																		
17 Policy Least Liked	4.13	1.61	-.33**	-.29**	-.50**	-.44**	-.51**	.58**	.59**	.56**	.50**	.56**	.45**	-.02	-.12	-.44**	.67**	.66**																	
18 Civil Rights least liked	4.44	1.92	.35**	.32**	.40**	.40**	.43**	-.56**	-.57**	-.41**	-.39**	-.46**	-.40**	.05	.02	.31**	-.68**	-.57**	-.74**																
19 Indirect Exclusion	3.46	1.91	-.36**	-.33**	-.41**	-.43**	-.42**	.62**	.59**	.45**	.43**	.45**	.41**	-.06	-.05	-.32**	.70**	.60**	.76**	.98**															
20 Exclusion	4.24	1.88	-.41**	-.36**	-.44**	-.43**	-.53**	.50**	.52**	.48**	.43**	.44**	.45**	-.08	-.04	-.52**	.75**	.61**	.72**	.77**	.80**														
21 Anti-democratic	3.60	1.04	.08	.18*	.19*	.15	.07	.05	.07	.12	.02	.06	.06	.16	-.01	.05	.06	.03	.12	-.02	.03	.04													
22 Democracy	5.75	1.13	-.10	-.03	-.25**	-.06	-.20*	-.03	.07	.09	.03	.08	.19*	-.10	.08	-.09	.08	.22**	.03	-.01	.03	.05	-.27**												
23 Civil Rights	5.71	1.22	-.09	-.05	-.25**	-.06	-.19*	-.03	.06	.10	.03	.08	.19*	-.13	.08	-.07	.05	.22**	.01	.01	.01	.01	-.30**	.98**											
24 Political violence	1.92	1.31	-.03	.06	.17*	.09	.19*	.28**	.08	.09	.19*	.01	.05	.02	.02	.06	.08	.04	.03	-.10	.13	.04	.22**	-.11	-.11										
25 Activism	2.24	1.2	.01	.19*	.18*	.20*	.23**	.16	.12	.08	.20*	-.01	.09	.01	.07	.14	.11	.04	.05	-.05	.07	.02	.25**	-.13	-.14	.54**									
26 Halacha	4.48	1.89	-.04	.04	-.10	.00	-.21*	.07	.18*	.08	.10	.25**	.08	.01	.05	-.13	.24**	.12	.26**	-.36**	.32**	.21*	.13	-.06	-.06	-.01	.10								
27 Dogmatism	3.15	1.20	.08	.07	.07	.10	.03	.31**	.21**	.25**	.27**	.04	.10	-.11	.04	.01	.14	.24**	.22**	-.15	.19*	.10	.27**	-.11	-.10	.40**	.29**	-.01							
28 RWA	4.64	1.39	.05	.26**	-.03	.11	-.15	-.04	.06	.11	-.03	.19*	.11	-.02	.03	-.16*	.09	.12	.18*	-.12	.12	.20*	.19*	.08	.07	.04	.03	.29**	.08						
29 LWA	3.84	1.8	.31**	.36**	.27**	.36**	.21**	-.26**	-.11	-.13	-.21*	-.04	-.01	-.05	.18*	.19*	-.16*	-.11	-.29**	.23**	-.24**	-.18*	-.05	.12	.12	.07	.12	-.01	-.10	.30**					
30 SDO	2.87	1.30	.08	.06	.14	-.02	.09	.15	.09	.01	.05	.03	-.09	.07	.00	.09	-.05	-.04	.10	-.07	.05	-.08	.38**	-.36**	-.34**	.32**	.14	.09	.30**	-.04	-.18*				

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

8.8 RUSSIANS/IMMIGRANTS FROM THE FORMER USSR

All waves N=75

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1 Capabilities	4.45	1.8																									
2 Warmth	2.33	1.50	.17																								
3 Morality	2.95	1.63	.36**	.44**																							
4 Loyalty to the country	2.93	1.60	.40**	.56**	.57**																						
5 Feeling Thermometer	32.32	22.29	.40**	.54**	.44**	.60**																					
6 Hatred	3.23	1.86	-.33**	-.35**	-.30**	-.53**	-.43**																				
7 Contempt	3.29	2.01	-.46**	-.33**	-.20	-.43**	-.50**	.72**																			
8 Anger	3.84	1.99	-.27	-.32	-.38	-.41**	-.41**	.50**	.52**																		
9 Fear	3.12	1.85	-.08	-.03	-.13	-.14	-.16	.03	-.02	.10																	
10 Disgust	3.47	1.90	-.34**	-.41**	-.38**	-.49**	-.44**	.82**	.71**	.51**	.05																
11 Disappointment	3.59	1.92	-.22	-.30**	-.33**	-.26	-.19	.49**	.40**	.59**	.05	.54**															
12 Openness to Political Other	3.82	1.85	.42**	.33**	.45**	.64**	.48**	-.65**	-.49**	-.33**	-.09	-.63**	-.29														
13 Threat Perceptions	3.44	1.73	-.18	-.03	.10	-.25	-.26	.53**	.43**	.35**	.11	.42**	.20	-.23													
14 Civil Rights least liked	4.93	1.69	.15	.21	.13	.37**	.30**	-.50**	-.47**	-.41**	-.21	-.54**	-.32**	.44**	-.65**												
15 Indirect Exclusion	2.94	1.65	-.18	-.18	-.09	-.38**	-.31**	.54**	.51**	.42**	.21	.55**	.30**	-.45**	.72**	-.98**											
16 Exclusion	2.96	1.58	-.31**	-.18	-.01	-.45**	-.34**	.62**	.55**	.41**	.19	.51**	.37**	-.51**	.68**	-.74**	.80**										
17 Unti-democratic	3.66	1.17	.02	-.08	-.07	-.33**	-.06	.33**	.09	.12	.18	.23	.28	-.41**	.13	-.31**	.31**	.43**									
18 Democracy	5.63	1.13	.08	-.17	-.17	.12	-.07	-.22	-.11	-.10	-.05	-.16	-.26	.19	-.27	.38**	-.40**	-.47**	-.33**								
19 Civil Rights	5.61	1.19	.08	-.15	-.19	.12	-.06	-.24	-.14	-.11	-.03	-.18	-.29	.20	-.29	.40**	-.43**	-.50**	-.32**	.98**							
20 Political violence	2.04	1.24	-.13	.22	.18	-.05	.02	.13	.22	.18	.07	.11	.01	.01	.35**	-.29	.32**	.29**	.17	-.40**	-.40**						
21 Activism	2.63	1.34	.06	-.03	.17	.01	.02	.05	-.05	.06	.22	-.06	-.16	.16	.27	-.08	.11	.14	-.05	-.13	-.11	.45**					
22 Halacha	3.95	2.11	.04	-.25	-.17	-.24	-.32**	.36**	.18	.20	.21	.31**	.07	-.34**	.26	-.28	.30**	.22	.30**	.25	.24	.02	.04				
23 Dogmatism	2.92	1.17	-.14	.12	-.09	-.08	.04	.26	.22	.18	.14	.13	.17	-.32**	.27	-.44**	.44**	.37**	.30**	-.49**	-.50**	.35**	.11	.14			
24 RWA	4.5	1.36	-.11	-.17	-.26	-.19	-.01	.34**	.07	.05	.07	.33**	.15	-.37**	.04	-.29	.26	.18	.33**	.27	.25	-.07	-.13	.51**	.09		
25 LWA	4.26	1.67	-.06	.09	.09	.18	.13	-.31**	-.15	.02	-.14	-.15	-.06	.33**	-.15	.24	-.23	-.22	-.40**	.24	.25	-.05	.01	-.39**	-.30**	-.12	
26 SDO	2.85	1.2	-.15	.00	.01	-.11	-.11	.18	.22	.18	.08	.18	.27	-.30**	.14	-.12	.13	.31**	.14	-.45**	-.46**	.23	.18	-.11	.42**	-.24	-.15

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

8.9 MIZRACHI

All waves N=42

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1 Capabilities	4.43	1.33																									
2 Warmth	5.05	1.58	.47**																								
3 Morality	4.38	1.77	.31**	.51**																							
4 Loyalty to the country	5.38	1.15	.51**	.65**	.36*																						
5 Feeling Thermometer	46.83	25.65	.20	.28	.55**	.20																					
6 Hatred	2.86	1.66	-.17	-.44**	-.28	-.29	-.29																				
7 Contempt	3.33	1.76	-.15	-.20	-.23	-.26	-.34**	.52**																			
8 Anger	3.60	1.71	-.25	-.22	-.38*	-.13	-.45**	.66**	.63**																		
9 Fear	2.74	1.93	-.10	-.33**	-.41**	-.22	-.43**	.67**	.35**	.65**																	
10 Disgust	3.19	1.70	-.17	-.38**	-.44**	-.25	-.48**	.64**	.72**	.77**	.58**																
11 Disappointment	3.76	2.05	-.25	-.31**	-.53**	-.13	-.39**	.43**	.43**	.74**	.38**	.55**															
12 Openness to Political Other	4.88	1.5	.24	.36**	.04	.21	.29	-.48**	-.36**	-.32**	-.55**	-.41**	-.15														
13 Threat Perceptions	3.02	1.59	.20	-.10	.09	-.06	.16	.42**	.23	.27	.44**	.24	.17	-.37*													
14 Civil Rights least liked	5.56	1.49	.06	.24	-.05	.22	-.27	-.30	-.07	-.13	-.32**	-.14	-.05	.38**	-.64**												
15 Indirect Exclusion	2.39	1.5	-.05	-.25	.09	-.19	.29	.29	.05	.10	.33**	.11	.02	-.38**	.65**	-.98**											
16 Exclusion	2.53	1.40	.06	-.31**	.10	-.23	.23	.36**	.14	.13	.38**	.19	.06	-.54**	.70**	-.86**	.89**										
17 Unti-democratic	3.4	1.26	-.03	-.28	.20	-.25	.41**	.18	-.04	-.24	.08	-.13	-.19	-.39**	.40**	-.39**	.44**	.58**									
18 Democracy	5.19	1.23	.17	.38**	.06	.41**	-.08	-.26	.07	-.08	-.30	-.18	.00	.36**	-.31**	.58**	-.57**	-.63**	-.42**								
19 Civil Rights	5.18	1.3	.16	.38**	.07	.44**	-.09	-.24	.06	-.11	-.33**	-.20	.01	.36**	-.32**	.59**	-.59**	-.65**	-.43**	.98**							
20 Political violence	2.88	1.42	.00	-.22	.19	-.15	.18	.31**	.06	-.02	.27	.11	-.07	-.35**	.47**	-.33**	.38**	.54**	.43**	-.56**	-.56**						
21 Activism	2.97	1.31	-.14	-.18	.12	-.05	.29	.29	-.05	-.05	.18	.04	-.26	-.25	.34**	-.23	.28	.32	.46**	-.28	-.26	.50**					
22 Halacha	2.95	1.62	.08	-.19	.21	-.12	.06	.24	.20	-.10	.09	.12	-.13	-.48**	.37**	-.48**	.49**	.60**	.61**	-.41**	-.43**	.39**	.22				
23 Dogmatism	3.24	1.09	-.06	-.30	-.09	-.33**	-.18	.31**	.27	.21	.32**	.33**	.19	-.37**	.40**	-.19	.25	.48**	.46**	-.41**	-.44**	.51**	.38**	.44**			
24 RWA	4.07	1.21	.20	-.13	.20	.16	.16	-.10	-.02	-.12	-.24	-.03	.02	-.16	.12	-.11	.08	.12	.16	.12	.10	.01	-.01	.27	-.10		
25 LWA	4.49	1.62	.18	.36**	.17	.34**	.17	.09	.02	.04	-.16	-.10	-.02	.47**	-.08	.21	-.23	-.34**	-.26	.39**	.42**	-.15	.00	-.32**	-.34**	.08	
26 SDO	3.06	1.14	-.31**	-.29	.00	-.46**	-.03	.09	.04	-.12	.03	.05	-.14	-.34**	-.06	-.15	.19	.22	.24	-.35**	-.31**	.15	.26	.24	.27	-.26	-.49**

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

8.10 ASHKENAZI

All waves N=43

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Capabilities	4.95	1.75																									
Warmth	3.51	2.10	.27																								
Morality	4.3	1.85	.74**	.60**																							
Loyalty to the country	4.72	1.84	.42**	.40**	.58**																						
Feeling Thermometer	53.86	27.86	.50**	.52**	.60**	.57**																					
Hatred	3.05	1.91	-.63**	-.18	-.51**	-.25	-.35*																				
Contempt	3.33	2.00	-.49**	-.24	-.50**	-.30	-.41**	.75**																			
Anger	3.21	1.97	-.55**	-.18	-.50**	-.23	-.31**	.87**	.82**																		
Fear	2.58	1.89	-.22	.05	-.26	.01	-.15	.59**	.55**	.59**																	
Disgust	3.05	1.94	-.46**	-.17	-.47**	-.28	-.32**	.79**	.87**	.83**	.58**																
Disappointment	3.37	1.85	-.41**	-.22	-.54**	-.28	-.35**	.76**	.68**	.82**	.61**	.76**															
Openness to Political Other	4.57	1.94	.67**	.29	.62**	.39**	.53**	-.60**	-.51**	-.51**	-.35**	-.46**	-.40**														
Threat Perceptions	2.81	1.75	-.57**	-.10	-.39**	-.36**	-.47**	.61**	.49**	.52**	.54**	.54**	.44**	-.51**													
Civil Rights least liked	5.40	1.54	.57**	.20	.47**	.17	.34**	-.67**	-.57**	-.61**	-.67**	-.55**	-.58**	.53**	-.76**												
Indirect Exclusion	2.55	1.58	-.58**	-.15	-.43**	-.16	-.31**	.68**	.58**	.64**	.68**	.56**	.56**	-.54**	.76**	-.99**											
Exclusion	2.73	1.44	-.69**	-.09	-.48**	-.34**	-.44**	.66**	.60**	.60**	.65**	.58**	.51**	-.62**	.86**	-.88**	.90**										
Anti-democratic	3.8	0.97	-.09	.24	.03	-.16	-.13	.24	.18	.15	.17	.24	.13	-.23	.33**	-.30	.31**	.39**									
Democracy	5.16	1.24	.12	-.13	.09	.12	-.01	-.26	-.30	-.27	-.53**	-.24	-.15	.26	-.38**	.29	-.33**	-.39**	-.12								
Civil Rights	5.10	1.32	.08	-.11	.06	.14	.03	-.22	-.31	-.24	-.51**	-.22	-.08	.26	-.37**	.28	-.33**	-.38**	-.17	.98**							
Political violence	2.74	1.57	-.26	.15	-.08	-.10	-.03	.40**	.35**	.32**	.46**	.38**	.29	-.40**	.52**	-.51**	.54**	.52**	.41**	-.52**	-.49**						
Activism	2.83	1.31	-.24	.31**	-.04	-.08	.02	.34**	.35**	.30	.45**	.32**	.22	-.29	.38**	-.44**	.49**	.45**	.15	-.55**	-.54**	.61**					
Halacha	4.06	1.66	-.15	.13	-.08	.00	.17	.07	.09	.00	-.04	.15	.04	-.10	.03	-.18	.18	.16	.23	.12	.09	.05	.07				
Dogmatism	3.32	1.05	-.42**	.08	-.34**	-.33**	-.18	.42**	.40**	.34**	.39**	.43**	.46**	-.53**	.55**	-.49**	.50**	.56**	.44**	-.33**	-.30	.75**	.41**	.15			
RWA	4.58	1.32	-.01	.13	.06	.07	.08	.03	.16	.08	-.02	.12	-.01	.03	.12	-.07	.06	.11	.36**	.06	.02	.09	.02	.27	.11		
LWA	4.43	1.68	.09	-.11	.03	-.12	-.08	-.20	-.05	-.15	-.12	-.20	-.16	.01	-.12	.28	-.26	-.23	-.12	-.09	-.12	-.07	-.10	-.32**	.00	.01	
SDO	3.23	1.03	-.08	-.02	-.10	-.18	-.12	.18	.17	.12	.49**	.18	.19	-.19	.49**	-.46**	.47**	.46**	.04	-.48**	-.48**	.56**	.57**	.01	.38**	-.06	-.26

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

8.11 SECULAR

All waves N=50

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1 Capabilities	4.32	1.56																									
2 Warmth	3.84	1.40	.43**																								
3 Morality	3.82	1.75	.42**	.70**																							
4 Loyalty to the country	4.28	1.68	.43**	.38**	.50**																						
5 Feeling Thermometer	47.7	29.3	.44**	.44**	.58**	.34*																					
6 Hatred	2.84	1.87	-.40**	.02	.11	-.14	-.08																				
7 Contempt	3.28	1.96	-.40**	-.22	-.26	-.15	-.35**	.43**																			
8 Anger	3.24	1.99	-.39**	-.25	-.16	-.39**	-.42**	.66**	.48**																		
9 Fear	2.80	1.77	-.31**	-.04	-.01	-.15	-.15	.65**	.57**	.54**																	
10 Disgust	3.06	1.79	-.43**	-.30**	-.27	-.38**	-.38**	.67**	.78**	.75**	.62**																
11 Disappointment	3.42	1.94	-.25	-.06	-.27	-.33**	-.13	.28	.55**	.38**	.26	.50**															
12 Openness to Political Other	4.16	1.6	.33**	.24	.37**	.52**	.52**	-.03	-.33**	-.37**	-.16	-.30**	-.33**														
13 Threat Perceptions	3.40	1.46	-.10	-.07	-.08	-.01	-.15	.38**	.35**	.29**	.37**	.31**	.25	.04													
14 Civil Rights least liked	4.95	1.22	.34**	.28**	.35**	.26	.26	-.56**	-.46**	-.49**	-.51**	-.59**	-.34**	.17	-.62**												
15 Indirect Exclusion	2.96	1.29	-.33**	-.23	-.28	-.25	-.22	.60**	.43**	.50**	.52**	.59**	.34**	-.18	.60**	-.97**											
16 Exclusion	3.16	1.33	-.46**	-.20	-.10	-.36**	-.33**	.61**	.55**	.59**	.54**	.61**	.34**	-.29**	.62**	-.76**	.77**										
17 Anti-democratic	3.8	0.82	-.18	.00	.02	-.05	-.16	.19	.22	.21	.12	.21	.00	-.11	.20	.01	.04	.20									
18 Democracy	5.47	1.05	.31**	.02	.05	.13	-.05	-.47**	-.28	-.25	-.28	-.35**	-.10	.21	-.11	.35**	-.44**	-.35**	-.08								
19 Civil Rights	5.46	1.10	.28	.01	.03	.12	-.06	-.46**	-.30**	-.24	-.28	-.35**	-.10	.20	-.15	.34**	-.43**	-.36**	-.09	.99**							
20 Political violence	2.49	1.35	-.10	.07	.24	.01	.24	.53**	.20	.29**	.37**	.34**	.03	.11	.24	-.49**	.58**	.47**	.11	-.51**	-.49**						
21 Activism	2.74	1.35	-.25	-.03	.12	.16	.11	.51**	.08	.17	.26	.12	-.09	.05	.16	-.37**	.43**	.24	.03	-.47**	-.45**	.65**					
22 Halacha	4.49	1.60	.18	.03	-.06	.05	-.14	.07	.23	.17	.00	.15	.42**	-.11	.28	-.12	.14	.20	.28	.13	.13	.18	-.03				
23 Dogmatism	3.29	0.99	-.04	.27	.37**	.14	.08	.44**	.26	.20	.35**	.22	.05	-.12	.27	-.23	.26	.36**	.35**	-.18	-.18	.53**	.43**	.24			
24 RWA	4.69	1.28	.25	.07	.16	.19	.11	-.27	-.09	-.21	-.15	-.26	.00	.04	-.03	.28	-.31**	-.07	.25	.32**	.31**	-.14	-.29**	.29**	.15		
25 LWA	3.87	1.40	.18	.01	.11	.44**	.20	.02	-.08	-.16	.08	-.10	-.16	.22	.16	-.03	-.01	-.11	.02	.16	.15	.08	.22	.17	.34**	.19	
26 SDO	3.23	1.19	.09	.12	.01	.19	.03	.10	-.12	-.12	-.23	-.16	-.07	.06	.25	-.24	.27	.16	-.10	-.48**	-.47**	.34**	.34**	.20	.22	-.15	.10

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

8.12 ETHIOPIANS

All waves N=48

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	
1 Capabilities	3.31	1.46																										
2 Warmth	3.65	1.59	.46**																									
3 Morality	3.42	1.47	.56**	.70**																								
4 Loyalty to the country	3.67	1.64	.35*	.65**	.69**																							
5 Feeling Thermometer	34.42	24.37	.55**	.60**	.65**	.57**																						
6 Hatred	2.83	1.92	-.06	-.19	-.27	-.09	-.16																					
7 Contempt	3.21	1.97	-.03	-.21	-.16	-.05	-.15	.66**																				
8 Anger	3.50	1.86	-.04	-.26	-.12	-.03	-.02	.57**	.69**																			
9 Fear	3.21	1.93	-.35**	-.45**	-.42**	-.15	-.35**	.50**	.64**	.54**																		
10 Disgust	3.48	2.02	-.21	-.19	-.33**	-.12	-.40**	.80**	.77**	.51**	.57**																	
11 Disappointment	3.58	2.02	-.14	-.29**	-.19	.01	-.11	.47**	.68**	.81**	.65**	.51**																
12 Openness to Political Other	2.98	1.56	.47**	.44**	.43**	.49**	.57**	-.24	-.37**	-.24	-.32**	-.37**	-.22															
13 Threat Perceptions	2.91	1.60	-.07	.05	-.01	.10	-.09	.42**	.47**	.35*	.40**	.54**	.32*	-.11														
14 Civil Rights least liked	5.17	1.60	-.05	-.01	.20	.20	.00	-.46**	-.49**	-.56**	-.23	-.45**	-.47**	.21	-.56**													
15 Indirect Exclusion	2.75	1.54	.00	-.02	-.23	-.18	-.06	.57**	.53**	.58**	.28	.54**	.50**	-.21	.59**	-.98**												
16 Exclusion	2.81	1.33	-.09	.08	-.07	-.08	.03	.49**	.41**	.45**	.32*	.39**	.33*	-.19	.60**	-.78**	.80**											
17 Anti-democratic	3.49	1.15	-.04	.21	.23	.14	.11	-.22	-.23	-.26	-.15	-.21	-.23	-.03	.05	.15	-.15	-.18										
18 Democracy	5.37	1.06	-.30**	-.47**	-.44**	-.31**	-.38**	.19	.30*	.26	.32*	.35*	.34*	-.28	.09	-.23	.28*	.16	-.42**									
19 Civil Rights	5.34	1.18	-.34**	-.48**	-.40**	-.26	-.36**	.15	.29*	.25	.33*	.33*	.39**	-.28	.07	-.19	.24	.13	-.39**	.97**								
20 Political violence	2.16	1.45	.46**	.36*	.31*	.21	.52**	.25	.05	.09	-.14	.00	-.06	.28	.32*	-.37**	.37**	.41**	.12	-.32*	-.34*							
21 Activism	2.78	1.41	.21	.14	.10	.12	.34*	.34*	.21	.31*	.23	.13	.21	.15	.47**	-.48**	.47**	.55**	.03	-.08	-.13	.56**						
22 Halacha	3.32	1.60	.18	-.01	.00	-.31**	-.04	.38**	.28	.22	.09	.22	.08	-.14	.31*	-.56**	.55**	.59**	-.08	.00	-.05	.32*	.46**					
23 Dogmatism	3.36	1.08	.05	.08	.00	-.07	.03	.42**	.48**	.26	.22	.30*	.09	-.37**	.34*	-.43**	.43**	.54**	.05	-.05	-.12	.34*	.41**	.31*				
24 RWa	4.55	1.44	-.10	-.14	-.07	-.12	-.02	.11	-.03	.06	.14	.01	.01	.05	.05	-.13	.17	.11	.25	.20	.16	.06	.38**	.27	.02			
25 LWA	4.55	1.81	.11	.12	.04	.30**	.09	.23	.16	.30**	.12	.26	.18	.20	.21	-.27	.31*	.22	-.46**	.22	.18	.12	.23	-.17	.17	-.09		
26 SDO	3.02	1.20	.26	.16	.09	-.20	.17	.23	-.08	-.17	-.18	-.01	-.33**	.19	-.02	-.01	.02	.16	.07	-.40**	-.45**	.41**	.27	.29*	.36**	.09	-.13	

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

9. CORRELATIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF STUDY VARIABLES BY POPULATION AND WAVE

9.1 ISRAELI JEWS

Wave 1 N=1609

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30		
1 Capabilities	3.97	1.65																																
2 Warmth	3.71	1.66	.35**																															
3 Morality	2.89	1.58	.40**	.47**																														
4 Loyalty to the country	2.25	1.56	.31**	.32**	.49**																													
5 Feeling Thermometer	27.53	21.67	.29**	.35**	.53**	.44**																												
6 Hatred	3.18	1.96	-.22**	-.29**	-.35**	-.20**	-.44**																											
7 Contempt	3.40	2.04	-.21**	-.32**	-.32**	-.19**	-.43**	.67**																										
8 Anger	4.60	1.99	-.13**	-.25**	-.39**	-.26**	-.46**	.56**	.53**																									
9 Fear	3.79	2.10	-.14**	-.06*	-.30**	-.26**	-.26**	.35**	.24**	.29**																								
10 Disgust	3.65	2.07	-.23**	-.35**	-.42**	-.26**	-.49**	.70**	.71**	.56**	.32**																							
11 Disappointment	4.49	2.18	-.03	-.19**	-.26**	-.13**	-.25**	.35**	.39**	.58**	.15**	.38**																						
12 Openness to Political Other	3.51	1.80	.39**	.25**	.41**	.43**	.41**	-.34**	-.23**	-.14**	-.35**	-.33**	.02																					
13 Threat Perceptions	4.44	1.77	-.17**	-.24**	-.44**	-.35**	-.44**	.44**	.38**	.45**	.37**	.44**	.32**	-.32**																				
14 Civil Rights least liked	3.28	1.73	-.31**	-.26**	-.40**	-.37**	-.38**	.43**	.34**	.29**	.41**	.39**	.12**	-.62**	.47**																			
15 Indirect Exclusion	3.22	1.78	-.32**	-.25**	-.39**	-.37**	-.37**	.41**	.31**	.25**	.43**	.37**	.08**	-.65**	.46**	.98**																		
16 Exclusion	3.54	1.73	-.31**	-.23**	-.38**	-.39**	-.34**	.36**	.24**	.17**	.40**	.33**	.05**	-.71**	.46**	.78**	.81**																	
17 Anti-democratic	2.9	1.29	-.15**	-.18**	-.16**	-.11**	-.12**	.27**	.24**	.11**	.16**	.25**	.06**	-.31**	.21**	.35**	.34**	.38**																
18 Democracy	5.70	1.04	.15**	.13**	.15**	.09**	.08**	-.25**	-.20**	-.09**	-.16**	-.21**	-.05**	.32**	-.13**	-.32**	-.33**	-.34**	-.37**															
19 Civil Rights	5.66	1.17	.17**	.16**	.19**	.13**	.12**	-.27**	-.24**	-.12**	-.18**	-.24**	-.07**	.35**	-.17**	-.35**	-.36**	-.37**	-.39**	.98**														
20 Political violence	1.65	1.13	-.09**	-.12**	-.02	.02	.01	.26**	.22**	.05**	.08**	.19**	.03	-.13**	.11**	.24**	.20**	.32**	-.24**	-.23**														
21 Activism	2.41	1.10	.05**	-.02	.07**	.08**	.06**	.12**	.13**	.07**	.02	.08**	.06**	.06**	.05**	.07**	.06**	.00	.06**	.03**	.37**													
22 Halacha	2.84	1.94	-.05**	-.15**	-.23**	-.15**	-.17**	.25**	.20**	.12**	.16**	.23**	.00	-.28**	.30**	.35**	.34**	.33**	.40**	-.15**	-.18**	.24**	.11**											
23 Dogmatism	2.52	1.07	-.19**	-.16**	-.15**	-.04**	-.14**	.31**	.31**	.13**	.14**	.28**	.07**	-.23**	.17**	.29**	.28**	.27**	.34**	-.28**	-.29**	.37**	.17**	.26**										
24 RWa	3.92	1.48	-.14**	-.17**	-.21**	-.14**	-.13**	.20**	.17**	.13**	.15**	.20**	.10**	-.35**	.24**	.37**	.36**	.41**	.45**	-.20**	-.22**	.15**	-.04**	.42**	.24**									
25 LWA	5.10	1.61	.09**	.07**	.16**	.15**	.13**	-.10**	-.10**	-.02**	-.11**	-.12**	.08**	.24**	-.14**	-.21**	-.22**	-.24**	.24**	-.09**	.05**	-.38**	-.21**	-.09**										
26 SDO	2.82	1.17	-.20**	-.04**	-.12**	-.11**	-.16**	.14**	.06**	.10**	.14**	-.02**	-.19**	.12**	.21**	.21**	.19**	.27**	-.31**	-.32**	.20**	.02**	.18**	.29**	.08**	-.30**								
27 Jewish Identification	6.53	1.10	.00	-.06**	-.08**	-.11**	.00	-.01	-.04**	.02**	.07**	-.01	.00	-.10**	.11**	.08**	.09**	.12**	.09**	.01	-.02**	-.15**	-.10**	-.17**	-.11**	.21**	-.08**	.01						
28 Israeli Identification	6.43	1.13	.03	-.01	.05	-.03	.03	-.09**	-.12**	.00**	-.07**	-.10**	.04**	.06**	-.01**	-.10**	-.09**	-.06**	-.10**	.07**	.06**	-.20**	-.08**	-.20**	-.16**	-.02**	.12**	-.02**	.44**					
29 State Identification	6.23	1.32	.03	.00	.05	-.05**	.07**	-.11**	-.13**	-.03**	-.07**	-.13**	.02**	.02**	-.02**	-.05**	-.03**	-.01**	-.03**	.02**	.00**	-.17**	-.09**	-.12**	-.12**	.04**	.08**	.01**	.41**	.75**				
30 Ideological Identification	3.82	1.67	-.02**	-.08**	-.13**	-.03**	-.13**	.17**	.13**	.19**	.05**	.14**	.16**	-.06**	.19**	.11**	.11**	.09**	.07**	-.06**	-.07**	.07**	.16**	.11**	.19**	.08**	-.01**	.03**	.00**	.07**	.07			

9.2. ARAB CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

Wave 1 N=407

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30				
1 Capabilities	3.65	1.74																																		
2 Warmth	2.49	1.57	.38**																																	
3 Morality	2.56	1.58	.36**	.71**																																
4 Loyalty to the country	3.42	1.89	.41**	.35**	.33**																															
5 Feeling Thermometer	28.98	25.38	.24**	.50**	.59**	.24**																														
6 Hatred	3.57	2.07	-.25**	-.17**	-.32**	-.10*	-.34**																													
7 Contempt	3.86	2.07	-.15*	-.26**	-.35**	-.12*	-.39**	.66**																												
8 Anger	4.49	2.05	-.16*	-.34**	-.46**	-.10*	-.48**	.61**	.63**																											
9 Fear	3.91	2.10	-.03	-.18**	-.20**	-.06	-.23**	.39**	.43**	.43**																										
10 Disgust	4.22	2.15	-.17**	-.28**	-.43**	-.12*	-.43**	.72**	.78**	.69**	.39**																									
11 Disappointment	4.55	2.07	-.11*	-.26**	-.32**	-.07	-.34**	.45**	.44**	.56**	.39**	.40**																								
12 Openness to Political Other	2.77	1.54	.37**	.45**	.56**	.32**	.54**	-.41**	-.34**	-.37**	-.22**	-.40**	-.26**																							
13 Threat Perceptions	4.37	1.83	-.03	-.15**	-.26**	-.04	-.34**	.33**	.33**	.45**	.28**	.38**	.33**	-.23**																						
14 Civil Rights least liked	3.61	1.60	-.16*	-.11*	-.26**	-.10	-.24**	.57**	.51**	.43**	.27**	.52**	.24**	-.32**	.49**																					
15 Indirect Exclusion	3.54	1.63	-.18**	-.10*	-.23**	-.10	-.24**	.58**	.51**	.43**	.27**	.53**	.23**	-.34**	.49**	.98**																				
16 Exclusion	3.88	1.61	-.18**	-.15**	-.28**	-.10*	-.32**	.51**	.48**	.40**	.25**	.51**	.21**	-.42**	.55**	.76**	.80**																			
17 Uni-democratic	3.47	1.23	-.02	.01	-.08	-.07	-.03	.15**	.15**	.05	.10*	.14**	-.03	-.13**	-.02	.16**	.16**	.14**																		
18 Democracy	5.99	1.08	-.01	-.24**	-.19**	.00	-.20**	-.09	-.10*	.08	.00	-.02	.12**	-.08	.11**	-.04	-.04	-.03	-.19**																	
19 Civil Rights	6.04	1.11	-.01	-.23**	-.19**	.00	-.21**	-.09	-.10*	.07	.01	-.02	.11**	-.08	.11**	-.03	-.04	-.04	-.18**	.98**																
20 Political violence	1.96	1.33	-.04	.19**	.17**	.03	.28**	.21**	.17**	.01	.02	.12**	-.09	.10*	-.05	.22**	.22**	.11**	.17**	-.38**	-.39**															
21 Activism	2.66	1.28	-.04	.08	.08	.12**	.09	.27**	.23**	.19**	.08	.22**	.05	.10	.08	.31**	.33**	.15**	.08	-.17**	-.17**	.41**														
22 Halacha	3.69	1.68	-.15**	-.03	-.02	-.13*	.02	.17**	.12**	.14**	.05	.13**	.15**	-.12*	.03	.12**	.15**	.12**	.19**	.00	-.02	.25**	.19**													
23 Dogmatism	2.98	1.12	-.03	.28**	.21**	.06	.19**	.20**	.16**	.01	.09	.11**	-.01	.04	-.02	.22**	.24**	.19**	.25**	-.27**	-.28**	.45**	.28**	.21**												
24 RWA	4.5	1.39	.01	.05	.07	-.15**	-.10	-.05	-.07	-.05	.06	-.05	.10*	-.02	-.03	-.04	-.04	.02	.12**	.12**	.10	.00	-.18**	.25**	.08											
25 LWA	3.47	1.88	.00	.00	.01	.05	-.05	.18**	.21**	.11**	.07	.17**	-.01	.05	.10*	.23**	.23**	.18**	-.09	.03	.03	.18**	.29**	-.01	.11**	-.04										
26 SDO	2.54	1.26	.00	.30**	.30**	.06	.34**	.08	.03	-.17**	-.01	-.03	-.17**	.10*	-.11**	.10*	.11**	.07	.17**	-.48**	-.49**	.48**	.26**	.13**	.42**	-.02	.00									
27 Jewish Identification	6.22	1.40	-.05	-.23**	-.25**	-.06	-.24**	.04	.07	.13**	.05	.11**	.12**	-.17**	.07	.02	.03	.06	-.06	.40**	.39**	-.27**	-.07	.06	-.17**	.09	.03	-.32**								
28 Israeli Identification	4.19	2.12	.08	.19**	.20**	-.02	.33**	-.25**	-.25**	-.27**	-.10*	-.24**	-.08	.26**	-.21**	-.23**	-.27**	-.21**	-.06	-.01	-.02	.04	-.22**	-.05	.13**	.25**	-.13**	.08	-.12**							
29 State Identification	4.18	2.07	.03	.16**	.18**	-.06	.33**	-.23**	-.30**	-.28**	-.16**	-.26**	-.08	.25**	-.25**	-.22**	-.25**	-.20**	-.01	.03	.02	.03	-.25**	-.02	.13**	.27**	-.16**	.06	-.11**	.85**						
30 Ideological Identification	3.90	1.88	.02	-.05	-.06	.08	-.05	.17**	.24**	.20**	.06	.23**	.06	-.07	.20**	.20**	.22**	.21**	-.11**	.05	.05	.13**	.27**	.04	.09	-.14**	.22**	.05	.08	-.27**	-.29**					
31 Political Orientation	5.01	1.55	.09	-.11**	-.01	.11**	-.04	.06	.08	.14**	.02	.09	.10	-.08	.20**	.08	.11**	.13**	-.23**	-.16**	-.16**	-.05	.11**	-.10*	-.10*	-.11**	-.10*	-.18**	-.12**	-.20**	-.38**					

Note: **, Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *, Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); Political orientation: higher values indicating on more left wing

Wave 2 N=465

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33						
1 Capabilities	4.16	1.49																																							
2 Warmth	3.88	1.46	.42**																																						
3 Morality	3.25	1.48	.38**	.43**																																					
4 Loyalty to the country	2.68	1.65	.35**	.29**	.44**																																				
5 Feeling Thermometer	32.14	19.23	.24**	.20**	.41**	.32**																																			
6 Hatred	2.87	1.70	-.14**	-.18**	-.27**	-.23**	-.35**																																		
7 Contempt	3.09	1.80	-.15**	-.23**	-.25**	-.22**	-.31**	.62**																																	
8 Anger	4.39	1.81	-.01	-.09	-.26**	-.22**	-.36**	.46**	.44**																																
9 Fear	3.59	2.00	-.13**	-.14**	-.26**	-.26**	-.18**	.40**	.31**	.29**																															
10 Disgust	3.44	1.82	-.20**	-.20**	-.32**	-.26**	-.44**	.61**	.60**	.47**	.30**																														
11 Disappointment	4.45	1.99	.00	-.16**	-.25**	-.19**	-.24**	.37**	.43**	.68**	.23**	.38**																													
12 Treatment	46.97	23.72	.18**	.01	.02	.16**	.02	.05	.10	.12**	-.04	.03	.15**																												
13 Justified	4.04	1.66	-.10**	-.06	-.10**	-.22**	-.11**	.10	.12**	.13**	.10	.13**	.14**	-.35**																											
14 Openness to Political Other	3.78	1.66	.39**	.30**	.38**	.43**	.36**	-.30**	-.22**	-.06	-.25**	-.29**	-.02	.12**	-.10**																										
15 Threat Perceptions	3.96	1.55	-.12**	-.16**	-.33**	-.29**	-.30**	.49**	.34**	.43**	.43**	.37**	.39**	.08	.08	-.28**																									
16 Dehumanization	3.32	1.61	-.28**	-.33**	-.43**	-.32**	-.38**	.56**	.52**	.39**	.38**	.55**	.31**	.09	.14**	-.44**	.50**																								
17 Policy Least Liked	2.9	1.30	-.28**	-.25**	-.36**	-.24**	-.33**	.41**	.34**	.16**	.28**	.41**	.09**	.00	.07	-.56**	.40**	.61**																							
18 Civil Rights least liked	5.09	1.45	.30**	.28**	.35**	.33**	.34**	-.38**	-.34**	-.20**	-.32**	-.43**	-.16**	-.01	-.10**	.56**	-.46**	-.61**	-.75**																						
19 Indirect Exclusion	2.80	1.47	-.32**	-.26**	-.34**	-.32**	-.33**	.35**	.30**	.13**	.34**	.39**	.10**	-.03	.11**	-.58**	.45**	.58**	.78**	-.97**																					
20 Exclusion	3.26	1.52	-.34**	-.29**	-.38**	-.37**	-.28**	.39**	.28**	.10**	.31**	.34**	.09**	-.09	.14**	-.66**	.46**	.52**	.68**	-.75**	.78**																				
21 Anti-democratic	2.77	1.18	-.16**	-.17**	-.17**	-.10**	-.03	.20**	.22**	.04	.18**	.20**	.04	-.01	.14**	-.29**	.20**	.31**	.36**	-.39**	.37**	.42**																			
22 Democracy	5.61	1.05	.18**	.20**	.20**	.14**	.08	-.22**	-.24**	-.07	-.25**	-.19**	-.02	-.04	.03	.30**	-.18**	-.31**	-.38**	.37**	-.37**	-.38**	-.43**																		
23 Civil Rights	5.59	1.16	.17**	.18**	.19**	.14**	.08	-.24**	-.25**	-.10**	-.28**	-.20**	-.04	-.04	.03	.31**	-.20**	-.33**	-.39**	.39**	-.38**	-.40**	-.45**	.96**																	
24 Political violence	1.63	1.02	-.19**	-.13**	-.09**	.00	.03	.26**	.26**	-.01	.13**	.18**	-.03	-.06	.08	-.14**	.20**	.28**	.39**	-.35**	.37**	.30**	.36**	-.26**	-.24**																
25 Activism	2.23	1.05	-.06	-.11**	.07	.09**	.03	.11**	.16**	.06	.02	.06	.08	.08	.02	.09	.13**	.14**	.09**	-.15**	.15**	.04	.10**	.00	.01	.39**															
26 Halacha	2.07	1.40	-.13**	-.07	-.01	.11**	-.03	.12**	.07	-.14**	.02	.12**	-.12**	.06	.00	-.21**	.11**	.24**	.34**	-.34**	.37**	.31**	.37**	-.20**	-.20**	.43**	.22**														
27 Dogmatism	2.42	0.98	-.18**	-.13**	-.09**	.00	-.05	.24**	.27**	.07	.09	.20**	.08	.05	.02	-.18**	.13**	.29**	.34**	-.31**	.34**	.30**	.36**	-.26**	-.25**	.44**	.17**	.36**													
28 RWA	3.94	1.46	-.17**	-.15**	-.15**	-.03	-.04	.24**	.18**	.05	.07	.23**	.10**	-.02	.13**	-.29**	.22**	.33**	.32**	-.36**	.35**	.45**	.48**	-.21**	-.24**	.24**	.01	.31**	.25**												
29 LWA	5.45	1.44	.12**	.07	.06	.06	.00	-.10**	-.06	.17**	-.04	-.02	.20**	.02	-.06	.28**	-.01	-.13**	-.28**	.24**	-.25**	-.24**	-.31**	.29**	.26**	-.19**	.03	-.31**	-.20**	-.12**											
30 SDO	2.84	1.17	-.10**	-.09**	-.12**	-.01	-.08	.19**	.17**	-.03	.10**	.14**	-.08	.04	.02	-.16**	.10**	.23**	.27**	-.24**	.24**	.21**	.24**	-.35**	-.36**	.25**	.06	.17**	.22**	.17**	-.29**										
31 Jewish Identification	6.41	1.18	.08	.03	-.07	-.01	-.09	.00	.01	.05	.05	.00	.02	.00	-.05	-.06	-.01	.03	.02	-.04	.05	.08	.08	-.01	-.01	-.09	-.14**	.05	-.06	.13**	.00	-.02									
32 Israeli Identification	6.47	1.07	.09	.09	.01	-.03	.04	-.03	.00	.10**	-.01	-.02	.06	-.04	-.01	.03	-.03	-.08	-.09**	.10**	-.11**	-.06	-.10**	.11**	.11**	-.19**	-.08	-.17**	-.17**	-.04	.15**	-.11**	.50**								
33 State Identification	6.26	1.22	.06	.09	.05	.00	.08	-.06	-.07	.02	-.03	-.09	.00	-.10**	.05	-.01	-.06	-.07	-.10**	.08	-.08	-.03	-.08	.09	.08	-.21**	-.12**	-.09**	-.11**	.03	.11**	-.09**	.43**	.71**							
34 Ideological Identification	3.34	1.53	-.02	-.01	.02	.08	.03	.05	.05	.07	.02	.03	.08	.10**	-.02	.00	.02	.10**	.00	.04	-.03	-.01	-.06	.00	-.01	-.03	.17**	-.06	.09	.06	.06	.00	.10**	.09	.21**						

Note: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); Political orientation: higher values indicating on more left wing

10. PERCEPTIONS, ATTITUDES AND FEELINGS TOWARDS LEAST LIKED GROUP CHOICE

The following section discusses perceptions, attitudes and feelings towards respondent's least liked group choice and its members. In particular, the following section examines threat perceptions (Sullivan et al., 1985) levels of openness towards the least liked group members (Bogardus, 1986), evaluations of traits (Cuddy et al, 2008), feelings (Iyengar, et al., 2012), and emotions towards the least liked group members, attitudes towards exclusion (Shamir, & Sullivan, 1985), and indirect exclusion (Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter 2006), support for civil rights, support for exclusion policies, dehumanization perceptions, perceptions regarding the treatment the least liked group receives in the society, and perceptions of justification related to this treatment.

Measures

Threat perceptions were measured using a three-item scale based on (Sullivan et al., 1985), as Israeli respondents were asked to indicate their agreement on a 1-7 scale (1 = "strongly disagree" to 7 = "strongly agree") to the following statements: (1) [the least liked group] are a threat to the identity of the state; (2) [the least liked group] endanger the security of the country; (3) Personally, I feel that my safety and the safety of my family are threatened by [the least liked group] Cronbach's alpha ranged between .81 to .87 across waves.

Openness to political other was measured using a five-item scale based on (Bogardus, 1986), as Israeli respondents were asked to indicate their agreement on a 1-7 scale (1 = "strongly disagree" to 7 = "strongly agree") to: (1) [the least liked group] will be my supervisor at the workplace; (2) to host [the least liked group] at my home in social circumstances; (3) that my family member will have a romantic relationship with [the least liked group]; (4) that [the least liked group] will live in my neighborhood and (5) to read opinion articles by [the least liked group]. Higher values indicated on greater openness to political other. Cronbach's alpha ranged between .87 to .91 across waves.

Evaluations of traits of the least liked group were based on (Cuddy et al, 2008) as Israeli respondents were asked to evaluate four traits (Capabilities, Morality, Warmth and Loyalty to the country) on a 1-7 scale where higher values indicate on higher attribution of this trait to the least liked group.

Feelings towards least liked group were measured using the feeling thermometer (Iyengar, et al., 2012), in which respondents rated their how unfavorable/ favorable and warm/cold they feel towards their least liked group on a scale of 0 to 100. Rating between 0 and 49 means that they feel unfavorable and cold and rating between 51 and 100 means that they feel favorable and warmth (where 100 represents the most favorable/warm rating).

Emotions towards least liked group were measured by asking respondents to indicate to what extent they feel hatred, disgust, contempt, anger, fear and disappointment towards their least liked group on a scale of 1-7 where higher values indicated on stronger emotions.

Political exclusion was measured using a six-item scale based on (Shamir, & Sullivan, 1985), as respondents were asked to indicate their agreement on a 1-7 scale (1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree”) to the following statements: (1) [the least liked group] should be banned from serving as prime ministers in Israel; (2) [the least liked group] must not be allowed to serve as Knesset members; (3) [the least liked group] should not be allowed to teach in public schools; (4) [the least liked group] should be allowed to hold demonstrations [R]; (5) Tracking should be enabled on the phones of [the least liked group]; (6) [the least liked group] should be banned from teaching at the university. Cronbach’s alpha ranged between .85 to .89.

Indirect exclusion was measured using a four-item scale based on (Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter 2006), as Israeli respondents were asked to indicate their agreement on a 1-7 scale (1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree”) to the following statements: (1) The [the least liked group] must be expelled from the State of Israel; (2) The right of [the least liked group] to express their worldview in public must be denied; (3) The citizenship of [the least liked group] should be revoked; (4) [the least liked group] are given too many civil rights in the country. Cronbach’s alpha ranged between .80 to .86.

Civil rights for the least liked group were measured using three statements from indirect exclusion in reverse coding ([the least liked group] are given too many civil rights in the country; The right of [the least liked group] to express their worldview in public must be denied; The citizenship of [the least liked group] should be revoked) such that higher values indicate on higher support for civil rights. Cronbach’s alpha ranged between .67 to .79.

Exclusion policies towards the least liked group was measured using a four-item scale based on (?) as respondents were asked to indicate their agreement on a 1-7 scale (1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree”) to the following statements: (1) We must ignore the existence of [the least liked group]; (2) We must cooperate with [the least liked group] to achieve common goals [R]; (3) We must forcibly expel the [the least liked group] from our shared space; (4) We must try to sabotage [the least liked group] attempts to increase their power in society. Cronbach’s alpha ranged between .61 to .78.

Dehumanization of the least liked group was measured using a three-item scale based on (?) as respondents were asked to indicate their agreement on a 1-7 scale (1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree”) to the following statements: (1) Eventually [the least liked group] are similar to each other; (2) What the members of the [the least liked group] really want is to harm the rest of Israeli society; (3) [the least liked group] have negative traits that are part of who they are - they will never change. Cronbach’s alpha ranged between .82 to .85.

Least liked group perceived treatment was measured by asking respondents to indicate to what extent they think that the [the least liked group] are currently treated negatively or positively in Israeli society? on a scale of 0-100 (where 100 represents a very positive treatment and 0 a very negative treatment).

Justification perceptions for current treatment was measured by asking respondents to indicate to what extent they think that the treatment the least liked receive is justified on a 1-7 scale ranging from 1- not justified at all to 7- justified to a great extent.⁸

The following sections discuss significant differences in least liked group outcomes by nationality and political affiliation.

10.1 DIFFERENCES BY NATIONALITY

	Wave	Nationality	Mean	SD		Wave	Nationality	Mean	SD
Threat Perceptions	<i>First</i>	Jewish	4.44	1.77	Disappointment	<i>First</i>	Jewish	4.49	2.18
		Arab	4.37	1.83			Arab	4.55	2.07
	<i>Second</i>	Jewish	4.67	1.78		<i>Second</i>	Jewish	4.80	2.07
		Arab	4.37	1.83			Arab	4.62	2.03
	<i>Third</i>	Jewish	4.41	1.81		<i>Third</i>	Jewish	4.52	2.12
		Arab	4.41	1.85			Arab	4.76	2.06
	<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	4.48	1.73		<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	4.61	2.12
		Arab	4.64	1.84			Arab	4.70	2.03
Capabilities	<i>First</i>	Jewish	3.97	1.65	Feeling Thermometer	<i>First</i>	Jewish	27.53	21.67
		Arab	3.65	1.74			Arab	28.98	25.38
	<i>Second</i>	Jewish	4.00	1.65		<i>Second</i>	Jewish	26.05	21.28
		Arab	3.36	1.68			Arab	27.46	26.25

⁸ Dehumanization, support for exclusion policies towards the least liked group, perceived treatment and justification for treatment were added in the second and the third waves.

	<i>Third</i>	Jewish	4.01	1.59		<i>Third</i>	Jewish	27.06	22.71
		Arab	3.52	1.70			Arab	23.30	25.92
	<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	4.00	1.66		<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	23.86	22.66
		Arab	3.40	1.61			Arab	22.85	24.81
Warmth	<i>First</i>	Jewish	3.71	1.66	Openness to	<i>First</i>	Jewish	3.51	1.80
		Arab	2.49	1.57	Political Other		Arab	2.77	1.54
	<i>Second</i>	Jewish	3.69	1.69		<i>Second</i>	Jewish	3.37	1.79
		Arab	2.56	1.65			Arab	2.54	1.42
	<i>Third</i>	Jewish	3.79	1.64		<i>Third</i>	Jewish	3.61	1.85
		Arab	2.90	1.70			Arab	2.65	1.58
	<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	3.75	1.63		<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	3.44	1.83
		Arab	2.84	1.74			Arab	2.62	1.57
Morality	<i>First</i>	Jewish	2.89	1.58	Civil Rights least	<i>First</i>	Jewish	4.72	1.73
		Arab	2.56	1.58	liked		Arab	4.39	1.60
	<i>Second</i>	Jewish	2.79	1.59		<i>Second</i>	Jewish	4.51	1.83
		Arab	2.40	1.60			Arab	4.26	1.57
	<i>Third</i>	Jewish	3.00	1.64		<i>Third</i>	Jewish	4.78	1.70
		Arab	2.62	1.71			Arab	4.30	1.67
	<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	2.94	1.59		<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	4.63	1.74
		Arab	2.69	1.73			Arab	4.23	1.70
Loyalty to the country	<i>First</i>	Jewish	2.25	1.56	Indirect Exclusion	<i>First</i>	Jewish	3.22	1.78
		Arab	3.42	1.89			Arab	3.54	1.63


	<i>Second</i>	Jewish	2.31	1.60		<i>Second</i>	Jewish	3.39	1.86
		Arab	3.19	1.84			Arab	3.65	1.62
	<i>Third</i>	Jewish	2.56	1.68		<i>Third</i>	Jewish	3.14	1.74
		Arab	3.38	1.83			Arab	3.62	1.70
	<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	2.53	1.73		<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	3.29	1.78
		Arab	3.25	1.80			Arab	3.71	1.73
Hatred	<i>First</i>	Jewish	3.18	1.96	Exclusion	<i>First</i>	Jewish	3.54	1.73
		Arab	3.57	2.07			Arab	3.88	1.61
	<i>Second</i>	Jewish	3.47	2.01		<i>Second</i>	Jewish	3.80	1.79
		Arab	3.86	2.04			Arab	4.15	1.58
	<i>Third</i>	Jewish	3.30	2.04		<i>Third</i>	Jewish	3.46	1.73
		Arab	3.80	2.07			Arab	4.21	1.66
	<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	3.34	2.00		<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	3.48	1.76
		Arab	3.96	2.05			Arab	4.13	1.61
Contempt	<i>First</i>	Jewish	3.40	2.04	Treatment	<i>Second</i>	Jewish	50.31	27.05
		Arab	3.86	2.07			Arab	47.69	30.46
	<i>Second</i>	Jewish	3.61	2.07		<i>Third</i>	Jewish	46.51	26.63
		Arab	4.27	1.96			Arab	46.62	32.90
	<i>Third</i>	Jewish	3.57	2.05		<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	47.64	27.26
		Arab	4.16	2.00			Arab	48.30	31.49
	<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	3.58	2.11	Justified	<i>Second</i>	Jewish	3.85	2.00

		Arab	4.48	1.97			Arab	3.73	2.06
	<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	3.58	2.11		<i>Third</i>	Jewish	4.10	1.90
		Arab	4.48	1.97			Arab	3.64	1.95
Anger	<i>First</i>	Jewish	4.60	1.99		<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	3.96	1.91
		Arab	4.49	2.05			Arab	3.87	1.99
	<i>Second</i>	Jewish	4.87	1.88	Dehumanization	<i>Second</i>	Jewish	3.87	1.84
		Arab	4.59	1.97			Arab	4.34	1.69
	<i>Third</i>	Jewish	4.55	2.01		<i>Third</i>	Jewish	3.57	1.76
		Arab	4.64	1.91			Arab	4.51	1.71
	<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	4.65	1.98		<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	3.71	1.79
		Arab	4.74	1.91			Arab	4.56	1.62
Fear	<i>First</i>	Jewish	3.79	2.10	Exclusion policies	<i>Second</i>	Jewish	3.44	1.58
		Arab	3.91	2.10	Least Liked		Arab	3.98	1.30
	<i>Second</i>	Jewish	3.89	2.11		<i>Third</i>	Jewish	3.27	1.50
		Arab	3.78	2.05			Arab	3.96	1.42
	<i>Third</i>	Jewish	3.78	2.12		<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	3.36	1.55
		Arab	3.82	2.13			Arab	4.09	1.36
	<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish	3.80	2.12	Disgust	<i>First</i>	Jewish	3.65	2.07
		Arab	3.95	2.05			Arab	4.22	2.15
						<i>Second</i>	Jewish	3.95	2.06
							Arab	4.61	2.07

Third	Jewish	3.82	2.12
	Arab	4.64	2.02
Fourth	Jewish	3.80	2.10
	Arab	4.74	2.04


The analysis indicated that there were significant differences between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel in evaluations of traits (see Figure 47), such that across waves Israeli Jews rated their least liked group members as having significantly greater capabilities, warmth and morality compared to Arab citizens rating (all p 's <.05). Arab citizens of Israel, on the other hand, rated across waves the loyalty (to the country) of their least liked group significantly higher than the rating of the Israeli Jews (all p 's <.001).

Figure 47. Mean evaluations of traits, filtered by nationality




Significant difference between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel was also found in threat perceptions (see Figure 48), such that only the second wave the mean threat perceptions of Israeli Jews was significantly higher than that of Arabs ($p < .01$). The significant increase in the second ($p < .01$) wave compared to the first among Israeli Jews may be related to the spike in terror attacks which took place around that time.

Figure 48. Mean threat perceptions scale filtered by nationality.




Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel also differed significantly in emotions towards their least liked group members. In particular, Arab citizens of Israel showed significantly higher hatred, contempt and disgust (towards their least liked group) than Israeli Jews across waves (*all p's* $< .001$). Further, while Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel did not differ significantly in the first, third and fourth waves in their mean anger, in the second wave Israeli Jews showed significantly higher anger compared to Arab citizens of Israel ($p < .05$). Furthermore, while Israeli Jews and Arab citizens did not differ significantly in the first and the second waves in their mean disappointment, Arab citizens in the third wave and the fourth waves showed higher disappointment compared to Israeli Jews, a difference which was marginally significant in wave 3 ($p = .058$) and significant in wave 4 ($p < .01$). No significant differences were found between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens in fear across waves (see Figure 49)

Figure 49. Mean emotions filtered by nationality.




Similarly, while Israeli Jews and Arab citizens did not differ in the first, second and fourth waves in the levels of warmth/ favorability towards their least liked group (see Figure 49), in the third wave Israeli Jews showed significantly greater warmth towards their least liked group compared to Arabs ($p < .01$).

Figure 49. Feeling Thermometer, filtered by nationality.




Significant differences between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel were also found in their mean openness to political other (the least liked group), such that Israeli Jews' mean openness was significantly higher than that of Arabs' across waves (*all p's* <.001) see Figure 50.

Figure 50. Mean openness to political other scale, filtered by nationality




Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel also differed in their support for civil right towards their least liked group (see Figure 51), such that Arab's support for civil right was significantly lower than that of Jew's (*all p's* <.01).

Figure 51. Mean civil right scale, filtered by nationality



Significant differences between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel were also found in support for indirect exclusion (See Figure 52) and exclusion, such that across waves Arab's support for indirect and direct exclusion was significantly higher than that of Jew's (p 's $<.01$).


Figure 52. Mean Indirect and Direct Exclusion scales, filtered by nationality



Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel also differed in their dehumanization perceptions of their least liked group (see Figure 53), such that Arab citizens of Israel held significantly


greater dehumanization perceptions compared to Israeli Jews across waves (*all p*'s <.001) and this gap was greater in the third wave.

Figure 53. Mean Dehumanization scale, filtered by nationality




Similarly, Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel significantly differed in support for exclusion policies towards their least liked group (see Figure 54) such that Arab's support was significantly higher than that of Jew's across waves (*all p*'s <.001).

Figure 54. Mean support for exclusion policies scale, filtered by nationality



Last, while Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel did not differ in their perceptions of negativity/positivity of the treatment their least liked group receives in the society, these groups differed significantly in their perceptions of justifications towards this treatment (see Figure 55). In particular, while there was no significant difference in the second or fourth waves, in the third wave Israeli Jews justified the treatment their least liked group receive significantly more than Arabs ($p < .001$).

Figure 55. Justification of treatment, filtered by nationality



10.2 DIFFERENCES BY POLITICAL AFFILIATION

	Wave	Affiliation	Mean	SD		Wave	Affiliation	Mean	SD
Threat Perceptions <small>HERZLIYA</small> <small>Center for Strategic Studies</small> <small>of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem</small>	<i>First</i>	Left	4.03	1.63	Disappointment	<i>First</i>	Left	4.56	2.15
		Center	4.85	1.63			Center	4.25	2.07
		Right	4.85	1.76			Right	4.60	2.24
	<i>Second</i>	Left	3.97	1.63		<i>Second</i>	Left	4.60	2.03
		Center	3.96	1.55			Center	4.45	1.99
		Right	5.25	1.72			Right	5.04	2.09
	<i>Third</i>	Left	4.21	1.73		<i>Third</i>	Left	4.38	2.05
		Center	3.90	1.64			Center	4.10	2.02
		Right	4.72	1.85			Right	4.76	2.16
	<i>Fourth</i>	Left	4.52	1.58		<i>Fourth</i>	Left	4.90	1.94
		Center	3.88	1.60			Center	4.28	2.04
		Right	4.75	1.77			Right	4.58	2.14
Capabilities	<i>First</i>	Left	4.33	1.44	Feeling Thermometer	<i>First</i>	Left	29.81	20.13
		Center	4.10	1.57			Center	33.39	21.69
		Right	3.80	1.73			Right	23.90	21.34
	<i>Second</i>	Left	4.51	1.51		<i>Second</i>	Left	29.96	19.37
		Center	4.16	1.49			Center	32.14	19.23
		Right	3.77	1.72			Right	21.70	21.84
	<i>Third</i>	Left	4.37	1.53		<i>Third</i>	Left	28.21	21.42
		Center	4.07	1.44			Center	31.94	20.56
		Right	3.89	1.65			Right	24.40	23.63
	<i>Fourth</i>	Left	4.65	1.48		<i>Fourth</i>	Left	24.64	21.10
		Center	4.05	1.58			Center	30.10	22.36
		Right	3.77	1.70			Right	20.65	22.69
Warmth	<i>First</i>	Left	4.20	1.43	Openness to Political Other	<i>First</i>	Left	4.61	1.71
		Center	4.01	1.45			Center	3.76	1.79
		Right	3.42	1.76			Right	3.08	1.67
	<i>Second</i>	Left	4.15	1.47		<i>Second</i>	Left	4.56	1.72
		Center	3.88	1.46			Center	3.78	1.66
		Right	3.45	1.82			Right	2.82	1.66
	<i>Third</i>	Left	4.13	1.53		<i>Third</i>	Left	4.83	1.69
		Center	4.03	1.43			Center	3.86	1.78
		Right	3.59	1.73			Right	3.17	1.76
	<i>Fourth</i>	Left	4.00	1.45		<i>Fourth</i>	Left	4.80	1.68
		Center	3.95	1.51			Center	3.63	1.79
		Right	3.58	1.72			Right	2.92	1.66
Morality	<i>First</i>	Left	3.39	1.60	Civil Rights least liked	<i>First</i>	Left	5.65	1.18
		Center	3.25	1.51			Center	5.13	1.48
		Right	2.57	1.55			Right	4.26	1.82


	<i>Second</i>	Left	3.41	1.48		<i>Second</i>	Left	5.52	1.32	
		Center	3.25	1.48			Center	5.09	1.45	
		Right	2.38	1.55			Right	3.92	1.91	
	<i>Third</i>	Left	3.36	1.65		<i>Third</i>	Left	5.65	1.28	
		Center	3.27	1.49			Center	5.20	1.43	
		Right	2.77	1.67			Right	4.35	1.78	
	<i>Fourth</i>	Left	3.31	1.56		<i>Fourth</i>	Left	5.62	1.14	
		Center	3.17	1.47			Center	4.91	1.57	
		Right	2.72	1.62			Right	4.19	1.82	
Loyalty to the country	<i>First</i>	Left	3.05	1.78	Indirect Exclusion	<i>First</i>	Left	2.15	1.12	
		Center	2.51	1.63			Center	2.82	1.52	
		Right	1.90	1.34			Right	3.71	1.86	
	<i>Second</i>	Left	3.22	1.72			<i>Second</i>	Left	2.29	1.27
		Center	2.68	1.65				Center	2.80	1.47
		Right	1.85	1.37				Right	4.01	1.93
	<i>Third</i>	Left	3.23	1.77			<i>Third</i>	Left	2.19	1.22
		Center	2.75	1.66				Center	2.74	1.48
		Right	2.30	1.60				Right	3.58	1.83
	<i>Fourth</i>	Left	3.28	1.83			<i>Fourth</i>	Left	2.15	1.06
		Center	2.69	1.75				Center	3.02	1.62
		Right	2.22	1.61				Right	3.78	1.84
Hatred	<i>First</i>	Left	2.78	1.71	Exclusion	<i>First</i>	Left	2.39	1.32	
		Center	2.66	1.73			Center	3.27	1.61	
		Right	3.55	2.06			Right	3.98	1.72	
	<i>Second</i>	Left	2.78	1.71			<i>Second</i>	Left	2.47	1.44
		Center	2.87	1.70				Center	3.26	1.52
		Right	3.99	2.10				Right	4.46	1.71
	<i>Third</i>	Left	2.76	1.88			<i>Third</i>	Left	2.15	1.26
		Center	2.76	1.78				Center	3.13	1.59
		Right	3.70	2.12				Right	3.96	1.68
	<i>Fourth</i>	Left	2.99	1.84			<i>Fourth</i>	Left	2.29	1.26
		Center	2.70	1.81				Center	3.09	1.63
		Right	3.76	2.04				Right	4.05	1.72
Contempt	<i>First</i>	Left	3.28	1.84	Dehumanization	<i>Second</i>	Left	2.92	1.48	
		Center	2.96	1.81			Center	3.32	1.61	
		Right	3.66	2.15			Right	4.43	1.84	
	<i>Second</i>	Left	3.16	1.89			<i>Third</i>	Left	2.89	1.54
		Center	3.09	1.80				Center	3.07	1.53
		Right	4.02	2.17				Right	3.99	1.81
	<i>Third</i>	Left	3.24	1.98			<i>Fourth</i>	Left	3.04	1.54
		Center	3.04	1.87				Center	3.18	1.57
		Right	3.91	2.09				Right	4.17	1.83
	<i>Fourth</i>	Left	3.24	1.98		Exclusion policies Least Liked	<i>Second</i>	Left	2.57	1.23
		Center	3.04	1.87				Center	2.90	1.30

		Right	3.91	2.09			Right	3.96	1.60
Anger	<i>First</i>	Left	4.64	1.91	Treatment	<i>Third</i>	Left	2.48	1.25
		Center	4.02	1.97			Center	2.83	1.32
		Right	4.89	1.96			Right	3.69	1.51
	<i>Second</i>	Left	4.67	1.83		<i>Fourth</i>	Left	2.49	1.14
		Center	4.39	1.81			Center	2.96	1.39
		Right	5.18	1.88			Right	3.83	1.56
	<i>Third</i>	Left	4.63	1.87		<i>Second</i>	Left	51.14	25.52
		Center	3.97	1.93			Center	46.97	23.72
		Right	4.81	2.03			Right	51.87	28.94
	<i>Fourth</i>	Left	5.07	1.67		<i>Third</i>	Left	53.20	25.74
		Center	4.16	2.01			Center	41.04	24.26
		Right	4.75	2.02			Right	47.41	27.47
Fear	<i>First</i>	Left	3.27	1.95	<i>Fourth</i>	Left	54.71	27.89	
		Center	3.49	1.99		Center	44.11	26.50	
		Right	4.08	2.15		Right	47.10	27.07	
	<i>Second</i>	Left	3.17	1.90	Justified	<i>Second</i>	Left	3.59	1.78
		Center	3.59	2.00			Center	4.04	1.66
		Right	4.24	2.15			Right	3.82	2.21
	<i>Third</i>	Left	3.49	1.93	<i>Third</i>	Left	3.81	1.83	
		Center	3.49	2.04		Center	4.15	1.66	
		Right	4.00	2.18		Right	4.15	2.02	
	<i>Fourth</i>	Left	3.63	1.95	<i>Fourth</i>	Left	3.73	1.90	
		Center	3.72	2.03		Center	3.88	1.71	
		Right	3.89	2.20		Right	4.06	2.00	
Disgust	<i>First</i>	Left	3.41	1.86					
		Center	3.22	1.95					
		Right	3.93	2.14					
	<i>Second</i>	Left	3.31	1.83					
		Center	3.44	1.82					
		Right	4.40	2.12					
	<i>Third</i>	Left	3.38	2.06					
		Center	3.21	1.92					
		Right	4.24	2.14					
	<i>Fourth</i>	Left	3.52	1.99					
		Center	3.31	1.93					
		Right	4.13	2.15					

The analysis indicated that there were significant differences between the political camps in evaluations of traits (see Figure 56) such that across waves and traits the evaluations of the political left were significantly higher (e.g., more moral) than those of the political right (all p 's $<.01$). Similarly, the evaluations of the political center were significantly higher than those of the political right across most waves and traits (all p 's $<.05$), except non-significant difference


in evaluation of capabilities in the third wave. Further, in evaluating loyalty to the country, the political left evaluations across waves were significantly higher than the evaluations of the political center (all p 's <.001) Furthermore, in evaluating warmth in the second wave, the political left were significantly higher than the political center (p <.05), and in evaluating capabilities, in the second and fourth waves, the political left were significantly higher than the political center(all p 's <.01).

Figure 56. Mean evaluation of Traits, filtered by political affiliation




Significant differences between the political affiliations were also found in threat perceptions (see Figure 57), such that across waves the mean threat perception of the political right was significantly higher than that of the political center (all p 's <.001). In waves 1-3 the mean threat perception of the political right was also significantly higher than that of the political left (all p 's <.01). Further, while the political left and center did not differ significantly in the first 3 waves in the fourth wave the mean threat perception of the political left was significantly higher than that of the center (p <.01).

Figure 57. Mean threat perceptions, filtered by political affiliation




The political camps also differed significantly in their emotions towards the least liked group members (See Figure 58). In particular, the political right showed across waves significantly higher hatred (all p 's <.001), contempt (all p 's <.05), and disgust (all p 's <.001) compared to the political left and center. In waves 1-3, the political right also showed significantly more fear (all p 's <.01) compared to the political left and center. The political right also showed across waves significantly higher anger (all p 's <.001) compared to the political center. In waves 1-3 the political right also showed significantly higher disappointment (all p 's <.01) compared to the political center. Compared to the political left, the political right showed significantly higher disappointment in the second wave (p <.01) and marginally significant in the third wave (p =.056). In terms of anger, the political right showed significantly higher anger compared to the left in the second wave (p <.001). Further, while the political left and center generally did not differ in their mean emotions towards their least liked group (e.g., disgust, hatred, see Figure 58), the political left showed significantly more contempt (p <.05) in the first wave and fourth waves; significantly more anger in the first third and fourth waves (all p 's <.01) and significantly greater disappointment in the fourth wave (p <.05).

Figure 58. Mean emotions, filtered by political affiliation




The political camps also significantly differed in their levels of warmth/ favorability towards their least liked group (see Figure 59), such that across all waves the political center showed significantly greater warmth compared to the political right (all p 's <.001) and the political left also showed significantly greater warmth towards their least liked group compared to the political right in the first two waves (all p 's <.001), and marginally significant and the last two waves (all p 's <.06).

Figure 59. Feeling Thermometer, filtered by political affiliation




Significant differences between political affiliations were also found in their mean openness to political other (the least liked group), (see Figure 60) such that the political left mean openness was significantly higher than that of the political center and right across waves (all p 's $<.001$) and the mean openness of the political center was significantly higher than that of the political right across waves (all p 's $<.001$).

Figure 60. Mean openness to political other scale, filtered by political affiliation




The political camps also differed significantly in their support for civil rights (see Figure 61), such that across waves mean support for civil right of the political left was significantly higher than that of the political right and the political center (all p 's <.01). The mean support for civil right of the political center was also significantly higher than that of the political right across waves (all p 's <.001).

Figure 61. Mean support for civil rights, filtered by political affiliation



Significant differences between the political camps were also found in support for indirect exclusion and exclusion (see Figure 62) such that across waves the mean support for indirect exclusion and exclusion of the political right was significantly higher than those of the political left and center (all p 's $<.001$). The mean support for indirect exclusion and exclusion of the political center was significantly higher than that of the political left across waves (all p 's $<.01$).

Figure 62. Mean Indirect and Direct Exclusion scales, filtered by political affiliation



Similarly, the political right across waves showed significantly higher dehumanization perceptions of the least liked group members compared to the political center and left (all p 's $<.001$) see Figure 63. Further, while the political center and left did not differ significantly in the third and the fourth waves, in the second wave the political center showed significantly higher dehumanization perceptions compared to the political left ($p <.01$).






Figure 63. Mean dehumanization perception, filtered by political affiliation




A similar pattern is seen in support for exclusion policies towards least liked group (see Figure 64), such that the political right across waves showed significantly more support compared to the political center and left (all p 's $< .001$) and the political center showed significantly more support than the political left across waves (all p 's $< .05$).

Figure 64. Mean support for exclusion policies, filtered by political affiliation




Significant differences between the political camps were also found in perception regarding the treatment the least liked group receives in the society (see Figure 65). Across waves the political left perceived the treatment as significantly more positive than the political center (all p 's $<.05$). Further, in the second and third waves the political right perceived the treatment as significantly more positive than the political center (all p 's $<.01$). In the third and fourth waves the political left perceived the treatment as significantly more positive than the political right (all p 's $<.05$).

Figure 65. Mean treatment perceptions, filtered by political affiliation



Last, the political camps also differed significantly in their perceptions of justifications towards the treatment the least liked group receives in the society (see Figure 66). In particular, while there were no significant differences between the groups in the third and the fourth waves, in the second wave the political center justified the treatment the least liked group receives significantly more than the political left ($p < .01$) and the political right (all $p = .053$).

Figure 66. Mean treatment justification, filtered by political affiliation



10.3 DIFFERENCES BY LEAST LIKE GROUP CHOICE

	Wave	Least Liked Group	Mean	SD		Wave	Least Liked Group	Mean	SD		
Threat Perceptions	<i>First</i>	Jewish settlers	4.85	1.72	Disappointment	<i>First</i>	Jewish settlers	4.81	2.07		
		Arab citizens	5.39	1.52			Arab citizens	4.87	2.15		
		Leftists	5.21	1.55			Leftists	5.49	1.88		
		Rightists	4.19	1.76			Rightists	4.86	1.99		
		Ultra-orthodox	3.64	1.53			Ultra-orthodox	4.85	1.88		
		Immigrants/refugees	4.20	1.76			Immigrants/refugees	3.42	2.18		
	<i>Second</i>	Foreign workers	3.46	1.79		<i>Second</i>	Foreign workers	3.21	2.06		
			Jewish settlers	4.65				1.61	Jewish settlers	4.77	1.98
			Arab citizens	5.52				1.54	Arab citizens	5.31	1.97
			Leftists	5.24				1.62	Leftists	5.67	1.65
			Rightists	4.07				1.78	Rightists	4.70	1.88
			Ultra-orthodox	3.88				1.59	Ultra-orthodox	4.68	1.97
	<i>Third</i>	Immigrants/refugees	4.31	1.68		<i>Third</i>	Immigrants/refugees	3.51	2.01		
			LGBT	3.69				1.91	LGBT	4.72	2.14
			Jewish settlers	4.96				1.67	Jewish settlers	4.84	1.96
Arab citizens			5.03	1.73	Arab citizens			4.76	2.10		
Leftists			5.11	1.62	Leftists			5.54	1.86		
Rightists	4.49	1.59	Rightists	4.78	1.86						
	Ultra-orthodox	3.80		1.70	Ultra-orthodox	4.57	2.02				

		Immigrants/refugees	4.33	1.73			Immigrants/refugees	3.50	2.05
		LGBT	3.65	2.04			LGBT	5.00	2.15
	<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	4.95	1.55		<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	4.91	1.65
		Arab citizens	5.38	1.46			Arab citizens	4.87	1.90
		Leftists	4.81	1.79			Leftists	5.30	1.97
		Rightists	4.36	1.53			Rightists	5.38	1.84
		Ultra-orthodox	3.27	2.05			Ultra-orthodox	3.60	2.07
		Immigrants/refugees	1.74	.88			Immigrants/refugees	2.67	2.06
		LGBT	4.24	1.63			LGBT	5.11	1.91
Capabilities	<i>First</i>	Jewish settlers	4.04	1.74	Feeling Thermometer	<i>First</i>	Jewish settlers	24.52	24.17
		Arab citizens	3.74	1.68			Arab citizens	23.21	20.84
		Leftists	4.26	1.75			Leftists	23.59	21.86
		Rightists	4.55	1.51			Rightists	33.94	23.34
		Ultra-orthodox	3.87	1.63			Ultra-orthodox	30.34	19.17
		Immigrants/refugees	3.57	1.59			Immigrants/refugees	27.79	23.03
		Foreign workers	4.13	1.74			Foreign workers	40.66	24.41
	<i>Second</i>	Jewish settlers	4.19	1.78		<i>Second</i>	Jewish settlers	28.43	24.17
		Arab citizens	3.72	1.62			Arab citizens	22.66	21.38
		Leftists	4.29	1.69			Leftists	21.74	21.20
		Rightists	4.22	1.49			Rightists	30.96	22.82

		Ultra-orthodox	3.95	1.70			Ultra-orthodox	30.06	20.12	
		Immigrants/refugees	3.40	1.34			Immigrants/refugees	28.97	22.37	
		LGBT	3.47	1.92			LGBT	18.38	21.57	
	<i>Third</i>	Jewish settlers	3.93	1.63		<i>Third</i>	Jewish settlers	23.01	23.98	
		Arab citizens	3.93	1.51			Arab citizens	27.39	24.46	
		Leftists	4.28	1.71			Leftists	22.29	21.36	
		Rightists	4.26	1.50			Rightists	30.21	24.15	
		Ultra-orthodox	3.79	1.73			Ultra-orthodox	28.16	23.87	
		Immigrants/refugees	3.46	1.35			Immigrants/refugees	28.23	20.17	
		LGBT	3.65	1.80			LGBT	15.55	21.19	
	<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	4.71	1.49		<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	19.75	19.63	
		Arab citizens	3.89	1.48			Arab citizens	19.18	19.26	
		Leftists	3.75	1.91			Leftists	16.76	21.82	
		Rightists	5.38	1.31			Rightists	39.29	30.82	
		Ultra-orthodox	4.80	2.05			Ultra-orthodox	70.20	27.22	
		Immigrants/refugees	6.00	1.22			Immigrants/refugees	68.00	24.12	
		LGBT	4.08	1.61			LGBT	26.05	19.66	
Warmth	<i>First</i>	Jewish settlers	2.91	1.75		Openness to Political Other	<i>First</i>	Jewish settlers	3.11	1.89
		Arab citizens	4.09	1.74				Arab citizens	2.70	1.37
		Leftists	2.46	1.50				Leftists	4.12	1.76

	Rightists	3.54	1.85
	Ultra-orthodox	3.56	1.62
	Immigrants/refugees	3.75	1.46
	Foreign workers	3.83	1.64
<i>Second</i>	Jewish settlers	3.25	1.83
	Arab citizens	3.75	1.87
	Leftists	2.73	1.55
	Rightists	3.41	1.95
	Ultra-orthodox	3.43	1.59
	Immigrants/refugees	3.77	1.32
	LGBT	3.22	1.86
<i>Third</i>	Jewish settlers	3.04	1.63
	Arab citizens	4.07	1.75
	Leftists	2.60	1.58
	Rightists	3.60	1.78
	Ultra-orthodox	3.50	1.66
	Immigrants/refugees	4.03	1.32
	LGBT	3.59	1.82
<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	3.89	1.25
	Arab citizens	3.99	1.59

	Rightists	4.58	1.88
	Ultra-orthodox	4.10	1.68
	Immigrants/refugees	2.56	1.47
	Foreign workers	3.17	1.56
<i>Second</i>	Jewish settlers	3.40	1.76
	Arab citizens	2.62	1.49
	Leftists	4.06	1.69
	Rightists	4.14	1.84
	Ultra-orthodox	3.91	1.75
	Immigrants/refugees	2.53	1.40
	LGBT	2.21	1.43
<i>Third</i>	Jewish settlers	3.13	1.84
	Arab citizens	2.85	1.50
	Leftists	4.11	1.72
	Rightists	4.40	1.76
	Ultra-orthodox	4.09	1.87
	Immigrants/refugees	2.68	1.47
	LGBT	2.34	1.63
<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	4.48	1.92
	Arab citizens	2.56	1.32

		Leftists	2.27	1.50			Leftists	3.56	1.81
		Rightists	5.38	1.47			Rightists	6.01	1.15
		Ultra-orthodox	5.40	1.52			Ultra-orthodox	5.28	1.68
		Immigrants/refugees	3.56	2.35			Immigrants/refugees	5.38	1.89
		LGBT	3.72	1.50			LGBT	4.30	1.60
Morality	<i>First</i>	Jewish settlers	2.38	1.49	Civil Rights least liked	<i>First</i>	Jewish settlers	4.52	1.80
		Arab citizens	2.37	1.49			Arab citizens	3.98	1.74
		Leftists	2.47	1.53			Leftists	5.18	1.68
		Rightists	3.08	1.58			Rightists	5.60	1.50
		Ultra-orthodox	3.34	1.56			Ultra-orthodox	5.28	1.14
		Immigrants/refugees	2.82	1.50			Immigrants/refugees	4.08	1.79
		Foreign workers	3.71	1.73			Foreign workers	4.60	1.76
	<i>Second</i>	Jewish settlers	2.64	1.53		<i>Second</i>	Jewish settlers	4.57	1.69
		Arab citizens	2.21	1.43			Arab citizens	3.83	1.94
		Leftists	2.63	1.71			Leftists	4.87	1.73
		Rightists	3.00	1.67			Rightists	5.54	1.39
		Ultra-orthodox	3.35	1.62			Ultra-orthodox	5.17	1.18
		Immigrants/refugees	2.85	1.27			Immigrants/refugees	3.94	1.74
		LGBT	2.28	1.75			LGBT	4.24	1.76
	<i>Third</i>	Jewish settlers	2.57	1.60		<i>Third</i>	Jewish settlers	4.46	1.68

		Arab citizens	2.68	1.59			Arab citizens	4.16	1.84
		Leftists	2.73	1.66			Leftists	4.97	1.71
		Rightists	3.13	1.63			Rightists	5.41	1.52
		Ultra-orthodox	3.34	1.64			Ultra-orthodox	5.23	1.26
		Immigrants/refugees	2.91	1.46			Immigrants/refugees	4.10	1.64
		LGBT	2.45	1.80			LGBT	4.44	1.92
	<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	2.88	1.34		<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	5.56	.91
		Arab citizens	2.47	1.40			Arab citizens	4.10	1.83
		Leftists	2.50	1.63			Leftists	4.47	1.89
		Rightists	3.71	1.92			Rightists	6.49	.92
		Ultra-orthodox	5.20	1.79			Ultra-orthodox	5.20	2.42
		Immigrants/refugees	5.33	1.41			Immigrants/refugees	6.00	.80
		LGBT	3.29	1.56			LGBT	5.38	1.04
Loyalty to the country	<i>First</i>	Jewish settlers	3.69	1.95		<i>First</i>	Jewish settlers	3.39	1.83
		Arab citizens	1.74	1.20	Indirect Exclusion		Arab citizens	3.95	1.77
		Leftists	2.06	1.50			Leftists	2.67	1.64
		Rightists	4.75	1.59			Rightists	2.35	1.57
		Ultra-orthodox	2.46	1.41			Ultra-orthodox	2.45	1.11
		Immigrants/refugees	1.90	1.27			Immigrants/refugees	4.14	1.76
		Foreign workers	2.72	1.85			Foreign workers	3.48	1.72

<i>Second</i>	Jewish settlers	3.78	1.91
	Arab citizens	1.67	1.08
	Leftists	2.02	1.55
	Rightists	4.13	1.78
	Ultra-orthodox	2.43	1.40
	Immigrants/refugees	1.90	1.14
	LGBT	3.28	1.88
<i>Third</i>	Jewish settlers	3.47	1.81
	Arab citizens	1.89	1.30
	Leftists	2.19	1.56
	Rightists	4.46	1.79
	Ultra-orthodox	2.58	1.45
	Immigrants/refugees	2.20	1.41
	LGBT	3.56	1.76
<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	4.00	1.65
	Arab citizens	1.82	1.26
	Leftists	2.22	1.59
	Rightists	5.29	1.81
	Ultra-orthodox	5.80	1.30
	Immigrants/refugees	5.67	1.50

<i>Second</i>	Jewish settlers	3.30	1.73
	Arab citizens	4.09	1.96
	Leftists	3.00	1.71
	Rightists	2.40	1.44
	Ultra-orthodox	2.53	1.15
	Immigrants/refugees	4.27	1.67
	LGBT	3.60	1.78
<i>Third</i>	Jewish settlers	3.41	1.73
	Arab citizens	3.75	1.86
	Leftists	2.92	1.72
	Rightists	2.47	1.48
	Ultra-orthodox	2.54	1.25
	Immigrants/refugees	4.09	1.64
	LGBT	3.46	1.91
<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	2.20	.86
	Arab citizens	3.82	1.81
	Leftists	3.43	1.90
	Rightists	1.49	.98
	Ultra-orthodox	2.80	2.39
	Immigrants/refugees	1.86	.72

		LGBT	2.33	1.43			LGBT	2.29	.96
Hatred	<i>First</i>	Jewish settlers	3.79	2.08	Exclusion	<i>First</i>	Jewish settlers	3.70	1.81
		Arab citizens	4.21	1.93			Arab citizens	4.32	1.49
		Leftists	3.53	2.11			Leftists	3.16	1.64
		Rightists	3.07	1.91			Rightists	2.87	1.68
		Ultra-orthodox	2.98	1.79			Ultra-orthodox	2.59	1.30
		Immigrants/refugees	2.47	1.75			Immigrants/refugees	4.46	1.58
		Foreign workers	2.28	1.65			Foreign workers	4.08	1.62
	<i>Second</i>	Jewish settlers	3.64	2.03		<i>Second</i>	Jewish settlers	3.60	1.79
		Arab citizens	4.47	1.96			Arab citizens	4.62	1.62
		Leftists	3.83	1.96			Leftists	3.72	1.55
		Rightists	3.04	1.85			Rightists	3.08	1.69
		Ultra-orthodox	2.95	1.78			Ultra-orthodox	2.81	1.43
		Immigrants/refugees	2.59	1.62			Immigrants/refugees	4.55	1.58
		LGBT	3.60	2.23			LGBT	4.12	1.72
	<i>Third</i>	Jewish settlers	3.80	2.13		<i>Third</i>	Jewish settlers	3.80	1.76
		Arab citizens	4.29	1.93			Arab citizens	4.21	1.61
		Leftists	4.03	2.13			Leftists	3.50	1.54
		Rightists	2.90	1.75			Rightists	3.04	1.75
		Ultra-orthodox	3.05	1.90			Ultra-orthodox	2.66	1.50

		Immigrants/refugees	2.73	1.79			Immigrants/refugees	4.35	1.55
		LGBT	3.42	2.29			LGBT	4.24	1.88
	<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	2.93	1.82		<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	2.25	1.17
		Arab citizens	4.21	1.88			Arab citizens	4.29	1.65
		Leftists	4.24	2.14			Leftists	3.72	1.69
		Rightists	3.37	2.22			Rightists	1.78	.94
		Ultra-orthodox	3.00	1.58			Ultra-orthodox	2.87	2.10
		Immigrants/refugees	2.00	1.50			Immigrants/refugees	1.63	.90
		LGBT	3.13	1.81			LGBT	2.43	1.31
Contempt	<i>First</i>	Jewish settlers	4.00	2.14	Dehumanization	<i>Second</i>	Jewish settlers	3.90	1.81
		Arab citizens	3.82	2.01			Arab citizens	4.82	1.74
		Leftists	4.29	2.23			Leftists	3.90	1.82
		Rightists	3.70	1.99			Rightists	3.51	1.72
		Ultra-orthodox	3.46	1.83			Ultra-orthodox	3.42	1.60
		Immigrants/refugees	2.57	1.81			Immigrants/refugees	3.39	1.70
		Foreign workers	2.54	1.81			LGBT	4.08	1.85
	<i>Second</i>	Jewish settlers	3.88	2.08		<i>Third</i>	Jewish settlers	4.18	1.84
		Arab citizens	4.09	2.09			Arab citizens	4.41	1.73
		Leftists	4.64	2.03			Leftists	4.18	1.82
		Rightists	3.65	1.93			Rightists	3.55	1.85

		Ultra-orthodox	3.36	1.81			Ultra-orthodox	3.55	1.69	
		Immigrants/refugees	2.60	1.68			Immigrants/refugees	3.31	1.64	
		LGBT	4.50	2.20			LGBT	3.87	1.95	
	<i>Third</i>	Jewish settlers	3.96	2.08		<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	2.80	1.43	
		Arab citizens	3.88	1.93			Arab citizens	4.85	1.72	
		Leftists	4.57	2.04			Leftists	3.96	1.83	
		Rightists	3.65	1.82			Rightists	2.72	1.53	
		Ultra-orthodox	3.59	1.99			Ultra-orthodox	3.00	1.51	
		Immigrants/refugees	2.75	1.80			Immigrants/refugees	2.79	1.40	
		LGBT	4.32	2.21			LGBT	3.19	1.50	
	<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	3.04	1.81		Exclusion policies Least Liked	<i>Second</i>	Jewish settlers	3.61	1.40
		Arab citizens	3.99	2.09				Arab citizens	3.95	1.67
		Leftists	4.92	2.10				Leftists	3.51	1.52
		Rightists	4.13	2.11				Rightists	2.91	1.37
		Ultra-orthodox	3.00	1.58				Ultra-orthodox	2.72	1.26
		Immigrants/refugees	1.89	1.36				Immigrants/refugees	3.81	1.34
		LGBT	3.74	1.96				LGBT	4.20	1.52
Anger	<i>First</i>	Jewish settlers	5.06	1.84			<i>Third</i>	Jewish settlers	3.71	1.43
		Arab citizens	5.28	1.71				Arab citizens	3.71	1.59
		Leftists	5.32	1.84				Leftists	3.46	1.56

	Rightists	4.73	1.87
	Ultra-orthodox	4.71	1.80
	Immigrants/refugees	3.60	2.08
	Foreign workers	2.88	1.90
<i>Second</i>	Jewish settlers	5.01	1.81
	Arab citizens	5.53	1.55
	Leftists	5.47	1.70
	Rightists	4.62	1.79
	Ultra-orthodox	4.66	1.70
	Immigrants/refugees	3.61	1.95
	LGBT	4.34	2.26
<i>Third</i>	Jewish settlers	5.07	1.72
	Arab citizens	5.15	1.81
	Leftists	5.24	1.84
	Rightists	4.45	1.58
	Ultra-orthodox	4.51	1.90
	Immigrants/refugees	3.68	1.96
	LGBT	4.41	2.26
<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	5.20	1.44
	Arab citizens	5.26	1.56

	Rightists	2.96	1.25	
	Ultra-orthodox	2.74	1.38	
	Immigrants/refugees	3.71	1.31	
	LGBT	4.13	1.61	
<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	2.81	1.05	
	Arab citizens	3.70	1.51	
	Leftists	3.90	1.69	
	Rightists	2.11	.96	
	Ultra-orthodox	2.40	1.51	
	Immigrants/refugees	2.06	1.01	
	LGBT	2.45	1.21	
Treatment	<i>Second</i>	Jewish settlers	55.83	27.45
		Arab citizens	51.69	29.22
		Leftists	52.52	29.71
		Rightists	53.91	30.26
		Ultra-orthodox	47.46	23.76
		Immigrants/refugees	39.92	23.86
		LGBT	47.74	30.50
	<i>Third</i>	Jewish settlers	51.34	32.13
		Arab citizens	49.93	26.69

		Leftists	5.07	1.92			Leftists	47.75	28.47
		Rightists	5.13	1.78			Rightists	53.08	32.20
		Ultra-orthodox	3.40	1.82			Ultra-orthodox	43.25	25.31
		Immigrants/refugees	2.11	1.69			Immigrants/refugees	34.92	23.58
		LGBT	5.27	1.73			LGBT	48.64	30.02
Fear	<i>First</i>	Jewish settlers	3.86	2.15		<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	62.98	26.74
		Arab citizens	4.93	1.84			Arab citizens	50.77	26.77
		Leftists	2.86	2.04			Leftists	47.17	28.72
		Rightists	3.38	1.93			Rightists	68.63	25.36
		Ultra-orthodox	3.10	1.92			Ultra-orthodox	69.20	30.96
		Immigrants/refugees	4.47	1.94			Immigrants/refugees	62.56	25.40
		Foreign workers	3.57	2.06			LGBT	43.95	24.79
	<i>Second</i>	Jewish settlers	3.46	2.00	Justified	<i>Second</i>	Jewish settlers	3.67	1.97
		Arab citizens	5.10	1.81			Arab citizens	3.90	2.18
		Leftists	2.81	1.88			Leftists	3.86	2.27
		Rightists	3.89	2.08			Rightists	3.19	1.80
		Ultra-orthodox	2.95	1.87			Ultra-orthodox	4.03	1.81
		Immigrants/refugees	4.42	1.85			Immigrants/refugees	4.06	1.75
		LGBT	3.18	2.08			LGBT	3.59	2.17

	<i>Third</i>	Jewish settlers	3.85	2.03		<i>Third</i>	Jewish settlers	3.49	1.94
		Arab citizens	4.70	1.90			Arab citizens	4.18	1.96
		Leftists	3.30	2.12			Leftists	4.01	2.16
		Rightists	4.23	1.90			Rightists	3.88	1.79
		Ultra-orthodox	2.89	1.95			Ultra-orthodox	4.21	1.79
		Immigrants/refugees	4.55	1.90			Immigrants/refugees	4.14	1.69
		LGBT	3.47	2.35			LGBT	3.65	2.18
	<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	3.75	1.94		<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	3.37	1.80
		Arab citizens	5.11	1.68			Arab citizens	4.05	1.94
		Leftists	2.59	1.90			Leftists	4.00	2.08
		Rightists	4.25	2.03			Rightists	3.42	1.77
		Ultra-orthodox	2.20	1.30			Ultra-orthodox	4.20	2.17
		Immigrants/refugees	1.33	.71			Immigrants/refugees	4.11	1.36
		LGBT	3.47	2.35			LGBT	4.40	1.85
Disgust	<i>First</i>	Jewish settlers	4.34	2.21					
		Arab citizens	4.15	2.06					
		Leftists	4.43	2.15					
		Rightists	3.93	2.10					
		Ultra-orthodox	3.64	1.95					
		Immigrants/refugees	3.05	1.94					


	Foreign workers	2.57	1.84
<i>Second</i>	Jewish settlers	4.04	2.12
	Arab citizens	4.44	2.05
	Leftists	4.63	2.06
	Rightists	3.83	1.87
	Ultra-orthodox	3.68	1.87
	Immigrants/refugees	3.15	1.88
	LGBT	5.53	1.84
<i>Third</i>	Jewish settlers	4.30	2.07
	Arab citizens	4.08	2.07
	Leftists	4.64	2.06
	Rightists	3.55	1.97
	Ultra-orthodox	3.76	2.13
	Immigrants/refugees	3.24	1.93
	LGBT	5.41	1.94
<i>Fourth</i>	Jewish settlers	3.63	2.00
	Arab citizens	4.07	2.07
	Leftists	4.81	2.15
	Rightists	3.79	2.32
	Ultra-orthodox	3.00	1.58

Immigrants/refugees	1.67	1.32
LGBT	3.67	1.91

Significant differences between the least liked group choice were found across all outcomes.

In terms of **threat perceptions** (see Figure 67), respondents who chose Arab citizens as their least liked group showed significantly higher threat perceptions across waves compared to rightists, ultra-orthodox, immigrants/refugees, LGBT (all p 's <.01). In waves 1-3 respondents who chose Arab citizens as their least liked group showed significantly higher threat perceptions compared to respondents who chose Jewish settlers (all p 's <.01). Further, while no significant difference found between respondents who chose Arabs citizens and Leftist as their least liked group in waves 1-3 in wave 4, the mean threat perceptions for Arabs was significantly higher (p <.01). Respondents who chose Jewish settlers showed significantly higher threat perceptions across waves compared to ultra-orthodox and LGBT (all p 's <.05); in the first two waves showed significantly higher threat compared to Rightists (all p 's <.01), in the fourth wave showed significantly higher threat compared to immigrants/refugees (p <.01) and in the first 3 waves showed lower threat perceptions compared to respondents who chose Arab citizens and leftists (all p 's <.05). Respondents who chose leftists as their least liked group showed significantly higher threat perceptions across waves compared to respondents who chose ultra-orthodox, immigrants/refugees and LGBT (all p 's <.01), in the first 2 waves showed significantly higher threat compared to rightists and Jewish settlers (all p 's <.01). Last, respondents who chose immigrants/refugees showed significantly higher threat perceptions across waves compared to LGBT (all p 's <.001) and in the first 3 waves showed significantly higher threat perceptions compared to respondents who chose ultra-orthodox (all p 's <.01).

Figure 67. Mean threat perceptions, by least liked group choice




In **evaluation of traits** of the least liked group (see Figure 68) and specifically loyalty to the country respondents who chose rightist as their least liked group evaluated across waves their loyalty significantly higher than respondents who chose all other groups (all p 's <.01). Similarly, respondents who chose Jewish settlers as their least liked group evaluated their loyalty significantly higher than all other groups except rightists (all p 's <.05). Respondents who chose LGBT as their least liked group evaluated their loyalty significantly higher than respondents who chose immigrants/refugees, ultra-orthodox, leftists and Arab citizens (all p 's <.001). Respondents who chose ultra-orthodox evaluated their loyalty significantly higher than immigrants/refugees and Arab citizens (all p 's <.001), and respondents who chose Arab citizens as their least liked group rated their loyalty as significantly lower than all other groups (all p 's <.01) except immigrants in wave 4. In term of morality respondents who chose ultra-orthodox as their least liked group evaluated across waves their morality significantly higher than respondents who chose all other groups (all p 's <.05) except rightist and settlers. Similarly, respondents who chose Rightists rated their morality across waves significantly higher than respondents who chose all other groups except ultra-orthodox and settlers (all p 's <.001). The morality of immigrants/refugees was evaluated across waves significantly higher than Arabs and Leftists (all p 's <.01). The morality of Arab citizens was evaluated across waves significantly lower than ultra-orthodox, rightists and immigrants/refugees (all p 's <.05).

In evaluations of capabilities, respondents who chose rightist evaluated across waves their capabilities as significantly greater than respondents who chose ultra-orthodox, immigrants/refugees and Arabs (all p 's <.05) Jewish settlers' capabilities were rated across

waves as significantly greater than that of Arabs, ultra-orthodox and immigrants/refugees (all p 's < .05) and ultra-orthodox capabilities were rated across waves as significantly greater than that of immigrants/refugees (all p 's < .01). Arab citizens capabilities were rated across waves significantly higher than immigrants/refugees (all p 's < .05). In evaluation of *warmth* of the least liked group respondents who chose Arab citizens as their least liked group rated their *warmth* significantly higher than Leftists across waves (all p 's < .01). Similarly, the warmth of immigrants/refugees was rated significantly higher than that of leftists across waves (all p 's < .01). The rightist's warmth was significantly higher than that all other groups except Jewish settlers (all p 's < .01). The warmth of ultra-orthodox warmth was rated across waves significantly higher than that of leftists (all p 's < .01). Jewish settlers' warmth was rated across waves as significantly higher than that of leftists (all p 's < .05), and leftists' warmth was rated across waves as significantly lower that of all other groups (all p 's < .01).


Figure 68. Trait evaluations, filtered by least liked group choice



In terms of **negative emotions** towards the least liked group (see Figure 69) In experiences of *hatred* towards the least liked group, respondents who chose Arab citizens showed across waves significantly higher hatred compared to respondents who chose all other groups (all p 's < .001) except leftists in the last two waves. Hatred towards leftist was across waves significantly higher than that of rightists, ultra-orthodox, immigrants/refugees and LGBT (all p 's < .05). Hatred towards Jewish settlers was across waves significantly lower than that of leftist and Arabs (all p 's < .001). Similarly, respondents who chose LGBT showed across waves significantly lower hatred compared to respondents who chose leftist and Arabs (all


p 's <.01). Hatred towards immigrants/refugees was across waves significantly lower than that of leftist and Arabs (all p 's <.01). In terms of anger respondents who chose leftists showed across waves significantly higher anger than respondents who chose immigrants and LGBT (all p 's <.01). Similarly, anger towards Arab citizens was across waves significantly higher than that of immigrants and LGBT (all p 's <.01). Anger towards Jewish settlers was across waves significantly higher than that of immigrants/refugees and LGBT (all p 's <.01). Anger towards ultra-orthodox was across waves significantly higher than that of immigrants/refugees and LGBT (all p 's <.05). Respondent who chose LGBT showed significantly lower anger compared to all other groups except immigrants (all p 's <.001) In experiences of contempt respondents who chose leftists as their least liked group showed across waves significantly higher contempt than respondents who chose all other groups except LGBT and rightist (all p 's <.01). Contempt towards rightists and ultra-orthodox was across waves significantly higher than that of immigrants/refugees (all p 's <.001), which was across waves significantly lower than all other groups (all p 's <.01). In experiences of disgust, respondents who chose LGBT as their least liked groups showed across waves significantly higher disgust compared to all other group choices except leftists (all p 's <.001). Similarly, respondents who chose leftists exhibited across waves significantly higher disgust compared to all other groups except LGBT (all p 's <.01). In experiencing disappointment towards the least liked group, respondents who chose leftists exhibited significantly higher disappointment compared to all other group choices in waves 1-3(all p 's <.001) and higher than LGBT and immigrants in wave 4. Respondents who chose immigrants/refugees showed across waves significantly lower disappointment compared to all other group choices (all p 's <.001) except LGBT. Disappointment towards Arabs across waves was significantly higher than that of immigrants/refugees (all p 's <.01). Disappointment towards rightists, Jewish settlers, ultra-orthodox and LGBT was across waves significantly higher than that of immigrants/refugees (all p 's <.001). Last, in experiencing fear, respondents who chose Arabs as their least liked group showed significantly higher fear than all other groups (all p 's <.01) except from immigrants/refugees in the third wave (all p 's <.05). Similarly, fear towards immigrants/refugees was significantly higher than all groups except Arabs (all p 's <.05). Fear towards Jewish settlers and rightists was in all waves significantly higher than that of ultra-orthodox, and leftists and LGBT (all p 's <.05). Fear towards leftists was in all waves significantly lower than all groups except ultra-orthodox and except LGBT (all p 's <.05). Fear towards ultra-orthodox was significantly lower than all groups except leftists and LGBT (all p 's <.05).

Figure 69. Mean emotions, filtered by least liked group choice




In terms of levels of **favorability and warmth** towards the least liked group (see Figure 70) respondents who chose leftists and LGBT as their least liked group showed significantly colder feeling than respondents who chose rightist, ultra-orthodox and immigrants/refugees (all p 's <.05). Mean feelings towards rightist was significantly warmer than that of all groups except ultra-orthodox (all p 's <.05) Mean feelings towards ultra-orthodox was significantly warmer than that of Arabs and leftists and LGBT (all p 's <.05) Similarly, mean feelings towards immigrants/refugees was significantly warmer than that of leftists and LGBT (all p 's <.05). Mean feelings towards Jewish settlers was significantly colder that of rightist (all p 's <.01).

Figure 70. Mean Feeling thermometer, filtered by least liked group choice




In terms **mean openness** towards the least liked group, (see Figure 71) respondents who chose rightist as their least liked group showed across waves significantly more openness than respondents who chose all other groups (all p 's <.05). Similarly, respondents who chose leftists and ultra-orthodox showed across waves significantly more openness than respondents who chose, Arabs, immigrants/refugees and LGBT (all p 's <.001). Openness towards Jewish settlers was significantly higher than that of Arabs, immigrants/refugees and LGBT (all p 's <.001). Openness towards Arabs and immigrants/refugees was significantly lower than all other groups except LGBT across waves (all p 's <.01).

Figure 71. Mean Openness, filtered by least liked group choice




In **support for civil rights** for the least liked group, (see Figure 72) respondents who chose rightists as their least liked group supported civil rights significantly more than all other groups across waves (all p 's $<.05$). Similarly, support for civil rights for Jewish settlers was across waves was significantly higher than that of all groups except rightist (all p 's $<.01$) and ultra-orthodox. Support for civil rights for ultra-orthodox was across waves significantly higher than that of all groups except rightists and settlers (all p 's $<.01$). Respondents who chose leftists supported civil rights significantly more than respondents who chose Arabs and immigrants/refugees (all p 's $<.01$). Support for civil rights for Arabs and immigrants/refugees was across waves significantly lower than all groups except each other (all p 's $<.01$).

Figure 72. Mean support for civil rights, filtered by least liked group choice




In **support for indirect exclusion and exclusion** of the least liked group, (see Figure 73) respondents who chose immigrants/refugees as their least liked group supported indirect exclusion and exclusion significantly more than all other groups except Arabs (all p 's <.01). Similarly, support for indirect exclusion and exclusion for Arabs was significantly higher than that of all groups except immigrants/refugees (all p 's <.05). Support for indirect exclusion and exclusion for LGBT, was significantly higher across waves than that of rightist and ultra-orthodox (all p 's <.05). Support for indirect exclusion and exclusion for Jewish settlers was significantly lower across waves than that of Arabs, leftists, and immigrants/refugees (all p 's <.01). Support for indirect exclusion and exclusion for leftists was significantly higher across waves than that of rightist and ultra-orthodox (all p 's <.001). Mean indirect exclusion and exclusion of ultra-orthodox was significantly lower than that of all other groups across waves except rightists and settlers (all p 's <.01).

Figure 73. Mean support for indirect and direct exclusion, filtered by least liked group choice




In **support for exclusion policies** towards the least liked group, (see Figure 74) respondents who chose LGBT as their least liked group supported significantly more exclusion policies compared to ultra-orthodox, rightists and settlers across waves (all p 's $<.01$). Support for exclusion policies towards immigrants/refugees and Arabs was across waves was significantly higher than that of Jewish settlers, rightists and ultra-orthodox (all p 's $<.05$). Support for exclusion policies towards Jewish settlers and leftists was across waves significantly higher than that of rightists (all p 's $<.01$). Support for exclusion policies towards rightists and ultra-orthodox was across waves significantly lower than all other groups except each other (all p 's $<.001$).

Figure 74. Mean support for exclusion policies scale, filtered by least liked group choice




In terms of **dehumanization perceptions** of the least liked group, (see Figure 75), the mean dehumanization of Arabs was across waves significantly higher than that of all other group choices (all p 's $<.001$) except leftists. The mean dehumanization of leftists was across waves significantly higher than that of rightists, ultra-orthodox, settlers and immigrants/refugees (all p 's $<.01$).

Figure 75. Mean Dehumanization perceptions scale, filtered by least liked group choice




In terms of perceptions of **negativity/positivity of the treatment** the least liked group receives in the society (see Figure 76), the mean perceptions of treatment for immigrants/refugees were across waves significantly more negative than that of all other groups (all p 's <.05). Similarly, the mean perceptions of treatment for ultra-orthodox was across waves significantly more negative than that of all other groups except immigrants/refugees (all p 's <.01). The mean perceptions of treatment for rightists and settlers were across waves significantly more positive than that of all other groups except leftists and LGBT (all p 's <.05). The mean perceptions of treatment for LGBT was significantly more positive than that of immigrants/refugees and ultra-orthodox (all p 's <.01). The mean perceptions of treatment for Arabs and leftist were across waves significantly more positive than that of ultra-orthodox and immigrants/refugees (all p 's <.05).

Figure 76. Mean perceptions of treatment, filtered by least liked group choice



Last, significant differences were also found in justification for the treatment the least liked group receives in the society (see Figure 77). The mean justification for the treatment among respondents who chose ultra-orthodox was significantly higher across waves than that of Jewish settlers and LGBT (all p 's <.05).



11. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GENERAL SUPPORT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND SUPPORT FOR CIVIL RIGHT FOR THE LEAST LIKED GROUP

Measures

Support for Civil rights for the least liked group was measured using three item scale based on (Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter 2006), as Israeli respondents were asked to indicate their agreement on a 1-7 scale (1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree”) to the following statements: (1)[the least liked group] are given too many civil rights in the country; (2) The right of [the least liked group] to express their worldview in public must be denied; (3) The citizenship of [the least liked group] should be revoked). All items were reverse coded, such that higher values indicate on higher support for civil rights. Cronbach’s alpha ranged between .67 to .79.


General Support for Civil rights was measured using seven item scale based on (Shamir, & Sullivan, 1985) were participate indicated their agreement on a 1-7 scale (1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree”) to the following statements: (1) Every citizen should have the same rights before the law; (2) Minority groups in the country must be allowed the right to representation in the political system; (3) Every citizen has the right to vote and be elected to the Knesset; (4) Every citizen has the right to hold demonstrations; (5)

Every citizen has the right to serve as a minister in the government; (6) Every citizen has the right to express his views in public, no matter what they are; and (7) The state must protect the human rights of all its citizens. Cronbach’s alpha ranged between .85 to .88.

11.1 DIFFERENCES BY NATIONALITY

As presented in Figure 78, a within subject effect was found for civil rights ($p < .001$), such that both Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel supported significantly more civil rights in general ($Mean = 5.61$, $SD = 1.24$), than for their least liked group choice ($Mean = 4.58$, $SD = 1.74$). Further, while Israeli Jews supported civil rights towards least liked group significantly more than Arabs ($p < .001$), Arabs supported general civil rights significantly more than Jewa ($p < .001$) and the gap between the right was significantly larger among Arabs.

Figure 78. Mean support for civil rights types, filtered by nationality




11.2 DIFFERENCES BY POLITICAL AFFILIATION

As presented in Figure 79 within subject effect was found for civil rights ($p < .001$), such that all political camps supported significantly more civil rights in general ($Mean = 5.50$, $SD = 1.26$), than for their least liked group choice ($Mean = 4.65$, $SD = 1.77$). Further, the support of the political left for any type of civil rights was significantly higher than that of the political center and right (all p 's $< .01$).

Similarly, the support of the political center for any type of civil rights was significantly higher than that of the political right (all p 's $< .001$). Furthermore, a significant effect for civil rights by political affiliation was found ($p < .001$), such that the gap between the support for the different types of civil right within each group was significantly greater among the political right, compared to the political center and the political left.

Figure 79. Mean support for civil rights types, filtered by political affiliation




12. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SUPPORT FOR THE USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE IN GENERAL AND SUPPORT FOR THE USE OF PHYSICAL FORCE AGAINST THE LEAST LIKED GROUP

In order to examine the differences between support for the use of physical force in general and the use of force against the least liked group the following items were compared: (1) *Using physical force against the least liked group*: "Sometimes there is no choice but to use physical force against [the least liked group] to prevent them from advancing their interests."; (2) *Use of physical force against government representatives*: "use of physical force against public servants or the security forces" in order to bring about an end to a dangerous policy of the government.

12.1 DIFFERENCES BY NATIONALITY

As presented in Figure 80, a within subject effect was found for force type ($p < .001$), such that both Israeli Jews and Arab citizens of Israel supported significantly more the use of force against their least liked group ($Mean = 3.07, SD = 2.14$), than against government representatives ($Mean = 1.46, SD = 1.15$). Further, a significant effect for force type by wave and nationality was found ($p < .001$). While the support of Arab citizens to use force against government representatives was significantly higher than that of Jews across waves (all p 's $< .001$) in support for using force against the least liked group there was a significant differences between Israeli Jews and Arab citizens in the second wave, such that Israeli Jews showed significantly more support than Arabs (all p 's $< .05$)


Figure 80. Mean support for use of force types, filtered by nationality



12.2 DIFFERENCES BY POLITICAL AFFILIATION

As presented in Figure 81 a within subject effect was found for force type ($p < .001$), such that all political camps supported significantly more the use of force against their least liked group ($Mean = 3.08$, $SD = 2.16$), than against government representatives ($Mean = 1.36$ $SD = 1.02$). Further, a significant effect for force type and wave was found ($p < .001$). while there were no significant differences between waves in support for using force against government representatives, in support for using force against the least liked group the mean support in the second wave was significantly higher than that of all other waves (all p 's $< .001$) Furthermore, an effect for force type by political affiliation was found ($p < .001$). While the support of the political right was significantly greater than that of the political left and center in support for using force against the least liked group (all p 's $< .001$), in support for using force against government representatives the political center did not differ from the political right.

Figure 81. Mean support for use of force types, filtered by political affiliation



13. DIFFERENCES IN SUPPORT FOR ALTERNATIVES FOR THE ISRAELI PALESTINIAN CONFLICT


Respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1-7 the degree of their agreement with each of the following policy alternatives, (1) *Permanent agreement with the Palestinians*: Israel should reach a two-state agreement with the Palestinians; (2) *Unilateral annexation of the territories of Judea and Samaria*: Israel should unilaterally annex the territories of Judea and Samaria; (3) *Independent separation from the Palestinians*: civil separation from the Palestinians and the continuation of security control over the West Bank even without an agreement. The separation will include the evacuation of isolated settlements and a declaration of the absence of territorial claims east of the fence; (4) *Continuation of the existing policy (status quo)*: Israel should maintain the existing situation without significant changes on the ground.

In a following question respondent were also asked to indicate out of the four options, which is the best option in their opinion.

13.1 DIFFERENCES BY NATIONALITY

As presented in Figure 82, a significant effect was found for alternative type by nationality and wave. Whereas Arab citizens across waves agreed significantly more than Israeli Jews to a permanent agreement with the Palestinians (all p 's $<.001$): and Israeli Jews across waves agreed significantly more than Arabs to Unilateral annexation (all p 's $<.001$) this was not the case for Independent separation and status quo. In particular, while in the first and second waves Israeli Jews agreed significantly more than Arabs to Independent separation (all p 's $<.001$), no significant difference was found between these group in the third or fourth waves. Further, while in the first, third and fourth waves Israeli Jews agreed significantly more than Arabs to the continuation of the existing policy (all p 's $<.05$) no significant difference was found between these group in the second wave.

Figure 82. Mean support for alternatives, filtered by nationality



As presented in the table below, the majority of Arab citizens chose permanent agreement across waves as their best policy option while only about third of Israeli Jew respondents chose this option as the best in their opinion across waves. Further, while about 20% of Israeli Jews chose annexation as the best option in their opinion, less than 7% of Arabs chose this option across waves. Similar results are seen in the choice of independent separation and status quo, such that greater proportion of Jewish Israelis chose this option as the best in their option, compared to Arab citizens. All proportion differences are significantly different $p < .05$.


	First		Second		Third		Fourth	
	Jewish	Arabs	Jewish	Arabs	Jewish	Arabs	Jewish	Arabs
Permanent agreement with the Palestinians	38.1% ^{0a}	77.6% ^{0b}	34.4% ^{0a}	79.3% ^{0b}	33.9% ^{0a}	73.9% ^{0b}	33.6% ^{0a}	65.5% ^{0b}
Independent separation from the Palestinians	29.0% ^{0a}	7.1% ^{0b}	29.3% ^{0a}	7.0% ^{0b}	24.8% ^{0a}	17.6% ^{0b}	22.1% ^{0a}	17.5% ^{0a}
Unilateral annexation of the territories of Judea and Samaria	17.7% ^{0a}	4.2% ^{0b}	20.8% ^{0a}	5.0% ^{0b}	19.9% ^{0a}	2.3% ^{0b}	20.0% ^{0a}	6.7% ^{0b}
Continuation of the existing policy (status quo)	15.2% ^{0a}	11.1% ^{0b}	15.5% ^{0a}	8.8% ^{0b}	21.4% ^{0a}	6.3% ^{0b}	24.2% ^{0a}	10.3% ^{0b}

Note: Values in the same row and subtable not sharing the same subscript are significantly different at $p < .05$ in the two-sided test of equality for column proportions. Cells with no subscript are not included in the test. Tests assume equal variances.¹ 1. Tests are adjusted for all pairwise comparisons within a row of each innermost subtable using the Bonferroni correction.

13.2 DIFFERENCES BY POLITICAL AFFILIATION

As presented in Figure 83, a significant effect was found for alternative type by political affiliation and wave. The political left across waves agreed significantly more to permanent agreement with the Palestinians compared to the political right and center, and the political center agreed significantly more to this alternative compared to the political right (all p 's $< .001$). In the mean agreement to unilateral annexation the political right agreed significantly more than the center and left across waves (all p 's $< .001$) and the political center agreed significantly more than the political left across waves (all p 's $< .001$). Similar pattern was also found in mean agreement to status quo. In particular, the political right agreed significantly more to this alternative than the political center and left across waves (all p 's $< .05$) and the political center agreed significantly more than the political left across waves (all p 's $< .001$). Further, while the political right agreed significantly more than the political left and center to independent separation in wave 1 (all p 's $< .001$), they agree significantly less than these groups in all other waves (all p 's $< .001$).

Figure 83. Mean support for alternatives, filtered by political affiliation



As presented in the table below, while the majority of the political left chose permanent agreement across waves as their best policy option only about 50% of the political center and less than quarter of the political right chose this option as the best in their opinion across waves, a difference which significantly different $p < .05$. Further, while about third of the political right chose annexation as the best option in their opinion, less than 12% of the political center, and less than 3% of the political left chose this option across waves. The difference between the political right to the political left and center was significantly different $p < .05$. In the choice of independent separation about 30% of the political center and right chose this option as the best in their option across waves, while only about 13%-20% of the political left chose this option. The difference between the political right and center to the political left was significantly different in waves 1-3, $p < .05$. Similar pattern was found in the choice of status quo, while about 17-32% of the political right and about 15%-20% of the political center chose this option as the best in their option across waves, only about 3%-7% of the political left chose this option across waves. The difference between the political right and center to the political left was significantly different $p < .05$.

**Permanent agreement with the
Palestinians**

First Left 77.8%_a

Center 50.9%_b

Right 20.8%_c

Second Left 74.4%_a

Center 49.2%_b

Right 15.3%_c

Third Left 81.9%_a

Center 49.8%_b

Right 13.6%_c

Fourth Left 76.9%_a

Center 43.8%_b

Right 15.2%_c

**Independent separation from the
Palestinians**

First Left 13.2%_a

Center 27.8%_b

Right 34.0%_b

Second Left 20.3%_a

Center 29.0%_b

		Right	31.9% _b
	<i>Third</i>	Left	12.5% _a
		Center	27.0% _b
		Right	27.0% _b
	<i>Fourth</i>	Left	14.9% _a
		Center	23.6% _a
		Right	23.7% _a
Unilateral annexation of the territories of Judea and Samaria	<i>First</i>	Left	2.9% _a
		Center	6.5% _a
		Right	27.5% _b
	<i>Second</i>	Left	2.0% _a
		Center	6.5% _b
		Right	33.7% _c
	<i>Third</i>	Left	2.1% _a
		Center	6.7% _a
		Right	31.0% _b
	<i>Fourth</i>	Left	1.5% _a

		Center	11.8% ^b
		Right	29.7% ^c
Continuation of the existing policy (status quo)	<i>First</i>	Left	6.2% ^a
		Center	14.9% ^b
		Right	17.8% ^b
	<i>Second</i>	Left	3.3% ^a
		Center	15.3% ^b
		Right	19.1% ^b
	<i>Third</i>	Left	3.5% ^a
		Center	16.5% ^b
		Right	28.4% ^c
	<i>Fourth</i>	Left	6.7% ^a
		Center	20.7% ^b
		Right	31.4% ^c


14. DIFFERENCES IN NORM PERCEPTIONS AND FEELING TOWARDS LEAST LIKED GROUP

From the third wave, respondents were also asked about the perceived norm towards the least like group by indicating how most of their ingroup (e.g., Jew, Arab, political affiliations) feel towards their least liked group choice on a scale of 0-100 where higher values indicated on warmer favorable feelings. We compared the mean perceived norm of the ingroup to the actual mean warmth to the least liked group.

14.1 DIFFERENCES BY NATIONALITY

A significant within effect was found for feelings such that the perceived norm of feeling towards the least liked group was significantly warmer ($Mean = 31.73$, $SD = 23.97$) than the actual feeling ($Mean = 24.99$, $SD = 23.51$). However, a significant effect for feeling by *nationality* and wave was found such that the gap between the norm and the feeling is seen only among Jews ($p < .001$), and not Arabs, and this gap is larger in the fourth wave compared to the third.


Figure 84. Mean perceived feeling and feeling, filtered by nationality



14.2 DIFFERENCES BY POLITICAL AFFILIATION

A significant within effect was found for feelings such that the perceived norm of feeling among the political groups towards the least liked group was significantly warmer ($Mean = 26.01$, $SD = 24.93$) than the actual feeling ($Mean = 23.58$, $SD = 22.90$). No significant interaction effect was found for feeling by political affiliation.

Figure 84. Mean perceived feeling and feeling, filtered by political affiliation




15. DIFFERENCES IN IN META FEELINGS AND FEELING TOWARDS LEAST LIKED GROUP

In the following section we compare respondents meta feelings (i.e., how they think their least liked group feels on 0-100 scale towards their ingroup (measured from wave 2) with their mean warmth towards their least liked group (thermometer).

15.1 DIFFERENCES BY POLITICAL AFFILIATION

In the comparison by political affiliation, a significant within effect was found for feelings such that the warmth presented towards the least liked group ($Mean = 23.40$, $SD = 22.10$) was significantly higher than the meta feelings (the perceived warmth towards the political ingroup) ($Mean = 21.02$, $SD = 23.59$, $p < .001$). This effect was followed by a feeling and party effect ($p < .001$) such that the gap between the feelings (meta and towards the least) was significant only among the left but not among the political right.

Figure 85. Mean perceived meta feeling and feelings, filtered by political affiliation




15.1 DIFFERENCES BY NATIONALITY⁹

Similar to political affiliation a significant within effect was found for feelings such that the warmth presented towards the least liked group ($Mean = 23.46$, $SD = 23.82$) was significantly higher than the meta feelings (the perceived warmth towards the national ingroup) ($Mean = 21.33$, $SD = 23.72$, $p < .001$). This effect was followed by a feeling and party effect ($p < .05$) such that the gap between the feelings was significant among Jews (meta and towards the least) but not among the Arabs.

⁹ In wave 3 there was a problem with the formatting of the question in Qualtrics and so participant did not answer it.

Figure 86. Mean perceived meta feeling and feelings, filtered by nationality



Ajzen, I. (2001). Nature and operation of attitudes. *Annual review of psychology*, 52(1), 27-58.

Ben-shitrit, L., Elad-Strenger, J., & Hirsch-Hoefler, S. (2022). 'Pinkwashing' the radical-right: Gender and the mainstreaming of radical-right policies and actions. *European Journal of political research*, 61(1), 86-110.

Benjamin, A. J. (2006). The relationship between right-wing authoritarianism and attitudes toward violence: Further validation of the attitudes toward violence scale. *Social Behavior and Personality: an international journal*, 34(8), 923-926.

Caiani, M. (2013). Extremism. *The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements*.

Card, N. A., Stucky, B. D., Sawalani, G. M., & Little, T. D. (2008). Direct and indirect aggression during childhood and adolescence: A meta-analytic review of gender differences, intercorrelations, and relations to maladjustment. *Child development*, 79(5), 1185-1229.

Carter, E. (2005) *The Extreme Right in Western Europe*. Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York.

Downs, W., Manning, C., and Engstrom, R. (2009) Revisiting the moderating effects of incumbency: A comparative study of government participation and political extremism. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 17(2), 151– 169.

Eatwell, R., & Goodwin, M. J. (Eds.). (2010). *The new extremism in 21st century Britain* (Vol. 5). London: Routledge.

Feierabend, I. K., Feierabend, R. L., & Gurr, T. R. (Eds.). (1972). *Anger, violence, and politics: theories and research* (p. 145). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Hirsch-Hoefler, S., Canetti, D., & Eiran, E. (2016). Radicalizing religion? Religious identity and settlers' behavior. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 39(6), 500-518.

Hirsch-Hoefler, S., Canetti, D., & Pedahzur, A. (2010). Two of a kind? Voting motivations for populist radical right and religious fundamentalist parties. *Electoral Studies*, 29(4), 678-690.

Jost, J. T. (2006). The end of the end of ideology. *American psychologist*, 61(7), 651.

Mandel, D.R. (2002) Evil and the instigation of collective violence. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy* 2, 101– 108.

McDermott, R. (2015). Sex and death: Gender differences in aggression and motivations for violence. *International Organization*, 69(3), 753-775.

Mudde, C. (1995). Right-wing extremism analyzed: A comparative analysis of the ideologies of three alleged right-wing extremist parties (NPD, NDP, CP'86). *European Journal of Political Research*, 27(2), 203-224.

Mudde, C. (2005). *Racist extremism in central & Eastern Europe*. Routledge.

Pedahzur, A., Hasisi, B., & Brichta, A. (2000). A proposed model for explaining political violence in Israel. *World Affs.*, 163, 18.

Peled, Y. (1992). Ethnic democracy and the legal construction of citizenship: Arab citizens of the Jewish state. *American political science review*, 86(2), 432-443.

Peres, Y., & Yuchtman-Yaar, E. (1998). *Between Consent and Dissent: Democracy and Peace in the Israeli Mind* (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute).

Pratto, F., Stallworth, L. M., & Sidanius, J. (1997). The gender gap: Differences in political attitudes and social dominance orientation. *British journal of social psychology*, 36(1), 49-68.

Shuman, E., Cohen-Chen, S., Hirsch-Hoefler, S., & Halperin, E. (2016). Explaining normative versus nonnormative action: The role of implicit theories. *Political Psychology*, 37(6), 835-852.

Sullivan, J. L., Piereson, J., & Marcus, G. E. (1993). *Political tolerance and American democracy*. University of Chicago Press.

Tausch, N., Becker, J. C., Spears, R., Christ, O., Saab, R., Singh, P., & Siddiqui, R. N. (2011). Explaining radical group behavior: Developing emotion and efficacy routes to normative and nonnormative collective action. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 101(1), 129.

Van Zomeren, M., Spears, R., Fischer, A. H., & Leach, C. W. (2004). Put your money where your mouth is! Explaining collective action tendencies through group-based anger and group efficacy. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 87(5), 649.

Wilcox, C., Hewitt, L., & Allsop, D. (1996). The gender gap in attitudes toward the Gulf War: A cross-national perspective. *Journal of Peace Research*, 33(1), 67-82.

Wright, S. C., Taylor, D. M., & Moghaddam, F. M. (1990). Responding to membership in a disadvantaged group: From acceptance to collective protest. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 58(6), 994.