

כנס הרצליה השנתי האחד-עשר  
מאזן החוסן והביטחון הלאומי

# הרצליה 2011 HERZLIYA

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The Balance of Israel's National Security

## אוגדן מסמכי דיון וסיכום

ממצאים מסקנות וכיווני מדיניות  
כנס הרצליה האחד-עשר 2011

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המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה

המסמך משקף את דעתם של הכותבים בלבד

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## The 2011 Herzliya Assessment

### Main Points

#### THE GLOBAL ARENA

1. The global economic crisis exposed and accentuated the shifts in world power relations – with the relative economic decline of the US and Europe, which invariably enhanced the relative posture of the two main emerging powers, China and India. While the decrease in Western global power and influence is not likely to result in a transformation of world politics, a more introverted America has squandered its global posture and projection of influence. Less able to depend on their patron, US allies around the world are left to fend for themselves.
2. The record high economic growth rates of the emerging powers and developing countries in the past decade are narrowing the gap between the global demand and the supply of oil. The steady rise in global demand will increase the political-strategic capital of oil producing nations and likely result in a price hike. The global dependency on oil for transportation bears strategic risks for both the developed and developing world. Unfolding events in the Middle East only serve to underscore this threat.

#### SHIFTING SANDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

3. Over the past decade and with growing Iranian support, radical Islamic groups across the Middle East are gaining political power and support, posing an imminent threat to the stability of the region. Moreover, the growing outreach of these groups in Europe and in the US has not been sufficiently challenged, which in turn, facilitates the export of radicalism, terror and violence to Western soil. Facilitated by political, social and economic under-development across the Middle East and among Muslim communities in the West, radicalization and terror are two sides of the same coin – terror is the manifestation, the realization, of radical indoctrination. Governments – in the Middle East and in the West – must vigorously promote traditional non-radical Islamic ideology and financially and institutionally empower non-radical Islamic civil society by vigilant and unrelenting outcasting of radicals. Counter-radicalization ought to be couched in a multi-dimensional strategy that would also prudently tackle the root causes that permit the festering of radicalism – political, social, and economic under-development.
4. Iran is exploiting domestic upheaval in the region to increase its clout, assuming the regime can contain its very own domestic challenge to its rule. A macro-regional risk assessment would underscore the increasing likelihood of an outburst of Iranian-sponsored and sanctioned radicalization of Middle East regimes. Iran and its allies and proxies share a strong sense of accomplishment, which in turn only reinforces their determination to wreak regional havoc.
5. The evolving turmoil across the Middle East and developments in some theaters, such as Egypt and Tunisia has solved the long-standing strategic conundrum of reforms vs. stability. Western policymakers ought therefore to support a gradual transition process of building-up a more responsive and accountable political, economic and social institutional infrastructure in Arab regimes to prevent their overtaking by radical Islamic forces. The US and Europe, along with the other G-20 powers should assist in the gradual transitions responding to the popular demand for representation, good governance and better life conditions.
6. While the Palestinian cause hardly features in the current intra-Middle East turmoil, the potential radicalization of key Middle East countries might revive the exploitation of the stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The Israeli-Palestinian impasse is an additional risk factor for the remaining moderate Arab regimes. Placed in that context, wrongly or rightfully, Israeli perceived reluctance to vigorously pursue the peace process is viewed as a contributing factor to regional instability. While a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian final status may not be in the cards in the immediate future, there is ample room for a series of concerted measures by Israel, the Palestinians and the moderate Arab countries.
7. The broad Middle Eastern perception of American declining power considerably harms the strategic posture of US allies in the region, Israel included. However, the strategic reliance of Israel and the moderate Arab countries upon the US cannot be passive and they ought to share the burden of revitalizing the US-led coalition of moderate forces in the region by jointly promoting the peace process, containing radicalism, and carefully managing the reform and transition processes across the region.
8. Although sanctions alone will not dissuade Iran from pursuing a military nuclear capability, maintaining international pressure is essential. While benefitting from the extensive international preoccupation with its military nuclear program, international pressure appears to have led Iran's leaders to avoid a short-term nuclear breakout and evade harsher sanctions. More effective dissuasion necessitates a realistic assessment of the regime's domestic resilience allowing the formulation of a carefully calibrated balance between sanctions and a credible threat to use sufficient military force. While Israel should do all that is in its means to prevent the military nuclearization of Iran, it should not assume a primary and exclusive responsibility in this indispensable undertaking.

## ISRAEL'S MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC FRONTIERS

9. The shifting global balance of power and Middle East political turmoil do not seem to enhance Israel's international standing and regional strategic posture. However, a sound national security doctrine and foreign policy and their calculated execution could leverage these fluctuations in Israel's favor and serve to enhance Israel's positioning – regionally and globally.
10. True or false, the broadly held international perception that Israel is not sufficiently instrumental in promoting the Middle East peace process is detrimental to its national security since it undermines Israel's position as a strategic asset of the Western world in a volatile region. While the regional turmoil mandates prudence, Israel ought to demonstrate its “peace credentials” by assuming the initiative in promoting the process through constructive declaratory and practical measures on the ground and by engaging moderate Arab parties in the region.
11. From a military perspective, Israel's strategic situation appears positive at the moment. Nonetheless, the current strategic situation is transient and a short-noticed military escalation could evolve resulting in unprecedented multi-dimensional warfare. This contingency requires urgent adjustments to Israel's national security doctrine and military force structure aiming at containing military confrontations and maintaining them short and decisive, while increasing the readiness of the civilian population to absorb attacks. Israel's military force structure ought to be based on a well-attuned balance between defensive (active and passive) and offensive capabilities.
12. Anti-Israeli discourse has become prevalent in mainstream policy communities throughout the Western world – more so in Europe, but growingly in the US as well. Transcending the line between criticizing legitimate (even if perceived unwise) Israeli decisions to outright delegitimizing of such actions and rendering them unlawful, this trajectory constitutes a strategic threat to Israel – by impairing Israel's ability to defend itself and enticing its enemies to try and exploit these vulnerabilities. To counter the assault on its legitimacy, Israel and its friends ought to promote an informed, unbiased, and professional debate in the Western political and media spheres concerning the Middle East.
13. In face of global power fluctuations, Israel ought to broaden the scope of its foreign policy, beyond the US and Europe. There is however, no strategic substitute to Israel's relations with the US, and Israel's regional posture is intertwined with the position of the US in the Middle East. Therefore, in expanding Israel's foreign relations, particularly in Asia-Pacific, the linchpin ought to be India, a recognized strategic partner of the US, along with other US allies and like-minded countries, namely Japan, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Australia.

## ISRAEL'S DOMESTIC CHALLENGES

14. The formidable challenges facing Israel on the global and regional scene only serve to underwrite the essential and urgent need to attend to critical issues on the domestic national agenda.
15. The growing societal inequality and rate of poverty pose a threat to the resilience of the society, which is exceptionally critical as the homefront is one of the main targets of Israel's enemies. *Vis-à-vis* the Western world, Israel recorded in 2010 the highest rates of poverty and economic growth and the lowest rate of labor participation. This combination is simply untenable and manifests the inadequacy of Israel's domestic government policies. The government has failed to both offer the benefits of economic growth across the board of Israel's society and to maximize the potential of the economic growth. Perhaps more than ever before, Israel needs effective performance-based governance. The primary domestic strategy of the government ought to be facilitating the continued trajectory of economic growth, while sharing the benefits of growth more equally and reducing socio-economic polarization.
16. While short-term measures are essential to deal with the staggering rates of poverty and socio-economic inequality, there is a vital imperative to launch a long-term grand-strategy to increase human capital, employment and labor income rates of the socio-economically disadvantaged members of Israel's society – focusing primarily on education and employment.
17. School education in Israel is unequal, with geographical and societal periphery suffering of lower quality teachers and teaching. In addressing socio-economic inequality in the education system, digital learning is a major tool for enhancing quality education in all society sectors. Information technology and the World Wide Web are not an end in themselves, but rather a critical platform for providing high-end education combined with effective teacher-student communication.
18. The government should allocate considerable resources for vocational education of adults from the three socio-economic weak segments of the society, namely Arab Israelis, ultra-orthodox Jews, and people with disabilities. This ought to be complemented by removing social and physical barriers for these segments' participation in the labor force and facilitating their employment placing by also providing necessary infrastructure. Tackling under-development among these sectors is not only essential for enhancing the societal and economic integration of what makes up nearly 40 percent of Israel's population; it is one of Israel's major untapped sources of future potential economic growth. For instance, the full integration of the Arab Israelis into the national economy – meeting the average rate of employment and salary – could potentially add approximately USD7 billion or 3 percent to the annual gross domestic product.

## ISRAEL AND THE JEWISH DIASPORA

19. The growingly pluralistic character of Jewish communities in the Diaspora and the greater diffusion of Jewish organizational life around the world warrant a reconsideration of Israel-Jewish Diaspora relations. Raised in liberal democracies that defend minority rights, a growing number of Jewish leaders, and even more so young Jews worldwide, find it increasingly difficult to unconditionally defend Israel's policies without their critical notes being registered. The alienation of younger Diaspora Jews is further reinforced by

the perceived growingly less liberal Israeli body politic, unproportionally dominated by ultra-orthodox parties and right-of-center political positions.

20. The mounting assault on Israel's legitimacy compounds and accentuates the challenges facing both Israel and the Jewish Diaspora. Being on the frontline of the assault is excessively burdening internal Jewish Diaspora debates on the future of Israel, on the logic and morality of its actions and on the nature of Jewish society in general.
21. However, and as opposed to the vibrant debate in the Diaspora, Israel-Diaspora relations are simply not on the Israeli agenda. There seems to be a broad, although implicit, belief that Israel is no longer strategically dependent upon the Diaspora. The mushrooming experiential programs of the Diaspora in Israel have however, led to a broad Israeli acknowledgement of the need to reinforce the bonds and attachment of young generation Jews to Israel.
22. The increasing need felt by Jews in the Diaspora to be heard on issues that directly and indirectly influence them as Jews, together with the need for Israel to keep the Diaspora involved but not formally so, offers the rationale for seeking possible mechanisms for enhancing more formal and regularized Israeli-Diaspora dialogue.

## The Global Arena: Reshuffling the Deck of Global Influence and Resources

For more than two centuries, the Western world shaped the global order. **The decrease in Western global power and influence is not likely to result in a transformation of world politics.**

While it seems that the global economy is slowly and unevenly recovering from the crisis, a possible source for the next global crisis is potential worldwide shortage in oil, also known as peak oil. Producing an unprecedented price hike, the materialization of the peak oil scenario could result in a global economic meltdown with profound strategic implications.

### SHIFTING GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER

**The global economic crisis exposed and accentuated the shifts in world power relations** – with the relative economic decline of the US and Europe, which invariably enhanced the relative posture of the two main emerging powers, China and India. As far as the US is concerned however, in the past year, its economy has recorded several positive indicators, which might herald the beginning of recovery. Although unemployment rates continue to loom high, there is an overall improvement in the confidence of the markets. While as this preliminary recovery has taken a toll on US national debt levels, sustained economic growth might limit the impact of the debt. US initial economic recovery is also positively affecting the global marketplace, which has demonstrated considerable resilience in face of the crisis.

In shunning “beggar thy neighbor” policies of currency manipulation and protectionist trade barriers, the global economy avoided the trajectory of the 1930s international economic crisis. The effective global policy coordination under the auspices of the growingly important G-20 also demonstrates the broad recognition that economic growth is not a “zero-sum game”.

The global economic crisis, however, has caused old and emerging powers alike to focus on attending to their own economies. The economic situation has become a major factor shaping the powers' international standing and a critical factor in their domestic political considerations.

**As the US has become more introversive, the economic preoccupation has particularly harmed US global posture and projection of influence, which in turn, adversely affects US allies across the world.** Less able to depend on their patron, the respective regional postures of US allies in the Middle East, Asia, Europe and Latin America have been impaired.

While US power and influence is expected to rebound at a certain point, Europe's position is far less clear. Solidarity within the EU is low and its domestic and intra-European socio-economic challenges are forbidding. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty has so far failed to deliver in terms of enhancing Europe's position in the global arena; some would posit that the EU has lost considerable global influence in the past year. This has opened the way for the major EU capitals to take the lead.

Some accounts predicted a growing role for Latin America, and Brazil in particular as an emerging power. However, the impact of Latin America's relatively smaller population combined with intra-regional and domestic challenges on the global marketplace will be more limited. Consequently, it appears premature to count Brazil alongside China and India as an emerging global power.

**Notwithstanding their steady and rapid economic growth, the emerging powers – China and India – are not expected to transform the global order in the foreseeable future** for three main reasons. First, the US is still the sole global power commanding a broad multi-dimensional range of “hard” and “soft” capabilities superior to anything China and India have to offer. It is equally important to note that China and India are both more “regional” players, than “global” actors. Second, both China and India owe their rise to the current globalizing world order and their future economic growth expectations depend on the stability of this order. Third, India and China do not appear to bestow hegemonic ambitions despite more recent Chinese altercations with the US. China does however wish to wield more globally recognized authority, status and influence as a world power. China has also increased its primarily economic presence in Latin America and Africa. India is campaigning for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, but considers itself a “bridging power”, not a world hegemon.

**Although it would be probably early to pronounce the “end of the West”, the front line of the world stage is becoming far more heterogeneous, clearly tilting to the East.** Nonetheless, the sustainability of China and India's rise is not a certainty. Many of the forecasts predicting the inevitable continuing economic rise of both powers fail to account for domestic socio-economic challenges and do not incorporate low probability events, which might bear high impact on their growth trajectories (“wild cards”). A global oil crunch is one possible scenario which would definitely mandate an adjustment of China and India's estimated growth curves.

## PEAK OIL? GLOBAL RAMIFICATIONS OF CONTINUED DEPENDENCY ON OIL

The record high economic growth rates of the emerging powers and developing countries in the past decade are narrowing the gap between the global demand and the supply of oil. OPEC production levels and the supply of oil have remained largely unaffected since 1980 bringing them to nearly exhaust their reserves. **The steady rise in global demand will increase the political-strategic capital of oil producing nations and most likely result in a price hike, which experts believe could reach the level of USD200 per barrel within a few years.**

While the world has coped with oil price at USD150 per barrel, a price hike to the level of USD200 per barrel would create profound worldwide instability and trigger a deep global economic crisis. To illustrate, such a price hike would debilitate world trade, thwart the power projection of the Western world due to the exuberant cost of deploying military forces, and cripple developing and failing states, particularly in Africa.

Nonetheless, these assessments may not be realized as the global oil marketplace is shrouded by nearly complete lack of transparency regarding the quality and quantity of oil reserves. Furthermore, sustained high oil prices might lead to the exploration of more expensively produced oil reserves. The advance of natural gas and its application as transportation fuel could reduce the global dependency on oil at least until new forms of fuel will be developed.

**Whether or not the “peak oil” scenario will materialize, the global dependency on oil for transportation bears strategic risks for both old and emerging powers and the developing world. Unfolding events in the Middle East only serve to underscore this threat.**

With current estimated production costs of Middle East oil ranging at USD4-15, rising oil revenues are posing a strategic threat to Israel. Responding to this challenge, the Government of Israel will invest more than USD400 million over the course of a decade to develop alternative energy sources for transportation – bio-fuels, synthetic fuels, electrical batteries for transportation, and technologies aimed at enhancing energy efficiency of transportation. Israel is also to assume a leading role in the application of the natural gas based fuel – methanol. The commercialization of these alternatives to fossil fuel will require resetting regulation in the Western world. The international community should also move to increase the transparency of the global energy markets. In this global campaign, Israel and its allies ought to take the lead.

## Shifting Sands in the Middle East

**The second decade of the 21st Century is shaping up to be an epoch of profound strategic uncertainty reflecting an ever turbulent global arena and a growingly volatile Middle East.** In historical terms, 2011 may come to be considered a watershed era in the annals of the Middle East. In the coming year, several formidable processes will take shape providing for regional game-changing developments and potentially constituting a “new”, but probably not better, Middle East. The region, more likely than not, is expected to experience political turmoil and instability, posing a strategic threat to the future of Israel and harming vital interests of the Western world, if not of the entire global community.

### THE DIMINISHING POSTURE OF THE US IN THE MIDDLE EAST

**The Middle East as a whole is under the impression that the US has reshuffled its national interests and priorities. Resulting in dwindling US regional influence and following the 2010 mid-term elections, President Obama’s future is far more dependent on his domestic track-record than on foreign policy achievements or debacles. This re-orientation was clearly demonstrated in President Obama’s January 2011 “State of the Union” address and in the inconsistent mishandling of both the political turmoil in the region and the Arab-Israeli peace process. Unless events in the Middle East will adversely impact current American priorities – primarily, domestic economic recovery and the Afghan offensive – the US Administration might look the other way as its regional authority and role will continue to diminish.**

**The broad Middle Eastern perception of American declining power considerably harms the strategic posture of US allies in the region, Israel included.** Simultaneously, this perception bolsters and reinforces Iran’s regional hegemonic ambitions and expansionism having it tighten its grip beyond the Northern tier of Syria-Hezbollah-Hamas-Turkey to the Southern tier – US allies from the Persian Gulf through Saudi Arabia and Jordan to North Africa. Iran might put the US and its regional allies to test sooner than one might expect by pursuing its easily materialized ambitions to take over oil-rich Southern Iraq.

Without a reinvigorated and consistent US containment strategy, Iran’s revisionist aspirations and aggressive destabilizing of other regimes in the region will pursue unchecked, as Western regional influence dwindles. This trajectory poses a clear and present danger to Israel and US allies across the region.

A “strong” US presence in the Middle East is a vital strategic interest of Israel and the moderate Arab countries in confronting the shared challenge posed by the radical forces in the region. However, **the strategic reliance of Israel and the moderate Arab countries upon the US cannot be passive and they ought to share the burden of revitalizing the once formidable US-led coalition of moderate forces in the region by jointly promoting the peace process and prudently managing reform and transition processes across the region.**

### BEYOND THE NUCLEAR FILE: IRAN’S BID FOR HEGEMONY OF A RADICAL MIDDLE EAST

**Iran is exploiting domestic upheaval in the region to increase its clout, assuming the regime in Tehran will be able to contain its very own domestic challenge to its rule.** The Iranian subversion offensive throughout the region is multiplying the likelihood of radical Islam forces coming to power in key Arab countries reversing their pro-Western strategic orientation. At the very least, Islamists are expected to enhance their political power and sway, which in turn would allow them to influence and direct the strategic re-orientation.

Thus, a **macro-regional risk assessment would underscore the increasing likelihood of an outburst of Iranian-sponsored and sanctioned radicalization of Middle East regimes.** This clearly constitutes a regional risk bearing a relatively high (if not highest) adverse impact with broad ripple (tsunami-like) effects extending across and well beyond the region. Radical Islamization of one of the “moderate” Arab regimes, for instance Egypt, might set a “spillover effect” into motion and could impair the interests of the international community in preserving regional stability and safeguarding energy and maritime security.

Western analysts disagree as to the domestic resilience of the Iranian regime, the political impact of the international sanctions and the consequent domestic economic crisis. Nonetheless, there is a broad consensus that **although sanctions alone will not dissuade Iran from pursuing a military nuclear capability, maintaining international pressure is essential.** Experts, however, disagree over the extent of the next phase of applied pressure and sanctions; some (including current US officialdom) question the efficacy of debilitating sanctions that might only serve to domestically reinforce the regime’s hold, while others maintain that harsher sanctions might undermine regime stability and facilitate dissuasion.

One way or the other, dissuading the Iranian regime from pursuing nuclear weapons mandates a much more united international front, yet to be fully and unequivocally demonstrated. **Effective dissuasion necessitates a realistic assessment of the regime’s domestic resilience allowing the formulation of a carefully calibrated balance between sanctions and a credible threat to use sufficient military force.** In formulating a strategy of dissuasion, it would be essential to prudently consider the implications of failure as it is estimated that a military operation could only forestall Iran’s nuclear program by four years and Israel would be the primary bearer of Iranian retaliation. While Israel should do all that is in its means to prevent the military nuclearization of Iran, it should not assume a primary and exclusive responsibility in this indispensable undertaking.

**Current international pressure appears however, to have led to a modification of Iran’s strategy to pursue military nuclear capability.** While Iran could technically be in a position to achieve nuclear capability within two years, its leaders seem to prefer to avoid a short-term nuclear breakout as it would legitimize broad and far harsher international counter-measures. It therefore is plausible to construe that Iran’s leadership has opted to methodically and patiently pursue the build-up of its nuclear producing infrastructure for military purposes.

Furthermore, not only is Iran not pressed to achieve short-term breakout, it is already benefitting from the extensive international preoccupation with its military nuclear program. Although understandable, the attention to its nuclear file has bolstered Iran’s strategic posture beyond any proportion well before mastering uranium enrichment to military grade levels. At the same time, Iran’s build-up of a domineering conventional military force been hardly noticed by the global powers, while its regional subversion efforts have only come to light more recently. **Iran and its allies and proxies share a strong sense of accomplishment, which in turn only reinforces their determination to wreak regional havoc.**

#### TURKEY – FOE OR FRIEND?

Following the Justice and Development Party’s (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) electoral victory in 2002, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has led Turkey’s domestic and international reorientation. Domestic societal processes are driving the Islamic identity of Turkey, although this identity is more conservative than radical. Meanwhile, Turkey has developed close strategic relations with the radical forces in the region – Iran, Syria, and Hamas. In the longer term however, Turkey’s regional ambitions position it as a likely rival of Iran and, in any case, Turkey would not want Iran to become a nuclear military power.

In this reorientation, **Turkey’s long-standing strategic relationship with Israel has effectively come to an end** marked by Turkish harsh criticism of Israel’s 2008/9 Cast Lead Operation in Gaza and the Turkish role in the *Mavi Marmara*-led flotilla to Gaza and its aftermath. Turkey’s relations with its NATO allies and European neighbors have also experienced considerable strain. From a Western perspective, Turkey remains a strategic asset although its actions vis-à-vis the Middle East continue to raise serious question marks, as in the Turkish effective veto of officially naming Iran as the target for NATO’s new missile defense program and in the joint Turkish-Chinese air force exercise.

The current direction of Turkey’s relations with Israel remains unclear. Both Prime Ministers, Erdoğan and Netanyahu, appear to be exploring the possibility of restoring amicable relations between the governments. However **there is substantial concern in Israel and in the West concerning the impact of Turkey’s Islamic public opinion and popular media, which increasingly display fervent anti-Western, anti-Israeli and even anti-Semitic discourse.**

#### THE SPECTER OF ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE WEST

Over the past decade, **radical Islamic groups across the Middle East are gaining political power and support,** posing an imminent threat to the stability of the region. Moreover, the **growing outreach of these groups in Europe and in the US has not been sufficiently challenged,** which in turn, facilitates the export of radicalism, terror and violence to Western soil. **Radicalization and terror are two sides of the same coin – terror is the manifestation, the realization, of radical indoctrination.**

One of the crucial drivers of Middle East instability and the specter of regional radicalization is the unique demography of the region – more than half of the Arab population is young; of which a large proportion is under 15. Many of the Arab regimes are failing in addressing the challenges posed by their rapidly growing populations – in providing adequate education and employment. This void is filled by radical Islamic movements funding education and welfare services instead of the government and poised to reap political dividends in democratic elections. The cases of Iran, Lebanon and Gaza demonstrate that once in power, radical Islamic-backed governments are likely to install draconian security apparatuses to enforce their authoritarian rule guided by a radical theological interpretation of Islam. The danger of this experience being repeated elsewhere in the Middle East is clear and potent.



**Facilitated by political, social and economic under-development across the Middle East, radical Islamist groups** – both Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist Jihadist (al-Qaeda) movements **are operating in all moderate Arab Sunni regimes** – Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Palestinian Authority, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Some of these groups benefit from assistance and guidance provided by Shi'ite Iran and Hezbollah.

**Islamist radical ideologies and movements have also penetrated third generation Muslim migrants in the US and Europe, many of whom are socio-economically under-privileged and suffering of identity crisis.** These movements provide the troubled youth and young adults a sense of belonging and purpose and provide welfare and education. The Western governments are failing to respond and effectively address radicalization as it may be construed as religiously offensive and an affront to the basic freedoms, the cornerstones of liberal democracies. Compelled by political correctness, government agencies in the West appear nearly helpless.

In a sense, combating radicalism in the West and in the Middle East is not all that different. The threatened regimes in the Middle East have chosen different tactics to counter the spread and sway of these movements including the recruiting of establishment clerics to delegitimize these movements and launching public propaganda campaigns. These efforts, as essential, attempting to undermine the religious credentials of radical Islamists in Middle East countries have been for most piecemeal and failed to create a critical mass.

**Governments – in the Middle East and in the West – must vigorously promote traditional non-radical Islamic ideology and financially and institutionally empower non-radical Islamic civil society. This approach can only be sustained by vigilant and unrelenting outcasting of radicals, which is the pre-condition for counter-radicalization.** Therefore, governments ought to unequivocally reject offering to radical organizations representation in any official agency, authority or government post and discard official engagement with “soft” or more “reasonable” radicals.

**Counter-radicalization ought, however, to be couched in a multi-dimensional strategy that would also prudently tackle the root causes that permit the festering of radicalism – political, social, and economic under-development.** The strategy should make clear that radicalism is not only a blasphemy, but also will not lead to a better life. In demonstrating this, governments should reclaim from radical Islamist organizations the responsibility for providing welfare and educational services. Governments ought to also lead the way in empowering women in Muslim communities in the West and in the Middle East.

Challenging radical Islam in the Western liberal world will not be an easy undertaking. Western governments will have to invest in media campaigns to explain to the broad public the dangers of radical Islam by underscoring their illiberal and anti-Christian agenda and the potent security threat they pose.

#### ADDRESSING TRANSITION: PROVIDING FREEDOM AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Domestic upheaval across the Middle East leading to the ousting of authoritarian leaders until recently vividly supported by Western governments has brought to fore one of the principal strategic dilemmas – freedom and democracy vs. regional stability. Having been discredited by all parties in the region, Western imprint has been limited. While the political, social and economic under-development of the Arab world facilitated radicalism and the export of violence to the West, the profound concern was, and still is, that given the headway achieved by radical forces in the past decade, democratically elected governments would end up being controlled by radical Islamist movements.

Therefore, in the past two years, the Obama administration seemed to have distanced itself from the freedom agenda actively promoted by its predecessor. Rather, the US clearly preferred maintaining the domestic political status-quo in countries considered its allies. **Events on the ground in the region compelled the Obama administration to adopt the Bush administration's stance on promoting freedom in the Middle East as a cure to regional instability and the export of violence and radicalism to the West.** However, the lessons the Bush administration learned during its first term through 2006 following the electoral successes of the Hamas in the Palestinian Authority and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt have not been all too apparent in the hitherto inconsistent handling of events by the current US administration. The former administration eventually realized that democratic elections alone are insufficient for durable freedom and progress, if not entirely counter-productive.

This experience has also informed the Israeli perspective that considers regional democratization as desirable only in principle. Arab Middle Eastern countries lack the required infrastructure – tradition, institutions, pluralism, individualism, and a robust multi-party system – to sustain a democratic process. Post Cold War democratic transitions in Eastern Europe prevailed in countries with some democratic traditions (e.g. Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic) and failed where this was absent (Russia). Therefore, installing democratic elections without a supporting socio-political infrastructure will only serve to open the way for radical forces to assume power, sooner or later.

While this perspective is held by many in the policy community in the West, the American and European administrations posit that they cannot but support the opposition to authoritarian rule and the yearning for democracy. Arguably, there is a limit to Western support to authoritarian rulers who condemn their nations to regress. In a sense, **the evolving situation across the region and developments in some theaters, such as Egypt and Tunisia has solved the strategic conundrum of freedom vs. stability.** The mission ahead is to provide both, even if incrementally.

**Western policymakers ought therefore to support a gradual transition process of building-up a responsive and accountable political, economic and social institutional infrastructure in Arab regimes to prevent their overtaking by radical Islamic forces.** The US and Europe, along with the middle and emerging powers represented in the G-20 should assist both the new administrations under formation and the remaining regimes in the gradual transitions which would respond to the local public demand for representation, good governance and better life conditions. International financial assistance and guidance in this process will be essential to allow the regimes to address the legitimate public demands, provide domestic and regional stability, and prevent the emergence of radicalism.

## ENGINEERING A TURNAROUND: TIME FOR ARABS AND ISRAELIS TO STEP UP TO THE PEACE PROCESS

**While the Palestinian cause hardly features in the current intra-Middle East turmoil, the potential radicalization of key Middle East countries might revive the exploitation of the stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.** The Israeli-Palestinian impasse is an additional risk factor for the remaining moderate Arab regimes. Placed in that context, wrongly or rightfully, **Israeli perceived reluctance to vigorously pursue the peace process** is viewed by foes and allies alike as a contributing factor to regional instability. From an Israeli perspective, this broadly held perception **is strategically detrimental to its national security since it undermines Israel's position as a strategic asset of the Western world in a volatile region.** In this sense, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has strategic implications beyond the remits of a bilateral protracted conflict concerning territory, security and self-determination. Furthermore, and at least from an Israeli perspective, promoting peace is a moral imperative.

Given the US position, posture and interests in the region, US allies in the region, Israel included, ought to assume more responsibility in promoting the peace process. The challenge facing Israel and the other US allies in the region is to contend with the failure of President Obama's initiative to reach a full and comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians within two years. Historically – from the 1977 Israeli-Egyptian breakthrough to the 1993 Oslo accords, the US has never effectively initiated the peace process.

**To engineer a turnaround in the slippery dangerous slope the region is experiencing, leaders of the moderate Arab countries should come forward and form a pro-peace Arab coalition with active US involvement to create a positive momentum in the peace process.**

A responsible coalition could substitute the extremist Arab League in mentoring the peace process with equivalent authority to the Quartet. In expanding the negotiating setting, this coalition would offer pan-Arab political support to the Palestinians in taking the difficult decisions to move ahead in resolving the conflict with Israel. This coalition would also expand the menu of tangible strategic and political benefits for Israel in attaining a final settlement with the Palestinians and consequently increase Israeli public support for the peace process. The release of the Al-Jazeera documents, the departure of President Mubarak who was the Arab standard-bearer of the peace process and the radical forces' growing political power in the region only serve to underscore the imperative of both Arab and Israeli leaders stepping forward.

While a comprehensive final status may not be in the cards in the immediate future and given the Palestinian rejection of a formal long-term interim agreement (rather than a final status agreement), **there is ample room for a series of concerted measures by Israel, the Palestinians and the moderate Arab countries.** These measures could be based on the continued fulfillment of the Roadmap obligations undertaken by Israel and the Palestinian Authority and accepting the spirit of the Arab Peace Initiative and its explicit equation – normalization for peace. **The concerted measures should be simultaneously implemented in the Israeli-Palestinian and the Israeli-Arab countries tracks.** Arab-Israeli-Palestinian concerted measures will not lead overnight to a comprehensive durable peace agreement, but might break the deadlock, create a momentum conducive to productive negotiations on the final status, and promote more regional stability by reinforcing the moderate players in the region. Constructive progress on the peace process would also serve to bolster the US regional posture and influence.

## ADDENDUM: TIME FOR A NEW GRAND-STRATEGY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

Events that have transpired since the 2011 Herzliya Conference in early February – the **spillover of political turmoil to Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain and the haphazard Western response to the events and additional potential contingencies – warrant an urgent yet broad rethink of Western strategy in the Middle East.**

The above outlined policy directions and recommendations elaborated in the run-up and during the Herzliya Conference remain relevant. The events have underscored that although Western projection of influence, power, and credibility in the region have diminished, **there is no substitute for the US and Europe in sharing the burden in maintaining, and where necessary restoring, regional stability.**

**Nonetheless, decision-making in Europe and in the US concerning their joint and respective roles has been erratic, incoherent and inconsistent.** The uneven application of the international norm of the "responsibility to protect" has diminished Western credibility. The segmented micro-management of evolving situations without due regard for broader regional considerations, as in the case of Libya, will limit Western capacity to effectively respond to other potential contingencies, which could pose a far more substantial threat to vital interests of the international community. Western powers have insufficiently considered the implications of their positions and actions as in the unequivocal support for the ousting of a long-time ally in the form of President Mubarak. They have also tended to overlook the role of revisionist regional forces, namely Iran and Turkey, and future contingencies which might undermine the position of key regional powers such as Saudi Arabia. The European position that in the midst of political turmoil in the Middle East, the immediate and final resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the key to regional stability demonstrates that Western policymakers are disconnected from the reality on the ground.

**Paving the way to a more stable, free, and progressive Middle East with an effective and credible role of Western powers requires the forthcoming of a new grand-strategy** for the region based on three mutually reinforcing pillars:

- Political, and where necessary, military containment of the region's revisionist and radical forces;
- Fostering a gradual, phased transition process which would improve the socio-economic living conditions and provide responsive and accountable governance of the Arab Middle East;
- Establishing a regional framework jointly led by the Western powers and the moderate and non-radical forces of the region to advance the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Arguably, the task of assuring progress in the Middle East and preventing its rapid downhill deterioration and radicalization will not be an easy or short feat for the US, Europe and their allies in the region. **The stakes however, are simply too high and warrant a paradigm change. In this undertaking however, Western powers need not to assume this burden exclusively, but rather engage and task – overtly or covertly, explicitly or implicitly – their regional allies.** This however will require the US and Europe to commit to real joint authorship with willing and able allies in the region in the process of crafting a new grand-strategy for the region.

## Facing the Game-Changers: Israel's Military and Diplomatic Frontiers

The implications for Israel's national security of the above-analyzed transforming global and regional strategic landscapes are yet to be fully determined. However, **with certain reservations and required prudence, the shifting global balance of power and Middle East political turmoil do not seem to enhance Israel's international standing and regional strategic posture.**

This assessment, however, is not a *fait accompli* that renders Israel vulnerable. **A sound national security doctrine and foreign policy and their calculated execution could leverage** these fluctuations in Israel's favor **and serve to enhance Israel's positioning – regionally and globally.** In this effort, Israel ought to strengthen the diplomatic dimension of its national security as the diplomatic arena is critical in tackling strategic challenges.

Furthermore, and as outlined in the previous section, Israel too, even if not alone, must effectively and credibly promote the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The current stalemate undermines Israel's regional and global standing and poses a threat to the very foundations of its national security.

From a military perspective, Israel's strategic situation appears at the moment positive – with Israel's northern border and the West Bank calm and quiet. This situation in the North stems from a deterrence-based equilibrium following the 2006 war in Lebanon. Nonetheless, the current strategic situation is transient and a short-noticed military escalation could evolve. The recent events in the Middle East, which took all intelligence establishments by total surprise, point to the limits of intelligence assessment.

### THE CHALLENGE OF MULTI-DIMENSIONAL WARFARE

The Second Lebanon War of 2006 exposed the vulnerability of the Israeli homefront to rocket and missile warfare. In preparing for the next war however, Israeli military planners are required to assume, account for, and address, additional forms of combat and armament simultaneously operated and targeting both the homefront and the military front.

**Israel's primary adversaries, the radical axis led by Iran and its proxies Hezbollah and Hamas, along with Syria, have adopted an offensive strategy aiming to negate and offset at the lowest possible costs Israel's military superiority.** The adversaries are challenging Israel's military deterrence, its strategic intelligence warning, and its ability to achieve military triumph in the battlefield. Enemies' mounting stockpile of ground-to-ground rockets and missiles is a blatant attempt to create a credible capacity to target, intimidate and terrorize Israeli civilian population; advanced aerial defense systems aim at restraining the operational ability of Israel's air force; and anti-tank capabilities and commando forces hamper Israel's armored and infantry maneuverability.

The range of multiple arenas and contingencies of varying level and degree – from low intensity combat, through full-scale conventional ground maneuvering, to ballistic missile warfare, conventional and non-conventional armaments, and cyber warfare – will take a considerable toll on Israel's fiscal resources. **The military's assessment is that future military confrontations will be more intensive and frequent. Israel's military force structure and operational concept should therefore be aimed at containing these confrontations and maintaining them short and decisive, while increasing the readiness of the civilian population to absorb attacks.** Furthermore, the assault on Israel's legitimacy and the prejudicial scrutiny applied to all of Israel's military operations constrain its maneuverability.

**The military strategic planning of the force structure will therefore require a calibrated balance between defensive (active and passive) and offensive capabilities. This balance will be decisive for the outcome of future confrontations as defense does not come at the expense of offense, and vice versa.** Rather, defense capabilities are necessary to launch effective offensive operations, while the latter are essential for rendering a decisive military outcome, which would restore deterrence for as long as possible. Nonetheless, defensive capabilities cannot provide an ultimate guarantee. To date, there is no absolute defensive solution for ballistic threats. Israel will therefore have to continue relying on classical deterrence mandating a credible and sufficiently intolerable threat aimed at Israel's enemies.

Israel, as the entire Western world, will have to invest resources and thinking into raising its level of readiness and preparedness to deal with cyber warfare. Wide range attacks upon Georgia and Estonia have already demonstrated that cyber warfare is not a theoretical possibility. **Defending Israel's advanced digital and cybernetic capabilities and highly networked economy should be a high priority for the defense establishment – leading to the development of cyber intelligence and of the (currently not available) capacity to identify the sources of cyber attacks.** The government – in coordination with the defense establishment and corporate sector – will also have to urgently resolve critical doctrinal, legal and regulative issues in order to be able to effectively counter and negate a cyber attack. This trilateral forum ought to also credibly assess the potential threat posed by Electro-Magnetic Pulses (EMP), which could theoretically cripple Israel's electrical system.

The rise of these new forms of security threats poses unprecedented challenges. Their multidimensional nature requires the recruitment and active participation of the corporate sector and the public in addressing the defense of the realm. This growing span of threats also raises substantial questions as to the responsibility and authority to define and prioritize national security threats. Ultimately, it is up to the government to become actively seized of these matters and swiftly resolve them.

## COUNTERING THE ASSAULT ON ISRAEL'S LEGITIMACY

**Israel has only recently become seriously engaged in trying to enhance its soft power and to counter the campaign delegitimizing its policies, positions, military operations, and even its very existence as a Jewish-Democratic state.**

The deadlock in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has harmed Israel's international standing. Concrete progress in the peace process would enhance Israel's soft power and undermine support for the anti-Israel campaign. However, the reality on the Middle East ground does not seem conducive for a substantial progress in the peace process.

The real and crucial challenge facing Israel stems from the political mainstream of Europe and increasingly the US, not the radical zealots. Policy communities throughout the Western world, more so in Europe, but now also in the US, are reaching a simplistic reading of the Middle East: Israel is the main, if not sole obstacle to the peace process; by resolving the Palestinian issue the Middle East would instantly and positively transform. The world's increasingly sharp focus and tight scrutiny applied to all of Israel's actions is often biased and out of all proportion to its size or the objective significance of Israel in wider international affairs.

The problem with this discourse is not only that it disregards the complex Middle East reality, but that it crosses the line between criticizing legitimate (even if perceived unwise) Israeli decisions to outright delegitimizing of such actions, rendering them unlawful. Oblivious to the obvious similarities between Israel's diplomatic and military courses of action and those of Western military forces across the Broader Middle East, this prejudice is becoming more broadly shared by political mainstreams. This trajectory, far more than the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement and radicals, constitutes a strategic threat to Israel – by impairing Israel's ability to defend itself and enticing its enemies to try and exploit these vulnerabilities.

Branding Israel as a source of creative energy, a “start-up nation”, in science, technology, and culture is unlikely to durably enhance Israel's standing in the West. **To counter the debilitating trend of delegitimization, Israel and its friends ought to promote an informed, unbiased, and professional debate in the Western political and media spheres concerning the Middle East.** Such an effort would not resolve all outstanding disagreements, but it might allow a growing circle of Western practitioners to appreciate the challenges facing Israel and to underscore the commonality of values and strategic interests between the West and Israel. Vigorous Israeli pursuit of the peace process would be not less essential although it may not suffice.

## BROADENING THE SCOPE OF ISRAEL'S FOREIGN POLICY IN FACE OF GLOBAL POWER FLUCTUATIONS

The focal point of Israel's foreign policy for more than four decades has been the US, with more limited attention to Europe and scant consideration to the rest of the world. The decreasing power and influence of the US and Europe mandates a reassessment of Israel's primary foreign policy objectives.

**Nonetheless, Israel has no strategic substitute to its “special relations” with the US. Furthermore, Israel's strategic posture is intertwined with the position and influence of the US in the region.** Therefore, and as outlined above, Israel's primary foreign policy objective ought to be substantially enhancing US regional posture in the Middle East in concert with the other US allies in the region to promote the peace process, contain the Iranian and radical forces in the region, and to foster social-economic-political progress across the region.

However, **as important as the US-Israeli relationship is, it cannot be the sole foundation of Israel's foreign policy. Israel should proactively seek to broaden the base of its foreign relations, particularly towards Asia-Pacific, but also to Russia and Latin America.** It would be wrong though, to assume that this effort might be considered a surrogate to the vital strategic relations of Israel with the US.

Furthermore, in expanding its foreign policy horizon, Israel must consider US strategic preferences. Consequently, the linchpin for developing Israel's relations with Asia-Pacific ought to be India, a recognized strategic partner of the US, along with other US allies and like-minded countries in the region, namely Japan, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Australia. Placed in this context, the decision of Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to focus its Asia-Pacific advance on China ought to be reconsidered.

The main driver for intensifying Israel's relations with Asia-Pacific is its considerable potential in developing commercial relations. Israel's high-tech assets and its proven entrepreneurial and innovation capacities are door-openers in Asia. Israel has only recently begun increasing its economic outreach to Asia and only in 2009 it doubled its exports to the region. Yet, Israel's trade volume with Asia is relatively low when compared to its main trade partners, Europe and the US. In developing trade and commercial relations with this rapidly growing region, Israel will have to carefully navigate its course through the broad variation among the heterogeneous Asia-Pacific economies.

Arguably, Israel's growing economic relations with Asia-Pacific could benefit from a mutually beneficial exchange on political and strategic issues of shared concern. Irrespective of political sensitivities and geographic distance, the key Asia-Pacific countries share with Israel a broad range of political and strategic interests to include Middle East regional stability, maritime security, WMD proliferation, and counter-terrorism and radicalization.

The rationale for enhancing relations with US allies in Asia-Pacific also serves to explain the need of developing Israel's relations (explicitly or implicitly) with US allies in the Middle East. By enhancing its global and regional standing, Israel would bolster its strategic position as an asset for the US. This in itself is critical at a time when more voices (although a small minority) in the American policy community question the strategic importance of Israel for the US.

Furthermore, in broadening the scope of foreign policy Israel ought not to forgo its unique relations with Europe. While Europe faces formidable domestic challenges and political relations between the European Union (EU) and Israel have soured, Israel ought to preserve, and where possible, promote its relations with the EU and NATO focusing on the main European capitals and nurturing relations with the friendly Central and Eastern European countries.

While the Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process are a major factor in Israel's foreign policy and relations, Israel also ought to consider "out of the box" foreign policy directions beyond the conflict. **Although Israel has traditionally refrained from promoting multilateral diplomacy, this is indispensable in the current global age.** Israel must invest sufficient resources in developing its multilateral diplomacy and standing within the UN system and also consider meeting the norms of providing international aid within the UN framework of the Millennium Development Goals.

## National Security Starts at Home: Israel's Domestic Challenges

The formidable challenges facing Israel on the global and regional scene only serve to underwrite the essential and urgent need to attend to critical issues on the domestic national agenda. Israel's capacity to pursue its national interests and to enhance its international influence extensively depend on policies applied at home. **Facilitating the continued trajectory of economic growth, while sharing the benefits of growth more equally, thus reducing socio-economic polarization, are perhaps as essential as defense research & development – both are critical investments in the future.**

The relationship between the domestic agenda and the pursuit of national interests is straightforward. **The growing societal inequality and rate of poverty pose a threat to the resilience of the society, which is exceptionally critical as the homefront is one of the main targets of Israel's enemies.**

Vis-à-vis the Western world, Israel recorded in 2010 the highest rates of poverty and economic growth and the lowest rate of labor participation. This combination is simply untenable and manifests the inadequacy of Israel's domestic government policies. The government has failed to both offer the benefits of economic growth across the board of Israel's society and to maximize the potential of the economic growth. Perhaps more than ever before, Israel needs effective performance-based governance

Insofar, the current political turmoil in the Middle East has not impacted Israel's economic standing. One possible reason for this is the high volume of the Bank of Israel's foreign currency reserves which may be perceived as an anchor of stability. However, a major politico-military crisis embroiling Israel could disrupt the economy, weaken the currency, lead to an inflationary breakout and swell the public expenditure ratio. In such a contingency, Israel would struggle to increase its defense expenditure, which is already high and stands between 7 and 8 percent of the GDP.

**A comprehensive reading of national security, which views domestic challenges as building blocks of national security and power, has become the norm and practice of most liberal democracies.** This is also the underlying concept of the Herzliya Conference Series. Time has come that this approach becomes the guiding principle of Israel's governance.

### ENHANCING EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT: PRESERVING ECONOMIC GROWTH, ADDRESSING POVERTY

**The major domestic challenge facing Israel is to preserve its impressive economic growth trajectory while urgently addressing growing socio-economic inequality and polarization.** Economic growth is unevenly shared. The commissioned 2011 Herzliya Indices demonstrate that Israel has well-weathered the global economic crisis. In 2010, Israel recorded the highest growth rate - 4.7 percent - among the world developed economies and created 120,000 new workplaces. Israel continues to narrow the economic gap with most OECD economies.

However, the 2011 Herzliya Indices also reveal an expanding rate of poverty and mounting inequality. OECD studies reveal that Israel is ranked low in comparison to other developed countries both in terms of the Gini Coefficient score and of government social and welfare expenditure. The government has failed in addressing poverty and the optimistic assertion that economic growth will improve the less privileged segments of society has been completely disproved. Furthermore, social disparities are likely to increase due to the continuous global rise in the price of commodities. The government's strategy in dealing with mounting socio-economic inequality through taxation policy and direct payments to the lower deciles has yet to be proven effective.

Therefore, there is a pressing demand for governmental intervention to alleviate socio-economic polarization. While Israel's security and defense concerns are clearly reflected in governmental fiscal terms, it is equally notable that social welfare, employment and education are insufficiently prioritized. With Israel's admission to the OECD, it might be useful to consider adjusting the proportionally low public expenditure .

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Therefore, there is a pressing demand for governmental intervention to alleviate socio-economic polarization. While Israel's security and defense concerns are clearly reflected in governmental fiscal terms, it is equally notable that social welfare, employment and education are insufficiently prioritized. With Israel's admission to the OECD, it might be useful to consider adjusting the proportionally low public expenditure on social welfare that falls 5 percent below the OECD average (USD10 billion in lacking budget). Such an adjustment could be utilized to meet long-standing governmental commitments to invest funds in focal projects for the two most lagging societal sectors, the Jewish Ultra-Orthodox and Arab-Israeli communities. These funds should aim at enhancing the participation of members of these communities in the labor force.

While short-term measures are essential to deal with the staggering rates of poverty and socio-economic inequality, **there is a vital imperative to launch a long-term grand-strategy to increase human capital, employment and labor income rates of the socio-economically disadvantaged members of Israel's society – focusing primarily on education and employment.**

#### TACKLING SOCIO-ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THROUGH EDUCATION

At the dawn of this century's second decade, Israel's schools lag behind. When bearing in mind that Israel is rightfully considered – by friends and foes alike – a technological path-blazer of innovation and a scholastic society – **the state of its education art is alarming and bears concerning consequences on Israel's capacity to remain a technological and innovative hub.**

School education in Israel is unequal, with geographical and societal periphery suffering of lower quality teachers and teaching. In addressing socio-economic inequality in the education system, digital learning is a major tool for enhancing quality education in all societal sectors. **Information technology and the World Wide Web are not an end in themselves, but rather a critical platform for providing high-end education combined with effective teacher-student communication.** Nonetheless, technology and hardware alone are insufficient for quality teaching. With teachers' proficiency in IT lagging way behind those of their pupils, embedding digital learning is not only about investing in hardware, but also requires substantial investment in raising quality of teachers (also through financial incentives) and the training of teachers.

Israel's education policy, which aspires to have all high-school students attain matriculation certificates, but fails in doing so, ought to be reconsidered. That only nearly half of the high-school students achieve matriculation certificates warrants the investment of resources in professional technological training which would provide all high school graduates with basic and relevant vocational skills for the 21st century global competitive information society. The basic mission of the school system must be to maximize the potential of each student.

Furthermore, the government needs to allocate considerable resources for vocational education of adults from the three socio-economic weak segments of the society, namely Arab Israelis, ultra-orthodox Jews, and people with disabilities. Vocational education ought to be complemented by removing the social and physical barriers for these segments' participation in the labor force and facilitating their employment placing by also providing necessary infrastructure (e.g. available public transportation).

#### THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF ARAB ISRAELIS

The effective discrimination of Arab Israelis in the labor force is particularly staggering – only 20 percent of Arab Israeli women participate in the labor force; Arab Israelis hold only 7 percent of jobs in the civil service; the level of income among Arab Israelis is 43 percent below the national average; the rate of poverty among Arab Israelis stands at 30 percent (the national average is approximately 10 percent);

only 3 percent of the industrial zones in Israel are located in Arab municipalities. **Tackling under-development among Arab Israelis is not only essential for enhancing the social and economic integration of what makes up 20 percent of Israel's population; it is one of Israel's major untapped sources of future potential economic growth.** The full integration of the Arab Israelis into the national economy – meeting the average rate of employment and salary – could potentially add approximately USD7 billion to the annual gross domestic product.

Hence, government investment in providing the necessary tools for the integration of Arab Israelis into the national labor force could provide substantial economic returns benefiting the entire economy. In this effort special attention should be granted to the inclusion of Arab Israeli women by providing vocational training, child care facilities, and effective public transportation solutions for Arab Israeli communities, most of which reside outside of the metropolitan centers. Additionally, the government should encourage entrepreneurship and the development of small and medium size enterprises among Arab Israelis by offering financial incentives and specialized business development training. Affirmative action in placement of Arab Israelis in government positions is also important – sending a clear message to the Arab Israeli community that their socio-economic integration is important.

## PERFORMANCE BASED-GOVERNANCE: MAXIMIZING THE POTENTIAL OF ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS

**Israel's economic competitiveness fails to maximize its potential due to a distinct and growing disadvantage in governance.** Whereas governance in developed countries is increasingly efficient by minimizing bureaucratic burden and enhancing policy stability in ways that benefit the business community, **Israel is characterized by both lack of stability and a growing regulative and bureaucratic burden.**

The government is unable to execute projects – large and small scale alike – in a timely and cost-efficient fashion. Sluggish planning processes are encumbered by extensive inner-governmental auditing and legal scrutiny procedures. Elected executive office-holders, suffering of high overturn rates, have been rendered powerless in face of the growing capacity of the bureaucracy. Over the course of the past two decades, the Ministry of Finance's Budget Division has assumed excessive bureaucratic control and authority becoming the key arbitrator for setting priorities and determining which projects should be authorized. In this process, government ministries and agencies, the beholders of professional expertise and experience, have been sidelined. This process does not appear optimal in terms of performance-based good governance and ought to be reversed by enhancing both executive and professional authority in Israeli governance.

## Creating a New Global Jewish Discourse between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora

The generation of Diaspora Jews that witnessed the creation of the State of Israel and its first insecure decades were firm standard-bearers of Israel, seeing in its unconditional support a near holy duty. However, Israel is no longer perceived a frail entity facing existential threats that desperately needs all the unconditional support it can muster. Successive generations of Diaspora Jews, particularly in the West, have been affected by a totally different global political culture which does not necessarily positively reflect upon Israel. Raised in liberal democracies that defend minority rights, a growing number of Jewish leaders, and even more so young Jews worldwide, find it increasingly difficult to unconditionally defend Israel's policies without their critical notes being registered. Studies have shown that young Jews in the Western world support a liberal type of Zionism, whereby values of an open debate, skepticism of military intervention, and human rights are fundamental. **The alienation of younger Diaspora Jews is further reinforced by the perceived growingly less liberal Israeli body politic, unproportionally dominated by ultra-orthodox parties and right-of-center political positions.**

Most of the "formal" Jewish communal organizations traditionally support Israel "right or wrong" and cannot easily adjust. Consequently, this position is alienating a growing number of young Diaspora Jews. Whereas recent polls show that the younger Jewish generation in North America (and probably throughout the Western world) is increasingly critical of Israel's actions, they also demonstrate that an overwhelming majority feels very connected to Israel. This might also be related to the mushrooming Israeli experience programs – Taglit-birthright Israel, MASA, and Lapid. Placed in this context, young Jews are in effect claiming the right to criticize Israel's action as part of their newfound Jewish identity and affinity. This means there is a potential for deepening the relationship and bond between the newer generation and Israel, but within a new and different context. This also illustrates the pluralistic character of the Jewish communities and the greater diffusion of Jewish organizational life abroad.

**The mounting assault on Israel's legitimacy, a source of concern for most, if not all, Jewish leaders and Jews worldwide, compounds and accentuates the challenges facing both Israel and the Jewish Diaspora.** Jewish communities around the world have found themselves on the frontline of the international obsession with Israel, either as proxy target for Israel itself or as (progressively more isolated) counter-advocates of the assault on Israel's legitimacy. This frontline position excessively burdens internal Jewish debates on the future of Israel, the logic and morality of its actions and the nature of Jewish society in general.

Jewish leaderships and their communities are often called upon to defend Israel. They are directly affected by Israel's decision-making, to which they are neither privy nor partner. This inevitably creates a fundamental tension between a perceived duty to defend whatever policies of the Government of Israel ("Israel right or wrong"), and a perceived obligation to criticize certain policies and advocate specific positions as a means for improving Israel in terms of "*tikun olam*" (without being necessarily labeled as 'self hating Jews'). This tension extends beyond the personal to the communal level – the expectation for a unified Jewish communal voice inevitably leads to the stifling of a vibrant pluralistic debate. Attempts to suppress intra-community debates stem from the fear that these debates undermine a united front for defending and advocating for Israel and play into the hands of its enemies.

These trends are a reflection of a growing body politic of Jewish Diaspora seeking a new global Jewish discourse and more involvement in the process of determining the course of Israel's strategic direction.

Israel has been slowly but steadily modifying its approach towards the Diaspora over the past 60 years. Israel's integration into the global marketplace seems to have facilitated a new approach to the Diaspora as has the effective end of large Jewish migration (*aliya*) waves. **To be clear, and as opposed to the vibrant debate in the Diaspora, Israel-Diaspora relations are simply not on the Israeli agenda. At best, one can detect a changing attitude in Israel towards the Diaspora.**

However, a certain 'Israel-centrality' remains in the minds of the Israeli public and decision makers rendering the concerns of Diaspora Jews low on Israel's list of national priorities. **There seems to be a broad, although implicit, belief that Israel is no longer strategically dependent upon the financial or political support of the Diaspora.**

The experiential programs of the Diaspora in Israel have however, led to a broad Israeli acknowledgement of the need to reinforce the bonds and attachment of the young generation Jews to Israel. This acknowledgement has led to substantial allocation of government funds to Taglit-birthright Israel and to other programs.

Furthermore, the new strategic direction of the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI) is also indicative of a new understanding of Israel-Diaspora relations. JAFI is reorienting its focus of activities in Jewish communities around the world from promoting and facilitating *Aliya* (Jewish migration to Israel) to instilling and reinforcing Jewish identity in Diaspora communities. In this effort offering programs for the teaching of Jewish culture – through the learning of Jewish canonical texts – in Israel and abroad is essential.

**The increasing need felt by Jews in the Diaspora to be heard on issues that directly and indirectly influence them as Jews, together with the need for Israel to keep the Diaspora involved but not formally so, offers the rationale for a seeking possible mechanisms for enhancing more formal and regularized Israeli-Diaspora dialogue.**



## הערכת הרצליה 2011

### אלוף (מיל.) דני רוטשילד

1. שנת 2011 מסתמנת כשנת מפנה דרמטית בהתפתחויות האזוריות. במהלך השנה הזו יגיעו תהליכים בעלי עוצמה רבה למיצוי ולהכרעה, כפי שאנו כבר רואים במצרים ובטוניסיה. בכוחם של תהליכים אלה – כל אחד לחוד ובתמהילים שונים – טמון איום גדול לעתיד המזרח התיכון כולו ולמציאות החיים שלנו בין הים לירדן.
2. האזור כולו נתון תחת התחושה, שארצות הברית המירה את סדר העדיפויות שלה. נשיא ארה"ב מבין – על רקע תוצאות בחירות אמצע הקדנציה שלו – שהבחירות הבאות לנשיאות ב-2012 יוכרעו על סמך תפקודו במדיניות הפנים אמריקאית ולא על סמך הישגיו או כישלונותיו במדיניות החוץ. על כן הוא מסיט במודע את ממשלו להתמקד באתגרים מבית. נאום "מצב האומה" של הנשיא אובמה בשלהי חודש ינואר ביטא זאת יותר מכל, והתנהלות הממשל מול מובארק בימים האחרונים המחישה זאת הלכה למעשה. בנוסף, המיקוד ביציאה מעיראק, המעבר לאופנסיה באפגניסטן ושיקום הכלכלה האמריקנית – כל אלה נתפשים כחשובים היום לשרידותו הפוליטית של הנשיא אובמה לאין ערוך יותר מהתהליך המדיני במזרח התיכון.
3. התפיסה הרווחת באזור על היחלשותה של ארה"ב והפגיעה במיצובה האזורי מחלישות את ישראל ואת המדינות המתונות באזור ומאיצה את התרחבות ההגמוניה האיראנית על חלקים הולכים וגדלים החל מציר חמאס-חיזבאללה-סוריה ותורכיה ועד לזירה המשלימה של מדינות המפרץ, מצרים וסעודיה. תהליך זה צובר תאוצה וללא שינוי מהותי במדיניות החוץ האמריקנית הוא אף יחמיר.
4. מפת ניהול הסיכונים מצביעה על סכנות להתפרצות הרדיקליזם נתמך-איראן בשורה של מדינות באזור. החוגה העדינה והרגישה הבוחנת את יציבותם של מנהיגים ומדינות מתונות באזור מגלה סימנים של פעולה נחושה של ציר האופנסיה האיראנית בהמתנה למומנטום מחולל שינוי שיביא להפיכה משטרית במתונות שבמדינות המזרח התיכון ולשינוי האוריינטציה המדינית שלהן. שאיפותיה של איראן בדרום עיראק ובאזור המפרץ עתיר עתודות הנפט ממתונות ליציאת הכוחות האמריקנים. השתלטות האיראנית על אזור הדמים הזה תימשך זן לא רב.
5. סכנה היא שגם במצרים, כוחות איסלמיסטיים קיצוניים, בתמיכת הממשל האיראני, יאחזו בהגה השלטון. התפתחות שכזו עלולה לסכן את היציבות בכל המזרח-התיכון וליצור אפקט "דומינו".
6. מנגד, העיסוק האובססיבי, גם אם המובן, בשאלת הגרעין האיראני מסית את הדיון מהצורך החשוב במבט קונבנציונאלי מפוכח. מבחינות רבות ניצלה איראן את אופציית הגרעין שלה עוד בטרם הושלם שלב העשרת האורניום. איראן יצרה מומנטום לה ולגרורותיה הרדיקאליות מול ציר המתונות הסטגנטי.
7. קיימים חילוקי דעות באשר למצבה של איראן נוכח הסנקציות והמשבר הכלכלי הפוקד אותה. יחד עם זאת, ישנה הסכמה גורפת שלא ניתן לראות בסנקציות לבדן אמצעי או מנוף לשכנע את המשטר בטהראן להחליט על עצירה מוחלטת של תוכנית הגרעין. הקהילה הבינלאומית חייבת להציג חזית אחידה בפני איראן. יש להמשיך ולדון בזיקה שבין הסנקציות, האיום לנקוט מהלך צבאי והערכת יציבותו הפנימית של המשטר ולמצוא את התמהיל שיגרום למשטר לשנות מן היסוד את גישתו ביחס לתוכנית הגרעין. למרות שיש לעשות הכל על מנת למנוע מאיראן להצטייד בנשק גרעיני, הרי שאל לה לישראל לקחת על עצמה בלעדיות במערכה זו.
8. תוקפנותו של הציר הרדיקאלי אינה זוכה למענה מקביל ממשי מן הצד שכנגד. אל מול סימני אי-היציבות ההולכים ומתרבים בחלק ממדינות האזור, השפעת המערב הולכת ומצטמצמת, שלא לומר נעלמת. העדר תהליך מדיני אזורי ימשיך להוות תירוץ להתחזקות כוחות רדיקאליים ומיליטנטיים.
9. ישראל הופכת יותר ויותר לגורם דומיננטי במדדי אי-היציבות האזורית. להעדר חלופה מדינית לסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני יש מחיר גבוה החורג משאלת סכסוך הגבולות המידי. השפעת העדר תהליך מדיני על המשטרים המתונים באזור מהווה גם הוא רכיב של סיכון גובר בעבורם. אולם, ההשפעה אינה רק חד-כיוונית; הציר הרדיקאלי הצפוני אימץ לו אסטרטגיה אופנסית שתכליתה לפגוע בעורף החברה הישראלית. לאסטרטגיה זו מטרה אופרטיבית של פגיעה בחברה הישראלית. חידוד משמעויות ההרס כלפי עומק העורף הישראלי הוא חלק מהאסטרטגיה הזו ואת ראשית פירותיה ניתן היה לאתר במלחמת לבנון השנייה.
10. על מנת להביא למפנה במורד המסוכן בו מחליק האזור, יש לגייס את ראשי מדינות ערב המתונות, לעודד וליזום הקמת גוף ערבי מתון הנשען על מעורבות אמריקנית פעילה שתכליתה ליצור מומנטום חיובי בתהליך המדיני. ברית המבוגרים הזו תהווה תחליף יעיל לליגה הערבית הקיצונית... הנעשה כיום במצרים ובאזור כולו, ממחיש למנהיגות הערבית המתונה, כי יש לשתף פעולה ולא להשאיר את הזירה לכוחות הקיצוניים המקבילים כעת רוח גבית. הגוף הערבי המתון - שאנחנו רואים בו מקבילה לקוורטט הקיים - ישמש בפועל מרחיב למעגל ההידברות הצר בין ישראל לבין הפלסטינים. השותפות הזו תאפשר לישראל להשיג יתרונות גדולים יותר במשא ומתן והיא תעניק לה נכסים גיאואסטרטגיים בעלי תמורה מהותית

- לאזרחי המדינה ויוקרה פוליטית למנהיגות שתוביל בכיוון זה. הצד הפלסטיני יינהג מגיבוי הנשען על אסטרטגיה כלל-ערבית ולא על פשרה פלסטינית. בכך תועמק לרשות תמיכה פאן-ערבית רחבה למהלך של סיום הסכסוך. פרסום מסמכי אל ג'זירה והחשש מפני התחזקות החמאס רק מחזקים את הצורך במהלך שכזה.
11. מהלכים ישראליים וערביים מתואמים לקידום התהליך המדיני לא רק יתרמו ליציבות המדינות המתונות במישורן, אלא אף יסייעו לביצור מעמדה האזורי של ארה"ב. ארה"ב "חזקה" היא אינטרס ישראלי חיוני עבור מדיניות החוץ של ישראל, כמו גם לשכנותיה המתונות.
12. הקיפאון בתהליך המדיני מסלים ומעצים את "המלחמה הרכה" ("soft war") נגד מדינת ישראל בזירה הבינלאומית. עד כה, רשמה "מלחמה רכה" זו הישגים משמעותיים בחיזוק הדה-לגיטימציה למדיניותה הצבאית והדיפלומטית של ישראל, לאופן מימוש זכותה להגנה עצמית ואף לעצם זכות קיומה. מערכה זו מתבטאת במשוא הפנים המביא להתמקדות בלתי-מדינית ובלתי-מאוזנת במדיניותה של ישראל ובמהלכה על חשבון כמעט כל סוגיה מדינית ואסטרטגית בינלאומית אחרת. ככל שיגבר הרושם באזור שישראל מאבדת את יסודות עוצמתה הרכה, כך תיפגע דימויה האסטרטגי ותגבר המוטיבציה של אויביה ליזום נגדה גם מהלכים צבאיים כוללים. המערכת הישראלית השקיעה לא מעט תשומות בניסיון למתג את ישראל כמדינה של יצירתיות וחדשנות בכל תחומי העשייה – החל ממחקר ופיתוח טכנולוגי וכלה בתרבות הפנאי. אולם, ספק אם בכוחם של מהלכים אלה לתרום למערכה המדינית שישראל כעת מצויה בה.
13. השינויים ביחסי הכוחות הגלובליים והאזוריים אינם מטיבים עם ישראל והיא מחויבת להרחיב את בסיס מדיניות החוץ שלה ואת הפרופיל הבינלאומי שלה ע"י העמקת שיתוף הפעולה עם מעצמות עולות באסיה ובאמריקה הלטינית. בהקשר זה הודו צריכה להוות ציר מרכזי למאמץ ישראל להעמקת היחסים גם בשל שותפותה האסטרטגית עם ארה"ב.
14. לשינויים הגלובליים השלכות לא מבוטלות גם על המשק הישראלי המוטה-ייצוא. עליית כוחה הכלכלי של אסיה-פסיפיק מציבה בפני ישראל הזדמנויות לצד סיכונים. המשך צמיחת המשק תלוי במידה רבה בפיתוח היצוא לאסיה-פסיפיק ומצריך לשקול מחדש את האוריינטציה המסחרית של ישראל. על מנת לנצל את ההזדמנויות הנפתחות למשק הישראלי באסיה, על מדינת ישראל להגדיר מדיניות מתאימה, אשר תסייע בהתמודדות עם העדר היכרות עם שווקים חדשים המאופיינים בתרבויות פוליטיות וניהוליות שונות.
15. הגידול המתמשך בביקוש לנפט מעבר לרמת ההיצע הקיים (המכונה "peak oil") מעלה את הסיכון הניכר למחסור עולמי ולעליות מחירים משמעותיות. תהליך גלובלי זה טומן בחובו סיכונים אסטרטגיים וכלכליים משמעותיים עבור ישראל. ישראל צריכה לקדם ולהשקיע במחקר ופיתוח ביצירת דלקים חלופיים ולקדם יוזמות בינלאומיות שיאפשרו חדירה של דלקים אלה לשווקים.
16. יכולתה של ישראל לעמוד אל מול האתגרים האזוריים והגלובליים המורכבים והדינמיים תלויה במידה רבה בביצור מקורות חוסנה הלאומי מבית. בפתחה של שנת 2011 ניתן לקבוע שישראל התמודדה היטב עם המשבר הכלכלי העולמי והצמיחה שאפיינה את המשק עד 2008 חודשה. השיפור במימד הכלכלי של ישראל במהלך 2010 בולט במיוחד על רקע הנסיגה הכלכלית שחוו רוב מדינות ה-OECD. עובדה זו מאפשרת לישראל לצמצם את הפער הכלכלי אל מול המדינות המתקדמות ולהגדילו בהשוואה למדינות האזור.
17. לעומת שיעורי הצמיחה הכלכלית, המדדים חברתיים מצביעים על עלייה בתחולת העוני והתרחבות אי-השוויון בחברה. הצמיחה הכלכלית אינה מטיבה עם השכבות החלשות יותר בחברה הישראלית. מדינת ישראל כושלת בהתמודדותה עם בעיית העוני.... התפיסה, על פיה צמיחה כלכלית תשפר את מצב כלל החברה, התבררה כשגויה. לתהליכים אלה השפעה אסטרטגית קשה ביותר לחוסנה של מדינת ישראל במיוחד בעת בה החברה והעורף מהווים חזית עבור אויביה. מדינת ישראל מחויבת להפיק את המיטב מהצמיחה הכלכלית ולהוביל מדיניות אפקטיבית, יסודית, נבונה וארוכת-טווח של צמצום פערים חברתיים, במיוחד בתחום החינוך המקצועי, ההשכלה הגבוהה ועידוד התעסוקה בקרב אוכלוסיות ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך.
18. כמדינת העם היהודי, חוסנה של ישראל תלוי גם בטיב קשריה עם התפוצה היהודית בעולם. המסע העולמי לפגיעה בלגיטימיות של ישראל מהווה איום גם על הקהילות היהודיות בעולם. מעבר לכך, בקרב הקהילות בעולם המערבי ניתן להצביע על מגמות המעמידות בסימן שאלה את המשך ההזדהות של יהודים עם מדינת ישראל – בעיקר בקרב הדור הצעיר. ישראל לא יכולה להרשות לעצמה להמעיט בחשיבות טיפוח היחסים עם התפוצות ולהמשיך להתייחס לתמיכת יהודי העולם כאל מובנת מאליה. ישראל חייבת לפתח דיאלוג חדש עם הקהילות וליצור אמצעים להעמקת השותפות והשיח גם בנושאים מדיניים ופוליטיים.
- השנים 2012 ו-2013 יהיו שנים אבודות מבחינת היכולת לחזור על הישגים נדרשים בשנה הזו. ב-2011 זה עדיין תלוי בנו. את מה שיכולנו להשיג בשנים האחרונות כבר איננו יכולים להשיג כיום ומה שלא נשיג היום לא נוכל להשיג בשנים הבאות.

## מדדי הרצליה 2010 לחוסן לאומי - המימד האזרחי - סיכום ממצאים

רופ' רפי מלניק

נייר עבודה

### עיקר הממצאים

1. מדדי הרצליה לחוסן לאומי לשנת 2010 מצביעים על מאזן לא אחיד לישראל: המשך השיפור במימד הכלכלי, תוך סגירת פעור, משמעותית, מול המדינות המפותחות, על רקע נסיגתן עקב המשבר הכלכלי שהשלכותיו ממשיות להשפיע על ביצועיהן; נסיגה קלה במימד החברתי על רקע עלייה בתחולת העוני והתרחבות אי השוויון בחלוקת ההכנסה; ונסיגה ניכרת במימד המשטרי/פוליטי על רקע הידרדרות במדדי המשילות הנערכים על ידי הבנק העולמי. המשך השיפור במימד הכלכלי של ישראל בשנת 2010, על רקע התמודדות העולם עם השלכות המשבר הכלכלי הגדול בשנתיים האחרונות, נותן ביטוי ממשי לחוסן הכלכלי של מדינת ישראל עליו דיווחנו בשנים האחרונות, ותוקף למתודולוגיות מדדת החוסן שפיתחנו. על פי המימד הכלכלי ניתן לקבוע שמדינת ישראל התמודדה בצורה טובה מאוד עם המשבר העולמי, התאוששותה הייתה מהירה בתחום החזרה לצמיחה ובעיקר בתחום התעסוקה. במהלך 2010 נוצרו בישראל כ-100,000 מקומות עבודה חדשים ושיעור הבלתי מועסקים ירד לסביבה של ערב המשבר, תוך עלייה בשיעור ההשתתפות בכוח העבודה. במימד החברתי של החוסן הלאומי, בשנת 2009 ניכרת הרעה מסוימת, זאת על רקע המיתון בפעילות הכלכלית של המשק בשנה זו, אשר קטע מגמת שיפור קלה שהסתמנה מאז השפל אליו הידרדר המשק בשנים 2002-2003. התפתחות זו ממחישה בצורה חדה את העובדה ששיפור כלכלי כשלעצמו, אינו מחלחל לתחום החברתי אם לא ננקטת מדיניות חברתית משלימה הכוללת התמודדות ישירה וממוקדת עם האתגרים החברתיים של ישראל. במימד המשטרי/פוליטי נרשמה הרעה, זאת על רקע אירועים גיאופוליטיים, שכל הנראה משפיעים במידה ניכרת על הערכת טיב המשילות על פי המדדים של הבנק העולמי. תמונה זו עולה מתוך מדדי הרצליה לחוסן לאומי לשנת 2010 שתמציתם מוצגים בלוח 1 להלן. המדדים מאפשרים השוואות כמותיות, שנתיות, בין 31 מדינות (ישראל, 26 מדינות OECD ו-4 מדינות האזור - איראן, ירדן, מצרים וסוריה), והשוואה בכל מדינה על פני זמן. המדדים מאפשרים לכמת את המיקום היחסי השנתי של כל מדינה, בכל מימד.

2. הנתונים הכלכליים המעודכנים לשנת 2010, מצביעים על שיפור ניכר במימד הכלכלי, זאת למרות שהמשבר הכלכלי העולמי גרם לעצירה זמנית בצמיחת המשק בשנת 2009. ניתן לקבוע, שישראל התמודדה היטב עם המשבר העולמי ושתהליך הצמיחה שאפיין את המשק עד 2008 חודש. התנופה הכלכלית באה לידי ביטוי בעליית התוצר והתוצר לנפש, בירידת שיעור הבלתי מועסקים - תוך המשך עליית שיעורי ההשתתפות, עליית מחירים שהייתה בתחום היעד שקבעה הממשלה, עודף בחשבון השוטף של מאזן התשלומים וירידה במשקל החוב הציבורי יחסית לתוצר. השיפור במימד הכלכלי של ישראל בשנת 2009 ובעיקר ב-2010, עומד כנגד הירידה שחלה ברוב מדינות ה-OECD. במהלך המשבר הכלכלי העולמי הצליחה ישראל לצמצם את הפער הכלכלי אל מול המדינות המתקדמות ולהגדילו בהשוואה למדינות האזור, כל זאת בהמשך למגמה המסתמנת מאז שנת 2003. השיפור במצבה הכלכלי של ישראל וסגירת הפער בינה ובין מדינות אחרות, העלה את מיקום ישראל בשלושה מקומות. ישראל עברה את ספרד, אירלנד וניו-זילנד והגיע למקום ה-18 ב-2010 מבין 31 המדינות הנבדקות (לוח 1 להלן).

3. במימד המשטרי/פוליטי נרשמה הרעה ניכרת ב-2009, זאת לאחר שיפור קל שנרשם בשנים 2003-2008. התפתחות זו מחקה את העלייה המצטברת של המדד המשטרי/פוליטי שהושגה בשנים האחרונות. המדד המשטרי/פוליטי מגלה הרעה כמעט בכל רכיבו אך בעיקר בתחומי הפיקוח על שחיתות, יעילות הממשל, הציבות הפוליטיות ויכולת האזרח להשפיע ולבקר את הממשל. ככל הנראה, אירועים בעלי אופי גיאופוליטי שזוכים לכיסוי תקשורתי נרחב כגון דו"ח גולדסטון, מבצע "עופרת יצוקה" והמשט הטורקי, שעדיין לא משתקף במדדים של 2009, משפיעים במידה ניכרת על כל מדדי המשילות המופקים על ידי הבנק העולמי, זאת גם אם ראייתנו המקומית אינה מצדיקה זאת. למרות האמור חשוב לציין שבהיבט השוואתי, כפי שהדגשנו בשנים קודמות, בעייתה העיקרית של ישראל אינה נעוצה בהבדלים בין שיעורי השינוי של המדד המשטרי/פוליטי, עליהם אנו מדווחים מדי שנה, אלא ברמתו הנמוכה של המדד, יחסית למדדי מדינות ה-OECD. ב-2009 רמת המדד הישראלית הייתה נמוכה בלמעלה מ-20 אחוזים מהרמה הממוצעת של מדדי שלוש קבוצות המדינות המערביות הנבחרות. מצד שני, היה המדד הישראלי גבוה בלמעלה מ-30 אחוזים מאלה של ירדן ומצרים, ובכ-140 אחוזים מהמדדים של איראן וסוריה. בהשוואה בינלאומית נותרה ישראל במקום ה-26, כלומר, מדורגת מעל מדינות האזור, אך מתחת לכל מדינות ה-OECD (למעט טורקיה) (לוח 1 להלן).

4. נתוני 2009 מצביעים על נסיגה קלה במימד החברתי. נסיגה זו הנה תוצאה ישירה של עלייה בתחולת העוני והתרחבות אי השוויון בהשוואה לשנים קודמות, זאת כתוצאה מההאטה בפעילות הכלכלית של 2009 ועליית שיעור הבלתי מועסקים. הנתונים הכלכליים של 2010 טרם באים לידי ביטוי בהיבט החברתי, המתפרסמים בפיגור של שנה. מבחינה מתודולוגית המימד החברתי המוצג השנה אינו בר השוואה פשוטה למדד שהצגנו בשנים קודמות. אומנם המתודולוגיה שלנו לבניית המדד לא השתנתה, אולם במדד הפיתוח האנושי (HDI), המתפרסם על ידי האו"ם, חל שינוי ולכן ההשוואה ישירה ופשוטה בין מדד 2009 למדדים שהוצגו בשנים קודמות, אינה תקפה. עיקר השינוי ב-HDI הוא השינוי ברכיב החינוך, מעבר ממדידת שיעור האנלפבתיות במדינות לשנות לימוד ממוצעות. להערכתנו שינוי זה משפר את ה-HDI וכתוצאה מכך משפר את המדד שלנו. בפרספקטיבה ארוכת טווח השינויים בתחום החברתי בישראל משמעותיים פחות ובלטת העובדה שהמגמות החברתיות והכלכליות אינן תואמות. הצמיחה הכלכלית ועליית החוסן הכלכלי של המשק אינן משתקפות בפיתוח החברה. ישראל לא הצליחה להתמודד עם בעיות העוני והפערים הכלכליים והתפיסה, שיתכן והייתה קיימת, על פיה הקידמה הכלכלית תדאג לשיפור החברה כתוצאה לוואי של תהליך הצמיחה, מתבררת כשגויה. גם בהשוואה בינלאומית לא הצליחה ישראל לבלום את מגמת ההתרחקות מהרמות המקובלות והמשתפרות במדינות המפותחות, זאת למרות שגם במדינות המפותחות חלה נסיגה חברתית מסוימת על רקע המשבר הכלכלי. מיקומה היחסי של ישראל בשנת 2010 הגיע למקום 20 (לוח 1 להלן).

5. מדדי הרצליה לחוסן לאומי לשנת 2009-2010 מצביעים אפוא על תמונה לא אחידה. למרות המשבר הכלכלי העולמי המתמשך, נרשם שיפור ניכר במימד הכלכלי, תוך סגירת פער מול המדינות המפותחות והתרחבות מול מדינות האזור, ועלייה בחוסן הכלכלי של המשק. במקביל נרשמה הרעה במימד המשטרי/פוליטי על רקע הרעה במדדי המשילות של ישראל והרעה קלה בתחום החברתי, תוך נסיגה הן בחזית העוני והן בתחום הפערים בחלוקת ההכנסות. שיפור החוסן הכלכלי בשנים האחרונות בא לידי ביטוי מובהק בהתמודדות המשק הישראלי עם המשבר הכלכלי העולמי. מרבית הפרמטרים הכלכליים מצביעים על שיפור, על התפתחות הבולטת על רקע המשך המשבר ברוב מדינות ה-OECD, ובעיית חוב לאומי המאפיינת את מרבית מדינות אלה תוך כניסה למשברים פיננסיים במדינות אירופיות כגון יוון ואירלנד. ביצועים אלה מעידים על כך שהאסטרטגיה המאקרו-כלכלית של ממשלת ישראל הצליחה והניבה פירות בתחום צמיחת המשק, מה שאפשר צליחת המשבר בפגיעה קטנה יחסית. היציאה מהמשבר מחייבת את הממשלה לחזור למדיניות השומרת על גירעון פיסקאלי נמוך המחזיר את מגמת הירידה בחוב הלאומי, יחסית לתוצר המשק ואסטרטגיה כלכלית מאוזנת ותוך שיפור הביצועים של המגזר הציבורי. המימד החברתי של החוסן הלאומי מצביע על כך שהאסטרטגיה של ממשלת ישראל לא הביאה לשיפור. אמנם רכיבי המימד החברתי מתקבלים בפיגור של שנה, וייתכן שההרעה הקלה שנרשמה בשנת 2009 תקוזז בשנת 2010, אך לא בהכרח תקוזז את הפער מול המדינות המתקדמות המסמנות את היעדים החברתיים שיש להציב לחברה הישראלית. נדגיש שוב כי יש לעצב מדיניות ממשלתית שתתמודד ישירות עם הבעיות החברתיות, שכן ניראה כי אין די בכוחות השוק. המדיניות החברתית חייבת להשלים את המדיניות הכלכלית; דרשת מדיניות אקטיבית החותרת בהתמדה לעלייה בשיעור ההשתתפות בכוח העבודה, ומדיניות היוצרת הפרדה בין אוכלוסייה המסוגלת להצטרף לכוח העבודה, וכתוצאה מכך לעלייה על מסלול של יציאה ממעגל העוני, לאוכלוסייה שאינה מסוגלת להצטרף (בעיקר זקנים אך גם אוכלוסיות אחרות) עבורם נדרש טיפול ישיר כדי למנוע את נפילתה מתחת לקו העוני, כל זאת מבלי לפגוע בתמריצים הכלכליים ליציאה ממעגל העוני תוך הצטרפות למעגל העבודה. הירידה במימד המשטרי/פוליטי משקפת בעיקר נורמות התנהגותיות ירודות של נבחרים הציבור ותפקוד לא מספק של המוסדות השלטוניים והפוליטיים בישראל, לצד השלכות של אירועים גיאופוליטיים המגבירים את בידודה הבינלאומי של ישראל. כאמור, יתכן שמדידות הבנק העולמי המושפעות גם ממעמדה הבינלאומי של ישראל מתבטאת בהערכת המשילות של ישראל במדדי הבנק. אולם, התרחקותנו מהמדינות המתקדמות, משקפת בעיה מערכתית ולא נקודתית, שכן היא באה לידי ביטוי בתחומים רבים, כגון: יציבות פוליטית, פיקוח על שחיתות, שמירת חוק, יעילות שלטונית, טיב הרגולציה, ייצוגיות ואחריות. כפי שהדגשנו בשנים קודמות, שיפור המצב יחייב אימוץ רפורמה מערכתית ורחבת היקף לשינוי מהותי של המגמות.

Table 1. THE HERZLIYA INDICES 2009/2010

GOVERNMENTAL/POLITICAL 2009			SOCIAL 2009			ECONOMIC 2010		
Index	Country	Rank	Index	Country	Rank	Index	Country	Rank
102.2	Canada	1	104.96	Denmark	1	102.85	USA	1
99.2	USA	2	104.59	Norway	2	73.12	Japan	2
97.9	Denmark	3	103.75	Sweden	3	68.77	Germany	3
97.4	Netherlands	4	102.75	Canada	4	64.96	Switzerland	4
96.1	Germany	5	101.84	Australia	5	64.92	Norway	5
95.8	Sweden	6	101.71	Finland	6	63.42	France	6
95.7	Norway	7	101.56	Netherlands	7	63.08	Netherlands	7
95.2	Finland	8	101.02	Switzerland	8	63.06	Canada	8
94.5	Switzerland	9	99.89	Austria	9	62.90	UK	9
94.1	UK	10	99.77	USA	10	62.38	Italy	10
93.9	Austria	11	99.07	Czech Rep	11	60.90	Australia	11
93.8	Belgium	12	98.90	Germany	12	60.27	Austria	12
92.7	France	13	98.65	France	13	60.08	Belgium	13
92.6	New Zealand	14	98.08	Hungary	14	59.61	Denmark	14
92.5	Australia	15	98.06	New Zealand	15	59.27	Korea, Rep	15
89.8	Ireland	16	97.39	Japan	16	59.19	Sweden	16
89.3	Portugal	17	97.28	UK	17	57.61	Finland	17
87.9	Japan	18	96.50	Belgium	18	<b>56.99</b>	<b>Israel</b>	<b>18</b>
86.0	Spain	19	95.95	Ireland	19	56.50	Spain	19
83.9	Czech Rep	20	<b>94.51</b>	<b>Israel</b>	<b>20</b>	56.36	New Zealand	20
83.9	Italy	21	93.97	Poland	21	55.52	Ireland	21
83.2	Poland	22	93.72	Spain	22	50.21	Portugal	22
82.7	Hungary	23	93.58	Korea, Rep	23	50.07	Greece	23
78.6	Greece	24	93.27	Portugal	24	48.17	Hungary	24
76.3	Korea, Rep	25	93.25	Italy	25	47.66	Egypt	25
<b>73.4</b>	<b>Israel</b>	<b>26</b>	92.00	Greece	26	44.44	Turkey	26
61.5	Turkey	27	82.72	Turkey	27	43.56	Poland	27
55.7	Jordan	28	78.59	Jordan	28	41.43	Czech Rep	28
53.4	Egypt	29	75.19	Iran	29	37.58	Iran	29
31.5	Syria	30	74.43	Egypt	30	33.69	Jordan	30
29.9	Iran	31	71.06	Syria	31	32.69	Syria	31

## מדיניות החוץ של ישראל בעידן של שינויים גלובאליים

דו"ח צוות חשיבה לכנס הרצליה 2011

יושבי ראש: השגריר זלמן שובל  
פרופ' שלמה אבינרי  
מרכז הצוות: טומי שטיינר

עיקרי הדו"ח נידונו על ידי הצוות ונוסחו בידי מחבריו לפני האירועים האחרונים בתוניסיה ובמצרים וטרם פרסום המסמכים בעניין המו"מ בין ישראל לפלסטינאים. התהליכים המתרחשים בימים אלה ממש, והרחוקים עדיין מלהגיע לסימם, עשויים להוות game-changers ולשנות את המציאות הפוליטית המזרח-תיכונית ובוודאי תהיינה להם השלכות על מעמדה של ארה"ב באזור. שינויים אלה יחייבו ללא ספק התאמות בכמה מכיווני הפעולה המוצעים להלן. אולם אנו סבורים שאירועים אלה רק מחזקים את הטענות הבסיסיים המופיעים בדו"ח ואת ההמלצות הנובעות מהם, בייחוד במה שנוגע לצורך במהלכים יזומים ישראלים גם בהיעדר מו"מ ישיר.

### הקדמה

מטרת עבודת הצוות היתה לבחון את ההשלכות האפשריות של השינויים הגלובליים והאזוריים על מעמדה הבינלאומי של ישראל ועל יחסי החוץ שלה. ההחלטה להקים צוות חשיבה לדין בנושא נבעה מתהליכי שינוי משמעותיים המתרחשים בתקופה האחרונה במערכת הגלובלית והאזורית. הפיחות בעוצמתן ובהשפעתן של ארה"ב ושל אירופה ניכר ומגביר את העוצמה הפוטנציאלית של מעצמות חדשות דוגמת סין, הודו וברזיל. טרם ברורה תוצאתם של שינויים אלה במאזן הכוחות העולמי, אך השפעתם ניכרת כבר היום במזרח התיכון.

המוקד העיקרי של מדיניות החוץ הישראלית בעשורים האחרונים הופנה לארה"ב, עם תשומת לב משנית לזירה האירופית. הירידה בעוצמתן היחסית מחייבת, לכל הפחות, חשיבה מחודשת על הגדרת יעדיה המרכזיים של מדיניות החוץ של ישראל. מוסכם כי הסכסוך הערבי-ישראלי והתהליך המדיני מהווים גורם מכריע המשפיע על יחסי החוץ של ישראל ועם זאת יש לבחון דרכים לעיצוב מדיניות חוץ החורגים ממסגרת הסכסוך, שכל הנראה לא יבוא על פתרונו בעתיד הקרוב. כמו כן, בעידן הגלובלי גוברת חשיבות הדיפלומטיה המולטילטרלית, תחום שבאופן מסורתי לא קודם על ידי ישראל.

הדו"ח שלהלן אינו מתיימר להציג משנה סדורה למדיניות החוץ של ישראל, שממשלות ישראל לדורותיהן נמנעו מלפרסם או לקבל ביחס אליהן הכרעות מכוונות. מטרת המסמך להציג תובנות מרכזיות מעבודת הצוות, הכוללות יעדים וכיווני פעולה חיוניים ועיקריים. הדו"ח מתבסס על דיוני הצוות וכן על הנקודות שהעלו חברי הצוות בכתב לקראת הכנת הדו"ח, אולם אין הוא מביא את כל אשר נאמר או נכתב. על כן, המסמך שלהלן אינו מחייב בהכרח את כל חברי הצוות.

### עיקרי הממצאים וההמלצות: צירי מאמץ עיקריים למדיניות החוץ של ישראל

תוך נקיטת זריחות מתבקשת, בנקודת הזמן הנוכחית ניתן להעריך שהשינויים הגלובליים אינם מטיבים עם מעמדה של ישראל במזרח התיכון ובמערכת הגלובלית. עם זאת, אין לראות בהערכה זו גזירת גורל, שעמה אין ישראל מסוגלת להתמודד. גם נוכח תמורות אלו, מדיניות חוץ ישראלית מושכלת עשויה למנף את השינויים לטובתה ולפעול לביצור מעמדה האזורי והבינלאומי.

השינויים הגלובליים מחייבים ציר מאמץ מרכזי, לצד מספר צירי פעולה נוספים. הציר המרכזי הוא תמיכה ישראלית בביצור מעמדה האזורי של ארה"ב והעמקת שיתוף הפעולה של ישראל עם בעלות בריתה של ארה"ב במזרח התיכון לקידום התהליך המדיני ולהכלת האיום האיראני. צירי פעולה חשובים נוספים הם:

- שימור וקידום היחסים עם האיחוד האירופי ועם נאט"ו תוך התמקדות בבירות המרכזיות וטיפוח מדינות מרכז ומזרח אירופה הידידותיות לישראל;
- העמקת הבסיס הגיאופוליטי של מדיניות החוץ של ישראל לעבר הודו, סין רוסיה ואמריקה הלטינית, אולם לא על חשבון מערכת היחסים עם ארה"ב;
- פיתוח הדיפלומטיה המולטילטרלית הגלובלית של ישראל במערכת האו"ם.

ככלל, ההסתמכות האסטרטגית של ישראל על ארה"ב אסור שתיוותר פאסיבית. ארה"ב "חזקה" היא אינטרס אסטרטגי חיוני עבור ישראל. לנוכח מצבה, מעמדה ועניינה של ארה"ב באזור, נראה כי בעלות בריתה במזרח התיכון, לרבות ישראל, חייבות ליטול את המושכות בהובלת התהליך המדיני.

אולם נראה כי קידום התהליך המדיני מחייב חשיבה חדשה ואימוץ גישה ריאלית. בעוד ההסתברות להשגת הסדרי ביניים מוסכמים ורשמיים קטנה, יש מקום לשורה של מהלכים מתואמים – באופן מפורש או משתמע – להם יהיו שותפים ישראל, הפלסטינים ומדינות ערב המתונות. מהלכים אלה עשויים להתבסס על המשך מילוי התחייבויותיהן של ישראל והרשות הפלסטינית במסגרת מפת הדרכים וכן על רוח יוזמת השלום הערבית. הניסיון להגיע להסכם כולל ולפתרון מלא של הסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני אינו רק לא סביר, אלא עלול לפגוע עוד יותר במעמדן האזורי של ארה"ב, מדינות ערב המתונות וישראל. במילים אחרות, **נראה כי הגיעה העת להנעת מהלכים ברי-השגה ולהניח בצד את היומרה לחתוך באבחה אחת את הקשר הגורדי של הסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני.**

הרחבת בסיס מדיניות החוץ אינה תחליף למערכת היחסים האסטרטגית של ישראל עם ארה"ב. על פיתוח צירי הפעולה לקחת בחשבון את העדפותיה של ארה"ב ועל כן ההזדמנות המשמעותית ביותר לפיתוח היחסים עם אסיה עוברת בהודו, המהווה אף היא שותפה אסטרטגית של ארה"ב. יתרה מכך, **שיפור מעמדה האזורי והבינלאומי של ישראל יחזק את היותה נכס אסטרטגי עבור ארה"ב ומדינות נוספות.** יש לכך חשיבות קריטית בשעה שגורמים בקהיליית המדיניות האמריקנית מטילים ספק בנכסיותה של ישראל, על אף היותם מיעוט.

דרכי הפעולה המוצעות במסמך זה מבליטים ומחדדים את הצורך הדחוף בחיזוק המימד המדיני בביטחון הלאומי של ישראל באמצעות **מדיניות חוץ מושכלת. למערכת הדיפלומטית ולמהלכים מדיניים חשיבות קריטית בסיכול אימים אסטרטגיים.**

## השינויים גלובאליים

במשך למעלה ממאתיים שנה עיצבו אירופה ולאחריה ארה"ב את הסדר העולמי כפי שאנו מכירים כיום. היחלשותו היחסית של המערב עלולה לסמן תפנית משמעותית, שאינה בהכרח ברת-חלוף, ביחסים הבינלאומיים. אולם, עלייתם של מוקדי כוח חדשים, באסיה בעיקר, לא צפויה לשנות את הסדר העולמי הקיים מהותית בטווח הקרוב.

המשבר הכלכלי העולמי חייד את התמורות ביחסי הכוחות העולמיים וגרם למעצמות המובילות – עלולות וותיקות גם יחד – להתמקד בסדר היום הפנימי שלהן והוא המכתיב את המדיניות הבינלאומית שלהן יותר מאי-פעם. כיום מנהלות המעצמות "דיפלומטיית חליפין" (transactional diplomacy) בין לבין עצמן ומול מדינות נוספות, הכוללת מיקוח מפורט וקונקרטי והשגת הסכמות המבוססות על הדדיות קצרת-טווח. השינויים המתהווים ביחסי הכוחות לצד השלכות המשבר הכלכלי העולמי צפויים להבליט את המחלוקות בין המעצמות המובילות. בעוד אתגרי המדיניות מגבירים את הצורך בממשל גלובלי (global governance) ובדיפלומטיה מולטילטראלית, הרי שמערכות היחסים בין המעצמות יקשו על השגת הסכמות רחבות. אין ודאות שהתפתחויות כגון היריבות ההולכת וגוברת בין ארה"ב לסין לא יחזירו את העולם לכללים הותיקים של פוליטיקה של עוצמה ואיזונים (Balance of Power).

הנפגעות הישירות ממגמות אלה הן בעלות הברית הסמוכות לשולחן המעצמות. יכולתן של בעלות ברית לסמוך על פטרוניהן מוטלת בספק שכן מחויבות המעצמות מוקדשת יותר מכל לאינטרסים ולצרכים מבית. מקרב המעצמות, לארה"ב בעלות הברית הרבות ביותר התלויות בה אסטרטגית. בהקשר זה דומה מצבה של ישראל למצבן של בעלות ברית נוספות של ארה"ב במזרח התיכון, במזרח אסיה, במרכז ומזרח אירופה ובדרום אמריקה.

לעת עתה ניכרים מזקי המשבר הכלכלי העולמי בעיקר בארה"ב ובאיחוד האירופי. חולשתה הכלכלית של ארה"ב לצד אי-מימוש הציפיות מהנשיא אובמה מבית ומחוץ צמצמו את יכולת התמרון של מדיניות החוץ של ארה"ב והגבירו את חוסר העניין, ואולי אף את התסכול, של ארה"ב מהתמודדות עם סוגיות אזוריות וגלובליות מורכבות. עם זאת, ארה"ב עודנה השחקן המרכזי בזירה העולמית, כזו תישאר בעתיד הנראה לעין ואופייה הטרנספורמטיבי יישמר ככל הנראה בטווח הארוך.

לעומת זאת נראה כי מצבו ומעמדו היחסי של האיחוד האירופי כיום קשה יותר. בעודו מתקשה למצוא את דרכו, הסולידריות בקרב האיחוד מתרופפת והנהגתו נחלשת. מיסוד והפנמת השינויים בתחום ניהול מדיניות החוץ בעקבות אמנת ליסבון טרם צלחו. גוברים הקולות המטילים ספק ביכולתו של האירו להחזיק מעמד, גם אם הסיכויים להתפרקות גוש האירו קטנים.

ככלל, "המעצמות החדשות" BRIC (ברזיל, רוסיה, הודו וסין) מתבססות על שיעורי הצמיחה הגבוהים שלהן בשנים האחרונות. רצוי להתייחס באיפוק לתחזיות השונות הנוגעות להמשך מגמות הצמיחה הנוכחיות שכן אינן לוקחות בחשבון אירועים בעלי הסתברות נמוכה יחסית, שעשויים לשנות את המצב ("wild cards"). יתרה מזאת, המשך צמיחתה הכלכלית של המדינות יצמצם בטווח הבינוני את היתרונות היחסיים הנוכחיים שלהן (כגון עלויות כוח עבודה) והן יאלצו להתמודד עם אתגרים כלכליים-חברתיים. ברזיל מהווה דוגמה בולטת לתהליך זה, שאותותיו הראשונים ניכרים.

המעצמות החדשות מנסות להעצים את הפרופיל המדיני הבינלאומי שלהן. בשנה האחרונה ניסו חלקן (ברזיל ורוסיה) לקדם יוזמות מדיניות. עם זאת השפעותיהן הגלובאליות והאזוריות עדיין מוגבלות, בפרט בהשוואה לארה"ב. בולטת בהקשר זה סין, המעצימה את הפרופיל האסטרטגי שלה בזירה האסייתית ונראה כי היא מגלה אסרטיביות בניסיון להגביר את השפעתה ועוצמתה על חשבון ארה"ב. הרחבת השפעתה של סין מחוץ לזירה האסייתית – במזרח התיכון, באפריקה ובאמריקה הלטינית – נובעת כך נראה בעיקר משיקולים כלכליים-אסטרטגיים.

נראה כי לפחות בטווח הקרוב תאופיין המערכת הבינלאומית בביזור עוצמה גדול יותר מבבער (non-polar moment). נטייתן ויכולתן של המעצמות – ובראשן ארה"ב – להתערב בסוגיות אזוריות תפחת, אלא אם כן אינטרסים חיוניים שלהן יהיו על כף המאזניים או שהתרחשויות דרמטיות שקשה לצפותן יחייבו מעורבות מיידית. העדפתן הברורה תהיה לשמר את הסטטוס-קוו ואת היציבות היחסית במוקדים האזוריים השונים במחיר הנמוך ביותר האפשרי מבחינתן.

## ארה"ב, ישראל והמזרח התיכון – קידום התהליך המדיני והכלת האיום האיראני

בשנתיים האחרונות מנסה ממשל אובמה להתוות אסטרטגיה אמריקנית בינלאומית חלופית, שביטוייה ניכר גם במזרח התיכון. נראה כי בשנתיים האחרונות השקיע הממשל מאמץ ניכר בהידברות (engagement) עם יריבים, גם על חשבון בעלות ברית מסורתיות. כך היה באירופה ביחס לרוסיה ובמידה מסוימת גם במזרח התיכון, כפי שמעיד הניסיון לבנות מערכת יחסים חדשה עם העולם המוסלמי ומדינות ערב.

בעיני הממשל, קידום התהליך המדיני נתפש כמפתח לצמצום עוינות העולם המוסלמי והערבי כלפי ארה"ב ולהשגת מטרות מדיניות אסטרטגיות אזרחיות נוספות, בהן הנסיגה מעיראק וההתמודדות עם איראן ועל כן שואף ממשל אובמה להגיע לתוצאות מהירות. אולם עקב מדיניות הידברות בלתי עקבית, עמדות הצדדים לא התקרבו ויתרה מזאת, ארה"ב עצמה לא הצליחה לשפר את מעמדה בעולם הערבי. כתוצאה מכך נעכרו יחסי ארה"ב עם ישראל והאמון שרוחש הציבור הישראלי לממשל ארה"ב נפגע.

בשנתיים האחרונות נפגעה מערכת היחסים המדינית בין ישראל לבין ארה"ב, בין היתר כתוצאה מעמדותיה של ישראל ביחס למשא ומתן עם הפלסטינים. נראה כי יותר מאי פעם מעמדה של ישראל והיותה נכס עבור הממשל מהווים פונקציה של התקדמות בתהליך המדיני. בנוסף, לראשונה עולה קולו של המיעוט בקהיליית המדיניות האמריקנית המערער על התועלת שבשימור מערכת היחסים האסטרטגית עם ישראל. עם זאת חשוב לציין כי בתקופה זו התהדק שיתוף הפעולה הביטחוני בין המדינות והסיוע הביטחוני גדל, בעיקר עקב ההחלטה הישראלית לוותר על הסיוע האזרחי לטובת הביטחוני. כמו כן, הבסיס ליחסים המיוחדים בין שתי המדינות – ובפרט תפיסת הערכים המשותפים – נותרו על כנם, כפי שבא לידי ביטוי בתוצאות הבחירות האחרונות לקונגרס.

היחלשות ארה"ב לצד התחזקות השפעתה של הכוחות הרדיקאליים במזרח-התיכון בהובלת איראן, משפיעים גם על מצבן של מצרים, ירדן, ערב הסעודית, מדינות המפרץ והרשות הפלסטינית. בשנים האחרונות מתחזקת ההכרה בישראל ובקרב בעלות ברית אחרות של ארה"ב במזרח התיכון שיש ביניהן שותפות אינטרסים אסטרטגית משמעותית. **שותפות האינטרסים האסטרטגית בין בעלות הברית של ארה"ב במזרח התיכון לרבות ישראל צריכה להתבסס על האינטרסים החיוניים המשותפים להן – הכלת השאיפות ההגמוניות של איראן וגרורותיה בד בבד עם ביצור תפיסת עוצמתה ומעמדה האזורי של ארה"ב – גם אם מדינות ערב המתונות לא יודו בכך בפרהסיה.** העמקת הקשרים האסטרטגיים בין ישראל למצרים היא עדות למגמה זו.

במסגרת זו יש לתהליך המדיני – ובעיקר לציר הישראלי-פלסטיני – תפקיד חשוב בביצור מעמדה האזורי של ארה"ב ובהעמקת היחסים האסטרטגיים בין בעלות הברית של ארה"ב באזור ובהן ישראל. ברור שאין ודאות שהסדר מדיני לא ימנע השתלטות של כוחות רדיקאליים על מדינה פלסטינית עתידית או מדינות נוספות בזירה. תוך קידום התהליך המדיני, ישראל וארה"ב יצטרכו לפעול למזער את ההסתברות להתפתחות אפשרית שכזו (שכבר אירעה ברצועת עזה) וההשלכות העלולות לנבוע ממדינה פלסטינית רדיקאלית בין ישראל לירדן.

**לנוכח מצבה, מעמדה ועניינה של ארה"ב באזור, נראה כי בעלות בריתה חייבות ליטול את המושכות בהובלת התהליך המדיני.** למותר לציין כי קידום התהליך המדיני הוא אינטרס חיוני של ישראל בפני עצמו. המהלכים הפלסטיניים הבינלאומיים האחרונים מעידים כי הסטאטוס-קוו אינו יציב וכי הזמן פועל לרעת ישראל. אמנם לכאורה אין קשר בין התהליך המדיני והסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי לבין האסטרטגיה האיראנית להשגת הגמוניה אזורית. **אין ספק שהכלת השאיפות והיכולות האיראניות יגדילו משמעותית את הסיכוי להשגת הסדר סופי ולו בשל שלילת התמיכה של בנות חסותה של איראן, חיזבאללה וחמאס.** חשיפת המסמכים האמריקניים (באמצעות הוויקייליקס) מעידה כי רוב בעלות הברית של ארה"ב לא רק מצדדות במדיניות אמריקנית נחרצת יותר כלפי אירן אלא גם מחשיבות פחות את הסוגיה הפלסטינית. עם זאת, גם אם תיבלם תכנית הגרעין הצבאית של איראן, שאיפותיה להגמוניה אזורית לא ייפסקו וחתרנותה באמצעות בנות חסותה עלולה לגבור על מנת לפצות על הקפאת האופציה הגרעינית. גם חילופי משטר לא מחייבים בהכרח מהפך משמעותי באסטרטגיה האזורית של איראן. **היות שלא ניתן להקפיא את התהליך המדיני עד לסיום ההתמודדות עם איראן, יש לפעול למינפוח באמצעות מהלכים המבוססים על מטרות מדיניות ברורות-השגה. זאת על מנת לבצר את מעמדה האזורי של ארה"ב, שותפותיה, בנות חסותה ובעלות בריתה מול איראן.**

האתגר שיעמוד בפני ישראל ובעלות בריתה של ארה"ב באזור יהיה התמודדות עם כשלון יוזמת הנשיא אובמה להגיע לפתרון כולל ומקיף של הסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי תוך שנתיים, תפקיד שהוטל על הסנטור מיטשל. נאומה של מזכירת המדינה הילארי קלינטון בפורום סבן בדצמבר 2010 מעיד כי לממשל אובמה אין בשלב זה תוכנית פעולה ממשית לקידום התהליך המדיני. ספק אם שיחות קירבה יצליחו בעתיד יותר מאשר בעבר. ציפיות ארה"ב מהצדדים להגיש לה את עמדותיהם המפורטות בסוגיות הליבה כדי שתוכל להציג בפני הצד השני כאמצעי לקירוב עמדות הינן תמוהות. אף הסכם בינלאומי לא הושג בדרך זו.

האסטרטגיה האמריקנית בשנתיים האחרונות התעלמה מהעובדה שבמשך ארבעת העשורים האחרונים נכשל כל ניסיון להגיע להסכם כולל באזור – בין אם ניזום על ידי גורמי חוץ (האו"ם, בריה"מ, ארה"ב, האיחוד האירופי) ובין אם על ידי גורמים אזוריים (יוזמת הליגה הערבית). ההסכמים היחידים שהושגו היו פרי יוזמות של שחקנים מקומיים ושיקפו אינטרסים של הצדדים עצמם להגיע להסכמים בילטרליים (הסכמי השלום עם מצרים וירדן וכן הסכמי אוסלו).

בנוסף, כישלון המו"מ בין ממשלת אולמרט לרשות הפלסטינית מראים כי לא רק עמדות ממשלה ספציפית הן הסיבה לאי-השגת הסכם. הפערים בין העמדות הישראליות והפלסטיניות המתונות ביותר בכל סוגיות הליבה – גבולות, התנחלויות, ירושלים, פליטים, הסדרי ביטחון – עמוקים, ואין להתכחש למציאות זו.

**בעוד ההסתברות להשגת הסדרי ביניים מוסכמים ורשמיים קטנה, יש מקום לשורה של מהלכים מתואמים – באופן מפורש או משתמע – להם יהיו שותפים ישראל, הפלסטינים ומדינות ערב המתונות. מהלכים אלה עשויים להתבסס על המשך מילוי התחייבויותיהן של ישראל והרשות הפלסטינית במסגרת מפת הדרכים וכן על רוח יוזמת השלום הערבית. במילים אחרות, הגיעה העת להנעת מהלכים ריאליים ולהניח בצד את היומרה לחתוך באבחה אחת את הקשר הגורדי של הסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני.**

לקידום מהלכים מעין אלה חשיבות רבה עבור ישראל היות שחוסר ההתקדמות בתהליך המדיני פוגע במעמדה הבינלאומי. מהלכים אלה יש בהם כדי לצמצם את החיכוך בין ישראל לפלסטינים, לייתר מהלכים דיפלומטיים חד-צדדיים לכפיית הסדר ולהקטין את ההסתברות להסלמה ולהתפרצות אלימה. יש לכוון מהלכים אלה לגיוס תמיכה ציבורית – הן בקרב הישראלים והן בקרב הפלסטינים – על מנת לאפשר למנהיגים להתקדם בתהליך המדיני אל עבר הסדרה ופתרון הסכסוך.

על סדרת המהלכים המתואמים להתנהל בשני מסלולים במקביל: מסלול ישראלי-פלסטיני ומסלול ישראל-מדינות ערב. למסלול השני חשיבות מרכזית בהקשר האזורי, מבחינת תמיכה והשפעה על מהלכים פלסטינים וכן לגיוס תמיכה ציבורית פנים-ישראלית למהלכי ישראל. בדיון במסלול ישראל-מדינות ערב אין להימנע מהתייחסות ליוזמת השלום הערבית משנת 2002. מתווה היוזמה בעייתי מבחינת ישראל – אין בו קריאה למשא ומתן ולמעשה הוא תובע מישראל לקבל את העמדה הערבית ביחס לפתרון הסכסוך, שרק בעקבותיה תחול נורמליזציה ביחסים בין ישראל למדינות ערב. מתווה זה אינו סביר ואין בו בכדי לקדם את התהליך המדיני. מעבר לכך, מסיבות שונות לא נראה שהליגה הערבית מהווה כיום גורם קונסטרוקטיבי. אי-אפשר להתעלם מכך שמדיניות הליגה מתנהלת לפי עקרון של פה אחד, מה שנותן לכל אחת מהמדינות הרדיקאליות וטו אפקטיבי. לכן, יש לצפות לחידוש מסגרת הקוורטט הערבי – ובו בעלות בריתה הערביות המרכזיות של ארה"ב – שפעל לפרק זמן קצר בשנים 2006-2007.

על אף כל זאת, במסגרת מהלכים מתואמים בין ישראל ומדינות ערב **חשובה הודעה רשמית ישראלית כי היא מקדמת בברכה את רוח יוזמת השלום הערבי, שיש בה חזון של שלום אזורי**. זאת, תוך הבעת ההסתייגות שיישום היוזמה מותנה במשא ומתן ולא בכפייה או בהכתבה. במקביל יוכלו כמה ממדינות ערב להודיע על מהלכים לקידום היחסים עם ישראל. מהלכים אלה עשויים לכלול זכויות מעבר לטיסות מסחריות אזרחיות ופתיחה הודית מחודשת של נציגויות מסחריות או דיפלומטיות. המהלכים יעידו על נכונותן של מדינות ערב לקדם את התהליך ועל הסכמתן לשינוי מתווה יוזמת השלום הערבית באופן משתמע.

כמו כן מוצע כי ישראל תשקול להודיע בנפרד מן המשא ומתן עם הפלסטינים כי היא מכירה בחשיבותם של המסגדים בהר הבית לעולם הערבי והמוסלמי, כמו גם לישראל ולעולם היהודי וכי זו אינה בעיה ישראלית-פלסטינית בילטרלית גרידא. מהלך זה, המחייב בדיקה מעמיקה, יתכן שיאפשר מעורבות קונקרטית ובונה של מדינות ערב מתונות במסלול הישראלי-פלסטיני.

במקביל יש לנצל את הרגיעה הביטחונית היחסית, המלווה בצעדים שנוקטת הרשות הפלסטינית למיילי התחייבויותיה במסגרת מפת הדרכים בתחומי הביטחון והממשל. המשך הרפורמות הממשליות, הביטחונית והכלכלית שהונהגו ע"י הממשלה הפלסטינית הוא תנאי הכרחי להתקדמות במסלול הישראלי-פלסטיני. על מנת להמשיך ביישום הרפורמות, תידרש גם ישראל לנקוט בצעדים הקשורים להתחייבויותיה במסגרת מפת הדרכים. על צעדים אלה לכלול – בתיאום עם גורמי הרשות, בכפוף לתנאי הביטחון השוטף בשטח ובאופן הדרגתי – העברת ערים נוספות לשליטה ביטחונית פלסטינית והעברת אחריות בשטחי C ו-B לרשות הפלסטינית. כמו כן על ישראל להתחיל בפניו המאחזים הבלתי חוקיים, מהלך עליו התחייבו ממשלות ישראל בעבר. מהלך זה יקדם הן את התהליך המדיני והן את שלטון החוק במדינת ישראל.

כמו כן יש לשקול מחדש את מדיניות ישראל ביחס לרצועת עזה. המשך הסגר, או המצור, לא תורם בהכרח למצבה הביטחוני של ישראל. המצב יוצא הדופן בעזה חושף את ישראל למתקפות בינלאומיות ולמהלכים המערערים על הלגיטימיות שלה, למרות שההסגר מוטל גם ע"י מצרים. בעוד חזרה למצב הקודם של פיקוח ישראלי ובינלאומי-אירופי על המעברים עלול להתפרש ככניעה למתקפות בינלאומיות ולעודד קידום מהלכים אנטי-ישראליים אחרים, הרי שיש לבחון את האפשרות, אולי בתיאום עם הרשות הפלסטינית ו/או עם מצרים ומדינות ערביות מתונות אחרות לשנות את המדיניות. יתכן ויש לבחון את האפשרות להביא לסיום את ספיחי השליטה הישראלית דה-יורה ודה-פקטו ברצועת עזה.

בקידום המסלול הישראלי-פלסטיני ניתן לצפות שהרשות הפלסטינית תחדל מהמאמץ הדיפלומטי לקדם יוזמות בינלאומיות חד-צדדיות, בהם הכרה בינלאומית של האו"ם בקיומה של מדינה פלסטינית או הקמתה החד-צדדית. מאמץ זה חשוב לומר, מנוגד לכל ההסכמים בין ישראל לפלסטינאים. אמנם לא סביר שהרשות הפלסטינית תכריז על הקפאת מהלכים אלה (כפי שלא הודיעה רשמית על קידומם), אולם הם יאבדו מחיוניותם אם ישראל תקדם מהלכים קונקרטיים מצידה. בהקשר זה, היוזמה להפוך את 'נאום בר-אילן' של ראש הממשלה להודעת ממשלה מחייבת, עשויה לסייע להנעת התהליך.

ניתן אמנם לחלוק על הצעדים המוצעים לעיל ולהציע להם חלופות, אולם קשה להתווכח עם חשיבות ההיערכות הישראלית למצב בו בהעדר משא ומתן ישראל עלולה להיקלע לסחף משמעותי שיפגע אף יותר במעמדה הבינלאומי. על כן, גם בהיעדר נכונות ערבית לגמול על מהלכים ישראליים, יש מקום לשקול לפחות ביצוע חלק מהמהלכים המוצעים. יש להימנע ככל האפשר ממהלך חד-צדדי במתכונת ההתנתקות, אלא לפעול לקידום מהלכים אלה בתיאום עם גורמי הרשות הפלסטינית.

חשוב להבהיר כי מהלכים מוגבלים מעין אלה לקידום התהליך המדיני לא מהווים אינטרס ישראלי בלבד. **עימות מדיני בינלאומי סביב הסוגיה הפלסטינית יחליש את ארה"ב ויעמיד את בעלות בריתה הערביות במצב אסטרטגי בעייתי אל מול הכוחות הרדיקאליים המובילים על ידי איראן וגרורותיה.**

המהלכים המוצעים לא יביאו לשלום כולל ובר-קיימא בטווח הקצר, אולם יש בכוחם לקדם את היציבות האזורית ולחזק את מעמדם של ארה"ב ושל הכוחות האנטי-רדיקאליים באזור. חשוב לזכור שהסכנה לאיתנות הפוליטית של מדינות ערב בעלות בריתה של ארה"ב וליציבות האזורית לא נובעת רק משאיפתה של איראן להשיג נשק גרעיני. במידה לא פחותה נובעת הסכנה ממגמת איראן להרחיב את השפעתה כמעט בכל מדינות ערב הסוניות – באופן ישיר או באמצעות בנות חסות. יציבות משטרי המדינות המקורבות לארה"ב היא גם אינטרס אסטרטגי ישראלי. על כן הגיעה העת לישראל, לפלסטינים ולמדינות ערב בעלות בריתה של ארה"ב ליטול אחריות ולהיות שותפות פעילות לתהליך המדיני וליציבות האזורית.

## שימור יחסי ישראל עם אירופה

מסיבות היסטוריות ותרבותיות ובשל סמיכות גיאוגרפית יחסית, היוותה אירופה מוקד משמעותי ליחסי החוץ של ישראל מאז הקמתה. לא במקרה היתה ישראל מהמדינות הראשונות ליצור קשרים דיפלומטיים עם הקהילה הכלכלית האירופית, לימים האיחוד האירופי. על אף הצפייות הישראליות לשדרוג משמעותי ביחסים עם האיחוד האירופי ועם נאט"ו, על המאמץ הנוכחי להיות מכוון לשימור היחסים ולמניעת התדרדרות נוספת.

מאז שנות השבעים הושפעו יחסי ישראל-אירופה מהסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי. למרות החלטת האיחוד האירופי לפעול לשדרוג היחסים עם ישראל ב-2008, עקב מבצע "עופרת יצוקה" הגיעה העמדה האירופית הביקורתית כלפי ישראל לשיא, והשדרוג הוקפא. קשה להתעלם



מהסחף בעמדת הזרם המרכזי של קהילת המדיניות של האיחוד האירופי ביחס לישראל. מגמה זו הוגדרה לאחרונה ע"י ראש ממשלת בריטניה לשעבר ושליח הקוורטט טוני בלייר כסוג מדאיג ומאיים של דה-לגיטימציה של ישראל, שבאה לידי ביטוי בחוסר נכונות להכיר בלגיטימיות של עמדותיה של ישראל, ואף לא להקשיב לטענותיה. לטענתו נאלץ לא פעם לשכנע את עמיתיו בהנהגה האירופית שלא להטיל מגבלות על ישראל, שלדבריו לא היו מטילים על עצמם במצב דומה.

היחלשות הפרופיל הבינלאומי של האיחוד האירופי וצמצום מעורבותו בתהליך המדיני לא מפחיתים מגודל הבעיה מבחינתה של ישראל, היות שהעמדה הביקורתית המגמתית מושרשת במספר בירות שהפכו לגורמים מכריעים בעיצוב המדיניות האירופית הבינלאומית. אמנם למנהיגי גרמניה וצרפת, המדינות המובילות באיחוד האירופי, גישה אוהדת כלפי ישראל (שעל ישראל לפעול לשימורה), אולם הפער הקיים בין עמדת הממשלות לעמדות אנטי-ישראליות המוצאות ביטוי בתקשורת ובאקדמיה, עשוי להצטמצם ועמדות אנטי-ישראליות עלולות לחלחל ולהשפיע גם על עמדתן של הממשלות.

**דומיננטיות הביקורת המגמתית באירופה נובעת בין היתר (ולא רק) מהיעדר תשתית רעיונית אלטרנטיבית.** באירופה אין מסורת של פעילות לובי פרו-ישראלי (להוציא את בריטניה) ועוצמתה הפוליטית של ההתארגנות היהודית קטנה, לא כל שכן בהשוואה ל"ארה"ב ואף לקנדה ולאוסטרליה. בנוסף, בניגוד לזירה האמריקנית, כמעט שאין ביטוי תקשורתי וציבורי לעמדות מקצועיות מאזנות ביחס למציאות המזרח תיכונית. חסרונו הבולט של מכון מחקר אסטרטגי מאוזן, מקצועי ומשפיע באירופה המתמחה במזרח התיכון (דוגמת מכון וושינגטון ודומיו בארה"ב) ניכר. השילוב בין גורמים אלה – היעדרם של פעילות לובי פרו-ישראלי ושל ניתוח מקצועי בלתי מגמתית של מגמות ותהליכים מרכזיים במזה"ת – תרמו להשתרשות השיח הביקורתי והמגמתית באירופה, כמעט ללא עוררין. על ישראל להשקיע משאבים בקידום דיון עדכני ומקצועי בענייני המזרח התיכון באירופה. מאמץ זה לא יפתור את חילוקי הדעות בין אירופה לישראל, אך יאפשר למעגל ההולך וגדל של בכירים אירופים להבין את האתגרים העומדים בפני ישראל ויעלה את המודעות באירופה לשותפות הערכים והאינטרסים האסטרטגיים בין אירופה לישראל. עם זאת, אין להתעלם מהעובדה כי הקיפאון בתהליך השלום ותפיסת ישראל כמבקשת להמשיך ולהרחיב את ההתנחלויות מוסיפים שמן לביקורת האירופית הנובעת מערכי היסוד של האיחוד האירופי.

מגמה נוספת החשובה לציון בזירה האירופית היא טווייה של מערכת קשרים משמעותית וחשובה בין ישראל למספר לא מבוטל של מדינות אירופיות, בייחוד במרכז-מזרח אירופה והבלקן, בהן פולין, צ'כיה, יוון, רומניה ובולגריה. לציר מדינות זה, המגן על האינטרסים של ישראל, ערך חשוב בזירה האירופית ועל ישראל לשמרו ולהרחיבו. במהלך זה יש לראות את אחת ההצלחות הדיפלומטיות של ישראל בשנים האחרונות.

המשבר הכלכלי הפוקד את אירופה והצפי כי תתקשה להתאושש ממנו בטווח הקרוב מחייב בחינה מחודשת של נכונות של ישראל להמשיך ולהעמיק את יחסיה הכלכליים-מסחריים עם אירופה במסגרת מדיניות השכנות האירופית. השדרוג הוקפא אמנם, אך גם אם יוסרו המכשולים להמשך המהלך, צפוי הידוק היחסים הכלכליים להצריך התאמת החקיקה הכלכלית הישראלית לזו האירופית והדבר מחייב דיון מעמיק בדבר התועלת הטמונה בו.

**האוריינטציה האסטרטגית מעוררת הדאגה של טורקיה מציבה אתגר בפני העמקת היחסים בין ישראל לברית נאט"ו.** בעשור האחרון חל מפנה משמעותי ביחסים אלה ושיתוף הפעולה הביטחוני-מדיני הודק, למרות המגבלות הלא-פורמליות שהוטלו על היחסים בשל חברות ישראל בקבוצת הדיאלוג הים-תיכוני. הרפורמה הארגונית שהברית התחייבה לה אמורה לסייע לקידום שיתופי פעולה קונקרטיים בין ישראל לנאט"ו ועל ישראל לנצל הזדמנויות בתחום שיתוף הפעולה הצבאי. בנוסף, על ישראל להתמיד בחילופי המידע והמודיעין שכן נאט"ו מהווה פלטפורמה חשובה ונוחה להצגת תמונת המודיעין של ישראל ולהטמעתה בממסדים האירופיים הביטחוניים. עם זאת יש לקחת בחשבון שבפני נאט"ו עומדים אתגרים מורכבים. המשך הלחימה באפגניסטן והקשיים הכלכליים מבית יקשו על שימור תפיסת האינטרסים והיעדים המשותפים של חברי הברית.

## הרחבת הבסיס הגיאופוליטי במדיניות החוץ של ישראל – סין, הודו, רוסיה ואמריקה הלטינית

במערכת בינלאומית בה יחסי העוצמה עוברים תהליך של ביזור, לא יכולה ישראל להמשיך לנהל מדיניות חוץ שממוקדת אך ורק בארה"ב ובמידה משנית ביחסים עם אירופה. ניתן אמנם לזהות סימני שינוי בהתייחסות ישראל לזירות החדשות, אולם נראה כי השינוי אינו מספק ויש להקצות תשומת לב מדינית ומשאבים רבים יותר לאסיה-פסיפיק ולאמריקה הלטינית, ובייחוד למדינות המפתח סין, הודו וברזיל. **ההתמקדות בזירות החדשות – אל לה לפגוע בהיקף ועומק היחסים עם ארה"ב או אירופה, אלא להיות מתואמת עם ארה"ב ועם האינטרסים האסטרטגיים שלה (לאו דווקא הכלכליים).** לפי מבחן זה, הודו, המהווה שותפה אסטרטגית של ארה"ב, תהווה מוקד עיקרי להעמקת מערכת היחסים במגוון רחב של תחומים.

לא ניתן אמנם להתייחס לשלוש המעצמות העולות ולשני המרחבים הגיאופוליטיים כמקשה אחת, אולם מספר דפוסים משותפים להתייחסות הדרושה לישראל. ראשית, **האטרקטיביות של ישראל בעיני מדינות אלה קשורה בהצלחותיה המרשימות בתחומי המחקר והפיתוח הטכנולוגי.** יוזמות לשיתוף פעולה בין ישראל למעצמות העולות בתחום האזרחי יהוו מנוף מרכזי להרחבת מערכת היחסים איתן.

שנית, באופן מסורתי ממוקדת תשומת הלב הכלכלית-מסחרית של ישראל לצפון אמריקה ולאירופה. על רקע המשבר הכלכלי הקשה הפוקד שווקים אלה, **על ישראל לפעול למיצוי הפוטנציאל הכלכלי בקרב המעצמות העולות וזירות אסיה, אמריקה הלטינית ואף חלקים מאפריקה, בהם שיעורי צמיחה גבוהים.**<sup>1</sup>

שלישית, על ישראל לשתף פעולה עם שאיפת המעצמות העולות להעצים את הפרופיל המדיני הבינלאומי שלהן. בעוד שהסיכויים למעורבות גבוהה שלהן בסוגיות מזרח תיכוניות נמוכים, **על ישראל לפעול להרחבת ההידברות המדינית-אסטרטגית עם המעצמות החדשות.** לפיתוח דיאלוג עם הודו, סין ומדינות אסיה-פסיפיק נוספות חשיבות רבה. בניגוד לאמריקה הלטינית, בזירת אסיה-פסיפיק ההיבט הנורמטיבי

1 סוגיה זו תורחב במסגרת צוות חשיבה מקביל העוסק במדיניות הסחר של ישראל.

של הסכסוך הישראלי-פלסטיני משני והמתקפה על הלגיטימיות של ישראל שולית במרחב זה, להוציא מספר מדינות מוסלמיות. **לישראל שורה של אינטרסים ביטחוניים ואסטרטגיים משותפים עם רוב מדינות אסיה-פסיפיק**, כגון התמודדות עם רדיקליזציה בקרב קהילות מוסלמיות ורשתות טרור של הג'יהאד העולמי, תפוצת נשק בלתי-קונבנציונלי וטכנולוגיית טילים, ביטחון ימי וביטחון אנרגיה. מסיבות מדיניות יתכן שמרבית המדינות בזירה זו יעדיפו להימנע מדיאלוג רשמי, על כן מוטב לישראל לשקול פיתוח ערוצי דיאלוג רשמיים למחצה, הנפוצים ומקובלים בזירת אסיה-פסיפיק. מאז שנות השמונים מעורבות מרבית הממשלות באגן אסיה-פסיפיק, בהן ארה"ב וחלק ממדינות אמריקה הלטינית, בערוצים כאלה והן ממנפות אותם להעברת מסרים ולקידום רעיונות רגישים מבחינה פוליטית. אף חלק ניכר מקשרים אלה בין מדינות אסיה למדינות אירופה מתנהל באמצעות ערוצים ייעודיים רשמיים למחצה. מסיבות מדיניות, ישראל אינה יכולה להצטרף לערוצים קיימים ויהיה עליה לקדם ערוצים מעין אלה בעצמה.

## יחסי ישראל-הודו

מערכת היחסים הדיפלומטית הרשמית בין הודו לישראל החלה בשנת 1992 ברף נמוך, אך התפתחות היחסים היתה מהירה ועקבית. סייעה לצמיחה המהירה העובדה שלמרות קשרי הודו עם איראן ועם מדינות ערב וחברותה בגוש המדינות הבלתי מזדהות, **המפלגות העיקריות בפוליטיקה ההודית – מפלגת הקונגרס INC (מרכז-שמאל) ו-BJP (ימין) – מסכימות על חיוניות היחסים עם ישראל ועל התועלת בהם.** ההבדל בין גישות המפלגות בכך שמפלגת הקונגרס מתמקדת בשאלת התועלת והאינטרס ההודי הלאומי (כפי שהיא נתפשת על ידה), בעוד שעבור מפלגת ה-BJP חשוב גם המרכיב הרגשי-אידיאולוגי בקשר בין יהדות והינדואיזם מחד, ותפישת האסלאם כאויב משותף המאיים על שתי הדתות מאידך. כתוצאה מכך, בתקופת שלטון ה-BJP התאפיינו יחסי ישראל והודו בידידות ובכירי המפלגה הביעו נכונות לבקר בישראל ולהפגין תמיכה ואהדה כלפיה. כיום, בתקופת שלטון ה-INC חסר מימד זה ביחסים עם הודו. גוש השמאל בפרלמנט ההודי, במרכזו ה-CPI-M, מתאפיין ביחס פחות ידידותי לישראל.

נוסף על כך, נוכח החשיבות הגוברת של מפלגות אזוריות בכל ממשלת קואליציה בהודו, על ישראל ליצור קשרים ברי קיימא עם המפלגות האזוריות מהמדינות הגדולות והמרכזיות בצפון ובדרום (להן מספר מושבים גדול בפרלמנט), ובעיקר אוטאר פרדש. כושר המיקוח של מפלגות אלה מקנה להן תפקידים מרכזיים בממשלה הפדרלית והן עשויות להפוך ללשון מאזניים.

**אחד היתרונות במערכת היחסים בין ישראל להודו הוא שהיחסים זוכים לברכת ארה"ב, שהכירה בהודו כשותפה אסטרטגית.** במובן זה, מקרב המעצמות העולות צריכה הודו להוות יעד מרכזי למדיניות החוץ של ישראל. בנוסף מקלים המשטר הדמוקרטי והיעדר מחסומי שפה על פיתוח היחסים.

**אחד המאפיינים העיקריים של מערכת היחסים בין הודו לישראל הוא האינטרסים המשותפים לשתי המדינות. ישראל רחוקה ממיצוי האפשרויות הגלומות בנגישות לשוק ההודי ובשיתוף הפעולה בתחומים צבאיים ואזרחיים.** בתחום הצבאי היחסים כוללים תחומים החיוניים לשתי המדינות, במרכזם קשרי המודיעין וסוגיות המלחמה בטרור וברדיקאליזם המוסלמי. בנוסף הפכה הודו לשוק המרכזי של התעשייה הביטחונית הישראלית. היקף הסחר עם הודו נמצא במגמת עלייה וניתן להרחיבו עד ל-15 מיליארד דולר בשנת 2015 ואף למעלה מכך, בפרט אם תושלם החתימה על הסכם הסחר החופשי. להסכם הסחר החופשי ולהרחבת קשרי המסחר חשיבות רבה בעיקר עקב המשבר הכלכלי הפוקד את אירופה וצפון אמריקה, המהוות יעדי ייצוא מרכזיים של ישראל. המשבר במערב אף מגדיל את האטרקטיביות להשקעות הישראליות במדינות מפתח באסיה, ובמרכזן הודו.

**מאזן דפוסי ההצבעה של הודו בארגונים מולטילטרלאליים בסוגיות הנוגעות לישראל עדיין עגום.** אין להרפות מהניסיון לשכנע את הודו לנקוט עמדה מאוזנת יותר בהצבעות אלה, אולם הסיכוי לכך קלוש מסיבות פוליטיות הקשורות בתחרות על השפעה בעולם השלישי. יחד עם זאת, עלות זו נמוכה למדי ביחס לתועלת שמפיקה ישראל מיחסיה עם הודו בנושאים חיוניים אחרים.

בראייה לטווח ארוך ולמרות סף הפתיחה הנמוך, היחסים עם הודו המריאו אולם הם רחוקים עדיין ממיצוי. ניהול נכון של מערכת יחסים זו מחייב ערנות להזדמנויות לשיפור, העמקה והרחבה של מערכת היחסים עם הודו. ראוי היה להקים גוף בין-משרדי יעיל שיעסוק בקידום מערכת יחסים חיונית וחשובה זו.

למרות מערכת היחסים החשובה והנרחבת עם הודו, **ישראל חייבת לחתור לדיאלוג עם פקיסטן.** דווקא חששה של פקיסטן ממערכת היחסים בין הודו לישראל ומיכולתן להשפיע על עמדת ארה"ב, הופך אותה למעוניינת בחילופי דעות בנושאים כמו ההתפתחויות במרכז אסיה, המלחמה בטרור, תפוצת טכנולוגיה ונשק גרעיני, רדיקאליזם איסלאמי חוצה גבולות, יחסה של פקיסטן לסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי ועוד. קיימת תשתית להידיברות כזו ויש למצוא דרכים להעמקתה.

## יחסי ישראל-סין

**סין מגלה אסרטיביות אסטרטגית מתעצמת בזירת אסיה-פסיפיק ומנסה להתמודד עם ארה"ב על עוצמה והשפעה.** היא משקיעה משאבים ניכרים בפיתוח צבאי במטרה לצמצם את הפער מול עליונותה האסטרטגית של ארה"ב. לא מן הנמנע שסין תבקש להגביר את הפרופיל המדיני הבינלאומי שלה בעתיד הקרוב בהיותה חברה קבועה במועצת הביטחון של האו"ם. כמדינות מובילות אחרות, מינתה סין שליח מיוחד למזרח התיכון ויתכן כי תהיה מעוניינת במעורבות רשמית בתהליך המדיני, לפחות כפי שיפן היתה מעורבת בהובלת אחת מקבוצות העבודה של השיחות הרב-צדדיות בשנות התשעים.

בעוד סין מבינה שיכולת המעורבות שלה בהתפתחויות מזרח-תיכוניות מוגבלת, **הרי שיש לה עניין בשימור היציבות באזור מסיבות כלכליות – תלותה האסטרטגית ביבוא נפט מהמזרח התיכון.** על ישראל לראות בחיוב את הצמצום הדרמטי של התלות הסינית בנפט האיראני. לפני כשנה וחצי היווה הנפט האיראני 15% מסך היבוא הנפט של סין וכיום הוא מהווה כ-6%. מגמה זו החלה עוד קודם לביקור

המשלחת הישראלית הבכירה בסין בפברואר 2010 (בראשות המשנה לראש הממשלה יעלון וגניד בנק ישראל פישר), שנועד להציג בפני בכירי הממשל את עמדתה האסטרטגית של ישראל באשר לאיום המתפתח מאיראן. לאירוע חד-פעמי זה טרם נקבע המשך. על אף הרגישויות והזהירות המדינית הסינית, יציבות אזורית במזרח התיכון היא אינטרס סיני-ישראלי משותף. תרומה ישראלית ניכרת ליציבות האזורית, בשיתוף מדינות ערב המתונות, עשויה להגביר את חשיבותה המדינית של ישראל עבור סין ולעודד המשך דיאלוג אסטרטגי בין שתי המדינות. בתחום זה נראה שלא תיתקל ישראל בהתנגדות של ארה"ב ועל כן יש לבחון את המשך הדיאלוג האסטרטגי, יתכן תוך שימוש בערוצים רשמיים למחצה.

עקב היריבות בין ארה"ב לסין ופרשת הפלקון לפני למעלה מעשור, אופק שיתוף הפעולה והדיאלוג בין ישראל לסין מוגבל. תחום בולט ומשמעותי להעמקת יחסי סין-ישראל הוא שיתוף הפעולה בתחום המחקר והפיתוח המדעי – הן בתעשיית ההיי-טק והן בקרב אוניברסיטאות המחקר. סין פועלת לפיתוח "עמקי סיליקון", והעיר שנזן היא דוגמה בולטת לכך. לישראל דימוי חיובי מאוד בתחומי המחקר, הפיתוח והיזמות הטכנולוגית בסין ויש למנף זאת. בנוסף, הממסד הסיני עדיין מחשיב את ישראל והעולם היהודי כגורמים בעלי משקל פוליטי וכלכלי בעולם המערבי.

## יחסי ישראל-רוסיה

בעשור האחרון משקיעה רוסיה משאבים ניכרים בבנייה מחודשת של מעמדה כמעצמה מובילה במערכת הבינלאומית. בתוך כך לא היססה להסתכן בעימות עם ארה"ב והמערב במספר הזדמנויות, בהן המלחמה עם גיאורגיה וסוגיית הצבת מערכות הגנה מפני טילים במזרח ובמרכז אירופה. נראה כי רוסיה חפה ממתען אידיאולוגי ואין לה עניין ביצירת מלחמה קרה חדשה שתפגע באינטרסים שלה, אך היא מנסה להחזיר לעצמה את המעמד המעצמתי שהיה בשעתו לברית המועצות. בשנים האחרונות הפכה רוסיה לשחקן מפתח בגיבוש הסכמה בנושאים העומדים על סדר היום של הקהילה הבינלאומית, כמו יצירת קונצנזוס על הטלת סנקציות על איראן. רוסיה איננה ממרתת להיענות לכל דרישה לשיתוף פעולה מצד המערב והדבר בא לידי ביטוי בולט בסוגיה האיראנית.

למרות חוסר הבהירות ביחס לגורמים המניעים את המדיניות הבינלאומית של רוסיה וליחסי הכוחות בין בעלי התפקידים בצמרת הרוסית, נראה כי גורם מרכזי המשפיע על יחסי החוץ של רוסיה הוא אינטרס כלכלי-מסחרי המנחה גם את מעורבותה ומהלכיה במזרח התיכון, בצד הרצון לשקם מחדש את מעמדה המעצמתי הבינלאומי. אינטרס זה בא לידי ביטוי במכירת אמצעי לחימה לסוריה ובמערכת היחסים של רוסיה עם איראן. נכונותה של רוסיה לתמוך בסבב הסנקציות הבינלאומיות האחרון מעידה כי אין לה עניין באיראן גרעינית, אולם מהלכיה בעניין זה תלויים ביחסיה עם ארה"ב ועם אירופה, יותר מאשר עם ישראל.

בעשור האחרון היתה מעורבותה של רוסיה בתהליך המדיני בין ישראל לפלסטינים שולית, למרות חברותה הפורמלית במסגרת הקוורטט. למרות שנראה כי רוסיה עצמה מניחה כי יכולתה להשפיע על התהליך מצומצמת, לא מן הנמנע שבעתיד הקרוב תנסה להגביר את מעורבותה על רקע כשלוני ארה"ב ואירופה בזירה זו.

רוסיה עודנה עומדת בפני כמה צמתים בהתפתחותה הפנימית. בקידום תכנית המודרניזציה הכיר הנשיא מדבדב במפורש ובמופגן בחוליים הקשים של הממשל והחברה ברוסיה. למרות מקורות האנרגיה המשמעותיים העומדים לרשותה ומהווים אבני יסוד של כלכלתה, עלולה רוסיה לחוות משבר חברתי פנימי משמעותי. השלכותיו הבינלאומיות האפשריות של משבר כזה אינן ברורות, אולם סדר היום הפנימי יכתיב עבור רוסיה גם את מהלכיה הבינלאומיים, בכפוף לאסטרטגיה שיאמץ הנשיא שייבחר ב-2012.

בהינתן מערכת היחסים העדינה בין רוסיה לארה"ב, ההזדמנות המשמעותית לפיתוח היחסים בין ישראל לרוסיה נעוצה בתכנית המודרניזציה שמנסה הנשיא מדבדב לקדם. בבסיס תכנית זו פיתוח התשתיות הרוסיות בתחום המחקר והפיתוח המדעי והטכנולוגי. בתחומים אלה מגלה הנשיא מדבדב עניין מיוחד במעורבות ובשיתוף פעולה עם ישראל, אולם קידום פרויקטים תלוי, כאמור, בתוצאות הבחירות לנשיאות רוסיה וביחסי הכוחות הפנימיים שיווצרו בעקבות זאת. על ישראל לגלות עניין ונכונות לשיתוף פעולה זה, בידיעה שהשקעות בפרויקטים אלה כרוכות בסיכון כלכלי לא מבוטל.

## יחסי ישראל-אמריקה הלטינית

בדומה ליחסים עם אירופה, מערכת היחסים הדיפלומטית בין ישראל לאמריקה הלטינית מושפעת ישירות ממצבו של הסכסוך הישראלי-ערבי. ברוב מדינות אמריקה הלטינית פעילות קהילות ערביות גדולות, שלהן השפעה פוליטית ניכרת. הביקורת על ישראל משתלבת היטב גם עם המגמות האנטי-אמריקניות הנפוצות באזור. התשומות המדיניות הישראליות והאמצעים המושקעים מנגד בזירה זו אינם מספקים. שאם לא כן, קשה להסביר את המפלה המדינית המפתיעה שספגה ישראל עם הודעתן של שבע מדינות ביבשת (בהן רוב המרכזיות) על הכרה ברשות הפלסטינית כמדינה. זאת, על אף הודעת שר החוץ ליברמן על כוונתו להקדיש תשומת לב מדינית מיוחדת לאמריקה הלטינית.

מצב הסכסוך משפיע ישירות גם על הקהילות היהודיות באזור, כשהסלמת הסכסוך ואירועי לחימה מביאים לעליה באירועים אנטישמיים. אין להתעלם גם מהרחבת השפעתה של איראן בזירה זו באמצעות שיתוף פעולה מעמיק עם ונצואלה, בוליביה, אקוודור, ניקרגואה ומדינות קריביות קטנות. השפעה איראנית זו מתבססת גם היא על התפיסה האנטי-אמריקנית המסורתית הרווחת באמריקה הלטינית.

מערכת היחסים עם ברזיל, מדינת מפתח ומעצמה שברדר, ידעה בעיקר מורדות בשנים האחרונות של נשיאות לולה. ביקור הנשיא לולה בישראל במרץ 2010 לא הפחית מחשיבות הידוק הקשרים עם איראן וניסיון המשותף של ברזיל וטורקיה לקדם עסקה שתמלט את איראן מסנקציות בינלאומיות חריפות. טרם ברורה השלכת חילופי הדורות על הפרופיל הבינלאומי-מדיני של ברזיל, לא כל שכן על היחסים עם ישראל. קרן האור המדינית המשמעותית של ישראל בזירה זו היתה מערכת היחסים עם קולומביה בתקופת הנשיא אוריבה. על רקע מאבקה בטרור, בסחר בסמים ובהתמודדות מול ונצואלה, נוצרה בתקופה זו שותפות אינטרסים משמעותית בין שתי המדינות. אולם, ניסיונו המופגן של יורשו לצנן את העימות עם הנשיא צ'אוז עלול להקרין על היחסים בין ישראל לקולומביה.

חשוב לציין כי ביקורים של אישים ישראלים רמי-דרג באמריקה הלטינית, כמו ביקור הנשיא פרס ברזיל ובארגנטינה בראשית 2010 היה בהם כדי להקהות – ולו לזמן קצר – את הביקורת הרווחת על ישראל. יש להגביר את תדירות הביקורים של בכירים ישראלים וכן לבחון את הדרכים לחיזוק ערוצים רשמיים ולא-רשמיים של דיאלוג אסטרטגי-מדיני עם מדינות מפתח באזור – ברזיל, מקסיקו, ארגנטינה, צ'ילה, קולומביה ופרו (על פי סדר זה). ראוי לקדם עמך קשרי אקדמיה, מחקר ופיתוח וכן לעודד ביקורים של גורמים בעלי השפעה בקהילות המדיניות (עיתונאים, כלכלנים, אנשי עסקים, פוליטיקאים ואנשי אקדמיה בכירים) בישראל. בנוסף יש למקד פעילות דיפלומטית במרכזים אורבניים עיקריים: סאו-פאולו, מקסיקו-סיטי, באנוס איירס, ברזיליה, סנטיאגו-דה-צ'ילה, בוגוטה ועוד.

**ישראל רחוקה ממיצוי הפוטנציאל הכלכלי-מסחרי עם מדינות אמריקה הלטינית.** הצמיחה הכלכלית המואצת בזירה זו מגבירה את האטרקטיביות להשקעות ישראליות. מגמת הממשלות בזירה זו להשקיע משאבים גוברים בקידום המחקר והפיתוח הטכנולוגי והאוניברסיטאות, יוצרת הזדמנות לישראל לפיתוח היחסים במסגרת שיתופי פעולה דו-לאומיים. כמו כן יש לצפות לגידול משמעותי בתיירות מאמריקה הלטינית על רקע כלכלי וכן על רקע האוונגליזם הנוצרי הפושט בה.

## פיתוח הדיפלומטיה המולטילטראלית הגלובלית של ישראל במערכת האו"ם

מסורתית, חסרה ישראל דיפלומטיה מולטילטראלית ומעמדה במערכת האו"ם טרם הוסדר ונורמל גם לאחר 62 שנות עצמאות. אי-שילובה הפורמלי והמלא של ישראל בקבוצה אזורית הותיר אותה במעמד נחות שאין דומה לו במערכת האו"ם. רוב מרצה הדיפלומטי של ישראל במערכת האו"ם לא הושקע בקידום סדר יום גלובלי מטעמה, אלא בניסיון ההכרחי למזער את השפעת הרוב האוטומטי הקיים נגדה כמעט בכל מסגרות האו"ם, למעט מועצת הביטחון בה לבעלת הברית העיקרית, ארה"ב, זכות וטו על קבלת החלטות. בשנים האחרונות חל מפנה בהתייחסותה של ישראל למסגרות מולטילטראליות ולמערכת האו"ם והדבר בא לידי ביטוי בין היתר בהצלחת הקמפיין להצטרפותה ל-OECD.

כיום, כשמדיניות הממשלות של מרבית מדינות העולם מושפעת יותר ויותר ממסגרות מולטילטראליות אזוריות וגלובליות, נפגעת ישראל הן ממעמדה הנחות באו"ם והן מהיעדר שיתוף פעולה אזורי משמעותי במזרח התיכון. חובת הסדרת מעמדה הבינלאומי של ישראל חלה גם עליה.

**מעמד בעייתי זה מחייב את ישראל להגביר את מעורבותה בשיח הגלובלי בסוגיות הנוגעות לה** – החל מאיכות הסביבה ובריאות, עבור בכלכלה בינלאומית וכלה בסוגיות ביטחון בינלאומי. על ישראל להעלות באופן הדרגתי את הקצאת המשאבים לסייע חוץ ולהעמידה ביעדים שנקבעו ע"י האו"ם במסגרת יעדי הפיתוח של המילניום (Millennium Development Goals). יתרה מזאת לישראל נכסים (ניסיון ואמצעים) שעשויים להיות משמעותיים במערכת האו"ם, בתחומי ההתמודדות עם מדבור, מחקר ופיתוח בתחומי החקלאות וגידולי המזון, רפואת חירום ועוד. במידה שישראל תתמיד במילוי מחויבויות אלה, תוכל לדרוש נורמליזציה של מעמדה במסגרת האו"ם. למרות שהשינויים ביחסי הכוחות הגלובליים לא בהכרח מבשרים טובות לשיתוף הפעולה הגלובלי, יש להשתלבותה המעמיקה של ישראל במערכת זו חשיבות רבה. אולם, **הקצאת משאבים לעניין זה צריכה להיות מדורגת ולקחת בחשבון את הקשיים הצפויים בניהול המערכת הדיפלומטית המולטילטראלית הגלובלית על רקע יחסי העוצמה בין המעצמות.**

למשולבות בפעילות הגלובלית ערך חשוב מעבר להישגים קונקרטיים בעודה פותחת צוהר להרחבת השיח עם מדינות שונות בעולם בתחומים מגוונים. סיוע למדינות מתפתחות לא יביא אמנם לשינוי דפוסי הצבעה במוסדות בינלאומיים, אולם הוא עשוי לקדם הישגים מדיניים אחרים ולתרום בטווח הארוך לתדמיתה של ישראל בעולם ובעיני עצמה. משולבות ופעילות גלובלית במובן של "תיקון עולם" הן ערך יהודי. יש להן ערך גם בחיבור הדור הצעיר היהודי והליברלי בעולם המערבי עם ישראל, דור שמזדהה עם ישראל פחות ופחות.

## סוף דבר

**מסמך זה מבליט ומחדד את הצורך הדחוף בחיזוק המימד המדיני בביטחון הלאומי של ישראל באמצעות מדיניות חוץ מושכלת. למערכת הדיפלומטית ולמהלכים מדיניים חשיבות קריטית בסיכול איומים אסטרטגיים.**

ישראל היא מדינה קטנה בעלת אמצעים מוגבלים בזירה המדינית הבינלאומית ומכאן מתחייב תעודף בהקצאת המשאבים. ניכר שהקצאת המשאבים הנוכחית לא מתאימה לשינויים הגלובליים ויש מקום לבחינה מחודשת ומעמיקה של התעודף במערכות היחסים הבינלאומיות של ישראל, כפי שמציע משרד החוץ.

במערכה המדינית חשיבות רבה למשרד החוץ ולדיפלומטים המשרתים במסגרתו במטה בישראל ובכ-100 הנציגויות בחו"ל. אין חולק על כך שעל המדינה מוטלת החובה לשפר את תנאי העסקתם של הדיפלומטים הנמצאים בחזית המדינית הקריטית של ישראל.

במישור המדיני יש להכיר בכך כי גם בהיעדר התקדמות במו"מ אין לשלול מהלכים אלטרנטיביים בשטח, ייתכן שחלקם חד-צדדיים, העשויים לשנות את הסטטוס קוו ואף להציג את ישראל באור אחר בזירה הבינלאומית. **בצד חשיבות העמקת הפעילות המדינית וההסברתית, לנקיטת מהלכים מעשיים משמעות לא מעטה.**

## ההתמודדות עם הדה-לגיטימציה לישראל באירופה מסמך מסכם של מושב הצד בכנס הרצליה האחד-עשר

### מהלך הדין

המערכה לדה-לגיטימציה של ישראל מתנהלת אמנם ברחבי העולם, אבל בישראל קיים חשש מיוחד מהאפשרות שישראל "תאבד את אירופה", ולכן הדין כאן מתמקד באפיון התופעה באירופה, ובהפקת מסקנות ודרכי פעולה אל מול מערכה זו. הקביעה שישראל עומדת "לאבד את אירופה" איננה בהכרח נכונה, אך יחד עם זאת ניכר כי מסתמנות מגמות מדיאגות, וראוי אם כן לבחון את הנושא באופן מעמיק, לגלות את הסיכויים להטבה ולחשוף את הצדדים האפלים.

### הבסיס האינטלקטואלי

בניתוח מעמיק ניכר כי הבעיה איננה חדשה. בניסיון למקם את התופעה בקונטקסט ההיסטורי הרחב יותר, התופעה של הדה-לגיטימציה של ישראל נופלת במסגרת המאבק על ההגמוניה התרבותית ("cultural hegemony"), ההגדרות בתחום נחלתו של הפוסט-מודרניזם האירופי, ובמסגרת מגמה מדעית ("scholarly") ואינטלקטואלית של ההסתערות של האינטליגנציה על עקרונות הרציונליזם, התרבות הנאורה, ומה שנראה כשליטה מערבית פוליטית – קרי ההשפעה של ערכים מערביים, וישראל מסומנת במסגרת זו. מקור התופעה הוא בדחיקת השמאל, שהשתתף באופן פעיל בניצחון על הנאצים, אבל אחרי 1945 נתפס כאיום, במהלך המלחמה הקרה, כך שהוא הסיק כי אם איננו יכול לכבוש את מעוזי העוצמה הפוליטית, הרי שמאז 1945 השמאל שואף "לכבוש את מרכזי הייצור התרבותיים השולטים על האמת" ("conquer the sources of cultural production to control the truth"). אם אתה יכול לשלוט באלה, תוכל לעצב את האופן שבו חברות רואות את המציאות, ומסתכלות על העולם, על פי העדפותיך הפוליטיות. מגמה זו התפתחה לה במשך הזמן לתופעה המכונה "פוסט-מודרניזם", שצמחה בעיקר מהגרסה המרקסיסטית של המדע (scholarship) וההיסטוריוגרפיה המרקסיסטית. כפי שאמר פעם מישל פוקו, "ידע הוא כוח" – אם אתה יכול לשלוט בייצור הידע, אתה יכול לשלוט בכוח, בעוצמה.

דבר שני, התפיסה הפוסט-מודרניסטית קובעת כי הדרך שבה אנחנו רואים את ההיסטוריה, או מבינים את ההיסטוריה, היא דבר שנכפה עלינו על ידי המנצחים במלחמת העולם השנייה. המשימה כיום לפיכך, לכאורה, של אנשי האשכולות (scholars) הפוסט-מודרניסטים היא לחשוף את התרמיות שכפו המנצחים-ההגמונים, את השקריות של גרסתם, כביכול, ולקבע את הנרטיבות של המדוכאים, ושל אלה שנדחקו לשולי ההיסטוריה ("the task of the scholars is to expose the fallacies of the victors, the hegemony, and reaffirm the narratives of the oppressed and those who have been marginalized in history"). בקונטקסט זה הפלסטינאים הופכים למועמדים אידיאליים להפגין את ההיסטוריה של המדוכאים, נגד ההיסטוריה של ההגמונים. לפיכך עפ"י ההגדרה הרי שהפירוש ההיסטורי של הציונות הוא של ההגמון, ועל כן בהגדרה הוא שקרי, ובגדר מניפולציה של ההתרחשויות שנועד להנציח את הדיכוי של המובסים ("to perpetuate the oppression of the vanquished"), ושליחותו של ה-scholar כיום הוא לפיכך למצב מחדש את הנרטיבה של המדוכא ("to renew the narrative of the oppressed"). כך, המחקר המדעי הופך ל"התנגדות" – ("Scholarship becomes 'resistance'"). בעת המלחמה הקרה, התעמולה שהוכתבה הייתה למעשה התעמולה הסובייטית, שקבעה שישראל היא נאצית, ומגמת הדה-קולוניזציה קבעה שהציונות היא גזענות, שכן ישראל הפכה ב-1967 לכובש ומכאן שניתן היה להדביק לה את התווית של מעצמה קולוניאלית. באירופה ניכר שהמורשת של הטרגדיה של המחיר הנורא של

### סיכום הדין

ד"ר עודד ברוש, המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה

### מועד

יום שני, 7 בפברואר 2011,  
שעה 07.30-10.00

### יושבי ראש ומנחי הדין

תא"ל (מיל.) יוסי קופרוסר, המשרד  
לעניינים אסטרטגיים;

מר טומי שטיינר, המכון למדיניות  
ואסטרטגיה

### מתדיינים

Mr. Robin Shepherd, Director  
of International Affairs, Henry  
Jackson Society

Rt. Hon. John Spellar, MP, UK  
Shadow Minister for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs

Dr. Richard Prasquier, President,  
Representative Council of  
French Jewish Institutions  
(CRIF)

Mr. Claude Kandiyoti, Publisher,  
Contact J

Dr. Emanuele Ottolenghi, Senior  
Fellow, Foundation for the  
Defense of Democracies

שתי מלחמות העולם, הראשונה והשנייה, היא כי כל מי שעוסק במלחמה מקבל תווית של פושע מלחמה, שכל מי שנלחם הוא בהגדרה, במשתמע, ipso facto, פושע מלחמה. מאוחר יותר, כשהקומוניזם התמוטט, הרי שהתופעה הכפולה של תלות באנגריה וגלובליזציה אפשרו אחרי 1989 את "החטיפה" של סוגיית זכויות האדם, ומכאן הרדיפה אחרי צדק למדוכאים ("pursuit of justice for the oppressed"). הבעיה שמולה אנו ניצבים כיום היא תוצר של המגמה ההיסטורית הזאת, וההיסטוריונים וחוקרי המזה"ת שיושבים במחלקות להיסטוריה או במחלקות המזה"ת, שמעצבים אותה כיום באקדמיה – ומלמדים את הדור החדש של חוקרים, חושבים, אנליסטים, פוליטיקאים, עיתונאים, וכיו"ב – אימצו את הרעיון שישראל היא ישות מלאכותית שנכפתה על הנרטיבה של ה-indigenous people of the Middle East, ועל כן זהו קולוניאליזם מערבי וכלי ליהירות המערבית ("Western arrogance") שצריך ללחם בו.

אם מבינים את כל זה, ניתן להבין כי אין זה משנה אם בישראל יש ממשלה שבראשה עומד נתניהו או עומד אולמרט, או פרטי הגבולות העומדים לדיון – אם יתנו לפלסטינים 97 אחוזים מהשטח, או 98 אחוזים מהשטח, או אם יהיו חילופי שטחים – לפתרון של שתי מדינות, ואין זה משנה מה ישראל תעשה, שכן ישראל עצמה איבדה את הלגיטימיות. זאת מאחר שמרכזי הייצור התרבותי של האמת ("the cultural production centers") קיבלו את הגרסה הזאת של הרעיון ("the notion") באופן בסיסי.

אם כן מה ניתן לעשות אל מול המגמה האינטלקטואלית שתוארה לעיל? ראשית, זהו פרויקט ארוך טווח, שצריך לזכות בו שוב במידה כלשהי של השפעה באותם "מרכזי ייצור תרבותיים" ("centers of cultural production"). צריך ליצור עיתונים או מחלקות אקדמיות, שינתחו ויצגו את המציאות עפ"י האמת כפי שאנחנו רואים אותה, צריך ליצור מרחבים משלנו ("to create our own spaces"), צריך להגדיר את הפרמטרים של מה לגיטימי ומה לא, וצריך להפסיק לבזבז זמן ומשאבים על מספר דברים:

- להפסיק להאשים את ישראל בהסברה גרועה – הדובר הישראלי הוא המדכא (קרי, נתפס כמייצג את הגורם המדכא), והוא לא זה שיאמינו לו, לא משנה מה הוא אומר – זהו חוסר אמון בנרטיבה של המדכא ("incredulity towards the master narrative");
- להפסיק להניח ש"אם נצניח את חנה סנש היא תנצח את הנאצים" – השיטה צריכה להיות "להשטיח" את דרזדן. כלומר, מאמר יפה ב"לה מונד" או ב"גארדיאן" פעם בחצי שנה לא יהפוך אותם לעיתונים ציוניים;
- להפסיק להחצין את חילוקי הדעות בינינו. אמנם זה מבורך שיש לנו דמוקרטיה, אבל מערכת יחסי הציבור הזאת היא תזמורת שצריכה לנגן יחדיו, תחת מנצח אחד. אם כל נגן ינגן יצירה אחרת, מה שייצא לא יישמע טוב. זה עסק מקצועי, כך הצד השני נוהג באופן יעיל ונחוש, ואנחנו צריכים לעשות כן גם מצידנו. בלי תאום ומטרה אחידה, ונכונות למאבק ארוך טווח, במשך שנות דור או יותר, אפילו לא נתחיל לשנות את המצב – יכול להיות שיהיו ניצחונות טקטיים קצרי טווח, אבל הם לא ישנו את התמונה בכללותה.

שיטות הסוואת ("כיבוס") של הדה-לגיטימציה תחת מטריית נעלות של חוק, צדק ומוסר: ניכר כי נהוג "כיבוס" מהותי של הדה-לגיטימציה באמצעות הנרטיבה של הצדק, כלומר הצגת הדה-לגיטימציה בשפה ה"נקייה" של רדיפת הצדק. וזאת בחמישה ערוצים ראויים לציון:

1. המטריה, או הכיסוי, של האו"ם, על ידי אימוץ של החלטות של ארגוני האו"ם המוקיעים את ישראל בתחום הפרת זכויות האדם; כלומר, אם האו"ם על ארגוני מוקיעים את ישראל ללא הרף, נוצר הרושם כי יש דברים בגו, ושיש לכך יסוד מוצדק כלשהו לכל הפחות;
2. "שלטון החוק" ("rule of law"): אירופה, ארה"ב וקנדה הן תרבויות חוק ("legal culture"), שבהן אם אתה מוקיע דבר מה כ"לא חוקי" ("illegal"), אתה מוציא אותם מתחום הלגיטימיות. כך למשל את ההתנחלויות שמכנים אותן "לא חוקיות" ("illegal"), בעוד אפשר היה אולי לכנותן "לא נבונות" ("ill-advised"). כלומר יש חצייה של הקו בין המותר (אפילו אם הוא לא נבון), לבין האסור בתכלית על פי שלטון החוק המהווה את עמוד התווך העיקרי של תרבותן של חברות בצפון אמריקה ובאירופה ("legal cultures"); כך נוצר הרושם שישראל הופכת יותר ויותר לישות הממוקמת מן העבר השני של מתרס החוקיות, שתכליתה בתחום ה"בלתי-חוקי", וככזאת איננה יכולה להמשיך ולזכות בהכרה כחברה מתוקנת, קרי של חברת חוק ותרבות חוק;
3. "זכויות אדם" ("human rights"): בתחום זו השתרשה לה דת חילונית רופפת ("a loose secular religion"), וכך כאשר ישראל מוצגת כ-"מגה-מפרה" של זכויות אדם, היא הופכת בהדרגה ל-"anti-Christ" החדש, כלומר לכופרת באותה הדת החילונית האוניברסאלית החדשה, עם כל המשמעויות הנובעות מכך;
4. גזענות – אם אתה מכנה את ישראל גזענית, מדינת אפרטהייד, אתה מציב אותה בצד הלא-נכון של הצדק, ובצד הלא-נכון של ההיסטוריה;
5. והיפוך השואה ("holocaust inversion") – הצגת ישראל כמדינה שמבצעת רצח-עם ("a genocidal state"), או כמדינה נאצית: כך, בעוד שאם ישראל אם היא גזענית או מדינת אפרטהייד, הרי שאין לה זכות להתקיים; אבל אם היא מדינה נאצית הרי שאז לא זו בלבד שאין לה זכות להתקיים, אלא כבר יש חובה לפעול ככל הניתן באופן אקטיבי על מנת שמדינה כזו לא תהיה לה זכות להתקיים.

בכל אלה נעשה שימוש במטרה "לכבס" את הדה-לגיטימציה. ויש לציון, למרבה הצער, כי אין זה רק נחלתם של שונאי ישראל, אלא מאפיינים מבין אלה ניתן לאתר גם בין ידידי ישראל לרוב, שנופלים למלכודת של תהליך ה"כיבוס" של הדה-לגיטימציה במסגרת הרבריקה של הצדק, וישראל סופה שהיא נוחתת בצד הלא-נכון של ההיסטוריה.

## הסוגיה בהשתקפות במדינות נבחרות: בריטניה, צרפת בלגיה

תפיסה אנליטית אחת, הנוקטת גישה של "מלמעלה למטה" ("top down"), מבחינה בשני כוחות שמניעים את התופעה: השפעות מניעות ("forcing effects – driving"), והשפעות של היזון ("feedback effects") הנוטות להחמיר עוד את המצב. בדרג הרשמי, שני מניעים עיקריים המניעים את הגישה האירופית הם (1) ביטחון אנרגיה ("energy security"); ו-2) השאיפה לקיים יחסים טובים עם 56 מדינות ארגון המדינות האסלאמי (OIC) ובעלי ברית נוספים, כאשר יחסים טובים עם אלה מקבלים עדיפות על פני יחסים טובים עם ישראל. אך עד כאן המדובר בעיקר ביחסים רעים, ואין בכך כדי לקבוע כי זוהי דה-לגיטימציה. בבריטניה ניכר כי ההסכמה עם דו"ח גולדסטון הייתה בגדר צביעות, מפני שהכוחות הבריטיים באפגניסטן נתקלים בבעיות דומות לאלו שישארל נתקלת בהן בלחימה בטרור, כולל בגרימת נפגעים אזרחיים, ולכן התמיכה בדו"ח הייתה כבגדר פגיעה באינטרסים הביטחוניים של בריטניה ובחופש הפעולה של כוחותיה באפגניסטן. מדינות אירופיות רבות, אם כן, מנסות להתאים את עצמן, לפיכך, לסדר היום של מדינות בעלות גישה קיצונית של דה-לגיטימציה, על מנת למצוא חן ("to ingratiate themselves") בעיני מדינות כאלה. אחד המניעים החבויים של התופעה הוא אנטישמיות לשמה, ושילוב זה, בין אנטישמיות קלאסית לבין הרצון למצוא חן בעיני הערבים, הוא עתיק יומין בפרודורי משרד החוץ הבריטי, למשל.

סיבה נוספת לתופעה היא כי האווירה ברובד האינטליגנציה הפוליטית מאמצת את הגישה שהמפעל הציוני הוא בלתי-לגיטימי, מפני שהעם הפלסטיני הוא העם המקומי ("indigenous peoples") הלגיטימי בחלק זה של העולם, ולכן אין למדינה הישראלית את מידת הלגיטימיות המוענקת למדינות אחרות בעולם. זוהי אמנם גרסת הקיצוניים בקבוצה, וחשוב לציין שיש גרסאות "קשות" ו"רכות" של ארגומנט זה. כך שניתן לומר שבראיה ש"מלמעלה למטה", יש סדר קדימויות דיפלומטי וכלכלי, והוא מתחבר לראיה רחבה יותר שהיא אידיאולוגית ותרבותית בהסתכלות על סוגיה זו, וזה מה שמוביל לאג'נדה של דה-לגיטימציה, ולא רק ביקורת ("criticism") על מדינת ישראל.

עוד יצוין כי הציבור הבריטי בכללותו איננו ממוקד בישראל, ולכן נראה שהוא נתון להשפעות שונות הנופלות על קרקע בתולית מבחינת תשומת הלב שלו. אמנם, המחשבה הצפויה היא כי בשל הגידול המתמיד בחלקו של המגזר המוסלמי צפוי שיגדל מאליו אלמנט האנטי-ישראלי. אבל אין זה בהכרח כך, וסדר היום של המוסלמים באירופה, או בבריטניה בפרט, איננו קשור לישראל; אלה אנשים שבאו ממדינות מוסלמיות לבריטניה על מנת לשפר את חייהם, או לתת הזדמנויות לילדיהם, ואלה הנושאים העומדים בראש סדר היום שלהם. צריך אם כן לנתח את התופעה ברמות אחרות. הרמה הראשונה היא הדיון ברמה האקדמית-אינטלקטואלית-תקשורתית, שכן אלה הכוחות המכנים את עצמם "מעצבי דעת קהל" ("opinion makers"), במידה רבה של התיימרות. זה חורג מעניין של משרד החוץ הבריטי שהינו בעל אינטרסים במדינות ערביות.

ניכר כי על פני זמן, הייתה ירידה בתמיכה בישראל, החל מהתמיכה הגבוהה שהייתה ממלחמת העצמאות ועד מלחמת ששת הימים, שבה הייתה תמיכה ב-underdog, בדוד העומד מול גולית, אך כיום שואלים מיהו דוד ומיהו גולית? שכן ישראל הפכה בעיני רבים לגולית. אין באירופה תשומת לב לעריצות החמאס. עם זאת לא צריך להגזים בהשפעות של מגמות הדה-לגיטימציה ומאמצי החרם בבריטניה. כך למשל, לאחרונה הסכימה רשת Tesco, שהיא רשת הסופרמרקטים הגדולה בממלכה המאוחדת, לשווק פרי הדר מספרד, בתקופות שישארל איננה מייצאת פרי הדר, תחת השם של המוצר הישראלי Jaffa – כלומר אין רתיעה מפני שיווק של מוצר שמקורו האמיתי מהאיחוד האירופי עם שם מותג ישראלי. אז ראוי אם כן גם לשמור על חוש הפרופורציה. נוסף על כך אנחנו כמובן גם מצווים על ערנות.

זה מזמן שקיימת בעיה עם האינטליגנציה הבריטית, אפילו, למשל, אם מסתכלים על התנהגותה במלחמת העולם השנייה. יש גם תופעה של "שמאל רך", ואף במפלגת הלייבור יש המאמצים גוון זה. בין השמרנים יש גם מידה של אנטישמיות ותיקה, אם גם היא מתונה מבעבר. מבחינת הפוליטיקאים, הגוש הגדול הוא "האמצע הרך", כלומר מרבית הפוליטיקאים כיום לא חושבים על הנושא, ומגיבים ללחצים שמופנים אליהם. לכן ניכר כי יש מגמה מדאיגה, אבל היא איננה כה בעלת עצמה כפי שחוששים בישראל ובין היהודים בקהילות אלו. אמנם צריך להתחשב בכך, אבל לא בהכרח תמיד צריך להתעמת עם התופעה חזיתית, מפני שפעמים המניעים אינם קשורים לישראל.

בריטניה היא בירת התקשורת, הרמקול המוצב על בסיס אוניברסאלי ייחודי, והאקדמיה הבריטית מושכת סטודנטים מכל העולם בשנות עיצוב בחייהם ("in their formative years"). בריטניה היא מרכז ה-NGOs, כמו OXFAM וארגון אמנסטי הבינלאומי, ששמו להם למטרה להשמיץ את ישראל ("to trash Israel") בנושא כיבוד זכויות האדם. זאת ועוד, הבעיה בבריטניה היא גם כי הבסיס של הקהילות היהודיות אינו איתן. יתרה מכך, שיא החוצפה הוא כאשר פרופסורים מישראל באים לבריטניה ומעודדים חרם על האוניברסיטאות שמעסיקות אותם בישראל, וזוהי תופעה שכיחה. אז היכן אותה תזמורת שאמורה לנגן יחדיו? המחשבה על תזמורת כזאת היא אוטופית ובלתי-מעשית לחלוטין, אלא אנחנו צריכים להכיר בכך שאנחנו נאלצים לעבוד בקופוניה של קולות.

באשר לבריטניה, הממשלה היא אוהדת הרבה יותר מהציבור שבוחר בה, ולכן אנחנו חיים על זמן שאול, שכן הפער צפוי להצטמצם לרעתנו ולא בעדנו בעתיד, מפני שהם צריכים להיבחר. אם כן מה צריך לעשות? להוריד את הכפפות נגד הדה-לגיטימציות, הם לוקים במידע שגוי ובמידע חסר ("ill-informed and mis-informed"), וצריך לסמן אותם. זוהי מלחמה, ולא דיון (debate) אינטלקטואלי, כי המלחמה מתנהלת נגדנו, וצריך לעשות שימוש בכל האמצעים שלא הופעלו – זהו שדה הקרב על יכולתה של ישראל לתפקד, ולהגן על עצמה, כי זכותה של ישראל להגנה עצמית נשחקת.

ניכר כי סחף נוסף בדעת הקהל באירופה אירע על רקע המשט, אך לא באופן מכריע בציבור הרחב, למשל בצרפת, על אף מאמצי אמצעי התקשורת להציג את ישראל כמדינה פיראטית ("pirate state"). בצרפת יש אמירה עתיקה שמתייחסת לשני הוגי הדעות

שהיו פופולאריים בעבר, ריימון ארון וז'אן פול סרטור, שייצגו את שני קטבי הימין והשמאל – ש"עדיף להיות טועה עם סרטור מאשר צודק עם ארון". ראייה זו עדיין מאפיינת את האינטליגנציה הצרפתית. כלומר, עדיף להיות נגד משהו ולא בעד משהו – לפני חמש שנים המטרה הייתה ארה"ב תחת ממשל בוש, או הגלובליזציה. לסוגיה הפלסטינית יש בולטות – היא קרובה, היא זמינה, רואים אותה הרבה. אמנם זהו לא נושא עיקרי בציבוריות בכללותה בצרפת, אבל זה כן נושא עיקרי אצל מי שנטלו לעצמם את גלימת "מעצבי דעת הקהל" ("opinion makers"). במצב זה, העיתונאים תופסים את המקום של האינטליגנציה, וכך גם המורים, שהינו ציבור ממורמר שמעמדו שקע בדור האחרון והוא זקוק לשליחות ("cause") כלשהי. אלה "מעצבי דעת הקהל", והם בהחלט מוטים. כך למשל, אינם מראים את פני משטר החמאס, אלא הוא מקבל דימוי של משטר אסלאמי מתון שעלול לשמש קרש קפיצה למעבר למשטר דמוקרטי. כאן אנו נכשלים באי-חשיפת פרצופו האמיתי של החמאס, למשל בכל הקשור לסעיף 7 באמנת החמאס הדוגל בציווי להרוג יהודים (לא ישראלים).

בזירה הפוליטית בצרפת – אין דה-לגיטימציה של ממש. אמנם בין הסוציאליסטים יש הבדל דורי, שכן בדור הקודם היו מקורבים למפלגת העבודה והייתה היכרות טובה עם ישראל, בעוד שבדור הנוכחי הקשר האינטימי עם מפלגת העבודה בישראל חלף, ואין היכרות עם ישראל. כמובן שלשמאל הקיצוני יש את האג'נדה שלו. אבל הבעיה הגדולה ביותר היא כי בין ידידי ישראל רווחת הדעה שכל מה שמתרחש בחלק זה של העולם באופן המורחב – הוא באחריותה (קרי, באשמתה) של ישראל. כלומר, הדעה שאומרת כי אילו היה הסכם שלום עם הפלסטינים, לא היו בעיות באפגניסטן, או במקומות אחרים בעולם. זוהי תפיסה מושרשת באופן העמוק ביותר, וככל שהיא משונה היא בגדר משאלת לב ("wishful thinking") – קשה מאד לעקור אותה, וזה קיים ברמה הגבוהה ביותר בזירה הפוליטית. אפילו לאור ההתרחשויות במצרים, טוענים רבים שזו העת להסכם בין ישראל לפלסטינים. כיצד הדבר יועיל אינם מסוגלים להסביר, אבל בשורה התחתונה ישראל מואשמת ומורשעת כאשמה.

בבלגיה, ובראייה למתרחש בצרפת, ניכר כי בהחלט יש מגמה מדאגיה – משהו השתבש. בהפגנות בזמן עופרת יצוקה מרבית המפגינים, כנראה 95 אחוזים, היו מוסלמים. אבל המצב יוצר דילמה בקהילות היהודיות בשאלה אם מותר למתוח ביקורת על ישראל, או שצריך לתמוך בה בכל מקרה. מרבית אירופה איננה אנטישמית, וצריך להכיר בכך עובדתית שכיום יש בישראל ממשלה שדוגלת בסטאטוס-קוו, דבר המקשה על העמדות האירופיות. יש עייפות מהקונפליקט, והתנועה שמקדמת את הדה-לגיטימציה פועלת באופן שצובר אפקטיביות ואגרסיביות, לעיתים עד לגבול החוק, במידה שקשה להתנגד לה. הקהילה היהודית מתקשה לנסח את התמיכה בישראל תוך הבעת עמדה שהיא לא מסכימה עם כל מה שישראל עושה.

בדיון נשמעו שוב ושוב טענות כי ישראל איננה עושה מספיק על מנת להפיג את הדימויים השליליים הדבקים בה בשל הנסיבות האובייקטיביות, ובשל מדיניות ממשלת נתניהו. נטען כי יש דימויים שקשה מאד להסביר, וזהו האפקט השוחק ("הקורוסיבי") של הכיבוש הנמשך – תמונה אחת משפיעה על דעות, וצריך לעשות הכל על מנת למנוע תמונות כאלה. כמו כן התחושה בין ישראלים שאירופה הפכת יותר ויותר מוסלמית איננה מדויקת ויש לעקור אותה. על כל פנים, נטען, הקיפאון המדיני גורם לנזק עצום. ישראל לא עשתה די על מנת לקעקע את עמדת שוללי הלגיטימציה. כעת קיימת הזדמנות לקדם את התהליך המדיני, על מנת לצאת מהגדה המערבית, לעשות עסקה והסכם עם עבאס, פיאד וערקאת, וזה יקעקע לחלוטין את עמדת שוללי הלגיטימציה של ישראל – למעט כמובן הקיצוניים שאותם לא ניתן לרצות, אבל על הציבור האירופי בכללותו תהיה לכך השפעה מרחיקת לכת לטובה. הציבור עייף מהתמונות ומהדימויים שלא ניתן לסתור אותם, ותמונות אלה, אם תימשכנה, תקעקענה את מעמדה של ישראל, כי הציבור מיד מייחס אותן לשליליות של ישראל. צריך לא רק להתעמת עם היריב, אלא צריך גם להתחשב בידידים וליפות את כוחם ("to empower them").

גם דוברים אחרים שללו את הקביעה כי אין זה משנה מה ישראל עושה. אנשים במערב אירופה כן מבינים מה המדיניות של הממשלה בישראל, ויש בעיה עם ממשלה שמצהירה על רצונה בשלום עם הפלסטינים אבל ממשיכה לבנות בהתנחלויות. כמו כן, הנטייה של ממשלות בישראל להעדיף יותר ויותר את השימוש בכוח במקום בדיפלומטיה, שהיא יסוד במדיניות, היא שלילית – לא טוב לדבר בכוח. אנשים באירופה, שלא היו עדים למלחמה מאז מלחמת העולם השנייה, לא מבינים אלימות ושימוש בכוח. נטען כי לא ניתן להצדיק את הכיבוש. וכן, לא צריך להיות מנהל אחד – יש כאן ריבוי דעות, וזה טוב, אסור שיהיה קול אחד; כך בהיסטוריה היהודית תמיד היו הרבה קולות, וגם היום אין מסר אחיד שיכול היה לאחד הקול היהודי בתפוצות.

עוד, ישראל איבדה את הקשר עם הנוער היהודי בתפוצות, אין מכנה משותף כפי שהיה בעבר, כמו הקיבוץ שבו בילו בני נוער יהודים לרוב – וגם בני נוער לא יהודים, בדגש על גרמניה; כיום רק תל-אביב נראית מושכת לנוער התפוצות, כעיר "ללא הפסקה". ועוד, צריך להבחין בין המוסלמים המתונים באירופה לבין הקיצוניים, וצריך לגייס את המוסלמים המתונים מפני שהם מנוף על מנת למתן את הקיצונים. במצרים אנחנו רואים את החשיבות של הערוצים החדשים – טוויטר ופייסבוק – צריך להשקיע בזה, ובטלוויזיית אינטרנט.

מנגד, בדיון הובלט כי התמונה המוצגת, בדבר חוסר היענותה של ישראל לצורך לקדם את התהליך עם הפלסטינים – חד-צדדית, עד מופרכת. שכן, קיימת א-סימטריה יסודית: הפלסטינים מדברים על זכויות היסטוריות, וישראל מדברת על שלום ועל ויתורים. הפלסטינים לא ויתרו על דבר, לא אמרו דבר טוב כלשהו על ישראל מאז 1993. כך קורה שישראל יורה לעצמה ברגל כאשר היא מבליטה שהלגיטימציה שלה נובעת מויתורים, ואילו הפלסטינים שלא ויתרו על דבר קיבלו "פס" (קרי, שחרור) מויתורים. ישראל צריכה להיות ערנית יותר בשפה שבה היא משתמשת, כי פעמים רבות ישראלים משתמשים בשפה כזו עד כי מה לה לישראל כי תלין על אויבותיה? אם מנהיגיה של ישראל עצמם, כולל ראשי ממשלה לשעבר, אומרים דברים כאלה, מה לנו כי נלין על אויבינו? כך לדוגמה, נאום שר הביטחון ברק, בנוכחותו של ראש הממשלה הפלסטיני, בכנס הרצליה הקודם, בדבר הצורך הדחוף להקים



מדינה פלסטינית, וכך בראיונותיו שהעניק ראש הממשלה לשעבר אולמרט בעת פרישתו. כך ישראל עצמה נבלעה ("has been engulfed") על ידי הנרטיבה הפלסטינית, תוך שימוש במונחים כמו "הכיבוש", בלי להבין מה זכויותיה של ישראל. ישראל צריכה "to get its act together", להביא ליותר אחדות בעמדה ולנקוט, משנה זהירות בשימוש הרופף בשפה בעת מלחמה (על דעת הקהל והדה-לגיטימציה).

ישראל נסוגה מלבנון ב-2000, עם תעודת יושר מטעם הקהילה הבינ"ל שהתייצבה על הגבול הבינ"ל המוכר, רק על מנת שכעבור חודשים ספורים החל מסע לחצים עליה להיענות לדרישות חזבאללה לסגת מחוות שבעא. ישראל נסוגה מעזה ב-2005, אבל באירופה עדיין מתייחסים ל"כיבוש" של עזה על ידי ישראל. הטענה שישראל לא עשתה מספיק על מנת להגיע להסכם עם הפלסטינים – מופרכת. ישראל באופן עקבי, תחת ממשלות שונות, עשתה ניסיונות להגיע להסכמים סבירים, וכל המאמצים נדחו על ידי הפלסטינים. ממשלת ברק, ב-2000/1, במו"מ בקמפ דייויד, ובמיוחד בהסכם טאבה, הציעה שתי מדינות כולל בירת המדינה הפלסטינית במזרח ירושלים, וההצעה נדחתה על ידי הפלסטינים. מי שקורא את 1700 המסמכים של ויקיליקס מגלה שהצעת אולמרט ב-2007 הייתה דומה, וגם היא נדחתה. פשוט צריך להבין שהפלסטינים, כמו גם יתר הערבים באזור, מסרבים להכיר בלגיטימיות של ישראל.

## On Criticism & Prejudice - The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Assault on Israel's Legitimacy

Brooke Goldstein

### Introduction: Two Fronts, Shared Implications, Get out of the Arab-Israeli Conflict Vacuum

There are 2 fronts in war on terror/extremism/Islamism/radical Islam, in the war between Israel and the Arabs, in the war between totalitarian dictatorships and democracies, there are two fronts, the violent and the non-violent, and the greatest non-violent threat posed against not just Israel but all democracies is *lawfare*, the use of the law as a weapon of war to, amongst other things, (i) delegitimize the right of democracies to defend themselves against terrorism and (ii) to exert sovereign control over its territory.

And this is especially true for the United States and Israel, for which every act of delegitimization *lawfare* has shared implications.

I will never forget a conversation I had with a colleague in the U.S. military about the Goldstone Report. When the report first came out, everyone was speaking about the legal and political implications it would have for Israel. I complained to my colleague over the telephone about how international law was being deliberately manipulated and misapplied to delegitimize Israel's right to exist as a sovereign state for the Jewish people, with equal rights in the world community.

As I continued, my colleague interrupted me and said "Brooke, you've got it wrong. The Goldstone Report, isn't just about Israel, it's about setting precedents in international law that can and will be used against U.S. and coalition forces fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan," forces which are using the same methods that Israelis are using on the battle field, against the same type of terrorist that engage in asymmetric warfare, the use of human shields and suicide bombings, etc.

And the more I think about it, the more I agree with him!

Because Israel is being used *now* on the legal front, just as it has been used on the physical battlefield, as the canary in the coal miners' tunnel, as a guinea pig and as a legal testing ground, for actions aimed at frustrating and hindering the ability of a democratic state to fight and win the war against terrorism.

The greatest mistake we can make as a legal community and as human beings with an interest in upholding principles of human rights law, is to analyze *lawfare* actions like the Goldstone Report, like the ICJ fence decision, like the flotilla incident, like the BDS movement, in an Israel-centric vacuum.

And the number one impediment, the critical hurdle we face in convincing the world community not to accept *lawfare* aimed at delegitimizing Israel as binding precedent, is the mistaken belief that these standards will only be used against Israel. They won't. And frankly, they are not.

### Examples of Shared Implications:

If immunity can be stripped from, and trumped up "war crimes" charges can be brought against Israeli government officials in England, Spain, Belgium, Switzerland, New Zealand, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Canada, what's stopping the same groups from using the same universal jurisdiction laws and effecting similar prosecutions against democratically elected officials from the U.S., Britain and France?

Nothing. In fact Belgium did attempt to prosecute both former president Bush and former U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair for the war in Iraq, the prosecution only dropped the case when the U.S. threatened to pull NATO headquarters out of Belgium. A Spanish judge, likewise attempted to prosecute six former legal officials in the Bush administration for the "crime" of providing legal advice to the President. Not so long ago, the U.S. Supreme Court broke with precedent and interpreted the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act to deny foreign officials immunity from prosecution for war crimes, potentially opening up the floodgates for politicized prosecution of allied state officials on U.S. soil. And, just a couple days ago, former Pres Bush cancelled a trip to Switzerland after groups reportedly submitted a 'war crimes' complaint to a Swiss court over waterboarding.

If an Israeli border-security fence is illegal under international law, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided in 2004 (while pointedly ignoring the fact that the fence contributed to a sharp decline in the loss of human lives) what effect, will such precedent have on any fence built on the US-Mexican border?

If, according to the UN HRC, boarding a flotilla to search for weapons and other materials being smuggled to specially designated terrorist group Hamas is an "outrageous and grave attack" which requires an "an international independent fact finding mission to investigate violations of international law," what then is the US military's drone program? Would a UN commission or an international court / fact finding mission agree with the ACLU that the targeted killing of terrorists by drone may run afoul of international law?

If the International Criminal Court (ICC) succeeds in erroneously declaring jurisdiction over Israel's Cast Lead Operation in Gaza, despite the fact that Israel has not signed the Rome Treaty, what then would prevent the ICC from declaring jurisdiction over the United States which has

also refused to ratify the treaty out of the very fear that the court would be used as a political tool against it?

There are shared implications for every act of delegitimization targeting Israel using legal processes.

Shouldn't Americans be concerned when we have organizations with 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status operating within the U.S., funding ships carrying construction material and which are aimed at breaking a legal maritime blockade against Hamas, all the while operating in violation of material support for terrorism statutes, yet the American government has thus far turned a blind eye to this activity?

Shouldn't Americans be concerned when people are engaging in BDS against Israeli products are doing so in violation of provisions of the Export Administration Act and state statutes that prohibit commercial discrimination based on race, religion, ethnicity and national origin?

And how about parallel efforts aimed directly at delegitimizing the US and eroding the traditional right of a state to hold enemy combatants for the duration of hostilities? Such as the Al Qaeda manuals that instruct captured militants to file false claims of torture in order to reposition themselves as victims in the eyes of the law and media,

We cannot analyze nor should we fight the delegitimization engine of *lawfare* in an Arab-Israeli conflict vacuum, as the title of this panel suggests. Rather, *lawfare* efforts against Israel must be seen as an interconnected whole played out by parties with an interest in delegitimizing not just Israel but democracies at large and the ability of democracies to defend themselves against terrorism.

If we fail to draw the parallels and point out the shared implication we risk minimizing the threat and losing potential allies to fight against it.

## Negative Effects on the Mainstream:

Now to the point of this panel as I understand it, what have been the effects of the assault on Israel's legitimacy on the mainstream public?

1) Well, why pursue delegitimization through non-violent means in the first place? Because those who are unable to seriously confront let alone defeat Israel militarily, can realize their objectives through legal means. Their strategy, to undermine public support for the IDF's defense measures by making the public believe that those measures are being conducted, in an unfair, inhumane way. Because the troops a democracy, unlike those of a dictatorship, derive their legitimacy and their will to fight from the support of the electorate, which is essential to a democracy's successful military intervention, as well as the perception of such. IDF soldiers are citizen soldiers in every sense of the term. So, the number one effect on the mainstream is an attempt to undermine public support for the IDF, to paint Israel as a perpetrator of war crimes as opposed to a nation engaged in a defensive war to protect its citizens.

This type of delegitimization complements the goal of actually tying the hands of the IDF and constraining the ability of IDF soldiers to fight effectively. As I understand, partially as a response to legal attacks against Israel, the IDF now deploys lawyers within each of its divisional commands to advise officers on the front lines as to which targets they can and can not attack under international law, which isn't necessarily a bad thing but can lead to split second hesitations which may mean the difference between life and death, the difference between capturing a mass murderer or letting him go. And wasn't that the case with the Mavi Marmara where the first wave of troops boarded the vessel wholly unprepared for the attack they faced? This is what *lawfare* does.

2) The second effect on the mainstream has been confusion. When human rights language and terms like 'apartheid,' 'genocide,' 'terrorism,' and 'Nazism' are deliberately misapplied it is done with the goal of diluting their meaning and feeding the inability to distinguish between real instances of human rights violations, and actions done in the defense of human lives, between terrorists that target civilians and the soldiers that fight to protect them. When concepts, like the 'disproportionate use of force,' 'collective punishment' and the unlawful targeting of civilians, are routinely thrown at Israel, but are less examined, if examined at all vis-à-vis the actions of terrorist groups, and the banks and states that sponsor them, it prevents any type of genuine dialogue much less prosecution of states that actually commit these crimes.

When lies are repeated over and over again it becomes the truth. When the NY Times publishes the term illegal settlements hundreds of times, it becomes the truth. When Zionism is equated with Nazism, the goal is historical revisionism, and when Israel is labeled an Apartheid state the desired effect is for history to repeat itself, for Israel to follow in the footsteps of the South African apartheid regime due to economic, political and social isolation. Apartheid is a term that you can look up in the dictionary and which is so obviously non applicable to Israel, but for some reason too a large of majority of the mainstream public is unable to make this distinction.

The effect on the mainstream has been an absence of logic - how could a gay pride parade in Toronto justify distributing T-shirts with slogans equating Israel to Nazi Germany when Israel is the only country in the Middle East that affords its gay citizens with equal protection under the law? Queers for Palestine, is this group not doing gays who are tortured and murdered in Islamist countries and in Gaza a disservice by ignoring their plight and focusing resources and undue attention on Israel? This illogic feeds the BDS movement, which derives its legitimacy from the false premise that Israel is the number one greatest human rights violator on the world stage, which is obviously factually untrue, but no matter, logic does not apply here.

It's no secret that international law isn't really understood in its complexity by the mainstream public, that's why it is particularly susceptible to politicization and why its easy to create a viscous cycle where assertions regarding international law become mainstreamed and then the mainstream public demands to know why these 'laws' aren't being enforced.

The goal is to effect confusion, revisionism, to make misinformation mainstream, to create a new language and to shift attention away from the real human rights violators and onto Israel, to put Israel on the defense, to make us waste time parsing line after line of the Goldstone Report when the UN could be producing a report on the genocide occurring in Sudan or the persecution of Christian minorities in Muslim majority countries.

3) The third major effect of delegitimization *lawfare* against Israel has been to erode respect for due process, the sanctity of human rights law and to undermine the western legal system itself all the while complementing terrorist actions. It's an attack on the rule of law itself, even though its proponents publicly claim to be looking to strengthen the rule of law.

When over 100 U.N. Resolutions are issued to condemn Israel, yet not one Resolution is even offered to criminalize the murder of innocent Muslim children as suicide bombers, we are sending the green light to terrorists that they may continue their actions with impunity.

What kind of credibility do we give a UN HRC that is being manipulated by the OIC, a 57 member-voting block that is currently lobbying to exclude the targeting of American and Israeli civilians from any international definition of the crime of terrorism? Which by the way, is the same group that has successfully lobbied the UN pass resolutions which attempt to ban the blasphemy of Islam as a crime against humanity every year for over a decade.

What kind of credibility do we give the ICJ which took the security barrier case regardless of the fact that it did not have jurisdiction over the PA which is not a state or Israel which did not consent to Jurisdiction, and which solicited testimony from the OIC, the Arab League and PLO but refused testimony from Israeli terror victims? Not to mention the fact that the ruling was an advisory opinion, a fact that is all too often ignored.

What kind of credibility do we give a U.N. that elects Saudi Arabia to a four-year seat on its Commission on the Status of Women?

What kind of impression is given when little to no legal accountability is demanded of Hezbollah and Hamas, and their agents remain relatively free to cross European borders, while at the same time Tzipi Livni and Dutch politician Geert Wilders are threatened with arrest if they travel to England? Does this not evidence bias in the application of the law if not a complete disregard for the concept of equality before the law?

In general, when international law is interpreted to prove an inadequate guarantor of the basic right to self-defense and the bodies tasked with applying the law are controlled by groups with a special interest in demonizing Israel, the mainstream perception of international law and its organs becomes one of distrust, contempt and, ultimately, indifference. This outcome is *not* in the interests of any democracy.

## Positive Effects on the Mainstream

Legal challenges to Israel's legitimacy have also had some positive effects.

It has prompted some to call for changes and updates in the substance of international law when it comes to the law of armed conflict, which has not evolved in my opinion, as quickly as asymmetric warfare tactics have. Some have been asking publicly whether a U.N. voting bloc comprised largely of non-democratic member should indeed have the power to dictate customary norms of international law. A robust debate has begun about what legal limits should be placed on those who fight the war against terrorism and what rights we should be granting the terrorists we are fighting.

*lawfare* has prompted the UK to consider changing its domestic laws concerning who can file an arrest warrant for foreign officials. We are seeing calls for an international standard of due process, for accountability and transparency when it comes to NGOs who have crowned themselves the arbiters of human rights law but are receiving foreign funding with political strings attached and often from states who themselves engage in massive HR violations.

## How to Distinguish Between Criticism and Prejudice

Lastly, how do we distinguish between criticism and prejudice? How do we distinguish between that which constitutes a constructive, legitimate legal battle from that which is a counterproductive perversion of the law?

I don't think there is any clear formula for drawing a straight line - The delineation is not as simple as - lawsuits against terrorists are good, and legal actions against the U.S. and Israel are bad.

Examples of *lawfare* aimed at delegitimizing Israel must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and the question should be one of mens rea, intent. The question is not 'Who is the target?' but 'What is the intention?' behind the legal action: Is it to pursue justice, to apply the law in the interests of freedom and democracy, or is the intent to undermine the very system of laws being manipulated? What are the intentions of the party behind the action? Are they exhibiting bias in the application of the law? Is there an ulterior motive?

And finally, does the action fall within a greater *lawfare* strategy to attack not just Israel but to challenge the legitimate rights of a democracy to defend itself and exert control over its territory.

## עקרונות לתוכנית לחיזוק הריבונות בירושלים

דני תרזה ואודי דקל

### הגדרת הבעיה

1. לאורך השנים, מאז איחוד ירושלים ביוני 1967, התפתח פער משמעותי בין השליטה הישראלית בירושלים לבין אי ההכרה בריבונות ישראל בה. פער זה בא לביטוי בהיבטים הבאים:
  - א. משלות ישראל מאז 67' יצרו בפועל פער בין גיבוש הדימוי של ירושלים המאוחדת כבירת העם היהודי, לבין הנחישות לממש יעד זה ולהקצות את המשאבים הנדרשים.
  - ב. ממשלות ישראל ועיריות ירושלים יצרו פער עצום, בהשקעה, במשאבים ובאיכות חיים, בין ירושלים המערבית והשכונות היהודיות החדשות, לבין מזרח העיר. פער זה מבליט את הניגוד מההכרזות על ירושלים מאוחדת, מחליש את התביעה לריבונות בכל חלקי העיר ומשדר כי בפועל ישראל אינה מעוניינת במרבית חלקי ירושלים המזרחית.
  - ג. ישראל אינה חופשית לעשות בירושלים כרצונה. השליטה בפועל אינה מבטאת הכרה בינלאומית בריבונות ישראל בירושלים ואף בלגיטימיות התביעה הישראלית לשליטה בירושלים.
  - ד. לאורך השנים, עיריות ירושלים מיקדו את השקעת המשאבים ופעילותן במתן שירותים מוניציפאליים וציפו כי הממשלה תשקיע משאבים בחיזוק ובבניית ירושלים כבירה. נוצר פער הולך וגדל בין מערב העיר למזרחה, אשר מדגיש גם את חוסר היכולת של השלטונות לשאת בנטל המשימות ואת אובדן השליטה, שכה חיונית להפגנת ולחיזוק הריבונות בירושלים.
  - ה. בקרב אזרחי ישראל קיים פער תודעתי פנימי ביחס לירושלים. הציבור הישראלי, ברובו, מגלה יחס רגשי עמוק לנושא ירושלים ולחיבור שבין הזהות היהודית לירושלים. מאידך, ירושלים נתפסת כמכלול של בעיות ונטל יותר מנכס ובכך מאבדת את מעמדה בקונצנזוס הישראלי.
2. תכלית העבודה: ביסוס וחיזוק הריבונות הישראלית באזורים בעלי אינטרס בירושלים על מנת:
  - א. למצב את מעמדה של העיר כבירת ישראל.
  - ב. לחזק את עמדות ותביעות ישראל לקראת הסדר מדיני עתידי.
  - ג. להגביר את השליטה והיציבות למצב של העדר הסדר מדיני, כולל הידרדרות למצב משבר.
3. קיימות מספר מגמות ארוכות הטווח אשר נדרש לפעול לקידומן ולחיזוקן:
  - א. ביטחון, יציבות ושגשוג בירושלים.
  - ב. עיגון ההכרה בזיקה ההיסטורית והדתית של העם היהודי לירושלים, כלפי פנים וכלפי חוץ.
  - ג. ירושלים כנכס לאזרחי ישראל ובסיס חיוני לאחדות העם היהודי ולזהות היהודית הלאומית והדתית.
  - ד. הבלטת השליטה הישראלית באזורי אינטרס מועדף, באמצעות שיפור משמעותי בתנאים הפיזיים והתרבותיים גם של האוכלוסייה הערבית.
  - ה. חיזוק ירושלים כמרכז תרבותי ודתי לכל הדתות, תוך שמירת חופש הפולחן. בתוך כך, חיזוק הדימוי שרק ישראל יכולה לספק ולהבטיח את חופש הפולחן לכל הדתות והעדות.
    - ו. חתירה להכרה בינלאומית בירושלים כבירת ישראל.
    - ז. סימון מעגלי אינטרס, חיזוק הריבונות הישראלית במעגלים בעלי אינטרס גבוה.
    - ח. ירושלים כמנוף לשיתוף פעולה נרחב – פנימי, אזורי ובינלאומי.

### תמצית ההמלצות

4. הרעיון האסטרטגי שאנו מציעים נשען על ארבע רגליים עם זיקות הדוקות וחיוניות ביניהן:
  - א. דגש ממשלתי מובלט בנושא ירושלים הכולל:
    01. אחריות משרד ראש הממשלה לנושא ירושלים. במסגרת זאת, הקמת רשות לנושא ירושלים במשרד ראש הממשלה, (ניתן על בסיס הרשות לפיתוח ירושלים) ואף מינוי שר במשרד ראש הממשלה.
    02. הקמת ועדת שרים לנושא ירושלים בראשות ראש הממשלה.
    03. הקמת ועדת מנכ"לים לעניין ירושלים בראשות מנכ"ל ראש הממשלה.
    04. הקצאת תקציב רב-שנתי לחיזוק הריבונות בירושלים.

- ב. סימון מעגלי השפעה בירושלים, בהתאם לאזורי אינטרס - חיוני, חשוב, רצוי, ולא נדרש – מיקוד העשייה, בכל המימדים, בהתאם לאזורי האינטרס.
- ג. הקניית מעמד מיוחד לאזור העיר העתיקה ואגן ירושלים הקדומה (דומה לאגן ההיסטורי). הפיכתו לפארק לאומי, אתר מורשת עולמי, מעין MALL הכולל מקומות קדושים, אתרי מורשת יהודית וישראלית, מרכזי תיירות ומבקרים, גנים, אנדרטאות, טיילת המחברת את העיר העתיקה עם הר הזיתים, עיר דויד ור הצופים.
- ד. שיפור השירותים המוניציפאליים והתשתיות במזרח ירושלים ושיפור בולט באיכות החיים בשכונות הערביות, בהתאם לאזורי אינטרס. נכונות ל"הלבין" (מצב אפס) בנייה ישנה, בהתניית התאמת תושבות למקום מגורים והסדרת הגבייה. ממצב אפס הידוק הפיקוח על בנייה לא חוקית. שיתוף האוכלוסייה הערבית בניהול חייהם: במנהלות שכונתיות, בהשתתפות בהחלטות, בהקמת יחידות שיטור קהילתיות. השקעה בהקמת מוסדות חינוך ותרבות וחיזוק המצב הכלכלי במזרח ירושלים.

5. מתכונת העבודה:

- א. גיבשו תהליך תכנון אסטרטגי אשר כלל את השלבים הבאים:
01. הגדרת הבעיה
  02. איסוף ולימוד, על בסיס עבודות קודמות ועמדות של גופים בסוגיות השונות.
  03. ניתוח מעמיק של המצב והאתגרים העומדים בפנינו בחיזוק הריבונות בירושלים.
  04. ניתוח האינטרסים של הגורמים והשחקנים המעורבים בנושא ירושלים.
  05. בחינת חלופות שונות לחיזוק הריבונות, בהינתן תרחישים של (1) הסדר מדיני, (2) צעדים חד-צדדיים, כולל הסלמה והידרדרות, (3) המשך הקיפאון המדיני.
  06. גיבוש 'סל כלים' וצעדים אפשריים לחיזוק הריבונות, בתחומים הממשלתיים, הארגוניים, המוניציפאליים, האזרחיים, הפיזיים, התדמיתיים והתודעתיים, המשפטיים, הדת ועוד.
  07. בחינת השלכות לצעדי יישום ולמימוש 'סל הכלים' וסימון האמצעים היותר אפקטיביים.
  08. גיבוש רשימת הצעדים בעלי היתכנות יישום ובחינה כללית של העלויות הצפויות.
  09. הצעת סדר עדיפויות בביצוע.
- ב. נפגשו עם שורה של מומחים בתחום, בדגש על ראש עיריית ירושלים, יועצי ענייני ערבים בעירייה, מנכ"ל משרד ראש הממשלה לשעבר, מנכ"ל העירייה לשעבר, ראש הרשות לפיתוח ירושלים לשעבר, מומחי מכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל, מנכ"ל פמ" ושורה ארוכה של אנשים נוספים שירושלים יקרה להם.

בברכה ובהצלחה ביישום,

דני תרזה ואודי דקל

## האתגרים בירושלים תחומי ירושלים – טריטוריה ואוכלוסיה



6. תיחום ירושלים:

- א. הגבול המוניציפאלי נקבע ביוני 1967 בסמוך לסיום מלחמת ששת הימים.
- ב. הגבול המוניציפאלי מבטא את המרחב בו חלות סמכויות העירייה בפועל: לחוקק חוקי עזר, לגבות מיסים, לספק שירותים וכן אחריות לתכנון הפיזי (שימושי קרקע).
- ג. קיים תחום תודעתי – התנהגותי של תושבי העיר והמתייחסים אליה, אשר אינו מתוחם בקו ברור ואחיד.
- ד. גדר הביטחון מהווה בפועל, מאז הקמתה, תיחום פיזי של גבולות העיר.
7. בנובמבר 1948 נקבעו קווי הפסקת האש, אשר היו בפועל צילום עמדות הצדדים.



- א. קווי הפסקת האש עודכנו בהסכם שביתת הנשק 1949. הסדרי שביתת הנשק לא היו אמורים להיות "סוף פסוק" באשר לעתיד מעמדה וגבולותיה של ירושלים, אלא לייצב מצב לאחר המלחמה. במסגרת זו נקבעו שטחים מיוחדים:
01. שטח הפקר - בין קו עמדות ירדנית וקו עמדות ישראל.
  02. שטחים מפורזים – הפחתת הריבונות ע"י הסכמה לאיסור נוכחות כוחות צבא.
  03. מעמד מיוחד של ארמון הנציב נועד לסמל את רצון האו"ם לשמר ריבונותו בעיר.

04. בין 1949 ל-1967 נערכו שינויים מוסכמים בקווים כדי לאפשר שיגרת חיים תקינה לתושבים משני עברי הקו. עיקרם, חלוקת שטחי ההפקר בין הצדדים.
- ב. הגבולות המוניציפאליים של שתי העיריות שונו מספר פעמים עד ל-1967.
01. ערב מלחמת ששת הימים היה שטח ירושלים הישראלית כ-38 קמ"ר.
02. השטח המוניציפאלי של ירושלים הירדנית היה כ-6 קמ"ר בלבד. גבול התכנון של העיר בשליטה ירדנית השתרע משדה תעופה עטרות בצפון, דרך ג'בעה ועין פרה במזרח, עד לעזריה, אבו דיס וצור באחר.
8. מאז '67 תחומי העיר שונו מספר פעמים, זאת בעיקר במערכה של העיר, אך גם בחלקה המזרחי וכיום הוא משתרע על 126.4 קמ"ר.
- א. האוכלוסייה בירושלים מונה - 753,100 איש, כ-66% יהודים. (נתוני 2008).
- ב. בשטחים מעבר לקו שביתת הנשק כ-434,000 איש, 56% ערבים, 44% יהודים.
- ג. נתונים מעודכנים למספר ערבים בתחומי ירושלים:
01. ע"פי הלשכה 303,000.
02. ע"פי הלמ"ס הפלסטיני 273,000.
9. לסיכום, קיימת מגמה קבועה של גידול בחלקה של האוכלוסייה הערבית ביחס לאוכלוסייה היהודית. בנוסף, נוצר חוסר תאימות בין התחום המוניציפאלי לבין תחום הגדר, אשר גורם לבעיה במתן שירותים לתושבי העיר שנותרו מעבר לגדר.



10. הגדרה מחודשת של התחום התודעתי של ירושלים, עשויה לשרת את המטרה של חיזוק הריבונות והקצאה ממוקדת של המשאבים.

### ערביי ירושלים – מעמדם ומגמות דמוגרפיות

- מאז 1967 הוענק לתושבי מזרח ירושלים מעמד של "תושבי קבע" המקנה זכות להצביע בבחירות לעיריית ירושלים וזכות להיבחר. נושאי תעודה זו נהנים מכל הזכויות הסוציאליות המוענקות לאזרחי ישראל. עיקרן, קצבאות הביטוח הלאומי וביטוח בריאות ממלכתי. הם זכאים לשירותים ממלכתיים ועירוניים ככל אזרח תושב ירושלים. הם גם רשאים לנוע בחופשיות בישראל, יש להם חופש גישה לשוק התעסוקה בירושלים ובכלל ישראל. עם זאת, הם אינם רשאים לשאת דרכן ישראלי ולהצביע לכנסת.
- בשל המחסור בקרקע זמינה, בעשורים האחרונים חלה עליה בבנייה הערבית בישובים הסמוכים לירושלים ולא בעיר עצמה. הישובים סביב ירושלים משכו אליהם תושבים שעזבו את ירושלים וחיפשו פיתרונות דיור זולים מחוץ לעיר הגדולה. מגמה זו תרמה להתרחבות ולהתעצמות המטרופולין הערבית סביב ירושלים.
- ערביי ירושלים, שעזבו את העיר, שמרו על זיקות חזקות כלפיה, בדגש לתחום התעסוקה, לתחום השירותים, כולל שירותי חינוך, רווחה ובריאות.
- עם הקמת הגדר הביטחונית, התחזקה זיקתם של הערבים, שעברו אל מחוץ לעיר, אל העיר עצמה ואל מוסדותיה, זאת בשל החשש שיפגעו זכויותיהם כתושבי קבע. הדבר גרם לזרם הגירה חוזרת, נסקו מחירי הדיור במזרח ירושלים וגברה מאד הבניה הבלתי חוקית. ניתן לקבוע כי הקשר של הערבים שעוזבים את ירושלים הוא חזק בהרבה מהקשר של היהודים שעוזבים אותה.
- ערביי ירושלים חשים סולידריות עם בני עמם בגדה ובעזה. הם מזדהים עםם פוליטית וחברתית וחשים שונים מערביי ישראל. עם זאת, אורחות חייהם במזרח ירושלים שונים מאלה שבגדה ובעזה. רמת הביטחון האישי במזרח ירושלים גבוהה בהשוואה לביטחון האישי בשטחי הרש"פ ובעזה. בנוסף, הם נהנים מתחושת חופש, שאינה קיימת בשטחים.
- בסקרים אחרונים ובפגישות לא רשמיות עם תושבי מזרח ירושלים הערביים עולה, באופן מובהק, שמרביתם מעדיפים להישאר בתחומי ישראל, במצב של הסדר מדיני הכולל את חלוקת העיר. נתון נוסף מעניין העולה מסקר של מכון פכטר האמריקני הוא ש-40% יעדיפו לעבור לצד הישראלי אם ביתם יקבע בחלק הפלסטיני, (לעומת 27% שיעדיפו לעבור מהצד הישראלי לצד הפלסטיני). עוד עולה בסקר

כי 44% מהתושבים הערביים מרוצים מהחיים בירושלים, 31% אינם מרוצים והשאר אדישים. הגורמים העיקריים המשפיעים על עמדות החיוביות של התושבים הערביים ביחס למצב הקיים הם תחושת החופש, חופש התנועה, הכנסה יחסית גבוהה, אפשרויות שוק העבודה וביטוח לאומי. מנגד, עומדות השאיפות הלאומיות והשפעות הדת.

7. התחזיות הדמוגרפיות מעריכות כי אחוז תושבי ירושלים הערביים יגיע לשיעור של 40% בשנת 2020 בהנחה שימשיכו להתקיים המגמות הנוכחיות. חלקם של אזורים, בעלי רוב מוסלמי ומעמד חברתי נמוך, צפוי לגדול מ- 24.6% בשנת 2000 למעל מ- 30% בשנת 2020.

8. שאלות דמוגרפיות אינן מתמצות במספר התושבים. הרעיון של הרחבת ירושלים בעיקר מערבה, ישפיע באופן מוגבל על המגמות המסתמנות. ירושלים "גדולה" אינה מצביעה בהכרח על חוסנה של העיר והיחס המספרי בין יהודים לערבים אינו חזות הכול (כל עוד מרבית האוכלוסייה הערבית אינה משתתפת בבחירות המוניציפאליות).

9. ייחודיותה של ירושלים, לכל תושביה, נעוץ במגוון תושביה, ביכולתם להנחיל רב-קיום והמרקם המיוחד בפסיפס שכונותיה. מומלץ ליזום פרויקטי דיור לאוכלוסייה הערבית בתוך ומחוץ לאזורי האינטרס המועדף. בד בבד, נדרש ליזום תמריצי דיור ותעסוקה לאוכלוסייה היהודית החילונית, כדי לבלום את עזיבת המעמד הבינוני וכדי להגדיל את כוח המשיכה של ירושלים לצעירים יהודים.

## העולם היהודי וסוגיית ירושלים

10. מאז חורבן בית שני ועד למחצית השנייה של המאה ה-19, לא היה רוב יהודי בקרב תושבי ירושלים. ריבונות יהודית ישראלית רשמית ומעשית, מתקיימת בירושלים מ- 1948.

11. בעקבות מלחמת ששת הימים מתקיימת למעשה ריבונות יהודית-ישראלית על ירושלים, אך ריבונות זו אינה מוכרת ע"י אומות העולם.

12. לעם היהודי זיקה דתית, היסטורית, תרבותית ולאומית לירושלים. קיימת שאיפה לעגן את הריבונות דרך הזיקה היהודית. לשם כך, המדינה הלאומית הריבונית היא מכשיר להסדרת החיים החברתיים, הכלכליים והביטחוניים, להגשמת ערכים ולביטוי לתכנים תרבותיים.

13. בעבר עלו רעיונות להכריז על ריבונות לעם היהודי בירושלים, אולם נמצא כי רעיון זה אינו יישומי לאור ההיבטים המורכבים, העומדים בניגוד זה לזה:

- א. במבחן המעשי, אין ממש לטעונו שהעם היהודי הוא הריבון על המקומות הקדושים גם ליהדות.
- ב. הזיקה היהודית לארץ ישראל ומושג קדושת הארץ, דווקא הובילו בעבר לדיון על שלטון, בכך שמצאו ביטוי בשאיפה לחזור לארץ וליישובה. חשובה התפיסה הכורכת את מצוות יישוב הארץ עם השליטה עליה, כך מתחברים בתודעת האנשים מושגים של קדושת הארץ ובראשה ירושלים, עם מצוות יישוב הארץ, קיום מצוות ארץ ישראל וכינון שלטון יהודי.
- ג. עם הקמת מדינת ישראל, חוגים מסויימים חיברו בין מושגים מתחום השלטון עם המושגים ההלכתיים הדתיים. הרב אברהם יצחק הכהן קוק גרס כי "אין אנו בעלים לוותר על זכויות" כלומר זכויות שהעם תובע מכוח תודעתו ההיסטורית, הדתית והתרבותית.
- ד. שילוב מושגי ריבונות עם ערכים דתיים, ממלכד את הדיון במסגרת נוקשה של כללי דיון מעין הלכתיים, למרות שבעולם ההלכה אין תקדימים לדיון בריבונות.
- ה. התמורות העולמיות מחזקות את היחס האינסטרומנטלי כלפי הריבונות על פני היחס הרגשי/אמוציונאלי.
- ו. הר הבית – סמל דתי של השראת השכינה בעם ישראל. הוא סמל דתי יהודי ומהות קדושתו אוסרת לראות בו כלי שרת לצורכי בני האדם. על אף היות המקום שיא השאיפה של העם היהודי, המימוש ואף הביקור במקום נתונים במחלוקת.
14. ירושלים משובצת במקומות קדושים (או מקודשים). מקום קדוש או מקודש הוא:
  - מקומות שבני אדם מייחסים להם תכונות מיוחדות שאינן קיימות במקומות אחרים.
  - מקומות שהתרחשו בהם אירועים מיוחדים.
  - מקומות כלפיהן קיימות אמונות ותודעת האנשים לייחודיות המקום.
  - מקומות עם מעמד פורמאלי, תוקף חוקי למעמדם המיוחד.
15. אין כללים וחוקים להכרזה על מקום קדוש. עם זאת קיימות תקנות לשמירת מקומות קדושים (1981). הרשימה כוללת בירושלים את: הכותל המערבי, מערת שמעון הצדיק, מערת הסנהדרין הקטנה (ואדי ג'וז), קבר רבי עובדיה מברטנורה (נחל קידרון), קבר זכריה ויד אבשלום. (אף לא אתר אחד הוכרז בתחומי העיר המערבית, כולל קבר דוד בהר ציון). מהרשימה נעדר הר הבית.
16. אתרים נוספים הקדושים לעם היהודי:
  - הר הזיתים (בית הקברות 3000 שנה, כולל קבר חולדה הנביאה, קברי הנביאים חגי ומלאכי).
  - הר ציון עם קבר דוד המלך.

17. אתרים נוספים בטיפול המרכז הארצי לפיתוח מקומות קדושים (יהודים בלבד): קבר דוד המלך, מערת הסנהדרין הגדולה (בסנהדריה), מערת הרמב"ן (סמוך למערת שמעון הצדיק), מערת קברי המלכים, מערת בית חזיר, מערת ירמיהו (חצר המטרה מצפון לשער שכם), מערת יהושפט (נחל קידרון), מעיין הגיחון ובריכת השילוח.



## העולם הנוצרי וסוגיית ירושלים


18. בתודעה הדתית הנוצרית ירושלים היא העיר בה פעל משיחם – ישו.
19. בזמן הקיסר קונסטנטין הגדול (ראשית המאה הרביעית לספירה), הפכה ירושלים מוקד פעולה נוצרית ממלכתית. מאמינים זרמו לירושלים כדי להדבק בקדושתה וכספים רבים הושקעו בה. השליטה הנוצרית בירושלים נמשכה כשלוש מאות שנים, עד שהעיר נפלה לידי הצבאות הערביים המוסלמיים במאה השביעית.
20. הקשר הנוצרי לירושלים לא נעלם והצורך לשחרר את הקבר הקדוש מידי המוסלמים, הביא למסעי הצלב החל מהמאה ה-11 וכיבוש ירושלים ביולי 1099. כמאה שנים שלטו הנוצרים בעיר והקימו בארץ ישראל את "ממלכת ירושלים הצלבנית" שבירתה ירושלים.
21. בשנת 1187 נפלה ירושלים לידי המנהיג המוסלמי צלאח א-דין. עד המאה ה-19 שלטו המוסלמים בעיר. הנוצרים האירופיים עזבו את העיר ונתרו מעט נזירים ונוצרים אשר היו בני חסות של השלטון המוסלמי.
22. מאז ראשית המאה ה-16 הורשו הנוצרים לחזור לעיר ולבנות מחדש מבנים נוצריים. במשך המאה ה-19 ועד למלחמת העולם הראשונה, גברה ההשפעה הנוצרית בעיר, אתרים נוצריים הוחזרו לידי מוסדות דת נוצריים, נבנו כנסיות, מנזרים, בתי חולים, אכסניות, בתי ספר ועוד מוסדות מגוונים.
23. כיבוש א"י ע"י הבריטים החזיר לזמן קצר את השליטה הנוצרית בירושלים. ככלל העולם הנוצרי (כמו המוסלמי) לא ראה בירושלים את מרכזו הדתי, (ולהוציא את התקופה הצלבנית), גם לא מרכז מדיני פוליטי. לפיכך, אין תביעה נוצרית לריבונות בירושלים.
24. היחס הנוצרי לשליטה הישראלית בעיר:
  - א. השליטה היהודית בירושלים מהווה בעיה דתית לנוצרים, לאור אמונתם כי הם יורשי היהדות. הדוקטרינה הנוצרית רואה ביהודים כופרים וטועים. העם היהודי איבד מעמדו כעם בחירה והברית שנכרת בינו לבין אלוהים התבטלה. עם זאת, רק חוגים קיצוניים ומיעוט דורשים למנוע מעם ישראל ומהיהודים מעמד רשמי בירושלים בכלל ובמקומות הקדושים לנצרות בפרט.
  - ב. באופן בלתי רשמי, מעדיפות מרבית העדות הנוצריות את השליטה הישראלית בירושלים ובתוך כך במקומות הקדושים. זאת, בשל הניסיון החיובי וחופש הפולחן תחת השלטון הישראלי בירושלים. לשלטון הישראלי תפקיד חשוב בשמירת האיזונים בין העדות הנוצריות השונות.

## איחוד העיר

25. במונח "מזרח ירושלים" רואה רוב הציבור הישראלי לנגד עיניו את העיר עתיקה וסביבתה ולא את הכפרים הערביים שסופחו לירושלים, כמו צור בהר, מחנה פליטים שועפאת, עיסוויה, אום טובה ועוד. העיר העתיקה וסביבתה, בעיקר עיר דויד והר הזיתים, נתפסים אצל רוב הציבור הישראלי כאזור החשוב ביותר לעם היהודי באשר הוא ויש לחזק דימוי זה.
26. איחוד העיר לא הצליח להתגבר על הפער בין מזרח העיר למערבה. איחוד העיר העמיס על עיריית ירושלים ועל הממשלה נטל כבד של שירותים עירוניים ותשלומי העברה לאוכלוסיות עניות. נראה כי העירייה מוגבלת ביכולותיה לשלוט בכל המרחב ולספק את השירותים הדרושים לכלל אוכלוסיות העיר. כתוצאה מהאיחוד נוספה לעיר אוכלוסייה ענייה גדולה, מרובת ילדים ופחות יצרנית, דבר נוסף שהבליט את הפערים וגרם לפגיעה מעמיקה בכלכלת העיר. גם לאור זאת יש לבחון את סוגיית הריבונות.

## היבטים משפטיים

27. על פי המשפט הבינלאומי לא קיים סיפוח חד צדדי. העברת טריטוריה מריבונות אחת לאחרת, נעשית רק על בסיס כללים מוכרים במשפט הבינלאומי, אז היא מקבלת הכרה. הרחבת שטח מוניציפאלי של עיר הוא תהליך כלל עולמי ואינו ייחודי לירושלים, אך אינו מקבל גושפנקא חוקית במשפט הבינ"ל.
28. מבחינה משפטית ניתן להדגיש טיעונים לחיזוק התביעה הישראלית לריבונות בירושלים:
  - א. לריבונות דה-פקטו יש השפעה ומשקל על מרכיבי ההסדרה.
  - ב. לא הייתה ריבונות מוכרת בירושלים המזרחית ערב יוני 1967.
  - ג. השלטון הירדני בירושלים עמד בניגוד להחלטת החלוקה.
  - ד. אין כיום מדינה שהזכות והסמכויות שלה משתוות לזו של ישראל בירושלים.
  - ה. לישראל הזכות להגנה עצמית על תושביה בירושלים ובסביבתה.
29. סוגיית מעמדם של התושבים הערבים של ירושלים. בהינתן התנאים הנוכחיים, על ישראל לשפר את השירותים המוענקים לתושביה הערביים של ירושלים ואף לקיים הפלייה חיובית לתיקון ההזנחה של שנים רבות. בהינתן הסדר מדיני, האופציה העדיפה היא העברת האוכלוסייה הערבית, המתגוררת מחוץ לאזור האינטרס המועדף, למעמד של אזרחי פלסטין, בהתאם לשטח שיועבר לשליטת הפלסטינים. (בנושא זה אנו מאמצים את ההמלצות של עבודת מכון ירושלים).



## היבטים ביטחוניים

30. לירושלים מעמד ייחודי גם בנושא הביטחוני: ב-1991 הוחלט במשטרה להפוך את ירושלים למחוז עצמאי, בין השאר כדי להימנע מהפעלת כוחות צבא בירושלים. במסגרת זאת, הוכפפו למחוז ירושלים יחידות מג"ב, עקב הצורך ביחידות משטרתיות בעלות יכולות לחימה משופרות בהשוואה למשטרה הכחולה. בתחילת שנות האלפיים הוקמה יחידת מג"ב ייעודית, שתפקידה לטפל ב"עוטף ירושלים" ובכלל זה הכניסות לירושלים מתחום איו"ש.

31. לאור האתגרים הביטחוניים, אשר מעבר לחוק וסדר, ובעיקר למניעת פיגועי הטרור, פוטנציאל להתנגשויות בין יהודים לערבים, חתרנות ומעורבות גורמים פלסטיניים בענייני העיר, הוקם צוות יעודי המורכב מנציגי שב"כ, המשטרה, צה"ל, המשרד לענייני דתות, משרד החוץ, משרד המשפטים, משרד הפנים ועריית ירושלים, שתכליתו עיסוק ותאום בין הגורמים בענייני ביטחון בירושלים.

32. בשנת 2002 לאחר גל פיגועי הטרור וההתאבדות בירושלים, החליטה הממשלה על הקמת גדר הביטחון ב"מרחב התפר" ו"בעוטף ירושלים" ותחילת יישום שלב א' של הגדר. הממשלה הדגישה כי אינה רואה בגדר גבול מדיני, או אחר, אלא אמצעי ביטחון בלבד. עם זאת, בהקמת הגדר ניתן משקל רב לתחום המוניציפאלי של ירושלים והוחלט שלא להוציא מעבר לגדר את מרבית השכונות הערביות, גם כאשר הזיקה העיקרית שלהם היא לרשות הפלסטינית. ב-2005 החליטה הממשלה על הקמת "מנהל קהילתי עוטף ירושלים" לטיפול בתושבי השכונות שבשטחה המוניציפאלי של ירושלים ובכל זאת הוצאו מעבר לגדר הביטחוני. הממשלה הדגישה את הצורך להסדיר אכיפה של הסדר במעברים, עם אפשרויות לאשר מעבר רגלי ורכוב.



33. בשנים האחרונות התייצב המצב הביטחוני בירושלים, בעקבות נטרול תשתיות הטרור ביהודה ובשומרון ושינוי במדיניות של הרשות הפלסטינית. עם זאת, דווקא פיגועי הטרור האחרונים בירושלים נעשו ע"י מפגעים מקרב התושבים הערביים שבעיר. יש הגורסים כי הדבר מבטא רגשות תסכול של התושבים הערביים וההשפעה הגוברת של גורמים אסלאמיים קיצוניים בקרב האוכלוסייה הערבית תוך ירושלים.

## סוגיית ההסברה

34. ההסברה אינה גוברת על ההיבטים המשפטיים ואינה עומדת בפני עצמה, אלא מהווה מאמץ תומך בתחום המדיני והתודעתי, אשר מטרתו חיזוק ההכרה בריבונות הישראלית בירושלים.
35. לאורך השנים עולה חולשה ישראלית בהסברה, אשר באה לביטוי:
- לא עושים מספיק. קיימת אוזלת יד מתמשכת לעניין ההסברה, הנובעת, בין השאר, מהעדר סנכרון ואחידות בין הגופים והמשרדים השונים העוסקים בהסברה, במסרים אסטרטגיים ובדוברות.
  - אין לנו "סיפור מספיק טוב".
  - העדר קונצנזוס פנימי בשאלת ירושלים, מקשה על גיבוש נרטיב לאומי המשותף למרבית האוכלוסייה ואף למרבית המפלגות הציוניות בכנסת.
  - דעת הקהילה הבינלאומית נחרצת, בעיקר נגד צעדים חד-צדדיים ומושפעת מהקשר אזורי רחב יותר.
  - איננו מבליטים ואיננו מדגישים את הזיקה ההיסטורית של העם היהודי לאותם חלקים בעיר.

## ההיבט הדתי - לאומי

36. בתפיסת הצדדים את ירושלים חוברים ההיבט הלאומי וההיבט הדתי.
37. העולם היהודי מצד אחד והמוסלמי מצד שני מציבים תביעות לריבונות. המוסלמים מבטלים את הזיקה של היהודים לירושלים. לישראל אינה נוהגת באופן דומה.
38. העולם הנוצרי אינו מציב תביעות לריבונות על ירושלים, אך תובע הסדרים מיוחדים וחופש פולחן באתרים הקדושים לו בעיר.
39. האסלאם אינו מקבל כי במקום קדוש לאסלאם תהא שותפות עם דת אחרת. כבר משנת 1967 התגבשה שליטה דה-פקטו של הווקף בהר הבית, מעבר למסגד אל אקצה, בכל מתחם חראם א-שריף.
40. "המשרד לענייני ירושלים" של הרש"פ רוכש השפעה, תקציבים ומעמד. במקביל, מתחזקים מערכי תאום לסוגיית ירושלים בין הרש"פ לערביי ישראל, בין האחים המוסלמים לחמא"ס.
41. כלפי העולם המערבית היהודית משרדת דבר והיפוכו, אם אסור ליהודי לעלות להר הבית, אז מדוע ישראל אינה מוכנה לוותר על ריבונות בשטח זה.

## תובנות בנוגע להסדרה בירושלים

42. להבנתנו, לא יהא הסכם, קבע או זמני, בין ישראל לפלסטינים, ללא הסכמה בנושא ירושלים.
43. לכל צד חיוני לשמר את האופי הייחודי שלו בהיבט הלאומי-דתי ובהקשר זה את המעמד המיוחד שמוענק לירושלים. כמו כן, לא ברור אם ניתן להגיע להגדרה רחבה על אופייה האוניברסאלי של ירושלים.
44. גם אם ניתן לקדם את הדיון על עקרונות להסדרה בירושלים, בשלב הירידה לפרטים מתעצמות המחלוקות, כך שלא ניתן לדלג על שלב המפנות וקביעת הגבול המדויק.
45. גבול מדיני יכול להיות שונה מגבולות של תחומים והיבטים אחרים, כגון: כלכלי, שטחי עיבוד, מסחר, מרחב אווירי ועוד.
46. שלוש אפשרויות עיקריות למשטר גבול במסגרת הסכם:
- גבול סגור – הפרדה פיזית עם מכשול ומעברים מבוקרים.
  - גבול פתוח – ללא הפרדה, מעבר חופשי לאנשים, רכבים, סחורות.
  - גבול מבוקר – מעבר חופשי להולכי רגל באזורים מוגדרים ומעבר מבוקר בין אזורים.
  - התפיסה היום גורסת גבול סגור ומבוקר במספר נקודות מוגדרות.
47. ארבעה סוגי פתרונות להסדר בירושלים:
- חלוקה מוחלטת של העיר.
  - חלוקה והשארית שטח במעמד ריבוני מיוחד, ינוהל ע"י צד שלישי מוסכם.
  - משולבת, חלוקה מוחלטת, אך העברת שטחים וסמכויות ניהול לצד שלישי.
  - ריבונות משותפת של שני ריבוניים (קונדומיניום).
48. רעיון נוסף העומד על הפרק הוא "יציאה מהקופסא" והרחבה משמעותית של השטח המוניציפאלי של ירושלים ובתוך כך, הגדלת שיעור הרוב היהודי בעיר. במסגרת זאת מוצעת הצעת חוק "ירושלים רבת" סיפוח 12 ישובים (ביתר עלית, אפרת, מעלה אדומים, גבעת זאב, מבשרת...) והחלת החוק על כל השטח.
49. המציאות בירושלים היא דינאמית, משתנה כל הזמן וקשה להקפיא מצב. לדעתנו, מה שניתן להשיג היום, בנוגע להסדרים בירושלים, נתקשה יותר להשיג בעתיד, בעיקר בשל המגמות הדמוגרפיות השליליות והעמדה המגובשת של הקהילה הבינלאומית בנושא ירושלים.

50. לפיכך, נדרש לבנות את התנאים, כולל במעשים בשטח, להשגת הסדר המבטא את האינטרסים הישראליים החיוניים בירושלים. חשוב להגדיר יתדות ליציבות בירושלים, תמריצים להשגת וליישום ההסכם ולשרידותו לאורך זמן. הסדר כזה, לדעתנו:
- א. אינו כולל פתרון של "עיר פתוחה". בנוסף, לא מומלץ לחלק פיזית את העיר העתיקה. אולם, ניתן להפריד את הר הבית משאר העיר העתיקה.
  - ב. לא מעשי לפנות את תושבי העיר העתיקה (להקמת אתר היסטורי תיירותי-תרבותי).
  - ג. חשוב בהסכם בניית התנאים ליציבות, לביטחון, לשגשוג ולרווחת התושבים בכל חלקי העיר.
  - ד. הפיתרון המעשי יותר הוא של חלוקה. את נתקשה להגיע להסדר בו 'ירושלים הקדומה' והאגן ההיסטורי יקבעו בצד הישראלי של העיר, אזי יש לשקול את החלופה של הענקת 'מעמד מיוחד לאגן ההיסטורי' או הסדר ביניים בירושלים. בכל מקרה, יש להבין זאת ולהיערך בהתאם.

## השליטה בהר הבית

51. סוגיית השליטה בהר הבית היא סלע מחלוקת קשה ביותר בסכסוך בין ישראל לפלסטינים. כבר ביוני 1967 נאלצה מדינת ישראל לוותר על שיקולים רגשיים ביחס להר הבית. כיום, 43 שנים לאחר השתלטות על הר הבית, ניתן לומר כי "הר הבית אינו בידנו", אלא בידי המוסלמים. לעומת זאת, הכותל המערבי, המסמל שריד של בית המקדש היהודי, בידנו!!!
52. החלוקה בין הר הבית כאתר פולחן מוסלמי, לבין הכותל המערבי כאתר פולחן יהודי, נקבעה ע"י משה דיין מייד עם סיום מלחמת ששת הימים. הסטאטוס קוו שיצר דיין נועד לנטרל את המימד הדתי מן הסכסוך היהודי-ערבי. הוא האמין כי ניהול מוסלמי של הר הבית ימנע התלהטות יצרים ואפשר הסתגלות של האוכלוסייה בשטחים למציאות החדשה. מציאות זו נשמרה עד היום ועולה כי רוב הגורמים השלימו עמה, למעט מספר חריגים.
53. לאורך השנים, ניתן להבחין בדואליות וקונפליקט פנימי בין העמדה המוצהרת ביחס להר הבית, לבין המדיניות למעשה. באופן מוצהר החילה מדינת ישראל את ריבונותה על הר הבית, במסגרת החלת הריבונות על מזרח ירושלים. על הר הבית חלים החוקים של השמירה על המקומות הקדושים, חוקי העתיקות, התכנון והבנייה ועוד. אולם, בפועל חוקים אלו אינם נאכפים במקום והתפתחה מציאות שונה, הנובעת משיקולים מדיניים אזוריים ובינלאומיים, ומשמעותה וזיתור על השליטה בהר הבית.
54. הסמל היחיד לשליטה הישראלית בהר הבית היא נקודת המשטרה, היכולת להפעיל את כוחות המשטרה נגד הפרות סדר בהר הבית. כמו כן, בידי ישראל לקבוע את מדיניות ההיתרים והחלטה בנוגע לאישור כניסת ערבים לתפילה בהר הבית.
55. בשנים האחרונות התפתחו מצד העולם המוסלמי שתי מגמות ביחס להר הבית. האחת, טוענת כי "אל אקצה בסכנה". חרף העובדה שהמקום בניהול ובשליטת פנימית של הווקף מאז 1967 הוא נתפס ע"י המוסלמים כ"מחולל" ומאיים ע"י היהודים וע"י השליטה הביטחונית הישראלית במקום. השנייה, נשענת על הטענה כי ירושלים ומתחם חרם א-שריף שייכים לאומה המוסלמית כולה, וכי אף גורם פוליטי מוסלמי, או ערבי, אינו רשאי להתפשר עליהם לבדו.
56. אנו גורסים כי הדרך היחידה לצאת מהמבוך היא מציאת פתרון שיספק לשני הצדדים מענה לאינטרסים החיוניים שלהם, ובתוך כך תשומת לב למימד הסמליות. מבחינת הפלסטינים שימור הניהול והשליטה בחרם א-שריף, מבלי לדרוש את חלוקת הריבונות במקום. מבחינת ישראל, הכותל המערבי יישאר רק בידי ישראל וימשיך לשמש כתחליף ל"דבר האמיתי". תנאי המינימום של ישראל לגבי הר הבית ידרשו, אי קביעה נחרצת של הריבונות במקום והמשך גישה חופשית, בזמנים מתואמים, תוך נכונות לוותר על זכויות פולחן בהר הבית.

## החלטות הממשלה בנושא ירושלים

57. כל ממשלות ישראל קיבלו החלטות בנושא ירושלים, כולן הביעו רצון לקדם את ענייני העיר ולשפר את אופן ההתמודדות עם הבעיות והאתגרים המורכבים של ירושלים. החלטות שהטביעו חותם חיובי על העיר היו הקמת מנהלת חינוך ירושלים (מנח"י) והרשות לפיתוח ירושלים (הרל"י), שתי רשויות מקצועיות, בעלות סמכויות, שהקמתן קידמה את נושא העיר.
58. עם זאת, ניתן להבחין בקושי ליישם תוכניות ארוכות טווח, בשל חילופי השלטון ושינויים בעדיפויות. הצורך בחיזוק ירושלים עלה על שולחן כל הממשלות, הוקמו מעל ל-20 וועדות שרים, מנכ"לים ובכירים, רובן לא השלימו את עבודתן לכדי תוכנית ארוכת טווח וברת יישום שאומצה ע"י הממשלה.
59. ירושלים היא העיר היחידה שמשרד ייחודי, השר לענייני ירושלים, הוקדש לטיפול בענייניה, בעיקר לתאם ולקדם את פיתוח ירושלים. ניתן לקבוע כי כל השרים, שהתמנו לעסוק בענייני ירושלים, התמקדו בתיאום בין הממשלה, העירייה וגופים אחרים, ללא סמכויות ביצוע ובעיקר ללא תקציב לביצוע ממשי.
60. קשה לקבל תמונה בהירה במעקב אחרי החלטות הממשלה בירושלים ואופן ביצוען. לא קיימים דו"חות מקיפים בתחום זה. בשנת 2001 הגישה עיריית ירושלים דו"ח למנכ"ל משרד ראש הממשלה ובה ניסיון לעקוב אחר מספר החלטות מרכזיות. הדו"ח קבע כי למרות החלטות רבות בעניין מזרח ירושלים, נותר מצב התשתיות במזרח ירושלים כפי רע. הדו"ח זה מצינת העירייה לחיוב את התקדמות נושא התחבורה בעיר, עם תקצוב שהופנה לרכבת הקלה. מאידך, הדו"ח מתאר את התקציבים המוקפאים בתחומי התעשייה, התיירות ושיקום השכונות.
61. באמצע העשור הקודם התקבלו שלוש החלטות מקיפות בנושא ירושלים ואפשר לטעון כי הממשלה פועלת ליישום החלטות אלה:

א. החלטה 3696 העוסקת בפיתוח מרכז העיר.

ב. החלטה 3873 העוסקת בגדר הביטחוני.

ג. החלטה 4090 העוסקת בין השאר בעיר העתיקה ובמתחם הר הזיתים.

62. בשנים האחרונות, בהשוואה לעבר, ההחלטות יותר מפורטות, מגדירות לוחות זמנים ומקצות תקציבים בראיה רב-שנתית, המועברים ישירות לרשות לפיתוח ירושלים. התקצוב הרב-שנתי מאפשר רציפות שלטונית ומגמות עקביות. לאור העדר גורם ממשלתי קבוע, בעל סמכויות ותקציבים, לעניין ירושלים, קשה לשמור על המשכיות ויישום החלטות הממשלה בנושא הבירה.

63. כפי שתואר, קיים פער משמעותי בין המדיניות המוצהרת לבין הפעולות בפועל של ממשלת ישראל בירושלים. לכך מתווסף אתגר התיאום והסנכרון בין הגופים הרבים הפועלים בירושלים.

01. ממשלת ישראל.

02. עיריית ירושלים.

03. הרשות לפיתוח ירושלים.

04. פמ"י.

05. מוריה.

06. גופים ממלכתיים אחרים.

07. הרשות הפלסטינית.

08. העדות והדתות.

09. ארגונים בינלאומיים.

64. נדרש כי משרד ראש הממשלה יוביל וירכז את הטיפול הממשלתי בירושלים. לשם כך, יוקצו לו תקציבים רב-שנתיים מתאימים; יוקם גוף חזק לתאום ולבקרה, אשר יודא ביצוע ההחלטות. יחזקו סמכויות ויכולות הביצוע של הרשות לפיתוח ירושלים, אשר תספק מענה אפקטיבי מעבר לבעיות שעולות וענייני היומיום, בהסתכלות רב-שנתית ורב-תחומית למען עתיד ירושלים.

## מושג הריבונות

65. ריבונות היא מושג יחסי, מרכיביה:

א. שליטה אפקטיבית באוכלוסייה במרחב המבוקש.

ב. המקום בו הריבון אחראי להשליט את החוק והסדר. (בלעדיות על כוחות הביטחון והמשטרה ואיזו מערכת משפטית תחול על התושבים והשטח).

ג. מימד הכרזתי בו תביעה על חזקה בשטח.

ד. הכרה בינלאומית.

66. בהיבט של מימוש הריבונות הישראלית בירושלים ניתן למפות מספר רב של שחקנים משפיעים והם:

א. ממשלת ישראל וגופי הביטחון (משטרה, צה"ל והשב"כ).

ב. עיריית ירושלים.

ג. גופים ממלכתיים אחרים.

ד. הרשות הפלסטינית.

ה. העולם היהודי.

ו. העולם הדתי המוסלמי.

ז. העולם הדתי הנוצרי.

ח. הקהילה הבינלאומית.

67. למדינות העולם אין עניין אמיתי מדיני בירושלים, ובלבד שמדינת ישראל תגיע להסכם עם הפלסטינים. לב הבעיה בין הצדדים היא העיר העתיקה ובלביה הר הבית. הרעיון של מעמד מיוחד באגן ההיסטורי אינו מגובש דיו בקרב הקהילה הבינלאומית, העולם הערבי ואף הפלסטינים.

68. לאורך השנים, ישראל מפעילה שורה של אמצעים להדגיש את ריבונותה בפועל בירושלים. להלן מספר דוגמאות:

א. יישוב מאסיבי של יהודים במזרח ירושלים ובסובב לה.

ב. מיקום מוסדות לאומיים ומשרדי ממשלה בכל שטחה של ירושלים, כולל במזרחה.

ג. ביקורים של ישראלים בכל שטח ירושלים.

ד. רכישת נכסים והעברתם לבעלות יהודית. (למרות שנדל"ן אינו קשור לריבונות).

ה. קיום אירועים לאומיים וממלכתיים בירושלים.

ו. חובות דומים לאוכלוסייה בכל שטחי העיר.

69. אמצעים לחיזוק הריבונות (בהתאם לאזורי אינטרס):

- א. יישוב של יהודים באזורים בעלי אינטרס.
- ב. עידוד וארגון ביקורים של ישראלים בכל שטח ירושלים.
- ג. רכישת נכסים באזורים בעלי אינטרס, תוך צמצום החיכוך עם האוכלוסייה הערבית, העברתם לבעלות והתיישבות יהודית. (למרות שנדל"ן אינו קשור לריבונות).
- ד. מיפוי בעלות יהודית בשטחים בעלי אינטרס מועדף.
- ה. שימוש נרחב באתרים לאומיים, בסמלים ובדגלים.
- ו. העמקת החדירה השלטונית הישראלית (חובות וזכויות) במזרח העיר.
- ז. יצירת רציפות ואחדות בין אזורים בעלי אינטרס, התאמת התשתיות ויצירת מרקם מובדל.
- ח. קיום אירועים לאומיים וממלכתיים בשטחים בעלי אינטרס.
- ט. יישום קפדני של כל החלטות הממשלה בנושא ירושלים.
- י. ייזום ועידוד פעילות במערכות החברתיות והתרבותיות הערביות. גיבוש אלטרנטיבה לפעילות הרש"פ ועמותות ערביות.
- יא. זכויות וחובות דומים לישראלים ולערבים באזורים בעלי אינטרס.

### מיפוי האינטרסים

70. בחנו לעומק את האינטרסים של השחקנים השונים לנושא ירושלים, החלטנו לציין אותם כרשימה, המבהירה את תמונת האינטרסים של ישראל, מול הרשות הפלסטינית ושאר העולם.

א. ישראל:

- הכרה נרחבת בירושלים כבירת מדינת ישראל. בכלל זה, הכרת העולם הערבי.
- חיות ושגשוג ירושלים כבירת ישראל.
- בטחון (יציבות ושליטה).
- שמירת רוב דמוגרפי יהודי מוחלט בירושלים.
- מניעת הסתננויות וגלישת פלסטינים לתוך העיר, בדגש לאזורים בעלי אינטרס.
- חיבור וזיקות ליישובי עוטף ירושלים, למטרופולין של הישובים הישראליים.
- פיתוח כלכלי – תעשייה/תעסוקה/מסחר.
- מרחב התפתחות וגדילה.
- חיזוק והכרה בקשר ההיסטורי של העם היהודי עם ירושלים.
- שמירה על הצביון יהודי של העיר ואזורי אינטרס במזרח העיר.
- ריבונות ישראלית מוכרת ומיושמת, עם מינימום הגבלות.
- הקטנת התלות בשטח הערבי הסובב את ירושלים.
- שמירת הרכוש היהודי ואי פגיעה בממצאים ארכיאולוגיים המעידים על הקשר, רב השנים, של העם היהודי לירושלים.
- שימור הסכם השלום עם ירדן, כולל סעיפיו בנושא ירושלים.
- מובהקות בחיבור ירושלים לישראל, אי הותרתה כישוב קצה ומרוחק.
- ירושלים סמל לאחדות העם היהודי.


ב. פלסטינים:

- הכרה באל-קודס כבירת פלסטין.
- סמל לעצמאות ולריבונות הפלסטינית.
- חיות כבירת פלסטין – מרכז שלטוני ומרכז כלכלי.
- חיבור לגדה, רציפות והמשכיות.
- יציבות, חוק וסדר, מניעת טרור וחופש פעולה של קיצונים.
- שליטה במרבית האוכלוסייה הפלסטינית המתגוררת בירושלים ובסביבתה.
- ריבונות מלאה בירושלים הפלסטינית, עם מינימום הגבלות.
- קשר עם הצד הישראלי (כלכלה, תשתיות, דת ותיירות).
- תנועה חופשית בין הצד הפלסטיני לצד הישראלי של ירושלים.
- מרחב התפתחות לאל-קודס כלפי צפון, מזרח ודרום.

- שמירה על רכוש ומוסדות והלאמתם לטובת המדינה הפלסטינית.
  - ביסוס הדימוי של הפלסטינים כמופקדים על מקומות קדושים לאסלאם ולנצרות.
  - תשתיות מוסדיות (שלטון, חינוך, תרבות, דת...).
  - תשתיות פיזיות מתפקדות ומתקדמות.
  - טשטוש הזיקה היהודית לירושלים, בפרט לאתרים ולמרחבים במזרח העיר.
- ג. שאר העולם:
- הסדרה בירושלים היא מפתח להסדר ישראלי פלסטיני.
  - מכיר בשליטה מוסלמית בהר הבית. (חוסר רצון להתעמת עם העולם הערבי והמוסלמי ועם אוכלוסיות מוסלמיות במערב).
  - שמירת רכוש, חופש הפולחן והצביון של העדות השונות הפועלות וחיות בירושלים.
  - סמליות ירושלים ושמירת מעמדה הדתי וההיסטורי המיוחד.
  - עיר פתוחה, חופש גישה לעיר לכל העמים והדתות, וחופש תנועה בין חלקיה.
  - מעמד משפיע (בין ערבי, דתי ובינלאומי).
- ד. ניתן לסמן אינטרסים משותפים למרבית השחקנים הפועלים בירושלים:
- אינטרס כללי לשקט וליציבות בירושלים.
  - חיות ירושלים, פיתוח ושגשוג בכל חלקיה.
  - כל צד שואף לכינון גבולות מוכרים ומוסכמים בירושלים.
  - פשטות בניהול החיים, בכלל זה קיום מייזמים משותפים לישראל ולערבים.
  - חופש פולחן וגישה למקומות הקדושים לכל הדתות.
  - שיתוף פעולה בתחומי הכלכלה, המסחר, התיירות, הדת ועוד.
  - הבנה כי סוגיית ירושלים היא מפתח חיוני לכל הסדר בין ישראל לפלסטינים.

## התכלית האסטרטגית

71. ביסוס וחיזוק הריבונות הישראלית בירושלים בפועל, על מנת:
- א. למצב את מעמדה של העיר כבירת ישראל.
  - ב. לחזק את עמדות ישראל לקראת הסדר מדיני עתידי.
  - ג. להגביר השליטה למצב של העדר הסדר מדיני.
72. היעדים האסטרטגיים:
- א. ביטחון, יציבות ושגשוג בירושלים.
  - ב. עיגון ההכרה בזיקה ההיסטורית והדתית של העם היהודי לירושלים, כלפי פנים וכלפי חוץ.
  - ג. ירושלים כנכס לאזרחי ישראל ובסיס חיוני לאחדות העם היהודי.
  - ד. הבלטת האחריות הישראלית למצב השכונות הערביות (באזור המועדף), באמצעות שיפור משמעותי בתנאים הפיזיים והתרבותיים של האוכלוסייה הערבית.
  - ה. חיזוק ירושלים כמרכז תרבותי ודתי לכל הדתות, תוך שמירת חופש הפולחן.
  - ו. חתירה להכרה בינלאומית בירושלים כבירת ישראל.
  - ז. מיקוד עוצמת הפעילות בהתאם לאזורי אינטרס מועדפים.
  - ח. סימון מעגלי ההשפעה, חיזוק הריבונות הישראלית במעגלים בעלי אינטרס.
  - ט. ירושלים כמנוף לשיתוף פעולה נרחב – פנימי, אזורי ובינלאומי.
73. הרעיון האסטרטגי שאנו מציעים נשען על ארבע רגליים עם זיקות הדוקות וחיוניות ביניהן:
- א. דגש ממשלתי מובלט בנושא ירושלים הכולל:
    01. אחריות משרד ראש הממשלה לנושא ירושלים. במסגרת זאת, הקמת רשות לנושא ירושלים במשרד ראש הממשלה, (ניתן על בסיס הרשות לפיתוח ירושלים) ואף מינוי שר במשרד ראש הממשלה.
    02. הקמת ועדת שרים לנושא ירושלים בראשות ראש הממשלה ובהשתתפות ראש העיר ירושלים.
    03. הקמת ועדת מנכ"לים לעניין ירושלים בראשות מנכ"ל ראש הממשלה.
    04. הקצאת תקציב רב-שנתי לחיזוק הריבונות בירושלים.
  - ב. סימון מעגלי השפעה בירושלים, בהתאם לאזורי אינטרס - חיוני, חשוב, רצוי, ולא נדרש – מיקוד העשייה, בכל המימדים, בהתאם לאזורי האינטרס (ראה מפה בעמוד הבא).



ג. הקניית מעמד מיוחד לאזור העיר העתיקה ואגן ירושלים הקדומה (חופף לאגן ההיסטורי). הפיכתו לפארק לאומי, אתר מורשת עולמי, מעין MALL הכולל מקומות קדושים, אתרי מורשת יהודית וישראלית, מרכזי תירות ומבקרים, גנים, אנדרטאות, טיילת המחברת את העיר העתיקה עם הר הזיתים, עיר דייד והר הצופים. קידום התיירות לייעד של 10 מיליון תיירים בשנה.

ד. שיפור השירותים המוניציפאליים והתשתיות במזרח ירושלים ושיפור בולט באיכות החיים בשכונות הערביות, בהתאם לאזורי אינטרס. נכונות ל"הלבין" (מצב אפס) בנייה ישנה, בהתניית התאמת תושבות למקום מגורים והסדרת הגבייה. ממצב אפס הידוק הפיקוח על בנייה לא חוקית. שיתוף האוכלוסייה הערבית בניהול חיהם: במנהלות שכונתיות, בהשתתפות בהחלטות, בהקמת יחידות שיטור קהילתיות. השקעה בהקמת מוסדות חינוך ותרבות וחיזוק המצב הכלכלי במזרח ירושלים.

תעדוף המלצות – על פי חשיבות וארבעת הנדבכים

נדבכים	עדיפות א'	עדיפות ב'	עדיפות ג'
ממשלתי	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• כינון מנגנון ממשלתי</li> <li>• ועדת שרים ומנכ"לים</li> <li>• השקעה בתחום התודעתי וההסברתי</li> <li>• מערכות ומוסדות חינוך ותרבות</li> <li>• לאוכלוסייה הערבית</li> <li>• מניעת מעורבות ופעילות הרש"פ</li> <li>• תוכנית אב לדזור</li> <li>• שמירת הסטאטוס קוו בהר הבית</li> <li>• פיקוח רשות העתיקות</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• הקמת משרדי ממשלה ומוסדות ציבור</li> <li>• שיפור והנגשת השירותים הממשלתיים</li> <li>• פתרונות בריאות לאוכלוסיית איו"ש מחוץ לירושלים</li> <li>• טיפוח קשרי מסחר של ערביי מזרח ירושלים</li> <li>• בניה לאוכלוסייה הערבית מחוץ לאזורי האינטרס</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ייזום אלטרנטיבות לאוכלוסייה הערבית שמחוץ לירושלים</li> <li>• מנהרה מצומת הגבעה הצרפתית לזואדי ג'וז</li> <li>• כביש הטבעת המזרחית</li> <li>• כביש הטבעת הדרומית</li> </ul>
מעגלי אינטרס	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• הגדרת אזורים מועדפים</li> <li>• מעמד מיוחד לירושלים הקדומה</li> <li>• עידוד ישוב יהודים</li> <li>• שכונה יהודית בגבעת המטוס</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• התאמת התחום המוניציפאלי לגדר הביטחון</li> <li>• שיפור גישת שכונות קצה ערביות למרחב איו"ש</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• תיקון תוואי הגדר והוצאת שכונות</li> <li>• הקמת מועצה ערבית נפרדת למטרופולין מזרח ירושלים</li> </ul>
ירושלים הקדומה	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• הקמת פארק לאומי וטיילת בירושלים הקדומה</li> <li>• הסעות לאגן ההיסטורי ולהר הבית</li> <li>• מיזמי תירות</li> <li>• שיפור וטיפוח האתרים הקדושים לכל הדתות</li> <li>• חופש גישה ופולחן</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• מיזמים בין עדות ודתות</li> <li>• קידום הכרה בינלאומית על ידי UNSCO</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• שמירה וטיפוח גנים ושטחים ציבוריים</li> <li>• הקמת מרכז לנושא ירושלים.</li> </ul>
מוניציפאלי	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• הכשרת והתאמת עובדים נותני שירותים</li> <li>• שיפור תנאי החיים לאוכלוסייה הערבית</li> <li>• חיזוק ושיפור תשתיות</li> <li>• הפשרת שטחים לבניה</li> <li>• מודל חיים משותפים</li> <li>• הסדרת בנייה בלתי חוקית</li> <li>• מנגנון קישור יעיל ומקצועי לערביי מזרח ירושלים</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• הקמת משטרה קהילתית בשכונות הערביות</li> <li>• שיפוץ הכביש האמריקאי</li> <li>• כביש עוקף ירושלים</li> <li>• חיבור רזמרין – בגין</li> <li>• שיפור דרכים פנימיות</li> <li>• התרי בנייה לגובה בשכונות הערביות</li> </ul>	



## פירוט המלצות

74. ריכוז המלצות מול הממשלה

א. בתחום המנגנון:

01. כינון רשות ייעודית לנושא ירושלים, בכפיפות ישירה לראש הממשלה, (או בכפיפות לשר במשרד ראש הממשלה). ניתן על בסיס הרשות לפיתוח ירושלים. תפקידה קידום האינטרסים של ישראל בירושלים:

• בניית תקציב בסיסי רב שנתי, ריכוז השליטה בתקציבים.

• תאום וסנכרון בין משרדים והרשויות.

• ייצוג ממשלת ישראל מול גורמי חוץ לעניין ירושלים.

• נציגות בכירה לכל המשרדים הרלוונטיים ברשות ואיגום משאבים בהתאם.

• ה. סמכויות ישירות לממשלה למימוש מדיניות הממשלה לעניין ירושלים.

02. הקמת ועדת שרים לנושא ירושלים בראשות ראש הממשלה ובהשתתפות ראש העיר ירושלים.

03. הקמת ועדת מנכ"לים לנושא ירושלים, בראשות מנכ"ל משרד ראש הממשלה, אשר תוודא את יישום החלטות הממשלה וועדת השרים בנושא ירושלים.

ב. תיחום ירושלים:

01. הגדרת אזורי אינטרס מועדפים (לא נידרש לחשוף אותם לציבור הרחב).

02. אופציה א': התאמת התחום המוניציפאלי לתוואי הגדר.

03. אופציה ב': תיקון תוואי הגדר הביטחוני והוצאת שטחים לא חיוניים המתחברים למטרופולין הערבי בסביבה החיצונית.

04. הקמת מועצה אזורית מוניציפאלית נפרדת למטרופולין מזרח ירושלים. העברת שכונות ערביות שאינן באזורי אינטרס מועדף לסמכות הניהול של המטרופולין. תקצוב נפרד למטרופולין. בנוסף, שילוב התושבים הערביים בניהול המטרופולין.

ג. הנגשת שירותים ממשלתיים:

01. 1) הקמת משרדי ממשלה ומוסדות ציבוריים באזורי אינטרס.

02. 2) התאמת והכשרת עובדים המספקים שירותים לאוכלוסייה הערבית.

03. שיפור חזות משרדי הממשלה במזרח העיר.

ד. השקעות ממשלה משמעותיות לפיתוח ירושלים, מעבר למתן שירותים מוניציפאליים, שבאחריות העירייה. סיוע הממשלה לאחזקה ולתפקוד אפקטיבי של כלל הגורמים הציבוריים הפועלים בעיר.

ה. עידוד יישוב יהודים באזורי אינטרס. כמו כן, הכרזה כי התיישבות יהודים באזורים האחרים לא תשנה את מעמד השטח בעתיד.

75. ריכוז המלצות בתחום הפיזי

א. סימון אזור העיר העתיקה ואגן ירושלים הקדומה (דומה לאגן ההיסטורי) כשטח בעל מעמד מיוחד. הפיכתו לפארק לאומי, אתר מורשת עולמי, מעין MALL הכולל מקומות קדושים, אתרי מורשת יהודית וישראלית, מרכזי תיירות ומבקרים, גנים, אנדרטאות, טיילת המחברת את העיר העתיקה עם הר הזיתים, עיר דויד והר הצופים.

ב. השוואת ההשקעות בתשתית בכל אזורי אינטרס מועדף, עם בולטות להשקעות בשכונות ערביות במזרח ירושלים.

ג. יצירת גישה וחיזוק הנגישות של שכונות קצה ערביות, שמחוץ לאזורי אינטרס, למרחב אי"ש ותחומי הרש"פ.

ד. תנופת בנייה ושיקום תשתיות באזורי אינטרס מועדף, תוך הקפדה על חוקי בנייה.

ה. הפשרת שטחים וייזום פרויקטי שיכון לאוכלוסייה הערבית, מחוץ לאזורי אינטרס ובמטרופולין מזרח ירושלים.

76. תחום התחבורה:

א. נגישות נוחה ומהירה של ישראלים לאזורי אינטרס מועדף ותיעול התנועות של האוכלוסייה הערבית לאזורים החיוניים להם - בעדיפות שלא דרך אזורי אינטרס.

01. הסעות אוכלוסייה יהודית לאגן ההיסטורי (חניון שער האשפות). במסגרת זאת, הקמת קו רכבת חד פס, או רכבל, מברכת הסולטאן לשער האשפות.

02. הסעות אוכלוסייה ערבית לתפילה בהר הבית (חניון שער האריות).

03. שיפוץ וסלילת הכביש האמריקאי.

04. מנהרה מצומת הגבעה הצרפתית - שועפת לואדי ג'וז.

05. סלילת כביש עוקף ירושלים (אל-זעיים - מזמוריה).

06. סלילת כביש הטבעת המזרחית (מחלף הזיתים - מזמוריה).

07. סלילת כביש הטבעת הדרומית (מזמוריה - צומת רוזמרין).

08. חיבור רוזמרין לכביש בגין.

09. שיפור מערכת פנימית של כבישים ונתיבי הולכי רגל ואופניים.

- א. קידום מודל החיים המשותפים של יהודים וערבים ולהביא לשגשוג העיר בכל מרחב האינטרס המועדף. במסגרת זאת נדרש:
01. טיפוח האוכלוסייה הערבית בתוך אזורי אינטרס ופיתוח מערכות תשתית, בתי ספר, בתי דואר, סניפי ביטוח לאומי, טיפת חלב ושירותים רפואיים.
  02. הקמת מנהלות שכונתיות ערביות בניהול תושבים ערביים, כולל הפעלת שוטרים מתנדבים, עם סמכויות חיפוש ועיכוב.
  03. שיפור משמעותי של שירותי הבריאות במרחב המועדף, לכל התושבים.
  04. תמיכה ועידוד של קשרי מסחר, עבודה ושירותים של תושבי מזרח ירושלים הערביים עם יהודים וחברות ישראליות במערב ירושלים ובישראל בכלל.
  05. פיתוח ישראלי (ולא פלסטיני) נרחב של מוסדות תרבות לאוכלוסייה הערבית.
  06. שיפור תנאי החיים והמעמד של האוכלוסייה הערבית שבתוך אזור האינטרס המועדף.
  07. מניעת צעדים חד-צדדיים של הפלסטינים, כגון קבורה בהר הבית.
  08. מניעת פעילות הרש"פ וגורמים עויינים בירושלים.
- ב. ביטחוני: חיזוק הנוכחות והאפקטיביות של משטרת ישראל במרחב. בד בבד, פיתוח משטרה קהילתית. ריכוז מאמץ ומתן תמריצים בניסיון לגייס אוכלוסיה ערבית לשיטור קהילתי. מניעת פעילות הרשות הפלסטינית וגורמים עויינים בירושלים, וניסיונם להרתיע את התושבים מהשתלבות בניהול ענייניהם.
- ג. חינוך:
01. השקעה בחינוך, בדגש לחינוך לדו קיום ולשלום.
  02. פיקוח על תוכניות הלימודים, בשילוב משרד החינוך.
  03. עידוד והטבות בלימוד השפה העברית בבתי ספר במזרח ירושלים והשפה הערבית במערב ירושלים.
  04. כינון מיזמים לדו קיום בשלום ותוכניות משותפות לתלמידים יהודים וערבים.
78. ריכוז המלצות בתחום המוניציפאלי
- א. הכנת תוכנית אב לדיור ולשיכון האוכלוסייה הערבית, בתוך ומחוץ לאזורי אינטרס.
- ב. הכנת תוכנית בניין עיר (תב"ע) ומתן אישורי בנייה באופן נרחב, בעיקר בשכונות בהם נוצרו פערים משמעותיים לאורך השנים.
- ג. נכונות ל"הלבין" בנייה ישנה, בהתניית התאמת תושבות למקום מגורים, שאינה פוגעת בכלל הציבור והסדרת הגבייה. מהמצב החדש, הידוק הפיקוח על בנייה לא חוקית.
- ד. הקמת חברה ייעודית (פרזות?) לשיכון ולשיפור תנאי הדיור של האוכלוסייה הערבית.
- ה. הכוונת רכישת קרקעות ובנייה לשכונות יהודיות לאזורי האינטרס המועדף.
- ו. חיזוק ושיפור התשתיות (ביוב, מים, חשמל, תקשורת) המחברות לעיריית ירושלים.
- ז. שמירת שטחים ציבוריים פתוחים וטיפוח הגנים הציבוריים במרחב האינטרס המועדף.
- ח. חיזוק השליטה במורדות המערביים של ארמון הנציב, הקמת מתקני ציבור וטיפוח הגנים. חיזוק האכיפה למניעת בנייה לא חוקית והתפרשות במעלה הגבעה.
- ט. הקמת שכונה חדשה בגבעת המטוס, כולל מוסדות ציבור.
- י. עידוד וסיוע למיזמי בנייה (כולל בנייה לגובה) לאוכלוסייה הערבית, בעדיפות מחוץ לאזורי אינטרס מועדף.
- יא. מנגנון תאום יעיל ומקצועי מול ערביי מזרח ירושלים:
01. בירור עמדות האוכלוסייה הערבית בסוגיות השונות, "מה באמת רוצים?".
  02. פיתוח מנופי השפעה כלפי האוכלוסייה הערבית. ( בדגש ל"גזרים" על פני "מקלות").
  03. שותפות האוכלוסייה הערבית בהחלטות הנוגעות לשגרת חייהם, ויתכן אף לעתידם.
  04. שותפות בביצוע וביישום ההחלטות, בדגש לשיפור רמת חיים, כולל התנדבות למשמר קהילתי.
  05. חיזוק מעמד וסמכות הייעוץ המשפטי והייעוץ לענייני ערבים בעיריית ירושלים.
79. ריכוז המלצות בתחום התודעתי והתדמיתי
- א. נדרש להשקיע מאמץ כלפי פנים בבניית בהטמעת הקונצנזוס בציבור באשר למרכזיות ירושלים בזהות הלאומית היהודית. בנוסף, יש להבליט את הזיקה ההיסטורית והדתית של העם היהודי לירושלים.
- ב. סימון (במעשים ולא בדיבורים) של אזור האינטרס המועדף והטמעתו בתודעה הלאומית כליבת ירושלים, המוסכמת על רוב הציבור בישראל.
- ג. כלפי חוץ נדרשת פעולה במספר מימדים לשם גיוס עמדת הקהילה הבינלאומית:
01. הבלטת הזיקה היהודית העמוקה ההיסטורית, הלאומית והמדינית לירושלים.
  02. הפגנת השקעה בתשתית, בשירותים ובאיכות חיים בכל העיר לרווחת כלל תושבי ירושלים, בהתאם לאזורי אינטרס.

03. הטמעת ההבנה כי רק ישראל יכולה להעניק חופש פולחן לכל הדתות בירושלים.
04. טיפוח ירושלים כמוקד אוניברסאלי.
05. נכונות לפשרות ולהסדרים יצירתיים ויציבים.
06. שילוב תושבי מזרח ירושלים בניהול חייהם.
- ד. חיזוק הדימוי של ירושלים בראייה אוניברסאלית:
01. דגש משמעותי לתיירות.
02. הקמת פארקים וגנים היסטוריים.
03. הפקת אירועי מסורת יהודית וחיבורה לכלל העמים.
04. טיפוח המקומות הקדושים לכלל הדתות והגישה החופשית והבטוחה.
05. טיפוח וסיוע למיזמים בין דתות ובין עדות.
06. טיפוח הנרטיב של ירושלים היהודית הקדומה.
- ה. פיקוח רשות העתיקות על הר הבית ואתרי מורשת, לצד השקעות בחפירות ארכיאולוגיות (שירות לאומי).
- ו. הקמת מרכז לאומי לנושאי ירושלים שיהווה מרכז מידע עולמי מתקדם. (ניתן לבחון שימוש במוזיאון רוקפלר).
- ז. אכיפת חוק התיירות.
- ח. חתירה להכרת אונסק"ו במקומות לשימור, בדגש עם זיקה להיסטוריה היהודית.
80. המלצות בהיבט הדתי
- א. הבלטת הקשר הדתי וההיסטורי של היהדות לירושלים ולהר הבית.
- ב. לחדד את קדושת הכותל, דבר המקובל על מרבית מדינות העולם ועל הנצרות.
- ג. עידוד עליית יהודים להר הבית, ללא תפילה.
- ד. להמשיך בחפירות ארכיאולוגיות ולהבליט ממצאים המעידים על הקשר היהודי.
- ה. עידוד יוזמות לפרויקטים פיזיים ותרבותיים, לקרוב בין דתות.
- ו. שימור וטיפוח האתרים הקדושים לכלל הדתות.
81. צמצום הזיקות בין אזורי אינטרס בירושלים לרש"פ
- א. מתן פתרונות תחבורתיים לתנועה בין צפון הגדה לדרומה. נגישות נוחה ומהירה של ישראלים לאזורי אינטרס מועדף ותיעול התנועות של האוכלוסייה הערבית לאזורים החיוניים להם - בעדיפות שלא דרך אזורי אינטרס. (ראה המלצות בתחום התחבורה וסלילת כבישים).
- ב. עידוד תוכניות בנייה לשיכון אוכלוסייה ערבית מחוץ לאזור אינטרס מועדף.
- ג. מציאת חלופות לטיפול רפואי מחוץ לירושלים.
- ד. עידוד השקעות חיצוניות בפתרונות אוטונומיים לפלסטינים מחוץ לירושלים.
- ה. עידוד קשרי כלכלה ומסחר של ערביי ירושלים עם ישראל. (בניית אלטרנטיבות אטרקטיביות למסחר עם שטחי הרש"פ).
- ו. סיוע בבניית תשתיות מתאימות למוסדות חינוך ערביים מחוץ לעיר, לצמצום התנועה היומית לתוך העיר.

#### דוגמא לצעדים מחזקי ריבונות מול מחלישים

צעדים מחזקי ריבונות	צעדים מחלישי ריבונות
הקמת שכונות חדשות אכלוס השכונות ביהודים	מעמד שונה של האוכלוסייה הערבית
מיקום משרדי ממשלה ומוסדות המטה הארצי של המשטרה	העדר השקעות בתשתית, באיכות חיים ובשירותים בשכונות ערביות
רציפות וחיות של אזורים ושכונות מאוכלסות ביהודים	אישור לגופים פוליטיים כמו הרש"פ והחמא"ס להפעיל מוסדות (כולל חינוך, תרבות וספורט)
הבלטת הזיקה ההיסטורית והדתית, ארכיאולוגיה וחשיפת ממצאים	מעמד המיוחד של ההקדשים בהר הבית ואי ריסונו
בניית הסכמה בעם לאזור אינטרס מועדף, מיועד לחיזוק הריבונות, הפגנת נחישות	פגיעה באתרים היסטוריים ודתיים עם זיקה ליהדות
ישראל מאפשרת גישה חופשית ובטוחה וחופש פולחן במקומות הקדושים לכל הדתות	חוסר יכולת לממש החלטות הממשלה והעירייה

## Time for a New Grand Bargain in the Middle East

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Events in the Middle East over the past six months have shattered long-standing paradigms and strategies. Correctly observing the inherent strategic uncertainties, Secretary Clinton likened any attempt to address the evolving regional situation as playing multi-dimensional Chess of an unprecedented scope.

Recent Western official attempts however, to address political change in the Middle East have revealed piecemeal thinking. President Obama's May 19 speech and the European Union's "new and ambitious" Neighborhood Policy are couched in nostalgic romanticism evocating Western mass protests for self-determination, be it the Boston Tea Party or the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia. These articulations assume that progress and democracy will eventually prevail with hardly any need for external intervention. Western statements share the anticipation that the Arab Middle East will follow the 1990s' path of Central and Eastern European countries transforming into liberal democracies. The Arab Middle East however, is expected to transform with a fraction of the political and financial support offered by the United States and Europe to the post-Communist bloc. Middle East 2011 however, is less adaptable than Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s.

Thus, Western strategy appears to be predicated on "dump and hope". Indeed, new Western doctrines all but ignore the overwhelming challenges of radicalism and development, which will most likely thwart the ambitions for installing "deep and sustainable democracy" (as suggested by the European Union). Furthermore, these challenges do not bode well for enhancing regional security or for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, which are cornerstones of Western interests in the Middle East.

The Western dismal track record in the Middle East over the past decade combined with the political and economic crises facing the US and Europe give considerable impetus to downsize Western regional commitments to the bare minimum and to direct political and financial capital to restore Western power. This downsizing approach well fits the Western preference to allow the Middle East political turmoil to run its natural course.

The "restoration" strategy is not without merit. For two principal reasons however, the West ought to find a more reasonable balance between pressing obligations at home and duties abroad. First, developments in the Middle East have underscored that although Western projection of influence, power, and credibility have diminished, there is no substitute for the US and Europe in sharing the burden to maintain and advance regional peace, security and prosperity. Although flawed and half-hearted, the Western role in Libya is consequential. Despite Iraqi yearning for the final withdrawal of US forces, a political cross-party consensus supporting continued US military presence is growing clout in Baghdad. Furthermore, the strategic posture of Western allies in the Middle East is intertwined with American and European power and influence.

Second, and perhaps more important, a Western credible and effective role in the Middle East is not a matter of charity. Strategic calamity in the Middle East would pose a threat to the long-standing interests of the West vis-à-vis the Middle East: curtailing the export of violence and instability to Europe and North America through terror, WMD proliferation, and radical indoctrination; maintaining energy security; and preserving maritime security along the main global shipping routes crossing, and adjacent to, the Middle East.

An indicative example for a potential Middle East calamity would be a terrorist attack targeting a major oil producing facility in Saudi Arabia, which is not a far-fetched scenario. In February 2006, al Qaida operatives attacked Saudi Arabia's main oil processing facility in Abqaiq, perhaps the world's most important petroleum hub. The Abqaiq facility, as most of Saudi Arabia's oil fields and facilities, is located in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia, which is home to the 15% Shiite minority of the Kingdom and physically borders the Persian Gulf. The Saudi government is long weary of Iranian meddling in this province neighboring Bahrain. Furthermore, the US role in toppling Egypt's Mubarak is viewed in Riyadh as a proof of the unreliability of the West. In turn, this has served to heighten Saudi sense of anxiety vis-à-vis a growingly aggressive Iran. Against the backdrop of Saudi insecurity, a terrorist plot targeting a major oil facility could unleash a severe Saudi response and set into motion an escalating crisis which might put the entire Persian Gulf on the brink, threaten main maritime routes, and would have oil prices skyrocket. The occurrence of a similar scenario would take a considerable toll on Western welfare and further deepen the world economic crisis.

Nonetheless, the Arab-Israeli conflict seems to have gained most of the attention in Western policy circles, particularly in Europe. Apparently, the prevalent conventional wisdom is that this protracted conflict is the primary challenge in the Middle East; its resolution would solve many of the challenges in the region; and that the only hurdle to the conflict's resolution is Israel. While resolving the conflict is essential and urgent for Israel's national security, the conflict is by far not the primary threat to regional security and Western interests in the Middle East. The onus for the current stalemate is not exclusively Israeli. Rather, the mismanagement of US-led efforts over the past few years had a more considerable impact. As President Abbas has repeatedly stated, the main US contribution to the peace process has been the unending

supply of tall ladders removed immediately after the Palestinians obligingly climbed to the top of the highest tree in the Middle East forest. The borderline-obsession with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process leads Western policy-makers to pay excessive attention to tactical episodic events (for instance, the Gaza flotilla or the expected Palestinian UN showdown in September), rather than taking a broad strategic view of the region.

Thus, the US and Europe fail to acknowledge the intertwined nature of the three primary challenges in the Middle East, namely: the growing political power and influence of Iran, its proxies and Islamist radical forces; socio-economic and political under-development; last and not least, the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Without addressing these challenges simultaneously, there is no chance to achieve progress on any track. Unless contained and checked, radical forces will derail a serious peace process and any negotiated agreement. The cause of good governance and human rights will not advance if radical forces are allowed to assume political power. Global private sector investments and public resources essential for improving living conditions in the Middle East will not be forthcoming if destabilizing radical Islamist forces will dominate “new” regimes in the region. Finally, it will be nearly impossible to contain radical forces and facilitate political development without (really) moving the peace process forward. Only a coherent and realistic approach conscious of the regional complex interdependencies might prevail.

Unlike Western powers, regional parties are starting to contend with shifting balances of power and interests. The politically boosted power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is already leading this country to seek new relations with the radical and terrorist forces in the region – namely Iran and Hamas. Concerned by the breakaway of Egypt, the growing assertiveness of Iran, and the sense of US betrayal, Saudi Arabia and its partners to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are moving to enlarge this Forum to include Jordan, a clear posturing message to both Iran and a radicalizing Egypt. These trends do not bode well for regional security or for the hope that democracy and peace will prevail in the region.

The task of enhancing security and progress in the Middle East and preventing its rapid deterioration will not be an easy or short feat for the US and Europe or their allies in the region. In this undertaking, Western powers ought not to assume this burden alone, but rather engage and work with real regional allies, not the Muslim Brotherhood.

A new grand bargain needs creative conceptualization. To illustrate, contemporary Middle East could benefit from the out-of-the-box thinking that was so essential for initiating European integration via the Marshall Plan or for accommodating a unified Germany through the Maastricht Treaty founding the European Union. Regionalism may not necessarily be the answer for the Middle East, but such ingenuity that looks at the broader regional strategic landscape is now critical for the future of the Middle East.

The possible contours for a new grand bargain would involve forming a Western-led regional pro-peace and security coalition. This would require the US and Europe to amend fences and reassure the strategic concerns of long-standing Western allies in the region in return for their active and positive role in addressing the region’s common challenges – radicalism, development and the peace process.

Credible Western strategic assurances to its regional allies could contain the ambitions of radical forces, particularly Iran and its proxies, and alleviate the sense of insecurity of Saudi Arabia and other GCC members. Demonstrating these assurances would not necessarily be politically costly and could include political signaling (official visits and effective statements in the region), the revitalization of US CENTCOM’s regional security architecture, and the application of NATO assurances as part of its new partnership policy. Although these assurances are in the interest of the West, GCC countries could be expected, in reciprocity, to undertake domestic measures to enhance good governance and to curb the export of Sunni radicalism to South Asia and Europe and its financing.

Furthermore, the GCC could assume a major role in regional socio-economic development along with international organizations and the global private sector. This would not be a handout. The radical forces in the region fester under the current socio-economic conditions. For instance, more than 30 percent of the young adults (18-29 years old) in the region are unemployed and 51 million new jobs are needed by 2020 only to avoid a further increase in unemployment rates.

The final element of a possible grand bargain would have the GCC along with Jordan and Morocco take an active role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. A responsible Arab pro-peace coalition could limit the role of Hamas and a radicalizing Egypt and with the Quartet mentor the peace process, substituting the extremist Arab League. In expanding the negotiating setting, this coalition could offer pan-Arab political support to the Palestinians in taking the difficult decisions to move ahead in resolving the conflict with Israel. This coalition would also expand the menu of tangible strategic and political benefits for Israel in attaining a final settlement with the Palestinians and increase Israeli public support for the peace process.

A comprehensive final status may not be in the cards in the immediate future. Despite the Palestinian rejection of a formal long-term interim agreement, there is ample room for a series of concerted measures by Israel, the Palestinians and a pro-peace Arab coalition. These measures could be based on the continued fulfillment of the Roadmap obligations undertaken by Israel and the Palestinian Authority and accepting the spirit of the Arab Peace Initiative and its explicit equation – normalization for peace. The concerted measures should be simultaneously implemented in the Israeli-Palestinian and the Israeli-Arab countries tracks. These concerted measures will not lead overnight to a comprehensive peace deal, but might break the deadlock, create a momentum for productive negotiations on the final status focusing on borders and security arrangements, and promote regional security by reinforcing the pro-peace coalition.

As we approach the 20th anniversary of the 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, time has come for a new grand bargain in the Middle East. In historical terms, the popular revolts across the Arab world have created an elastic moment during which the future of the Middle East will take shape for years to come. While as hitherto Western preference has been to allow this process to “naturally” evolve, the inherent risks to regional and global security and welfare warrant a far more politically proactive, creative and informed effort jointly executed by the West and its allies in the region.

## The Abdication of America - The Middle East after America

Dr. Shmuel Bar

### The End of the Age of America?

The Middle East – like other regions in the world – has gone through eras of projection of influence by external powers, adapting to the balance of power between them. This was the case during the age of colonialism (predominance of Britain and France), the Cold War (competition between the US and the USSR) and the period since the end of the Cold War, during which the US became the sole superpower in the region.

The passage from one era to another, however, is never clearly demarcated and the process of adaptation does not begin only when a new era has been “declared”. Thus, years before the fall of the Soviet Union, countries began to hedge their relations with the two Superpowers, reflecting their anticipations of the future status of the “power market”. Today, the Middle East and other regions of the world are in the throes of a re-alignment which is primarily a response to American policies and actions and reflects the expectation of a power void which will be left with the end of the “Age of America”. The re-alignment of the Middle East will have a profound influence on other theatres and on the domestic and economic interests of the United States and the rest of the West.

### The Strategic Weltanschauung of the Obama Administration

The American Middle Eastern policy under the Obama administration aims first and foremost at reducing American projection of “hard power”, particularly in the Middle East, as part of a fundamental change in US foreign and defense policies. The new American policy has already found its way into six major policy documents issued during the administration’s first year - between February 1 and May 29, 2010: (1) the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR); (2) the Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (BMDR) both issued on February 1st; (3) the Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPR), issued on April 6th; (4) the New START Treaty signed by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation (Prague, April 8th); (5) the Washington Nuclear Summit Conference declaration (on April 12th); (6) and the National Security Strategy for 2010, issued on May 29th.

Together, these documents present a comprehensive description of the underlying beliefs held by the administration about how the world works, what threats and potential threats need to be addressed, and how best to address them. The publication of this number of strategic policy documents in such a short time period and in such an early stage of the administration is unprecedented. The documents reflect the world view with which the administration came to office more than an attempt to interpret the events of its first year in office. They reflect a strategic assessment based on the supposition that America has engaged in strategic overreach. They conclude that the solution is a fundamental change in America’s strategic profile. They also reflect an assumption in international affairs of the inherent rationality of all parties that can facilitate conflict resolution through dialogue; a rejection of confrontation, projection of hard power and unilateralism (all of which are seen as having characterized the Bush administration); and an aversion to American exceptionalism and export of values on one hand, and a belief in the intrinsic “rightness” of engagement, consensus and “communities of interests” as a means to solve international conflicts and, on the other hand.

This worldview contradicts in many of its elements key perceptions of the world held by America’s allies in the Middle East (and even in the world at large) and creates a gap in the threat perception between the US and those countries. It has several key elements:

1. The NPR views acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists (or alternatively the breakdown of a nuclear state which could result in transfer of nuclear weapons to sub-states) as the primary threat to the entire international community, but one that can be best contained by multilateral cooperation on technical measures such as better safeguards, isotope ID and others.
2. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by rogue states and subsequent regional proliferation among other countries (including but not only in the Middle East) is relegated to the status of a challenge that can be contained by traditional cold war deterrence. This position drives the administration’s interest in a dialogue with rogue states that are open proliferators to states in order to ensure that they do not proliferate to terrorists as well.
3. An equation between a nuclear Iran and a nuclear North Korea, ignoring the different motivations and strategic environments of the

two countries.<sup>1</sup> In doing so, it suggests that further proliferation in the Middle East in the wake of acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran can be contained as was the case in East Asia.

4. The adoption of the thesis that a declared policy of general nuclear disarmament will reduce the motivation of rogue states to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. This thesis implicitly accepts the “third world” claim that the key motivation for the drive of those states for nuclear weapons is the stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the hands of the veteran nuclear powers and ignores the local strategic and cultural motivations.
5. The assumption that extended assurances will suffice to stem the tide of nuclear proliferation or will even be feasible in a scenario in which Iran will have become a nuclear power. This assumption ignores the damage that such a scenario will have on American credibility in the region.
6. The downplaying of the possibility that such new nuclear states in the region may actually use their nuclear weapons or that deterrence may fail in an escalating crisis situation. The administration clearly does not accept the view that inherent political, cultural and religious features of the region raise the risk of nuclear confrontation due to escalation in the Middle East in comparison to other nuclear “neighborhoods” (the Indian sub-continent, Europe during the Cold War and East Asia).
7. The emphasis of multi-lateral action by the international community and “isolation” of offenders of the world order as the ultimate punishment. The concept underlying this assumption is that all nations accord a high value to their international legitimacy. Experience with Cuba, North Korea, Iraq and Iran does not seem to bear this thesis out.
8. The downgrading of the war against radical Islamist ideology to one against “a specific network – al-Qaida and its affiliates who support efforts to attack the United States, our allies and our partners” and disregard of the strength of the radical Islamist ideology in the Muslim street and the broad support that the terrorist organizations succeed in gathering.

These principles have been put to the test during the first half of the Obama administration and have been found wanting. Engagement has not succeeded in bringing Iran or North Korea to cease their nuclear programs, nor has it mitigated the bellicosity of the Chavez regime in Venezuela, and its successes vis-à-vis Russia and China have also been limited. This is, first and foremost, due to the perception that America is indeed “speaking softly” and carrying “a big stick”, but has neither the present intention nor the future willpower to wield it if and when push comes to shove.

## Real Power vs. Perceived Power

The actual power of a nation is something that only the leadership of that nation can really know. The probability that that leadership will actually employ that power in given circumstances is a question which cannot be answered even by that leadership, as it will depend on circumstances – political and psychological – at that time. Therefore, projection of power does not correspond precisely to real power; it is measured in terms of the perception by friend and foe alike of that nation’s power, resolution and willpower. The perception of American power has long been a central component in the security of America’s allies around the world. Hence, decline in the perception by US allies of American willingness/capacity to project power holds strategic implications for the security of America’s allies.

While this is true in all theatres – from Central Europe to South American and East Asia, it is particularly acute in the Middle East, where American resolve and projection of power have been put to the test in recent years. Local expectations and opinions as to what the US course of action will be, and not only the actual American choice of action, will have a far reaching influence on the behavior of local actors. The expectations of countries in the region and the messages that Washington sends – intentionally or unintentionally – will determine the readiness of its Arab allies to still rely upon it against the growing Iranian threat.

Ostensibly, the **real** strength of the United States has not declined. American military power has proven itself in the last decade in simultaneous involvement in two major wars and numerous other interventions. Objectively, the US has the strongest military in the world. America’s broader economic, financial, social and technological strength also remains robust.

Despite all of these dimensions of American power, there is a growing perception of the **decline of American power**. In the Middle East, this perception is based on the conventional wisdom in the region that the US will disengage from Iraq, leaving it to Iranian predominance, will engage the Taliban both in Afghanistan and Pakistan; will not act with resolution to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons (and will even try to prevent Israel from acting) and will even attempt to reach a “modus vivendi” with Iran as a regional hegemon. In Asia (particularly China) and in South America (Venezuela and Brazil) there is a growing perception of America as a declining giant, hollowed out of its essential source of power, which is economic, unable to respond to market challenges

## American Regional Policy

US involvement in the Middle East and the driving force behind most American initiatives in the region since the 1930’s have traditionally stemmed from the need to acquire and maintain access to vital economic interests – first and foremost among them – energy resources.

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1 The NPR refers to the two proliferation challenges as follows:

“As President Obama has made clear, today’s most immediate and extreme danger is nuclear terrorism. Al Qaeda and their extremist allies are seeking nuclear weapons. We must assume they would use such weapons if they managed to obtain them.” Whereas al-Qaeda is assumed to be willing to use such weapons, the reference to proliferation of nuclear weapons among states does not make that assumption: “Today’s **other pressing threat** is nuclear proliferation. Additional countries – especially **those at odds with the United States, its allies and partners, and the broader international community** – may acquire nuclear weapons. ...North Korea and Iran have violated non-proliferation obligations, defied directives of the United Nations Security Council, pursued missile delivery capabilities, and resisted international efforts to resolve through diplomatic means the crises they have created. Their provocative behavior has increased instability in their regions and could generate pressures in neighboring countries for considering nuclear deterrent options of their own. Continued non-compliance with non-proliferation norms by these and other countries would seriously weaken the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with adverse security implications for the United States and the international community.”

The underlying assumptions of this strategic worldview were that:

- The US economy is the bedrock of all American power. Hence, a constraint on US economic activity is at heart, an attack on the US, both hard and soft.
- Unrestrained access to energy sources is essential to the growth and prosperity of the American economy.
- Middle Eastern oil (and possibly central Asian gas) is essential to maintaining sufficient energy sources.
- More recently - the image of the Saudi and Gulf states as “bank vaults” for dollars, available for investment at short notice. This is a growing consideration in the light of the decline of the European economy and of Europe as an actor in the American economy and the competition with China for the Asian market.

With the possible exception of the invasion of Iraq (regarding which there is a debate about the motivation of the administration), the option of American military intervention has been raised over the years only in the face of a direct attack or clear and imminent danger to those interests.

Ostensibly, the threat to US vital interests posed by the anticipated denial of economic interests and access to energy by a nuclear Iran or the breakdown of the conservative pro-American regimes in the region and their replacement with Islamist governments should be viewed as severe. This, however, will not be so if the administration believes that the threats to the United States can be mitigated by pre-emptive engagement with the forces (Iran and fundamentalist Islam) that are on an inevitable course to gaining power in the region.

In practice, US policy in the Middle East focuses on five key inter-related issues – some of them anchored in specific geographical areas, and some with trans-national implications: (1) Iraq (with the implications for future Sunni-Shiite relations in the region and for Iranian and Jihadi influences); (2) Afghanistan (with implications for Pakistan and potential for nuclear proliferation); (3) Iran (with implications for possible nuclearization of the Middle East); (4) al-Qa’ida and (5) the Israeli-Arab peace process.

## Iraq

The primary aim of American foreign policy in Iraq is to end the war, withdraw US forces and hand the security of the new nation over to Iraqi military forces, based on President Obama’s February 27, 2009 declaration on his intention to bring the war to a conclusion following a “responsible drawdown” of American troops from this country. On the security level, this aim may be achievable. The Iraq of today is quite different than the Iraq of 2006-2007. The insurgency in Iraq continues to decline and at current levels it does not pose a major threat to the stability of the Iraqi government. While al-Qaida in Iraq and other Sunni extremists continue their attacks, they have thus far failed to provoke the type of tit for tat retributive cycle of violence, of revenge killings that used to take place. Hence, with or without a large American presence, a return to the sectarian strife of the years 2006-2007 seems unlikely: the Sunni terrorist networks have been devastated (for the time being); the Shiite militant groups have for the most part moved into the political process; and the Iraqi security forces are much more numerous and capable today.

On the other hand, six months after the March elections, the Iraqi parties have not succeeded in forming a new national government. This is primarily due to Iranian intervention. Tehran has a vested interest in keeping Iraq in a status of limbo until after the first stage of American withdrawal and has succeeded in doing so. The sense of growing Iranian influence and declining American presence feeds the willingness of the Shiite parties to take the Iranian position into account. Another important long-term political challenge to political stability in Iraq is embodied in Arab-Kurd tensions over Kirkuk and other disputed territories, oil revenues and the balance of power between the central government and the Kurdistan regional government. These tensions could lead to a wider conflict. Here too, in the light of the waning of American influence, both sides are turning to Iran and the neighboring Arab states (and Turkey) for support.

The fact that the US itself is not averse to engaging Iran in order to guarantee an orderly withdrawal process raises concerns in the region of a “grand bargain” based on an Iranian commitment to cooperate in Iraq (and Afghanistan) in return for a softening of the American position on the nuclear issue. Whether or not such a bargain is being contemplated by the administration already does not change the perception in the region that it is likely, and the influence of such an assessment on the positions of the countries of the region. The Sunni countries surrounding Iraq are already developing their own areas of influence and nurturing relationships with groups inside Iraq. Today there are already close ties between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, and between the Turks and Shiite delegates such as Muqtada al-Sadr and others. The US may encourage this trend as a preferable alternative to Iranian influence. Iraq, after the American withdrawal, will become a microcosm of regional struggles at the expense of both Iraqi and wider American interests.

## Afghanistan

The Afghani surge declared by President Obama (November 2009) will not achieve the success of the surge in Iraq. This is due to basic differences between the two theatres. However, by declaring that the American troops will start their drawdown from Afghanistan in mid-2011, the administration has sent a message to all the actors in the theatre that the present military effort is temporary and if they can ride it out, the American agenda will eventually fizzle. The US military has already recognized the futility of achieving the administration’s goals and recommended a shift in focus from nation-building to simply destroying al-Qaida forces in Afghanistan and creating areas of stability under the central government in lieu of extending Kabul’s sway over the entire country.

The US may decide to forego the goal of pacifying the entire territory of Afghanistan and to attempt to stabilize only areas controlled by the central government in order to reduce terrorist attacks in these areas. Naturally, this will be perceived by the administration as an accomplishment. However, a rise in American casualties could cause a shift in American public opinion, which still sees the Afghanistan war as a “just war” against terrorism, as opposed to Iraq which was the “wrong war”. Such a shift, bringing public opinion to perceive it



as a second “Vietnam War” may bring the administration to look for a way to “cut losses” and to initiate an even earlier withdrawal, or alternatively, to invest further resources in order to achieve an image of success.

The price of an American “cut and run” strategy in Afghanistan may be high. A resurgence of Taliban influence in Afghanistan will surely revive the Pakistani Taliban and further weaken the regime in Islamabad. A failed nuclear state of Pakistan will have dire consequences for the proliferation regime, nuclearization of the Middle East and the potential transformation of Pakistan and Afghanistan together into a staging ground for Jihadist attacks against the West.

## The Iranian Challenge

Probably the greatest contributor to the perception of the decline in America’s resolve to support its allies in the Middle East – or alternatively the perception of a conspiratorial undeclared shift in American policy from support of those allies – has been the policy of the Obama administration towards Iran. Seemingly unambiguous statements of non-acceptance of Iran’s nuclear aspirations (“unacceptable”, “all options are on the table”) have given way to a perception that the US has already reconciled itself to a nuclear Iran (at best) or even is realigning its interest in the region to accommodate Iranian predominance. The outcome of the administration’s engagement policy to date has been to encourage Iran to take more strident and provocative moves towards a nuclear capability. The sanctions regime creates an illusion of action in consensus, but few truly believe that it will achieve the necessary effect.

The case for continuing this policy is primarily the absence of alternatives and particularly the potential consequences of an Iranian retaliation to a military strike. The argument against military action (or even threat of military action) is based on the assessment that such action will be met with a broad Iranian response that will be catastrophic for the region, generate upheavals in moderate states, ignite a war between Iran and the Gulf States, cause a steep rise in energy prices, endanger American troops in Iran and Afghanistan and give the Iranian regime the opportunity to make short shrift of the “Green Revolution” opposition. This assessment is applied by the administration also to the implications of an Israeli strike. The administration is aware of the consensus among the political leadership in Israel that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable and that it would lead to a long list of negative outcomes: the end of the Peace Process; undermining the stability of moderate regimes and strengthening Hezbollah and Hamas. Ostensibly, a credible Israeli threat against Iran would serve the US as pressure against Iran. However, the administration fears that even the perception of US support for Israeli action would lead to severe reactions in the Muslim world, would damage friendly regimes and inspire terrorist activities against the US.

This apocalyptic assessment regarding Iranian reactions to a military strike is fed by various circles in Washington and is deeply flawed. The Iranian military capability to close the Straits of Hormuz or to attack American interests in the Gulf is limited. So is the Iranian subversive and terrorist capacity to ignite the Sunni Arab world in response to an attack on its nuclear project (deeply feared by the Sunni world). However, there is little or no challenge within the US administration to these assumptions, which continue to determine the limits of US policy towards Iran.

Internal events in Iran are also conjured by the administration as a kind of a potential “deus ex machina” for solving the issue without violence. This is based on the belief that regime change in Iran would bring about suspension of the nuclear program or even its complete dismantling. Some observers argue that the Iranian regime will change or the Green Movement will take over in a year or two and therefore, the best way to deal with the Iranian nuclear threat is to wait. These argue that although the changing of the regime in Iran will probably not bring about a liberal democracy, there might be a rise to power of “religious democrats” who have an interest in restoring Iran’s international legitimacy and would prefer good relations with the West over perseverance with the nuclear program.

A major source of differences between the United States and its allies in the region is in the definition of the “nuclear Iran” which must be prevented: is it Iran with a nuclear bomb which has done a test? Is it Iran with a bomb in a basement? Is it Iran with enough for one bomb and a proven capability for one bomb? Or is it an Iran with stockpiles of enriched uranium for a large amount of weapons and half a year away from breakout or sneak-out? It seems (though there is no formal definition by the administration on this issue) that the American definition is the first – an Iran which has completed weaponization and testing of a weapon. For most of the countries in the Middle East, both Israel and the Arab countries, stockpiles alone would be seen as an Iran which has already crossed the nuclear threshold, *de facto*.

The administration also seems to believe that Iran does not really intend to break out with a military nuclear capability but will suffice with being a “threshold nuclear power” along the lines of the Japanese model. This assessment leads it to redefine its objectives regarding the Iranian threat: from the complete prevention of a “nuclear” Iran to the acceptance of Iran as a nuclear threshold state, while convincing Tehran not to cross the threshold.

This assessment though does not seem to hold water. There is broad anticipation in the region that Iran will not stop at a threshold status and the states of the region will be driven by this assessment and not by an optimistic American attitude. The basis for this assessment is the belief that Iran cannot achieve its goals in the region just by announcing such a status. These goals – driving the US out of the Gulf, imposing hegemony on the countries of the Gulf, having immunity for subversive action – can only be achieved by actually having a weapon capability. The “threshold assumption” may have fit the Iranian policy a few years back. Today, given the present balance of power between the more circumspect “old guard” and the IRGC leadership, the possibility of a policy of reaching the threshold and staying there is highly unlikely.

## Al-Qaeda

A leitmotif that has characterized the Obama administration has been outreach to the Muslim world. President Obama came to office at a time when relations between the US and the Muslim world had reached a nadir and he saw himself as particularly suited – as one who was brought up as a Muslim and lived in a Muslim country - to rectify them. As part of this policy, the administration refuses to acknowledge

any link between Islam and the phenomenon of Jihadi terrorism (to the extent that the administration refuses to use the terminology of “Jihadist” on the grounds that “Jihad” in Islam is a personal moral struggle) and presents the latter as an aberration with no real link to “true Islam” - individual acts of personal violence and not part of a wider phenomenon.

Furthermore, the engagement policy also dictates outreach not only to bone fide moderates and mainstream Muslims, but also to the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates and “moderate” Taliban elements on the Sunni side and Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi proxies of Iran on the Shiite side. The rationale for such engagement is rooted in (1) a tacit belief that these parties are not irrevocably anti-American but respond to America’s actions, policies and rejection of dialogue with them; (2) belief that preemptive engagement of these movements will neutralize their radicalism and anti-western positions; (3) and unwillingness to invest the necessary soft and hard power in order to perpetuate the “old guard” of pro-American regimes in the region.

The insistence on ignoring the religious motivation and broader religious legitimacy of the Jihadi phenomenon is very much out of sync with the concerns of the pro-American Muslim regimes which see the main problem in that very legitimacy. The strategy of using sanitized terminology as a means to woo the radicals from their fundamental religious, cultural and political hostility to the values that America represents (at least in their eyes) will ultimately fail.

## Relations with Israel and the Israeli-Arab Peace Process

The key area in which the administration sees a need to project active involvement in the region is the Israeli-Arab Peace Process. The administration has, in essence, accepted the claim that the “Palestinian problem” and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are the “core issue” of the Middle East and the key cause of instability in the region and that this conflict could be solved were it not for Israel’s obstinacy. The efforts to promote Israeli-Palestinian negotiations – and possibly Israeli-Syrian talks in the future - and the willingness to risk confrontation and crisis with Israel is seen by the Obama administration as a means to garner Arab and Muslim sympathy. The result is an American policy vis-à-vis the peace process which is more Palestinian than that of the Palestinians. Washington demanded a total cessation of settlement activity, including in East Jerusalem when the Palestinian leadership itself did not, and joined the demand that Israel subscribe to the NPT. The voices heard from those close to the administration charging Israel, the Jewish lobby and even Jewish figures within government with subversion of strategic American interests in the region in favor of Israeli interests both reflect the true opinion of those individuals and serve as a lever for restraining Israel. The presentation of a fundamental conflict of interests between the US and Israel in regards to Iran exacerbates this narrative.

The efforts of the administration to distance itself from Israel and to present an “even-handed” or even pro-Palestinian stance, however, have not significantly improved the chances of a peace settlement. The decline in the perception of American power was evident in the long refusal of the Palestinian leadership to American requests to renew direct negotiations. As American presence in the region wanes, the Palestinians and the Arab regimes will have to take into account growing domestic radicalization as a severe constraint against moving forward in the peace process.

By distancing itself from Israel and by lowering its profile in the Middle East in general, however, the administration also distances itself from influence on the peace process. The image of American power in the region is an important component of Israel’s own deterrent image. This is expressed in the very image of American capacity to act in the region to support its allies and in the assumption of a strategic alliance and special relationship between the US and Israel. The erosion of the image of American power is not due to the perception of American capabilities per se, but to the perception of willingness of the US to act in the region to support its allies, buttressed by a perceived decline in US economic pre-eminence. Erosion of the image of support for allies in general and for Israel in particular, will have a detrimental effect on Israel’s deterrence. The erosion of Israel’s deterrence will have, in turn, a detrimental effect on that of the United States.

The Obama administration – backed up by parts of the US military establishment – views Israeli military action against Iran as fraught with negative consequences for American interests. Paradoxically, this view contradicts the expressed interest of many of America’s Arab allies in an immediate (and military) solution to the Iranian nuclear program. Whether such action – if it takes place – will achieve its goals or not and whether the doomsday scenarios of Iranian responses will take place or not, an Israeli attack will certainly be exploited by the administration to create a crisis with Israel in order to demonstrate non-complicity in the attack.

## Implications for the Strategic Position of the US

The perception in the Middle East of a future “de-Americanized” region is not baseless. The United States will most probably pull out of Iraq by the end of 2011, leaving Iran to play a pivotal role of power-broker. Until then, the US will be constrained by its Iraqi agenda to refrain from any serious crisis with Iran, lest it retaliate in the Iraqi theatre. In the ACPAK theatre, without (the unlikely) investment of sufficient additional resources, the US will not achieve strategic defeat of the Taliban and their supporters, nor will the current level of military intervention or efforts to reach agreements with parts of the Taliban achieve the elimination of al-Qaida in Afghanistan. There are grounds for the scenario that continued American military engagement in Afghanistan without any real resolution on the horizon (especially if the number of American casualties rises) may change American public opinion about this war. The war with the Taliban has already spilled over to Pakistan. However, while the US must rely on Pakistan in the war against al-Qaida, there exists a real possibility that the Taliban will broaden their “sphere of influence” in Pakistan, both geographically and institutionally in the Pakistani religious establishment, and even within the regime itself. Such a development would affect the stability of this country and its willingness to cooperate with the US and signal the decline of American power in yet another area. From the point of view of the Sunni Arab states, US policy in Iraq, allowing Iran a foothold in that country, acceptance of Hezbollah predominance in Lebanon and overtures towards the (relatively pro-Iranian) Muslim Brotherhood movement all indicate that the US sees Iran as the future power in the region.

The future of American interests in the Middle East— and the interests of America’s allies in the region - hinge primarily on the outcome of the efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear status. If Iran is perceived as having crossed the nuclear threshold it will have “won” against the pressures of the international community. It will become a model for radical movements throughout the Muslim world and will be on its way to achieving its desired hegemony in the region. As long as this threshold has not been crossed the US government can claim success of its engagement policy – at least as a holding tactic. Delaying Iran’s crossing the threshold however does not delay the process of decline in the willingness to rely on the United States. The cumulative impression of American reluctance to confront Iran out of fear of Iranian reprisal exacerbates the concerns in the region that the pro-Western countries will not be able to rely, when the chips are down, on the United States.

Failure to prevent Iran from nearing the nuclear threshold will certainly intensify the drive of other states in the region for nuclear weapons. The increased demand for nuclear materials and know-how will probably induce increased supply. The prime suppliers of these will be Pakistan and North Korea – two nuclear nations which may become failed states on short notice. The possibility of a “melt-down” in these countries may bring the elements responsible for the nuclear program to enter the market. Increased demand would probably bring Chinese and Russian companies back into the market. Increased supply will most likely induce additional demand, with countries in the Middle East and other regions speeding up their nuclear programs to take advantage of the market. The assumption in Washington that American promises of extended deterrence will stem the tide of proliferation to other countries, as it did in East Asia ignores the damage that the credibility of such guarantees will have sustained after the US has failed to prevent Iran from going nuclear. The willingness of the regional parties to rely on American assurances has already declined and will decline further once Iran achieves even a nascent nuclear status. It is doubtful that the US will be able to provide the high profile military deployment necessary to back up such assurances. Difficulties will come both from domestic American considerations and from domestic pressures in the region, with America’s allies facing Iranian-led and Islamist opposition to close security relations with the US.

The administration may attempt to balance the perception of having abandoned its Arab allies by selling them advanced weapons – a step already initiated vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, Egypt and some of the Gulf States – and by the argument that the withdrawal from Iraq, and eventually from Afghanistan will ultimately enhance America’s operational flexibility and hence its deterrence vis-à-vis Iran. However it is not likely that the conservative Arab regimes will be satisfied by such a claim and it is unlikely that reinforcement of their strategic capabilities will provide them with the level of confidence they would need to challenge Iranian aspirations. In any case, the Sunni Arab states would probably demand – at least for domestic reasons - that American promises of extended deterrence include guarantees against Israel and efforts to disarm Israel as well as Iran. Thus, certain steps that may be taken by the administration to counter-balance the decline in American projection of power may have an adverse effect on Israel’s deterrence posture.

The strategic – indeed historic - implications of a nuclear Iran should ostensibly galvanize the countries of the region into action. However, in light of the perception that the United States is withdrawing from the region, many of the regimes therein are already accommodating themselves to the new “neighborhood strongman”. This is evident in the behavior of Qatar, Oman and even Saudi Arabia itself. Iran will probably take advantage of this period of Arab strategic inferiority to cement its hegemony in the region. A prime example may be by renewing its call for “leaving the security of the Gulf in the hands of the Gulf countries themselves” - a euphemism for Iranian hegemony without American or British presence. In this demand, Iran will be able to leverage the fact that the very failure of the US to prevent Iran from going nuclear and the regional image of the Obama administration as conciliatory towards Iran will diminish any faith that the countries of the region may have in American guarantees. The Iranian ability to employ subversion will also make it difficult for those regimes to continue to rely on the “infidel” to defend them against (Muslim) Iran. Other consequences will be felt in the heart of the Middle East; the chances of weaning Syria out of the Iranian orbit and promoting stability in Lebanon, where Iran’s surrogate – Hezbollah – has already become the key power broker will become even slimmer. Hamas, Iran’s Palestinian proxy will feel that it has a longer leash. The chances that the Palestinian Authority will be willing to take bold steps towards a peace agreement with Israel will also wane.

For the Wahhabi regime of Saudi Arabia, which was born as an anti-Shiite movement, Iranian (i.e. Shiite) hegemony is a nightmare come true. At the same time, secular conservative Arab regimes such as Egypt and Jordan fear that the US is in the process of shifting its support from the “old guards” in the region to oppositional popular forces such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The growing anxiety in the Gulf States from a “Shiite threat” due to the prospects of a nuclear Iran and increasing Shiite (Iranian) influence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon could lead to enhanced strategic collaboration between these regimes and radical Islamic elements on the basis of an anti-Shiite “platform”, common to both parties. However, these regimes will not be able to compel the radical organizations they sponsor to restrict their militant activities solely to Shiite and Iranian targets and to avoid action against the Western “infidel” and Israel.

These trends are not irreversible. Events in the region may impose on the administration a change of policy and return to a higher level of involvement in the region. Some possible scenarios and events may cause change and reassessment in US regional policy: regime change (or even succession within regimes that will bring younger, more radical and inexperienced leaders to the helm) in key states in the region (Saudi Arabia, Egypt); domestic developments in Iraq and Afghanistan that could undermine plans for redeployment and withdrawal of the US from those countries; deterioration of the internal situation in Pakistan; significant progress in the Iranian nuclear program; the future of Yemen as a base of al-Qaida in the region, and major terrorist attacks originating in one of the countries of the region. US policy towards the Middle East may also be overturned by developments in the relations with Russia, China and North Korea.

Politics – like nature – abhors a vacuum. The conscious disengagement of the United States from the role it played since the mid-1970’s as leading power in the Middle East will open the door wide for other players – local ones like Iran that will seek regional hegemony and global ones like Russia and China. The United States can still reverse the trend by re-drawing its lines in the sand and re-evaluating of global re-positioning.

## Culture of Command & Control of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East

Dr. Shmuel Bar & Dr. Oded Brosh

### Executive Summary

A number of Middle Eastern states are potential candidates for acquisition of nuclear weapons after Iran has achieved this goal. These include: Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Libya. This study is an attempt to portray possible paradigms of C3 (Command, Control and Communications) of nuclear weapons in these countries if and when they acquire those assets. The study explores not only the paradigms that may emerge in the present regimes (or continuity regimes), but also in potentially revolutionary Muslim Brotherhood or Jihadi-Salafi regimes.

The factors that will influence the C3 paradigms of nuclear weapons in the region include a wide range of political, military, bureaucratic, religious and technological issues. The basic building block for C3 of nuclear weapons will be the country's perception of what they are meant for; are they perceived as "taboo" and so destructive and terrible that they must be controlled far past any other weapon? While the public discourse in the Middle East perceives nuclear weapons as a means that will allow their owner to deter its enemies by threat of total annihilation, it does not reflect the sense of a "taboo" on the actual use of nuclear weapons that developed in the international community. This is particularly evident in Islamic writings – both Jihadi-Salafi and mainstream – which tend to analyze nuclear weapons as extrapolations of weapons which existed in the early days of Islam and were permitted by the Prophet, and hence their use is permissible. The absence of this "taboo" will impact on the stringency of the C3.

The historical record shows that nuclear aspirations in the Middle East have been motivated by a number of considerations. One is derived from the issue of honor, and the desire of successive regimes to demonstrate a measure of stature, regional and international standing, and prowess, so as to garner the esteem of a wider audience, inside and outside direct national constituencies. Looking at Egypt's Nasser in the distant past, seeking recognition as the leader of the Arabs, albeit without nuclear weapons; Saddam Hussein in the more recent past, invoking mythological images to establish his particular form of dominance over others; Qaddafi, or Iran in the future – evoke this factor in trying to understand the future nuclear posture of the states concerned. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Syria, Libya or others, therefore all have motives that are beyond the scope of pure strategic deterrence associated with nuclear prowess. It is evident that nuclear weapons thus invoke a degree, a modicum, of mysticism that reinforces images of ideological fervor seeking to undermine the status-quo, or anxieties regarding these states' integrity and survival. They are thus subject to entirely rational calculations regarding their utility, but in an environment of values quite different from that of the Cold War.

A country – such as Iran – that views nuclear weapons not only as a deterrent against its enemies (in the case of Iran – the United States and Israel), but also as weapons to be brandished in order to achieve a predominant – even hegemonic – status in the region, will be more likely to integrate this capability in its day to day strategic posture. Such operationalization of the nuclear assets will create a need for more elaborate models of command and control. Other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, may view the weapons as quintessentially deterrents, and hence to be stored away until extreme circumstances warrant their deployment. Such an operational concept will facilitate C3 measures. However, the attitude of one party to its nuclear assets will affect that of its potential adversaries. Those states who may initially not opt for operationalization of the weapons may be forced to adopt a more operational (and hence more demanding in C3 procedures) attitude as a response to the behavior of their neighbors.

A key conclusion of the project is that the C3 paradigms that will probably emerge in the early stages of a nascent nuclear power in the region will probably be closer to the early structures of the veteran nuclear powers, with adaptations for regional cultural, political and religious idiosyncrasies, and will not necessarily reflect the accumulated lessons of those powers. The latter developed their paradigms gradually as nuclear weapons became more abundant, and in a thoroughly different strategic and cultural context. Furthermore, the suspicion towards the West in the region is likely to bring them to reject solutions that are based on "off the shelf" Western technology, and to try to develop local solutions, which will be, initially at least, less sophisticated. They may, however, turn to willing supplier states with which they have long-standing strategic relationships, or other commonalities of interest, for assistance in expertise and hardware, to establish the required C3 infrastructures – Iran, North Korea (DPRK), Pakistan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) all come to mind as supplier thereof, in one possible context or another, for one or another of the states examined.

Furthermore, the nuclear capability, once achieved, will be an important lever for influence within the regimes because it is viewed in these societies as confirming the prowess of the leadership, thus enhancing regime survival. This may well create solutions based on "constructive" ambiguity to solve internal conflicts which will leave loopholes for the actual C3 of the weapons.

Thus, although it is the assumption that even ideologically, or religiously, highly charged leaderships will remain rational, by and large cognizant of the effects of nuclear weapons and the fundamentals of nuclear deterrence stability – yet the possibility of catastrophic miscalculation, for a multiplicity of reasons, is disconcerting. An initial evolving of a low-probability-high-consequence danger of nuclear

weapons being in the possession of the regimes which rule the states scrutinized in the study, could then embody dynamics that might lead to escalation, volatility, crisis brinkmanship, and ultimately deterrence instability. This would, then, possibly occur in a manner quite different from that which evolved during the Cold War in its latter stages, and to which much reference is commonly made in current studies, especially after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 served to superimpose mutual rules, regulations, and caution.

The personalized leadership style common in the Middle East will also have a determining effect on C3. All the regimes and military establishments in question are averse to delegation of authority in matters relating to strategic weapons and strategic interests. In contrast to the Western system, of delegation of authority and de-centralization of information on a need to know basis, we will probably encounter in the Middle East a more individualized chain of command consisting of fewer, but highly loyal and trusted individuals, with less compartmentalization between them. The delegation of authority will be based on collective identity (tribal, familial, "old boys" networks, religious schools). The tradition of hyper-centralism of some of the regimes, and the tendency for deep involvement in military affairs by the political leadership, would probably extend to its involvement in the very identity of each link in the chain of command over nuclear weapons.

The purported Soviet style "dead man's hand" system would, theoretically, be acceptable to many of the regimes in the region, and particularly to autocratic authoritarian regimes. However, the logic behind this system – the total destruction of the country in the wake of a nuclear attack, warranting an all-out second strike and the *a priori* knowledge of the identity of the attacker – will not be true in the Middle East. In the Middle East, a nuclear attack may be perceived as survivable, especially if such a notion were to be legitimized by religious edict (*fatwas*), and elements of the regimes involved may, therefore, not necessarily accept the idea that the incapacitation of the incumbent leadership should automatically escalate to an all-out nuclear war. This concern may bring regimes to pre-delegate authority to particularly loyal pre-designated trusted field commanders. In authoritarian regimes with an "*après moi le deluge*" mentality, there will be more of a propensity to adopt these means. However, it may also be compatible with a leader or regime that has a strong apocalyptic, or messianic, belief, and views such action not as merely revenge but as an act which may hasten the apocalyptic or messianic stage of history, and ultimate victory.

In most of the regimes in the region, custody of the weapons and the delivery systems will have to be put in the hands of organizations whose loyalty to the leaders is beyond doubt. This constraint may lead to weapons and delivery systems being under unified command, or at least held in units which are subordinate to one common field command. Research and development (R&D) establishments in the Middle East are also liable to play a role in the decision-making processes even after completing development of the weapons, similar to that of A.Q. Khan in Pakistan. Since these are usually linked to military organizations, they may emerge as "back doors" to the C3 system for the weapons they devised. Thus, these organizations may become "loose cannons" in scenarios of breakdown of the states.

Integration of Western-style technologies (the American "football", the Russian Cheget, or permissive action links [PALs]) into the command and control structures of regimes in the Middle East is doubtful, at least in the early stages. The natural suspicion that the enemy may be capable of planting Trojan horses in technological systems in order to manipulate them, may inhibit the use of such means, and increase the reliance on physical communication, verbal codes understood only by the addressees, trusted emissaries and runners, and security vetting. The inhibitions behind the use of such technology would derive also from the fact that a country with only a small nuclear arsenal would probably not endanger it by integrating a system which may cause permanent damage to the weapons in case of improper use. Reliance on such means, though, would have an adverse effect on the regime's ability to maintain flexible time-sensitive response mechanisms and hence would influence other elements of the nuclear doctrine. With this, high alert levels desired to reinforce deterrence, intimidate, establish escalation dominance, and demonstrate prowess for domestic regime survival motive – would require extra efforts to build reliable C3I (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) capabilities, perhaps beyond the capacities of the states concerned to do independently without outside assistance.

The fact that the same types of delivery systems may be used for both conventional and non-conventional warheads will further complicate C2 (Command and Control), as different standard operating procedures (SOPs) will probably be applied to those delivery systems which are dedicated for nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the possibility that nuclear weapons may be delivered in un-orthodox ways – by truck, civilian ship or airliner, neighbouring countries' territory – to obfuscate responsibility will also reduce the use of technological means of command and control.

It is very unlikely that any of the regimes in the region will adopt human verification of the orders of the Head of State. In the authoritarian regime model, the leader would probably not accept any restrictions on his authority to launch weapons – even authentication by a "trusted" deputy. Regimes such as the Iranian or future Jihadi-Salafi regimes in which the leader is perceived as the "*Amir al-Muminin*" (Commander of the Believers) or (as in Iran) the *Vali-Faqih*, the leader is thought to have a certain inspiration from *Allah*, and restriction of his discretion by a lesser individual would be tantamount to imposing restrictions on the will of *Allah*. Even the argument that the verification is not meant for regular situations but for contingencies during which the leader may be incapacitated, for any reason, would be difficult to support in these regimes.

A state that acquires a military nuclear capability will have to make a substantial investment in means of delivery of those weapons. The preferred means of delivery will be surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). The logic that brought existing nuclear states to deploy assets in sparsely populated non-central locations may not be applicable in some of the regimes under discussion. Distant areas are, in many cases, populated by minority groups who are perceived as *a priori* disloyal to the regime. The advantage of deployment in these areas – drawing enemy attacks to areas which are not the "heartland" of the nation – must be considered in contrast with the question of the security of the installations in those areas.

The fear of infiltration and betrayal may encourage separation of weapons from delivery systems. Keeping warheads unassembled, with parts stored in different locations or in the same location but one step, “a turn of the screw”, away from operational status would make the stealing of fully operational weapons difficult, but would extract a price in terms of operational flexibility, and hinder frequent or permanent high alert. Hence, it is more likely that these regimes will opt for storage of warheads under control of highly reliable keepers. The limited number of such loyal and reliable keepers will oblige the regime to keep nuclear assets together – compromising their security and raising the chances of unauthorized use or theft. In regimes for which the nuclear capability is viewed as a strategic capability for possible use, the security consideration may be subordinated to the necessity for flexible response, and hair-trigger readiness.

## Preface

This paper is a summary of a series of country studies and roundtable discussions on potential paradigms of command and control over nuclear weapons that may be adopted by Middle Eastern countries if they acquire such weapons. The objective of the project was to bring a broader understanding of the implications of a “nuclearized” Middle East in the wake of the acquisition of a military nuclear capability by one or more countries in the region.

There are various views regarding which countries may be the first to enter the nuclear arms race in the wake of Iran. In the course of the discussion, the following points were raised:

- **Saudi Arabia** will have the highest motivation to acquire a nuclear capability in the wake of Iran. Conventional wisdom suggests that Saudi Arabia will not, and cannot, undertake an independent nuclear weapons R&D effort, but will likely take advantage of its links to the Pakistani nuclear program (which it funded in the distant past), and will attempt to purchase a capability from any willing supplier. Disconcerting is the possibility, however remote at this point, that such a capability might devolve to a successor regime of unspecified type, particularly a Jihadi-Salafi one.
- There is a basis for assessing that the first state that will attempt to attain a nuclear capability after Iran is **Turkey**. The Turkish case is complicated: in spite of its indigenous capability for developing a nuclear program, Turkey is a member of NATO and seeks to become a member of the European Union. As such, it theoretically has access today to US nuclear weapons stationed on its soil, at Incirlik, and which are designated as being at its disposal. But this does not constitute an independent deterrent, and does not bestow it with the regional nuclear status that would be desired in response to a regional poly-nuclear environment. Thus, it faces a number of limitations. However, in a scenario following the collapse of regional non-proliferation firebreaks, and consequently perhaps the global non-proliferation regime, Turkey may find itself forced to go on this course, particularly if other countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia or Egypt, begin to develop nuclear weapons, and if Russia were to revert to old stances.
- **Egypt** undoubtedly has the most advanced scientific, technological and industrial infrastructure of the Arab states. It has the best scientific array for operating nuclear reactors and implementing a dedicated nuclear program. It is inconceivable that Egypt, which sees Iran as the key threat to its own interests and to Arab-Sunni interests in general, would allow Iran to become a nuclear power without attempting to acquire a comparable capability. Egypt, which also sees itself as the strategic defender of the Arab world, would find it hard to abandon the defense of the Arabs to the Saudis and Gulf States, even if they were to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. Rogue elements inside the Egyptian ruling elite (Abu Ghazala), and outside of it (Haykal), are reported to have sought to acquire or establish a nuclear weapons capability at various stages, and it is possible that in the late 1980s or mid-1990s, Egypt may have been on the threshold of attempting to seek a nuclear capability. Another danger with respect to Egypt lies in the possibility that the Muslim Brotherhood will gain power in the state, and take control of a nuclear program in an advanced stage of development, or initiate one if it is not already underway when assuming power.
- **Iraq** was twice close to establishing the wherewithal for attaining a nuclear weapons capability, first until Israel’s action against the Osiraq reactor in 1981, and again the first Gulf War of 1991 interrupted its plans, as first US military intervention, and then UN inspection teams, put a stop to the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. The new order in Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s regime is still coalescing, and it is difficult to say what Iraq’s identity will be under Shiite dominance – whether it will adopt the Arab identity and seek to fill a key role in the Arab world, or whether it will adopt the Shiite identity and an intimate connection with Iran. If Iraq seeks to develop a nuclear weapons capability, it will have to start from scratch in terms of the hardware that it will need, because most of its equipment was destroyed, and there is tight international monitoring of everything it possessed prior to the US-led invasion. However, as regards the expertise required, some of the personnel who established Iraq’s nuclear program up to 2003 are still present and ready to mobilize for this effort, even if Security Council resolutions imposing severe restrictions on Iraq remain in effect after the US withdrawal. In addition, Iraq might also be able to purchase the necessary wherewithal, perhaps even nuclear weaponry off-the-shelf from willing suppliers, such as the DPRK perhaps, or Pakistani elements, rogue or official.
- **Syria** is incapable of achieving a nuclear capability on its own, but until 2007 it almost succeeded in clandestinely constructing a nuclear reactor acquired covertly from the DPRK, obviously intended for the production of weapons grade plutonium for a modest nuclear weapons program, similar to its role in the North Korean program, and is suspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of possibly also having engaged in undeclared uranium enrichment activity. The very fact that the Syrian regime had already begun a clandestine nuclear weapons program should be taken as indication that it may do so again in the future, the more so if regional non-proliferation firebreaks are breached, and regional rivals like Saudi Arabia, Egypt or Turkey appear to be going nuclear.
- **Libya** embarked on a nuclear weapons program by the acquisition of “turnkey” uranium enrichment facilities from the A.Q. Khan network, which also supplied it with the blueprints of an early PRC atomic bomb design, and therefore it is only plausible that once the dam had been breached, it could attempt to return to previous efforts halted by US and UK intervention in late 2003.

The questions that were posed to the participants include, *inter alia*, the following:

- What is the motivation of the countries of the region to develop, test and declare possession of nuclear weapons, and how does the motivation affect the envisaged future C2 and nuclear posture of those countries after they acquire them?
- What are the influences on C2 paradigms of religious, local-political, cultural, and social-organizational culture on nuclear policy in the various potential nuclear states under scrutiny in the project? In this context, what is the influence of domestic stability, regime politics, sectorial (tribal, sectors within the defense and security establishments) interests, religious authority and other internal factors?
- What lessons may be learned from conventional command and control paradigms, and C2 of current “strategic weapons” (SSMs or chemical and biological weapons [CBW] arsenals which have been around for many years in some of the states being examined – Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Libya)?
- What cultural and political features of potential nuclear states in the Middle East may affect future C2 of nuclear weapons, and of nuclear posturing?
- The decision-making process regarding the use of nuclear weapons; who is involved (functionally; personal inclinations)? Rivalries (between functions; personalities)? Likely options regarding the chain of command?
- What existing C2 procedures may be compatible with the military and political culture of the countries of the region and which will be rejected? Examples of these may be:
  - Means for authentication of identity and legitimacy of commands (codes, authentication by second-in-command, etc.);
  - Triggers and methods for delegation of authority;
  - PALs (Permissive Action Links);
- What checks and balances – by human control or technological enhancement – could be instituted to prevent unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons?
- “Plan B” scenarios envisaged for C3 in case the legitimate leadership is incapacitated, or the primary chain of command is disrupted (salience of the Iraqi example in 1991 and 2003 to other states, and lessons possibly learned?).
- Relevance of potential multilateral control, involving partnerships and alliances between Arab states (Egypt/Saudi Arabia/ Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] States) – either in normal situations or in situations when the national command structure collapses.
- Communication (thus, C3) issues; and intelligence issues (thus, C3I) issues with respect to a coherent system that such states might be obliged to develop, at least over time, even if during the initial stages it may be assumed that these would be perhaps somewhat “primitive” and centralized.
- In which cases will there be a higher risk of transfer of nuclear weapons to non-state (terrorist, proxy) players, by either authorized official decision, or by renegade or rogue elements acting at behest?

During the project various political scenarios were discussed in which countries in the region may be in danger of nuclear confrontation. These scenarios served to test the different assumptions regarding the C2 paradigms of the different countries, and the outcome of the interaction between them. This facet of the project has not been summarized and may serve as raw material for future discussion.

The project commissioned separate studies on a number of key Middle Eastern countries, regarding which these questions were posed: Iran, Saudi Arabia (assuming the continued rule of current ruling elite represented by the Saudi royal family), Egypt (assuming the current, or continuity, ruling regime elite), Iraq, Syria, and Libya. In addition, studies were prepared on C2 of nuclear weapons by a possible Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt, and by a possible Jihadi-Salafi regime, principally in Arabia if the Sa’ud line were to be displaced. Three roundtables were held in which the issues above were discussed. The list of participants in these roundtables appears in Appendix 3.

## Overview

As far as is known, none of the regimes in this study currently possess nuclear weapons, and there are no indications that any of them have even begun to develop a doctrine for command and control of such weapons if and when they acquire them, except perhaps Iran that already has a well established operational SSM infrastructure under the auspices of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Air Force, which might be expected to be designated as the trustee of nuclear weapons assets too. However, there exist cultural, political and organizational features of these countries, which can shed light on possible command and control paradigms for nuclear weapons that may emerge if these regimes acquire them. These features include:

- Islamic views embraced by some of these regimes regarding the acceptability of nuclear weapons for deterrence, and the permissibility of using nuclear weapons to advance the cause of victory. These views may provide for insight into the level of flexibility and access to the weapons that these regimes may desire, and hence the type of C3 they may establish and develop.
- Present C2 of existing weapons which are perceived in the context of the region as “strategic weapons”, and therefore call for a higher level of command and control may also shed light on future C2 of nuclear weapons. All these regimes have or had other types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – chemical (CW), and in some cases reportedly biological (BW), and strategic SSM delivery systems, mostly for conventional warheads – the Iraqi case provided extensive information regarding SSM CBW

munitions, based on UNSCOM reporting. Some of the guiding principles which may affect command and control of nuclear weapons may be inferred from the cases of these. The Iraqi example may also provide insight into the guiding principles of control of CBW WMD and SSM delivery systems by an autocratic Middle Eastern regime headed by a centralist and highly suspicious leader.

- Paradigms of C2 in conventional situations – levels of centralization, culture of delegation of authority, levels of trust in the regular military as opposed to special praetorian guards forces – like the IRGC, or the “Republican Guard”, or Saddam’s “Special Republican Guard”, tendencies towards brinkmanship, and methods or practices to control situations which emerge from such actions.
- Willingness to risk civilian casualties by deployment of weapons in highly populated areas on the one hand, due to regime survival considerations, and suspicion towards certain elements in the population which may restrict deployment in remote parts of the state.
- Personalized leadership – may lead to small circles of highly trusted individuals on whom the political leadership will rely, and restrictions on the ability to implement control through expansion of delegated authority to additional echelons.
- Traditional tendencies by ideologically or religiously highly charged authoritarian decision-making leaderships towards miscalculation – as a result of insufficient acquaintance with the issues of nuclear weapons technology and effects, nuclear deterrence, nuclear strategy, concepts and terminology in their regard, nuclear brinkmanship, crisis management, the characteristics and values of adversaries, excessive disdain for the moral integrity or resolve of Western cultures, misunderstanding, misperception, misinformation, warped prisms caused by deliberately manipulated information, or just plain human frailties (such as stress, fatigue, psychological quirks, cognitive dissonance, stupidity, or the effects of medication or drugs).

The motivation to acquire nuclear weapons, and the considerations that will guide the operational concept, may change over time. Primarily, it is believed that the security considerations for the acquisition of nuclear weapons are led by the states involved being obsessed with issues of regional competition, dominance, hegemony, domination, honor and standing. Iran, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey are all deeply involved in these – for example, it is believed that Saddam Hussein’s quest for nuclear weapons was clearly led by prestige considerations, above security ones. Similarly, Iran, or Persia before it, has historically perceived its role as one of a regional superpower deserving of a hegemonic standing in its region. Moreover, and very significantly, questions of support for, or opposition to, the status-quo are crucial – a nuclear Iran would pose a severe challenge to other states in the region because it seeks, under the current regime’s ideology and belief system, to undermine, nay overthrow, the status-quo, regionally and globally, using any means, bar none. Other states in the region may be obliged to react defensively to retain as far as possible the status-quo, and to retain their influence and standing in the view of the masses, domestic or Arab, Islamic, or what have you.

Once the nuclear weapons trend snowballs, a state whose main motivation to become a member of the nuclear “club” may have originally been deterrence (Syria) might - upon joining that club – be tempted to take advantage of its newfound capability to promote both old and new strategic ambitions (to change the status-quo in its favor). The nuclear weapons snowball may also be subject to a dynamic environment, which evolves on a “rolling” basis, rather than establishing rigid rules and conditions. Therefore such a change may also be a result of the need to adapt security doctrine to adversaries’ changing reality, and to the ways they perceive the threats and risks that a nuclear neighbor’s signals. Thus a state that achieves a nuclear capability, and by doing so motivates its rival-neighbor to achieve such a capability as well, will update its nuclear doctrine to address the actions of its neighbor.

Thus it may be expected that in a poly-nuclear Middle East, even after states acquire nuclear weapons, the strategic ramifications will be exceedingly dynamic, perhaps volatile. In this sense the environment would differ from the deterrence stability attributed to the superpower relationship in the latter part of the Cold War – and possibly more like the nervousness exhibited during its early years, but with many nuclear players, not only two, including mutual alarm regarding first strikes and pre-emption, escalation dominance, the rationality of adversary leaderships, and the integrity of C3I.

The ways by which a state reaches a military nuclear capability will affect its operating concept and its C3 methods. For example, a state that acquires a nuclear capability through struggle – perhaps even involving violent expressions – with either the international community, or with its neighbors, will be forced right from the start to develop an operating concept, and a C3 doctrine, that will address possible attempts to destroy its nuclear facilities during preliminary stages of the establishment of the nuclear system; and to demonstrate full control over this nuclear system in order to assure its rivals-neighbors that it is in good hands in terms of prevention of unauthorized use by renegade or rogue elements.

In the veteran nuclear powers, command and control systems were perfected over the years through constant processes of design, planning and exercises. However, such processes entail a wide range of military and civilian participants to be privy to a certain extent to the capabilities of the state, and the intelligence on which the simulations are based on. In closed regimes, such extensive gaming is difficult if not impossible, leaving the decision-maker to make instinctive decisions with a small circle of trusted advisors.

A key conclusion of the project is that the C3 paradigms that will probably emerge in the early stages of a nascent nuclear power in the region will probably be closer to the early structures of the veteran nuclear powers, in the dawn of the nuclear age, and will not necessarily reflect the lessons that those powers have accumulated. The learning curve will be different from that of the original nuclear powers; the latter developed their paradigms gradually as nuclear weapons became more abundant, and in a thoroughly different strategic and cultural context. Furthermore, the suspicion towards the West in the region – particularly among current, and possible future, radical regimes – is likely to bring them to reject solutions that are based on “off the shelf” Western technology, and to try to develop local solutions, which will be, initially at least, less sophisticated.



## Common Elements of Regional Culture that Affect C2

### *Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons*

The basic building block for C2 of nuclear weapons will be the country's perception of what they are meant for; are they perceived as *sui generis* – so destructive and terrible that they must be controlled far past any other weapon? Or are they just more powerful manifestations of existing weapons? Will these countries assimilate the view of use of nuclear weapons as a “taboo” which must be avoided at all cost? Many of the leadership elites of the emerging, or potential, nuclear states in the region, have not internalized the collective traumas of World War II and the Cold War that brought most of the international community – and particularly the Western world – to subscribe to such a taboo. To the extent that the design of command and control structures in the veteran nuclear states was influenced by the sense of enormity of the use of nuclear weapons, a less acute sense of the same will also influence C3 paradigms – perhaps in the direction of less robust safeguards for prevention of mistakes. In addition, for many of these states, the perceived legality of the use of certain weapons will not be evident from “international law” – which may even be seen as “discriminatory infidel conventions” imposed on the Muslims in order to weaken or exploit them – but from Islamic values (discussed below) and regional interpretations.

The potential nuclear states in the region will not universally adopt the same attitude towards the role of nuclear weapons in their strategic posture, but the interaction between these attitudes will have a seminal impact on the design of C2 structures; will the emphasis be on easy facilitation of their operation in certain contingencies, including frequent or permanent high alert (defense readiness condition, or DEFCON) levels, or on safeguards to prevent them from being used by mistake? Schematically, we can portray three possible roles that nuclear weapons may be seen to play:

- **As weapons of deterrence** – this attitude resembles that of the West during most of the Cold War, at least from the late 1950s onward. The underlying assumption would be that the weapons probably will not be used, and that the country may not have to deal with a second strike scenario, deterrence stability having been established, or a need to respond after the political leadership has been incapacitated or “decapitated”.
- **As “last resort” weapons** for use only when threatened with, or attacked by, the same weapons. In light of the mutual perceptions of the countries in the region, the belief that the weapons may ultimately have to be used will probably be more prevalent than between the nuclear powers of the Cold War, at least during the latter stages of the Cold War once deterrence stability was well established, and more similar to perceptions held in the early nuclear age that nuclear weapons would indeed be used early in hostilities – at least until the mid-1950s, only gradually abating as the learning curve developed. This implies a certain volatile environment for at least the first decade after nuclear weapons are acquired, and as learning curves develop.<sup>1</sup>
- **As weapons of choice** to brandish as a means to achieve regional hegemony, or to realize religiously or ideologically deterministic victory. To adopt such an attitude it would not be necessary for the regime leadership to be devoid of a sense of the enormity of use of nuclear weapons, or to be irrational; rather it would suffice for it to suffer from the hubris of the belief that it can “handle” nuclear brinkmanship situations. This scenario opens up a vast expanse of potential nuclear exchanges, war by catastrophic miscalculation, elsewhere discussed, partly gleaned from historical experience with the record of authoritarian regimes’ decisions on war and peace over the past century (WW1, WW2, the Falklands, Kuwait, etc.), which signify catastrophic miscalculation through unfounded disdain for the adversary, and utter misunderstanding of Western democracies’ integrity and resolve, albeit, significantly, so far limited to the conventional context.

The public discourse in the Middle East reflects a contradictory view of the capability of nuclear weapons. On the one hand, they are indeed perceived as “doomsday weapons” – a “silver bullet” that will allow the country that has access to them to no longer need to project conventional power, and it will be able to threaten its enemies with total annihilation, thus providing for deterrence and its ultimate security. On the other hand, despite this perception, the public discourse does not reflect the sense of a “taboo” on the actual use of nuclear weapons that developed in the international community as the result of fear of worldwide nuclear conflagration – “peace is the sturdy child of terror”, as Churchill would have it. The absence of this “taboo” will impact on the stringency of the C3 procedures – particularly measures to prevent unauthorized or accidental use and to guarantee full control in escalatory situations.

The attitude towards nuclear weapons will be determined not only by “rational” strategic considerations (these would normally encourage a view of nuclear weapons as almost exclusively weapons of deterrence), but by cultural, religious and political factors which may override the former. In fact, the issue of rationality is far more complex: the worst wars in history were initiated by sane, rational, intelligent, sober and realistic leaderships, but holding extremist ideological agendas that sowed unfounded disdain for adversaries, resulting in catastrophic miscalculation; and the most heinous crimes in history were perpetrated by perfectly sane and rational individuals, to methodically realize an atrocious agenda shaped by ignorance and vilification of the other, a belief in the absolute supremacy of one set of beliefs over the other's, destiny's promise of inevitable victory, and the other's pre-ordained defeat.<sup>2</sup> In the Middle East, radical leaderships that may acquire control of nuclear assets, and salient strategic considerations, may include:

- The Sunni or Shiite Islamic element within the regime – its influence on regime strategic decision-making and on the military. The clerical establishment in countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran – or a future Muslim Brotherhood regime in one of the countries – will have a pivotal role in determining how the utility of nuclear weapons will be perceived.
- The relationship with the US and the West – pro-Western regimes will be more prone to succumb to Western pressures to maintain strong controls over their weapons, and to accept Western guidance in this regard.

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Schelling has suggested that it might take an Iranian leadership at least a decade to learn the pitfalls of possession of nuclear weapons, and gain the required degree of understanding of the complexities in their regard, since it took the United States and the Soviet Union almost two decades to do so before instituting robust C3 and PALs.

<sup>2</sup> Similarly, it was perfectly rational for Saddam Hussein to believe that he could occupy and annex Kuwait, and get away with it – it would have been irrational for him to believe that President George H.W. Bush would send half a million troops to liberate Kuwait, especially given America's Vietnam trauma, and that the US and its allies would then hound him unrelentingly until he was swinging at the end of a rope. The Argentine junta was rational to believe that it could invade and confiscate the Falkland / Malvinas Islands, and that the UK would no more than protest vociferously – it would have been irrational for its members to believe that Mrs. Thatcher would send the British armed forces 10,000 miles across the Atlantic to kill, maim or capture every single Argentinean that set foot on the islands, to the last one.

- Prior proclivity towards risk – countries with a history of conventional brinkmanship are more likely to view nuclear weapons as additional tools in such a policy toolbox.
- Regional aspirations that can be achieved through political use of nuclear weapons – intimidation, domination, blackmail, coercion.
- The relations and threat-image of the other nuclear states.
- Confidence that the regimes have in their own capability to operate the weapons on short notice, or to posture a plausible second strike capability if attacked.
- Reciprocal attitudes of the “threat” countries towards which the nuclear weapons are directed. Thus, while a country such as Saudi Arabia may view nuclear weapons as primarily a “status symbol”, it will find it difficult to maintain that attitude in the face of provocations and nuclear “one-upmanship” of other powers in the region (particularly Iran). Command and control structures in the different countries of the region will have a reciprocal influence on each other. Staging of nuclear exercises in one country will be met by similar exercises in the neighboring countries; each side will be learning, imitating and trying to counter the doctrine of the other. A country with a neighbor which demonstrates a highly flexible command and control structure will feel the need to meet those standards.
- All the above may have an effect on the level of central control and safeguards of the weapons:
- A regime which views nuclear weapons as purely a deterrent may have a greater tendency towards a centralized structure: deployment in few high security areas; direct lines of control to the political leadership cutting out the intermediary echelons; little reliance on authentication systems and “fail-safe” mechanisms. In the extreme, the nuclear arsenal may be treated as a “status symbol” and not as an operational system. The emphasis in this case will therefore be on simplification of the storage and operation of the arsenal, since the situations for operational activity of the units controlling the weapons will be few. This attitude may encourage total separation of weapons and delivery systems. The number of people with access to the weapons could then be very limited and the security issues they raise would be less acute.
- On the other hand, if the threat assessment of the regime in control of the weapons brings it to believe that it may have to brandish, or use, its nuclear weapons, then the complexity of the command and control system will be much greater.
- The regime which views nuclear weapons as a lever for regional hegemony and imposing its dominance over its neighbors will need a much higher level of command and control and supervision to prevent accidental or unauthorized use of the weapons.
- A regime that will wish to exercise its nuclear status to intimidate adversaries on an ongoing basis, may wish to maintain elevated alert levels, either intermittently or on a routine basis (much as the US maintained nuclear airborne alerts, of strategic bombers in the air and poised to strike, for decades).

An important issue in this regard will be the option for nuclear ambiguity, along the lines of the Israeli model. Although an ambiguous stance by Iran cannot be ruled out, due to its international obligations and considerations, it now seems that the chances of Iran acquiring a military nuclear capability and maintaining ambiguity are slim – both for reasons relating to the Iranian regime itself, and since Iran’s adversaries in the region will expose Iran’s capabilities. Therefore, it seems that the option for nuclear ambiguity for the rest of the countries in the region will not be on the table for long.

This will have a profound effect on the structuring of C3 models; a military establishment with an overt nuclear weapons capability will be more likely to integrate this capability in strategic exercises, and to establish a structure that will have to cope with scenarios arising from such strategic planning. Such “outing” of the nuclear capability by a regime will also oblige it to reassure the international community, and its neighbors, that it has a C3 structure which can prevent erroneous use of the weapons. This will perhaps be a key driver for building more sophisticated models of command and control.

### ***Traditions of Delegation of Authority***

In the veteran nuclear states the issue of “ownership” of the nuclear arsenal was decided – even if modified over the years – and was, for the most part, not an issue for large scale struggles within the respective regimes. The democratic countries separated the responsibility over the R&D of the weapons from the operational responsibility, and the R&D bodies had no grounds to demand a voice in the operational forums. Similarly, after the initial adaptation of the nuclear countries to the new nuclear era, there was little debate (certainly not violent debate) over who will participate in the control of the weapons. This will not be the case in any of the regimes discussed here. The nuclear capability, once achieved, will be an important lever for influence within the regimes.

Another important element in the delegation of authority is rooted in the personalized leadership style common in the Middle East. In the veteran nuclear powers, there is a tendency to lower the profile of nuclear tests, exercises and contingency planning out of concern that publication will result in possible escalation. Therefore, the political leaders will usually refrain from publicized presence at such events in order not to raise the profile. However, the very identification of the nuclear capability with the political leader is, in the Middle East, a source of legitimacy and public support. Therefore, we can expect that even technical issues relating to building, deploying or training the nuclear force will receive a high profile and publicized reference in these regimes, to enhance the legitimacy of the leadership in the eyes of the constituency.

All the regimes and military establishments in question have demonstrated an aversion towards delegation of authority in matters relating to strategic weapons and strategic interests. According to some sources, though, Saddam Hussein did delegate authority to field units to initiate the use of CBW WMD and SSM strikes if the chain of command was disrupted or he was incapacitated, to establish revenge, and thus to establish deterrence in the first place. The aversion to delegate authority, especially in sensitive matters, derives from a wide range of regime-specific characteristics in each case. However, a general cause that can be identified in almost all the regimes in the region dealt with in this study is the concept of loyalty, trust and the links that “really” matter. The Western system of delegation of authority, including but not only for

strategic weapons, is based on the *ex officio* status of the officers who receive the orders, an assumption of loyalty (albeit based on a vetting system) and de-centralization of information on a need to know basis. This creates networks in which almost nobody is apprised of all aspects of the capability, and the system is expected to operate as a “*Gestalt*” (each part independently and with respect to its specifically designated mission). The working assumption is that they will obey orders – excluding “illegal” orders – and therefore can be trusted. The collective affiliation of the individual officers (ethnic, regional or family affiliation) is considered irrelevant.

This model was and is the rule in the US, the UK and France. While the Soviet system did, apparently, take into account ethnic background of senior officers, this was not, so it seems, a constant concern of the political leadership. It was relegated to the security services to perform appropriate weeding and vetting.

The model in the Middle East in this regard will be fundamentally different:

- In most of the countries in this study, tribal identification – including “old boys” networks, like the religious institutions of learning backgrounds or IRGC networking in Iran – remains strong, and such identification would probably determine who would have access to nuclear weapons, and to whom, and when, authority would be delegated.
- The tradition of hyper-centralism of some of the regimes – the late Ba’th regime in Iraq and the incumbent one in Damascus, and in Egypt – and the tendency for deep involvement in military affairs by the political leadership, would probably extend to its involvement in the very identity of each link in the chain of command over nuclear weapons. In contrast to the Western system described above, we may expect to encounter in the cases discussed here a more individualized chain of command consisting of fewer, but highly trusted, individuals, with less compartmentalization between them. Similarly, the field units entrusted with nuclear assets are likely to be fiercely loyal, disciplined and ideologically unshakable (IRGC).

Taking into account the aversion of most of the regime models in the region to delegation of authority, the solution for a breakdown of communications – likely in situations of nuclear warfare or high level electronic warfare (EW) attacks by the enemy, or even intensive conventional strikes – would probably have to be physical. These solutions can range from low-level physical communication (PTP telephone), through covert trusted civilian chains of communication, (Iranian or Saudi clergy channels for those states), dependable runners (on motorbike?), and others.

The key issue with respect to delegation of authority though is not the default authorization (Saddam Hussein’s example of delegating authorization of WMD and SSM use in 1991, 2003 to field commanders) through the chain of command when the leader is alive and in the loop, but how to authorize use in case the normal channels of authorization are inoperative (the leaders are dead, or cannot communicate). In other words, what happens when the authorized leadership is incapacitated, and primary C3 assets, or the chain of command, are disrupted?

A Soviet style “dead man’s hand” system, the infamous “doomsday machine”, if it ever really existed, would, theoretically, be acceptable to many of the regimes in the region, and particularly to autocratic authoritarian regimes. However, the logic behind this system in the Cold War was a reflection of two assumptions: 1) since a nuclear war could only be total, if the leadership were destroyed, it would mean that a large part of the country had been decimated; and 2) that there was only one enemy who could carry out such an act, and therefore it was clear *a priori* against whom the automatic retaliation would be carried out (the US).

These two assumptions will not be true in the Middle East. For the near future, the nuclear arsenals of the states of the region will be limited, and will not have anything near the destructive capacity of the two Cold War superpowers. Therefore, as opposed to a Cold War nuclear confrontation, exchange of nuclear blows in the Middle East may be perceived, rightly or wrongly, as survivable, especially in the larger and more populous states, like Iran or Egypt. Elements of the regimes involved may, therefore, not necessarily accept the idea that the incapacitation of the incumbent leadership should automatically escalate to an all-out nuclear war.

The main solutions for such a situation would be:

- Pre-delegate authority to launch to pre-designated political command chain: political associates and “reliables” (Saudi royal family, Egyptian Vice President or Defense Minister, an Alawite relative of the Asad family in Syria);
- Pre-delegate authority to launch to pre-designated military/strategic command chain – IRGC high command, Presidential Guard in Syria, Egyptian Chief of Military Intelligence);
- Pre-delegate authority to launch to “responsible” field commanders, assuming that they cannot verify an order with their superiors. This can be likened to the example of Saddam, who reportedly, or allegedly, gave such authority for use of chemical weapons in case he was killed, or Soviet authorization to division commanders to use tactical nuclear weapons in the European theater, or Cuba.

The first two solutions will probably be more acceptable in regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey, where the consensus is that the state must survive the individual leader (if not the dynasty such as in the case of Saudi Arabia). The second solution is more fitting to the “*après moi le deluge*” mentality that typified Saddam Hussein. However, it may also be compatible with a leader or regime that has a strong apocalyptic, or messianic, belief. In such a case, adoption of this solution would not be seen as merely revenge without regard for the consequences, but as an act which may hasten the apocalyptic or messianic stage of history, and ultimate victory.

#### ***Custody of Weapons – the Security of Nuclear Assets***

Command and control over nuclear capabilities is not restricted to authorization of their use, but also – and perhaps more on the day to day level – relates to the safeguarding of the know-how and materials relevant to those capabilities. A major factor which may emerge in the Middle East in this regard may be the R&D establishment which will develop the weapons. In the nations involved in the Cold War,

R&D projects had no pretensions about maintaining their influence over the weaponry they worked to develop.<sup>3</sup> R&D establishments in the Middle East are liable to act differently; they may be more likely to act like the case of A.Q. Khan in Pakistan, and demand a role in the decision-making processes even after completing development of the weapons. Since these are usually linked to military bodies, they may emerge as “back doors” to the C2 system for the weapons they devised. Thus, these organizations may become “loose cannons” in scenarios of breakdown of the states. Ostensibly, this may be seen as analogous to the case of the former Soviet Union at the time of its melt-down. However, unlike the insular and isolated scientists and scientific institutions of the Soviet Union who had no prior interaction with potential customers for their know-how, and whose efforts to capitalize on their access could be relatively easily monitored and disrupted by the successor state (Russia) and the West, these elements have wide access to potential clients. The lesson of A.Q. Khan and North Korea therefore should be well studied.

In most of the regimes in the region, custody of the weapons and the delivery systems will have to be put in the hands of organizations whose loyalty to the leaders is beyond doubt. These may be relatives – like in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – or ideologically pure elements. However, this restriction may well lead to weapons and delivery systems being under unified command, or at least held in units which are subordinate to one common command – and not the supreme command. In Iran this will be the IRGC, and in Syria it may be the existing missile corps.

### ***Intelligence***

The confidence of the regime in C3I with the nuclear weapons will play a pivotal role in determining the spectrum of alert levels, and the routine in regards to those levels. Such an operational nuclear deployment will require strategic early warning and intelligence capabilities covering all relevant threats: day and night airborne visual intelligence (VISINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) assets, ground SIGINT and radar deployment in effective ranges, an advanced satellite deployment, and more. The early warning capabilities of all these countries to SSM threats in general – conventional, CBW, and then nuclear as projected by this study, are (with the exception of Israel, supported as it is by deployed US capabilities, and to some extent the Gulf States where the US has deployed some systems) weak to non-existent, and the potential for error is very high.

Since the threat of nuclear weapons comes from beyond the intelligence horizon of most of these countries, there may be more reliance on intelligence allies to the extent that these might be available to regional parties; the US, for example, might assist its allies in the region in early warning systems, if they retain the alliance with it (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, GCC, Turkey?) – including international players with highly developed satellite capabilities. Such reliance may bring about situations not dissimilar to the role the Soviet Union played in 1967,<sup>3</sup> but with far more dire consequences, in which an external player feeds alarming information that provokes nuclear alert. Without ability to assess the information, the countries which receive the information will have no choice but to go on nuclear alert.

Cold War C3 took decades to fully develop, including the evolution of PALs, which has continued, in fact, beyond the Cold War’s termination. Early Cold War intelligence capabilities were limited, and an early poly-nuclear Middle East may resemble this environment in some ways. The parties involved will maintain a high level of central control, and will probably refrain from the modes of delegation of authority that, in the Cold War, underscored the need for stringent command and control measures to prevent accidental use of nuclear weapons.

### ***Technology***

C3 systems in the veteran nuclear powers have gradually moved towards the technological, leaving behind slow cumbersome and potentially compromising human methods. Authentication redundancies of the authority to launch nuclear weapons developed over the years in the existing nuclear powers (the American “football”, or the Russian Cheget).

However, integration of such technologies into the command and control structures of regimes in the Middle East is doubtful, at least in the early stages. On one hand, they will, no doubt, want to implement elaborate, robust technical systems for coded authentication of the identities of those who give the orders in order to prevent attempts by a technologically superior enemy to override orders by imposture of the leader in order to disable weapon systems. However, the same natural suspicion that the enemy may be capable of planting Trojan horses in technological systems in order to manipulate them may preclude use of highly technological means and increase the reliance on physical communication, and verbal codes. Reliance on such means though would have an adverse effect on the regime’s ability to maintain flexible time-sensitive response mechanisms and hence would influence other elements of the nuclear doctrine.

Another presumed factor that may inhibit or even preclude incorporation of certain technological controls for prevention of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons is the potential “poly-nuclear” nature of the region that the different parties will have to address. Unlike the bilateral relationship between the US and the USSR, early warning in the Middle East may be directed towards a number of potential adversaries. A radical Islamic takeover of any of the countries in the region (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf States), and Iranian influence in others may create new relationships both of alliances and adversity. If any of these countries will have possession of nuclear weapons, they will have to take into account use of those weapons against multiple potential enemies.

Each fledgling nuclear country will also initially have access to only small arsenals, rendering pre-designation of a given weapon and a given delivery system for a pre-determined target impossible in most cases. This scenario will inhibit use of PALs which preclude the accidental

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<sup>3</sup> In May of 1967 the Soviet Union used erroneous and bogus intelligence to convince Nasser of the false notion that Israel was about to attack Syria, and thus ignited the escalation that led to the 1967 war, as Nasser mobilized and dispatched his forces into the demilitarized Sinai, and Israel reacted by calling up its reserves. For honor reasons Nasser could by then not retreat, and responded by expelling the UN forces that intervened between Egyptian and Israeli forces, closed the Straits of Sharm al-Shaykh to Israeli shipping, adopted ever more belligerent postures, and so on.

use of a weapon against targets which are not pre-defined.

The fact that the same types of delivery systems may be used for both conventional and non-conventional warheads will further complicate C2, as different SOPs will probably be applied to those delivery systems which are dedicated for nuclear weapons. The victim will not know for sure whether the SSM launched against him is carrying a conventional or WMD warhead until it explodes, and the attacking leader may or may not take this into consideration – he may for example just assume that the defender understands that he is only using conventional warheads, or may deliberately use the ambiguity involved to intimidate the defender when placing his SSM units on increased alert, or on hair-trigger readiness, such as to increase the credibility of deterrence.

Furthermore, the possibility that nuclear weapons may be delivered in un-orthodox ways (from civilian ships, neighboring countries territory) in order to obfuscate responsibility will also reduce the use of technological means of command and control.

### **Verification - Authentication**

Human verification may be implemented at operational levels (for example, the need to combine codes held by more than one senior officer in order to override safeguards and arm weapons). However, it is very unlikely that any of the regimes in the region would be able to adopt human verification of the orders of the Head of State. In the authoritarian regime model, the leader would probably not accept any restrictions on his authority to launch weapons – even authentication by a “trusted” deputy. Regimes such as the Iranian or future Jihadi-Salafi regimes in which the leader is perceived as the “*Amir al-Mu'minin*” (Commander of the Believers) or (as in Iran) the *Vali-Faqih*, the leader is thought to have a certain inspiration from *Allah*, and restriction of his discretion by a lesser individual would be tantamount to imposing restrictions on the will of *Allah*. Even the argument that the verification is not meant for regular situations but for contingencies during which the leader may be incapacitated, for any reason, would be difficult to support in these regimes.

### **Communication**

Communication with nuclear weapons units is a potential major weakness in command and control of those units. The working assumption that in a nuclear exchange the higher command may itself be either obliterated or incommunicado creates potential for launching of weapons due to breaches in communication.

The safeguards for communication with the units in the countries of the region are far less advanced than in any of the other nuclear states. Communicating a command authorizing the launch of nuclear weapons at an adversary would probably mandate redundancy, including both modern as well as primitive means, given that communications in a crisis or war might be vulnerable to disruption. The tendency of Middle Eastern regimes to personalize the state may lead to broad authorization to launch nuclear weapons in case the leader is presumed dead – even if no nuclear attack has taken place. However, as mentioned above, the regime may not be confident in the resolve of those who remain after the leadership has been decimated to carry out such doomsday commands.

### **Deployment Considerations**

A state that acquires a military nuclear capability will have to make a substantial investment in means of delivery of those weapons. The preferred means of delivery will be SSMs. Most of the states in the region already have significant capabilities in this aspect and some of these missiles have been adjusted to a chemical warhead. SSMs are also easier to control, and can be accurate. On the other hand, SSMs are more exposed to be destroyed or incapacitated in their stationary positions – both in operational storage and in launching sites.

The tendency in the existing nuclear states has been to deploy nuclear weapons in distant areas, far from population centers. The logic behind such a deployment would be to impose on the enemy counter-force strikes to deal with a large and widely dispersed number of targets. This of course poses a greater challenge for the attacker in terms of initial intelligence for building target banks, and post attack BDA (Battle Damage Assessment), hence increasing the survivability of the nuclear assets. A secondary consideration may be to minimize collateral damage to civilian infrastructure as a result of counter-force attacks. However this logic may not be applicable in some of the regimes under discussion. Distant areas are, in many cases, populated by minority groups who are perceived as *a priori* disloyal to the regime. The advantage of deployment in these areas – drawing enemy attacks to areas which are not the “heartland” of the nation – must be considered in contrast with the question of the security of the installations in those areas. One example may be seen in “polite complaints” by residents of Natanz and Isfahan who found themselves, in their assessment, at “ground zero” of an American or Israeli attack on the nuclear installations and expressed their fear that they will be harmed. The Iranian regime, however, has shown confidence in the dispersal of its strategic assets and installations, including nuclear production facilities and SSM assets, over a wide geographical expanse, and shows relatively little concern regarding the threat of C3 reliability in their regard. This ambience may not hold true for other, less confident, regimes in the region.

A key issue in command and control of nuclear weapons is the storage of those weapons. This has a bearing on security issues, preventing their theft, flexibility of response to threats and alert levels, and the size of the force which will have access to the various components of the nuclear capability. In some of these regimes, the fear of infiltration and betrayal may encourage separation of weapons from delivery systems. The number of people who would be charged with securing the weapons themselves would be much smaller than the number needed to maintain the delivery systems. Keeping the two separate would be the proper security driven solution. This however will extract a price in terms of operational flexibility, and would preclude demonstrating frequent or permanent high alert levels for purposes of upgrading the credibility of deterrent threats, or to intimidate or coerce adversaries, or to guarantee escalation dominance. In regimes for which the nuclear capability is viewed as a strategic capability for possible use, the security consideration may be subordinated to the necessity for flexible response, and hair-trigger readiness, with all the implications that this would have for deterrence stability, first strike propensities, the danger of pre-emption, and so on.

### ***Prevention of Unauthorized Transfer of Weapons/Materials – Security Issues***

All the regimes in the region – when they finally acquire a military nuclear capability – will probably do so in contravention to the international accords to which they and the supplier countries are signatories. This way or that, they will be extremely sensitive regarding the possibility of unauthorized transfer of nuclear materials, expertise, hardware, components or weapons to adversaries. The presence of individuals in each country with ideological, ethnic or political affiliations with other countries will exacerbate this concern. The main concern will probably be that individuals with Islamist motivation will attempt to transfer weapons from a “conservative” pro-Western country to a regime or organization which they perceive as more “Islamic”. Hence, the safeguards will have to address not only clandestine transfer of weapons to other countries by rogue or renegade elements that identify with an adversary, but with sabotage of a country’s nuclear weapons by an insider with ideological motivation or external – not necessarily state-related – affiliations. This issue is a salient issue today in the Pakistani context, and is of utmost concern to the US.

Measures that the regimes in the region may take against such an eventuality may include:

To adopt US security standards – most regimes in the region would probably not be able to fully attain such standards; they will also be aware of this and would not trust their own establishments with such measures.

Keep warheads one step, “a turn of the screw”, away from operational status – this solution would preclude transfer of fully operational weapons, but would not solve the problem and the danger of the theft of near-operational weapons, materials and expertise.

Keep warheads unassembled, with parts stored in different locations – this solution would enhance security but would only be feasible if the regime involved adopts the attitude of nuclear weapons as purely a deterrent or status symbol, and do not feel the need to integrate them operationally into their day-to-day strategic systems.

Store warheads under control of highly reliable keepers – such as IRGC buddies or family members. This would be the most probable solution in most of the regimes involved.

All of the above solutions contradict a stance in which high alert levels are desired so as to exploit the “benefits” of nuclear weapons status in the adversarial relationships with the other states in the region. In order to effectively deter, or coerce, or compel, or establish escalation dominance, the nuclear assets would have to be available for intermittent or regular demonstrations of high alert (the example of round the clock US airborne strategic bombers comes to mind). This scenario appears to carry a relatively high probability given the dynamics of the region.

### ***Prevention of Deliberate Unauthorized Use (DUU)***

Prevention of deliberate unauthorized use will be a paramount concern for all the regimes in the region. The presence of radical, and even apocalyptic, or messianic, tendencies among the Islamic groups in all of these countries is likely to exacerbate this concern. Over the years, the means that have evolved for prevention of deliberate unauthorized use (and to prevent accidental use) have moved from the human to the electronic spectrum. In the absence of technical means to ensure that weapons will not be detonated without authorization – whether as a result of their having been stolen or commandeered by disgruntled military officers, or through a misunderstanding of instructions passed down the primary chain of command – regimes in the region may adopt systems based on split codes held by separate senior officers, so that launch of nuclear weapons would have to entail collaboration of all the officers with the codes. However, in a region plagued by military coups, the regimes may rightly take into account that an entire nuclear unit may mutiny, and take control over the weapons.

It is also conceivable that the new nuclear weapons states in the region might adopt some of the more readily available Permissive Action Links (PALs), however antiquated or “primitive” they may be in Western terms. The DPRK, Pakistan, Iran, the PRC, or possibly France could conceivably be trusted suppliers of PAL hardware and expertise. On the other hand, many of these states would be reluctant to incorporate PALs into the nuclear system and would probably prefer to rely on its own time-tested “human intelligence” and security vetting. The inhibitions behind the use of such technology would derive both from an innate suspicion towards Western technology in such a sensitive component of the country’s national security, and from the fact that a country with only a small nuclear arsenal would probably not endanger it by integrating a system which may cause permanent damage to the weapons in case of improper use.

### ***Potential Multi-Lateral Command and Control***

One of the ramifications of a common interest of a number of Sunni Arab states facing the need for a fast track to a nuclear capability may be multilateral collaboration in R&D, and later in a form of joint custody and command and control of the nuclear weapons, possibly along the lines of the NATO example as between allies. Theoretically, this could create a unique relationship, and unique problems of command and control. The main candidates for such collaboration would be Egypt and Saudi Arabia and the GCC States, with Egypt providing the technological know-how and the military backbone, and the latter the funding for the project. However, we believe that even in such a scenario, Egypt would insist on establishing and maintaining the project totally on its own territory; to develop it by means of its own scientific, industrial and military capabilities; and to maintain full, direct and exclusive control over operational nuclear deployments. Thus, Egypt may be in the position of offering a form of extended deterrence, loosely based on the NATO example, and perhaps to either reinforce or displace US guarantees of extended deterrence, a scenario that could evolve as US strategic influence and credibility recede, given its withdrawal from the region or its failure to prevent Iran from going nuclear in the first place. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both of which are primary candidates to follow Iran’s going nuclear – and assuming the current or continuity regimes in both, in spite of some incompatibilities and skirmishes of the past – could collaborate on the basis of fundamentally shared interests: the necessity of stemming anti-status-quo tendencies in the region ignited by Iranian nuclearization.

## Culture of Command & Control of nuclear weapons in the Middle East – Jihadi-Salafi Regime

Dr. Shmuel Bar

### Executive Summary

The question how a regime motivated by radical Jihadi-Salafi ideology may structure its command and control of nuclear weapons is doubly speculative: first - except for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and – with reservations – Hamas in Gaza, no Jihadi-Salafi organization has ever achieved control over a state; second – we do not know what state may be under such control and what stage of development of nuclear weapons it may be in. It would be reasonable though to assume that in any such regime, the attitude towards nuclear weapons may not stem from the international “taboo” on the use of such weapons which has emerged over the last half century, but rather from traditional Islamic jurisprudence. This assumption raises important issues: What is the Islamist perspective today on the legality of possession and/or use of nuclear weapons? What are the Islamist concepts of command and control in the context of an Islamist state that they aspire to create? What might be the constraints that will impact on the development of the command and control structures of such a regime?

There has been some discussion in Sunni jurisprudence circles regarding the legality of possession or use of nuclear weapons. Common elements of the writings in these circles include: (1) the fact that the distinction in Islamic law of war is not between combatants and non-combatants, per se, but rather between those whom must be killed and those regarding whom may be spared if tactical considerations warrant that and high tolerance for “Collateral damage” to such non-combatants; (2) permission – or even obligation - to use any possible means to destroy the enemy whose blood is permitted; preference for “counter-value” attacks aspiring to total destruction of symbolic targets, as opposed to a “counter-force” doctrine; (3) a perception (at least in jurisprudential terms) of nuclear weapons as a modern incarnation of “strategic” weapons from the days of Muhammad and hence the permissibility of their use is analogous to their predecessor’s use by the Prophet Muhammad; (4) the duty of the Muslims to achieve military superiority over the enemy, or at least parity in types of weapons, leads to the permissibility of acquiring any weapon which is found in the hands of the enemy; (5) The duty of the Muslims to “make the enemies of the *Umma* or the enemies of Allah tremble”, clearly accomplished by nuclear weapons; (5) the principle of reciprocity of damages and punishment (*qisas*) and the right of “Retaliation in kind” (*al-mu’amala bil-mithl*).

A Jihadi-Salafi regime can be expected to consider the possession of a nuclear deterrent as an ultimate guarantor of its survival in power, and as a key strategic asset in its relations with its neighbors and with the West. However, assuming that a Jihadi-Salafi regime will – at least initially - follow the ideological guidelines that appear in the writings before it takes power, its attitude towards nuclear weapons would probably not be restricted to the role of a deterrent to be kept under wraps or as a last resort doomsday weapon, but rather as a weapon to be wielded and brandished to further the movement’s strategic goals and ideological agenda.

An important factor that may affect the command and control paradigm of a Jihadi-Salafi regime is the way that the leader is perceived by the public (or projects his self). Thus, an autocratic Jihadi-Salafi regime leader who enjoys some direct inspiration from Allah, or even is endowed with some supernatural perspicacity, may not be obliged to provide an explanation for his decisions. It is worth noting that although consultation in leadership is encouraged, it is not a must insofar as non-consultation does not invalidate the legitimacy of the decision by the leader. Such single-leader decision-making may be more prone than collective decision-making to the primary pitfall of nuclear standoff – catastrophic miscalculation. Another possible consequence of this aspect of leadership may be a certain incompatibility of such leadership structures with procedures for command and control, which call for redundancy and authentication as a safeguard against a leader who loses self-control or suffers a breakdown. Thus, well-established Western principles of nuclear asset security may be in serious jeopardy.

The influence of Islamic principles on the subject of military command should also be taken into account. These principles typically will also accord greater status in the military structure to those who demonstrate greater religious commitment or knowledge over professional merit. Hence, in the first stages of such a revolutionary military structure, the army – including with respect to the strategic assets – will typically resemble a “revolutionary guard” more than a professional military and officers may subordinate their duty of military obedience to their religious values. Such a regime may also create a vanguard, or Praetorian Guard, force, along the lines of other such ideologically fiercely loyal forces typical of authoritarian and highly charged regimes – from the early Soviet Union, to Nazi Germany, to Iran (the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

A Jihadi-Salafi regime will most likely establish a new ideologically vetted military force, parallel with the regular army, similar perhaps in some or many respects to the IRGC. This parallel army may be responsible for the most sensitive and important projects, like the nuclear infrastructure and the surface to surface missiles (SSM’s). The command and control characteristics of that hypothetical parallel force are hard to predict, however the Iranian model, as well as Al-Qa’ida and Taliban practices, may provide some guidance. However, while the nuclear weapons themselves may not be placed in the hands of the regular military, non-integration of the dual use delivery systems in the regular army will be problematic. Such a set-up may facilitate direct command and control by the leadership of the weapons. At the early

stages of the regime – especially if it inherits an existing nuclear arsenal – this paradigm may necessitate concentrating the nuclear assets in a limited number of locations. The solution for the problem of loyalty of the forces in contact with the weapons may, therefore, create a greater risk insofar as there will be less separation between the various components of the weapon. A more centralized command and control (C2) structure, as manifested by the imposition of a regime-favored force, such as a Praetorian Guard fiercely loyal to the Leader, would then inevitably have both its advantages and its disadvantages in terms of the security of the nuclear assets, prevention of theft, unauthorized launch and other outstanding issues.

The presumption of Jihadi-Salafi leaders to emulate the behavior of the Prophet Muhammad brings them to eschew delegation of authority when such delegation is not dictated by the conditions in the field (i.e. absence of communication, multiple theaters of Jihad etc.). This is not a necessary conclusion from the biography of the Prophet or his companions; however it does seem to be the lesson that most of the Jihadi-Salafi strategists learn from it. It seems that once a Jihadi-Salafi regime will be founded, even the existing tolerance of pluralist authority and delegation of authority can be expected to be reduced. Such behavior may serve as a serious impediment for building a robust structure of command and control. It seems likely that Jihadi-Salafi regimes will follow the tradition of hyper-centralism of some of the secular Middle Eastern regimes – the Ba’th regime in Iraq, and the incumbent one in Damascus, and Egypt – and the tendency for deep involvement in military affairs by the political leadership would probably extend to its involvement in appointing individuals who are personally known to the leadership in each link in the chain of command over nuclear weapons. Thus, in contrast to Western nuclear C2, command and control with communication (C3) and with intelligence (C3I) systems, we can expect to encounter in a Jihadi-Salafi regime a more individualized line of command consisting of fewer (but highly trusted and religiously motivated) individuals, with less compartmentalization between them.

Jihadi-Salafi organizations are generally open to technology, and are less apprehensive of Western technology than established regimes with developed security apparatuses. Consequently, a newly founded regime based on a Jihadi-Salafi movement may conceivably be more open to adopting borrowed communications and command and control technology, and be less apprehensive that integration of such borrowed means may compromise regime survival. Nevertheless, a Jihadi-Salafi regime would probably encounter a problem similar to that of the revolutionary regime in Iran after Khomeini took power – a deep suspicion and even animosity towards the Western oriented and educated technological elite and military professionals. This attitude will probably hinder development of local technological solutions to the idiosyncratic needs of the regime. However, while the perception of nuclear weapons as weapons which must be demonstrated and brandished in order to deter nuclear strategic enemies should dictate a robust and sophisticated and flexible C3 system, the dearth of cadres who are both loyal and professional would make the forming of such a system difficult. The dearth of totally loyal professional officers to staff the strategic weapons units can also be expected to impact upon deployment considerations and logistics of safeguarding the weapons.

A Jihadi-Salafi regime inheriting an existing state would, in its first stages, have to cope with residual opposition by the previous, perhaps secular, regime (as in Iraq) and external intervention. Regions of the country – usually in the periphery – may therefore be insecure for deployment of strategic assets. It would appear therefore, that in the early stages of such a nuclear entity, the regime would probably not prefer a complicated model of total separation between weapons and delivery systems. The limited amount and dual use nature of delivery systems in the Middle Eastern theater will render their allocation only for nuclear use impossible; the delivery systems themselves will have to be integrated in conventional forces (and in the regular army) and the personnel for those units will have to be vetted at a higher level than regular forces. These constraints may preclude a system based on separation of components to different installations. However, it is altogether possible that they would allocate mission-committed units for nuclear weapons, as is customary in the Western states – the US, UK, France, and may be in Iran soon.

## Introduction

The distinction between permitted and forbidden weapons and legitimate targets of any weapons during armed hostilities evolved in the international community mainly in the wake of the use of chemical weapons in World War I. These understandings were duly codified in international law since, and were prohibited in the 1925 Geneva Convention, and of course later in the Chemical Weapons Convention that came into force in 1996 after long years of negotiation. Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, have never been “prohibited” for use in the same sense as chemical weapons. Their use though has been viewed since Hiroshima and Nagasaki as even more horrific and, hence, they have been viewed by all the nuclear states as weapons of deterrence, to be employed only as a last resort weapon when – and only when – their possessor is attacked or imminently threatened by such weapons. The “taboo” on even brandishing of nuclear weapons in order to gain advantage in conventional conflicts has become more and more deeply rooted over the decades of the Cold War. Since the role of nuclear weapons is primarily mass destruction of civilian population – the existence of tactical nuclear weapons, notwithstanding – the nuclear taboo has been reinforced by the acceptance after World War II of the prohibition on the indiscriminate targeting of civilian population in conflicts.

However, it ought not to be taken for granted that all new nuclear states emerging in the “Fourth Nuclear Age”<sup>1</sup> will automatically adhere to these understandings. Many of the elites of the emerging (or potential) nuclear states have no collective traumas of the experiences that brought the Western World to subscribe to these taboos. In addition, for many of these states, the perceived legality of use of certain weapons will not transpire from “international law” (which may even be seen as discriminatory infidel conventions imposed on the Muslims in order to weaken them) but on traditional Islamic jurisprudence. To understand how these states may apply these principles, we must delve into modern Islamic jurisprudence regarding the permissibility or unacceptability of weapons of mass destruction – particularly nuclear weapons, the attitude towards “non-combatants” in conflict and the underlying reasoning processes regarding these issues.

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1 The “Fourth Nuclear Age” – after a general breakdown of the international non-proliferation regime.



The question how a regime motivated by radical Jihadi-Salafi ideology may structure its command and control of nuclear weapons is doubly speculative: first - except for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and – with reservations – Hamas in Gaza<sup>2</sup>, no Jihadi-Salafi organization has ever achieved control over a state; second – we do not know what state may be under such control and what stage of development of nuclear weapons it may be in. Saudi Arabia may well be the most relevant country for the Jihadi-Salafi model for two reasons: First, the potential of a Jihadi-Salafi (or neo-Wahhabi) takeover of the Kingdom is higher than in any other Sunni country; and second, the motivation of Saudi Arabia under the present regime – and certainly under a Jihadi-Salafi regime – to develop nuclear weapons against a nuclear (Shiite) Iran would be high. Therefore, of all the countries in the region, the risk of a Jihadi-Salafi regime inheriting a nuclear state is the highest in Saudi Arabia.

Nevertheless the question raises important issues: What is the Islamist perspective today on the legality of possession and/or use of nuclear weapons? What are the Islamist concepts of command and control in the context of an Islamist state that they aspire to create? What might be the constraints that will impact on the development of the command and control structures of such a regime?

## Sunni Islamist Perspectives on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons

There has been some discussion in Sunni jurisprudence circles regarding the legality of possession or use of nuclear weapons.<sup>3</sup> Much of this discussion has taken place in Jihadi-Salafi circles affiliated with al-Qaida; however the issue has also been raised in mainstream circles, including in the prestigious institution of al-Azhar. The Sunni Islamic discourse on acquisition and use of nuclear weapons<sup>4</sup> relies on classical Islamic jurisprudence. Naturally, the writings of classical jurists can offer only limited guidelines, as they could only rule on those weapons which existed in the 7th – 11th centuries.

The principles that appear in this literature relate first to the question of permissibility of mass killing and of killing of non-combatants. These include the following arguments:

- Islamic law of war does not recognize the concept, accepted in modern law of war, of the inviolability of “non-combatants”. Islamic law of war recognizes a category of those regarding which the commander in battle has discretion whether to kill or not. These include categories such as women, minors, aged, invalids and monks in their cloisters. However, the prohibition (*hurma*) against the spilling of the blood of protected persons (*ma’sumun*) is not unconditional.<sup>5</sup> The criterion for killing them or not is ultimately the benefit gained or harm inflicted on the Muslim cause as the result of such killing.
- “Collateral damage” to non-combatants in cases such as night attacks (*tabyit*) on cities and use of catapults (*manjanik*) in which the non-combatants may be unintentionally killed, is accepted on a broad scale.
- It is also legitimate to attack civilian targets directly (attacking the enemy in his own home – (*‘aqr darihi*) in order to “make (the enemy) tremble with fear” and to bring about his collapse.
- Islamic law permits and even obliges the Muslims to use any possible means to destroy the enemy whose blood is permitted (*istihlal al-dam*) and who constitutes “belligerent countries” (*bilad al-harb*). Significantly perhaps, the model for this is the total annihilation by the Prophet Muhammad of the Jewish tribes of Arabia.
- Islamic tradition accords high importance to “counter-value” attacks as opposed to a “counter-force” doctrine, aspiring to total destruction of symbolic targets in order to inflict catastrophic material damage and cause collapse.
- The definition of the United States as a country against which war can be waged (*bilad al-harb*) and not a country with which a convention has been signed (*bilad ‘ahd*). Once that status is determined, it is incumbent on the Muslims to inflict **maximum damage** on it since its blood, money and women (*‘arad*) are permitted to Muslims.

Jihadi-Salafi ideologues add to the above justification for both possession and use of nuclear weapons against “infidels”. These arguments refer to:

- The analogy of nuclear weapons with some weapon type which was sanctioned by the Prophet. Indeed, in most of the Islamic writing on this issue, nuclear weapons are viewed as a modern incarnation of “strategic” weapons from the days of Muhammad: instruments used to torch the homes of the enemy, catapults, and so on. Insofar as nuclear weapons have been likened to such a weapon, and clear evidence exists that the Prophet Muhammad approved the use of such a weapon, the permission is automatically extended to nuclear weapons.
- Even if the analogy of nuclear weapons to some legitimate ancient weapon is not proven, the duty of the Muslims to achieve military superiority over the enemy, or at least parity in types of weapons, leads to the permissibility of acquiring any weapon which is found in the hands of the enemy. This injunction supersedes the Islamic objection to “innovation” (*bid’a*) of ideas which

2 It is not clear whether the Hamas regime should be taken into account as a Jihadi-Salafi type regime which has come to power. The Hamasist Jihad is directed primarily against Israel and its roots are in the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood, and not in the mélange of the Jihadi branch of that movement and the Wahhabi movement.

3 See: Manbar al-tawhid wal-jihad (website)- *Al-hurub al-nawawiyya wal-kimawiyya wal-biologiyya fi mizan al-fiqh* - <http://66.45.228.55/r?i=bw3rogbe>; Abu A'isha al-Maghrebi, *Hukm al-shari'a fi istikhdam aslihat al-damar al-shamil* - <http://majles.alukah.net/showthread.php?t=41611>; Fatwa by Sheikh 'Ala al-Shanawi by The “Al-Azhar Fatwas Committee” headed by Sheikh 'Ali Abu al-Hassan - faxed text in handwriting - <http://www.islamonline.net/Arabic/news/2002-12/23/article06.shtm>; Fatwa by Sheikh Faysal Mawlawi, *Using WMD in War: Islamic View*, December 2002 - [www.islamonline.net/fatwa/english/Fatwa\\_Display.asp?nFatwa\\_152398,64](http://www.islamonline.net/fatwa/english/Fatwa_Display.asp?nFatwa_152398,64); [www.islamonline.net/ol-arabic/dowalia/alhadath-17-11/alhada.th2.asp](http://www.islamonline.net/ol-arabic/dowalia/alhadath-17-11/alhada.th2.asp), 17 November 1999; Sheikh Nasser bin Hamid al-Fahd, *Risalah fi hukm istikhdam aslihat al-damar al-shamil did al-kuffar* (A treatise on the legal status of using weapons of mass destruction against infidels), 1 May 2003.

4 The Shiite principles of legal and theological jurisprudence have wider leeway for extracting practical guidelines for modern situations on the basis of general principles, without the need for recourse to classical legal decisions.

5 Yusuf al-'Airi, *Haqiqat al-Harb al-Salibiyya al-Jadida* (The Truths of the New Crusader War), Manbar al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, no date.

were not in existence in the times of the Prophet. Thus, given that Christian – especially the United States – Jewish, and Hindu adversaries are all viewed as being already in possession of nuclear weapons and of harboring evil intentions towards the true faith of the Islamic nation, obviously acquisition and wielding or brandishing of nuclear weapons is legitimized. Furthermore, the duty to possess weapons of deterrence against the enemy proscribes the Muslims from being party to international agreements in which they agree not to acquire such weapons.

- The duty of the Muslims to “make the enemies of the *Umma* or the enemies of Allah tremble (*irhab a’ada al-Umma/ a’ada Allah*).<sup>6</sup> This is clearly accomplished by nuclear weapons, and invokes the image of classical deterrence, and of compellence. One authoritative exegesis of this injunction stipulates that:

Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means; it is the end in itself... Terror is not a means of imposing decision on the enemy, it is the decision we wish to impose upon him... an army that practices the Qur’anic philosophy of war in its totality is immune to psychological pressures. An invincible faith is immune to terror. The faith conferred upon us by the Holy Qur’an has the inherent strength to ward off terror and to enable us to strike terror into the hearts of the enemy. This rule is fully applicable to nuclear as well as conventional wars. It is equally true of the strategy of nuclear deterrence in fashion today. To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence must be capable of striking terror into the hearts of the enemy.<sup>7</sup>

- The principle of reciprocity of damages and punishment (*qisas*) and the right of “Retaliation in kind” (*al-mu’amala bil-mithl*). According to this principle, the compensation for the death of a Muslim is ten times that for the death of a non-Muslim. Hence the number of “infidels” who should be killed as revenge for the deaths of Muslims is ten times. Given the number of Muslims, who have been killed according to the radical Islamic narrative, there is no other way to balance the account without use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).<sup>8</sup>
- If the use of nuclear weapons is the only realistic means for achieving victory, it is obligatory by Islamic law. This principle places the proactive goal of “achieving victory” (not necessarily in defense) as the criterion for use of nuclear weapons – not retaliation against, or pre-emption of, use of those weapons by the enemy. Some Islamist thinkers go further and determine that given the balance of power, nuclear weapons are, a priori, the only means to achieve victory. The prominent al-Qa’ida ideologue, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri point out that “the ultimate choice is the destruction of the United States by operations of strategic symmetry through weapons of mass destruction, namely nuclear, chemical or biological means, if the mujahidin can achieve it with the help of those who possess them or through buying them... (or) by the production of basic nuclear bombs, known as ‘dirty bombs.’<sup>9</sup>
- The danger that acquisition of nuclear weapon may entail being targeted by a nuclear state does not seem to play a role in Islamist strategic thought. Martyrdom and noble death in jihad are central elements in the Jihadi-Salafi ethos. The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna developed a dogma in which the “art of death” and the belief that a Muslim is obliged to “love death and despise life” play a pivotal role, an essential and sublime part of the jihad and a sine qua non for victory, and not a necessary evil of war. God grants a “noble life” to that nation alone which “knows how to die a noble death”. This dogma was further elaborated by the founder of the Jihadi-Salafi tendency within the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood – Sayid Qotb – who is widely perceived as the ideological father of modern Jihadi-Salafi movements. This ethos may be reminiscent of Japanese military traditions (and Bushido) as they came to be practiced during World War 2, resulting in gross miscalculation, senseless or futile personal sacrifice, and catastrophe.

The Jihadi-Salafi position on the legitimacy of use of nuclear weapons is grounded in a broader mainstream consensus. Prominent scholars in the Egyptian Islamic establishment have supported the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In the late 1990’s the Sheikh of al-Azhar Muhammad Tantawi, drew an analogy from the ruling of the Caliph Abu Bakr “to fight the enemy with a sword if he fights with a sword and ... with a spear if he fights with a spear” to conclude that **if the enemy uses a nuclear bomb, it is the duty of the Muslims to use it.**<sup>10</sup> Similarly, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qardawi – a prominent Sheikh associated with the Muslim Brotherhood – takes the point of departure of the law of *qisas* (*Lex Talionis*)<sup>11</sup> - an eye for an eye, equal retribution: “**in case these nuclear weapons are used against Muslims, it becomes permissible for Muslims to defend themselves using the same weapon**, based on Qur’an (16:126): “If you punish, then punish with the like of that by which you were afflicted.”<sup>12</sup> A separate *fatwa* of the al-Azhar Fatwas Committee ruled that since nuclear weapons are held by the “enemies” of the Muslims or any other nation at all, it is the **Islamic duty of all Muslim countries to acquire such weapons**. A Muslim regime which does not fulfill this duty is a sinner

6 The relevant verses in the Qur’an which the supporters of use of nuclear weapons use are: “And prepare against them what force you can and horses tied at the frontier, to frighten thereby the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them, whom you do not know (but) Allah knows them and whatever thing you will spend in Allah’s way, it will be paid back to you fully and you shall not be dealt with unjustly” - Qur’an 8:60; “And fight in the way of Allah with those who fight with you, and do not exceed the limits, surely Allah does not love those who exceed the limits” - Qur’an 9/36 - ; “And fight the polytheists all together as they fight you all together” - Qur’an 4/89 - ; “And kill them wherever you find them, and take not from among them a friend or a helper - Qur’an 4:89.

7 S.K. Malik, “The Qur’anic Concept of War”, in Jim Lacey, *The Canons of Jihad. Terrorists’ Strategy for Defeating America*. Annapolis (2008), pp. 112-116.

8 An unusually long (25 pages) *fatwa* by the Saudi Sheikh Nasser bin Hamid al-Fahd in May 2003: al-Fahd struggles in his *fatwas* with the legal ramifications of use of WMD even if children and other Muslims are killed and he reaches the conclusion that use of such weapons against the United States is obligatory. The basic justification for al-Fahd is also reciprocity; the behavior of the United States against the Muslims is such that it warrants use of weapons of mass destruction. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Rashid al-‘Anzi (a.k.a. ‘Abdallah bin Nasser al-Rashid), who also belongs to the Saudi *Shuyukh al-Sahwa*, rules that the use of weapons of mass destruction is permissible against a combatant enemy, but not against one that has surrendered.

9 Reuven Paz, “Global Jihad and WMD: Between Martyrdom and Mass Destruction, Vol. 2.,” *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, Hudson Institute, September 12, 2005.

10 <http://www.islamonline.net/iol-arabic/dowalia/alhadath-17-11/alhadath2.asp>, November 17, 1999.

11 Qardawi to Qatari TV, 18 October 2002.

12 *Fatwa* by Sheikh Faysal Mawlawi, Deputy Chairman of the “European Council for Fatwas and Research” (headed by Sheikh Qardawi), 16 October 2002 - <http://www.islamonline.net/fatwas/english/FatwasDisplay.asp?hFatwasID=52398>.

and may be guilty of “corruption (*fasad*) on earth”.<sup>13</sup> In May 2009, Egypt’s Mufti, Dr. ‘Ali Gum’a, issued a *fatwa* according to which although it is not permitted to use non-conventional weapons against non-Muslims **by non-state actors, groups or individuals**, however, **weapons of mass destruction can and should be used by Muslim states for deterrence and self-defense, based on the verse in the Qur’an: “You shall prepare for them all the power you can muster” (Qur’an, 8:60).**

**It is notable and significant that the Sunni Islamic argument against use of nuclear weapons is less forceful than the argument in its favor.** It is based on their inherent indiscriminate nature, killing “souls that Allah has forbidden to kill” along with the guilty. According to a *fatwa* by Sheikh Taher Jaber Alwani, the **use** of weapons of mass destruction is “not permissible” (*ghayr ja’iz* - not *haram* – forbidden, but just “not permissible”) since they do not differentiate between the innocent and the criminal. Sheikh Alwani also offers a practical objection to the use of WMD; Islamic law obliges *lex talionis* (*qisas*) by the kin of a person who is wrongly killed. Since in the case of WMD, there is no doubt that the innocent will be taken with the guilty, it opens the door for an endless cycle of legally justified revenge. It is of interest that the discussion of WMD *per se* is mainly focused on nuclear weapons, while chemical and radiological weapons are generally perceived as legitimate means that do not require special dispensation to use against infidels.

## The Role of Nuclear Weapons in a Jihadi-Salafi Regime

The justification of Islamic jurisprudence for acquisition of nuclear weapons leaves much room for interpretation: is the purpose of the weapon intended for deterrence of nuclear enemies, or for possible use? If it is for deterrence, is being a threshold state a sufficient deterrent, or should one assemble a weapon and declare it? Or actually test a device? Or is it necessary to deploy an arsenal? Is it permitted to co-opt fellow Muslims (such as proxy or surrogate organizations) into the nuclear program as part of the deterrence doctrine?

A Jihadi-Salafi regime can be expected to consider the possession of a nuclear deterrent as an ultimate guarantor of its survival in power, and as a key strategic asset in its relations with its neighbors and with the West. However, assuming that a Jihadi-Salafi regime will initially follow the ideological guidelines that appear in the writings before it takes power, its attitude towards nuclear weapons would probably not be restricted to the role of a deterrent to be kept under wraps or as a last resort doomsday weapon, but rather as a weapon to be wielded and brandished to further the movement’s strategic goals and ideological agenda. It is clear from most of the strategic writings of the Jihadi-Salafi movement that it will see such weapons as the means to fulfill the Qur’anic injunction “and make the enemies of Allah tremble with fear”. **This view implies that such a regime would not only strive to acquire nuclear weapons, but also threaten the use of nuclear weapons.** Such a *modus operandi* would fit in with the concept of “deterrence” which emerges from many Jihadi-Salafi writings; **viewed as the fear that the enemy feels of possible punishment due to the fact that he has already experienced such a punishment and not – as in classic Western deterrence theory – due to an assessment regarding the capability of the enemy to meet out that punishment.**

## Strategic Command

The leadership structure of any future Jihadi-Salafi state entity will influence the paradigm for command and control of nuclear weapons if that entity acquires them. “Revolutionary” movements which take power are typically very slow to lose their naive views of how an army should operate “ideologically”. The early days of Lenin’s Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Iran are all cases in point. Therefore, the influence of Islamic principles on the subject of military command has to be taken into account. These principles typically will also accord greater status in the military structure to those who demonstrate greater religious commitment or knowledge over professional merit. Hence, in the first stages of such a revolutionary military structure, the army – including with respect to the strategic assets – will typically resemble a “revolutionary guard” more than a professional military. Furthermore, the implications of such a characteristic may impact on issues of discipline, as officers may subordinate their duty of military obedience to their religious values. Another possibility is that such a regime will create a vanguard, or Praetorian Guard, force, along the lines of other such ideologically fiercely loyal forces typical of authoritarian and highly charged regimes – from the early Soviet Union, to Nazi Germany, to Iran (IRGC).

Leadership legitimacy and cultural and religious traditions of the infallibility of leaders – will most certainly have an effect on command and control of nuclear assets. To date, most Jihadi-Salafi movements tend towards autocratic rule by charismatic centralist leaders. If a state entity were to emerge based on such a movement, one may assume that it will be structured roughly along those lines, while taking into account and adapting the traditional local power structure of the country it has taken over, “Islamizing” it with appropriate titles and institutions.<sup>14</sup> Relevant characteristics of such a regime are likely to be:

- A ruler who embodies the Islamic principle of *amir al-mu’minin* (Commander of the Faithful) and *wali al-amr* (he who must be obeyed) or a *khalifa* (Caliph) who receives an oath of allegiance (*bay’a*) from his followers and senior members of the regime.
- A consultative council consisting of senior clerics whose rulings bind the ruler in matters of religious importance.
- A chain of command in the military based on an oath of allegiance to the ruler and possibly even oaths of each unit to its respective commander.

An important factor that may affect the command and control paradigm of a Jihadi-Salafi regime is the way that the leader is perceived by the public (or projects himself). Thus, one set of assumptions regarding possible command and control (C2) patterns must derive from the model above, of an autocratic Jihadi-Salafi regime leader as one who enjoys some direct inspiration from Allah, or even is endowed with some

13 *Fatwa* by Sheikh ‘ala al-Shanawi, the “Al-Azhar Fatwas Committee” headed by Sheikh ‘Ali Abu al-Hassan - <http://www.islamonline.net/Arabic/news/2002-2/23/article06.shtml>. A similar *fatwa* was issued (21 July 2002) by Dr. ‘Abd al-Mo’az Hariz from Jordan, also on the basis of the duty to “awaken fear in the land of *kufir* (the infidel)”.

14 A case in point is the Taliban regime in Afghanistan which reflected traditional Pashtoon tribal structures with an Islamic veneer.

supernatural perspicacity, hence is not obliged to provide an explanation for his decisions (a “Supreme Leader” of a kind). This is justified in Islam both at the level of the leader (*wali al-amr, amir*) and in scholarly authority. It is worth noting that although consultation in leadership is encouraged, it is not a must insofar as non-consultation does not invalidate the legitimacy of the decision by the leader. **Therefore, the formal models of collective decision-making may be no more than window-dressing for what would, in fact, be an authoritarian, perhaps totalitarian, pattern of decision-making regarding crucial strategic issues and assets, such as nuclear weapons and nuclear brinkmanship crisis situations.** Perhaps past examples are important foghorns that should raise the alarm in this regard, especially since single-leader decision-making may be more prone than collective decision-making to the primary pitfall of nuclear standoff – catastrophic miscalculation. This principle of Sunni Islamic government would hamper the development of a system by which strategic decisions are taken in a collective framework. A possible consequence of this aspect of leadership may be a certain incompatibility of such leadership structures with procedures for command and control, which call for redundancy and authentication as a safeguard against a leader who loses self-control or suffers a breakdown. Thus, well-established Western principles of nuclear asset security may be in serious jeopardy.

On the optimistic side, albeit apparently of relatively marginal weight, is the possibility that the reliance on Islamic jurisprudence for setting the guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons may restrict the absolute discretion of the ruler in ordering their actual use. While the ruler may have the right to give the orders, he may feel the need to “consult” with the higher *‘ulama* regarding critical issues that derive from the use of weapons of mass destruction. These issues would include: the religious implications of killing “immune individuals” (*nafs harrama Allah qatlaha* – those whose blood Allah has forbidden); “public interest” (*maslaha*) as expressed in the duty to refrain from actions that may be counter-productive to the Muslims (i.e. nuclear retaliation); *tatarus* - the question of killing Muslims living in the attacked country; and so on. Most of the deliberations on these subjects may take place before any crisis situation, and serve as the underlying justification for the ruler’s decisions. However, some will be linked to the actual assessment of the situation (the probability and scope of the enemy’s nuclear retaliation) and would call for ad hoc rulings. Therefore, one could expect to see in the vicinity of the ruler a group of *‘ulama* who will be part of the decision making process with respect to ordering the use of such weapons. Unfortunately, their participation may only be limited to providing the *fatwa* which legitimizes the act despite the above possible reservations, but they will be a factor in the process to some degree at least.

## Custody of the Weapons

A Jihadi-Salafi regime which takes over an existing state will probably be mistrustful of the existing army, insofar as it would be inevitably representative of the ousted secular elites, and as the officer corps might be perceived to be too deeply influenced by, and maintaining close connections with the West, Western states or Western ideas. This attitude would then resemble the suspicion that the revolutionary regime in Iran harbored towards the regular army. Therefore, like the Iranian regime, a Jihadi-Salafi regime will most likely establish a new ideologically vetted military force, parallel with the regular army, similar perhaps in some or many respects to the IRGC. This parallel army may be responsible for the most sensitive and important projects, like the nuclear infrastructure and the SSM’s. The command and control characteristics of that hypothetical parallel force are hard to predict, however the Iranian model, as well as Al-Qa’ida and Taliban practices, may provide some guidance. However, while the nuclear weapons themselves may not be placed in the hands of the regular military, non-integration of the dual use delivery systems in the regular army will be problematic. The precedents of the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, Iran, or even Saddam’s Iraq, may all be pertinent to the issue at hand, since in all of them a Praetorian Guard was entrusted with the most sensitive assets and tasks, while the established organizations were blatantly superseded or marginalized, or subordinated (for example, regular units were appended to elite guard units to execute regime priority tasks as deemed necessary, without consultation or in disregard of the regular command structure tasking).

Such a set-up may facilitate direct command and control by the leadership of the weapons. At the early stages of the regime – especially if it inherits an existing nuclear arsenal – this paradigm may necessitate concentrating the nuclear assets in a limited number of locations. The solution for the problem of loyalty of the forces in contact with the weapons may, therefore, create a greater risk insofar as there will be less separation between the various components of the weapon. A more centralized C2 structure, as manifested by the imposition of a regime-favored force, such as a Praetorian Guard fiercely loyal to the Supreme Leader, or to the ideological core of a radical regime, would then inevitably have both its advantages and its disadvantages in terms of the security of the nuclear assets, prevention of theft, unauthorized launch and other outstanding issues. Inevitably too, non-substantive considerations, such as those derived of subjective mystical or specific cultural values, bureaucratic interests and assorted regime priorities unrelated to the matter at hand – may all gain in weight, and make predicting the “rational” strategic behavior of such a regime very much more difficult.

Related to the above assertions would be the problem that would probably arise regarding the existence of “Jacobin” or “Trotskyist” factions within the regime, which may not accept the *Realpolitik* considerations of the regime leadership. This too is a natural development in revolutionary regimes after the leadership establishes itself and begins to forge a strategy that seems to some of its elements to be incompatible with the original goals of the revolution. Identification of commanders with access to nuclear sites with such unruly factions may seriously compromise the control of the leadership over the nuclear weapons.

## Sole or Multiple Authorization

It is possible that there may be a difference in the command and control structure tailored for a founding leader of a Jihadi-Salafi state, and that which will eventually evolve under his successors. The founding leader may be seen by his followers as being privy to the will of Allah, much like voices that Jean d’Arc heard or, *mutatis mutandis*, Hitler’s “inner voice” or “providence” guiding his military strategy, or Ahmadinejad’s *halavat* (sessions of solitude) with the “Hidden Imam”. The common denominator of all of these is that they integrate a personal experience

of revelation with earthly authority to act on those revelations. Since their authority in the eyes of their followers derives from acceptance of the authentic nature of these revelations, it would be hard to accept external human constraints on their discretion. This characteristic of such a regime may rule out the implementation of systems for dual or multiple authorization, authentication and other restraints on the authority of the ruler to launch nuclear weapons based on his sole decision. It should be noted, though, that while there have been Sunni Islamists who have claimed such direct divine inspiration (the Sudanese *Mahdi* for example), most modern Sunni Islamist movements do not, since such a claim would be tantamount to rejection of one of the most crucial Sunni tenets – that prophecy ended with Muhammad.

This paradigm may change in the second generation of the regime. The appointment of a successor is, by definition, by a process of agreement within the leadership group and implies some level of collective consultation and decisions within that group regarding strategic issues. This is the way that the Iranian regime developed after the demise of the founding father, Ayatollah Khomeini, and the advent of his successor, whose dearth of personal charisma and authority does not allow him the luxury of non-consultation. However, based on what we know about the Iranian precedent and its incorporation of a consultative process or model, it does nevertheless allow for manipulation of the Supreme Leader by the various factions, depending on the degree of access that they might enjoy, and for the screening, i.e. the manipulation, of the information that is brought to his attention. Thus, collective decision-making patterns have serious deficiencies in revolutionary regimes, and can not necessarily guarantee more balanced policy outcomes than authoritarian ones. The more so because it is still the Supreme Leader who makes the ultimate decisions and is obeyed by the Praetorian Guard charged with the most sensitive strategic assets and tasks, and in this environment his decisions are vulnerable to manipulation by the interested parties, to put it mildly. In fact, the competition for the Supreme Leader's preference is likely to be brutal, and thus the more savage and the less scrupulous may well be the more likely to win out over the restrained and the cautious, a potential cause for some alarm, perhaps.

The presumption of Jihadi-Salafi leaders to emulate the behavior of the Prophet Muhammad brings them to eschew delegation of authority when such delegation is not dictated by the conditions in the field (i.e. absence of communication, multiple theaters of *Jihad* etc.). This is not a necessary conclusion from the biography of the Prophet or his companions; however it does seem to be the lesson that most of the Jihadi-Salafi strategists learn from it. It seems that once a Jihadi-Salafi regime will be founded, even the existing tolerance of pluralist authority and delegation of authority can be expected to be reduced. Such behavior may serve as a serious impediment for building a robust structure of command and control. It seems likely that Jihadi-Salafi regimes will follow the tradition of hyper-centralism of some of the secular Middle Eastern regimes – the Ba'th regime in Iraq, and the incumbent one in Damascus, and Egypt – and the tendency for deep involvement in military affairs by the political leadership would probably extend to its involvement in appointing individuals who are personally known to the leadership in each link in the chain of command over nuclear weapons. Thus, in contrast to Western nuclear Command and Control (C2) and Command and Control together with Communication (C3), and Intelligence (C3I) systems, we can expect to encounter in a Jihadi-Salafi regime a more individualized line of command consisting of fewer (but highly trusted and religiously motivated) individuals, with less compartmentalization between them.

## Technical Means of Command and Control

Regardless of their political milieu, and with some degree of irony, it can be said that Jihadi-Salafi organizations are generally open to technology, and are less apprehensive of Western technology than established regimes with developed security apparatuses. Consequently, a newly founded regime based on a Jihadi-Salafi movement may conceivably be more open to adopting borrowed communications and command and control technology, and less apprehensive that integration of such borrowed means may compromise regime survival. Notably, ironically, and paradoxically, some of the most radical Sunni Islamic elements have traditionally benefited from a Western technological education, and have proven quite adept at applying their knowledge gained by Western training to advance their radical agenda, including to kill as many Westerners as they can.

Nevertheless, a Jihadi-Salafi regime would probably encounter a problem similar to that of the revolutionary regime in Iran after Khomeini took power – a deep suspicion and even animosity towards the Western oriented and educated technological elite and military professionals. This attitude will probably hinder development of local technological solutions to the idiosyncratic needs of the regime. The regime then would be caught between a rock and a hard place. On one hand, its very perception of nuclear weapons as weapons which must be demonstrated and brandished in order to deter what will be perceived as a coalition of nuclear strategic enemies (Iran, Israel, the United States, secular countries in the region) should dictate adopting a robust and sophisticated command and control system that could guarantee flexibility in time of crisis, prevention of unauthorized use by ideological elements of the regime which may be more radical than the leadership, and a “dead man's hand” capability (in the context of a second strike capability). On the other hand the lack of cadres who are both loyal and professional would make the forming of such a system difficult.

## Potential Multilateral Party (involving two or more radical nuclear- aspirant regimes) Command and Control

The Jihadi-Salafi ideology aspires to create an Islamic Caliphate under which all present Muslim political entities will be merged. This ideology could, at least theoretically, bring Islamist regimes with deep ideological affinity between them to contemplate joint command and control of nuclear weapons. This, of course, is a paradigm which has not existed even in NATO. All the issues that arise within a state (tribal balances, interference of the *'ulama* in operational considerations et alia) will be multiplied in such a situation.

The lure to develop multi-lateral nuclear programs will be both ideological (Islamic unity) and strategic. The leaders of two Jihadi-Salafi states may believe that collaboration on a nuclear program and maintenance of a nuclear weapons infrastructure of both countries in

both territories will broaden their strategic room of maneuver, and upgrade a second strike capability that each one may not have alone. Such a model, however, will create even greater command and control issues, amplifying the problems of loyalty, ease of access to nuclear weapons and ultimately possible unauthorized use.

## Deployment Considerations

A Jihadi-Salafi regime inheriting an existing state would, in its first stages, have to cope with residual opposition by the previous, perhaps secular, regime (as in Iraq) and external intervention. Regions of the country – usually in the periphery – may therefore be insecure for deployment of strategic assets. The dearth of totally loyal professional officers to staff the strategic weapons units can also be expected to impact upon deployment considerations and logistics of safeguarding the weapons.

It would appear therefore, that in the early stages of such a nuclear entity, the regime would probably not prefer a complicated model of total separation between weapons and delivery systems. The limited amount and dual use nature of delivery systems in the Middle Eastern theater will render their allocation only for nuclear use impossible; the delivery systems themselves will have to be integrated in conventional forces (and in the regular army) and the personnel for those units will have to be vetted at a higher level than regular forces. These constraints may preclude a system based on separation of components to different installations. However, it is altogether possible that they would allocate mission-committed units for nuclear weapons, as is customary in the Western states – the US, UK, France, and may be in Iran soon.

## The Jihadi-Salafi Model and Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is the most relevant country for the Jihadi-Salafi model for two reasons: First, the potential of a Jihadi-Salafi (or neo-Wahhabi) takeover of the Kingdom is higher than in any other Sunni country; and second, the motivation of Saudi Arabia under the present regime – and certainly under a Jihadi-Salafi regime – to develop nuclear weapons against a nuclear (Shiite) Iran would be high. Therefore, of all the countries in the region, the risk of a Jihadi-Salafi regime inheriting a nuclear state is the highest in Saudi Arabia. Whether it is the current regime or a future Jihadi-Salafi regime, whoever rules what is now the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will see himself as “Custodian of the Holy Places”. This implies guardianship against Shiite attempts to take over those sites no less than guardianship against the “Crusaders”.

The Jihadi-Salafi regime that may emerge in the Arabian Peninsula may get rid of the Ibn Sa’ud family, but some elements of the tribal decision-making and command and control paradigm which have characterized the Saudi regime are likely to persist. The hallmark of this paradigm is consultation between the regime and tribal power bases on one hand, and the *‘ulama* on the other hand. Some of the issues that are raised by the tension between authoritarian, single Supreme Leader decision-making, on the one hand, and on the other consultative patterns of decision-making and collective decision-making – have been described in preceding passages. In the context of an Arabian peninsula (i.e. what we nowadays call Saudi Arabia) takeover by a Jihadi-Salafi movement, and its acquisition of a strategic nuclear assets capability, nuclear weapons and an operational delivery capability, the following may be stated. The tendency towards multi-focal consultation may have a number of consequences:

- Drawn out decision-making processes in time of crisis with considerable weight accorded to the positions of the *‘ulama*. This latter feature will most probably weigh in on the side of a more pessimistic threat assessment and a greater proclivity to activate the nuclear option in time of conflict.
- A tendency to demonstrate nuclear prowess through military exercises and tests in order to “make the enemies of Allah tremble”. In this context, we may expect a strong tendency for belligerency towards the US, its allies in the Arab and Islamic world, Shiite Iran, as well as Israel, as the prime targets of the nuclear weapons.

The security of the weapons would be a weighty issue too as one may assume that any new regime would encounter certain opposition from former royalists, rival tribes and areas of the country which may be expected to chafe under the new yoke. This is particularly relevant in a tribal society like Saudi Arabia.

## Summary

Strategic thinking in Jihadi-Salafi circles has been exploring the issue of use of nuclear weapons for the last decade. However, there is no discussion in this literature of how the Islamic State should control those weapons. This is not unusual since the discussion of the inner workings of the Islamic State is limited to small groups which are not at the center of the Jihadi movement (such as *Hizb al-Tahrir* and the *Muhajirun*).

Nonetheless, certain possible constraints and influencing factors over C3 of nuclear weapons by a regime formed by a Jihadi-Salafi movement can be identified. In general, this regime is liable to see nuclear weapons not only as a deterrent against use of such weapons by the enemy, but as a means to threaten an enemy, to impose its political will on it by intimidation, and even as a weapon to be used in order to achieve victory if a perception of such an overall utility evolves. This attitude towards potential use of nuclear weapons will influence the C3 paradigms that such a regime may develop: weapons will have to be more operational on a regular basis, accessible to the leaders, under their direct control, and with minimum safeguards which may be tampered with by the enemy. These constraints may not contribute to the stability of the C3 system in time of crisis.

## Culture of Command & Control of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East - Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood

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### Executive Summary

If the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) rules Egypt, it will move to acquire military nuclear capabilities, if Egypt does not have them already. This would be especially true if Iran, and perhaps other states following Iran, appear to be aspiring to a nuclear weapons capability, including Saudi Arabia, or a post-Saudi regime in Arabia, or perhaps Turkey. The MB will view this as the implementation of an explicit divine instruction for Muslims to possess all the means required to deter their enemies. In addition, the MB will consider the possession of such capabilities as the guarantor of its survival in power, deterring external forces from seeking to topple it. The MB, which is committed to the liquidation of Israel, will see the possession of nuclear weapons as putting it in a position to abrogate the peace treaty with the Jewish state and to threaten the latter with conventional military action, under the protection of a nuclear “equalizer” that might be perceived to negate any Israeli deterrence in this regard, or even use nuclear weapons if they come to be perceived as valid instruments in the surge towards victory over “infidel” forces of one kind or another. In this sense, an ideologically religious fundamentalist Egypt would bear some striking similarities to an ideologically radical Iran with nuclear weapons, where vast geographic, demographic and natural resource reserves could lead a strongly willed anti-status-quo leadership to launch nuclear weapons in the belief that it could still prevail in a nuclear exchange, while absorbing relatively high attrition rates, which other, less populated or smaller states in the region could not. Religious fervor and commitment, while not necessarily being irrational per se, could in this sense contribute to nuclear blows by miscalculation, rather than by premeditated design.

The MB will probably assign the nuclear project to an ideologically loyal military force, which will be formed in parallel to the existing military which the MB will not trust (a force along the lines of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps – IRGC). It can be a modern version of the Secret Apparatus which operated within the Brotherhood, but it will have to start from scratch and will take time and significant resources to establish. Given the turbulent history of leadership and control in the movement, it is not easy to predict what its nuclear decision-making and control will really look like. Zealots might act against the will of the formal leadership and perhaps behind its back, and securing nuclear weapons and materials against unauthorized access by radical elements in the movement may become a major problem.

A doctrinal question which may arise pertains to how far does the “deterrence of the enemy”, to which Muslims are obliged by the *Qur’an*, go? *Shar’i* legal opinion has by and large authorized the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and even advocated it – as a deterrent. This leaves wide room for interpretation of what deterrence is: is being a threshold state a sufficient deterrent, or should one assemble a weapon, test a device, or openly threaten to use the weapon, in order to create deterrence? And can one transfer the weapons or materials to fellow Muslims, like Hamas or Hizballah, so that they too can deter the “enemy” in the name of “Islamic justice” against “infidel usurpers”?

How can a nuclear MB be deterred? How sensitive will it be to civilian casualties on its side? The MB’s ideology idealizes death in *jihad* as a supreme value. At the same time the MB is neither messianic nor apocalyptic, and as a persecuted opposition movement has pursued a pragmatic strategy in which first priority is given to the movement’s preservation and expansion, and conflicts with stronger adversaries are avoided if they put the movement’s very survival at risk. **This is likely to change once the Brotherhood is in power and equipped with nuclear weapons, which will enable hard liners to argue that the movement’s survival is now assured and that the past pragmatism is no longer necessary.**

As far as sensitivity to civilian casualties is concerned, the MB’s Palestinian branch, Hamas, which rules the Gaza Strip, made use of civilians as human shields for its combatants during the Gaza War (2008-9) and bragged about it. One should not expect the Egyptian MB to have a different approach. More generically, it can be assumed that an Egyptian MB rule would view casualties as part of the struggle towards achieving ideologically mandated goals – and by divine commandment and conviction there can be no victory without a willingness to incur great sacrifice. It should perhaps be noted that the MB is a Sunni organization, with all that this could entail in terms of its commitment to effect revolutionary, come messianic, change in the region, usually attributed more commonly to Shiite movements, such as the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary regime – the experience with al-Qa’ida and its allies is disconcerting in terms of radicalization trends evident in Sunni movements too.

**It should be noted that the MB is a global movement with branches or groups affiliated with it to various degrees operating all over the Arab and Muslim worlds and in non-Muslim countries, in Asia and Africa as well as in Europe and North America. If the Egyptian MB takes power, and as a government possesses military nuclear capabilities, this might have wide-ranging implications, like the empowerment of MB branches in Arab or other states or the likelihood of proliferation, for example to Hamas, which is part of the MB movement. At least, Hamas might enjoy the benefits of extended deterrence offered by a MB nuclear armed Egypt, which given current tensions could spark severe escalation (such as a regional “Cuban Missile Crisis”), or worse. In this sense, a nuclear armed MB Egypt would raise the specter of**

an almost al-Qa'ida-like global threat, and other concerns regarding nuclear security similar to those that exist today with respect to the integrity of the Pakistani assets facing various forms of threats.

Command and Control in an MB nuclear armed Egypt would be subject to the evolution and trends observable in a revolutionary leadership once it was in power. Our closest basis for comparison is Iran, notwithstanding that the Iranian Revolution was Shiite, and non-Arab. The following sections highlight some of the possibilities that may be contemplated regarding nuclear security, C2 (Command and Control), C3 (Command, Control and Communications), C3I (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), deployment, and unauthorized use issues in an MB nuclear armed Egypt.

## Introduction

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is the strongest political opposition movement in Egypt and the country's only real mass political movement. Its objective is to take power in order to establish an Islamic state which will implement Islamic religious law (the *Shari'a*), free Muslim lands from Western dominance and influence in all its manifestations, and spread Islam worldwide. In this sense, the agenda of the Sunni MB in Egypt is reminiscent of the Shiite Iranian Islamic Revolution, or of the Sunni al-Qa'ida and its diverse affiliates deployed regionally and globally. It is currently assessed that an MB takeover of power in Egypt under present circumstances is not a likely scenario: the movement has failed to do that during its 82 years of existence, and at no point has it even been close to taking power. Still, it is a scenario that cannot be totally excluded: Hamas, the Palestinian MB branch, was not expected to win legislative elections in the West Bank and Gaza (2006) and to take control of Gaza, but it did in 2007. If we go back in time to the 1970s, nor were the radical Islamic revolutionary elements expected to take power in Iran after the collapse of the Shah regime, but they did. This paper tries to look at nuclear C3 issues in an Egypt ruled by the Egyptian MB.

There are several scenarios in which the MB takes power. In the first scenario, it takes power when Egypt is a *bona fide* non-nuclear state and is not pursuing a military program, or even a program seeking to achieve fuel cycle independence, as it is now. In another scenario, the MB takes power with Egypt having a nuclear program seeking nuclear fuel cycle independence, or even having completed such a program, without a military program. Thirdly, the MB might reach power when Egypt already has nuclear weapons or a military nuclear program. It is our assessment that if Egypt is not a nuclear state when the MB attains power, the MB will launch a nuclear military program without delay. It will most likely look for help from ideologically allied parties with access to nuclear knowledge and material, be they Sunni Islamic experts in Pakistan or the Iranian government, with which the MB shares an animosity toward the US, Israel and the pro-Western Arab regimes, and which will be more than happy to have a foothold in Egypt. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Libya or Syria (or Algeria), all of which could become nuclear aspirants, Egypt does have the technological infrastructure to support a relatively extensive nuclear program, and already has in place several facilities that could be used to produce weapons grade materials (and might have more if nuclear power stations are constructed in the meantime). It also has a relatively advanced and extensive military industries infrastructure, like Iran and unlike the other potentially nuclear aspirant states in the region, thus capabilities that could support a weaponization program and produce relatively reliable delivery systems.

## The Role of the Nuclear Capability



The MB logo

Why should the MB seek a military nuclear capability and what will be the role of this capability according to the MB's strategic thinking? In the MB's doctrine, possession of nuclear weapons would be the implementation of a divine instruction to Muslims to possess all possible means of war. In addition, the MB will consider the possession of a nuclear deterrent as the ultimate guarantor of its survival in power in the face of external plans to topple it. Furthermore, the MB is deeply opposed to Egypt's peace treaty with Israel, and, like its Palestinian offshoot Hamas, is committed to the liquidation of the Jewish state and to the establishment of Islamic rule in

Palestine in its place. The MB will see the possession of nuclear weapons as putting it in a position to abrogate the peace treaty with Israel, and to threaten the latter with conventional military action, under the protection of a nuclear "equalizer" that would negate any Israeli deterrence in this regard, or even use nuclear weapons if they come to be seen as valid instruments in the surge towards victory over "infidel" forces of one kind or another.

The doctrinal aspect is reflected in the MB logo. The logo features a *Qur'an* and two crossed swords and beneath them the first word from Verse 60 of *Sura 8, Surat al-Anfal* ("The Spoils of War"), which says: "You shall prepare for them all the power you can muster, and all the equipment you can mobilize, that you may frighten the enemies of God, your enemies, as well as others who are not known to you; God knows them. Whatever you spend in the cause of God will be repaid to you generously, without the least injustice." This *Sura* describes how the Muslims defeated the much more numerous pagan people of Mecca in the battle of Badr (624 AD). This particular verse is so well known that its first word is enough for many Muslims to understand what stands behind the logo.

It would be fair to expect that as soon as the MB takes power, it will move to "prepare all the equipment it can mobilize" in order to frighten the enemies of God, and its own enemies. The *Qur'an* speaks here actually about deterrence ("that you may frighten..."). A doctrinal question which may arise pertains to how far does the "deterrence of the enemy", to which Muslims are obliged by the *Qur'an*, go? *Shar'i* legal opinion has by and large authorized the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and even advocated it - as a deterrent. This leaves wide room



for interpretation of what deterrence is: is being a threshold state a sufficient deterrent, or should one assemble a weapon, test a device, or openly threaten to use the weapon, in order to create deterrence? And can one transfer the weapons or materials to fellow Muslims, like Hamas or Hizballah, so that they too can deter the enemy in the name of Islamic justice against “infidel usurpers”?

Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, probably the most influential Sunni jurist nowadays, and who enjoys strong influence in the MB, has ruled that Muslims should acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent, in line with that *Qur'anic* phrase, “that you may frighten the enemies of God.” Those weapons should provide “an armed peace - when you possess the means to deter your enemy so that he cannot launch aggression against you.” But nuclear weapons should only be used for deterrence.<sup>1</sup>

Indeed, the MB has spoken openly of the need for Egypt to acquire nuclear weapons. In its 2005 parliamentary election platform, for example, the MB declared that under its leadership, Egypt would develop “special national programs, such as the nuclear program, the space and aviation program, armaments program, and the bio-technology program.”<sup>2</sup> In the summer of 2006, after pressing the Egyptian government for more than a year to restart the country’s nuclear power program, the MB escalated its nuclear goals and openly called for Egypt to develop nuclear weapons to counterbalance Israel’s nuclear capabilities. A spokesperson of the Brotherhood’s parliamentary caucus stated in July 2006: “We are ready to starve in order to own a nuclear weapon that will represent a real deterrent and will be decisive in the Arab-Israeli conflict.”<sup>3</sup> MB deputies argued that Egypt’s old strategy of calling for a Nuclear Weapons Free Middle East is of no use, and demanded that Egypt acquire nuclear weapons to deter Israel, in fact to reinstate the conventional advantages that Egypt, when allied with other Arab forces, might enjoy over Israel, if its perceived nuclear option were to be cancelled out by an Egyptian “equalizer”.<sup>4</sup> In May 2009 an MB parliament deputy said that Egypt should acquire nuclear weapons in light of the accelerated arming of Israel and Iran.<sup>5</sup>

Even prominent scholars in the official Egyptian religious establishment, which is financed by the state and by and large supports the government’s positions, have supported the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The establishment’s formal position was pronounced by Egypt’s most senior Islamic jurist, the Mufti, Dr. ‘Ali Gum’a, in a *fatwa* he issued in May 2009.<sup>6</sup> The main thrust of the *fatwa* was to prohibit the use of non-conventional weapons against non-Muslims by non-state actors, groups or individuals – which was the question to which the *fatwa* responded. But it also stated that weapons of mass destruction can and should be used by Muslim states for deterrence and self-defense. The Mufti said that the acquisition of such weapons by Muslim states for the purpose of deterring aggressors is required according to the *Shari’a*, because *Allah* said “You shall prepare for them all the power you can muster.” On this matter, then, the Mufti, who answers to the government, shares the view of the MB opposition ideologues.

## Decision-Making and Command Regarding Nuclear Weapons

The formal model of decision-making and control of the Egyptian MB, as it was established by the movement’s founder and first leader (General Guide), Hasan al-Banna, is very Egyptian, in the sense of the Egyptian tradition of a strong state with total control of society, where the ruler is omnipotent, and runs the state through a vast and loyal bureaucracy. The ruler, who in most cases is in power for life, consults with advisers, but takes decisions alone and does not need to build coalitions.

This model is still adhered to formally, and the movement is formally led by a General Guide who presides over a leadership structure consisting of a consultative council, an executive bureau and an elaborate hierarchical bureaucratic system. Yet in reality this model was fully practiced only under Hasan al-Banna, who led the movement for 21 years until he was assassinated in 1949. Since then, decision-making and control patterns have shifted from this model. Oftentimes real power was wielded not by the General Guide and the formal leadership structure, but rather by strong groups and individuals behind the scenes. Clear decision-making mechanisms do not exist.<sup>7</sup>

As for control, it stands to reason that the MB leadership will seek to construct the parallel (IRGC-type) force which will be in charge of the nuclear assets with a view to ensure its utmost loyalty, discipline and orderliness - which the old Special Apparatus often lacked. The supreme leader and his close advisers will have direct control over the command of that parallel force, and of the commanders of field units. How this will work in practice, however, is hard to predict.

Similarly, diverse opinions can be expected within the MB leadership, if in power, regarding its nuclear doctrine. While some elements in the MB leadership might tend to proceed cautiously, others could push for radical positions, leading to internal conflicts in which the radicals might act against the will of the formal leadership and perhaps behind its back. The more ruthless in such a scenario could thus potentially marginalize the cautious, as is typical of both Arab and other authoritarian political cultures.

The Muslim Brotherhood is a political movement whose ideology is religious. Unlike Khomeini’s Islamic republic, where the religious jurist is the ruler, the Muslim Brotherhood is led, with some exceptions, not by religious authorities, jurists or preachers, but by bureaucratic-organizational types of individuals. Religious authorities have influenced the movement’s doctrine, but have not been involved in operational decision-making. Beyond issuing rulings allowing the use of nuclear weapons in *jihad*, therefore, it is not likely that they will be involved in decision-making regarding the brandishing, or use, of those weapons.

Who will be in charge of managing the nuclear project, and of operating strategic military nuclear assets? It is assessed that the MB

1 Qatar Television, October 18, 2002.

2 Sammy Salama, Khalid Hilal, “Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Presses Government for Nuclear Weapons”, *WMD Insights*, Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 2006, Issue, [http://wmdinsights.com/110/110\\_ME3\\_EgyptianMuslim.htm](http://wmdinsights.com/110/110_ME3_EgyptianMuslim.htm).

3 *Ibid.*

4 <http://www.ikhwanonline.net/Article.asp?ArtID=26065&SecID=250>, February 1, 2007.

5 [http://www.thememriblog.org/blog\\_personal/en/16621.htm](http://www.thememriblog.org/blog_personal/en/16621.htm).

6 [http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA\\_C&cid=1242759335439&pagename=Zone-Arabic-News%2FNWALayout](http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid=1242759335439&pagename=Zone-Arabic-News%2FNWALayout), May 31, 2009.

7 Ibrahim al-Houdaibi, “As Succession Nears, which way Will Egypt’s Muslim Brothers Lean?” [http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition\\_id=1&categ\\_id=5&article\\_id=109378](http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=5&article_id=109378), December 4, 2009

regime will not trust the existing regular army. This is a legacy of many revolutions in the region over the years, especially of those that are ideologically highly charged. The army will inevitably be viewed as part and parcel of the ousted secular elites, and its officer corps deeply influenced by, and with close connections with the US, or the West. The new regime will most likely establish a new military force, parallel to the regular army, as a large Praetorian Guard, along the model of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This parallel army will be responsible for the most sensitive and important projects, like the nuclear infrastructure and the surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), much as the IRGC in Iran is responsible for some of the more sensitive aspects of the strategic nuclear assets, such as the SSM arm of the IRGC Air Force, and is expected to be in control of nuclear weapons when they become available and are deployed.

In constructing this new force, the MB can fall back on its own history. Between the 1940s and the 1960s it had a secret paramilitary and terrorist arm, the “Special Apparatus” or the “Secret Apparatus”, which operated parallel to the MB’s organizational structure; was compartmentalized to the regular Brotherhood members and to most of their leaders; and was answerable directly to the General Guide, the Brotherhood’s supreme leader. Muslim Brethren who were members of the Special Apparatus in the 1960s are among the MB’s present leaders. But since such a parallel force does not exist it will have to start from scratch and will take time and significant resources to establish. As the MB’s history shows, zealots might act against the will of the formal leadership and perhaps behind its back. Thus, in a nuclear armed MB-dominated Egypt, securing nuclear weapons and materials against unauthorized access by radical elements in the movement may become a major problem.

## How Can One Deter a Nuclear MB?

The question arises whether it would be possible to deter an MB nuclear armed Egypt? Will such a government be sensitive to casualties among its population? In this sense, an ideologically religious fundamentalist Egypt would bear some striking similarities to an ideologically radical Iran with nuclear weapons, where vast geographic, demographic and natural resource reserves could lead a strongly willed anti-status-quo leadership to launch nuclear weapons in the belief that it could still prevail in a nuclear exchange, while absorbing relatively high attrition rates, which other, less populated or smaller states in the region could not. Religious fervor and commitment, while not necessarily being irrational per se, could in this sense contribute to nuclear blows by miscalculation, rather than by premeditated design.

The MB is a political movement, and as all political movements, once it took power its perspective will differ from what it was when the MB was an opposition movement. Still, its purpose in acquiring power is to implement its ideology. It can therefore be expected to face some degree of tension between its ideological commitments, on the one hand, and the imperatives of the reality in which it has to function as a government, on the other. Which choices it will make on the range from ideological purism to political realism is hard to predict, but the possibilities of miscalculation due to ignorance regarding adversarial forces, errors of judgment due to common inherent human faults, domestic political constraints, bureaucratic interest-driven disinformation and misinformation, and competition for legitimacy and prestige – are all seriously disconcerting.

On the one hand, then, there is the ideology. Martyrdom and noble death in *jihad* are central elements in the MB’s ethos as it was shaped by the movement’s founder, and still immensely revered and admired, Hasan al-Banna. God grants a “noble life” to that nation alone which “knows how to die a noble death,” he said. He extolled death as an important end of *jihad* in the phrase “the art of death”. “Death is art,” he said. The *Qur’an* has commanded people to love death more than life. Unless “the philosophy of the *Qur’an* on death” replaces “the love of life” which has consumed Muslims, then they will reach naught. Victory can only come with the mastery of “the art of death”. These themes have been an important aspect of MB training.<sup>8</sup> Thus, the obligation of sacrifice is an essential prerequisite for victory, there can be no victory without it. This too bears at least some potential for grave miscalculation in an escalating crisis scenario.

Muhammad Mahdi ‘Akif, the General Guide from January 2004 to January 2010, stated in a missive entitled “*Jihad and Martyrdom [Istishhad] Are the Way to Glory and Victory*” that Islam regards resistance against occupation, like the ones in Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq “a *jihad* for God” (*jihad fi sabil Allah*).<sup>9</sup> In an article outlining the MB’s objectives, ‘Akif stated that for the MB, *jihad* was the most elevated pillar of Islam after “the two testimonies” (that there is no God but *Allah* and that Muhammad is His messenger), and recapitulated the Prophet’s saying, often quoted by al-Banna: “He who dies and has not fought, and was not resolved to fight, has died a *jahiliyya* (unholy, in ignorance of God) death.”<sup>10</sup> ‘Akif declared that all Zionists - civilians and soldiers - must be killed, because the “Zionist People” as a whole is an armed military force occupying Palestine, and there is no difference between military Zionists and civilian ones.<sup>11</sup>

It follows that once in power, the Egyptian MB would consider itself obliged to mount an active *jihad* to liberate occupied Muslim lands, from Palestine through Iraq to Afghanistan. It follows also that casualties would not deter the MB from pursuing the *jihad*. This puts in question the relevance of Western theories of nuclear containment and deterrence, originally developed to address non-democratic states whose objective was to spread a certain ideology, to build an empire, or simply to survive. Will a movement for which death in holy war in *Allah’s* name is a key objective be deterred by the threat of death? To clarify, the belief is not messianic or suicidal, but rather that sacrifice is an essential element on the path to divinely assured victory, and that therefore great sacrifice is not a messenger of defeat but rather of imminent victory. Neither does this mean that an MB leadership would deliberately seek great destruction among its own people, but rather that it would be prone to miscalculate the magnitude of disaster due to ignorance and guidance by subjectively warped or slanted prisms toward realities in a nuclear environment. Nor does this mean that the probabilities of nuclear war are inevitably high; they are not,

8 Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood*. London: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 207.

9 “Al-Jihad wal-Istishhad huma Tariq al-‘Izza wal-Nasr,” [www.ikhwanonline.com](http://www.ikhwanonline.com), April 15, 2004.

10 Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa-‘Awdat al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya,” [www.ikhwanonline.com](http://www.ikhwanonline.com), July 10, 2005.

11 “‘Akif: La Farq bayna al-Madaniyyin al-Sahayina wal-‘Askariyyin,” [www.ikhwanonline.com](http://www.ikhwanonline.com), February 9, 2005.

and even a radical leadership is likely to be rational, and cautious. The problem is one of degree, how probable is “probable”, and what the margin of error may turn out to be – even a relatively small one could be catastrophic.

To be sure, the MB’s mainstream trend is neither messianic nor apocalyptic, and the movement’s survival and expansion are its first priorities. In the 1950s and again in the 1960s extremist trends in the MB dragged it to violent confrontations with the Nasser regime which brought it close to being eliminated as a movement, and since then it has eschewed violence; adopted electoral politics as a central strategy; avoided confrontations with the regime whenever those could put the movement’s very survival at risk; and practiced self restraint even under heavy repression. This has an ideological dimension: the Brotherhood regards itself as the real Islamic community, which should gradually Islamize society until the movement becomes identical with society and state. Putting at risk the movement’s survival amounts, therefore, to risking the existence of the real Islamic community. Thus, the MB have demonstrated obviously rational and cost-effective, rational-actor model, characteristics, and can be expected to carry these through when it becomes responsible for a relatively modern state, which Egypt is (again, more like Iran than the other states in the region).

It is an open question, however, how much of this pragmatic approach will survive the MB’s reaching power and having nuclear weapons at its disposal: some elements in the MB might continue to preach caution, but others will argue that the movement has finally been endowed with a God-given ultimate power which ensures its survival, and therefore that a pragmatic approach is no longer mandated.

As far as the question of civilian casualties is concerned, there is a lesson to be learned from the experience of Hamas, the MB’s Palestinian branch, which has ruled Gaza since June 2007. Hamas provoked Israel to launch its military operation against Gaza in December 2008-January 2009, and had no compunctions in using civilians as human shields. On the contrary, it boasted making use of them as a strategy. Thus, Hamas’ TV channel, *al-Aqsa TV*, showed (February 29, 2009) a Hamas MP stating the following:

[The enemies of Allah] do not know that the Palestinian people have developed their [methods] of death and death-seeking. For the Palestinian people, death has become an industry, at which women excel, and so do all the people living on this land. The elderly excel at this, and so do the *mujahidin* and the children. This is why they have formed human shields of the women, the children, the elderly, and the *mujahidin*, in order to challenge the Zionist bombing machine. It is as if they were saying to the Zionist enemy: “We desire death like you desire life.”<sup>12</sup>

One can clearly detect here Hasan al-Banna’s praise of Islam’s “art of death” as against its enemies’ “love of life”, a ubiquitous disdain for the Western sanctity of life and pursuit of material values, which is common to extremist and undemocratic ideologies throughout history, especially evidenced in the twentieth century. Concern for civilian life, therefore, may not be a powerful deterrent when the MB takes power.

What then could deter a nuclear MB in power? To be deterred the MB perhaps will have to perceive that it faces a credible existential threat in spite of its possession of nuclear weapons. In other words, it will need to be convinced that the sacrifices entailed in nuclear escalation are not a channel that leads ultimately to victory, but rather to the demise of the ideology that is held dear, and that it risks collapse of the espoused agenda. Short of that, the MB apparently will not hesitate to advance its agenda most energetically and forcefully, not to say ruthlessly, under the cover of its nuclear weapons assets.

## Will the Enemy’s Identity Influence C3 Procedures?

As demonstrated in the chapter on nuclear C3I in Egypt under the present regime, or a continuity regime, Muslim Arab rulers of Muslim countries like Nasser of Egypt and Saddam of Iraq had no qualms about using chemical weapons against Muslims, their own nationals included, leading one to assume that under the present regime in Egypt, the enemy’s being Muslim will have no influence on nuclear C2 procedures and levels of control. But will the fact that the enemy is Muslim have no effect on those procedures and levels of control in a regime run by the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist religious movement?

It will not. It was the Muslim Brotherhood which introduced to modern politics the method of defining a Muslim enemy or rival as an apostate (the method of *takfir*). Once defined as such, that enemy or rival can be fought against. The Egyptian Brotherhood carried out assassinations against its rivals, Muslims, including a prime minister, and the Syrian branch conducted a terror and guerilla war against the Syrian regime. Neither would the likelihood that Muslims might be unintended victims of attacks on non-Muslims (Israeli targets, for example) be a deterrent. The justification will be that those Muslims were blessed with the privilege of dying a martyr’s death with all the associated benefits.

The issue of the legality, in the eyes of MB ideological formulators, of using nuclear weapons against Muslim adversaries, or the possibility that Muslims might be killed as collateral damage in nuclear attacks directed at non-Muslims, is raised here only in the sense that this is an indirect issue. For, inevitably, an MB nuclear armed Egypt would target principally non-Muslim rivals, such as the US, Israel, their allies, or other diverse groups (Russians, Communist Atheists, Hindus, etc, as the imagination may invoke), but Muslims are an integral part of the region and are likely to be victims one way or another of nuclear escalation, and of any nuclear exchange. Moreover, most interesting is the question whether a nuclear armed Islamic Revolutionary Iran, being a natural Shiite rival of a Sunni MB nuclear armed Egypt, might come to be viewed as a nuclear ally or as an adversary, and targeted specifically so as to nullify its influence for regional dominance, and to mitigate its anti-status-quo troublemaking potential, being as it is as such directly in competition against an MB nuclear armed Egypt.

12 <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g0wJXf2nt4Y>.

## Will Differences between Sunni and Shiite Traditions Affect Nuclear C3 Culture in an MB-Ruled Egypt?

Sunni traditions in the Middle East regarding the state and its means of power are generally different from Shi'i ones in this regard due to the different historical conditions – Sunni Islam by and large has been the faith of the rulers and ruling elites, whereas Shi'ism has by and large been associated with the ruled and the persecuted by state power. Does this difference have relevance to nuclear C2? To our understanding what counts is not Sunni versus Shi'i traditions, but rather much more so the local political culture. Thus the political culture of Sunnis in Egypt, who see their identity and loyalty closely related to the concept of the Egyptian state and to its ruler, differs from that of Sunnis in Iraq or Saudi Arabia whose identity is first and foremost tribal, whose loyalty is to their tribal leaders, and for whom the concept of the state means little. Similarly, in the Egyptian military culture officers are often appointed to key and sensitive positions on the basis of seniority and perhaps merit, not on the basis of their tribal affiliation.

Moreover, Egypt's cultural traits as a centralized, strongly hierarchical and highly bureaucratic state have made their imprints on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood which, in this sense, is very Egyptian: in its centralist leadership, powerful hierarchical and bureaucratic organizational apparatus and strong discipline the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood differs from other branches of the movement.

### The Iranian Factor

If the present Iranian regime is in power when the Egyptian MB takes over power, and given the ideological affinity between that regime and the Egyptian MB, their common animosity toward the US, Israel and the pro-Western Arab regimes, and their relative international isolation, a strategic alliance and defense cooperation, including in the nuclear field, may develop between them. Iran will seek to turn Egypt under the MB into a satellite, as close to Iran as Hamas or even more so. There will be elements in the Brotherhood who will resent or openly oppose such a course, but the Iranians may take advantage of the defense cooperation to infiltrate the Egyptian defense and security organizations in terms of intelligence and influence. In that context they are likely to try to use their involvement with the nuclear program in order to achieve influence in it, and to control it.

### Implications of the MB's Global Nature

The MB is a global movement with branches or groups affiliated with it to various degrees operating all over the Arab and Muslim world, and in non-Muslim countries in Asia and Africa, as well as in Europe and North America. The strategies of the various branches vary from place to place, according to local conditions. But the Brethren by and large share the basic doctrine of an existential struggle between Islam and the West, in which the movement's goals are to liberate Muslim lands from the occupation or influence and exploitation of the West, to unify the Muslims, to establish the Islamic state ruled by the *Shari'a*, and to spread its version of revivalist Islam worldwide.

Beyond a shared doctrine, many of the branches are connected in various degrees to the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, a loose association which is dominated by the Egyptian branch, the movement's "mother" and the strongest branch. If the Egyptian MB takes power, and as a government possesses military nuclear capabilities, this could thus have wide-ranging implications, like the empowerment of MB branches in Arab states, or globally.

### Command, Control, Communications and Deployment Issues in an MB Nuclear Armed Egypt

Pursuant to all the above comments and observations, it is not easy to make definitive assessments regarding the C2, C3 or C3I structures that an MB regime would establish in an MB nuclear armed Egypt.<sup>13</sup> We project with a high degree of certainty a combination of characteristics that may draw on two sources: one is the Iranian example, where the establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic revolutionary regime has given rise to certain patterns that are very relevant to the issue here before us. The other is the typically Egyptian milieu. The precise measure of blending of the two is an imponderable, but the following is an attempt to underline some of the most salient aspects.

As detailed above, an MB takeover would probably entail a demoting of the regular Egyptian security establishment, identified as it would be with the *ancien regime*, including the armed forces, the internal security forces associated with the deposed secular regime, and the intelligence establishment. The degree to which these would be marginalized, and by what means, is not clear – the very ruthless methods employed by the Iranian Revolution may, or may not, be repeated. But it can be fairly surely surmised that a certain degree of the functionality of the armed forces will be retained, even if the senior echelons are removed, by one method or another, or remain but are distrusted by the MB leadership. This way or that, it is assessed that the MB leadership will establish a highly loyal Praetorian Guard type force, along the lines of the IRGC but not necessarily of its scope or influence, to be entrusted with the most sensitive of the MB regime's agenda items, including custodianship of a nuclear weapons asset capability. Alternatively, or additionally, specific mission-oriented entities, or units, are likely to be established to this end.

Since the Egyptian armed forces already possess very extensive and significant Air Force and SSM capabilities, these can be expected to be very firmly confiscated or otherwise requisitioned to serve the agenda of the MB revolution's agenda. To this end, for reasons of the expertise required for their maintenance and operation, significant manpower elements can be expected to be co-opted into the MB system, even at the price of some compromise regarding ideological dogma (perhaps learning the lessons of the debilitating harshness practiced by the

<sup>13</sup> Some of the typically Egyptian characteristics of command, control and deployment issues are covered in the chapter on a continuity regime nuclear armed Egypt.

Iranian Revolution towards these assets in its early days, which left Iran vulnerable and exposed to attack by Iraq in September 1980, resulting in disastrous reversals in the Iran-Iraq War, at least during its first two years, until late 1982 when the tide was turned in favor of the Iranians, by the fierce resolve of the IRGC, and the reconstruction of the Iranian army after its debilitating harassment by the Islamic Revolution). If it is the Air Force and the SSM force in an MB ruled Egypt that is entrusted with a nuclear delivery capability too, then it might be expected that a superseding command structure may be superimposed upon the existing one, so as to solidify the chain of command down from the “Supreme Leader” through to the relevant field subordinate ranks.

In time, as the regime solidifies its hold over the diverse elements of the Egyptian system, then given the strength of the IRGC-like force, or Praetorian Guard entrusted with the regime’s survival and essential agenda items, including its strategic assets, it might gradually gnaw away at the existing structures and seek to displace them. In such a scenario, ideological prerogatives will become dominant, and there will be less leeway for the caution and moderation inherent in the current, or existing, or continuity regime systems, and Egypt will, in fact, become much more like Iran as we know it.

The chain of command, in a nuclear context MB Egypt, would then develop in the following manner: the MB equivalent of the “Supreme Leader” would still be the ultimate authority regarding the brandishing of the nuclear option – either for deterrence, for escalation, threats, or actual use *in extremis*. Some of the problems which have arisen in the Iranian context would then likely be repeated in the Egyptian: the “Supreme Leader’s” information gatekeepers, who “screen” the information reaching him, manipulate it in their and others’ interests, and the influence of key figures over the Praetorian Guard / IRGC entrusted with the strategic assets and operations (in the Iranian case President Ahmadinejad and the IRGC elements behind him and favored by him; in the Egyptian case, such forces could easily evolve too given the dynamics of a mystical and extremist foundation legitimizing the MB regime).

Thus, the chain of command in an MB nuclear armed Egypt could be likened to that of an IRGC-dominated Iran: the prerogative of the “Supreme Leader”; the fierce loyalty and ideological commitment of a trusted force superimposed on the military structure, separate and independent; extremist elements attempting to manipulate information and messages while maintaining their credibility in the eyes of the “Supreme Leader” for political expediency; interference by religious figures with agendas of their own; and a chain of military command involving the senior command of the ideological force structure (in Iran meaning the IRGC), the heads of the relevant forces (in Iran the IRGC Air Force), the Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff, and the field commanders. A nuclear armed MB Egypt would have to define authorization standard operating procedures (SOPs), and to ensure the security of nuclear assets against theft by renegade elements, and of course to adopt existing measures, or install new ones to prevent unauthorized use, much as discussed in other contexts. These can be expected to involve a very few of the customary Western precautions and procedures, but they will be tailored to the specific needs and ambience of an Egyptian nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems environment.

**Notwithstanding everything that can be said about an Egyptian MB emulation, *grosso modo*, of the Iranian model, still it is worth emphasizing, if this is not obvious, that Egypt is not Iran, and that typically Egyptian models of C2, C3, C3I, deployment and doctrine are unlikely to be wholly jettisoned.** Egypt is Egypt, and Egyptian characteristics and traditions are likely to remain significant and perhaps even dominant – there is a typically “Egyptian” way of doing things, and this will not vanish overnight. Much of what has been stated (in a separate chapter) regarding the scenario of a continuity regime ruling over a nuclear armed Egypt – will likely remain valid for an MB ruled nuclear armed Egypt. It may be assessed that C2 structures, and deployment, will be subject to similar considerations of the relative benefits and risks – the advantages of dispersal in the vast geographical expanse that is Egypt, including Upper Egypt and the Western Desert – versus the concentration near the capital, the Cairo area and the Delta. A regime that is unsure of itself may prefer to concentrate such assets geographically nearer its centers of control, or near its centers of influence, which may be two different things. In this case, the analogy to the Iranian case is ambiguous, because the Iranian regime acts in this regard with a great degree of confidence – it does not doubt its absolute ability to rule over any deployment mode opted for – and this may or may not turn out to be the case in a future MB ruled nuclear armed Egypt.

Similarly, communicating nuclear orders is likely to be impacted by a change of regime in Egypt. An MB rule can be expected to be naturally distrustful of established communication capabilities, to establish additional, redundant and circumventing channels of communication, and to perhaps rely less on computerized, cyber and hi-tech capabilities, for a myriad of reasons, including a suspicion that they may be corrupted by Western or adversary foiling mechanisms that would make them unreliable in a crisis situation, or because they would be operated by professional echelons that would be, rightly or wrongly, suspected of association with the secular pro-Western *ancien regime*, or Western interests or influences, and therefore disqualified. Thus, redundancy would be mandated, and C3 systems involved could theoretically revert to what have been termed “primitive” communication means – personal orders, trusted emissaries or runners, point-to-point safe telephones, default broadcast codes understood only by trusted subordinates, etc.

## Command & Control of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East – Key Influencing Factors

General (rtd) Dr. Zvi Stauber

### Executive Summary

This chapter analyzes the implications of further nuclear proliferation by states in the Middle East, especially if and after Iran crosses the nuclear weapons threshold, thus signaling the collapse of long-standing nuclear non-proliferation firebreaks established at great effort over the years. The ability to achieve a military nuclear capability will inevitably impact on the strategic behavior of the additional nuclear weapons states in the region, and will induce patterns of command and control (C2), together with Communication and Intelligence issues (i.e., C3I) with regard to nuclear weapons assets, their strategic significance, delivery systems, their security against theft by rogue elements or terrorists, authentication of orders for their operational deployment or readiness, and to prevent unauthorized launch. Each of the states that are candidates for this additional nuclear weapons surge has unique and typical characteristics, though some cross-fertilization of thinking in regard to these issues may occur as one state borrows and adopts at least some elements of another's model – for example, Syria borrowing from an Iranian model of C3I, just to demonstrate the idea, though in reality it may not evolve as such.<sup>1</sup> Additionally, there can be expected to be a cyclic feedback, inside and outside the region, in response to this kind of development, as adversaries adjust to the new reality of multiple nuclear armed players in the region insofar as this may impact on their regional and global interests in terms of security, economics and economic security, freedom of movement in the seas and air, and so on.

Iran has been striving slowly but surely in a manner that will provide it with a nuclear weapons option down the road, by constructing and operating facilities that can produce weapons grade fissile materials, and in developing designs for nuclear weapons. Assuming that Iran does establish an implicit – “ambiguous” – or explicit nuclear weapons capability, it is important to note the following:

- Attaining a military nuclear capability is not an easy task for any state. It is likely to be done against the will of the international community and other regional parties, and it involves political problems, economic and technological challenges, and significant security risks – the complexities of which have so far foiled attempts by Iraq, Syria, and Libya.
- This chapter's analysis attempts to explore the implications of developments the realization of which is likely to last many years. The analysis assumes that the political and the strategic situation that has characterized this region's main foundations for more than a decade will be maintained; however, there is no guarantee that this indeed will be the case. There are strong elements, not only radicals, throughout the region, that are pressing for changes, hence the Middle Eastern theater as we know it today may undergo change. The radical Islamic regimes would be, by definition, committed to undermining the status-quo so as to impose their visions of the regional, and global, orders.
- And another methodological remark is that an analysis of the possible implications of a multi-polar Middle East can not be based upon lessons learnt from developments in relations between India and Pakistan, or between the superpower nuclear-related behavior during the Cold War (i.e. rivalry and contest while conducting a dialogue at the same time), and the means that were developed back then to cope with nuclear affairs are generally inapplicable to Middle Eastern crisis environments.

### Overview – the Nuclear Middle East

Iran's achieving a military nuclear capability will dramatically intensify regional players' motivation to follow suit, for the following reasons:

- An increased sense of threat: such a development would be perceived as a radical change of the regional balance of power in favor of radical forces, and as a severe threat to the security of states, including to the stability of moderate or secular regimes insofar as Iran is recognized as seeking to undermine the status-quo, or to overthrow it, and change both the regional and the global order so as to reduce the influence of the US and its allies in world affairs.
- Moreover, Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons will drive home to other regional parties who feel threatened that reliance on US guarantees or extended deterrence – is of limited value, since the US failed to prevent the emergence of the threat in the first place, and thus could not be trusted to prevent the snowballing of subsequent developments down the road.
- Additionally, states in the region may reach the conclusion (following the precedents of Pakistan, North Korea and perhaps Iran) that despite the pressures and the problems of carrying out a decisive policy, it is possible to acquire a military nuclear capability, perhaps even in timelines shorter than ever before. It is important to recall that a few of the region's states have already invested in creating the nuclear intellectual infrastructure; they have scientific and technological capabilities (Egypt, Turkey); and some of them have even made actual moves in order to promote nuclear projects (Iraq, Libya, Syria, Algeria, the UAE).

<sup>1</sup> A more obvious case would be a nuclear armed Egypt ruled by a radical Islamic regime led by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) borrowing from the Iranian model – this example is discussed in detail in subsequent chapters.

Clearly, it is very important to ask who the state (or states) that will follow Iran might be. Currently, the possible candidates are Saudi Arabia, or a regime that might replace the Saudi family in ruling the Arabian area, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria and Turkey. These states' motivations to follow the military nuclear track are not identical, and each has unique characteristics that will impact on strategy, doctrine, and C3I.

## Defense and Security Doctrine

### Motivations

The exclusive "club" of states with military nuclear capability provides those states that join it a new level – both actual and image-wise – of deterrence and of sense of security, all of which strengthen the state's and its leaders' status and prestige. A state that strives to achieve a military nuclear capability despite the difficulties, the challenges and the risks involved demonstrates its decisiveness, its belief that it is doing the right thing and its willingness to pay whatever price necessary for this sake.

The past couple of decades have seen four Middle Eastern states attempting to acquire a military nuclear capability:

- Iraq – as part of its quest for the primary leadership position of the Arab nation, especially in competition with Egypt which was accused of "treason" in regard to the Arab cause when it became an ally of the US and signed a peace treaty with Israel, and to satisfy Saddam Hussein's vision as a true successor to Nebuchadnezzar and the mighty Babylonian empire that had ruled the Middle East, defeated the Egyptians, and significantly, conquered Jerusalem (only to be ejected by the Persians, ironically, to invoke the power of history); and also in an attempt to compensate for its basic weaknesses vis-à-vis Iran with which it was involved in altercations, still in the days of the Shah, and then a full scale war after the Islamic revolution, in which Iran proved to be an unexpectedly formidable enemy.
- Libya – not to be outdone by others, and given the eccentricities of its long-time leader, for purposes of Arab prestige and regional and international status, including its presumptions of a role in African affairs as demonstrated by its military involvements in Chad and elsewhere, and as a backup for its sense of security, especially after the 1986 US attacks, while viewing Israel and Egypt as its regional potential enemies or adversaries.
- Iran – Iran has always been viewed by its leadership as deserving of a predominant or even hegemonic regional standing. This was true during the days of the Persian Empire, that defeated and demolished the Babylonian (i.e. Iraqi) empire, and it was true during the somewhat megalomaniacal reign of the Shah. In its present stage, the Iranian nuclear program began in the latter part of the 1980s, during the bitter Iran-Iraq war, in response to Iraq's Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities and programs in the Saddam Hussein era.
- Syria – to remain a leader of the so-called "rejectionist" front of the Arab world, which maintains a fierce refusal to accept what it views as US and Israeli domination and demands, thus in juxtaposition mainly to Egypt that is accused of betraying Arab interests by allying itself with the US and Israel, and to Saudi Arabia that "has sold out" to US interests; and in order to balance its strategic inferiority and its exposure to Israeli conventional strategic attacks, to deter perceived nuclear threats by established potential enemies (the US, Israel, Turkey, others if they were to go nuclear – Egypt, Iraq or Saudi Arabia, for example); **as well as for reasons flowing from the insecurity of the regime in the domestic context.**

Observing these states' behavior shows, among other things, that:

- The central motivation for the effort to achieve a military nuclear capability has been the desire to acquire an element of deterrence, alongside status and prestige considerations.
- Some of the states involved have had many years of gaining experience in C3 for Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW), WMD and Surface to Surface Missiles (SSMs) (Syria, Iraq, Egypt, perhaps Libya), and the means to launch them. Despite the difference between nuclear and chemical weapons it is possible to assume that such an experience can at least serve as a basis for planning the nuclear system's C3.
- It is possible to trace many similarities between the regimes that attempted to acquire a military nuclear capability. Beyond the structure and the methods of decision-making, these regimes' actions invariably contain strong anti-Western elements and hostility toward the US, among other things; this is true even for those regimes nominally allied with the US, like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, who are inimical to some of the US values and positions, and must watch their more radical domestic flanks and secure them.

Moreover,

- **The motivation to acquire nuclear weapons and the considerations that will guide the operating concept may change over time.** Hence a state whose main motivation to become a member of the nuclear "club" is deterrence might - upon joining that club - **take advantage of the nuclear weapons at its disposal to serve to reinforce and support both old and new ambitions, such as to alter the status-quo in its favor.**
- Such a change is also an outcome of **the need to adapt the security doctrine to the adversaries' changing reality, and to the ways they perceive the threats and risks that a nuclear neighbor wields.** Thus a state that achieves a nuclear capability might motivate its rival-neighbor state to acquire such a capability as well – a development that might have implications over the former's strategic concepts. In other words, a chain-reaction of actions and reactions could be initiated, resulting in a dynamic process of readjustment to escalating realities, scenarios, nuclear arms races, postures, and so on. This would induce an ever increasingly complex C3I picture, as each side attempts to address the challenges posed by adversaries, **including perhaps in frequent demonstrations of nuclear preparedness to press home the strategic advantage of escalation dominance, or to respond to an adversary's attempt to establish it.**

- The ways by which a state reaches a military nuclear capability will affect its operating concept and its C3 methods. For example, a state that acquires a nuclear capability through struggle (perhaps even involving violent expressions), with either the international community or with its neighbors, **will be forced right from the start to develop an operating concept and a C3 doctrine that will provide an appropriate reply for a possible attempt to neutralize or to destroy its nuclear facilities at preliminary stages of the establishment of the nuclear system, on the one hand, and to demonstrate full control over its nuclear assets system so as to assure its rivals-neighbors that there is unlikely to be a “bolt out of the blue” unauthorized attack. The tension between demonstrating a high alert level of preparedness, frequently or on a permanent basis, on the one hand, and on the other preventing hair-trigger situations from getting out of hand, may turn out to be a tremendous challenge to deterrence stability.**

Currently, Iran is continuing its efforts to acquire a military nuclear capability, and this chapter’s working assumption is that Iran will eventually achieve such a capability. However, it is also possible that the Iranians will stop at the threshold, a few months away from the assembly of their first nuclear device, so as to be perceived as somewhat responsive to the international community’s demands. Iran’s behavior will affect the next nuclear state to follow suit. If Iran stops at the threshold, especially in the framework of an international agreement, this will surely impact on following states’ considerations. On the other hand, if Iran acquires a proven, declared nuclear capability (possibly including a nuclear test along the lines of the North Korean model, or of the Indian and Pakistani models), the motivation among other states to fall short of going nuclear will significantly diminish.

Generally speaking, the benefits for a state that has acquired a military nuclear capability to adopt a policy of nuclear ambiguity, i.e. tacit nuclear deterrence, are not evident, in spite of the obvious Israeli case, which may be an exception to the rule. The case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in this context is interesting: the impression is that there is a reverse correlation between North Korea’s progress in the military nuclear track and the quantity and severity of the international threats against it. **A state that develops a military nuclear capability may assume that a proven, declared capability protects it to a great extent from a possible military attack against it, and especially against its nuclear sites. North Korea’s and Iran’s behavior en route to a nuclear bomb might encourage other states to adopt a similarly aggressive policy.**

A successful acquisition of a military nuclear capability by an Arab state will probably be accepted by the Arab public opinion with excitement and enthusiasm, and the Arab media will present this capability as the “Arab bomb”, and as “the ultimate response” of the Arab world vis-à-vis both Israel and Iran, as well as an answer to the US involvement in Middle Eastern affairs which is viewed as excessive, irrational, and exploitative. It is possible that the leaders of an Arab state acquiring military nuclear capability will use this rhetoric to further their standing and prestige, and other Arab leaders will probably follow suit. Even so, and despite all inter-Arab agreements, the absolute and exclusive control over the nuclear weapons will remain at the national particular level; it is virtually impossible to imagine a scenario of a nuclear weapons’ partnership, or a conscious entanglement of an Arab nuclear state in nuclear tensions due to deeds or omissions of a third party. Ostensibly, in a rational behavior scenario it is possible to assume that a state possessing nuclear weapons will be hesitant to get into a coalition with a state/party that might put it in danger of military escalation. Hence it is likely that a military nuclear capability in the hands of an Arab state will induce it, as well as other parties, to consider all the possible implications for bilateral and inter-Arab defense pacts, both existing agreements and future ones. Nevertheless, one cannot dismiss the possibility that a nuclear Arab state will sign a defense pact with a non-nuclear Arab state, or that the former will at least make a declaratory commitment to put its nuclear capability at the disposal of the “Arab nation”, i.e. a variation on classical extended deterrence fashioned for the place, time, environment and contingency. From a different angle, strategic cooperation between a nuclear Iran and an Arab state (or perhaps even Turkey) with a military nuclear capability might be overshadowed by a possible rivalry.

## The Israeli Consideration

Except for the case of Syria, and to a certain extent Egypt, it seems that, so far, Israel’s attributed nuclear capabilities have not been a significant factor for regional parties’ motivation to acquire a military nuclear capability. Saddam Hussein, for example, would most likely have sought nuclear weapons regardless of Israel’s nuclear standing, or even regardless of Israel existing at all, for his own reasons. Egypt has adapted reluctantly but well to living with the nuclear dimension attributed to Israel, but could probably not stand for Iran, Saudi Arabia or Turkey going nuclear too without acting to acquire similar capabilities. Most significantly, Israel differs from Iran in its perceived strategic approach and view towards the status-quo: Israel is believed by Arab leaderships to favor the status-quo, and the survival of moderate regimes in the region; while Iran is openly hostile to the status-quo, to US interests in the region, to moderate Sunni Arab regimes that “have sold out” to material values, the US interest, Israel, and so on, and is committed to undermining it (the status-quo) by all means available (including sedition and terrorism, perhaps by nuclear intimidation), and to overthrowing the global order in which the US plays what is viewed by Islamic leaderships, especially Iran’s, as an excessive role.

Based upon Israel’s past behavior in times of stress (such as, reportedly, during the early days of the 1973 October War), Middle Eastern parties assume that it will consider a projection or maybe even the use of its nuclear capability only under the risk of a military defeat, and the penetration of its enemies’ forces of the 1967 borders – commonly called the “last resort” option or capability. Radical opposition figures have alleged more than that, to the effect that Israel has used the nuclear dimension to impose on the Arab regimes its own terms. Israel’s conventional military superiority throughout its existence (as well as the nature of its governance, and of its relationship with the US) has to a large extent marginalized the question whether or not Israel might make use of its nuclear capabilities.

Even so, the Israeli nuclear issue has always been part of its neighbors’ strategic and operative considerations.

- According to several versions, Egypt and Syria both set limited goals for their armed forces in the 1973 War fearing that achieving



even more ambitious goals might embroil them with Israel's nuclear capabilities, and thus planned for no more than a "limited war" aimed at Israel's strategic margins in the territories occupied in 1967, and without threatening the Israeli heartland which might trigger the brandishing of the perceived nuclear "last resort" option. Even in the later stages of the war, with the possibility of looming defeat, both Egypt and Syria refrained from using CW capabilities that were at their disposal at the time.

- Saddam Hussein refrained, despite apparent capabilities, from using CBW warheads against Israel during the first Gulf War of 1991, fearing, so it has been reported, an Israeli nuclear reaction. The threat of Israeli retribution for such an attack was reinforced by remarks made at the time by US Secretary of Defense Cheney. It is also interesting to note that the Iraqi leader refrained during the war with Iran from using CBW WMD in the midst of offensives outside Iraqi territory, though using them extensively against targets on Iraqi territory – in effect adopting the stance of the Arab tribal leader that "what I do in my own tent is nobody's business", thus justifying extensive use of chemical weapons against Iranian troops that invaded Iraqi soil, and the Iraqi Kurdish population that had risen up against him.
- Moreover, there is no doubt that the nuclear capability attributed to Israel, which backups its conventional superiority, has significantly contributed to the transformation in the Arab stance regarding relations with Israel, and largely driven home the futility of continuing the cycle of large-scale conventional wars, at least since 1973.

It seems that since 1973 the need to regain the Golan Heights with the use of force has not been at the top of Syria's priorities, with all the risks and costs that might be involved. Damascus' policy has been quite cautious. Syria's strategic weakness and its susceptibility to Israeli conventional strategic strikes have induced an emphasis upon developing SSMs and CBW capabilities, for both deterrence and to provide a capability for retribution should Israel initiate such actions, in effect attempting to create deterrence stability and even a modicum of escalation dominance in Syria's favor, given that Israel would be very unlikely to brandish its nuclear capability in other than a "last resort" scenario, while being exceedingly sensitive to casualties that might be caused by conventional strategic SSM strikes, and further up the escalation ladder by the threatened Syrian use of CBW agents in either the battlefield or implicitly against civilian populations. Apparently, the Syrians also attempted to develop a military nuclear capability, but were stopped in the midst of the process.

A nuclear Syria, having passed the stages of anxiety fearing it might be attacked on its way to going nuclear, will be very self-confident, sensing that it can deter all its adversaries – mainly the US, which for the duration of the Bush administration was strongly suspected of seeking regime change by force in Syria, following the interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, a suspicion that has not entirely waned since the change in Washington following the 2008 elections; as well as, of course, Israel, but also Turkey. Its position in the Arab world will be strengthened, and its leeway will increase vis-à-vis the international community as well.

It is difficult to determine categorically whether or not a nuclear Syria would be more willing to take a risk and try to regain the Golan Heights militarily, assuming that its nuclear capability immunizes it by limiting Israel's response options. It is a possibility one cannot rule out. Arab strategic thinkers have long posited that an Arab nuclear weapons capability, an "equalizer", would reinstate the natural quantitative conventional advantage enjoyed over Israel, and given the 1973 lesson that quantity equals quality, a nuclear equalizer would allow for the more energetic revival of the conventional military struggle against Israel.

However, rational behavior obligates Syria to act more cautiously, including with respect to the actions of Hizballah and the Lebanese arena. A nuclear armed Damascus might estimate that it can "pull the rope" due to Israel's strategic constraints, which might limit the latter's ability to operate against infrastructure and ruling institutions in Lebanon. In order to "convince" Israel at times of tension and war regarding its willingness to use nuclear weapons Syria might take steps which may include a high state of alertness of the non-conventional systems, emergency deployment, etc. On the other hand, Syria will be guided by a dominant consideration not to cause a miscalculation regarding its intentions in a way that might bring about an Israeli strike against it.

All things considered, and other than the serious but low-probability-high-consequence possibility of nuclear war through miscalculation, it is possible to assume that nuclear weapons in the hands of Middle Eastern states might dictate cautiousness as far as major wars are concerned, but will make sub-conventional wars (i.e. terror, guerilla) more suitable. Nuclear weapons will also necessitate the following:

- Caution during conventional war, especially with regard to the use of strategic SSMs due to the possible misperception that they could be armed with nuclear warheads.
- Letting the adversary know that control over the nuclear arsenal and decisions concerning this arsenal are in the hands of a recognized legitimate leadership (this is definitely relevant to the Syrian case).
- Utilization of means of communication between adversaries, and through third parties, in real time, in order to prevent miscalculations, and to encourage both sides to develop confidence building measures (CBMs).

## Force Building

Developing a military nuclear capability, especially an organized system, necessitates investments. It is important to note that no military nuclear power has so far perceived a nuclear weapon as a substitute for conventional power, but rather as a supplement. In the Middle East, conventional power is still perceived as the main support for securing the regime and the state, and for protecting its vital interests, mainly due to the nature of challenges and wars states are facing, on the one hand, and the relatively low flexibility of nuclear weapons and the extreme circumstances in which these weapons can be openly brandished, on the other.

Nevertheless, in recent years there have been some changes in the mixture of strategic and military capabilities in order to better adjust them to current challenges. Syria, for example, has been diluting the armored component of its armed forces in favor of developing CBW, WMD, strategic SSMs and sub-conventional (Hizballah) capabilities. Iraq had SSM delivery capabilities for CBW warheads, as well as air- and

artillery- launch systems for them, used against the Iranians and designated for use against US forces in Kuwait, including formidable means for the dispersal of anthrax by Mirage F-1 fighter-bomber earmarked for use against US & coalition forces.

It is our assumption that a state that acquires a military nuclear capability will have to make a substantial investment in establishing an operational launch capability. Regarding SSMs, most of the region's states (Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Saudi Arabia) already have substantial capabilities in this respect and some of these missiles have been adjusted to a chemical warhead (Iraq, Syria). SSMs are also easier to control, relatively accurate (in the context of establishing a threat to cities – the SSMs in the region are unlikely to be able to acquire point targets, but armed with nuclear warheads could pose a primitive first strike threat, much as the arsenals of the superpowers did in the early years of the Cold War), and it is relatively more difficult to intercept them, notwithstanding the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems undergoing deployment by the US and its allies in the region, prominently Israel, which might nullify this advantage. On the other hand, SSMs are more exposed and vulnerable to destruction in their deployed positions – both in storage and in launch sites. Furthermore, it is likely that another state's efforts to go nuclear in this region will put it in a confrontational position vis-à-vis the international system – a development that will jeopardize that state's equipment supply capability, all the more so in terms of crucial aircraft systems.

Therefore, this means that SSMs will probably be the salient platform for delivery of nuclear weapons. In this context it is important to note that:

- There needs to be a rethinking regarding the perception of the use of SSMs as a conventional weapon of intimidation against the adversary's rear due to the risks that emanate from a possible dual use (i.e. the use of these missiles might be perceived as a launching of nuclear/chemical weapons).
- The development of a reliable SSM system that is likely to penetrate possible layers of an increasingly reliable incremental BMD deployment, as this is envisaged developing between now and the year 2020 (according to the 2010 US DoD BMDR Report).

And on another aspect:

- Some of the region's states have invested in developing a diversified chemical weapons' system and in its launching means. Acquiring a military nuclear capability usually does not make such systems unnecessary because they are viewed as basically of tactical, as well as of strategic deterrent, value, and provide flexibility thus broadening the scope of actions leaders are facing.
- The development of an organized, well-established nuclear system demands a long term investment that can last many years, involving budgets and technological (and other) challenges. However, it is doubtful whether a state (or states) in the region that acquires a military nuclear capability can over the long run settle for a sparse, mainly symbolic disposition of nuclear capability. A transformation in the way the threat is perceived can have an impact on the scope of investments required in building a nuclear system.

### C3I Issues

When nuclear weapons aspirant states in the region acquire the wherewithal of the salient assets, there are several factors that will influence the way in which the C3 frameworks will be established, and their characteristics, quality and nature. These are – the political culture of the state; the structure and the nature of the regime and the leadership; the external (and domestic) threats that the state faces etc.

Each of the states in the Middle East has its own characteristics: Turkey has so far been the most democratic; in Iran there are some democratic elements integrated within an autocratic regime led by religious leadership; the Saudi regime is a patrimonial family rule system, etc. **However it can generally be said that in the Arab world, there does not exist an organized and systematic decision-making process (though outwardly, the Arab states make efforts to present a formal and legal process of this kind), and there does not exist a built-in system of checks and balances, and of consultation. The head of state, usually the "President" (who sometimes serves also as the "Commander of the armed forces"), the *Ra'is*, has an almost absolute monopoly on military power and the use of it, and he is certainly not interested in sharing with others decision-making, or to allow establishment of restrictions on his authority.** He usually relies on, and is assisted by, relatives and close advisors. The leader plays among the various power foci (persons as well as systems), creates rivalries, competition for authority and redundancies in tasks and functions, and strives that no one will have the "complete picture". The purpose of all these is to prevent the danger of accumulation of substantial power in the hands of ambitious subordinates. The Vice President, if this function does exist at all, usually lacks real power, and he and other functionaries – political or bureaucratic – their functioning and operation depend on the good will of the leader.

In the Middle East, traditionally the military is, then, the main source of support and backing for the regime's security and even survivability; in modern history, it has also provided the state with its leaders, which grew within its ranks (Egypt, Syria, and Libya). However, in the course of time, and in order to neutralize the monopolistic control of the military, and to balance its influence, the leaders in Middle Eastern states have established parallel regime-sponsored force systems, dedicated to secure the regime and tighten the control over the armed forces through a network of intelligence and security apparatuses. The establishment of parallel special and favored security forces, and separate armies that marginalize the established security and armed establishments, and are entrusted with "special" missions high on the regime's ideological agenda – is a trademark of authoritarian regimes, and twentieth century examples abound, from Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union to Romania to Haiti. Thus, the Islamic Revolutionary regime in Iran established the "Revolutionary Guard" (IRGC), to supersede the influence of the military which was a creation of the Shah. Even before the revolution in Iran, Syria and Iraq established the "Republican Guard", and Saudi Arabia established the "National Guard". Anyhow the head of state is deeply involved in all key nominations inside the organizations that are in charge of security and regime survival. **Most of the high ranking officers in these organizations primarily "specialize" in loyalty to**

**the regime, and they come from the “appropriate” background (community, sect, family, ideological hotbeds). Some of them are bound by family links or parochial background to the ruler, and they all share the same interest – the survival of the regime.**

As far as we can judge, nothing in the political and religious culture of Middle Eastern states prevents them from acquiring military nuclear capability, or from using it, if circumstances demand. On the other hand, it is important to note that in their political and religious culture, certainly there is nothing that obliges them, or even empowers them to make a decision to activate this ability, or justify the sacrifice of the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, and to severely harm, for a long period of time, the state’s ability to function.

Indeed, the sacrifice concept, certainly that of an individual, exists and is even highlighted, in various streams of Islam. In fact, the believers are exhorted to sacrifice, since there can be no victory without it. This concept, together with the relatively low “value”, at least in Western terms of the nominal “sanctity” of human life that is foreign to Islamic beliefs insofar as those engaged in Holy War are extolled to accept sacrifice as a positive value on the road to victory, and a subjective sense of “justified action”, could push a leadership that is motivated by sense of religious mission – to take greater risks. However, looking at the modern history of the Middle East (including Iran), it is hard to point to even one case where these motivations were not restrained by pragmatic considerations of “*Realpolitik*”. At least theoretically, one can not exclude “irrational”, or “irresponsible”, behavior scenarios, by a ruler in the Middle East, or by personnel of the nuclear weapons C3I organization. Perhaps even more dangerous than outright irrationality is the prospect of miscalculation, through ignorance, disdain for the adversary as representing an “inferior” culture, or due to human frailties – stress, fatigue, anger, misunderstanding, misperception, misinformation, or other factors too numerous to mention diplomatically (stupidity, cognitive dissonance, wishful thinking, obstinacy, mental quirks, the effects of medication or drugs, etc.).

From what could be gleaned<sup>2</sup> from the behavior of Middle Eastern states concerning the development and the use of CBW WMD, it appears that in all these states, the rulers did not rely on the organized military, but preferred to establish a designated force to be in charge of them, under direct supervision of the ruler himself, and through his close and veteran loyalists. The decision to activate this weapon is exclusively in the ruler’s hands, and the execution of the decision has been delegated to the field commanders on the scene. This was the case when Iraq used chemical weapon against Iran (on Iraqi territory only) and against the Kurds (“Chemical Ali”). And this was the case when Iraq launched SSMs against Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and coalition targets during the first Gulf War of 1991.

The issue of delegation of authority to launch WMD assets, especially nuclear ones, in case of disruption of the primary C3I channels or incapacitation of the leadership, is a complicated one, discussed in the case studies here examined. Whether such authority would be delegated for “Plan B” contingencies at all, and if so – how, is a matter of much speculation, and there are very heavy considerations involved that bear on questions of the security of nuclear assets. We can not even say for sure whether Saddam Hussein would have applied to nuclear weapons assets the rules that he is alleged to have applied to CBW and SSM assets, in terms of delegation of authority to initiate their use to field commanders in case of disruption of C3I channels or incapacitation of the leader – he might have, or he might not have. We do know that Soviet field commanders were authorized to initiate the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the battlefield – as distinct from strategic nuclear weapons systems against the “Contiguous United States” (CONUS) – in case of hostilities in the European theater during the height of the Cold War, and, alarmingly, in Cuba in 1962 the use of Frog rockets armed with nuclear warheads, again only in a tactical nuclear scenario, not as regards strategic nuclear weapons.<sup>®</sup>

## Comments

Concerning the Arab World, it can surely be assumed that the ruler of the nuclearized state will preserve full and exclusive authority in his hands, in all issues related to the nuclear system – its establishment, including C3I aspects, and its activation. He will not allow any restrictions on his decisions, or co-partnership in decision-making. From *his* point of view, this might give strength and prestige to a potential candidate who will strive to replace him. Exceptional is a relative who is designated as a successor (such as a son – Syria, Egypt and Libya come to mind), or family arrangements like in Saudi Arabia. Beyond the need to balance power within the leadership, the drive to retain absolute and complete control of the nuclear assets derives from additional considerations:

- An interest to reduce miscalculations and potential complications;
- Constant fear that the nuclear weapons assets will fall into the hands of opposition elements who strive to undermine the regime (like the “Muslim Brotherhood” in Egypt), or renegade or rogue elements within the ruling system;
- The need to appease an adversary country, or the international community, in order to avoid unwanted reactions. This, by signaling that the nuclear weapons assets remain in legitimate and “responsible” hands.

**In the first stages (which are in their nature “sensitive” in particular) of the establishment of the military nuclear capability, the facilities, the apparatus and the procedures will probably be quite primitive. However it is likely that as time passes and the nuclear system and the “learning curve” develop, the regime will establish more satisfactory, and more sophisticated frameworks and procedures with regard to the security and C3I concepts applied.** This, *inter alia* - to pacify opponents and the international system. It is likely that superpowers will offer to assist in procedures and technical means, but it is doubtful whether and to what degree the local parties, radicals in particular, will be open to adopting Western procedures and technology; we can not rule out the possibility that they will be assisted by countries like the DPRK or Pakistan. All this, while striving to minimize exposure of procedures and technology, and in accordance with the structure and the nature of the regime and the ruler.

It is worthy of mention that in each stage of the decision making process, i.e. authorization and authentication – there are substantial challenges to deal with, and inadequate solutions could lead to miscalculation. Some challenges to be considered are:

- The governmental culture and tradition in the Arab world: this culture does not encourage freedom of expression, and there

<sup>2</sup> Alarmingly, this became known only after the collapse demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, when the Soviet archives were opened.

is a phenomenon of self deprecation versus the “ruler” – the paterfamilias, he who is the supreme authority. The result is that there is no scrutiny, no real debate, no collective brainstorming, probably little participation of professional echelons with the intellectual wherewithal and the technical expertise required to make well-considered and balanced choices in brinkmanship crisis environments, and no structural mechanism of consultation. Dissenting opinions have no chance to be heard, and when they are raised, the one who raised them may be punished. You simply do not contradict the opinions, or question the orders, of an authoritarian leader, unless you are in an especially privileged position (a son designated for succession, for example); disagreeing openly could be life-threatening, or at least career-threatening. This phenomenon could impact the nature of the management of nuclear brinkmanship crisis environments between two or more parties or states, and decisions whether to brandish, or to launch, nuclear weapons.

- Moreover, information that reaches the salient decision-making leader may be manipulated by interested parties, or to “soften” bad news that could make the leader rife at its carrier. There is a very deep and disturbing record of false reporting in crisis situations in the Middle East (perhaps not only in the Middle East, but that is beside the point), either due to self-delusion by reporting ranks, or a tendency to wildly exaggerate good news, or due to outright fear of the consequences of truthfully reporting bad news. This is a very worrying gap when considering the potential for catastrophic miscalculation by a decision-maker in a nuclear brinkmanship crisis environment.
- The composition of the leadership and the absence of a designated “Number Two”. In Egypt, for many years there is no one who has been regarded as Number Two, although recently Gamal Mubarak is an obviously designated successor and deputy to his father, who appears to be moving inevitably towards a termination of his long rule, and Seif al-Islam in Libya similarly. In Syria, the deceased Bassel al-Asad was a clearly designated successor until his demise in a road accident, while his brother Bashar was away in Europe practicing medicine, but after Bassel’s death he too was brought it to the close circle of the *Ra’is*; today, there are vice presidents, but their political weight is negligible, and they are not regarded as real “Number Twos”. Our assumption is that rulers will hesitate to delegate to anyone else a similar authority over nuclear C3 assets and weapons. **The meaning of this is that if Libya, Egypt and Syria become nuclear states, it is unlikely that there will be a “double authentication” mechanism.** However in (democratic) Turkey, Saudi Arabia (arrangements within the family) and in a “new Iraq” – these may be devised.
- **The historical record is dire, and dismal: failures in collecting, filtering and processing information in the Arab world – have led to severe, sometime catastrophic, miscalculation regarding the adversary’s intentions and steps.** There is no intelligence tradition, in Western terms. The local culture encourages almost blind trust in what appears in the media, **and in unfounded conspiracy theories. The reactions reflect in many cases an unrealistic reading of developments, and they indicate that the information “filters” do not work well enough.** Intelligence has been manipulated by interested parties, deliberate misinformation and disinformation is rampant, foreign elements have warped the perceptions of regional leaders (as did the Soviet Union in May 1967, when it convinced Nasser that Israel was about to attack Syria, which was entirely unfounded), and actions and reactions have been based on popular lore and myth rather than on reality, to a disconcerting degree.
- The issue of intelligence and information, i.e. a correct reading of the adversary’s intentions and steps is critical, particularly in a nuclearized Middle East. In order to get the needed intelligence, it is likely that various states will ask for assistance from third countries, but fundamentally they will try as much as possible to act on the basis of the national and autonomous information capabilities. There is doubt if the Middle Eastern nuclear weapons states will develop the same pattern of communicating adopted by the US and USSR during the Cold War. But they might adopt other confidence building measures (CBMs).
- The Middle Eastern states, in general, lack the required technologies and expertise to safeguard nuclear weapons assets, such as Permissive Action Links (PALs), to authenticate commands and prevent unauthorized use. They also lack the cultural basis to induce thinking and practice regarding the ramifications of the possession of nuclear weapons assets; however, reality can be expected to foist a learning curve about all related issues, so as to retain a crucial degree of stability in an anyway excessively volatile region. The question is, to a large extent, how long such a “learning curve” might take to establish procedures and the wherewithal to secure deterrence stability, and whether catastrophic miscalculation might not precede it.<sup>3</sup>

## Problematic scenarios

**There are several scenarios which might challenge the “rational behavior” assumption, with regard to nuclear weapons.** The almost monopoly that the ruler of the state has on the main decisions and on the executive branches; the obscurity of the “Number Two” in the leadership; and the possibility that the ruler will hesitate to develop such procedures that will oblige him to share his decisions with others – all these lead to the following scenarios. **It must be emphasized that most of the problematic scenarios do not necessarily characterize the Middle East alone, but the problems in this region are amplified because of the regime’s structure, religion, and other traditional culture elements that are dominant, and may block the infusion of more sophisticated concepts, ways and means to make nuclear C3I stable, reliable, and less threatening. Otherwise, first strike and preemption will become the order of the day, and deterrence stability will be virtually absent.** The following are possible scenarios:

- A governmental vacuum that follows a sudden death of a ruler, either during a war or during a tense situation, or as a result of it.
- It is interesting to note that Saddam Hussein, in spite of his cruel manner of ruling, was relatively cautious with regard to the use of chemical weapons against Iran and Israel. Unfortunately, Saddam’s caution was negated by his tendency to miscalculate, and

<sup>3</sup> Thomas Schelling has suggested that it might take an Iranian leadership a decade or so to gain a reasonable understanding of the complexities of being in possession of, and managing, a nuclear weapons arsenal. Schelling points out that it took the United States and the Soviet Union two decades to thus establish mutual deterrence stability. Needless perhaps to add, the states of the Middle East are fundamentally, culturally, different from the US and the USSR, and emotions and antipathies, crises and conflicts, are perhaps more shrill, even than was evident in the early years of the Cold War.

misperceive the resolve of adversary states, like Iran, and then the US. **Thus he became, in fact, a gambler taking undue risks without being aware that he was doing so. This is a very worrying precedent, and whether a nuclear weapons environment can induce changes to long-standing and deep cultural inclinations, is an interesting question, with no clear evident answer one way or another.**

- The rise of an extremist or fanatic religious ruler, either following a coup or another kind of seizure of the regime, by a religious group (like the “Muslim Brotherhood”), or following a process of religious radicalization of a ruler. A regime that is heavily influenced by a religious hierarchy may not necessarily be irrational in its reference to nuclear weapons. However, it will be impossible to disregard the possibility that religious motivations and perceptions do increase the chances for manifestations of a slanted rationality, which might posit that the use of nuclear weapons to attain victory would be permissible.
- A crisis in the C3 channels, following deterioration in the political stability; penetration of radical elements of the chain of command; an attempt of a rogue or renegade element from within the system to seize power; and as a result of a war.
- **Domestic pressures to use nuclear weapons against an enemy, following a defeat in a conventional war and massive damages to population or infrastructure, or following a behavior of an enemy that stimulates much anger inside the state – thus forcing the hand of a regime that might come to view its survival as threatened from within due to its perceived capitulation to a reviled adversary.**

## Culture of Command & Control of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East – Iran

Dr. Shmuel Bar & Dr. Oded Brosh

### Executive Summary

Iran will probably be the first country in the Middle East to break out with a military nuclear capability, thus inevitably becoming the catalyst for other countries in the region to follow suit. Therefore, the Iranian attitude towards nuclear command and control is of paramount salience.

Iran has always been viewed by its leadership as deserving of a predominant or even hegemonic regional standing. In its present stage, the Iranian nuclear program began in the latter part of the 1980's in response to Iran's strategic and conventional inferiority vis-à-vis Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities and programs in the Saddam Hussein era. Later, the fact that the United States attacked Iraq, in spite of its purported Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) arsenal, strengthened the Iranian resolve to achieve a nuclear capability. The positions of senior clerics associated with the regime (and particularly with Ahmadinejad), seem to indicate religious legitimization of acquisition, even use of nuclear weapons in the context of deterrence of the enemy; a more extreme view, for which there is some evidence, goes well beyond deterrence, and could support using nuclear weapons if they were viewed as necessary for achieving divinely guaranteed victory over infidel adversaries, even granted that a nuclear exchange might involve great sacrifice, in itself perceived as a commanded, and thus blessed, indispensable price for victory.

Furthermore, there are indications of a more activist and less deterrence-oriented view of the need for nuclear weapons in Iran: one that enables Iran to create instability in the region to energetically propel forward its agenda to undermine, and then overthrow, the status-quo, both regionally and globally. There are grounds to believe that Iran will see nuclear weapons, once acquired, not only as weapons of deterrence and last resort, but as an umbrella under which it can establish its hegemony at least in the Gulf, with enhanced influence in other parts of the region. This influence will have economic (oil), religious (acceptance of Iran's role in the holy cities and of the legitimacy of Shiite Islam), and political aspects. Once perceived by its neighbors as having a nuclear capability, Iran would have much more leverage over oil production policy. The nuclear capability will enable it to indulge in subversion and terrorism against its neighbors, moderate Arab Sunni regimes that have allegedly "sold out" to the US, and Israel, with impunity, without fear of retaliation. Its regional hegemonic standing will increase its global leverage, as it seeks to induce changes in the international order, especially to reduce US and Western influence in world affairs.

Common wisdom in the past has argued that the final decision regarding the brandishing, activation, or use of nuclear weapons will always lie with the Supreme Leader, who, at least currently, putatively represents a more risk-averse world view than the regime's Praetorian Guard, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), that is the most powerful organization exercising the state's instruments of coercion, as well as the custodian of its strategic assets, thus mitigating the risk of nuclear escalation and confrontation. From information available over the last few years, it appears that this view may now be anachronistic, and that the Supreme Leader is exceedingly receptive to the assessments and recommendations put to him by the President, Ahmadinejad, who is the political arrowhead of the IRGC structure that is Iran today. In light of the ascendancy of the IRGC as the most formidable political power in Iran, especially since the election of President Ahmadinejad in 2005, and as evidenced after his re-election in 2009, we can not assume that the Supreme Leader will be the final authority for use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, even if the Supreme Leader is formally the ultimate authority, the latitude for manipulation of information that gets to him, thus shaping his choices, and interpretation of his instructions by interested parties, all easily move the focus of crucial decision-making to additional, or other, centers of the exercise of power.

So far, crucial decisions on the pace and directions of the nuclear technological research and development (R&D), towards acquiring a military nuclear potential, have evidently been influenced at least to some degree by the technocrats and scientists dealing in this highly professional area. However, once the nuclear threshold of nuclear weapons is acquired – the input to the leadership will most probably pass on to the military-political strategists, virtually all of which have IRGC links of present or past, and if Ahmadinejad is still President, through him to the Supreme Leader; the Supreme National Security Council, which is staffed by many of these, may play a significant role in preparing contingency options to which reference can be made in an escalating nuclear brinkmanship crisis scenario. Be those as they may, the IRGC high command may be expected to play a crucial role in future nuclear command, control and communication (C3) structures, chain of command, communication and execution of strategic instructions, as the most fiercely loyal and powerful organization that the regime commands.

The IRGC will then probably be the organization in charge of nuclear weapons assets: storing, security, deploying, transporting them from place to place, assembling their diverse components when told to do so if their components are stored separately for any determined reason, preparing them for launch, signaling to adversaries that they may be launched, and actually launching them if so ordered. In the IRGC, it is probably the IRGC Air Force, which is already the force that is in charge of Iran's operational and deployed strategic surface-to-surface

missiles (SSM) capabilities, which would be the salient operational force. In addition to the standard delivery systems, primarily SSMs and secondarily possibly combat aircraft<sup>1</sup>, the Iranian regime may additionally opt for “primitive” nuclear devices that could be delivered clandestinely by other, unconventional, means, such as by land, truck, commercial or transport aircraft, or sea, such as a freighter docking in the port of a major Western city, or as a launch pad for another delivery means thus extending the reach of the threat or allowing for the involvement of covert operations (such as by putatively “renegade” elements, to deny responsibility later).

The Iranian regime tends to centralism in strategic areas, and an aversion towards delegation of authority in matters relating to strategic weapons and strategic interests. There is no reason not to assume that this feature will apply to nuclear issues as well. The centralist tendency derives, *inter alia*, from a broad factionalism and deep lack of trust which imbues Iranian society. This lack of trust makes Western C3 procedures, which are based on the premise of a reliable military command, difficult to copy. In Iran, the perceived dedication of the IRGC compensates for the inherent laxity of regular established chains of command. In this sense, Iran is similar to many of the significant authoritarian cultures in history, all of which have commanded an unwaveringly committed Praetorian guard to guarantee the security of the regime and carry forward “special” strategic regime agenda priorities that there was a reluctance to entrust to the regular structures because of a suspicion regarding their unambiguous commitment.

Definitions of authority in Iran are ambiguous, and decision-making processes are convoluted. The identity of key figures in the specific command and control structure will most probably be based on criteria for loyalty of individuals, and not primarily bureaucratic affiliation. The fear of betrayal from inside (or more precisely – transfer of loyalty) is accentuated in Iran, as it is in other Middle Eastern regional cultures. Hence, Iranian decision-making structures are nebulous networks of influence saturated with “back doors” and “back channels” between the decision-makers and the operational level. In the domain of nuclear weapons, we may expect that the “representatives of the Supreme Leader” in the military units would be one of those back channels, and in the dedicated IRGC units may be the transmitters of the Supreme Leader’s orders.

Centralism notwithstanding, a nuclear armed Iran would have to develop a “Plan B” C3 system for enablement of nuclear weapons assets in case the leadership was incapacitated. But it is unclear to what degree authority may be delegated, and what events may trigger such delegation of authority. The Iranian regime will probably take into account that even senior officers of the regular forces may not obey orders to launch weapons if the regime seems as if it is in danger of failing, or that the use of those weapons may be of catastrophic consequences for them and their families, or the nation. An extensive delegation of authority would raise a severe risk of unauthorized use in a crisis situation, on one hand, and a fear of insubordination if launching of the weapons is ordered, on the other hand. Presumably, the legitimate leadership will be acutely aware of this, and is therefore likely to be extremely circumspect and cautious in delegating “Plan B” authority for the launch of nuclear weapons, and may even rule it out entirely. This, however, would also be seen to undermine deterrence, should the leadership’s C3 mechanisms be seen to be relatively easily knocked out in a pre-emptive strike by an adversary.

A nuclear armed Iran would probably attempt to institute stringent controls to prevent accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons, and would undoubtedly copy some of the Western procedures and perhaps technical precautions, while also possibly allowing for some degree of discretion to IRGC command elements. However, there exists a deep suspicion in the Iranian regime towards technological means that can conceivably be manipulated by an enemy with a much higher technological capability (such as the US, or Israel), and there may be a certain reticence regarding use of technologies of Western origin to this end. Some form of codes system for transmitting instructions can be envisaged, though for reasons of redundancy these might include rather primitive systems (because computers and sophisticated communications might be suspect, out of action in a crisis or war situation). Deployed “Plan B” communications could range from low-level physical communication (PTP telephone), through covert trusted civilian chains of communication, clergy channels, coded broadcast messages understood only by the intended receivers, trusted emissaries and runners, and so on.

It is very unlikely though that the Iranian regime would adopt human authentication of the orders of the Head of State- particularly when that individual is ideologically perceived as the “*vali faqih*” and hence virtually infallible. A leader like Khamene’i would probably not accept any restrictions on his authority to launch weapons – even authentication by a “trusted” deputy as restriction of his discretion by a lesser individual would be tantamount to imposing restrictions on the will of Allah. Even the argument that the authentication is not meant for routine situations, but for contingencies during which the leader may become incapacitated for one reason or another, would be difficult to support. This having been stated, it is also believed that the necessity for a robust authentication and C3 system could be explained to the Supreme Leader by a responsible authority to whom he is attentive, such as President Ahmadinejad today, and that he would accept, by and large, any recommendation in this vein put to him.

It is possible that Iran will import C3 technology and expertise from a willing partner, such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) or Pakistan. Since Pakistan has recently upgraded – with American help - the security of its nuclear assets, it cannot be ruled out that US-based hardware, technology and expertise relating to C3, including PALs, will reach Iran.

The Iranian deployment mode of nuclear weapons – geographically and in terms of readiness alert levels – will depend on two key considerations: short lines for command and control – particularly to allow physical transfer of commands in case of a breakdown of communications; and a desire to keep the weapons away from centers of population to prevent the latter to become necessary “counter-force” targets for an enemy’s nuclear doctrine. It seems that the former consideration will take precedence. In case of escalation, the regime will be concerned that lines of communication would break down and will want to have direct control over the weapons. Forces controlling the weapons in non-Farsi provinces may be seen as susceptible to local pressures. This having been stated, so far the regime has demonstrated a relatively high degree of confidence regarding the exercise of its authority over, by and large, the larger part of Iran’s territory, and does not appear to be excessively nervous about potential loss of control. As such it has constructed or deployed strategic

1 In this connection it is noted that, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reporting, as part of the clandestine deals with the A.Q. Khan network, the blueprints provided by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to Pakistan of the early version Chinese atomic bomb – were transferred to Iran (and Libya), for what it may be worth.

assets – nuclear production facilities and IRGC SSM forces – over a great geographical range, and whether this would hold true for nuclear weapons assets too remains to be seen.

Iranian nuclear doctrine may include transfer of nuclear weapons to a non-state actor – Lebanese Hezbollah would be the prime candidate, especially given its intimate relationship with the IRGC's Qods arm. This could be in order to achieve “plausible deniability” regarding Iranian responsibility in case of the use of a nuclear weapon in a plausibly terrorist attack, in order to escape retaliation, or to claim that the whole action was instigated by rogue elements. It could also serve as a means of preparing a ground based second strike capability outside of Iranian territory, and hence not vulnerable to an enemy first strike against Iran. In any case, the weapons would have to be prepared for operation in advance, the non-state actor's designated operators would have to be trained, C3 procedures would have to be worked out and actual physical deployment of the weapons outside of Iran (e.g. in Lebanon under complete control of Hezbollah, analogous to the US deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe NATO model), or contingency planning for such a deployment would have to be put in place. In any case, the command and control (C2) issues that such a deployment would raise would be manifold and the risks of accidental or unauthorized use, or of loss of the weapons, would be considerably greater.

## Overview

Given today's threat to the breach of nuclear non-proliferation firebreaks, Iran will probably be the first country in the Middle East to break out with a military nuclear capability, thus inevitably becoming the catalyst for other countries in the region to follow suit. Therefore, the Iranian attitude towards nuclear command and control is of paramount salience, insofar as Iran will be of ongoing concern with respect to the danger of regional escalation and the evolvment of nuclear brinkmanship, crisis, and the exchange of nuclear blows between parties in the region – a low-probability-high-consequence contingency that requires addressing.

Some analysts have suggested that the probability of nuclear war by miscalculation, if not by design, is actually heightened, in a region where ignorance about Western ways and resolve; mystical beliefs in the supremacy of one way over all others; honor issues; cumbersome channels of mutual communication; rampant disinformation, misinformation and manipulation of information to which authoritarian decision-making leaderships are allowed access; and subjective prisms that severely distort perceptions of reality – are allowed to heavily influence the flow of events, as evident from the historical record. Even if crises and escalation do not come to nuclear blows, the other effects of a regional nuclear arms race between a number of parties, and the fierce competition for regional hegemony and dominance, not to say domination, in a nuclear weapons environment – bodes ill for stability, for the survivability of status-quo regimes, and for future developments in the region. In the early days of the nuclear era, the perceptions regarding the existence of gaps in the command and control structure that could result in accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons, drove both the development of safeguards (on both sides of the Cold War), and efforts to implement procedures on the political level so as to preclude such scenarios. The behavior of Iran's neighbors will be highly influenced by their perception of the probability of use of nuclear weapons by Iran (either by design or by accident or due to escalation or miscalculation). Another issue is the fallout of the status of alert levels that Iran might chose to maintain: if it will give preference to a posture that intimidates frequently or permanently based on a high level of nuclear alert, this will obviously impact other parties' alert levels and nuclear readiness, thus infusing a great degree of volatility to aspects of deterrence stability.

## The Iranian Rationale for Nuclear Weapons

A key question regarding Iran's nuclear ambitions is: what is the regime's goal in regards to acquiring nuclear weapons? Is it to make Iran into a threshold state poised a few months from a nuclear arsenal? Or do Iran's strategic goals lead it into demonstrating a military nuclear capability once it achieves that stage? Under what conditions may the Iranian regime actually be drawn at some point into a nuclear confrontation? How exactly Iran might cross the nuclear weapons threshold, in terms of the degree of publicity this would be given, is the subject of much international speculation. One option would be to follow the North Korean example: first let it be understood that Iran is in possession of weapons grade fissile materials in a quantity sufficient to make several nuclear weapons; then leak by official circles that it has nuclear weapons; and finally conduct a series of nuclear tests. A second option would be to follow the Israeli example of maintaining a disciplined silence regarding what it may or may not have, but with the widely held implicit international perception that it has an operational and deployed nuclear arsenal, with all that this may signal. The third option would be to follow the Indian example, by bursting onto the scene with a nuclear test “for peaceful purposes”, or some such hyperbole, as India did in 1974. And of course it could follow the example of Pakistan by maintaining silence until the conduct of openly declared nuclear weapons, as both India and Pakistan did in 1998.

Iran's drive to acquire a military nuclear capability precedes the current Iranian administration, or even the Islamic regime. Iran, and before it Persia, has always been viewed by its leadership as deserving of a regional standing of significance, even dominance or hegemony. In the 1970's, the Shah envisaged an ambitious nuclear program, starting with the construction of a network of nuclear power stations, and it can only be assumed that he was thinking of the nuclear weapons option down the road if and when it would be appropriate. To this end, Iran began construction of the first in a series of planned nuclear power stations, at Bushehr, by the German company KWU (which later withdrew from the project and was replaced by the current Russian auspices). The prestige value of nuclear weapons in a regional, radical Islamic, and global context, is the most persuading explanation for Iran's current nuclear weapons aspirations, but there are others not less compelling too.

In its present stage, it began in the latter part of the 1980's in response to Iraq's WMD capabilities and programs in the Saddam Hussein era, particularly Saddam's obvious quest for a nuclear weapons capability, twice foiled – by Israel in 1981, and by the US in 1991. Later, the fact



that the United States attacked Iraq, in spite of the widespread assumption that it was in possession of a large chemical and biological weapons (CBW) WMD arsenal, would appear to only strengthen the Iranian resolve to achieve a nuclear capability, which presumably is viewed as the only non-conventional WMD capability which can effectively deter the United States from attacking Iran, including to induce “regime change” by force as it did in Afghanistan and Iraq, and threatened to do in Libya and Syria, according to deeply held regional perceptions, right or wrong (see for example the issue expanded upon in the chapter on Syria). Additionally it may be noted, in Iran’s defense, that Iran is surrounded on all sides by nuclear weapons states and powers – to the west by the US presence in Iraq, and by Israel; to the north by the Soviet Union, historically, and today by Russia, as well as by the US-Turkish nuclear weapons presence in Turkey, at Incirlik; to the south by the US naval presence in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, as well as the extensive US and British military presences in the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia; and to the east by Pakistan and India. In this sense, Iran is, in a way, a non-nuclear island in a nuclear ocean that surrounds it, and were it not for the very disconcerting nature of Iran’s radical, extremist, Shiite, perhaps somewhat messianic, revolutionary, anti-status-quo, and ruthless regime that is currently in power, then perhaps the development of Iranian nuclear weapons would be less disconcerting.

These arguments have spilled over into the public domain in Iran, indicating a high level of public support of the nuclear program for peaceful purposes, as is postured, but tacitly at least for defensive and deterrent purposes for nuclear weapons too. The strategic argument taking place in the public domain in favor of nuclear weapons is basically one of deterrence<sup>2</sup>: Iran lives in a dangerous neighborhood and is surrounded by nuclear or potentially nuclear neighbors.<sup>3</sup> Another argument justifies acquisition of nuclear weapons on the basis of national honor and achieving the means to impose Iran’s world view on the region.<sup>4</sup> According to this viewpoint, Iran should formally withdraw from the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in light of the IAEA decision to report it to the Security Council. Such a step would be compatible with the guidelines of the Supreme Leader for the states principles: expediency, honor and wisdom.<sup>5</sup> Former president Ayatollah Ali Akbar Rafsanjani indicated in the past that “the experience of the (Iran-Iraq) war showed the potential of WMD ... [therefore] ... We should fully equip ourselves in the defensive and offensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons.” Later as Head of the Expediency Council, in late 2001, he stated that one nuclear weapon would suffice to destroy Israel, but that a similar use of a nuclear weapon against “the Muslim world” would not bring about its destruction – as understood, this insinuated that he believed that Iran could use nuclear weapons against Israel, survive retaliation by it or the US, and still win, with all that this implies in terms of escalation dominance, coercion and compellence in Iran’s view.<sup>6</sup>

Iranian defense theoreticians rarely comment on the place of nuclear weapons in their country’s strategic outlook. A significant departure from this custom were remarks made by former Minister of Defense, Ali Shamkhani, which can be interpreted as legitimization for acquisition of a military nuclear capability. Such a capability, according to Shamkhani, would be the “natural reaction of the Islamic Republic of Iran to achieving its national and regional security...”. Iran, in essence, “ignores parts of its security concerns ... for the sake of broader security goals for all countries... despite the fact that threats to the national security of the Islamic Republic all point to a security imbalance.” This imbalance, according to Shamkhani is epitomized in the list of Iran’s potential nuclear threats: Israel, India and Pakistan, Russia, NATO and the U.S. naval fleets deployed in the region that are carrying atomic weapons.<sup>7</sup> Shamkhani has been credited with floating the concept of “nuclear defense” in the Iranian strategic context, but this concept has remained ambiguous.

Along with this essentially defensive and deterrent view of the potential of nuclear weapons, there exists another attitude – particularly popular in IRGC circles and among radical clerics identified with the Haqqani school in Qom – which views such weapons as part of Iran’s arsenal for enhancement of its regional status.. Thus, Hussein Shariatmadari, the Supreme Leader’s representative in the Kayhan Institute, and Chief Editor of the Kayhan Daily wrote, “...Iran’s transformation into a nuclear power contains a powerful and wide-ranging message... the Europeans and the Americans made various and diverse excuses ... they expected us to ... accept that they are a master cult and race, and that the rest of the world ...must ... enslave itself... Either we ...throw up our hands, and slaughter at their feet the ‘daring’ and the ‘will’ that are the foundations for building civilization, honor, and progress – or we do not give in to blackmail, and value and preserve the rare pearl for which we have labored greatly... If our country wants to attain glory in the world, it has no choice but to lay out a strategy in this direction, and to prepare the appropriate means for this strategy... **We must make the enemies understand that it is inconceivable that instability, insecurity, and shock will be our lot, while theirs will be stability, security, and tranquility**”.

Along with the argument that nuclear weapons are needed for deterrence, they are also seen as compensation for Iran’s humiliation at the hands of the West during the last centuries, and as a “membership card” to an exclusive and respected club of nuclear powers, to which Iran feels it is worthy of belonging. The international acceptance of other nuclear states in Iran’s neighborhood (India and Pakistan as declared nuclear powers and Israel as an undeclared power) exacerbates the Iranian sense of discrimination, and infuriating hypocrisy, as far as Iranians are concerned, in the international demand for Iran to give up its own nuclear program.

However, the strategic rationale for Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons has a proactive aspect as well. There are grounds to believe that Iran will view such weapons, once acquired, not only as weapons of deterrence and last resort, but as an umbrella under which it can establish its hegemony, at least in the Gulf, with enhanced influence in other parts of the region. This influence will have economic (oil), religious

2 For example, reformist politician Mustafa Tajzadeh said, “It’s basically a matter of equilibrium. If I don’t have them, I don’t have security,” and according to conservative Amir Mohebian, “The Americans say, in order to preserve the peace for my children, I should have nuclear weapons and you shouldn’t have them.”

3 “Pasokh beh yek soal” (Answer to a question) - *Farda* 101 1377/1999, Quoted in Farida Farhi, 47.

4 See Hossein Shariatmadari, quoted above, note no. 3.

5 *Kayhan*, 9 March 2006.

6 “If a day comes when the world of Islam is duly equipped with the arms Israel has in possession, the strategy of colonialism would face a stalemate because application of an atomic bomb would not leave any thing in Israel but the same thing would just produce minor damages in the Muslim world” -

[http://www.iran-press-service.com/articles\\_2001/dec\\_2001/israel\\_iran\\_nule\\_threat\\_301201.htm](http://www.iran-press-service.com/articles_2001/dec_2001/israel_iran_nule_threat_301201.htm)

7 *Jaam-e Jam*, 3.638 & 639 2002. See translation in: <http://www.netiran.com>. See also Ali Akbar Velayati to *Qods Daily*, February, 10-15, 1998: “[Iran’s] neighbors have all sorts of weapons, missiles, armored weapons, air, chemical and biological weapons. They have everything. From Israel to Iraq, from Pakistan to India, from Russia to China, and from Turkey to European countries. They have all sorts of weapons or some of the conventional weapons which form a part of the weapons of mass destruction”- <http://www.netiran.com>; *Kayhan*, June, 12, 2004 (trans.: MEMRI, Inquiry and Analysis 181 2004).

(acceptance of Iran's role in the holy cities and of the legitimacy of Shiite Islam), and political aspects. Once perceived by its neighbors as having a nuclear capability, Iran would have much more leverage over oil production policy. The nuclear capability will enable it to indulge in subversion and terrorism against its neighbors and Israel with impunity, without fear of retaliation, thus advancing its agenda to undermine the status-quo, destabilize moderate regimes in the region alleged to have "sold out" to US interests, and to alter the global status-quo by reducing the influence of the US and the West in world affairs, such as at the UN. This could effectively also undermine any hopes of an Israeli-Arab peace process, especially given that significant Palestinian parties are already deeply associated with Iranian influences ( Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as well as Lebanese Hizballah which threatens Israel from Lebanon and could destabilize the region at Iran's behest). Whether Iran has thought out all the implications of acquiring nuclear weapons or not, there is no doubt that it will take advantage of them once it is achieved for these strategic goals.

Therefore, once it acquires nuclear weapons, it may be assessed that Iran would most probably tend to brandish them in order to promote its regional agendas and to coerce neighboring states. The Iranian tendency to demonize the West, Israel and its Sunni Arab neighbors will surely exacerbate its already acute threat perception (some would say paranoia). Discovery of extreme threats to the very existence of the regime will encourage its decision-makers to counter-balance the threats with a commensurate nuclear threat. American assurances of "extended deterrence" to the Gulf States will surely exacerbate the Iranian threat perception and create a sense of a clear and imminent threat to the regime, thus creating a dynamic of mutual threat perceptions that will lead inevitably to escalation, including nuclear brinkmanship in response to US extended deterrence and when other parties go nuclear too, to the the great detriment of deterrence stability and the consequent increase for catastrophic miscalculation. If we judge by the responses of the Iranian regime to recent events that were interpreted as threats against it, the stock response is to threaten with disproportionate force, advanced weaponry and devastation. Thus, the brandishing of nuclear weapons would be in form with this behavior. This would, of course, preclude the adoption of a stance of "nuclear ambiguity" along the lines of the Israeli model, or of the Pakistani model prior to its tests of 1998, or of the North Korean model until its test of 2006, that would only imply possession of nuclear weapons assets by insinuation and hearsay. The truth is probably somewhere in the middle – and it may be expected that a nuclear armed Iran will devise its own special definition of its status, one that will allow it to extract all the advantages possible from the international recognition of its nuclear standing, without incurring the costs of becoming a completely isolated pariah like the DPRK.

Nationalistic considerations and Ahmadinejad's propensity towards challenging the international community may push Iran towards exposing its nuclear capabilities. It appears that Iran has already crossed the Rubicon that precludes adoption of a model of nuclear ambiguity for any length of time. An analysis of the goals of the Iranian nuclear program shows that they are not achievable by a mere "threshold" status. However, an active policy of brandishing nuclear weapons (declaring nuclear alerts, target lists, flying aircraft with nuclear weapons, etc.) will oblige Iran to develop rigid and robust controls over the weapons at an early stage.

The form of command and control that the Iranians would prefer in these four different scenarios is going to be different. In the scenario of Iran only having demonstrated possession of a nuclear device and possessing a limited amount of weapons grade fissile material, perhaps emulating the North Korean model outlined earlier, there is no need for a sophisticated structure of command and control. In any other model, a relatively established C3 structure will be necessary from the level of the decision makers down to issues of custody, safeguards, prevention of unauthorized use, etc'. Demonstration of the capability will call for holding exercises in which the nuclear arsenal is part of the response to a threat scenario. This scenario would make highly sensitive and complex command and control structures indispensable.

## Religious Input on Use of Nuclear Weapons

The Islamic legality of nuclear weapons became an issue in Shiite Iran as far back as the early 1980's. Upon achieving power in 1979, Khomeini ordered the suspension of the Shah's nuclear program on the basis of his legal opinion regarding the Islamic illegality of nuclear weapons. He has been quoted as having ruled, albeit orally, that "Atom(ic power/ weapons) is a thing of Satan". There is however no written record or official ruling by Khomeini on the issue of nuclear power or nuclear weapons. Be the historic truth of that statement as it may, Khomeini's position against acquisition of nuclear weapons was short-lived. As time – and the war with Iraq - went on, his attitude apparently changed, and he is reported to have given the religious justification and policy directive to renew the efforts to acquire a military nuclear potential.<sup>8</sup> The fact that the nuclear program was revived while Khomeini was still alive is of cardinal significance not only for historic reasons. While there is no official record of a ruling by Khomeini on this matter, the power structure of Iran at the time of the renewal of the Iranian program precludes the possibility that the program was initiated without his legal and moral dispensation. If and when Iran achieves a military nuclear potential, Khomeini's rulings may emerge both as a key element in the internal debate within the regime, and in order to provide Islamic justification of the highest level to whatever decision is made.

Nevertheless, Khomeini's original position remains in force among many of the traditional "quietist" clerics. For example, Ayatollah Ozma Yusuf Saanei claims that "a consensus exists among the senior '*ulama* in Qom" that the prohibition on nuclear weapons (as well as chemical and biological weapons) is "self-evident in Islam" and an "eternal law" that cannot be reversed, since "the basic function" of these weapons is to kill innocent people. According to Saanei, this was the position behind the Iranian decision not to make use of chemical weapons against Iraq during the war. In September 2003 an additional *fatwa* was issued by the scholars of Qom stating that "Nuclear weapons are un-Islamic because they are inhumane."

On the other hand, there has been increasing support for acquisition of nuclear weapons and even justification of their use by radical '*ulama*. The most outspoken of them are:

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8 The Iranian centrifuge uranium enrichment program was begun in 1987, or even earlier, and in 1987 the first of the two A.Q. Khan deals (the second was in the mid-1990s) provided Iran with crucial centrifuge technology derived from the Pakistani program.

- In June 2005, before the presidential elections, Ayatollah Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, widely considered as the spiritual mentor of Ahmadinejad and other key IRGC leaders, published a book (distributed in no more than 3,000 copies to the select) called “The Islamic Revolution – Surges in Political Changes in History”. The book deals, obliquely, with justification for Iran to independently produce nuclear weapons for deterrence. According to Mesbah Yazdi: “We cannot know with certainty when the wolf-like elements in many countries which hold power will disappear and be wiped off the face of the earth, or when they will change their murderous ways. Therefore, we should not be indifferent to defensive policy and must strengthen our internal forces... we must always strive to strengthen the country’s military and defense systems. **We have to produce the most advanced weapon inside the country, even if our enemies don’t like it. There is no reason that they have the right to produce a certain special type of weapon, but that other countries not have that right...** In seeking to acquire the [necessary] technology Iran must be patient and not be deterred by economic shortages: Divine, messianic support has been the determining factor in the success of the Iranian regime during the various trying periods which have plagued it since its foundation... We cannot be broken because of temporary difficulties, they will pass, and Muslims must be patient and not be deterred by material or economic shortages, because if they do, it may lead them to be separated from [Islam].”
- One of Mesbah Yazdi’s prominent disciples, Hojjat al-Islam Mohsen Gharavian, a professor at the Imam Khomeini Institute in Qom, was quoted (April 2006) as having ruled that the use of nuclear weapons is legal in Islam as “One must say that when the entire world is armed with nuclear weapons, it is only natural that, as a counter-measure, it is necessary to be able to use these weapons. However, what is important is what goal they may be used for”. Later, he denied having issued such a *fatwa* and claimed that he was misquoted. The incident itself is indicative of the high significance that the regime accords to statements by clerics – even middle ranking ones.
- Ayatollah Javadi Amoli (in a meeting with whom Ahmadinejad told of the “light” that surrounded him when he spoke at the UN).
- Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati (Head of the Guardians’ Council)
- It is reported that this attitude is accepted among other teachers and alumni of the Haqqani School, such as Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi, Ayatollah Mohammad Fazel Lankarani, Ayatollah Lotfollah Safi Golpaygani and Ayatollah Javad Tabrizi.

The balance of power within the clerical world of Qom has undergone changes since the revolution. For example, for most of Khomeini’s era, Ayatollah Montazeri, who had issued an unequivocal *fatwa* against the use of nuclear weapons, was at that time recognized as the Supreme Leader’s successor, and hence was expected to become the most senior religious authority in the post-Khomeini era. Undoubtedly, the positions of senior Ayatollahs who are viewed by key figures in the other decision forming bodies mentioned above have played a role in the decision-making regarding nuclear weapons. The ascendancy of Ayatollah Taqi al-Din Mesbah Yazdi – widely considered as the spiritual mentor of the President – who has gone on record as supporting acquisition of nuclear weapons, has changed the balance in this sector of the regime as well.

Khamene’i lacks his predecessor’s status as an almost infallible religious scholar, and came to power by collegial choice. Nevertheless he remains at the centre of the decision-making process on the issue of nuclear power. During the two decades of Khamene’i as Supreme Leader, there has also been no substantiated official ruling on nuclear weapons by him, or by any other cleric associated with him and perceived as ruling on his direction. On the eve of the crucial discussion in the IAEA on Iran’s military nuclear program, the spokesman of the Iranian Foreign Ministry Hamid Reza-Asafi released the “news” (10 August 2005) that the Supreme Leader had issued a *fatwa* declaring the use of nuclear weapons as “*haram*” – forbidden by Islamic law. Khamene’i’s purported *fatwa* however was not published by the Office of the Leader, and its exact wording is nowhere to be found in the Iranian media or in official records of the Supreme Leader’s religious edicts, which are assiduously updated and published. The closest declaration by Khamene’i that can be interpreted as such a *fatwa* could be a statement he made (22 May 2005) that “We are not after producing the atomic bomb, because Islam does not even allow us to treat our enemy in such a manner”. Such a statement does not amount to a *fatwa*. Given the role of the Supreme Leader in the Iranian regime, this raises serious questions regarding its very existence.

A major element in Ahmadinejad’s Weltanschauung is his “intimacy” with the “Hidden Imam”, and his belief in his imminent reappearance. According to Shiite eschatological thought, advent of the “Hidden Imam” will be preceded by cataclysms and great sacrifice of the Muslims. However, at the end, the Imam will appear, punish the oppressors and reward the believers. To most Shiites the hidden Imam<sup>9</sup> is no more than an eschatological idea with little immediate relevance to the actual life of society. Traditional “quietist” Shiite scholars have usually embraced pragmatic positions towards external forces, based on their understanding that until the Imam appears, the Shiites are in the minority and “the oppressed upon earth” by definition. They must bide their time and maintain their beliefs. A leader who subscribes to such a belief would naturally be less perturbed or deterred by the prospects of a nuclear war or any other wide-scale use of force against his country. Ahmadinejad – though not a cleric himself – has elevated the eschatological expectation of the reappearance of the Hidden Imam to the level of a central principle of the regime’s political, cultural, economic and social life. More significant is the fact that Ahmadinejad has a “timeline” for the reappearance of the Imam (“very soon”) and claims to engage in regular “*khalvat*” (audiences) with Him.

The president’s supporters have spread the claim that he himself is one of the 36 nails (*owtad*) which hold the world together pending the return of the Imam. Ahmadinejad attributes his running and winning the presidency to this personal link with the Imam, and hence sees himself as the agent of the Imam, bound to perform his mission, rather than the representative of his constituency. The ideological movement that appears to be behind this worldview of Ahmadinejad and his colleagues is frequently linked to the Hojjatiyeh Association. This link is

9 The twelfth Imam in the line of the founder of the Shi’a, the Imam Ali, who is believed to have disappeared, remains in the world in “occultation” (Ghaiba) and will eventually reappear to meet out justice, to reward his believers (the Shiites) and to punish the oppressors. He is expected to re-appear at the well of Jamkaran, near Teheran, where he disappeared; during Ahmadinejad’s tenure as mayor of Teheran, and since assuming the presidency, the highway between Jamkaran and Teheran has been widened to a freeway, and a rail line has been laid down, presumably to encourage pilgrimage to the site, or to ease the procession of the Imam to Teheran when he returns, which messianic believers like Ahmadinejad expect to happen very soon.

tendentious. The Hojatieh Society was established in 1953 by a preacher from Mashhad, Sheikh Mahmud Halabi, who first supported Prime Minister Mosadeq and then the Shah. The essence of the Hojatieh doctrine is that true Islamic government must await the return of the Hidden Imam. Therefore, the Hojatieh Association opposed Ayatollah Khomeini's theory of Islamic government and *velayat-e faqih*, called for collective leadership of the religious community, and opposed religious involvement in political affairs. While the movement was essentially "quietist" and eschewed political involvement, it believed that only when the situation would be intolerable and absolute chaos will reign, will the Imam feel obliged to reappear to save the believers.

It is difficult to say what impact the eschatological doctrine of part of the Iranian regime may have on the command and control structure. Certainly, parts of the regime which are averse to that doctrine will attempt to deny its proponents access to those weapons which could hasten their apocalyptic vision. **The fact that an increasingly predominant faction in the regime is supportive of that world view may bring about its own efforts to plant its supporters in the chain of command, including as potential back doors to the control systems over the weapons.**

In terms of command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I), the religious support for a more assertive, not to say aggressive, nuclear posture, could induce a higher alert level by the designated IRGC units entrusted with the nuclear weapons than might be otherwise expected. Drawing on the exhortations of the more extreme of the religious authorities, legitimacy might be afforded to active intimidation of adversaries by maintaining a threatening nuclear weapons posture on a frequent, or permanent, basis. This would require an early establishment of relatively sophisticated C3 rules. Until such rules were set in place, the instability, unreliability and questionable security regarding nuclear assets would be quite disconcerting. Such a raised alert level by the Iranians would inevitably be responded to by nuclear armed adversaries, if and when they go nuclear, such as Saudi Arabia, or by the wielding of US extended deterrence, and could therefore spawn escalation and undermine deterrence stability, subsequently creating a severe potential for catastrophic miscalculation.

## The Decision Making Level – the Supreme Leader and the President

The core of the Iranian leadership is comprised today of less than a dozen veterans of the Revolution surrounding the Supreme Leader, and of a "second generation" IRGC elite around the President. Definitions of authority in Iran are ambiguous, and decision-making processes are convoluted. On one hand, the regime adheres to Khomeini's doctrine of *velayat-e (motleghi) faqih* ([absolute] Rule of the jurisprudents) that provides for constant scrutiny and overruling of the elected government by the *Rahbar* (Supreme Leader) and self-elected bodies of conservative clerics. The status and authority of the *Rahbar*, Ayatollah Khamene'i, is evocative of the traditional Iranian Shah. The relatively short period of Supreme Leadership of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Khomeini (1979-1988), was dominated by his personal positions on matters of national security; other institutions of the revolution (such as the IRGC, the National Security Council-NSC and the Office of the Supreme Leader – *daftar-e Rahbar* – itself) evolved gradually to their present positions.

If Iran achieves nuclear weapons under the incumbency of the present Supreme Leader, it is reasonable to assume that formally at least, he would be designated as the highest authority as far as the authorization to deploy or use nuclear weapons. One salient question, therefore, is what is the extent of Khamenei's acquaintance with nuclear weapons issues, such as command and control, safeguards, deterrence, operational use of the weapons, and the consequences of wielding nuclear threats, or of carrying them out? Will he see the need to develop a doctrine based on international experience regarding these issues, or would he see Islamic doctrines as a sufficient base for operational procedures?

A partial answer to this question may be found in the way the incumbent Supreme Leader filters information and makes strategic decisions in other areas. Khamene'i does not speak foreign languages – except for Arabic, and is not a direct recipient of information from foreign media, though it is said that he listens occasionally to BBC in Persian and Arabic, and to Israeli Persian broadcasts, as well as reading translations of the foreign press in Iranian newspapers.<sup>10</sup>

While the Iranian press on its own is informative enough to provide a relatively good picture of domestic public opinion, the clamp-down on the press by the Ahmadinejad administration has reduced its value as a window to the outside world. For assessment of foreign affairs, Khamene'i is almost totally dependent on his "gatekeepers" for both raw information and its interpretation. These sources of information tend to be radical and revolutionary in their worldview – many associated with the IRGC.

The decisions on the pace and directions of the technological R&D towards acquiring a military nuclear potential have evidently been heavily influenced by the technocrats and scientists dealing in this highly professional area. It is believed that in the current context, of the past five years, President Ahmadinejad has exercised considerable influence over the Supreme Leader's decision-making, and that he is profusely receptive to Ahmadinejad's interpretations and recommendations. We assess that reports regarding disagreements between the two, or about Khamenei's disdain for Ahmadinejad, have been exaggerated, allowing for the fact that they would naturally and inevitably not be in absolute agreement about every nuance all of the time. We believe that reports to the effect that the *rahbar* has placed the blame for Iran's isolation and international decline in its standing on Ahmadinejad's heavy-handed attitude towards the West, and lately towards Russia too – are exaggerations, or possibly groundless, rumours proliferated by interested parties inside and outside the regime. Khamenei's receptiveness to Ahmadinejad's views, or of equivalent figures after Ahmadinejad, could be of real significance in a nuclear weapons decision-making scenario and environment. It may be assessed that the regular armed forces chain of command are, and will remain, of only secondary relevance to the nuclear decision-making process, except for the Chief of Staff who may be apprised of the operative strategy. Similarly, it may be assumed that the role of the relevant echelons of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), as well as of the military industrial elements involved in weaponization, will remain circumscribed to professional technical, or technological issues, and involved in strategic or political decisions only insofar as their opinions will be sought regarding the technical viability of contingency options.

10 According to an informed Iranian religious source.

The institution of the “Supreme Leader” and the *vali-faqih* is not sacrosanct in the Iranian regime. It was created by, and for, Khomeini, and was adapted after his death to allow for Khamene’i to succeed him. Therefore, the role of the Supreme Leader in the nuclear chain of command today may not be the same after Khamene’i. Senior Iranians – among them Rafsanjani who sees himself as candidate for the position of Supreme Leader – have floated ideas for separating the position of the Supreme Leader from that of the *vali-faqih*, or of creating a “collective leadership” for religious guidance. It is quite possible that the IRGC will prefer such a demotion of the religious leadership, leaving the authority for use of nuclear weapons directly in its own hands.

The changes in the relative strength of the presidency under different Presidents (since Khomeini’s death – Rafsanjani, Khatami and Ahmadinejad), and in the relationships of these presidents with the other bodies, has also determined the weight of those persons in issues of national security, and of nuclear development in particular. As of 2005, the rise to power of Ahmadinejad, and his clique of IRGC veterans, appears to be a new phase in the balance of power within the regime. During the Rafsanjani and Khatami presidencies, conventional wisdom saw the Iranian regime as a “two-headed” entity: an ideological clerical regime headed by the Supreme Leader and supported by the IRGC, which was dominant in the strategic issues and in domestic affairs; and a non-clerical (though not “secular”) government which handled the day to day affairs of the Islamic Republic, including its international relations. The ascendancy of Ahmadinejad has changed this equation. The president now is more ideologically outspoken – if not more religiously committed – than many of the representatives of the clerical establishment, many of whom have even criticized him for endangering the vital interests of the regime by his confrontational rhetoric. His link to the IRGC also strengthens him vis-à-vis the Supreme Leader, as does the fact that IRGC veterans now comprise a large portion of the Supreme Leader’s office and serve as his information gatekeepers. Ahmadinejad’s appointing of many of his IRGC cronies and IRGC-link associates has significantly boosted both their and his position in terms of the ability to exercise power effectively and securely, and to reinforce the ideological foundations of the courses of actions prioritized by his and their agenda – namely to maintain, or reinvigorate, revolutionary fervor, and shake the status-quo (in a way reminiscent of Mao Zedong’s revival of revolutionary fervor by launching the “Cultural Revolution” to shake off the stagnation brought about by the abandoning of revolutionary zeal in favor of stabilization).

Conventional wisdom in the past has argued that the final decision will always lie with the Supreme Leader, who represents a more risk-averse world view which would mitigate the risk of nuclear escalation and confrontation. This view may now be anachronistic. Even in the past, during the Iran-Iraq War, there are indications that the IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) occasionally acted in a way that appears to run against orders devolving from above. Furthermore, historically, members of the IRGC high command have often made pronouncements based on its own interests, without due consideration of those of the Supreme Leader, who has, from time to time, been forced to respond. This situation has exacerbated with a shift of the balance of power between the Supreme Leader and the President since Ahmadinejad assumed power in 2005, including with respect to the nuclear program. Therefore, even if the Supreme Leader is designated as the final authority for use of nuclear weapons, the fact that the entire chain of command is comprised of IRGC loyalists may compromise his absolute control. **In this sense, it may be a commonly held but serious mistake therefore to assume that the office of the Supreme Leader will be the supreme authority for use of nuclear weapons in any regime constellation, when in fact other elements do wield significant power, even in the current context. Moreover, even if the Supreme Leader is formally the supreme authority, the latitude for manipulation of information that gets to him, thus shaping his choices, and interpretation of his instructions by interested parties, all easily move the focus of crucial decision-making to additional, or other, centers of the exercise of power.** It is only basic political science that the crucial issue is the question of who exercises the state’s instruments of coercion (currently the IRGC through the position of the President who is a vanguard), and controls the national strategic assets, such as nuclear weapons.

Below the level of the Supreme Leader, the President’s office and the IRGC, Iran has already involved different bodies in oversight of the nuclear program to a certain degree. These may continue to have a say in the future, after a nuclear capability is achieved. The key organizations involved are:

- The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), which may have important contributions to the evolution of a coherent national nuclear strategy, desirable strategic postures, contingency planning, C2, C3, C3I and deployment modes, including with respect to the security of nuclear assets, authentication issues and prevention of unauthorized use.
- The Iranian Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI), which has a purely technological role, but may be an authority on defining what is doable and what isn’t in a future scenario.
- The Iranian Military (including the civilian level – the Minister of Defense – and other senior officers).
- The clerical establishment – the The Council of Experts (*Majles-e Khobregan*), the Guardians Council (*Shoura-ye Nagahban*) and the Expediency Discernment Council of the System (*Majma’-e Tashkhis-e Maslahat-e Nezam*) under former president Rafsanjani. The clerical establishment includes senior Ayatollahs who have ruled on the issue of the legality of acquisition and use of nuclear weapons.
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs – which has so far represented the interests of those elements that have been making efforts to mitigate Iran’s deteriorating international standing, by attempting to devise solutions to placate opprobrium of Iran, or at least to reduce or delay it. In a nuclear armed Iran scenario, it would presumably be a voice of reason and attempt to clarify anticipated international reaction to Iranian measures, but it may be expected to be by and large drowned out by more shrill exhortations, and by the more extremist and ruthless elements; and so, all things considered, probably, not definitely or entirely, of less relevance.

The ambiguity regarding central control in strategic decision-making will certainly filter down to the more tactical and technical procedures of command and control of nuclear weapons. Iranian decision-making structures are nebulous networks of influence saturated with “back doors” and “back channels” between the decision-makers and the operational level. In such an important domain as the operation of nuclear weapons, we may expect that this feature of the regime will be even more salient.

## IRGC Chain of Command

It is widely assumed, and this is very probably a valid assessment, that the IRGC will be the organization in charge of nuclear weapons assets: storing them, security, deploying them, transporting them from place to place, assembling their diverse components when told to do so and if their components are stored separately for any determined reason, preparing them for launch, signaling to adversaries that they may be launched, and actually launching them if so ordered. In the IRGC, it is probably the IRGC Air Force, which is already the force that is in charge of Iran's operational and deployed strategic SSM capabilities, which would be the salient operational force. The IRGC's other arms would be expected to have contributing roles, such as regarding security, transportation or communication aspects. This would largely assume that Iran would opt for an SSM-based operational capability for its nuclear assets.

If an air-delivered, or cruise-missile delivered – Iran is reported to be in possession of cruise missiles acquired from the former Soviet Union, and is developing indigenous capabilities too, as recently openly demonstrated – then additional preparations would have to be installed. Another option would be to involve the regular Air Force for designated salient missions – but this would entail entrusting to it C2 and C3 aspects that have so far not been typical of the Islamic Revolutionary regime.

Additionally, the Iranian regime may opt for “primitive” nuclear devices that could be delivered clandestinely by other, unconventional, means, such as by land, truck, commercial or transport aircraft, or sea, such as a freighter docking in the port of a major Western city, or as a launch pad for another delivery means thus extending the reach of the threat or allowing for the involvement of covert operations – such as by putatively “renegade” elements, to deny responsibility later. Generally, the regular military has no access to the WMD program and is not trusted by the leadership.

However, the identity of key figures in the specific command and control structure will most probably be based on criteria for loyalty of individuals, rather than primarily bureaucratic affiliation. The fear of betrayal from inside (or more precisely – transfer of loyalty) is accentuated in Iran, as it is in other Middle Eastern regional cultures. This is particularly the case when it seems as if the regime is in danger. The collective memory of the regime holds the images of military officers who crossed the lines when it became evident that the Shah was falling. There is cultural legitimization of pragmatism, hence, the Iranian regime will probably take into account that even senior officers of the regular forces may not obey orders to launch weapons if the regime seems as if it is in danger of failing, or that the use of those weapons may bring a catastrophe on them, their families, or the nation. The fierce loyalty, discipline, and ideological commitment, of the IRGC command and its personnel, among other things due to an unshakable religious fervor – is much less in doubt.

Vetting of the line of command over strategic weapons therefore will first and foremost be based on the loyalty that can be expected from the individual. In Iranian society, people are divided by lineage and social circle into categories of “*khod*” (insider, “one of us”) and “*gheir-khod*” (outsider). The former status may derive from the following: family affiliation, perceived in Iranian culture as the most basic and fundamental loyalty structure which supersedes all other affiliations; personal past (“old boys clubs” made up of pre-Revolution “comrades in arms”, schoolmates from the same madrasa in the *Hawza*); or contemporary membership in the same social-political circle (*dowreh*). These serve as frames of reference for trust and mutual help (a concept similar to the Chinese “*guanxi*”), and indications of an individual's influence (*nofouz*). Another important criterion may be the religious allegiance of an individual to a senior cleric; since a religious Shiite is expected to adhere to the rulings of his “model of emulation” (*marja' taqlid*) in all matters – personal and public – it stands to reason that no officer who does not give his allegiance to the Supreme Leader will be trusted with control over nuclear weapons, as he may have to petition his own *marja'*, and may receive contradictory rulings. Deployment of weapons, and delegation of authority, will rely heavily on these person-dependent factors and not be based on pure military bureaucratic reasoning.

**Another possible element in the line of command and control in Iran may be the “representatives of the Supreme Leader” in all military units. These “commissars” oversee the activities and religious orthodoxy of the troops up to the highest level. During the Iran-Iraq War, they were at the front and often gave the military units operational instruction.** Their advice was followed because the military feared reprisals from the senior religious echelons. **However, there is no indication that these ‘representatives’ have ever been delegated with executive powers. Their power is a derivative of the status of the Supreme Leader himself.** There may conceivably be a situation in which the Supreme Leader is more cautious regarding instructions on deployment or use of nuclear weapons, and orders are given through the line of the IRGC. The IRGC officers would then have to assess the relative strength of the Supreme Leader in order to decide whether or not to accept advice of their “commissars” which contradict the orders of their IRGC superiors. But, all things considered, there aren't very likely to be such contradictory orders.

A nuclear armed Iran would institute stringent controls to prevent accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons, and would undoubtedly copy some of the Western procedures, and perhaps technical precautions, while also possibly allowing for some degree of discretion to IRGC command elements. Some form of codes system can be envisaged, though for reasons of redundancy these might include rather primitive systems – because computers and sophisticated communications might be suspect, corrupted or out of action in a crisis or war situation. Given that the IRGC is not only a military organization, but is also responsible for regime security and “special operations” – as embodied by the Qods force – it might be expected that influential figures from those sections might be involved in transmission of a command too.

## Central Control vs. Delegation of Authority

The Iranian regime tends to centralism regarding strategic issues and to an aversion towards delegation of authority in matters relating to strategic weapons and strategic interests. There is no reason not to assume that this feature will apply to nuclear issues as well. The centralist tendency derives not only from a “micro-management” tendency of the leadership, but from a broad factionalism and deep lack of trust which imbues Iranian society. The western system of delegation of authority (including but not only for strategic weapons) is based on an **assumption of loyalty** (based on a vetting system), according to which the individuals in the chain of command will obey orders (except for “illegal” orders).

The collective affiliation - ethnic, regional or family - of the officers down the line of command is assumed to be irrelevant in democratic societies to the judgement whether they are suited for sensitive tasks. This is not the case in Iran, where the individual officer's collective affiliation is far more salient to the assessment of his loyalty than his individual past.

There are few indications of actual delegation of authority to forces in the field to act in absence of orders from above. In the mid-2000's, the regime gave orders to its military personnel in the Persian Gulf that if, during warfare, they are cut off from the center, they are instructed to use whatever they have to wreak havoc in the Gulf – especially to blockade the Straits of Hormuz. We do not know whether this order has been given to be implemented in other situations. The very issuing of such an order is out of form for the Iranian regime and runs counter to two basic features of Iranian culture:

- The basic stratification of Iranian society to superiors and subordinates, in which the former make decisions and the latter carry them out and;
- The view of authority as deriving from the source of authority actually being in power, so that the very fact that the superiors cannot give orders would be indicative of their no longer being in power and their authority – and hence their standing orders – having lost its validity.

It is in such instances that it may be of value for foreign governments who might be threatened by this regime to devise plans to transmit messages directly to the different echelons who control the nuclear arsenal, in order to deter not only the regime but critical links in the entire chain of command, for the eventuality that the former is perceived as falling. The experience with this practice, as it was done regarding the Iraqi command in both Gulf Wars, is inconclusive. It is not clear whether such warnings contributed to the non-use of WMD by the Iraqis in the two Gulf Wars, or whether such warnings are dismissed with disdain by the intended audience. When the IRGC is involved, it is highly doubtful that the intended audience would be receptive to such messages and warnings.

Taking into account this aversion to delegation of authority, the solution for a breakdown of communications – likely in situations of nuclear warfare or high level electronic warfare (EW) attacks by the enemy – would probably have to be physical. These solutions can range from low-level physical communication (PTP telephone), through covert trusted civilian chains of communication, (clergy channels), coded broadcast messages understood only by the intended receivers, trusted emissaries and runners, and so on.

It can also be assumed that a nuclear armed Iran would develop a C3 system for enablement of nuclear weapons assets in case the leadership was incapacitated. But the degree to which authority may be delegated is an imponderable, and in fact a very serious and disconcerting matter. An extensive delegation of authority for such an eventuality would raise a severe risk of unauthorized use in a crisis situation – such as a regional “Cuban Missile crisis” environment. Presumably, the legitimate leadership will be acutely aware of this, and is therefore likely to be extremely circumspect and cautious in delegating “Plan B” authority for the launch of nuclear weapons, and may even rule it out entirely. This, however, would also be seen to undermine deterrence, should the leadership's C3 mechanisms be seen by it to be relatively easily knocked out in a pre-emptive strike by an adversary. How the Iranian leadership might consider balancing the tension between the possibilities is unclear, and it may turn to advisory arms – such as the SNSC – to suggest plausible answers and options. On the other hand, while official delegation of authority may not always be implemented, there may be cases of *de facto* delegation of authority. This may occur as a result of multiple channels of command (IRGC vs. the Supreme Leader's Office). Additionally, the current leadership may chose to base redundant C3 assets in fallback outlying power locations where the political environment might be comfortable even in a crisis or escalation, and especially where IRGC assets and resources could conceivably allow for a measure of continued effective C3 even if Teheran-based assets are liable to be incapacitated.

## “Seconding” of Nuclear Weapons to Proxy Organizations

Although assessed as highly unlikely, but not to be ruled out, the rationale for Iranian nuclear doctrine to include transfer of nuclear weapons to a non-state actor – Lebanese Hizballah would be the prime candidate – would be:

- A desire to attain “plausible deniability” regarding Iranian responsibility for a nuclear explosion in another country. Clearly an attack using missiles or any other weapons launched from Iranian territory would preclude this. Hence, Iran may contemplate using a trusted non-state actor proxy as a delivery system.
- Such a scenario would also allow the Iranians to claim, assuming that forensics traced back any weapon used to Iranian sources, that the whole action was instigated by rogue elements without official authorization.
- A means of preparing a ground based second strike capability outside of Iranian territory – and hence not vulnerable to an enemy first strike – based on a non-state actor in another country.

In all three cases, the weapons would have to be prepared for operation in advance, the non-state actor's designated operators would have to be trained, and command and control procedures would have to be worked out. An Iranian doctrine which includes a “second strike” capability based on a proxy organization would entail either actual physical deployment of the weapons outside of Iran – e.g. in Lebanon under complete control of Hizballah, analogous to the US deployment in Europe – or contingency planning for such a deployment. In any case, the C2 issues that such a deployment would raise would be manifold and the risks of accidental or unauthorized use, or of loss of the weapons, would be considerably greater. This having been stated, given the very intimate link between the IRGC and Hizballah, and the role of the “Al-Qods” arm of the IRGC in instigating foreign turmoil (including in Iraq), as well as in maintenance of the Hizballah connection, an Iranian directing hand could be involved.

## Deployment Considerations

Iranian deployment of nuclear weapons will depend on two key, conflicting, considerations: short lines for command and control – particularly to allow physical transmission of commands in case of a breakdown of communications; and desire to keep the weapons away from centers of population to prevent the latter from becoming targeted as a result, for fear that the disruptions caused by an adversary's first strike in such a case, would endanger regime survival. It seems that the former consideration will take precedence. In case of escalation, the regime will be concerned that lines of communication would break down and will want to have direct control over the weapons. Forces controlling the weapons in non-Farsi provinces may be seen as susceptible to local pressures. On the other hand, the regime would also fear the reaction of the population (and the clerics) to deployment of nuclear weapons in populated areas such as Tehran, Qom or other main cities. The solution would then be to deploy weapons in outlying areas near the center of the country but outside of the population centers. This having been stated, so far the regime has demonstrated a relatively high degree of confidence regarding the exercise of its authority over, by and large, the larger part of Iran's territory, and does not appear to be excessively nervous about potential loss of control. As such it has constructed or deployed strategic assets – nuclear production facilities and IRGC SSM forces – over a great geographical range, and whether this would hold true for nuclear weapons assets too remains to be seen.

Thus, a plausible scenario is that the Iranians would prefer to deploy nuclear weapons– components and delivery systems – in diverse outlying sectors, where fall-back leadership centers may provide the necessary C3 wherewithal for retaining a good measure of authority over them, based on IRGC resources, assets and effective deployment. In this manner, a dire scenario of incapacitation of the leadership and its C3 assets in the Teheran area may be augmented to prevent collapse of the strategic posture. Whether the current leadership has thought out the possibilities, examined options with the assistance of its advisory organs, begun physically establishing redundant C3 assets and deploying them geographically – is all unknown at this time.

## Authentication Procedures

There exists a deep suspicion in the Iranian regime towards technological means that can conceivably be manipulated by an enemy with a much higher technological capability, and there may be a certain reticence regarding use of US or Western-origin technology. This aversion towards technological means which are culturally identified with the West is compounded by a preference for personal trust and interpersonal interaction.

Human verification may be implemented at operational levels (for example, the need to combine codes held by more than one senior officer in order to override safeguards and arm weapons). However, it is very unlikely that the Iranian regime would adopt human verification of the orders of the Head of State – particularly when that individual is ideologically perceived as the “*vali faqih*” and hence virtually infallible. A leader like Khamene'i would probably not accept any restrictions on his authority to launch weapons – even authentication by a “trusted” deputy, as restriction of his discretion by a lesser individual would be tantamount to imposing restrictions on the will of Allah. Even the argument that the verification is not meant for regular situations but for contingencies during which the leader may be incapacitated, for any reason, would be difficult to support. This having been stated, it is also believed that the necessity for a robust authentication and C3 system could be explained to the Supreme Leader by a responsible authority to whom he is attentive, such as President Ahmadinejad today, and that he would accept, by and large, any recommendation in this vein put to him.

Elaborate, robust technical systems for coded authentication of the identities of those who give the orders would be more acceptable. It seems that an Iranian C2 system would probably rely mainly on coded authentication as opposed to encryption which – it would be feared – may be broken by the enemy. Even with these means, the natural suspicion of these regimes that the enemy may find a way to override orders by imposture of the leader in order to disable weapon systems would lead them to adopt such systems. However, the same natural suspicion towards any foreign technology (for the same reason) would keep such systems at a relatively primitive level, with a great deal of reliance on physical communication, and verbal codes for communication between the highest level – the Leader, President and other senior figures – and the operational units. Reliance on such means would have an adverse effect on the regime's ability to maintain flexible time-sensitive response mechanisms, and hence would influence other elements of the nuclear doctrine.

No doubt, these methods will develop over a period of time, as needed and in light of experience of crisis and near confrontations. It should not be expected that these regimes adopt procedures developed throughout the years of the Cold War; they will view many of the technological means for verification and authentication with suspicion, and will prefer to extend conventional procedures of command and control to the nuclear domain. Additionally to be noted is the possibility that Iran will import C3 technology and expertise from a willing partner, such as the DPRK or Pakistan. Since Pakistan has recently upgraded the security of its nuclear assets thanks to a relatively generous US assistance program in this area – a process that is ongoing – it can not be ruled out that US-based hardware, technology and expertise relating to C3, including PALs, will devolve to Iran to this end, which is not necessarily a bad thing, one might add, for a multiplicity of reasons.

However, once the weapons are in place, there is some doubt that Iran would allow itself to use foreign – particularly US – technology that has the capacity to disable its weapons. The fear that any such technology would be vulnerable to foreign manipulation – if not pre-built with Trojan horses that would allow the designer to take control – might preclude their use. Another consideration is the possibility that Iran's strategic SSM forces –including Shehab-3 and Scuds, as well as the more advanced missiles already in development, production and perhaps subsequently to be deployed – will remain dual-use, capable of essentially launching missiles with either conventional, or WMD, or nuclear warheads. Another plausible scenario is that the IRGC Air Force will designate a limited given units for nuclear force missions; this would reduce complications and be more efficient or effective than an eclectic designation of all SSM forces as potential nuclear weapons designated units. But since this is Iran, one way or another at this point this question remains an imponderable, if not moot. Furthermore, it could be suggested that since the Iranian launch units will not know in advance what the target will be, they may not be able to hardwire this data into PALs.



## האתגר האיראני: חלופות דיפלומטיות ואחרות

ד"ר שמוליק בכר וד"ר עודד ברוש

מסמך מסכם של מושב הצד בכנס הרצליה האחד-עשר

### המצב הנוכחי: הערכת הסנקציות על איראן

הדעה הרווחת בקרב רבים ממשתתפי הדיונים בנושא האיראני, שנערכו במסגרות השונות של כנס הרצליה האחד-עשר, היא כי הסנקציות נגד איראן במתכונתן הנוכחית אינן נוקשות דיין, וכי לפיכך אין בהן כדי להוביל לשינוי בעמדתו של המשטר בטהרן בנושא הגרעיני. מספר דוברים קבעו באופן נחרץ כי הסנקציות כשלו, וכי למעשה איראן ניצלה אותן כדי להרוויח זמן נוסף על מנת לקדם עוד את תוכניתה הגרעינית. אף שהמשתתפים הסכימו כי ניכר כיום מאמץ רציני מצידו של הממשל האמריקני להפעיל סנקציות, ולאכופ אותן, גם מחוץ למסגרת הסנקציות שהוטלו על-ידי מועבי"ט, ועל אף מהלכים (דוגמת פעולות חבלה כאלה ואחרות) שהאטו את קצב העשרת האורניום – ברור לכל כי איראן ממשיכה להתקדם בתוכניתה הגרעינית. למעשה, נראה כי כרגע לא ניתן יהיה למנוע מאיראן להשיג נשק גרעיני. צוין כי מבחן נייר הלקמוס של האיראנים הוא התנהלות הקהילה הבינלאומית מול צפ"ק. לאור חוסר היכולת לעצור את צפ"ק מלהשיג נשק גרעיני המסקנה באיראן היא שהמערכת הבינלאומית לא תצליח למנוע ממנה להשיג את מטרתה.

בדיונים נשמעה אזהרה כי הקהילה הבינלאומית מתחילה לאבד עניין בנושא הסנקציות. כלומר, הדיון הפומבי ברחבי העולם על הסנקציות נגד איראן הולך ומאבד מחשיבותו, במיוחד לנוכח אירועים אחרים דוגמת אלה שהתרחשו במזה"ת באחרונה והמאפילים על העניין האיראני. באופן פרדוקסאלי, דווקא העובדה שהסנקציות עצמן מאטות את קצב העשרת האורניום ופוגעות בתוכנית הגרעין האיראנית עלולה ליצור קושי לשכנע את דעת הקהל בעולם ואת מנהיגי העולם להמשיך ולהגביר את לחץ הסנקציות על איראן. לפיכך, ישנה סכנה לכרסום במעמדן ובעוצמתן של הסנקציות, באופן שיוביל לאובדן הנחישות הבינלאומית להחריפן. כלומר, יתכן אף היפוך המגמה הנוכחית תוך שחיקת הסנקציות. נשמעה קריאה לרסן התבטאויות פומביות, דוגמת זו של ראש המוסד לשעבר, באשר להאטת קצב העשרת האורניום, בטענה שיהיה זה בלתי-נכון להציג מציאות "רודה" יותר משהיא בפועל. מומלץ לצאת מנקודת הנחה שתוכנית הגרעין האיראנית מצויה במצב טוב הרבה יותר אף מזה שהקהילה הבינלאומית משערת.

דעת הרוב, אם כן, הייתה כי הסנקציות אינן אפקטיביות, מפני שהאיראנים מיטיבים לעקוף אותן בשיטות משיטות שונות, ועל כן גם השפעתן הישירה היא חלקית, או אף מועטה. כך או כך, נראה שלסנקציות, תהה השפעתן אשר תהיה, אין עד כה כדי להביא את המשטר האיראני להכרעה המבוקשת מבחינת קבלת החלטה להשעות את הפעילות הגרעינית הרגישה (העשרה + זיווד) שמקדמת את איראן אל עבר יכולת פריצה לנשק גרעיני.

מעבר לסוגיית הסנקציות, ובמטרה לחמוק מהשפעתן, נטען כי איראן משתמשת בכל כלי אפשרי להפגנת עוצמתה הלאומית. אחת הדרכים לעשות כן היא השימוש בגז הטבעי המצוי ברשותה בשפע על מנת ליצור תלות פוליטית וכלכלית בה של מדינות המערב, ושל מעצמות אחרות. האיראנים הקימו בשנים האחרונות צינורות גז המחברים בין איראן לבין כל שכנותיה – ביניהן ארמניה, טג'יקיסטן, ופקיסטן. הודו תלויה באופן מהותי בגז האיראני, וכך גם מדינות באירופה. עם זאת, יש לציין כי האיחוד האירופי העביר שורה של סנקציות בתחום זה, שאוסרות כיום העברת טכנולוגיה וידע טכנולוגי לאיראן בתחום, והשפעתן של הסנקציות הללו כבר ניכרת.

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Global Security

בדיון עלו (כמו בכנס הרצליה קודמים) חילוקי הדעות בדבר מידת התלות האיראנית בייבוא תזקי נפט (קרי, דלק לכלי רכב). יש הטוענים כי התלות האיראנית בייבוא דלק מהותית, ולעומתם יש המציגים תמונה שמשמעותה שתלות זו שולית מבחינת המשטר. כך או כך, צוין שהאיראנים עושים מאמצים ניכרים להגביר את יכולות הזיקוק העצמאית שלהם. מחד גיסא, נטען כי האיראנים הצליחו להקים מפעלים לזיקוק נפט באופן שמקטין את התלות שלהם בייבוא. ומאידך גיסא, מנגד נטען שהאיראנים עדיין רחוקים מעצמאות בתחום זיקוק הדלק ותזקי הנפט, וכי הצהרותיהם על יכולת הזיקוק העצמאית הן חלק מהלוחמה הפסיכולוגית שהם מנהלים מול הקהילה הבינלאומית.

באשר לאופוזיציה הפנימית למשטר האיראני, נאמר כי התנועה הירוקה רואה עצמה כתנועת רפורמות ולא כתנועה מהפכנית, ומכאן שעדיין לא נשמעה מתוכה קריאה לשינוי המשטר ולסילוקו של ח'מנאי; אם כי אין זה מן הנמנע שכאשר השעה תהיה כשרה לכך – תוביל האופוזיציה הזו מהלך עממי ואזרחי להפלת המשטר. מכל מקום, בשלב זה המשטר ממשיך להפגין עוצמה ומכריז כי הוא חסין בפני הסנקציות.

דעת המיעוט במושבי הכנס על איראן נשמעה באופן רהוט, נחרץ ומהימן, בזכות התפיסה שלסנקציות יש השפעה ניכרת, וזאת כאשר סנקציות נוספות ומחמירות עוד יותר נמצאות "בקנה". עמדה זו נשמעה הן מדוברים המזוהים כמקורבים לממשל הנוכחי בארה"ב, והן מדוברים רשמיים מערב אירופיים, והיא הוצגה באופן נחרץ ועובדתי. גורמי הממשל מציינים לחיוב את העובדה שעד כה מדינות כמו יפן, דרום קוריאה, קנדה, אוסטרליה ומדינות האיחוד האירופי, וכן מספר מדינות ערביות (למשל, איחוד האמירויות הערביות) הצטרפו למשטר הסנקציות. איראן מבודדת היום יותר מבעבר. מנהיגיה אינם מורשים להיכנס לאיחוד האירופי בחופשיות, ולמעשה מדיניות "הפייסנות הפסיבית" (passive appeasement) שאפיינה את ממשל בוש הוחלפה בגישה של הידברות אסרטיבית (assertive engagement) מצדו של ממשל אובמה.

בין הדוברים שצינו כי הסנקציות הולכות וצוברות הצלחה, וכי מגמה זאת צפויה להמשיך ולהתעצם, עלתה טענה נחרצת שהסיבה לכך שאיראן טרם השיגה יכולת גרעינית הינה תוצאה ישירה של השפעת הסנקציות. נקודתית, נקבע שאיראן איננה מסוגלת לייצר צנטריפוגות תקינות נוספות מעבר לאלו שברשותה כיום, וכי איננה מסוגלת להפעיל קסקדות חדשות של צנטריפוגות שכבר מותקנות, בשל הקושי לרכוש את הרכיבים הדרושים, דבר שמהווה נדבך מרכזי באסטרטגיית הסנקציות. במובן זה, הסנקציות הן ש"תוקעות" את התכנית הגרעינית בכללותה, והן צפויות להתרחב ולהחמיר עוד כל זמן שהמשטר האיראני לא נאות להיכנס להידברות מעשית ובונה, בדגש על השעיית הפעילות הגרעינית הרגישה. אחד הדוברים סבר שאיראן מונעת את גישת פקחי סבא"א למפעלים לייצור הצנטריפוגות במטרה להסתיר את הקשיים הניכרים – וכי חשיפת הסוגיה ע"י סבא"א עשויה להוכיח את יעילות הסנקציות בסיכול ייצור צנטריפוגות נוספות.

מעבר לכך, המיניסטריון להנחיה אסלאמית של המשטר האיראני הורה לתקשורת שלא להזכיר את השפעת הסנקציות בציבור. אלמלא השפעתן של הסנקציות לא היתה ניתנת הנחיה כזו. כמו כן, המשטר מסרב לחשוף בפומבי את הכנסות הנפט של איראן, עדות נוספת לכך שהמשטר מצוי במצוקה. עד כה הוקפאו השקעות בתעשיית הדלק האיראנית בשווי של כ-60 מיליארד דולר, ונרשם צמצום של 80-90% בהעברת משלוחי דלק למדינה, מאחר שחברות בינלאומיות רבות נוטשות את איראן. בנוסף לכך, הפרלמנט האיראני גילה כי הממשלה החליטה להקצות ב-12 השנים הבאות 5 מיליארד דולר מדי שנה למה שמוגדר כ"ביקורי הנשיא במחוזות השונים של איראן", אך הכסף עצמו נעלם מספר התקציב, ונראה כי הוא מוזרם בחשאי וללא ידיעת המג'לס למימון תוכנית הגרעין.

אינדיקציה נוספת למצוקת המשטר הוא ניסיונה של הממשלה ליצור בועת השקעות בבורסה, שמזנקת בחודשים האחרונים בניגוד גמור למגמת הירידות בבורסות אחרות באזור. נראה כי הממשלה מנסה לפצות בכך על ההפסדים שהסנקציות מסבות תוך יצירת מצג שווא של כלכלה איראנית מתפקדת היטב, כשלמעשה האבטלה והאינפלציה גאות. מוערך כי היום שבו תתפוצץ בועת הבורסה יהיה היום שבו המחיר הכלכלי של הסנקציות יהיה גבוה מדי, ואולי אז ניתן יהיה להוביל לעצירת תוכנית הגרעין. עוד נטען כי, יתר על כן, נראה שהאיראנים מתקשים עד מאוד להפעיל את מערך השייט והספנות שלהם ברחבי העולם, בשעה שאף מדינה אינה מוכנה לספק להם ספינות להעברת מטענים לאיראן, וחברות ביטוח אינן מוכנות לבטח את המטענים הללו. האיראנים מנסים לעקוף את האיסורים באמצעות החלפת דגלים במרמה על ספינות מטען בלב ים, אך לאורך זמן לא תוכל איראן להתמיד בפעילות מסוג זה. כאמור, הערכת מרבית המשתתפים הייתה שונה באשר להשפעת הסנקציות.

## הממשל האמריקני ותוכנית הגרעין האיראנית

עמדתו של ממשל אובמה בנושא הסנקציות נגד איראן היא שמטרתן איננה כלל וכלל פגיעה כואבת בכלכלה האיראנית ובאזרח האיראני (במיוחד בני המעמד הבינוני), או גרימת נזק למרקם החיים במדינה. הכוונה של אסטרטגיית הסנקציות מבחינת הממשל בווינגטון היא לשכנע את המשטר כי אין כל סיכוי שישלים את התכנית הגרעינית ויממש מהלך של הצטיידות בנשק גרעיני, וכי החלופה של התעקשות על הקו הנוכחי תביא לנזק עצום למשטר. כמו כן להסב נזק ישיר ככל האפשר אך ורק לתוכנית הגרעין עצמה, ולא להביא לזעזועים שיערערו את המשטר על ידי הערמת קשיים על האזרחים בכללותם. כמו כן יש כוונה לפגוע בתכנית הגרעינית באמצעות חבלה (דוגמת תולעת המחשב "סטוקסנט" או "סילוקם" מן הזירה של מדעני אטום בכירים), וכן לפגוע בגורמי משטר (משמרות המהפכה ובכירי בהנהגה) באמצעות הסנקציות על מנת להביא את המשטר אל שולחן המו"מ תוך נכונות לקבל עליו את תכתיבי הקהילה הבינלאומית ("constructive engagement"). כמו כן, שואף הממשל האמריקני ליצור קונצנזוס בינלאומי סביב סוגיית הסנקציות, כך שבבוא יום, כמוצא אחרון ובלית ברירה, תתגבש תמיכה בינ"ל רחבה בשימוש בכוח נגד איראן. הממשל

אינו מעוניין לראות מרוץ חימוש גרעיני במזה"ת, ונראה כי הנשיא אובמה מחויב לנושא זה, שכן הוא סבור שאם איראן תתגרען תלכנה בעקבותיה מדינות נוספות, ומשטר אי-התפוצה עלול לקרוס. יחד עם זאת נשמעה ההערכה כי מדינות כמו ערב הסעודית, מצרים ותורכיה נתונות להשפעה מהותית של ארה"ב, ולפיכך גירעון הצבאי בעקבות איראן איננו מובן מאליו.

גם אלה הסבורים כי הסנקציות לבדן לא תספקנה לעצירת תוכנית הגרעין מסכימים כי הממשל האמריקני פועל בצורה נחושה הרבה יותר מבעבר נגד תוכנית הגרעין האיראנית, וכי הן הממשל והן הקונגרס מחויבים להחמרת הסנקציות באמצעות חקיקה פדראלית בתוך ארה"ב. על-פי גורמי ממשל, נכונותה של ארה"ב להחריף את הסנקציות התחזקה במיוחד עתה, לאחר כישלון שיחות איסטנבול (ינואר 2011).

כאמור, דוברים רבים בדיוני הכנס סברו כי הסנקציות אינן אפקטיביות דיין, וכי ארה"ב לא נקטה מדיניות הצהרתית ברורה, אמינה ונחרצת שיהיה בה כדי לגרום למשטר האיראני להבין שכל ניסיון להמשיך בתוכנית להשיג נשק גרעיני ייענה בהפעלת העוצמה האמריקנית על כל מרכיביה, כולל תקיפה צבאית, שתסב למשטר נזק בלתי-נסבל. מעבר לכך, עד כה טרם גיבשה ארה"ב מדיניות ביטחון אזרחי נחושה שתוכל להקרין עוצמה אזרחית בדמות של כוח קונבנציונאלי משכנע ויכולת גרעינית נגדית. נהפוך הוא: מדיניותה של ארה"ב נתפסת באזור כחלשה, ובתהליך מתמשך של דעיכה, שחיקה ונסיגה, הן לאור אופן ההתנהלות מול איראן, שהובילה את האיראנים לפקפק עוד יותר בנחישותם של האמריקאים, הן משום המצב בעיראק ובאפגניסטן, ועתה גם לאור התגובה האמריקנית לאירועים במזה"ת בחודשים האחרונים. מכאן, שדיפלומטיה ללא מרכיב ביטחוני אמין חסרה נדבך מרכזי חיוני להעברת מסר של נחישות אל מול יריב נחוש כמו המשטר האיראני. מרבית משתתפי הדיונים סבורים, כי בשלב זה גם ערובות אמריקניות לביטחון של מדינות האזור לא תצלחנה למנוע את המשך גרעונה של איראן, וכי מרגע שאיראן תשיג יכולת גרעינית צבאית תחלופנה שלוש-ארבע שנים לכל היותר עד שתהיה מדינה גרעינית נוספת באזור (על-פי הערכות, ערב הסעודית ומצרים הן הצפויות להצטייד בנשק גרעיני ראשונות אחרי איראן).<sup>1</sup>

בין המשתתפים בדיונים היו שסברו כי בתוך שנתיים עד שלוש שנים תבין הקהילה הבינלאומית, ובכללה ארה"ב, כי משטר הסנקציות אינו אפקטיבי, וכי אז תהיינה לארה"ב שתי אופציות עיקריות: מהלך התקפי צבאי, שבו הממסד הצבאי והממשל האמריקני אינם רוצים כרגע (מזכירת המדינה קלינטון אף הצהירה כי פעולה צבאית תהיה אסון, אמירה המעידה על חוסר נכונות של ממש למנוע בכל מחיר את הגירעון האיראני). או לחילופין לקבל את האפשרות שלאיראן יהיה נשק גרעיני, ולהתמודד עם קיומו באמצעות אסטרטגיות של הרתעה והכלה. אפשרות אחרת היא שהממשל האמריקני יהיה מוכן לקבל את איראן כמדינת סף גרעיני. היו שהביעו חשש מפני המשך פעילות ארה"ב לצמצם את מאגר הנשק הגרעיני שברשותה כחלק מאמנת START, עליה חתמה ארה"ב עם רוסיה, שכן עולם שבו למערב, ולעולם הדמוקרטי, אין יכולת גרעינית מרתיעה הינו עולם פחות בטוח, וכזה שבו מדינות בלתי-אחראיות אינן חוששות להציב אתגר ואיום בפני המערכת העולמית.

השאלה אם ניתן יהיה להרתיע ולהכיל איראן גרעינית בהצלחה – פתוחה לפרשנויות שונות לכאן ולכאן. בכנס ניכר שיש הסבורים שהדבר אפשרי בהחלט, בהתבסס על ניסיון העבר שהצטבר המצביע על כך כי ההנהגה האיראנית מכללת תמיד את צעדיה בתבונה ובזהירות, נמנעת מעימותים שעלולים לגבות מחיר מהמשטר, ונרתעת באופן עקבי מפני הסלמה מסוכנת. מנגד, יש המפקקים ביכולת לעשות כן, במיוחד בתרחישי הסלמה שעלולים לנבוע ממדיניות, או פעילות, איראנית נועזת, או הרפתקנית, יותר, הצפויה בעקבות גירעון צבאי.

## מסקנות: כיצד להתמודד עם תוכנית הגרעין של איראן?

במהלך דיוני הכנס נשמעו דעות לכאן ולכאן באשר לדרכים היעילות ביותר להתמודד עם תוכנית הגרעין האיראנית. היו שסברו כי יש להמשיך במתכונת הסנקציות הקיימת, ולעשות את כל מה שהוא בגדר הסביר והמדוד כדי למנוע איראן גרעינית – תוך אימוץ התפיסה שהמערב והקהילה הבינלאומית כבר הצליחו לכופף את ידה של איראן, וכי זו מצויה בעמדת נחיתות ברורה. על-פי גישה זו, נדרש שינוי תפיסתי בישראל ובמערב, והבנה שבמקום להתמקד בפרדוקסל איראן, במיוחד במישור הרטורי והפומבי, יש להפגין ביטחון רב יותר בעוצמתה של הקואליציה נגד איראן, ובמגמה הניכרת של התמודדות בהצלחה עם האתגר האיראני – "אנחנו מנצחים". הגישה הנוכחית נתפסת כתבוסתנית, וככזו שמחזקת את ידיה של איראן בזירה הבינלאומית. יתר על כן, הטענה שלפיה ישראל אינה יכולה לחיות עם איראן גרעינית משמעה שישראל תחדל מלהתקיים אם איראן תצליח להשלים את תוכניתה, ולהצטייד באמל"ח גרעיני, וזו טענה שאינה יכולה להתקבל ואינה נכונה. היו מי שהציעו דרכים אקטיביות יותר כדי להביא לעצירה מוחלטת של תוכנית הגרעין האיראנית, כלהלן:

### א. חילופי משטר – עידוד האופוזיציה והפלת המשטר

כמה מהדוברים גרסו כי אין להסתפק רק בהשעיית תוכנית הגרעין האיראנית, וכי למעשה היעד האמיתי צריך להיות החלפת המשטר עצמו, מאחר שבמצב הנוכחי אין כל סיכוי שיוותר על שאיפותיו לנשק גרעיני. החלפת המשטר צריכה להתבצע על-ידי האזרחים באיראן, ולא כתוצאה ממעורבות זרה ישירה, אם כי על המערב לשדר לאופוזיציה האיראנית שהוא תומך בכיוון ממשלה דמוקרטית וחילונית. אף שהאזרחים חשים בלחץ הכלכלי הכבד, לא נעשה דבר עד כה כדי לגרום להם להאמין שהקהילה הבינלאומית תתייצב

1 ראו להלן בנספח את תוצאות שאלון דלפי שמילאו משתתפי הדיון הסגור בנושא הסנקציות על איראן כחלק מדיוני כנס הרצליה האחד-עשר.

לצידם כאשר יחליטו לצאת נגד המשטר. על כן, בניגוד להתנהלות של ארה"ב והקהילה הבינלאומית ביוני 2009, עתה יש לעודד את גורמי האופוזיציה ליטול את היוזמה, ולהעניק רוח גבית למהלכים שינקטו נגד המשטר. עוד נטען כי אחד הכוחות שיש לסייע לו ולתמוך בו ביתר שאת הוא הבלוצ'ים, גורם ממתנגדיו החריפים ביותר של המשטר האיראני, שטרם זכה לתמיכה ראויה מארה"ב ומהמערב.

מספר משתתפים הדגישו את הצורך להפעיל סנקציות לא רק נגד תוכנית הגרעין האיראנית, אלא גם בכל הקשור לתחום הפרת זכויות האדם על-ידי המשטר האיראני, נושא שארה"ב והמערב לא טיפלו בו עד כה ברצינות די הצורך. יש למנוע מבכירי המשטר, כולל המנהיג העליון, הנשיא, מפקדי משמרות המהפכה ובכירים במערכת המודיעין והמשפט של איראן לצאת מגבולות המדינה, ובמיוחד לאירופה.

העובדה שהסנקציות מוטלות רק בגין התכנית הגרעינית, ולא בשל הפרת זכויות האדם, מאפשרת למשטר להציג אותן לאוכלוסיה כמזימה בינ"ל שנועדה לשלול מאיראן קידמה מדעית וטכנולוגית, כמו בדמות פיתוח יכולות גרעין לצרכי שלום. רק אם הסנקציות יוטלו גם בהקשר להפרה של זכויות האדם, יובהר לאוכלוסיה באיראן שההתנגדות הבינ"ל היא למשטר הדיכוי, ובראש ובראשונה למשה"מ, ולא להתפתחותה המדעית והטכנולוגית של איראן.

על אף האמור לעיל, גורמים בממשל האמריקני דבקים בתפיסה לפיה שינוי משטר אינו המטרה שיש לשאוף אליה, גם אם יש צורך לתמוך בתנועת האופוזיציה ובנושא זכויות האדם. בראייה זו, יש להתמקד במטרה המתוחמת יותר של סיכול הגירעון הצבאי האיראני, ולפעול בפרמטרים של גיוס הקהילה הבינ"ל לסכנה זו. זאת בעוד שבנושא שינוי המשטר אין זה ביכולתה של הקהילה הבינ"ל לממשו, אלא זהו דבר שרק אזרחי איראן עצמם יכולים להביא להתממשותו, ואין אפשרות לגבש קונצנזוס בינ"ל להטלת סנקציות במטרה להביא לשינוי המשטר. כך שהרחבת היריעה עלולה להביא להחטאת המטרה הממוקדת יותר של סיכול הגירעון הצבאי. יחד עם זאת – ראוי להבהיר לאזרחי איראן את הרווחים הצפויים מהיותה של איראן שותפה, אם תצטרף כחברה חופשית ודמוקרטית לקהילת העמים, ותנער מהמחיר הכבד הכרוך בהיותה מדינת עימות, ומצורעת בינ"ל. כמו כן, מלבד זאת, היו שהזהירו כי גם אם יחול שינוי משטר באיראן אין זה אומר שיחול בהכרח שינוי גם במדיניות הגרעין, היות שרבים מאזרחי איראן, גם באופוזיציה, תומכים בשאיפות של תכנית הגרעין, במשתמע, או במובלע, יתכן שגם ביחס לגירעון צבאי.

### ב. הגברת לחץ הסנקציות – סנקציות "נושכות"

אף שהאופוזיציה האיראנית מבית מביעה התנגדות רשמית לסנקציות, הרי שבחשאי היא תובעת החמרה של הסנקציות, במיוחד נגד משמרות המהפכה. לטענת התנועה הירוקה, כל עוד ננקטות סנקציות הדרגתיות נגד המשטר הוא נעשה חסין בפניהן, שכן הוא מצליח למצוא תחליפים ודרכים להתגבר עליהן. לפיכך, נדרשות סנקציות רבות-עוצמה ומשתקות שלא תאפשרנה למשטר להתאושש. מטרת הסנקציות המשתקות היא לגרום לסטגפלציה במשק האיראני, ולהקשות על פעילותה של ממשלת איראן. את הסנקציות יש למקד, בין היתר, בסקטור האנרגיה, מקור החיים של המשטר, שמהווה כ-75% מתקציב הממשלה, כ-80% מרווחי הייצוא, וכ-24% מהתמ"ג של איראן. יש לפעול בהקדם האפשרי נגד תעשיית הגז הטבעי של איראן, שהיא השנייה בגודלה בעולם (אחרי זו של רוסיה). כבר עתה מנצלת איראן את תעשיית הגז על מנת למנף את עוצמתה הלאומית. היה ותצליח איראן להפוך את הגז הטבעי לנוזלי היא תוכל להפוך עד מהרה למעצמה מובילה בתחום. יש לפעול גם נגד ייצוא הנפט הגולמי, ולשם כך יש להעביר חקיקה בארה"ב ומחוצה לה האוסרת על חברות לסחור בנפט עם איראן, ויש לעודד בנקים שלא לקיים עסקאות בתחום הנפט. עם זאת, חשוב למצוא דרכים לעשות כן מבלי לפגוע בשוק הנפט העולמי, בין היתר על-ידי עידוד מדינות המפרץ להגביר את התפוקה, כפי שכבר נעשה בעבר. מלבד סנקציות ישירות נגד איראן, יש לנקוט מהלכים גם נגד חברות ומדינות שמוסיפות לבצע עסקאות עם איראן (למשל, חברות אנרגיה גדולות שמפרות את החקיקה האמריקנית בנושא). רק לאחר שתינקטנה סנקציות משתקות נגד איראן, יוכח שגם הן אינן מצליחות לעצור את תוכנית הגרעין – רק אז ניתן יהיה לשכנע את הממשל האמריקני לנקוט מהלך התקפי צבאי. עד אז, צפויה ארה"ב להתנגד נחרצות למתקפה צבאית. מהלך הסנקציות צריך להתבצע במקביל להכנות צבאיות. יש לגרום לקהילה הבינלאומית להבין שאם הסנקציות לא תצלחנה עלול להתרחש אסון חסר תקדים, על מנת לגרום לכל מי שעד כה סירב להצטרף לסנקציות מחמירות לעשות כן.

### ג. תקיפה צבאית?

במושבי הכנס נשמעה הטענה כי האירועים שהתרחשו בעולם הערבי באחרונה יצרו מצב שבו אופציה צבאית הופכת כמעט בלתי-אפשרית מבחינת ישראל, ארה"ב והמערב. זאת מאחר שהמשטרים הערביים שעוד נותרו על כנם (ובמיוחד במדינות המפרץ) עסוקים במאמצי הישרדות. החשש במדינות כמו סעודיה, בחריין ומדינות נוספות מפני האפשרות שאיראן תגייס את השיעים באותן מדינות על מנת לערער את יציבות המשטרים – עשוי להניא את השליטים הללו מלתמוך במהלך צבאי נגד איראן. מנגד, גם הוערך כי אין אף צעד, לבד ממתקפה צבאית, שיוכל למנוע מאיראן השגת נשק גרעיני. אמנם, כך נטען, הדאגה נוכח המצב הפנימי בעולם הערבי אינה צריכה להוות שיקול האם לתקוף את איראן או לא, ואם ארה"ב תהיה נחושה בדעתה לבצע מתקפה שכזו, היא לא תזדקק לעזרה ערבית. בשלב זה ניכר כי אין נחישות אמריקנית למהלך התקפי, וגם דחיפה ערבית ככל שהייתה בעבר או שתהיה בעתיד למהלך שכזה לא תדרבן את ארה"ב לתקוף. אחדים מהמשתתפים קבעו כי ישראל צריכה להיערך עם אופציה צבאית אמינה, היות שהחשש בעולם מפני התקפה חד-צדדית ישראלית הוא אחד הגורמים שיכולים להניע את הקהילה הבינלאומית לפעול בחזיתות שונות (במשתמע, הדיפלומטית + סנקציות).

לעומת זאת, קבעו דוברים אחרים כי החשיבה על אופציה צבאית רחבה הינה שגויה. אין כל צורך לחשוב במונחים של מתקפה צבאית כוללת כפי שנקטה ארה"ב נגד עיראק. ישנן אופציות רבות בתחום הצבאי: יש להראות ליריב נכונות לעשות הכל, יש להראות תיאום בין בנות ברית, יש לבצע אימונים, להכין את הטייסים ואת המפקדים למקרה שיהיה צורך לפעול, לפרוס כוחות באזור ולהעלות את רמת הכוננות, לבצע טיסות וגיחות סיור באזור, ולהפעיל כוחות מיוחדים בדמונסטרציות קטנות של מידת הנחישות והיכולות על מנת להעלות את רמת האמינות של האיום הצבאי.

מנגד, נשמעו דעות המפקקות בכלל בתועלת של מהלך של תקיפה צבאית. בניגוד לגישות התומכות במהלך צבאי או בהכנות מתקדמות לקראתו, היו שטענו כי יש להיערך לאפשרות שגם מתקפה צבאית לא תעצור את תוכנית הגרעין האיראנית, היות שגם אם היכולת הגרעינית האיראנית תנוטרל לפרק זמן מסוים – האיראנים צפויים לשוב ולחדש את תוכנית הגרעין בחשאי. מלבד זאת, ראוי לזכור שהעשרת אורניום ע"י איראן אינה הדרך היחידה האפשרית לקדם את תוכנית הגרעין. פוטנציאל תפוצת הנשק הגרעיני מצפ"ק או מפקיסטן (אם זו תתמוטט בשנים הקרובות) קיים ויש לקחת זאת בחשבון. משמע, איראן תוכל להסתפק בפצצת גרעין אחת על מנת לגרום לקהילה הבינלאומית להתאים עצמה למצב החדש, ולכל היותר ניתן יהיה לשאת ולתת עם איראן על אי-ייצור פצצות נוספות או על אי-פריסת הנשק הגרעיני שיהיה ברשותה באופן מבצעי.

## The Economic Impact of International Sanctions on Iran

Yitzhak Gal & Yair Minzili

### Executive Summary

The accumulating effect of the sanctions has already started to bite into the fabric of the Iranian economy.

Sanctions are hurting Iran's efforts to increase its oil production, and indeed expected to cause production and export reduction; and have reduced foreign investment, particularly in the oil & gas sector. International companies are increasingly reluctant to do business with Iran, considering the high risk associated with such business; Iran is already cut off from most of the international banking system, and faces severe difficulties in the fields of insurance, transportation, and external trade.

However, though the direction and intensity of the process are clear and powerful, the cumulative effect, to date, is not yet strong enough to force the Iranian regime to re-think its policies on the nuclear issue. Furthermore, one should always take into consideration that the Iranian regime can fight back; for example by taking moves which would threaten or even mildly interfere with the flow of oil and gas from the Persian Gulf; or otherwise putting pressure on oil and gas production, shipping or other economic activities in the Persian Gulf area.

Looking ahead for the coming months, one should look mainly for the impact of the sanctions on internal economic affairs, and especially the following issues:

- The continuation and aftermath of subsidy reductions, which are expected to be probably the hottest political issue in Iran; coupled with mounting difficulties in balancing the state budget.
- Indications for other effects on the standard of living of low-income classes, unemployment rates, etc.
- Shortage in various important consumption and industrial items: primarily oil products, but also critical imported products for industrial production, etc.
- Mounting pressure on the banking system, which may reflect on the stability of Iranian banks
- Difficulties in oil production and exports

### The Four-Circle Structure of International Sanctions on Iran

The complex structure of international economic sanctions on Iran, which has developed since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1929 on June 9th 2010, can be described as composed of four concentric circles:<sup>1</sup>

- **The first, central circle:** the UN Security Council Resolution, which imposes basic set of sanctions, and has been the basis and the source of international legitimacy for the whole structure of international sanctions
- **The second circle:** US and EU unilateral sanctions, which extend far beyond the UN sanctions, affect all major fields of the Iranian economy; and pressure other governments to join in implementing the UN sanctions, and add their own unilateral sanctions. Moreover, the US and EU sanctions focus on limiting international trade, investments, and financial transactions with Iran to a degree that forces international banks, insurers and other businesses to "mark" doing business with Iran as too risky for their much more important businesses in the US and the EU markets.
- **The third Circle:** application of the UN sanctions and observance of US and EU sanctions, by many other countries, including most important trade partners of Iran: the United Arab Emirates, Japan, South Korea, and others.
- **The fourth Circle:** the business sector – banks, insurance companies, and other businesses which trade with Iran, deal with Iranian banks, invest in Iran's oil sector, etc.

The wide range and complexity of US and EU sanctions on the one hand, and the great number of "banned" Iranian companies and entities on the other hand, has created a situation which makes any deal with an Iranian governmental or business entity too risky for international companies.

<sup>1</sup> Resolution 1929 was the fourth in row, following previous UN Security Council resolutions—1737, 1747, and 1803 of 2006 – 2008. See detailed discussion of these previous resolutions in the authors' working paper for the Herzliya Conference 2010 "The Economic Impact of Stricter US AND UN Sanctions on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps

## Application of the International Sanctions on Iran

The US and EU sanction packages are far-reaching, targeting Iran's energy industry as well as its transport, banking and insurance sectors. Under the new EU sanction regime, for example, European firms are not allowed to sell equipment to Iran for use in oil and gas exploration, refining and the production of liquified gas. European banks are not allowed to establish new "banking relations" with Iranian financial institutions, and "enhanced vigilance" is imposed on Iranian banks operating in Europe. Cash transfers of €10,000 and above require notification of domestic authorities and transfers of €40,000 and above require prior authorization. Insurance contracts for more than two years are to end, and those under two years are discouraged. Insurance and re-insurance companies are no longer allowed to offer their services to Iranian government bodies. Trade supports, including export credit guarantees, are forbidden.

The EU measures match the US level of restrictions. Moreover, the special importance of the EU sanctions lies in its position as the primary supplier of high-level technology to Iran. The US does not really do any significant business with Iran; and though Iran can get low-level technologies from China, Chinese technology is much less effective than European technology for developing their oil and gas sectors.

Japan and South Korea, and other leading economies like Australia and Canada, followed the US and the EU with their own packages of unilateral economic measures.

Even more importantly, the reaction of the international business community to the sanctions has been strong and rapid. All major international banks and many smaller ones have already stopped doing business with the Iranian banking system; international insurance and reinsurance companies are reluctant to provide coverage for Iranian ships and shipments; and the number of major international companies in other fields (e.g. oil, industry), which have decided to sever or significantly limit their business relations with Iran, is rapidly increasing. This includes multi-national giants involved in multi-billion projects or trade in Iran, such as Toyota, Kia, Lukoil, Allianz, Royal Dutch Shell, Total, Repsol, BP, Eni, and many more.

## The Impact of Sanctions on the Iranian Economy

The Intensity, scope and speed of the 2010 round of sanctions have already put significant pressure on Iran's banking, insurance, transportation sector, and on its international trade; and, towards the end of 2010, the cumulative effect on the internal economic situation starts to show as well.

### Iran's vulnerability to economic sanctions

Though Iran is a major oil exporter, the Iranian government is relatively vulnerable to well-targeted economic sanctions. Oil and gas exports that are Iran's main export revenues constitute about 80% of the total exports, the government's chief source of foreign exchange, and the most important source of revenue in the State Budget. The government's dependency on oil income makes it vulnerable even to partial decline in oil exports.

Iran's economy is dominated by the state, which is the recipient of revenues from crude oil exports, and in recent years by quasi-state actors, mainly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This is the most powerful quasi-state actor, and its role in the economy has become even more dominant since the June 2009 Presidential Elections, along with its pivotal new position in Iranian politics. The Revolutionary Guard controls strategic industries and commercial services ranging from dam and pipeline construction to automobile manufacturing, along with illicit smuggling and black market enterprises; and its influence has been extended into virtually every sector of the Iranian market.

The Iranian petroleum sector is plagued with aging infrastructure and old technology. Iran needs large international investments in order to maintain its present oil production and export, and to develop its refining capacity.

### The impact of sanctions on the banking sector

US Treasury regulations prohibiting US or foreign financial institution to deal with Iranian banks, has been extended, during the second half of 2010, to include all Iran's major banks. As a result of this move, the choice for international banks has become very clear: conduct business with those Iranian banks, practically Iran's whole banking system and loose access to US financial systems, or stop dealing with Iranian banks altogether.

All major international banks and many smaller ones have stopped providing financial services to Iranian banks. Iran is already cut off from most of the international banking system, and increasingly unable to conduct trade transactions in dollar and euro.

This, in turn, is expected to reflect on the stability of Iran's banking sector.

The IMF has already warned the Iranian government that bank soundness indicators have deteriorated. Iranian banks are facing increased credit risks and a significant increase in nonperforming assets, which at a certain point may jeopardize public confidence.

### Insurance

A most important immediate result of US and EU sanctions has been the reluctance of insurance and reinsurance companies to provide coverage for Iranian ships and Iranian shipments.

### Shipping

Insurance problems are gradually crippling Iran's shipping, including its ability to deliver oil via its large tanker fleet. In fact, the whole of Iran's large fleet of tankers is in danger of losing its insurance coverage, making it impossible to operate in international ports.

Among the hardest hit is Iran's governmental shipping company IRISL. This company is banned and the US Treasury is continuously slapping sanctions on shipping companies accused of operating as fronts for IRISL. In mid-January 2011, for example, the US banned 24 international shipping companies, for allegedly operating as fronts for IRISL. IRISL is already under tremendous financial pressure and is going to extreme

lengths to obscure its network and the ownership of vessels. According to a US Treasury report, this company has recently defaulted on more than half a billion dollars in loans.

### **International trade**

The complexity and wide scope of the sanctions of the US, the EU and other countries (which prohibit business relations with hundreds of Iranian companies, with tens of new companies added from time to time to the list of prohibited companies) has caused uncertainties for international companies about which Iranian entity is legitimate and which is illicit and subject to sanctions.

For trading companies and other businesses making such distinction on daily basis for their transactions is costly and risky. More and more companies find it easier and safer for them to cut their dealings with Iran altogether, than being subjected to US sanctions, penalties, and loss of access to the American market.

The intense and speedy impact of the sanctions on international trade with Iran's is felt quite dramatically in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE is one of the most important trading partners of Iran, and substantial part of Iran's imports came through the huge free-trade zones of Dubai and other UAE free-trade zones.

The application of US sanctions in the UAE has dramatically affected its trade with Iran. The UAE authorities as well as banks, insurers, and transportation companies have applied more and more daily restrictions to thousands of Iranian traders and businesses, which are based in Dubai and deal with Iranian trade. Trade licenses that have an Iranian name on them trigger concern at banks, Iranian businesses are not allowed transfer money in Euros or dollars to Iran, shipments to Iran are carefully checked and face various difficulties.

Another indication comes from South Korea. A survey of South Korean companies, which was conducted among small and mid-size exporters to Iran, found that more than three-quarters of South Korea's small and mid-size exporters have partly or totally discontinued shipments to Iran following Seoul's sanctions. The cut-off was due mainly to fears they would be unable to receive payments for shipments.

## **The Impact on oil and gas production (and exports)**

International pressure on Iran under previous UN resolutions (UN Security Council resolutions—1737, 1747, and 1803 of 2006 – 2008) had increased the hesitation of many major foreign firms to invest in Iran's energy sector, and hindered Iran's efforts to expand oil production.

The impact of the 2010 sanctions on Iran's oil sector will take more time to be felt. However, the exodus of major oil companies from Iran may reflect quite significantly on the level of oil production in the medium term. The rapidly aging oil industry of Iran is in need for huge investments (estimated at many tens of US dollar billions in oil infrastructure to maintain its current production level).

According to report submitted to the US Congress, Iran's oil production has already fallen slightly to about 3.9 million barrels per day, from over 4.1 million barrels per day several years ago, and sales to Iran of gasoline have fallen dramatically.

Less oil produced due to lack of new investments and maintenance, less oil revenues are generated. This will gradually lower oil exports without directly adding it to the embargo list.

Moreover, the pure economic risk of being dependent on oil imports from Iran has already pushed countries like China and Japan to lower their dependence on imports of oil from Iran, regardless of the international sanctions.

According to Chinese customs data released in September 2010, China has significantly reduced its oil purchases from Iran during 2010, both in terms of total volume and market share. According to the Chinese General Administration of Customs, from January through August, Chinese oil imports from Iran decreased by 25 percent compared to the same period of the previous year. Among China's top 14 suppliers in 2010, Iran is the only one with reduced oil sales compared to the first eight months of 2009. While Chinese oil imports from Iran have decreased nearly 25 percent, its total oil imports have increased by around 23 percent compared to the first eight months of 2009.

The most important project in the oil & gas sector already hit by sanctions is the South Pars gas field. South Pars is the Iranian portion of the world's largest gas field (the other portion is Qatari). Threatened by tougher US penalties, Western firms such as Shell, Total and Halliburton have already pulled out of the development of the South Pars gas field. Qatar that shares the gas field with Iran, exported \$62 billion of mainly gas products in 2008, while Iran's gas exports brought in only about \$6 billion.

Another important development relates to the Revolutionary Guard Corps' involvement in oil sector projects. Khatam ol-Anbia, the engineering and construction arm of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, withdrew lately from two key gas refinery projects. Industry sources were quoted saying that these projects were lagging behind schedule because foreign banks were not providing financing. By pulling out, the Revolutionary Guard hopes to head off further delays.

### **The impact on internal economic stability**

Initial indications point to the potentially powerful effects of the sanctions on internal economic stability, in spite of Government's rhetoric.

Sources at the Tehran Chamber of Commerce were quoted saying that the sanctions could lead to a 1.8 per cent fall in the annual growth of the gross domestic product. That, combined with other effects, could mean negative growth and increasing unemployment. Other media reports quote a confidential study prepared for the Ministry of Commerce, estimating that more than 40,000 businesses are likely to go under as a result of the new sanctions, over the next three years.

However, the most outstanding challenge for the Iranian government, on the internal economic front, is the continuation and aftermath of subsidy reduction, which has started in December 2010.

The price of gasoline was raised fourfold, from the equivalent of 10 US cents to 40 US cents per liter for a basic allocation of 60 liter per month per car, and to 70 US cents per liter for additional quantities. The price of other petroleum products jumped as well (some of them as high as nine-fold); and the price of bread more than doubled.



This came as a second step – after issuing a first round of cash payments to Iranian households, designed to soften the impact of higher prices to come. The government committed itself to continue this program at a total annual cost of about USD 30 billion a year.

Following rounds of price increases, expected in the near future, include electricity bills (expected to triple), heating gas (expected to rise more than five-fold), transportation and many other basic products and services.

Production costs of energy-consuming industries such as cement and steel will go up dramatically a well, fuelling unemployment which already stands at about 15 per cent, and rising.

The overall impact on the general price level is predicted to be a jump of about 20 percentage points of inflation, in 2011; which would further destabilize the already high inflationary environment; as inflation in Iran has fluctuated between 10%-25% per annum in recent years.

At a price of 10 US cents per liter of gasoline, the prices of energy products in Iran were among the most heavily subsidized in the world. The overall burden of subsidies on government budget was estimated at between USD 75 – 100 billion; and unless handled, subsidies were forecasted (by the IMF) to cost the Iranian economy no less than about 4 percentage points of real annual GDP growth, and one third decline in oil exports in just a few years.

The new round of sanctions made this unbearable burden even much less sustainable, and has forced the government to act, in spite of the sensitive nature of this move.

President Ahmadinejad has rightly called the subsidy cut plan the “biggest surgery” in Iran’s economy in half a century and vowed to fully cut all subsidies by the end of his term in 2013.

Hence, one can expect an on-going process of periodic increases in gasoline price, electricity tariffs, and prices of other energy products, coupled with secondary inflationary waves; which, in turn, would generate a continuous, prolonged atmosphere of economic instability.

Looking ahead

Looking ahead for the coming months, one should look for the impact of the sanctions on internal economic affairs, and especially the following issues:

- The continuation and aftermath of subsidy reduction, which are expected to be probably the hottest political issue in Iran; coupled with mounting difficulties in balancing the state budget.
- Continuation or changes in cash payments compensating for subsidy cuts; difficulties in execution and effectiveness of this mechanism.
- Indications for other effects on the standard of living of low-income classes, unemployment rates, etc.
- Shortage in various important consumption and industrial items: primarily oil products, but also critical imported products for industrial production, etc.
- Mounting pressure on the banking system, which may reflect on the stability of Iranian banks
- Difficulties in oil production and exports

Other indications recommended for close monitoring:

- Effects on the economic power and role of the Revolutionary Guard
- Effects on the positions of major political actors regarding the sanctions and how it should be handled, and possible effects on the Regime’s relations with its close foreign allies (Syria, etc.)

Though the cumulative effect could harm Iran’s economy to the point where domestic pressure compels Iranian leaders to start considering a compromise on Iran’s nuclear policy, sanctions have not, to date, caused such an Iranian policy shift. One should note however, that US officials say that international sanctions has restricted Iran’s ability to procure certain critical inputs / raw materials needed for its nuclear project.

## Iran and US Policy: Legal, Strategic and Policy Options

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National Press Club, Washington, D.C.

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First, I would like to thank Professor Yonah Alexander and the Potomac Institute for the kind invitation to address you today. Secondly, I would like to thank each of you for attending this important symposium. Today, my remarks will focus on the legal tools which the United States and litigators within our courts who represent victims of Iranian state sponsored terrorism have vis-à-vis holding the Islamic Republic of Iran responsible for their heinous terrorist activity.

As you may know, the United States Department of State maintains a list of designated State-Sponsors of Terrorism. Countries determined by the Secretary of State to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism are designated pursuant to three US laws: section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act.

There are essentially four main sets of US Government sanctions that apply once the State Department determines that a state should be listed on the official list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. The four categories of sanctions resulting from designation under these authorities include but are not solely limited to restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls over exports of what are called “dual use” items; and other restrictions pertaining to, *inter alia*, finance.

The list is also important, because at one level, it designates and specifies which countries may be sued in U.S. courts by the American victims as a result of the terrorist acts which caused damage to them and their loved ones.

Today, four officially designated State Sponsors of Terrorism remain on the Secretary of State’s official list. This is contrasted with seven designated State Sponsors of Terrorism when President George W. Bush came into office. The seven were Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. During the Bush administration, as a result of different circumstances regarding each country, Iraq, Libya and North Korea were removed from the list, leaving the remaining four (Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria), Iran remains one of the four currently designated State Sponsors of Terrorism and was officially designated on January 14, 1984.

In designating Iran in 1984, the State Department determined at that time that Iran was not only repeatedly supporting terrorism in its official capacity but was reported in the State Department's 1984 *Patterns of Global Terrorism* publication to be "the world's leading supporter of terrorism." The State Department determined that Iran had directly sponsored terrorist activities against the US and its citizens. Again, I quote from the State Department's 1984 *Patterns of Global Terrorism* publication, "Iran's fundamental regime, which ultimately hopes to drive US and Western influence from the Islamic world, has championed some of the most viciously anti-Western groups in the region—such as the Hizballah in Lebanon."

One of the most heinous Iranian supported Hezbollah attacks against the United States of America which many assert led to Iran's designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, was the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. The Marines targeted in that attack were in Beirut on a mission of peace when their headquarters was maliciously destroyed by an Iranian supported suicide vehicle bombing.

Our law firm, Heideman Nudelman & Kalik, P.C., is active in bringing civil lawsuits in U.S. courts against these State Sponsors of Terrorism, such as Iran. Included among the many suits we have initiated against State Sponsors of Terrorism are cases we have brought against Iran on behalf of American victims who suffered loss of life or limb in the Marine Barracks bombing.

The Marine Barracks Bombing related litigation is something that I will talk about in a very quick moment, but prior to speaking about this case study, I want to put it in the broader context for you.

United States legislative, executive and judicial branches have been working in concert to prevent Iran from supporting international terrorism and bring justice to those American victims who have suffered as a result of Iran's horrific use of terrorism as a foreign policy instrument.

In addition to the trio of legislation authorizing the designation and listing of Iran as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, Congress has been instrumental in ratcheting up pressure on Iran by passing legislation such as the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act and its subsequent modification in 2004 and again this past year. There has also been a great deal of legislation that has impacted Iran as a primary state sponsor of terror. Such legislation includes the passage of the 1996 legislation that amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act which removed Iran's immunity from civil suits in American courts for its state sponsorship of terrorism. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was recently modified again as a result of the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act in 2008. This new amendment permits litigants to seek, *inter alia*, punitive damages in suits against State Sponsors of Terrorism such as Iran.

With regards to the Executive Branch, many agencies under the President's direct authority such as the Departments of State, Treasury and Commerce are engaged in the issues of sanctions and enforcement of the laws restricting State Sponsors of Terrorism. These government agencies enforce presidentially and congressionally invoked sanctions to put pressure on these international pariahs. An example where one can see the outcome of the interplay between legislative and executive pressure exerted on a State Sponsor of Terrorism is to look at the recent example of Libya coming off the designated list. Some believe that Libya didn't just come to the other side of the table because they loved the United States; they came to the other side of the table because they wanted a better future. The combination of UN sanctions and US sanctions put pressure upon them not only to turnover their nuclear armament capabilities; but also their commitment to stop funding and to cease sponsorship of terrorism was key to their acceptance back into the larger world community. Libya is an interesting example; query can we see Syria follow that track? Query, can we see Iran follow that track?

Turning to the judicial branch, as I have previously mentioned, Iran has been the rightful target of civil law suits for its sponsorship of various international acts of terrorism. Unlike Libya, Iran hasn't really paid much attention to litigation brought against it, and in fact in an opinion issued on September 30, 2009, just barely a year ago by Chief Judge Royce C. Lamberth of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, commented on a group of cases that he and other judges in Washington had decided against Iran. At that time Chief Judge Lamberth commented on his frustration that Iran wasn't listening. He then did a very unique thing for a federal judge, he spoke to the President of the US through his decision, he spoke to the Congress through his decision, and I quote from 659 Fed. Supp. 2<sup>nd</sup> page 31 just two paragraphs:

Judge Lamberth said, "The challenges that confront the president with respect to our relations with Iran as are daunting as ever as thus this court must leave it to the experts in the political branches to consider whether a balanced and meaning political compromise can be reached with respect to these difficult terrorism cases. It seems to this judge that it is time for a new approach and perhaps it is time to think more systematically about how these cases can work with concert rather than in conflict with a broader strategy towards the goals of better relations with the Muslim world, peace in the Middle East and the eradication of terrorism."

He then comments, "To all the plaintiffs, this court wishes to stress that it as always will endeavor to see to it that plaintiffs in these actions get all the relief in which they are entitled under the law, this court continues to hope that one day soon, justice might be achieved". This was a very comprehensive review by the judge of decisions that had rendered and billions of dollars in assessed damages against Iran to which Iran had paid no attention, and the judge commented in his decision about the fact that we need teeth in order to be able to allow people to recover, otherwise our judicial system really does not deliver justice.

Most recently Judge Lamberth asked me to argue the question of the extent to which, under the 2008 amendment of the FSIA, 28 USC §1605A, the Court had authority to impose punitive damages against Iran in a lawsuit relating to the Marine Barracks bombing. And, if the court had that authority, what amount of punitive damages the Court should award. Knowing of his decision of September 30, 2009, and knowing that this federal judge had expressed in writing his frustration on the question of whether or not Iran is listening, I argued that it was necessary to change the equation to get Iran's attention, and that punitive damages were appropriate.

During the argument and subsequent filings, we presented testimony of Dr. Patrick Clawson of the Washington Institute. Dr. Clawson had testified in a number of earlier cases which had been pending in the federal courts against Iran. In those cases, Dr. Clawson had testified about Iran's expenditures for terrorism and helped put Iran's moniker as the world's worst state sponsor of terrorism into dollar figures. In other words, Clawson shed light on how many dollars Iran was spending on terrorism. Previously, in other earlier cases, Clawson testified that Iran spent approximately 100 to 150 million dollars on terrorism. In the case we argued, we went back to Dr. Clawson and asked him to update his opinion.

According to Dr. Clawson's updated analyses and opinion, Iran is now spending between 300 million and 500 million dollars a year on the sponsorship of terrorism. Moreover, Clawson testified that when parties with judgments have shown up in other countries where Iran has assets and where there are collection efforts of these billions of dollars judgments against Iran, Iran has shown up to attempt to defend and derail the collection efforts. Iran has reportedly appeared with counsel in Europe and in

Canada. Even in this country in a case pending in Chicago trying to attach Persian museum artifacts, Iran has appeared in our judicial system, with lawyers, and this says a great deal.

Following the oral argument, Judge Lamberth in a 2010 opinion awarded, not only more than 290 million dollars in compensatory damages to the Plaintiffs, Marines and their family members who had been injured or killed in the marine barracks bombing, but Judge Lamberth also did an extraordinary thing with regards to punitive damages.

Judge Lamberth accepted Professor Clawson's testimony and subsequently decided in his conclusion, that, "Iran and the Ministry of Internal Security are responsible for the deaths and injuries of hundreds of American servicemen are liable for the emotional Injures that family members have suffered as a result and Iran deserves to be punished to the fullest legal extent possible." Judge Lamberth then went on to note, and quoting from 700 Fed Supp 2<sup>nd</sup> on page 52, "Iran has recently begun to actively participate in litigation in the US and elsewhere according to Patrick Clawson."

Iran's participation in the legal system garnered great weight with Judge Lamberth. It was as if he was saying that because it appeared that Iran was possibly beginning to listen, maybe it was necessary that we need to speak even louder. So despite the fact that in 2009 Judge Lamberth appears to have expressed tremendous pessimism about the litigation process, in 2010 he was moved to grant a significant award of punitive damages against the Islamic Republic of Iran for their past and continued sponsorship of terrorism. I further quote from Judge Lamberth, "in the hopes that Iran is paying more attention to the cases that had been brought against it, this court seeks to send the strongest possible message that Iran-supported terrorism against citizens of the United States absolutely will not be tolerated by the courts of this nation." Judge Lamberth then awarded a record setting one billion dollars in punitive damages against Iran. The victims and the entire judicial process are being well served by Judge Lamberth's diligent review and stewardship of the pending cases against the Islamic Republic of Iran as a state sponsor of terror.

Finally, it is important that we remember that we cannot forget those who have been repressed, we cannot forget those who have been victimized and we cannot forget those who have been brutalized by senseless and heinous acts of terrorism committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is in the spirit of the victims and their families, on behalf of those who are gone, and those who have lost limbs, we as officers of the federal courts hope that in the confluence of the work of the executive branch, legislative branch and judicial branch that we continue to get Iran's attention. If a billion dollars won't get Iran's attention, let us not give up. It is important to continue to strive towards restoring some measure of justice to these victims of Iranian terrorism by using all of the legal strategic options available. Failing to consider this as part of the overall strategic options in relation to the subject of this symposium: "Iran and US Policy: Legal and Strategic Options would be a mistake for us all and would deny the victims the justice they deserve under applicable US laws enacted for the purpose of protecting the rights of the victims and providing a meaningful avenue for them to seek justice for heinous acts of terrorism committed against the victims and their families..

We have prepared materials which are available to you relating to Iran as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. We hope you will find them of interest and that each of you will leave here today with a continuing commitment to stand with the victims as they seek justice for the unforgiving acts of international terrorism committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Thank you.

## The Views and Strategy of Global Jihad toward Shi'ism

Yair Minzili

### A. Introduction

The ideologues of the jihadi Salafist movement devote an extensive part of their thought to Twelver Imamist Shi'ism (*a-shiya al-imamiya al-ithna ashariya*), including its beliefs, its historical and current political path, its attitude toward the Sunnis, and its status today. In general, they regard Shi'ism from a religious perspective as heretical and polytheistic, and from a political-strategic perspective as a principal enemy of Sunni Islam, along with the other main infidels/enemies – the “Crusaders,” led by the U.S., and the “heretical” (*murtadun*) regimes ruling the Arab and Sunni Muslim states. They cast aspersions on Shi'ites, calling them “infidels, abandoners of Islam, dissenters” (*al-kufra, al-murtada, al-kafra ar-rafda*). From their perspective, the Shi'ites abandoned the religion and community of Islam (already at the beginning of its development, when they split from the Sunnis), adopted beliefs that became increasingly foreign to Islam (that is, Sunni practice), and became completely heretical. This explains the title in Islamic law of “heretic who abandoned the religion of Islam” (*murtada*). The jihadi Salafist movement applies this title to Shi'ism, as it does to the Islamic regimes that have abandoned the religion of Islam (from its perspective). Abu Basir emphatically states that the Sunni religious ruling vis-à-vis Shi'ism declares that the latter is completely heretical.

According to the jihadi Salafist movement, Shi'ism – which has been “heretical” since its establishment – fights against the Sunnis alongside the other “infidel” enemies of Islam at home and abroad. And it is expected to continue to wage battle against the Sunnis, apparently until the end of time.

Iran, as a regional superpower, is identified with Shi'ism more than any other Shi'ite entity. It is even portrayed as the patron of Shi'ism. Numerous essays in jihadi Salafism are devoted to denouncing Iran from a religious, institutional and political perspective.

The considerable attention the jihadi Salafist thinkers devote to Shi'ism in their essays, religious rulings and responses to questions from the general public can apparently be attributed to the following factors, among others:

Declarations and rulings by religious regimes and institutions in the Sunni world that have tried to portray Shi'ism as an inseparable part of Islam, with an equal status to that of the Sunni schools of thought. This, in addition to the initiatives of Sunni institutions to facilitate rapprochement between the Sunnis and the Shi'ites. The jihadi Salafist ideologues reject these initiatives and make it unequivocally clear that Shi'ism is heretical and external to the Islamic community. It also attempts to undermine the efforts invested by both Sunnis and Shi'ites to create an atmosphere of conciliation and rapprochement between the two sides.

1. The growing concerns among the jihadi Salafist ideologues that Shi'ism has become (under the leadership of Iran, particularly since Khomeini's Islamic Revolution) an existential danger for the Sunni world and is actually seeking to take over it. This concern has grown since the occupation of Iraq by the U.S. and its allies. The involvement of Shi'ite Iran in Iraq is regarded as an attempt to gain control of this state – whether by collaborating with the Shi'ite majority or by cooperating with the United States. The relentless Iranian effort to acquire a nuclear military capability has even further underlined the Shi'ite threat against the Sunnis.
2. The concern that exists in light of what is described as subversive activity against the Sunnis conducted by Shi'ite minorities living in the Sunni states, especially with encouragement and incitement from Iran.
3. The concern about the “Shi'itization” of Sunnis; the signs of this are growing as the Shi'ite forces – led by Iran and Hezbollah – win military and political gains in the region.

For the ideologues of the global jihad movement, the combination of these threatening factors turns Shi'ism, and Iran in particular, into a bitter and difficult rival, and a serious obstacle standing in the way of the battle this movement is conducting to attain influence in the region in the short term and to realize their declared, long-term aspiration of establishing a caliphate under their leadership.

The ideologues and leaders of the global jihad movement are trying to formulate a comprehensive outlook for waging the battle against Shi'ism. In practice, there are disagreements among them regarding the strategic path of action to take against Shi'ism, its government institutions and its general public. Each of the sides anchors its position in both religious rulings and political-military reasons. Leading the camp that advocates adopting an aggressive and violent policy against Shi'ism is the al-Qaeda organization in Iraq, where it is conducting a bloody war (*jihad*) against the Shi'ite population and sometimes also against the Sunni population. On the other side of the jihadi camp are those who oppose this violent strategy. While they believe that it is necessary to fight to the bitter end against the government establishment and its foreign “Crusader” allies, they also think it is necessary to simultaneously engage in proselytization (*da'wa*) and education in order to assimilate the general Shi'ite public among the Sunnis and return them to the fold of Islam.

This paper will present and analyze – based on the extensive literature disseminated by the religious and political jihadi Salafist movement – the view of its ideologues vis-à-vis Shi'ism, with an emphasis on the leading al-Ja'afari Twelver stream. Religious-legal approaches toward Shi'ism will be presented, as well as strategic-political positions. The paper will note the efforts of the jihadi Salafist movement to undermine the trend of rapprochement between Shi'ites and Sunnis, which is regarded as a threat to the global jihad. The strategy of the global jihad vis-à-vis Shi'ism will also be presented – a strategy that is not monolithic, but rather composed of various approaches that are at odds with each other in regard to the best way to fight against Shi'ism.

## **B. The Views and Attitudes of the Jihadi Salafist Ideologues toward Shi'ism and the Shi'ites**

### **General**

In their many writings on Shi'ism, the jihadi Salafist ideologues explain quite explicitly what they view as Shi'ism's serious deviations from the unique faith of the original Islam – that is, Sunni Islam. They list these deviations from two perspectives: The first focuses on Shi'ism's challenge to the beliefs, views and practices that constitute the foundations of Sunni Islam, while the second entails the beliefs that Shi'ism has adopted for itself and which, in their view, constitute heresy and polytheism. Their emphatic conclusion – which they say is anchored in Islamic law and reflects the consensus of all Islamic sages – is that Shi'ism betrayed Islam and removed itself from the framework of the religion and community of Islam.

From the standpoint of these ideologues, Shi'ism stands on the other side of the barricade – not only from a religious-legal perspective, but also from a political one. This is because, in their view, Shi'ism from the outset has waged an all-out war against Sunni Islam that continues to this very day, while switching allies along the way. This chapter includes three sections that clearly reflect the stance of the jihadi Salafist ideologues toward Shi'ism from the religious and political perspective. The first section focuses on a comprehensive work by Abu Basir on Shi'ism. The second section presents a summary of the “heresies” of Shi'ism written by al-Alwan. In the third section, a number of writers describe Shi'ism's “betrayal” of Sunni Islam, which they see as an attempt to delegitimize Sunnism.

#### **Abu Basir al-Tartusi**

Abu Basir, one of the leading ideologues of jihadi Salafism, declares Shi'ism to be an heretical community that actually lies outside of the framework of Islam. He devotes a book to portraying Shi'ism as a community that left Islam and rejects what he regards as the principles and foundations of Islamic religion and beliefs.<sup>1</sup>

In the introduction to his book, he notes that he saw a need to write the book in light of two phenomena: The first is the presentation of Shi'ism by unknowledgeable Muslims as if it were a fifth school in Islam that should be recognized as part of Islamic law. As a result of this, a second phenomenon developed in which Muslims ask and wonder whether Shi'ism is indeed Islamic or instead a heresy that abandoned the Islamic religion (*murtad*) and lies outside of its bounds. In the introduction to his book, he summarizes in a few lines the characteristics of Shi'ism as a religion based on falsehood, denial and damage to Islam, conspiring against “the nation of monotheism” (*ummat at-tawhid*). He states that despite the fact that these are the characteristics of Shi'ism, the Shi'ites claim to be Muslims in every way. From this description of the characteristics of Shi'ism and his introductory remarks, which include a religious ruling on the status of Shi'ism, the author makes his view very clear: Shi'ism is not part of true Islam and lies outside of it.

In the introduction, the author implicitly refers to Iran, without mentioning it by name, when noting that the greatest danger in Shi'ism stems from the fact that the Shi'ites rely on a state that provides patronage and disseminates its falsehood and heresy.

According to the author, the book is intended for Muslims (*ahl al-Islam*) in order to familiarize them with the essence of Shi'ism, something that is necessary to do in every period of time. This book is also intended for those among the Shi'ites who are trying to lead mankind astray.

#### **Abi Basir's ruling on Shi'ism**

Abu Basir summarizes the ruling on the Shi'ites-dissenters (*hukam a-shi'a ar-ruafad*) as follows: All of the definitive evidence points to the fact that the Shi'ites-dissenters-Twelvers are a group of polytheism (*shirq*) and heresy (*rada*) that lies outside of the Islamic community. Their religion is based on falsehood and denial and concealed hatred for Islam and its followers. Abu Basir later presents evidence to prove and support this ruling.

#### **Falsification of the Quran in two aspects:**

Abu Basir states that the “distorted” approach of the Shi'ites toward the Quran has two aspects: The first is the actual falsification of its content and the second is their open declaration that Sunnism's version of the Quran is distorted.

The first aspect pertains to the field of allegorical/homiletical interpretation (*tawil*) and literal translation (*tafsir*). Abi Basir claims that Shi'ism's interpretation of the Quran is an interpretation of “people of heresy and atheism” and is more of a distortion of the Quran's content than a true and correct homiletical (*tawil*) or literal (*tafsir*) interpretation. In order to support this claim, Abu Basir quotes a series of interpretations given to Quranic verses in the book *al-Kafi* by the Shi'ite writer al-Kalini, which Abu Basir describes as the most prominent and credible book of Shi'ism. Many of the interpretations attribute supernatural, cosmic qualities and virtues to the fourth caliph and nephew of Muhammad – Ali bin Abi Talib (who is given the title *amir al-mu'aminim*) – that deviate from the perspective of Sunnism. For example, the interpretation identifies Ali with the concept of “the Great News” and the verse that contains this concept (Sura LXXVIII, 1-2: “Concerning what are they disputing? Concerning the Great News”). According to the Sunni sages, this concept refers to the tidings included in the Quran about the Day of Judgment, and other subjects (“The Quran” – Uri Rubin). This means, according to Abu Basir, that “the Shi'ites attribute to Ali a verse that is greater and loftier than

<sup>1</sup> Abu Basir al-Tartusi, *The Dissenting Shi'ites: A Community of Polytheism and Heresy (a-shi'a ar-rafd: taefat shirq warida)* July 2002, <http://www.abu-qatada.com/r?i=1382&c=4250>

the prophets, the messengers, the holy Quran, the creation of heaven and earth, as well as ‘the Great News,’ which is loftier than the Day of Judgment and its frights.”

The second aspect pertains to the open declaration by the Shi’ites that the Quran is falsified, and this goes beyond their distorted interpretation of the Quran. Abu Basir again brings examples from the book *al-Kafi*. The most prominent example is the declaration by the Shi’ites that whoever claims to have possession of the Quran as it was handed down by Allah is speaking falsehood, because the true Quran that Allah brought down from heaven is the one that was compiled and edited by Ali and the imams who succeeded him. This constitutes an open declaration that the Quran that has been in the hands of Muslims since the time of the Messenger and his companions to this very day is not the full Quran. Rather, the full Quran is the one the imams of Shi’ism compiled and preserved. This declaration constitutes a falsehood and represents what Abu Basir calls “a belief that the Quran is untrue” (*aqidat tahrif at-tanzil*), which is a heretical belief (*aqida kufra*). Abu Basir states that Allah instructed to guard the Quran against any distortion, addition or deletion of its contents. In this context, Abu Basir cites the verse: “We have, without doubt, sent down the Message; and we will assuredly guard it (from corruption)” (Sura XV, 9). He also quotes other verses from the Quran which he says determine that anyone involved in distorting, adding or deleting from the contents of the Quran is engaged in an act of heresy. (Suras XVII, 10; XXI, 6).

Abu Basir even quotes the words of Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, to illustrate how far the Shi’ites go. According to Abu Basir, Khomeini states in his book *Revealing the Secrets (Kasaf al-Asrar)* that the Prophet refrained from referring to the “*imama*” [imamate] in the Quran for fear that the Quran would later be distorted or that the conflicts between the Muslims would intensify. If the Prophet had spoken about the “*imama*” in the Quran, conflicts and fights would not have broken out in the Muslim states and disputes would not have erupted about the foundations of the religion. Abu Basir adds: The words of this “heretic, lunatic and dreamer” suggest that the Prophet is to blame and the concealment and distortion came from him, because he allegedly did not deliver the versions about the imams and the “*imama*,” despite the fact that these were handed down, and as a result the Islamic nation became entangled in problems and internal wars.

Abu Basir makes an effort to emphasize that Ali, his sons Hassan and Hussein and others from the family of the Prophet (*ahl al-bayt*) are completely clean of these heretical and false beliefs; the things that are said in their names are untrue and they are innocent of these falsehoods.

#### **The belief in the existence of the Fatima Quran and the bestowal of prophesy upon her**

Abu Basir cites from the book *al-Kafi* the Shi’ite belief that attributes the Prophet’s qualities and virtues to Ali’s wife and Muhammad’s daughter – Fatima. These qualities center on “the existence of the Fatima Quran (*madhaf fatima*) and the descending of prophesy upon her (*nuzul al-wahi alayha*). This means that Muhammad is not the Seal of the Prophets, that the religion was not completed in his lifetime, that prophesy did not end after Muhammad’s death and needed to pass onto Fatima during the course of her life so that she could receive, through prophesy, her book – which is three times the size of the Quran. And this is contrary to the accepted view of all Muslims. Abu Basir wonders “if there is indeed a Fatima Quran, which is three times the size of the existing Quran, as the Shi’ites believe, then why don’t they present it?”

#### **Attributing divine qualities to the imams**

According to *al-Kafi*, the imams are treasures of Allah in the sense of treasures of divine knowledge that are beyond the understanding of man (“*khazan Allah*” – see this concept in Sura VI, 50) They are exemplars for the worshippers of Allah – exemplars that surpass the Quran, the prophets and messengers and the signs of heaven and earth. The imam controls the entire universe – but this has never been or never will be. This is reserved for Allah alone.

#### **The view of the Prophet’s companions and the Muslim public as heretics**

Abu Basir quotes from the introduction to the *al-Kafi* to argue that the book clearly shows that the Shi’ites regard the Prophet’s companions and the Muslim public as heretics (*takfiruhum lildahaba wal’amat al-muslimim*). First, Abu Basir quotes from al-Kalini’s book that “no one before Ali was given the title of ‘*amir al-muaminim*’ and no one will be called by this title in the future, except if he is a heretic.” Abu Basir understands from this that the caliphs Abu Bakr, ‘Umar and ‘Uthman are considered heretics in the eyes of the Shi’ites. The same applies to all of the Muslim rulers who came after Ali, because they were called *amir al-muaminin*.

Second, Abu Basir states that the Shi’ites regard all of the people of Islam as heretics because they do not believe in the infallibility of the imams, do not turn to the imams when disagreements arise between them, and do not show submission toward them. Abu Basir explains that the Muslims do not do this because, according to the Quran, one should turn to Allah and His Messenger alone in times of disagreement, and that submission is to the Messenger, his law and his *sunna* [Islamic practice] (Sura VI, 59). In addition, Allah determined that one of the foundations of the faith is to turn to Allah and His Messenger (and to the Quran and the *sunna* after his death) in times of dispute, and not to the imams as Shi’ism claims (Sura VI, 650).

Third, Khomeini disparaged the Prophet’s companions (*sahba*) when he said in his last testament that he prefers the errant people of our generation to the people of the Hijaz during the period of God’s Messenger. Abu Basir says in summary that the statements in Khomeini’s book (and in other books of Shi’ism), which regard the Messenger’s companions as heretics, prove the heresy of Shi’ism and place it outside the community of Islam.

According to Abu Basir, there is much evidence proving that whoever regards the Prophet’s companions as heretics is a heretic himself, and this evidence can be found in the Quran. Abu Basir quotes verses IX, 65-66 in the Quran and infers from them that the Shi’ites became heretics after first being believers, and this is because they spoke ill of the Messenger’s companions.



### **The Shi'ite's denial of the sunna**

Abu Basir finds that the Shi'ite's heresy is also expressed in their denial of the *sunna*. The writers of Shi'ism clearly demonstrate their denial of the *sunna* taught by the Prophet Muhammad. The Shi'ite writer Hasin al-'Almi states that the words of Ali are inferior to the words of God, but they are loftier than the words of any creature. In their view, the words of the Prophet Muhammad and his *sunna* are inferior to the words of Ali and to the book falsely attributed to Ali – *Nahj al-Bilaghah*. Abu Basir states that whoever raises a person above the personality of the Prophet Muhammad or places a law above the law of the Prophet deserves to be considered a heretic and outside of the community of Islam. The proof that Shi'ites became heretics because of their denial of the *sunna* can be found in the Quran in verse IV, 64: "We sent not an Apostle, but to be obeyed in accordance with the will of Allah." They do not deny the *sunna* because they have disproved its trustworthiness, but rather because it is inconsistent with their false and worthless foundations. According to the rule they follow, they deny anything that contradicts their false foundations and accept everything that is congruent with them.

### **The assistance to heretics in their war against the Muslims**

The heresy of the Shi'ites is expressed in the fact that they help the heretics and polytheists, the enemies of the nation, in their war against the Muslims, the believers in one God. Abu Basir states that due to the hatred of the Shi'ite dissenters for Islam and its people, they chose and choose to ally themselves with the heretics and atheists, the enemies of the nation, against Islam and its people. This is an unequivocal fact. Abu Basir presents an example of this from the distant past and quotes the "Sheikh of Islam," Ibn Timiya, from his book of *fatwas* on this subject. Ibn Timiya noted that since the Shi'ites regard the people of Islam as heretics, they assist the heretics and Tartars against the community of Muslims. The Shi'ites were the main reason that the leader of the Tartars, Genghis Khan, attacked the Islamic states and that Hulego sacked Iraq. Abu Basir presents examples from our period, noting that "the Shi'ites align themselves, like treacherous foxes, alongside the Americans and the other heretical states that conquered Afghanistan and participate with them in the brutal Crusader attack against Islam and the Muslims – until their wish was realized and the Islamic Taliban state fell. Today they are collaborating with the Americans and others in conquering Iraq, based on the pretext of deposing the tyrant of Iraq." In addition, Abu Basir notes that Shi'ite Iran oppresses the Sunni minority in Iran, which numbers about 10 million people. The Shi'ites are the most eager of all people to provoke divisiveness among the Muslims. Their strongest fundamental characteristics pertain to accusing others of heresy and cursing the most enlightened Muslim rulers – the honest caliphs and sages of Islamic law and sheikhs of the Muslims. This is in light of their belief that anyone who does not believe in their infallible imam – who actually does not exist – does not believe in Allah and His Messenger.

### **Worshipping and praying to man**

The heresy of the Shi'ites is expressed in the fact that they accept polytheism and worship the human creature and pray to him – and also seek help, support and longevity from the dead. The pilgrimage to the tombs scattered in Iran, Iraq and other countries is evidence of this. Their belief that the dead are capable of assisting them and responding to them is absolute apotheosis and heresy. Khomeini said in his book *Revealing the Secrets (Kasaf al-Asrar)* (page 49) that "we seek longevity from the holy spirits of the prophets and imams, whom Allah endowed with the ability. Ibn Timiya said that the Shi'ites are similar to the Christians in that they exaggerate the ability of man, conduct religious rituals that are forbidden innovations (*abadat mu'tada'ah*) and accept polytheism.

### **The different attitude toward Shi'ism as a community, on one hand, and the individual Shi'ite, on the other hand**

In concluding his essay, Abu Basir notes that these are the aspects which require us to say that the dissenting Shi'ites, the Twelvers, are a community of apotheosis, departure from Islam and heresy (*taifat, shirq warida*). He says that any of these alone is sufficient to determine that this community is heretic. The fact that the dissenting Shi'ites comprise a community of polytheism and heresy means that it is subject to all of the laws of the heretic community (*ihkam at-taifa al-murtada*) and the laws of heresy (*murtada*) and their provisions stipulated in the books of *hadith* [oral traditions linked to Muhammad] and Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*). Despite the fact that all of the laws of a dissident community apply to Shi'ism, we do not determine that everyone who belongs to this deviant community is a heretic. This is for the following reasons: There may be a factor that prevents regarding a person as a heretic. Individuals might also be innocent of the accusations leveled against this deviant community because there are some among the Shi'ites who do not identify with the foundations of heresy that we attribute to Shi'ism. The laws aimed at declaring the Shi'ites as heretics will not be applied to them.

To support this position, Abu Basir quotes Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Timiya, who said in his book of fatwas 500/28: It is true that the things the dissenting Shi'ites espouse are heresy and contrary to the words of the Prophet. It is also true that their actions, which are the type of actions that infidels take against the Muslims, are also heresy. However, to identify an individual Shi'ite as a heretic and sentence him to hell forever requires evidence proving that he should indeed be regarded as a heretic. We advocate the principles of "the promise of heaven and the threat of hell" (*al-wa'ad wal-wa'id*) and of "the declaration of a person as a heretic and sinner" (*takfir* and *tafsik*), but will not impose these on any person until there is something in him that mandates this and as long as there is nothing contradicting it.

According to Abu Basir, Ibn Timiya's remarks indicate that if there is indeed evidence testifying to the fact that a particular individual is a heretic, it is obligatory and unavoidable to declare him a heretic unless there is a recognized legal cause to prevent this.

Abu Basir states in summary that the closer a person is to the area of preaching to accept Shi'ism and refusal (*al-daw'at ila at-tashyu'a war-rafid*), the less leeway there is for treating him with forgiveness and lenient interpretation. This is because a person can be forgiven in the case of ignorance and when he is unable to shake off this ignorance. The preachers and senior legal sages of Shi'ism, who preach for dissension and acceptance of Shi'ism, are not ignorant, do not recognize the truth, and are capable of shaking off ignorance by virtue of their knowledge. For this reason, they should not be treated with forgiveness or lenient interpretation.

### **Summary of the words of the people of knowledge (ahl al-'ilam) on Shi'ism**

Abu Basir does not suffice with the aforementioned evidence to prove the heresy of the Shi'ites. To reinforce this evidence of the danger and heresy of the Shi'ite community, he cites a number of statements by wise men: Whoever curses Abu Bakr, 'Umar and 'Aisha has no part

in Islam. Whoever curses the Prophet's companions has no part in Islam. Whoever, in addition to cursing, also declares them to be heretics deserves more than anyone else to be declared a heretic (*kafir*) and to be expelled from Islam. The Shi'ites comprise a community that is not part of Islam and follows the path of the Jews and Christians in falsehood and heresy (*kufr*). I do not eat from the ritual slaughter of Shi'ites because they are considered dissidents from Islam (*murtadun*).

### **An appeal to the Shi'ite masses to return to the true Islam and the Islamic nation**

Abu Basir turns to the Shi'ite masses (*amat a-shi'a war-ruafad*), "who were led astray by their religious sages and officials" and tells them "in complete sincerity" – return to Allah, return to your true religion that you have left and attacked, return to your logic and straight path, return to the nation that you left and attacked. Our main concern is to extract you from polytheism and ignorance and the worship of the past, and to bring you back to the world of Islam, faith and monotheism.

### **Sulayman al-Alwan**

Sulayman al-Alwan lists nine heresies (*mukafirat*) that are considered by Muslims as beliefs that contradict the religion of Islam (*nuqd al-Islam*) and corrupt the faith (*mufsidat al-iman*).<sup>2,3</sup>

- The insertion of polytheism into the belief in one God (*shiqhum fi tawhid ar-rabubiya*) – their belief that the first creature that Allah created is the Light of the Imams (*nur al-imama*) from which all of the creatures in the universe emerged. That is, this light is a partner of God in creating the creatures in the universe.
- The insertion of polytheism into the worship of the one God (*shiqhum fi tawhid al-'abada*). This is expressed in the fact that their prayer is not directed toward Allah, but instead toward others, such as the dead – who are elevated to the rank of a god.
- Their rejection of the titles of Allah and their description of Allah by negation and opposition.
- Attributing the first things to Allah – among the Shi'ites, this means that Allah is not aware of developments and makes judgments that are contradictory to those He made in the past.
- The Shi'ites claim that the Quran is falsified and that it has extraneous content, on one hand, and is missing content, on the other hand.
- Quoting their imams as knowing what was and what will be, and the belief that nothing is hidden from them.
- The emergence of the claim that the imams of Shi'ism (*a'imat ar-rafd*) know what was and what will be, and that nothing is hidden from them.
- Their attitude toward the Prophet's companions as heretics (*takfir as-sahba*).
- Slandering 'Aisha (the Prophet's wife) in the case of "*al-ifak*" (a concept related to a woman's modesty)

Al-Alwan praises the Internet site "Defense Network of the Sunna" (*shibkat ad-difa'a 'an as-sunna*) that seeks to accurately publish the beliefs of Shi'ism and its crimes throughout history, on one hand, and to present the "correct belief" and open the eyes of the ignorant Shi'ite masses "regarding the corruption of their religion and the treachery of their religious sages," on the other hand.

## **C. Accusation of Shiism of delegitimizing the sunna**

### **'The great treachery'**

Some of the spokesmen for jihadi Salafism depict Shi'ism in a derogatory way from the perspective of its "treachery" (*al-khayna*) and alienation toward the *sunna*, as opposed to the "faithfulness" (*al-amana*) of the Sunnis. According to Amad Ali Abd al-Samia Hasin, treachery is one of the most contemptible attributes that Islam warns against and prohibits, while faithfulness is among the loftiest attributes that Islam urges one to acquire.<sup>4</sup> The treachery of Shi'ism is the most despicable because it is a public treachery that the religious sages defined as "the great treachery." It entails treason vis-à-vis the religion and the nation. This is sometimes perpetrated through collaboration and sometimes through espionage and exposing state secrets, and sometimes by demonstrating weakness in extending assistance to the nation when it is possible to do so.

The laws of treachery are stipulated in the research literature of Islamic law. Faithfulness for the Sunnis is the religion – there is no faith for someone who is not faithful. On the other hand, treachery, fraud and deception constitute the religion for the Shi'ites. For the Shi'ites, *taqiya* leads them to the reins of power and centers of influence in many places, and through their treachery they succeed in carrying out their conspiracies.<sup>5</sup>

2 Sulayman bin Nasir bin Abdallah al-Alwan, *The Imams of Dissent (a'imat ar-rafd)*, November 18, 2002, Minbar al-Tawhid wal-Jihad.

3 Note – According to Muhammad Abd al-Wahab, as quoted by Salafi ideologues, the beliefs that are considered to be contradictions (*nuqd*) to Islam remove the people who hold them from the Islamic community. Thus, Shi'ism, because it believes these heretical things, has removed itself in effect from the Islamic community.

4 Amad Ali Abd al-Samia Hasin, *The Treacheries of Shi'ism and Their Influences on the Defeats of the Islamic Nation (khiyanad a-shi'a wat-tariha fi hazaim al-uma al-islam)*, July 30, 2003, Minbar al-Tawhid al-Jihad. The author quotes from the Quran about the meaning of these two concepts. In regard to the faithful, Allah said: "Those who faithfully observe their trusts and their covenants" (Sura XXIII, 8; LXX, 32). In regard to the traitors, Allah said: "For God loveth not the treacherous" (Sura VIII, 58) and that "Allah does not guide the device of the unfaithful." (Sura XII, 52)

5 Amad Ali Abd al-Samia Hasin.

## **Treachery is inherent to Shi'ism**

According to al-Rifa'i, the nature of Shi'ism is expressed in behavior characterized by hiding oneself (*takhafi*), inconstancy/hypocrisy (*talun*), behavior that conceals the faith (*taqiya*) and adopting an internal path (*batani*). As a minority and because they are unable to display their false belief, the Shi'ites sufficed with concealing their faith – except to someone they trusted. When possible, they openly displayed their belief and utilized every means to liquidate their enemies, not hesitating to carry out their intrigues and collaborate with any of the enemies of Allah and the devils.<sup>6</sup>

## **The delegitimization of the sunna**

The jihadi Salafist stream attributes beliefs to Shi'ism that alienate and revile the *sunna*, and even treat it as heretical. From the perspective of this stream, these beliefs illustrate the treachery (*khayna*) of Shi'ism and the double meaning derived from them: On one hand, Shi'ism does not accept Sunnism as a legitimate Islamic school, challenges its status and undermines its foundations. On the other hand, Shi'ism regards itself as the only legitimate Islamic community and religion.

According to the jihadi Salafist stream, the Shi'ite rejection of the *sunna's* authentic legitimate standing is expressed in two ways. The first is to challenge the religious sources of the *sunna*. In regard to the Quran, the prevalent argument among the Shi'ites is that the Quran was forged and that certain suras were omitted. In regard to the *hadith*, the Shi'ites reject the *hadiths* presented in the name of the Prophet's companions (*sahba*) and accuse those who presented these *hadiths* of forgery and falsehood.

The second way is to challenge the historical connection that Sunnism attributes and claims for itself vis-à-vis the Prophet's family (*ahl bayt rasul allah*, or simply *ahl al-bayt*). This is done, first of all, by undermining the standing of the *sahba*, who are regarded in Sunnism as the authentic heirs of the Prophet Muhammad and as the continuers of his path and the historical and exemplary leadership of the Islamic community. In this context, the jihadi Salafist stream argues that legal authorities in Shi'ism accuse the *sahba* of outwardly accepting Islam out of a lust for power, while concealing their non-belief and hypocrisy.<sup>7</sup>

In addition, this is done by severing and separating the *sunna* from the Prophet's family. Shi'ism even claims that Sunnism is the greatest enemy of the Prophet's family and calls Sunnis "*nuadab*" (singular: "*nadb*") – that is, those who demonstrate animosity toward the Prophet's family (*eledina yandubuna al-adaa lilahl al-bayt*).<sup>8</sup>

On the other hand, the Shi'ite's legal writings state that whoever does not believe in the authority (*walaya*) of the twelve imams, or of even one of them, is considered a heretic, and that belief in these imams is one of the pillars of the religion (*usul ad-din*).<sup>9</sup>

Permission for Shi'ites to kill and rob Sunnis

The jihadi Salafist stream also goes one step further and attributes a legal ruling to Shi'ite sages that not only regards Sunnis as heretics, but also "makes their blood and money forfeit, and states that they are impure" (*i'tiqad a-shi'a fi kufr ahl as-sunna wastibahat damaihum wamualihum, walhukam binjastihum*)<sup>10</sup> And the jihadi Salafists argue that this ruling is contrary to Islamic law (*as-shari'a*), which prohibited spilling the blood of others, particularly when this is done in a treacherous way.

## **The prohibition on embarking on jihad before the mahdi appears**

The jihadi Salafist stream argues that Shi'ism forbids jihad prior to the appearance of the mahdi, on one hand, and condemns the Sunnis for embarking on jihad, on the other hand. Shi'ism's rejection of the jihad is expressed from a political perspective by the fact that it is standing on the sidelines while a disaster is besetting the Islamic nation. On the other hand, Shi'ism embarks on jihad only when it is fighting in a treacherous way against Sunnism.<sup>11</sup> According to the jihadi Salafist stream, this Shi'ite view is contrary to a fundamental element in jihadi Salafism, which stipulates that only the faith takes precedence over the jihad in the hierarchy of Islamic values and beliefs.

## **D. The Jihadi Salafist view of Iran**

### **General**

The way in which the ideologues of jihadi Salafism view Iran – including its religious and political establishment – is based on a number of

6 Abd al-Muhsan ar-Rifa'i, *The Dimensions of the Alliance between the Dissenters and the Crusaders in Iraq and its Effects on the Region* (*ab'ad al-tahaluf ar-rafdi as-salabi fi iraq wa-itharahu 'al al-mantiqa*), Minbar al-Tawhid a-Jihad, January 2005.

7 Dr. Ali bin Muhammad Nasir al-Faqihi, "Presentation and Critique - Critical and Advisory Research Conducted on Studies of Groups in the History of Muslims, the *Hawarij* and the Shi'ites" by Dr. Ahmad Muhammad Ali (*arad wanuqd – dirasa, nuqdiya, watujjih likitab: dirasa 'an al-firak fi tarih al-muslimin, al-hawarij wa-shi'a*), Minbar al-Tawhid al-Jihad

8 Abd al-Sami'a Hasin. The author cites Shi'ite writers who include exemplars in the Sunni world (such as the first three caliphs, the Prophet's wife 'Aisha and Sheikh Ibn Timiya) in the category of "*nuadab*" – that is, those who are hostile to the Prophet's family. In particular, this includes the book by the Shi'ite sage Muhsan al-Mualem – *an-Nadb wan-Nudab* – which was published in Beirut. The quotes indicate that the concept "*nuadab*" became synonymous with the Sunni school. Another quote, from Muhammad al-Tijani, states that "the people of the *sunna* and the *jama'a* are those who fought against the Prophet's family (*ahl al-bayt an-nabi*) under the leadership of the Umayyads and the Abbasids." It is clear from the perspective of the Shi'ite writers that the Prophet's family (*ahl al-bayt*) is identified with Ali bin Abi Taleb, the founder of Shi'ism, whom the Sunnis fought against (and against his descendants).

9 Abd al-Sami'a Hasin. He cites a central Shi'ite sage as saying that anyone who rejects the imamate of Ali bin Abi Taleb and of the imams who succeeded him is like someone who rejects the prophesy of all of the prophets. Whoever recognizes the emir of the believers – that is, Ali – and rejects all of the imams who succeeded him is like someone who recognizes all of the prophets but rejects the prophesy of Muhammad. A Shi'ite *hadith* is quoted as spoken by Muhammad: The imams who come after me are twelve in numbers. The first is Ali and the last is al-Kayem. For those who obey them, it is as if they obeyed me, and for those who rebel against them, it is as if they rebelled against me.

10 Abd al-Sami'a Hasin quotes Shi'ite writers who authorize the murder and robbery of Sunnis and even command them to do this because they are "*nuadab*." He even infers from the words of Shi'ite sages that there is nothing wrong with a Shi'ite forging an alliance with the devil – whether it be Tartar, Crusader, American or English – in order to kill the "*nuadab*." According to his account, the Shi'a "ruling" on "killing Sunnis" has been in effect throughout Muslim history and remains in effect to this very day. In addition, the author suggests that Shi'ites conspire with non-Muslims to kill Sunnis.

11 Abd al-Sami'a Hasin

central starting points:

From a religious perspective, Iran, which is part of the Twelver imamist stream, is seen – like Shi'ism in general – as heretical from the standpoint of Islamic law and outside the borders of the religion and faith of the true Islam, on one hand, and external to the human community of Islam and its rule, on the other hand. In the eyes of these ideologues, this perspective applies to an Iran led by the current religious and political Shi'ite establishment, and which adheres to the Shi'ite religion, with its heretical (*kufr*) and polytheistic (*shirk*) characteristics. The conclusion stemming from a purely religious and moral perspective is that Iran, as a “heretical” Shi'ite state, has no place on earth and must be eradicated – as is the fate of any other “heretical” political entity in the Muslim world. On the other hand, these ideologues recognize that the success of the Iranian Shi'ite religious system in generating an Islamic Revolution and bringing to power an Islamic government led by religious sages (*waliyat faqih*) boosts Iran's prestige in the eyes of the Sunnis and constitutes a source of attraction for them.

From a political perspective, they portray Iran as a collaborator with the Crusader enemy against the Muslims, even if there are ostensibly clashes and conflicts of interest between the two sides. In addition, Iran is depicted as having an interest in signing cultural, economic and social rapprochement agreements with Arab states with the aim of exploiting the agreements as leverage for spreading its influence in the region and even for the Shi'itization of the region.

From a military perspective, Iran is seen as a state that is becoming more and more of a regional power. This ongoing buildup is financed by the enormous revenues from oil resources. This process stems from a deliberate policy to build a modern and sophisticated army and, especially, to attain a nuclear military capability and long-range missiles that would give it a qualitative military advantage over Muslim states in the region in particular and in the world in general.

From a strategic perspective, Iran is attributed with aspirations to expand and a desire to exploit the weaknesses of rival Sunni states as well as local opportunities and developments – such as the fall of the regime of its sworn enemy, Saddam Hussein – in order to spread the Shi'ite religion and culture among the Sunnis and impose its hegemony, or at least gain significant influence in these states.

The combination of Iran's success in fomenting a real Islamic Revolution, its capabilities as a regional power, its strategic aspirations and activity to spread Shi'ism in the region – make it a central enemy of the global jihad in the eyes of this stream's ideologues and its main competitor for influence in the Sunni sphere. It is clear to these ideologues that Iran, which is creating a unified Shi'ite-Iranian crescent based on local power centers, is a more difficult rival than the divided Arab regimes, each of which suffers from longstanding internal weaknesses.<sup>12</sup>

#### **Iran's buildup and aspirations in the region – in the view of Abu Basir**

Abu Basir al-Tartusi is one of the most prolific ideologues, if not the most prolific, in the jihadi Salafist stream in analyzing the essence and trends of Shi'ism and Iran, and in preaching for their delegitimization. In his recent essay on Iran and its aspirations, published in late 2007, Abu Basir gives broad, exhaustive and in-depth expression to the structured perspective in jihadi Salafist ideology of Iran as “heretical, hostile and threatening.”<sup>13</sup> This essay interprets, in the spirit of jihadi Salafism, the policy of Iran, its intentions, regional aspirations and the connections it conducts with all states, entities and Shi'ite minorities that comprise its natural allies in the region. He analyzes the Iranian military and nuclear buildup and its ambitious and expansionary tendencies based on the regional variables. He identifies problematic points of connection (from the perspective of the global jihad) between Iran and the Arab regimes, as well as between Iran and the West. One can also learn about the proposed method of action vis-à-vis Iran, which is fundamentally different than the violent path against the Arab regimes and is mainly expressed by estranging Iran in the eyes of the Sunnis and creating a partition between Iran and the Muslim world, apparently in anticipation of deciding the fate of the Iranian regime in subsequent stages – that is, after al-Qaeda takes over the main Arab regimes.

Like jihadi Salafism, the author of the document regards Shi'ite Iran as an inseparable part of the array of enemies of Islam. Thus, in his view, whether separately or as part of this array, it constitutes a strategic threat to Sunni Islam. According to his analysis, Iran acts against Sunni Islam in collaboration with both of the two components of this array: the “heretical” Islamic regimes at home and the “Crusaders” abroad. Moreover, Iran fills an essential role of creating a bridge between the two parts of this array and making it into a global, hostile and belligerent camp against Sunni Islam. The author is aware that his colleagues in jihadi Salafism fail to clearly portray Iran as part of the array of heretical Islamic regimes or the “Crusader” array or both. And this is against the background of the tension that exists in practice between Iran and each of these two camps. For this reason, he places the emphasis in his essay on communicating the message that the Sunnis should not place their hopes on the West's action against Iran because this action will not succeed. And he warns against the trend of rapprochement with the “heretical” regimes vis-à-vis Iran because it will end up being an obstacle for the Sunnis and Iran will end up benefiting from it.

#### **The Iranian strategic goal – the Shi'itization of the region**

The author defines the supreme goal of Iran as imposing and spreading its political, economic and military influence throughout the Arab region and especially in the Gulf. He attributes to Iran an incremental strategy for realizing this goal. During the first stage, the strategy aims to make a cultural and religious incursion via a bridgehead in the form of Shi'ite minorities living in these states, “who are blindly loyal to the

12 Muhammad Abu Raman – a Jordanian expert in extremist Islamic organizations – believes that al-Qaeda is in ideological crisis and that this is reflected in the words and examples of “repentance” among leaders and organizations identified with jihadi Salafism. He cites, for example, the latest book by al-Zawahiri (*at-tabra'a*), published in early 2008, in which he responds to the essay of the former leader of the Egyptian jihad, Sayed Imam Sharif, “Guiding Jihad Action” (*tarshid al-amal al-jihadi*), who “repented.” Abu Raman states that the axis of resistance led by Iran and in collaboration with its allies in the region, both Shi'ites and Sunnis, has a more convincing and attractive strategic message than the ideological message of al-Qaeda and is likely to replace al-Qaeda as the leading axis of resistance in the region. *al-Hayat*, March 19, 2008.

13 Abd al-Munim Mustafa Halima – Abu Basir al-Tartusi – “Iran and its Aspirations in the Region” (*iran watumuha fil mantiqa*), December 23, 2007 [www.abubaseer.bizland.com](http://www.abubaseer.bizland.com)

rule of the Iranian sage" (*waliyat faqih*). After completing the first stage, the second stage will be devoted to a political, economic and military invasion of the region. The main catalyst for this invasion will be the signing of cultural accords with one of the Arab states, which will pave the way for Iran to disseminate "the culture of accepting Shi'ism as a religious school and of the dissension that characterizes Shi'ism" (*thaqafat a-tashi'a war-rafd*). The significance of accepting this culture is the adoption of "a culture of destroying Islam and its foundations." Iran's military and nuclear arms race accompanies these two stages and serves as a catalyst for convincing the peoples of the region to liberate themselves from the oppression of their leaders and to cast their lot with Iran. The depiction of the strategy attributed to Iran is apparently intended to warn against signing agreements with it – agreements that Iran would exploit to accelerate the process of the Shi'itization of the region.

### **Iran's double role**

Iran plays a double role whose two parts are ostensibly contradictory, but they actually complement each other. Its first role is expressed in the fact that it serves as an agent of the U.S. and the West. In the framework of this role, it aided the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the victims of this process were the Sunni Muslims. In its second role, it works to disseminate Shi'ite Islam in the region. It uses the U.S. and the latter's allies as a "minesweeper" to clear the territory of mines and obstacles and thus make it easier for the U.S. to realize its aspirations in the region with a minimum of losses. According to this method, Iran saves itself from heavy losses like those it suffered in its bloody war with Iraq.

### **The ambivalent relationship between Iran and the U.S./West**

The author denies the existence of a basic conflict in the global arena between Iran and the U.S./West. He believes that it is an ambivalent relationship that simply has its ups and down. On one hand, the U.S. is concerned about the nuclear armament of Iran and its expansionist aspirations, which is leading the U.S. to consider a military attack against Iran. On the other hand, there is American hesitation about delivering a blow to Iran because Iran is a natural ally of the U.S. when the latter conquers an Arab state, as happened during the American conquest of Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>14</sup> Based on this analysis, the author concludes that Iran will succeed, sooner or later, in producing a nuclear bomb because there is no strategic entity interested in confronting it and preventing it from continuing to advance its nuclear plan.

### **The Arab regimes' policy of rapprochement with Iran**

The author argues that the Arab regimes are conducting a policy of rapprochement with Iran for several reasons: courting Iran so that it will not seek to subvert them and will be less inclined to carry out a military attack against the Gulf states if and when a war erupts between the U.S. and Iran. The invitation of Iran's President Ahmadinejad to the latest hajj ceremonies in Saudi Arabia is an expression of this policy.

On the other hand, Iran has no real interest in true rapprochement with the Arab states. It exploits the good will of the Arab states for closer relations with it in order to make new inroads for itself in disseminating the Shi'ite religion in the Arab arena without disruption. The author defines the goals of the Shi'ite religion in a negative way – turning Sunnis into Shi'ites (*tashi'a*), casting aspersions on others (*ta'an*), sowing destruction (*hadam*) and displaying dissension (*rafd*). This is because in Iran's view the Shi'itization of the region (*tashi'a al-mantiqa*) is a main preliminary step in gaining political, economic and military influence at a later stage.

The author later argues that the Arab regimes ignore the religious Shi'ite activity in Arab states and prevent Sunni sages from warning about this danger, while Iran provides full support for propagandists who engage in disseminating Shi'ism. Iraq's previous ruler, Saddam Hussein, erred when he prevented Sunni sages from conducting religious propaganda among Shi'ites in order to "save them from their ignorance and wandering, and to instill them with the faith in the unity of God." He paid for this with his life when he was executed by the Shi'ites. The author suggests that lessons should be learned from the mistakes of Saddam Hussein and action should be taken against Shi'ism by bringing the Shi'ites back into the fold of Sunni Islam. In summary, the author regards Shi'ism as a central danger to Sunni Islam, and he declares himself to be someone who is making efforts to warn against it, to thwart it, and to rescue the "remnants" of Sunni Islam. Despite his basic negative attitude toward the Arab rulers and regimes, who are also seen as heretical by jihadi Salafism, he sees them as the lesser of two evils and prefers that they remain rather than be replaced by the leaders of the Shi'ite religion and the sages of "Qom and Tehran." In his view, consenting to the replacement of a Sunni government by a Shi'ite one is like "replacing a minor transgression with a major transgression." The bottom line is that Iran is the major beneficiary of the rapprochement of the Arab regimes toward it.

### **The Iranian nuclear plan**

The author is primarily concerned about the development of the Iranian nuclear program. He warns the Sunni Muslim world and, by implication, the entire world that the production of a nuclear bomb by Iran is unacceptable. And this is because Muslim states – and first and foremost, the Gulf states including Mecca and Medina – are liable to be the first target of "an Iranian nuclear test" or "an Iranian nuclear attack."

The author does not attribute any credence to the reassuring declarations recently made by the leaders of Iran that the Gulf states would not be a target for Iranian missiles and bombs. He bases this judgment on three systems of "deviant" characteristics and behaviors that the jihadi Salafist literature attributes to the religion, tradition and culture of Shi'ism. He suggests that the leaders of Iran, who have internalized these characteristics, are not endowed with logical judgment and their behavior is predictable. They are liable to use nuclear weapons, if available to them, to embark on an unrestrained attack against the Muslims, in particular, and the world, in general. Thus, from his perspective, Iran is not only an enemy of the Muslims, but of the entire world due to these characteristics, combined with its expansionist aspirations, which know no bounds.

The first system of characteristics that jihadi Salafism attributes to the religion and culture of Shi'ism includes concealing the faith (*taqiya*),

<sup>14</sup> Al-Zawahiri, on the other hand, does not hesitate to note that "a real fight is being waged between the U. S. and Iran." He hopes that the two sides will exhaust each other and then the jihad movement will be the beneficiary. He adds that even if one of them emerges victorious from this confrontation, it will not be the only entity to determine the fate of the region, because it will face a resurgent jihad movement. The Open Dialogue with Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri – first series. (*al-liqaa al-maftuh ma'a a-Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri – al-halqa al-awla*), As-Sahab Media, April 2, 2008.

falsehood (*kizab*), deception (*khida'a*) and fraud (*ghadr*). As a result of these “characteristics” of the Shi'ites, the author contends, it is impossible to determine whether the leaders of Shi'ism in general and Iran in particular are speaking truth or falsehood. The second system is “the deep hatred that Shi'ism feels for Islam and the Islamic community” (that is, vis-à-vis the *sunna* and Sunnis). “This hatred is passed on from generation to generation among the Shi'ites. The old and new literature of Shi'ism allows for the shedding of Muslims' blood and the defiling of their holy places, and regards the Muslims as the primary enemy of Shi'ism.” The third system is the deviant behavior expressed in the cult of tombs and self-flagellation in the religious ceremonies of Shi'ism. The author summarizes by noting “that it is impossible to ensure that the Iranian leaders, who behave in such a deviant way, will not use nuclear weapons to annihilate peoples and states, and even the entire universe.” Thus, not only the Jews, but also most of the countries in the world are opposed to Iran having a nuclear bomb.

### **The jihadi Salafist position from a religious and political perspective – the view of Ayman al-Zawahiri**

The deputy leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, does not usually initiate public criticism of Shi'ite Iran in the political reviews he disseminates via global jihad Internet sites.<sup>15</sup> His public criticism of Iran is usually intended to refute information stemming from interviews with him about collaboration between Iran and al-Qaeda. This criticism focuses on the political and strategic aspect of Iran's policies and positions. On the other hand, he very rarely – in comparison to his colleagues in the jihadi camp – presents the “heretical” side of the Shi'ite religion and community. His position vis-à-vis Iran is important for understanding al-Qaeda's policy on this subject due to his very senior standing – second only to Bin Laden in al-Qaeda's hierarchy.<sup>16</sup>

In a public interview he gave in April 1995, al-Zawahiri denied the assertion that the Islamic movement receives assistance and guidance from Iran. He described Iran from two negative standpoints that make this assertion seem unreasonable and totally without foundation. The first standpoint focuses on the religious perspective of Shi'ism, which, in his view, clearly demonstrates that the leaders of Iran are heretics and that the religious gaps between Shi'ism and Sunnism are so wide that they are unbridgeable.<sup>17</sup>

According to al-Zawahiri, Shi'ism – the Twelver (*ithna ashariya*) stream – is one of the groups known as “innovators,” which introduced forbidden elements (*fiqh muftada'a*) into the faith (*bida'an 'aqaydiya*). These innovations were expressed in the following ways:

1. Curses and calumny directed against the caliphs Abu Bakr and 'Umar and the Muslim matriarchs, the Prophet's companions (*sahba*) and disciples (*taba'in*).
2. The contention put forward by their imams (with the exception of four of them) that the Quran is forged.
3. Attributing infallibility (*'isma*) to the twelve imams and regarding them as having reached a higher level than that of God's messenger.
4. Adopting the claim about the occultation (*ghabe*) of the twelfth imam and his future return (*raj'ah*)

Al-Zawahiri states that whoever shares these beliefs – despite the definitive counterproofs presented to him (the reference here is to the ruling and educated elite) – will be regarded as someone who has left the religion of Islam (*murtadun 'an din al-Islam*). On the other hand, a simple and uneducated person who innocently believes in worthless beliefs, based on ideas he thought to be correct, should not be accused of heresy due to his ignorance.

The second standpoint al-Zawahiri describes in the interview portrays Iran's policy as hostile to the global jihad movement and preferential toward Shi'ites, with positions based on its own clear interests. He presents several examples to support this contention:

1. The position of Iran toward the Islamic revolution in Syria: It supported the government of Hafez al-Assad, claimed that the Muslim Brotherhood served as agents of America and abandoned them to be slaughtered by al-Assad.
2. Its stance vis-à-vis the Afghani jihad: It only supported the Shi'ite parties before and after the fall of the communist regime.
3. Its stance vis-à-vis the expulsion of the Arab mujahidin from Pakistan: It completely ignored what was happening, failed to intervene and did not allow any Arabs into Iran.
4. Its stance vis-à-vis the jihad in Egypt and Algeria: It does not provide any assistance to the jihadi movements, abandoning them in their bloody struggle against the tyrants.
5. Its stance vis-à-vis the jihadi movements: It only provides assistance to those who follow its leadership.
6. Iran did not provide anything to the jihadi movement in Egypt, only because this movement refused to be its puppet.

In summary, al-Zawahiri warns the Islamic movements sponsored by Iran that they will not derive any benefit from this patronage. Because of the little they receive from Iran, they will be accused of serving as its agents and will lose the respect the Muslim public feels toward them.

In December 2007, al-Zawahiri was cautious in a public media appearance not to disparage Iran from a religious perspective, but criticized its policy regarding the bloody struggles in Afghanistan and Iraq against the local authority and its U.S. ally – struggles in which al-Qaeda is still involved to this very day. Regarding Afghanistan, he argued that Iran aided the “Northern Alliance,” while the Taliban regime protected “its

15 See Note 2.

16 The Lebanese expert in extremist Islamic organizations, Dr. Dr. Radwan Shahin, notes that al-Zawahiri displays a cautious public stance vis-à-vis Iran and refrains from criticizing it directly because al-Zawahiri is situated in an area of Iranian influence. According to Shahin, the al-Qaeda organization has collaborated with Iran and Syria, and received weaponry and explosives from them in return. Because of its extensive relations with Iran and Syria, and the fact that its activists are situated within their borders, al-Qaeda cannot openly oppose them. “Al-Qaeda, Palestine, Lebanon” – **Emirates Media**, June 16, 2008, [www.amin.org/look/amin/press.htm](http://www.amin.org/look/amin/press.htm)

17 A response on this subject by Ayman al-Zawahiri was published in the *Al-Ansar* magazine, edition 6, 91 – April 1995.

<http://www.abu-qatada.com/r?i=1867&PHPSESSID=5fa1d2751eb27723c5545857334935e1>

Muslim brethren" (that is, al-Qaeda personnel) prior to the American occupation of the state, and that Iran helped the Americans and their Afghani allies during the occupation itself. In regard to Iraq, he accused Iran of training the Iraqi Shi'ite militias prior to the American conquest of the state and of subsequently bringing them into the state and integrating them into the Shi'ite Iraqi government apparatuses in order to serve the Iranian interest<sup>18</sup>

### **The role of Iran vis-à-vis the superpowers and Middle East policy – in the view of al-Rifa'i**

Abd al-Muhsan al-Rifa'i calls Iran "the patron of Shi'ism in the world (*ra'it a-shi'a fil 'alem*). He portrays Iran as a country that has conducted strategic collaboration in the region with both of the superpowers – American and Russian, and has joined with Shi'ite communities in a number of states in the region to promote its expansionist aspirations and hegemony.<sup>19</sup>

### **The Iranian role in Afghanistan**

Iran provided military and logistical assistance to the Crusader invasion forces in Afghanistan and even dispatched its army to fight alongside the invasion forces, especially in the "Northern Alliance" areas. It also opened its border to these forces. Iran provided assistance to the "al-Hazara" Shi'ite minority and the Shi'ite "al-Wahda" party and other "Northern Alliance" parties in order to overthrow the young Sunni state headed by the Taliban. Iran used the Hirat border district as a base for delivering logistical assistance to the Taliban's enemies. It also opened an embassy in Kabul and thus accorded legal legitimacy to the new government.

### **The role of Iran in Iraq**

Iran adopted the Shi'ite opposition manifested in political parties led by the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution, headed by Muhammad Bakr al-Hakim, who was killed in Iraq after returning to it. Iran arrived in Iraq on American tanks in order to realize its old dream of ruling in Iraq with its co-religionist brethren – the Crusaders.

## **E. The Shi'ite – Russian Orthodox alliance**

The author questions the meaning of the rapprochement between Iran, which is a religious Shi'ite state, and Russia, which is a Christian secular state, part of the Crusaders, and a hater of Muslims. Evidence of the latter can be seen in the oppression of the Chechens. Iran does not seek to protect it. The common denominator is the hatred of Muslims. Iran oppresses the Sunnis in its country. It is no surprise that there is Shi'ite-Russian collaboration in liquidating the jihad in Chechnya. The cooperation between the two sides is prominent in Central Asia, which is under Russian influence. Russia ignores Shi'ite activity conducted under Iran's supervision, but suppresses the activity of Sunnis and regards it as terrorism, despite the fact that it is actually assistance. Russia built nuclear reactors in Iran, despite international opposition to this.

There are several reasons why atheist Russia supports Iran, which claims to be Muslim, and the world remains silent about this: the West has empowered Russia to arm Shi'ites at the expense of the Muslims and seeks to create a balance between Shi'ism and Sunnism after Pakistan succeeded in developing nuclear weapons; the West fears that the Muslims in Pakistan will take over the state and constitute a threat to them and to the Shi'ites and the Indians; compensation to Iran for its assistance to the Crusaders against the Jews and Islam; to create a nuclear stranglehold on the Muslims. The opposition of America is illusory; in fact, the U.S. seeks to make Iran into the strongest state after Israel.

## **F. The Shi'ite-Indian alliance**

There is direct coordination between the racist Indian government and Iran. They are partners in the war against Islam. The Indians are known for their enmity toward Muslims. Iran conspired against Kashmir, as it has done against other Sunni Muslims in the world. The Shi'ites in Pakistan are operating with the direct assistance of Iran to incite a civil war. These Shi'ites did not suffice with open activity against Muslims, but also conducted military action and killed Muslim leaders.

## **G. The Position Vis-à-Vis Shi'ism in Iraq**

### **The aspirations of Shi'ism in Iraq**

Since its conquest by the U.S. and its allies in March 2003, the political developments in Iraq have had an important influence on the formation of the views and policies of jihadi Salafism toward the Shi'ites in Iraq and elsewhere. This policy is examined against the background of what are seen as Shi'ite aspirations in Iraq in particular and in the region in general, as part of the Shi'ite sphere.

Abd al-Muhsan al-Rifa'i summarizes these aspirations as follows: First, he believes that Shi'ites harbor a centuries-old dream of taking over Iraq. Against this background, he states that the Shi'ites in Iraq have coordinated with "their brethren" in Iran to collaborate with the "Crusader forces" in order to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and conquer it.<sup>20</sup> Secondly, al-Rifa'i focuses on the current aspirations of Iraqi Shi'ites on two levels:

The aspiration in Iraq – to takeover the administrative government institutions in order to disseminate the ideology of the dissenters (*a-ruafad*) and to eradicate the Sunnis (*ahl a-sunna*). The Shi'ites leave the military and economic control of Iraq to the Crusaders. There is Shi'ite-Crusader coordination between the invasion forces and the Shi'ite political parties such as the Dawa Party – the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution, currently led by Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim. "Al-Badr" is its militia, trained and financed by Iran. In coordination with the occupier, it persecutes the Sunnis under the pretext that the Sunnis are adopting Wahabism and Salafism.

The aspiration in the region – The next stage in the Shi'ite plan is to gain Shi'ite influence over Saudi Arabia, especially in eastern Saudi Arabia

18 Interview with al-Zawahiri in "As-Sahab," **As-Sahab Media**, December 16, 2007

19 Abd al-Muhsan al-Rifa'i, "The Dimensions of the Dissenter-Crusader Alliance in Iraq and its Impact on the Region," (*ab'ad a-tahaluf a-rafdi a-salibi fil 'iraq wa itharhi 'al al-mantiqa*), January 2005, Minbar a-Dawa wal-Jihad

20 "The Dimensions of Alliance between the Dissenters and the Crusaders in Iraq and its Impact on the Region," (*ab'ad a-tahaluf a-rafdi a-salibi fil 'iraq wa itharhi 'al al-mantiqa*), Minbar a-Tawhid wal-Jihad, January 2005.

where a Shi'ite minority is located, and to transfer the actual rule over Saudi Arabia to the Crusaders, as in Iraq. The Shi'ite plan seeks to gain influence in other countries and establish a Shi'ite ring stretching from Iran and Iraq, through parts of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, to Syria and Lebanon, creating a noose around the Sunnis.

At the same time, the policy of jihadi Salafism is also examined from the perspective of two important interests: on the Islamic level – foiling the Shi'ite takeover of Iraq and the establishment of an Islamic Sunni state, in the spirit of jihadi Salafism, which would serve as a springboard for taking over other states in the Mashreq and Maghreb in preparation for the establishment of the Islamic caliphate; on the regional level – confronting the “Shi'ite ring,” of which Iraq comprises a vital part, and thwarting its coalescence and threats to the Sunni region.

While the various positions expressed by spokesmen and ideologues of jihadi Salafism are identical to a large extent in their attitude toward Shi'ism from a religious, moral and historical standpoint, the test of practical experience of the jihad conducted by the al-Qaeda organization in Iraq has engendered different, and sometimes contradictory, approaches regarding the policy required on the ground vis-à-vis the Shi'ites. This disagreement is clearly expressed in a letter sent by the deputy leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri to the founder and leader of the al-Qaeda organization in Iraq up until his death in early July 2005, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

#### **The approach of al-Rifa'i**

Abd al-Muhsan al-Rifa'i believes that the jihad that Sunnis conducted in Iraq, with the support of their brethren in other Muslim countries, saved Iraq from the clutches of “the Crusaders and their Shi'ite puppet allies” who entertained the notion of completely taking over Iraq after the fall of Saddam. The jihad put an end to the plans of the Shi'ites to conquer the land of the caliphate and establish Shi'ite rule under Crusader supervision. If it were not for the jihad, Iraq and Sunnis would have fallen like ripe fruit into the hands of the enemies and would have suffered humiliation. Those who follow this path of jihad, which is the path of Allah (*sunnat allah*), will be crowned with victory by Allah. Al-Rifa'i's words indicate that he sanctifies the use of jihad without commenting on the format of its use – whether or not it is too aggressive and brutal. In any case, he regards the use of jihad as a successful policy and that it alone can ensure the victory of the Sunnis in Iraq.

#### **The approach of al-Zawahiri**

On the theological level, al-Zawahiri does not disagree in his letter with most of al-Zarqawi's allegations of *tafkir* (heresy) directed against the establishment and leaders of Shi'ism in Iraq. Shi'ism is described in his letter as “the school of *rafda* [a disparaging term used by Sunnis to refer to Shi'ism] *al-ithna'ashariya*” (Twelver), based on “exaggeration and falsehood,” which slanders the Prophet's companions and believes in the hidden, omnipotent and infallible (*'isma*) mahdi. They collaborated with the enemies of Islam in the past (during the Crusader period) and during the current invasion of Iraq. Ultimately, a confrontation between the Islamic state and Shi'ism is unavoidable. However, the letter directly criticizes the bloody struggle that al-Zarqawi conducted against Shi'ism and the Shi'ite holy places in particular and against the Muslims in general. The letter contends that this struggle is unnecessary and even detrimental to the true jihad battle for the following reasons:

- The masses, who are not aware of the aforementioned negative characteristics of Shi'ism, wonder about the reasons for the attack waged against Shi'ism (that is, by al-Zarqawi).
- The mujahidin believe that it is not correct to conduct this struggle against Shi'ism at this time, and seek to defer it until after the fighting movement is strengthened in Iraq.
- Opening an additional front against Shi'ism, alongside the front conducted against the Americans, plays into the hands of the Americans.
- The attack on the Shi'ite masses only strengthens the false believe of the Shi'ites, while we need to show them the truth.
- The attack on Shi'ism is liable to spur the Iranians into adopting countermeasures in a situation in which the Americans constitute a target. Mutual non-belligerence is needed vis-à-vis the Iranians.

Al-Zawahiri distinguishes between the leaders of Shi'ism and the “common people.” The former bear responsibility for distorting Islam. The latter were led astray and are thus deserving of forgiveness for their ignorance and can be redeemed via preaching (*da'wa*).

#### **Al-Zarqawi's approach and the criticism of it**

Al-Zawahiri's criticism of the indiscriminate attacks against Shi'ites is not unique in al-Qaeda circles. More than a few Salafi *'ulama* have stated that the massacre of Muslims, including Shi'ite Muslims, is counterproductive to al-Qaeda's strategy of gaining mass Muslim support for its struggle. The older generation of al-Qaeda-linked Salafi *'ulama* is clearly growing uneasy. Included in this group are Abu Basir al-Tartusi, who took a stand against the London bombings on the basis of his interpretation of Islamic law on jihad; Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who criticized al-Zarqawi, his erstwhile disciple, in a public statement on the same basis; and Mohammed al-Masari, one of the fathers of the Saudi reform movement in London. These scholars hold undeniable jihadi Salafist credentials and are close to al-Zawahiri ideologically and organizationally. It is conceivable, therefore, that they influenced al-Zawahiri's decision to add his weight to their arguments.<sup>21</sup>

Al-Zarqawi defended his terrorist jihad policy in remarks published immediately after receiving al-Zawahiri's letter. He argued in his response

21 "A Virulent Ideology in Mutation: Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi" by Nibras Kazimi, Published on September 12, 2005, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 2, Hudson Institute

"The Zawahiri Letter and the Strategy of al-Qaeda" by Shmuel Bar, Yair Minzili, Published on February 16, 2006, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 3, Hudson Institute



that the jihad against the institutions of government and the army in Iraq is like the jihad against the atheist occupier in Iraq (that is, the U.S. and its allies) and there is no reason to distinguish between one jihad and another. From his standpoint, the Iraqi army is “an army of dissenters of Islam and an agent of the Crusaders, seeking to destroy Islam (that is, Sunnism) and fight the Muslims (that is, the Sunnis). Therefore, we are fighting against it just as the nation fought against the Tartars.” He expressed regret about the appeals addressed to him from “people of knowledge,” attempting to persuade him to refrain from conducting a jihad in Iraq, and rejects these calls out of hand.<sup>22</sup>

## H. The Jihadi Salafist Position towards Hezbollah

### General

The global jihad movement regards the Hezbollah organization as a serious challenge for it. The movement views Hezbollah as a central branch of Iran in the heart of the Middle East, designed to promote Iran’s religious and strategic aspirations at the expense of the Sunnis. Hezbollah’s achievements at home and vis-à-vis Israel strengthen the appeal of the Shi’ite Islamic Revolution in the eyes of the Sunni public. Against this background, there is a salient effort by spokesmen for the global jihad movement to turn Hezbollah into a target of their anti-Shi’ite attacks. The supporters of the tough line of jihad tended to intensify their propaganda attacks against Hezbollah following the Second Lebanon War, after the Sunni Arab world adopted Hezbollah’s version depicting the war as a clear victory over Israel, and after Ayman al-Zawahiri published a position that was not sufficiently clear vis-à-vis Hezbollah. In this attack, the following motifs stand out in particular: From a religious standpoint, Hezbollah is depicted as part of the Shi’ite system with its “anti-Islamic heretical” characteristic. From a military perspective, Hezbollah’s achievements vis-à-vis Israel are downplayed. From a strategic perspective, Hezbollah is portrayed as part of the Iranian attack against the Sunnis, which works in tandem with the Crusader attack in the region.<sup>23</sup>

### The comparison between Hezbollah and Atatürk

Osama Shehadeh examines the balance of Hezbollah’s achievements in the Second Lebanon War against the background of what was presented in the Arab media as a victory for Hezbollah against Israel in the war. The author rejects the approach that views the war as ending in a Hezbollah victory and argues that it was actually a new act of futility (*fitna*) by Hezbollah, similar to its imagined victory in 2000. From the author’s perspective, the main question pertaining to this war is not the extent of its seriousness but whether it will ultimately benefit Islam, Arabism and the Palestinian cause. For Shehadeh, this war serves as a catalyst to portray what appears to him as Hezbollah’s threat to the Sunnis in Lebanon and even beyond Lebanon.<sup>24</sup>

### The similarities between Hezbollah and Atatürk

Shehadeh compares Hezbollah to the regime of Atatürk. He states that from an external perspective, both appeared on the scene when the Muslim states were under occupation by the non-believers. Both advanced during the course of a war against occupiers. In terms of substance, they held a worldview that is different from that of the Muslim community and sought to gain power in order to realize this worldview during a period in which the Muslims suffered from weakness and a lack of stratagem.

**Hezbollah poses a danger to the Islamic nation** due to its positions and beliefs, on one hand, and its policies and allies, on the other hand. The author assesses this danger by examining Hezbollah’s beliefs and policies:

Hezbollah’s ideology and beliefs – Hezbollah belongs to the Twelver imamist Shi’ite school (*al-madhab a-shi’a al-imami al-ithna’ashari*) that regards the twelve imams from the Prophet’s family (*ahl al-bayt*) as the rulers of the Muslims and believes that anyone who believes in another caliph is a heretic. In addition, Hezbollah considers the Prophet’s companions (*as-sahba*) to be heretics, with a few exceptions. It also views the Quran as forged and deficient (*al-quran muhraf wankis*). Hezbollah expressed its loyalty to Khomeini, who disseminated these ideas, and did not disassociate itself from them. However, the organization did not express support for the Shi’ite leader in authority (*marj’iyya*) Fadallah, who was subject to a harsh Shi’ite attack that even reached the point of declaring him a heretic.

**Hezbollah’s positions and policies** – The positions and policies of Hezbollah serve the pure Shi’ite interest and not the general Islamic interest. The examples of this are: the organization’s silence regarding Iran’s connection with the Americans in Afghanistan and in Iraq; the fact that it ignored the treachery of the Shi’ites in Iraq and their collaboration with America, and ignored the crimes of the Shi’ites in Iraq against the Sunnis; and Hezbollah’s demand for Syria to remain in Lebanon.

**The Hezbollah’s allies and supporters** – Iran is not only an ally of Hezbollah, but also its habitat. All of its attention is devoted to fostering Shi’ites, including Hezbollah, even if this comes at the expense of Islam. Syria – the hands of the Ba’ath regime in Syria are tainted with the blood of Muslim victims in acts of massacre in Hama and Tel al-Za’atar. Any ally of this type of Ba’ath regime cannot bring benefit to Islam and the Muslims.

### Summary of the dangers posed by Hezbollah

In short, if Hezbollah emerges strengthened from its futile action in the Second Lebanon War, it will exploit this to carry out its sectarian

22 The BBC in Arabic, July 6, 2007 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/arabic/news/newsid\\_4655000/4655405.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/arabic/news/newsid_4655000/4655405.stm)

23 Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri assumed a somewhat vague position towards Hezbollah. A speech he delivered was circulated in jihadi forums on July 26, 2006 and sparked a fierce debate among the Sunni jihadists, which continues to this day. The confusion created by al-Zawahiri came to an end by several analyses of his speech, published by known jihadi-Salafist scholars. The most important of these analyses, which was circulated on the Internet through the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), was written by an Egyptian, Dr. Sayf al-Din al-Kinani, on July 28, 2006, under the title “The Puzzle of the Oppressed and the Red Lines.” The bottom line of his interpretation of al-Zawahiri’s speech was the necessity of the fight for Palestine and Lebanon by the Muslims, but... the only Muslims are the Sunnis. Shi’ites are not Muslims so their fight against Israel is not regarded as jihad and serves foreign interests. “Hotwiring the Apocalypse: Jihadi Salafi Attitude towards Hizballah and Iran.” By Reuven Paz, The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (Prism), Occasional Papers Vol. 4 (2006), No. 4 (August 2006)

24 Osama Shehadeh, “Will Hezbollah Be Our Atatürk?” (*hal yakun hizballah atatürk fi 'asrina*), Mifkarat al-Islam Website, August 7, 2006

agenda and demand that Hamas and Islamic Jihad follow in its path and adopt its style of resistance (*muqawama*). It will also exploit its popularity to proselytize for accepting Shi'ism (*tashi'a*), as it has done in Palestine, Syria and other countries.

A danger is anticipated from a deal between the Hezbollah-Iran-Syria axis and the Israel-U.S. axis at the expense of the Sunni Arabs in Lebanon, the Gulf, Palestine and Iraq. The author raises the question of whether Hezbollah will adopt positions in favor of the Muslims ("something we hope it will do") or will instead be a new Atatürk, leading the Muslims astray in futile wars in order to serve Iran and Syria. From his overall analysis of Hezbollah's policy, one can understand that he expects Hezbollah to continue to follow the path of Atatürk.

### **The position of al-Zawahiri**

Al-Zawahiri has also recently tried to downplay what was described in the Arab media as a Hezbollah victory in the Second Lebanon War. He also harshly criticizes Hezbollah's policy in two areas where Hezbollah acted, in his view, against the basic principles of jihadi Salafism: The first area is Hezbollah's attitude toward the liberation of the Shaba Farms in the framework of a nationalist worldview that is "foreign to Islam" rather than in the framework of the individual's duty to liberate Islamic land that is under occupation (*farad 'ayin*). The second area is Hezbollah's abandonment of the Islamic land of South Lebanon to the "Crusader" forces (UNIFIL) and its recognition of this "international Crusader presence" on Muslim territory in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701.<sup>25</sup>

#### **The role of Hezbollah – al-Rifa'i**

Al-Rifa'i believes that Hezbollah uses the Palestinian card and rides the wave of Islamic resistance in an effort to deceive the Muslim public – as if Shi'ism were waging a battle against the occupier. He succeeds in portraying this erroneous image of Shi'ism among a public of weak faith, which is not familiar with Shi'ism's hostility toward Islam and the fact that it is an Iranian product. The goals of Hezbollah are:<sup>26</sup>

1. Conducting a campaign of persuasion among the Sunnis throughout Lebanon in an effort to convert them to the Shi'ite religion by presenting Hezbollah as the supporter of the Palestinians' struggle and as the leader of the resistance.
2. Pushing the Sunnis to the sidelines and stripping them of any leadership role, and transferring the leadership into the hands of the Christians and Shi'ites.
3. Turning Lebanon into a launching pad for realizing the plan to establish a Shi'ite Crusade.

## **I. The Issue of Rapprochement between Sunnism and Shi'ism**

The ideologues of jihadi Salafism show great concern about the initiatives aimed at encouraging rapprochement between the Sunni and Shi'ite communities. These initiatives – which mostly originate from the Sunni side, but also come from the Shi'ite side – seek to downplay the significant religious and historic gaps and contradictions that exist, in their view, between Sunnism and Shi'ism. Some of these initiatives even regard Shi'ism, with an emphasis on the Ja'afari imamist Twelver (*al-ithna 'ashariya*) stream that rules in Iran and Iraq, as a school (*madhab*) of equal value to the four schools of Sunnism. These initiatives – which already appeared in the distant past – have been proposed in recent years at conferences and meetings aimed at promoting "rapprochement" between the two large communities and streams in Islam, as well as in books and articles and religious rulings (*fatwas*) issued by Sunni sages who advocate this rapprochement.<sup>27</sup> This push for rapprochement between the two communities is being led by the Arab regimes, which fear an outburst of violence and civil war (*fitna*) on a sectarian/religious background between the two communities – like those taking place in Iraq and Lebanon. In an effort to prevent the development of conditions that are conducive to sectarian outbursts, they are working to mobilize the religious establishment to grant religious legitimacy to Shi'ism.

In this context, the most important conference was the International Islamic Conference, which was organized in Jordan by the Ahl Al-Bayt Institute, opened by the king himself, and held under his sponsorship on July 4-6, 2005. The subject of the conference was "The Truthfulness

25 The Open Dialogue with Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri – first series. (*al-liqaa al-maftuh ma'a a-Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri – al-halqa al-awla*), As-Sahab Media, April 2, 2008. An interview with al-Zawahiri with As-Sahab Media on December 16, 2007.

26 Abd al-Muhsan ar-Rifa'i, *The Dimensions of the Alliance between the Dissenters and the Crusaders in Iraq and its Effects on the Region* (*ab'ad al-tahaluf ar-rafdi as-salabi fi iraq wa-itharahu 'al al-mantiqa*), Minbar al-Da'wa al-Jihad, January 2005.

27 Mustafa al-Faki warns against the destructive consequences of a civil war (*fitna*) between the Sunnis and Shi'ites in Iraq for the entire region. He believes that this "fitna" does not have its roots in Islamic belief and its spiritual dimension, but instead derives from historical political events. He sees the outbreak of sectarian disputes and divisions between the schools in the Arab system in our generation as echoing a worldwide trend expressed in the growing emphasis on nationalism and ethnic affiliation as opposed to the social theories that reigned in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, led by Marxism. Al-Faki calls on Shi'ite and Sunni religious leaders to do more to bring the two schools closer. He cites as an example for emulation the action of the sheikh of Al-Azhar in the early 1960s, Muhammad Shaltut, who issued a famous *fatwa* that recognized the legitimacy of the rituals of the Ja'afari and Zaydi schools. "The fights between the schools in the Arab region" (*a-sir'aat al-madhabiya fil mantiqa al-'arabiya*) *Al-Hayat*, March 13, 2007 [www.daralhayat/actions/print.php](http://www.daralhayat/actions/print.php)

In his book on the relations between Sunnis and Shi'ites, Dr. Muhammad Salim al-'Awa confirms the existence of a real, historical dispute – profound and acute – between Shi'ism and Sunnism. But he believes that on the religious level this dispute does not center on fundamental principles, but rather on secondary issues of belief and religious law. Thus, for example, he states that the disagreement over the anticipated mahdi (*al-mahdi al-muntazaer*), the immunity of the twelve Shi'ite imams from error and sin (*'isma*), and the *taqiya* – is a minor dispute. On the other hand, he cites leading sages, headed by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, to emphasize that there are common denominators such as the belief that the Quran is a heavenly book sent down by Allah. In any case, he places the responsibility on the Muslim sages (*'ulama*) to act to unite Shi'ites and Sunnis, and to oppose tendencies of separatism and sectarian fanaticism. He also notes that new, contemporary Shi'ite interpretation has generated a significant change in the original philosophy of imamist Shi'ism. In his view, the political factor is responsible for the division between Shi'ism and Sunnism – in both the ancient period of the Prophet's companions (*sahba*) and in our generation. He gave a lecture on his book on September 6, 2006 in Cairo, *Al-Jazeera*, February 22, 2007.

The Al-Azhar sheikh, Tantawi, says that the dispute between Sunnis and Shi'ites centers on secondary issues rather than the fundamentals of the faith. He also states that he supports any initiative for rapprochement between Sunnis and Shi'ites, and that Al-Azhar has led such an initiative in the past. An interview with the *al-Sharq al-Awsat* daily, November 2, 2006.

Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the chairman of the World Association of Muslim Sages, outlines in his book *Principles for Dialogue and Rapprochement between Sunnism and Shi'ism* ten such principles, including good thought, focusing on points of consensus, avoiding provocation. However, he points out some Shi'ite beliefs that he rejects – the infallibility of the imams and Shi'ism's lack of recognition of the sources of the *sunna*, as well as the denial of the *sunna's* status as a secondary source for legislation and the Shi'ite belief in the falsification of the Quran. In fact, al-Qaradawi identifies with a central part of the arguments of jihadi Salafism against the Shi'ites. But, unlike jihadi Salafism, he sees the need for rapprochement between the Sunnis and Shi'ites. *Al-Jazeera*, November 12, 2006.

of Islam and its Role in Modern Society.” It was attended by the heads of the religious establishment and many senior *‘ulama* from Muslim countries, both Sunni and Shi’ite. The final statement of the conference was recognized as a collective *fatwa*, which is unprecedented in the history of the Muslim world. This *fatwa* called for order, overhaul, recognition, equality, and reconciliation between the recognized schools in the Islamic world, in the face of what was described as the tragic circumstances in which the Islamic world currently exists. From the statement, it can be understood that these circumstances include the spread of the radical ideology that accuses as apostates all those who do not respond to radical demands and expectations; the outbreak of a violent confrontation between the different schools (mainly between the Sunni and Shi’ite); and the fact that unskillful and unauthorized elements have taken upon themselves the right to issue *fatwas*. The statement explicitly argued that the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence – the Ja’fari, the Zaydi, the Ibadī and the Tahiri – are Muslim<sup>28</sup>

Against this background, these ideologues launched an informational and religious counterattack designed to undermine this “rapprochement,” to refute the arguments about the lack of substantial, fundamental religious differences between the two communities, to present – without embellishment – what they see as the heretical beliefs of Shi’ism, and to warn against “the dangers Shi’ism poses to Sunnis.”

Below are prominent examples in which the ideologues of jihadi Salafism oppose initiatives for “rapprochement” between Sunnism and Shi’ism. These ideologues are led by Abu Basir al-Tartusi, who took upon himself the task of openly opposing the trend of rapprochement between Sunnism and Shi’ism.

### **Opposition to collaboration between Sunnis and Shi’ites in waging jihad against the enemies of Islam**<sup>29</sup>

One of the main and popular arguments in favor of rapprochement between Sunnis and Shi’ites is the need to unify all Islamic forces for “the struggle against the West and the Jews.” Abu Basir al-Tartusi tries to counter this argument in his response to the question of an Internet surfer regarding the position of Islamic legal law vis-à-vis the ruling that Muslims must cooperate with the Shi’ites against the Jews and Americans. As part of his response, Abu Basir says that unity of the ranks against the enemies of the nation is a demand of religious law (*shari’a*) and is logical, but this objective should be attained via proper means. Disregarding these means would lead to missing the objective and wasting the efforts made to achieve this goal. The essence of these means is addressed in a separate discussion.

In regard to unity with the Shi’ites and dissenters (*al-ruafad*) – this is an old slogan that did not materialize. Abu Basir decisively states that this unity is impossible to achieve and will not be achieved, and this is due to a number of reasons:

#### **From the perspective of religion and faith**

Their harmful belief in regard to the Quran – on one hand, their statement that the Quran is falsified (*muhraf*) and, on the other hand, their false interpretation (*al-batala*) of many verses (*ayat*) in the Quran and distorting the religious and linguistic meanings of these verses.

- Casting aspersion on the traditional *sunna* and texts such as “Sahih al-Bukhari” and “Sahih Muslim,” while according priority to the words of their sheikhs and imams.
- Accusing senior companions (*sahba*) of the Prophet, their community and followers, and all of nation’s *‘ulama* with heresy.
- Accusing the Prophet’s wives, and particularly his beloved wife in this world and in the next world – ‘Aisha, the mother of the believers (*um al-muaminin*) – with heresy and slandering them.
- Their belief in their imams, which has a heretical and polytheistic character. Elevating these imams to the level of the prophets and messengers, and even to a level of divinity.
- Their outlook that considers heretical anyone who does not accept their polytheistic belief.

These beliefs constitute an obstacle to unity with them. It is impossible to reach a consensus with them on any issue unless they declare their integrity (*bara’a*) and repentance (*tawbatihum*) – in the sense of discarding these beliefs – and return to the Islamic fold.

From a political perspective

The Shi’ites, with all of their resources, stand alongside the Crusader enemies of the Islamic nation. This began with Ibn al-Alki al-Shi’i, who conspired with the Tartar camp against the Abbasid caliphate and continues now with their current position vis-à-vis the Islamic jihad movements in the world. (That is, the ideologues of jihadi Salafism see them as enemies of the jihad movement.)

They forged an alliance with the Russian infidel (*mulhadun*) Crusaders against the Islamic peoples in Afghanistan and Chechnya because these peoples do not belong to their false polytheistic school. They preferred to stand alongside the Christian Ba’athist regime ruling Syria, in opposition to the jihad movement in Syria and against the Muslims – only because they are not affiliated with the false Shi’ite religion.

In regard to the position vis-à-vis the Shi’ite Hezbollah in Lebanon – they support it from all aspects and shower it with billions of dollars. And this is because Hezbollah is affiliated with their false polytheistic religion, in addition to the fact that it provides leverage for disseminating propaganda on behalf of Shi’ism in the region.

From the perspective of characteristics

The Shi’ites excel among all people in adopting falsehood and denying truth, especially when this entails causing damage to the community of Islam. They teach their children to hate the Prophet’s companions (*sahba*) and Sunnis to the point that the killing of Sunnis takes precedence over waging jihad against the Jews. In short, their religion is based on two foundations: falsehood and denial, on one hand, and deep-seated hatred for Muslims, on the other hand.

28 Shmuel Bachar, Shmuel Bar, Rachel Machtiger and Yair Minzili, “Establishment ‘Ulama and Radicalism in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan,” Series No 1, Paper No. 4, December 2006. Hudson Institute Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World

29 “Collaboration with Shi’ites in the Jihad Against the Enemies of Islam” (*a-ta’awun ma’a ar-rafida fil jihad did a’ida al-islam*), Website of Minbar at-Tawhid wal-Jihad  
<http://www.abu-qatada.com/r?i=696&PHPSESSID=5fa1d2751eb27723c5545857334935e1>

For these reasons, we say that it is impossible to meet with them as long as they maintain these characteristics. Those who have tried to attain unity with them have suffered disappointment.

A letter to the Sheikh of Al-Azhar regarding the conference for rapprochement between the schools

In response to the announcement that the Center for Islamic Research (*majma'a a-dirasat al-islamiya*), headed by the sheikh of Al-Azhar, agreed to participate in a conference in Iran on rapprochement between the Islamic schools, al-Balushi writes in a letter to the sheikh of Al-Azhar that the rapprochement between Shi'ism and Sunnism must be built upon a proper scientific and ideological basis, and in accordance with the guidelines set by the Quran and the *sunna*.<sup>30</sup> In the author's view, Sheikh Shaltut fell victim to the deceit of the Shi'ites, granted it recognition and gave permission to follow the path of Shi'ism – for the first time in Islamic history. Al-Azhar subsequently began to teach their religion, assuming that the religion of the Sunnis would be taught in Iran, but this did not happen. The Shi'ites in Iran exploited Al-Azhar and its reputation to realize its political ambitions. In practice, they did not begin to teach the *sunna*. Instead, they oppressed the Sunnis in every way – murdering their *ulama*, closing their religious academies (*madaras*) and imposing Shi'ism (*tashi'a*) on them. Sunnis were prohibited from building mosques in cities that have a Shi'ite majority, despite the fact that this was permitted for members of other religions. Sunnis were also not allowed to participate in the government, despite the fact that they comprise a third of the state's population.

Al-Balushi states that despite the fact that unsuccessful attempts were made by Sunni sages (such as Sheikh Muhammad 'Arfa, al-Latif al-Sabki, Rashid Rida and Mustafa al-Saba'i) to draw the Shi'ites closer to the Muslims, their Shi'ite counterparts did not surrender their destructive and divisive principles because of considerations of material gain. In his view, after these actions, which are contrary to the spirit of humane Islam, Al-Azhar must not honor the Shi'ites with its participation because the Shi'ites exploit Al-Azhar's name to oppress, deceive and compel people to accept Shi'ism (*tashi'a*). Al-Azhar must not repeat the mistakes of the past and fall into the Shi'ite trap of "*taqiya*" and deception, because since the rapprochement initiative of fifty years ago the Shi'ites have exploited this initiative to camouflage the dissemination of their deceptions. Instead, Al-Azhar should raise its voice against the injustice inflicted on Sunnis, as perpetrated by Iran. How is it possible to achieve rapprochement between Sunnis and those [that is, Shi'ites] whose school challenges the book of Allah and the *sunna*, and openly curses the Prophet's companions (*sahba*)?

#### **Unity between Sunnis and Shi'ites is impossible to achieve, unless the Shi'ites return to Islam**

In another article, Abu Basir focuses on the call that is periodically made "for unity between Sunnis and Shi'ites" and the requisite conditions – which "are impossible, in practice" – for achieving this.<sup>31</sup> In his view, this is an old-new slogan raised from time to time by people in one of the two communities. But their efforts to achieve this objective very quickly go for naught. He also explains in this article that the "longed for" unity between the two communities has not materialized, not even superficially, because of the beliefs of Shi'ism. These beliefs, in his view, contradict the Quran's command to Muslims to adhere to the Quran and the *sunna* as a single body. (The author learns this from the verse: "And hold fast by the covenant of Allah all together and be not disunited" (Sura III, 103).

The author describes the Shi'ite beliefs that are contrary to this command and which do not allow for the realization of unity between Shi'ites and Sunnis, as the Shi'ites desire and call for:

- Assigning a higher status to the imams of Shi'ism than to the prophets and messengers.
- Regarding the words of the imams as equal to the words of the Quran in terms of their infallibility (*'isma*) and the need to obey them.
- Attributing infallibility (*'isma*) to the imams, the power to control the universe and knowledge of the unknown, what has been and what will be.
- The belief of the Shi'ites that they have a Quran that descended from heaven, called the "Fatima Quran," which does include a single verse from the Quran that came down to Muhammad.
- The belief that the Quran in the hands of the Muslims is a falsified one.
- The declaration that they do not believe in a God that did not assign the imamate to their twelfth imam.
- Hatred and accusing the Prophet's companions with heresy (*takfir*).
- Accusing the Prophet's wives with heresy and obscene language (*fuhsh*) and inappropriate behavior.
- The belief that the *sunna* is fundamentally exaggerated.
- Worshipping their imams and dead sheikhs more than they worship Allah and pray to Him.
- Treachery and enmity toward the Sunni Muslims.
- Their devotion, heart and soul, to the enemies of the nation – heretics and invaders – throughout their history and to this very day. Their treacherous stance is expressed in the events in Afghanistan and Iraq and other countries.

30 Abu Mitnaser al-Balushi – "A Letter to the Sheikh of Al-Azhar Regarding the Conference for Rapprochement between the Schools" (*risala ila sheikh al-azhar bihudud muatamar a-takrib bina al madhab*), April 24, 2000. Minbar at-Tawhid wal-Jihad

31 Mustafa Halima – Abu Basir al-Tartusi, "Unity Between Sunnis and Shi'ites" (*al-wahda bayn a-sunna wa-shi'a*), November 30, 2003, [www.abubaseer.bizland.com](http://www.abubaseer.bizland.com)

The author states that if the Shi'ites indeed seek unity between Shi'ites and Sunnis, they must distance themselves from the heresy and hatred to which they adhere, and from all falsehood. If they do this, they will be an integral part of the nation, without the need for dialogues. But if they do not reform their ways, the dream of unity with the Sunnis will not be attainable. Those among the Sunnis who call for unity with the Shi'ites without demanding that they disassociate themselves from their beliefs are only fools who do not recognize the truth about Shi'ism. The calls by Shi'ites for unity are designed to win recognition for the justice of their path and beliefs in order to prove that their path is the real truth while falsehood is the lot of the Sunnis. The author concludes by warning that "whoever honors a proponent of innovation and deviation from the laws of religion contributes to the destruction of Islam." ("من وفر صاحب بدعة فقد أعان على هدم الإسلام")

### **Warning against granting state recognition to the Shi'ite minority in Saudi Arabia**

Sa'id al-'Amri addresses the important issue of the status of a Shi'ite minority that is seeking to receive state recognition in an Islamic state with a Sunni majority and regime. He suggests that the political status of this Shi'ite minority should be judged according to the principles of Islamic law, which determines whether or not it is an Islamic community – and not according to the principles of nationalism, which are rejected by jihadi Salafism.<sup>32</sup>

At the beginning of his article, he states that Sunnism's dispute with the "*ar-rafda*" (dissenters – a disparaging term for the Shi'ites) is deep-rooted and conceptual. The enmity of the Shi'ites toward the Sunnis is clear and explicit. Throughout history, the Shi'ites have exploited their power to oppress the Sunnis. Against this background, he warns against the strengthening of the Shi'ite minority in eastern Saudi Arabia, its penetration to central positions in the establishment, and its aspiration to receive official recognition from the kingdom. In his view, this Shi'ite minority aspires to ultimately establish a Shi'ite state in Saudi Arabia. As tangible evidence, al-'Amri cites a number of "severe" measures adopted by the Shi'ite minority that are aimed at promoting their ambitions in the kingdom: On the political level – the participation of Hasan al-Dafar on behalf of the Shi'ites at the first dialogue conference, which represented the start of a new era in which Shi'ism was recognized as a chosen community; exploitation of the improvement in relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the desire of the crown prince to foster rapprochement with the Shi'ites in order to raise new demands in the framework of a petition they submitted to the government. On the military level – the author claims that the Shi'ites are making efforts to stockpile weapons.

At the same time, al-'Amri regards the Saudi government and the "*ar-rafda*" (that is, the Shi'ites), in the spirit of jihadi Salafism, as two sides of the same coin – a forged coin. It is a coin of heresy (*kufr*), hypocrisy (*nafak*), promiscuity (*fusuk*), rebellion (*'adian*) and treachery (*khiana*). They compete for winning the affection of America. The attack (*ghazwa*) against Manhattan led America to lose trust in its friends. It now needs more and more guarantees, which the Shi'ites (as opposed to Saudi Arabia) offer it. The government of Saudi Arabia knows that it cannot remain in power unless it deceives people (*iltabis 'ala nas*), hides behind Islam, claims it is implementing Islam and showers money on the people in order to lull them to sleep. Today, as there is less money, the Saudi government has no alternative but to deceive the people in the name of Islam – something that the U.S. is not happy about. Will the Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula fulfill their historic duty at this stage and collectively mobilize to fight for Allah? If they do this, they will be rewarded in this world and in the next world, and if they fail to do this they will not be part of this truth:

"Unless ye go forth [to war], He will punish you with a grievous penalty, and put others in your place; but Him ye would not harm in the least. For Allah hath power over all things" (Sura IX, 39).

## **J. The Strategy of Global Jihad Vis-à-Vis Shi'ism**

From a religious perspective, the jihad leaders define Shi'ism as heretical and as the sworn enemy of Sunni Islam. There can be no co-existence between Shi'ism and Sunnism because the two sides challenge each other's sources of religious authority and legitimacy. While the leaders of global jihad adopt more or less the same strategy toward "heretical" Sunni Islamic regimes – which necessitates waging jihad against them in order to uproot and replace them with a "true Islamic" government – they disagree on the concrete strategic method that should be adopted vis-à-vis the Shi'ite world, led by Iran.

We will focus here on the operative policy proposed and implemented in practice vis-à-vis Shi'ism:

### **Preferring the "heretical" Islamic regimes to a Shi'ite takeover**

The ideologues are clearly in a dilemma about the priorities in the struggle against the enemy from within (the "heretical" Sunni regimes), on one hand, and the Shi'ite enemy (Iran), on the other hand. They are aware that giving priority to weakening the "heretical" Sunni regimes (by waging a policy of systematic terror against them and undermining their internal political and social fabric) is likely to play into the hands of Iran, which is growing stronger, and make it easier for Iran to penetrate Muslim states and ultimately take control of these regimes with the help of its "fifth column" – the Shi'ite minorities. Abu Basir believes that Iranian rule over the states of Islam is a worse option than the current rule by the "heretical" Sunni rulers. It seems that this dilemma leads the ideologues of jihadi Salafism to the operative conclusion that it is necessary to simultaneously pursue two parallel tracks: to continue to fight via the violent jihad against the Arab regimes, with the aim of toppling them and replacing them with "true Islamic" rule, while simultaneously waging a propaganda and ideological campaign against Iran, portraying it as an enemy of Islam and an ally of the Crusader enemy in order to neutralize its religious and cultural impact on the Arab and Islamic system and stymie initiatives of rapprochement between Iran and the Arab states, which is liable to generate a process of Shi'itization in the region.

### **Al-Qaeda's reluctance to conduct terror against Iran**

32 "The Dissenters" (*a-rafda*) - Sa'id al-'Amri – Ma'skar al-Batar, Vol. 6, January 1425

In practice, global jihad organizations, led by al-Qaeda – the leadership in Pakistan/Afghanistan and al-Qaeda's branch in Iraq – refrain from waging terror activity against Iran itself and suffice with conducting open and harsh propaganda against Iran, challenging its religious and political legitimacy. On the other hand, local jihad operatives affiliated with al-Qaeda conduct terror activity against the Syrian regime (which is seen as Alawite and thus identified with Shi'ism) and particularly against the Shi'ite regime and population in Iraq.

In a letter al-Zawahiri sent to the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in July 2005, he tries to dissuade him from attacking the Shi'ite masses and warns that the continuation of aggressive attacks against the Shi'ites is liable to encourage the Iranians to take countermeasures. He states that al-Qaeda's interest requires creating a situation of mutual non-belligerence between the organization and Iran.<sup>33</sup> Perhaps global jihad organizations also refrain from attacking Iran because they fear losing the assistance they reportedly receive from Iran.<sup>34</sup> In addition, this reluctance derives from a fear of a violent, systemic, Iranian countermeasure against global jihad organizations on various fronts – in Iraq, Afghanistan/Pakistan and Lebanon – a response that would severely erode its accomplishments.

### **The religious status of the 'ignorant and illiterate' Shi'ite masses and the policy toward them**

An important issue in the religious literature of jihadi Salafism pertains to the religious status of Shi'ites and the possibility of their repentance. The premise is that in the same way that they left Islam they can return to it as long as they fully repent. There is indeed a consensus that the Iranian regime is heretical from the standpoint of religion and faith according to the principles of Sunnism<sup>35</sup> and is a political/strategic enemy due to its expansionist tendencies and aspirations. But the question arises of whether the heretical religious status of the Iranian establishment also applies to the Shi'ite masses in this country and in other countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Azerbaijan. Al-Zawahiri, who recently discussed this issue, accuses the leaders of Shi'ism with crimes against Islam and against the Muslims. On the other hand, he presents a tolerant and pragmatic stance vis-à-vis the Shi'ite masses. He states that due to the ignorance and illiteracy of the Shi'ite masses on religious matters, it is possible to forgive them and not accuse them of deliberate heresy. In his judgment, a distinction should be made between two camps within the Shi'ite masses: The first camp is comprised of Shi'ites who refrain from fighting against "the Muslims" (that is, Sunnis) under the flag of the Crusaders. He says that a policy of religious exhortation (*da'wa*) should be pursued vis-à-vis this camp, exposing them to "the crimes of Shi'ite leaders against the Muslims," encouraging them to repent and bringing them closer to the *sunna*.<sup>36</sup> The second camp is comprised of Shi'ites who collaborate with "the Crusaders" in harming the Muslims. The law applying to this camp is the law of "communities that refrain from following the laws of Islam."<sup>37</sup>

Abu Basir presents a more rigid religious approach toward the Shi'ites, conscious of the attempts being made to promote rapprochement between the Sunnis and Shi'ites from both sides. He does not absolve the Shi'ite masses from the charge of heresy due to ignorance, but definitely sees a way to return them to the fold of Islam. The required method of action is to conduct religious propaganda among the Shi'ites in order "to save them from their ignorance and deviance, and to instill in them the belief in the oneness of God." He turns to the Shi'ite masses (*amam a-shi'a wa-ruafad*), who were led astray by their religious sages and leaders, and says to them: Return to Allah, return to your true religion, which you left and attacked, return to your senses and the straight path, return to the nation that you left and attacked."<sup>38</sup> Abu Basir states that if the Shi'ites do not reform their ways, the dream of unity with the Sunnis, which they desire, will be unattainable. "It will only be possible to reach an agreement with the Shi'ites after they declare their integrity and repentance, and re-enter the Islamic fold."<sup>39</sup>

Al-Alwan praises the Internet site "Defense Network of the Sunna" which works to open the eyes of the ignorant Shi'ite masses and to show them the heresy and treachery of their religious sages.<sup>40</sup>

### **The disagreement regarding policy toward the Shi'ites in Iraq in the struggle for power in the country**

Iraq – after the conquest by the allied forces – became the primary arena in which the global jihad movement's anti-Shi'ite political and theological stance was actually translated into an operative policy against the Shi'ites. The leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was the initiator and instigator of the aggressive and bloody policy of terror against the Shi'ites, without discriminating between government and security targets, on one hand, and mosques and holy places and innocent citizens, on the other hand. He viewed the waging of an all-out war against the Shi'ites in Iraq as a means for unifying the Sunnis around his leadership in the fateful struggle for the future and shape of

33 The U.S. exposed the letter after intercepting it in July 2005. It was published on various Websites.

34 Ayman al-Zawahiri – the deputy leader of al-Qaeda – systematically refrained from addressing Iran in his public messages to the media via jihad Internet sites, though he often harshly attacks other enemies of the global jihad, headed by the Arab regimes and the West. He recently evaded giving a public response to the question of a Internet surfer about whether al-Qaeda is exploiting Iran, in the framework of its relations with it, to orchestrate terror activity outside of Iran and whether Saif al-Adl, one of the senior members of the organization who fled from Afghanistan to Iran, is responsible for coordinating this activity. Instead, he referred the surfer to an interview he gave to As-Sahab Media. See: The Open Dialogue with Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri – first series. (*al-liqaa al-maftuh ma'a a-Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri – al-halqa al-awla*), As-Sahab Media, April 2, 2008. However, in the second series of this Open Dialogue, he made an exception to his usual practice of refraining from publicly attacking Iran, and accused it of conspiring with the U.S. in occupying Afghanistan and Iraq – a charge that appears in the messages of his colleagues in al-Qaeda – *Al-Hayat*, April 23, 2008. It should be noted that in an interview he gave to the *Al-Ansar* magazine (Vol. 91, 1415 Hijra) al-Zawahiri denies any collaboration between the jihadi Salafist movement and Iran. <http://www.abu-qatada.com/?i=1867&PHPSESSID=5fa1d2751eb27723c5545857334935e1>

35 Ayman al-Zawahiri states that whoever believes in these beliefs after being presented with decisive proofs will be regarded as someone who has left the religion of Islam (*murtadun 'an din al-islam*). *Al-Ansar* magazine, Vol. 91, 1415 Hijra.

36 Even prior to this, al-Zawahiri supported the approach of teaching the Shi'ites in Iraq the path of truth in order to bring them back to "the true" Islam in advance of the conquest of Iraq by the local al-Qaeda organization. See al-Zawahiri's letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, exposed by the U.S. in July 2005 and published on various Websites.

37 The Open Dialogue with Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri, April 2008; *Al-Ansar* magazine, April 1995. In both of these sources, al-Zawahiri uses the concept of *anhum ma'azirin bilahlilum* (أنهم معزرون بحليلهم) to argue that they should not be blamed and should be forgiven due to their ignorance. Ibn Timiya offers a more lenient position vis-à-vis Shi'ism (*ar-rafd*). He states that whoever believes in the message of the Prophet Muhammad is better than someone who does not believe in it, even if his belief includes innovation that is prohibited by Islam (*bid'a*) such as the Khawarij and Shi'ites. If they are in agreement with Muhammad, then they are not unbelievers. However, he warns that the Shi'ites are liable to lapse and join the apostates (*ahl az-zandaka*). Collection of religious rulings (*majmu'a al-fatawi*) C18/R122 – Minbar at-Tahid wal-Jihad.

38 See above.

39 See above.

40 Suleiman bin Nasir bin Abdallah al-'Alwan, "The Imams of the Dissension" (*a'imat ar-rafd*), November 18, 2002, Minbar at-Tawhid wal-Jihad.

Iraq's government – not only against the “American occupier” but also against its “protégé,” “the Shi’ite enemy from within.” His successors followed and are following his path. They have gone quite a bit further and have established what is called “The Islamic State of Iraq,” which combines anti-Shi’ite theology with practical policy: On one hand, this “entity” symbolizes the aspiration to abolish the reality of “heretical Shi’ism” in a country that served in the past as the capital of the Sunni Abbasid caliphate. On the other hand, it lays the cornerstone for the establishment of an Islamic state in all of Iraqi territory.

However, al-Zarqawi’s policy aroused resentment among the leaders of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, to whom al-Zarqawi swore allegiance. In his letter to al-Zarqawi (July 2005), al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s deputy, expressed reservations about what he regarded as an overly aggressive policy toward the Shi’ites, and explained the policy’s shortcomings and deficiencies in a gentle and collegial way. First, he stated that the acts of slaughter against Shi’ites only make al-Zarqawi’s fight to liberate Iraq more difficult because they open an additional front against him by the Shi’ites and are liable to implicitly generate a threat from Iran. Secondly, he proposed an alternative path, pragmatic but effective: to bring the Shi’ites into the Sunni Islamic camp not through counterproductive violence but rather through exhortation and calls for repentance. He grants religious justification to this process by stating that the Shi’ites are not knowingly heretics, but only heretics due to ignorance and illiteracy. Therefore, they can be reformed and returned to the fold of Islam by proselytizing and inculcating the values of the true Islam.

In speeches and messages disseminated by the leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and his deputy, al-Zawahiri, in late 2007 and early 2008 via Internet sites associated with their organization, they again addressed the question of the operative policy and steps they believe are required in Iraq, which they consider al-Qaeda’s central battlefield from two perspectives: First, the organization’s accomplishments in Iraq surpass any achievement in any other arena since the terror attack of September 11, 2001. Thus, it is important to preserve these accomplishments. Secondly, Iraq is regarded as the arena that is slated to serve as the launching pad (after Islamic/jihadist rule is established in it) from which holy warriors (*mujahidin*) will embark to conquer other adjacent arenas, including Palestine, en route to re-establishing the Islamic caliphate. Their messages reflect the dissatisfaction of al-Qaeda’s leadership with the patterns of behavior of the local organization in Iraq, led by al-Zarqawi’s successors. The two call on the *mujahidin* in Iraq – including the local al-Qaeda organization and other jihad organizations operating separately from it – to resolve their differences, to unify the ranks and wage a united jihad, while faithfully adhering to the al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan/Afghanistan. However, they reconcile themselves to the reality of establishing the “Islamic State of Iraq” and even reject critics who argue that the establishment of this entity is not at all necessary because there is no firm basis for its existence. It is clear that these two al-Qaeda leaders were obliged to accept the establishment of this “entity” as a *fait accompli* because there was no other alternative in light of the strong independence of the local al-Qaeda organization in Iraq.<sup>41</sup>

### Summary

The leaders of the global jihad – both the ideologues and officials – concur that Shi’ism is both heretical from a religious perspective and an active enemy, which is growing stronger and aspires to gradually uproot Sunnism from its leadership positions. It seeks to accomplish this by first spreading Shi’ite influence and striking roots in the Sunni arena, utilizing the existing Shi’ite minorities, and later by actually taking over the rule in Sunni states. They are also unified in their view that any initiative for rapprochement between Sunnism and Shi’ism should be promptly thwarted because, if allowed to proceed, it would play into the hands of Shi’ism and help it to accelerate the realization of its ambitions as described above. In addition, they are very concerned about the growing strength of Iran, particularly its efforts to establish a strategic axis that would encircle the Sunnis and to attain a nuclear capability that would establish its military superiority. Every Shi’ite achievement in the region, even if it comes at the expense of other enemies of the global jihad – such as the accomplishments of Hezbollah in the Second Lebanon War – serves to strengthen the Shi’ite threat against the Sunnis.

However, they find it difficult to formulate a uniform and decisive strategy of action vis-à-vis the Shi’ites, led by Iran. Al-Zarqawi had no qualms. He acted against the Shi’ites in the framework of an uncompromising and indiscriminate policy of violent terror, similar to the classic jihad attacks conducted by al-Qaeda and its branches and affiliates against American, Arab and Islamic targets. He made sure to first obtain (and later publicize) “religious justification” for his violent actions. Al-Zarqawi was successful in instilling his policy in his successors, and they are indeed continuing it and even “enhancing” the terror campaign by using women and children as suicide bombers. However, the leaders of al-Qaeda saw a need to adopt a pragmatic and cautious policy toward the Shi’ites, if only for tactical reasons. First, they refrained from declaring and actually waging a jihad against Iran because, in their view, the assets and advantages derived from Iran outweigh the harm Iran causes. Secondly, they are reluctant to alienate the Shi’ite masses and found a religious path for bringing them over to the Sunni side. In this way, the war effort in Iraq can be focused against the more sensitive and problematic targets – the Shi’ite ruling establishment and the American forces in Iraq.

The question is whether in light of the intensified offensive by the American and Iraqi forces against al-Qaeda in Iraq during the past year we will witness sharper differences of opinions between the leadership of al-Qaeda and the al-Qaeda organization in Iraq – which operates independently to a large extent – in regard to the preferred policy of al-Qaeda in this country.

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41 Audio tape of Osama bin Laden. Disseminated on Internet sites on December 29, 2007, summary of Osama bin Laden audio tape on March 21, 2008 on *Al-Jazeera*.

## Hizballah's Ideology: Main Points and Practical Implementation

Yair Minzili

### A. Background Factors and Influences behind the Development of Hizballah's Ideology

The Hizballah organization attributes supreme importance to the religious and political ideology it has formulated since its establishment in 1983. In fact, the organization regards ideology as the basis for its existence and as the driving force for the resistance militia it has built in Lebanon. In the organization's view, ideology is equivalent to its weaponry. Thus, the motto of Hizballah is that faith is the guarantee of victory, and without faith the organization will fail to attain its objectives.

The local and regional background for the formulation of Hizballah's ideology was based on a number of fundamental factors:

1. The Iranian role versus the Lebanese-local interest – The Hizballah organization was established as a long strategic arm of Iran in the heart of the Arab world, in general, and in Lebanon, in particular.<sup>1</sup> Over time, Hizballah, in addition to its role as a militia, also turned into an authentic Lebanese-Shiite force, both political and social. These two factors had a decisive impact on the essence and content of the ideology. Hizballah needed to formulate an ideology that would present a broad common denominator for these two factors, which often were in a state of conflict with each other. The role of ideology was to find the right formula to connect these two factors and bridge the gaps between them in order to form a political and military force of great influence and power in Lebanon, capable of realizing the movement's objectives. In addition, the role of ideology became critical, considering the fact that Hizballah's leadership demands that its members be prepared to martyr themselves (*shahada*) for the sake of realizing the movement's aspirations. The mobilization of the motif of enmity toward Israel and the confrontation with it, ostensibly aimed at defending Lebanese sovereignty, has served as Hizballah's main formula for bridging between these two conflicting motifs.
2. Rivalry vis-à-vis veteran players in the Lebanese political arena – The Hizballah organization is a relatively new political movement in the diverse Lebanese political landscape. The existence of the veteran Shiite Amal movement did help Hizballah to emerge, but Hizballah's leadership – after breaking away from Amal – had to compete with political rivals from the Sunni, Shiite and Christian factions. The formulation of the ideology in a relatively quick way and its aggressive dissemination helped Hizballah to establish itself as a local political force.
3. Political pluralism in Lebanon – In general, the diversity of the political system in Lebanon made it difficult for any new political player to stand out as a force offering an innovative message. Therefore, the founders of Hizballah – in Iran and in Lebanon – needed to emphasize in a sharp and prominent way the uniqueness and revolutionary nature of Hizballah's ideology in this pluralistic political landscape. Even so, attractive content and effective tools were both required to market and instill the ideology among the various strata of the Shiite community, while simultaneously convincing the general public of its essentiality.<sup>2</sup> In practice, Hizballah succeeded in disseminating its ideology not only among the Shiite public but also among other communities. It also succeeded in mobilizing support for its political worldview among Sunnis, Druze and Christians. The multi-sectarian coalition led by Hizballah, which has competed since late 2007 against the March 14 Alliance led by Sa'ad Hariri, testifies to this.
4. The conflict between the influence of the Islamic Revolution and particularistic Lebanese interests – When first established, the Hizballah organization initially adopted a pan-Islamic ideology under Iranian inspiration. This ideology called for establishing a state in Lebanon based on Islamic law (*Shari'a*), which would be an integral part of a world-embracing Islamic state. According to this ideology, the center of this state is in Iran and its ruler is the *wali faqih* – the ruling jurist – the leader Khomeini. In effect, Hizballah rejected the Lebanese identity and right of existence of the (Christian-controlled) Lebanese regime, and recognized Imam Khomeini as both its religious and political leader.<sup>3</sup>
5. The ideological paradox between representing Lebanese interests and promoting foreign interests – Over the years, and in light of the development of new political and strategic conditions, Hizballah in mid-1992 formed a political entity, alongside its militia,

1 The Deputy Secretary General of Hizballah, Sheikh Na'im Qasim, explicitly states that: "Hizballah was established in its current format in accordance with the instructions of Imam Khomeini" and that Khomeini, "because of his understanding of Islam and his loyalty to the Prophet's family, directed Hizballah toward a confrontation with Israel." See: Baqiyyat Allah (Beirut), February 2001.

2 Dr. 'Abbas Maznar points out the difficulty of establishing "a resisting Lebanese society" (*mujtama' lubnani muqawim*) in light of the cultural and ethnic pluralism, on the one hand, and the political and sectarian rift, on the other hand. Against the background of these basic realities, the Lebanese have not demonstrated a uniform stance vis-à-vis the "resistance" (*al-muqawama* – that is, Hizballah's militia). Instead, they have been divided in regard to its definition, influence and acceptance for about two decades: See, for example, *Baqiyyat Allah*, August 2001.

3 Shimon Shapira, *Hizbulla between Iran and Lebanon*, Tel Aviv, 2000, p. 125; a central dilemma for Hizballah is the debt to Iran for helping to establish and sustain it. Hizballah follows Iran's path, perceptions and even its dictates. It wants to establish an Islamic Republic in Lebanon, like the Iranian counterpart. But Hizballah must also consider the Lebanese context in which it functions. Eyal Zisser, "Hizballah in Lebanon: At the Crossroads," *MERIA*, Vol. 3, September 1997; in Hizballah's platform from February 1985, the organization adopted the view of its spiritual leader at the time, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, stating that despite its commitment to Islam, Hizballah would not forcibly impose it on Lebanon. Iran, on the other hand, demanded that the platform stipulate the establishment of an Islamic Republic as the immediate solution for the problems of Lebanon. See: Shapira, pp. 127-128.



with the aim of participating in the parliamentary elections and integrating into the political life of the state. Hizballah sought and received an Islamic legal ruling for this move from the leader Khamene'i – Khomeini's successor. In practice, Hizballah's ideology is caught in a political paradox that is one of the primary reasons for the Lebanese tragedy: On the one hand, Hizballah purports to represent the particularistic aspirations of the Lebanese people vis-à-vis Israel, the U.S., the West and the Arab world. It justifies the continued existence of its militia – the Islamic resistance – by the need to defend Lebanon from its enemies. On the other hand, Hizballah operates in the service of two key states in the region – Iran and Syria – in order to promote the regional agenda and even the international agenda of these two states. Its founders left the mother movement – Amal – and started Hizballah in order to fulfill this mission. In addition, the organization demands complete freedom of action and autonomy for itself in waging the resistance against Israel – whenever it wants and employing any means and method it deems appropriate. This demand is inconsistent with Lebanon's sovereignty and contrary to the foundations of its constitutional-parliamentary regime, which is supposed to have the sovereign right to decide whether to pursue war or peace with any external entity.

6. Hizballah's demand for full autonomy in conducting the resistance is a supreme value in its ideology. In May 2008, this demand faced a national test against the background of the ultimatum the government of Lebanon gave to Hizballah to dismantle the independent communications network it built for itself in the state. In response, Hizballah took over the main strongholds in Beirut and threatened to carry out a military coup d'état. The retraction of the ultimatum by the government of Lebanon lifted Hizballah's threat and ultimately led to the Doha Agreement<sup>4</sup> and subsequently to the election of a president and government. All these moves were made under the dictates of Hizballah and its local political allies, who strengthened their status in the political and governmental system.<sup>5</sup>

In summary, the Hizballah organization formulated its ideology in the face of different variables, some of which conflict with one another. This ideology aspired to bridge these variables and was imposed upon the Lebanese reality. In this way, Hizballah built in Lebanon – with the assistance and guidance of Iran and Syria – a powerful military force alongside a local political force that wields considerable influence.

## B. Formulating the View of a “Resisting Society” (*al-mujtama' al-muqawim*)

The leadership of Hizballah shaped the ideological and organizational view of a “resisting society,”<sup>6</sup> characterized by a “culture of resistance and of sacrifice.” The “resisting society” is based on the Shiite community in Lebanon and includes all those identifying with Hizballah's notion of “resistance” – men and women, armed and unarmed – who take upon themselves the responsibility to assist the “resistance” (the militia) in all aspects. According to this definition, “anyone who shirks the responsibility to assist the ‘resistance’ also shirks his human, religious, moral and national responsibility.” In other words, Hizballah states that devotion to the “resistance” – by identifying with it, assisting it or joining its ranks of fighters – is the entry test for the “resisting society.” Hizballah regards the Shiites in Lebanon as a community that must be committed to comprise an inseparable part of the “resisting society” and to fulfill its purpose. Any Shiite who fails to act in this way remains outside of the “resisting society.” In practice, Hizballah tries to mobilize non-Shiite citizens to join the “resisting society,” but its center of gravity, as stated, is the Shiite community.<sup>7</sup> The main instrument for building and consolidating the “resisting society” and shaping it in the spirit of the “culture of resistance” is the “resisting information campaign” (see below for more on this). The primary purpose of the “resisting society” is to recruit and mobilize all of its resources, systems and institutions for a single, central objective – providing service for the “program of resistance.”<sup>8</sup> The aims of the “resisting society” in Lebanon can be summarized as follows:

1. Vis-à-vis the political movement and militia (the “Islamic resistance”): Building a base of strategic support within the Shiite community, which fills two principal roles:
  - To give the party electoral power in municipal elections and in parliamentary elections, and thus strengthen its political and public standing.
  - To serve as a catalyst for providing economic and social aid to the militia, and to constitute a persistent source for recruiting fighters to its ranks.<sup>9</sup>
2. Vis-à-vis the Lebanese state: Recruiting ethnic and religious communities outside of the Shiite community to provide ideological, political and material support for the “resistance” and its objectives. In practice, Hizballah achieved success, even if only partial, by mobilizing non-Shiites in Lebanon – Sunnis, Druze and Christians – who identify with the idea of “resistance” and some of them even

4 The “Doha Agreement” was signed in May 2008 and ended the long political crisis in the state. As part of this agreement, the sides decided to form a national unity government, whose 30 members would include 11 from Hizballah. In addition, the agreement gave Hizballah the right to veto any government decision. The agreement paved the way for General Michel Suleiman to assume the role of president of the Lebanon, thus ending the political crisis.

5 The deputy chairman of Hizballah's Political Council, Mahmud Qamati, decisively states – at the time these lines are being written – Hizballah's policy in regard to the autonomous standing of the resistance in Lebanon and its independence from the state's sovereign institutions: “The Islamic resistance will continue to defend, more than ever, the independence of its weapons, its power, its capability and its readiness. It does not belong to any official institution because if it belonged to an official institution it would be forced to be subject to every official decision that is derived, in practice, from the dictates of the international forces. The resistance's decision-making process will remain free and its weapons will remain in its hands. We are engaging in national dialogue so that the official decision-making process will be conducted in parallel to the army, the resistance and the people.” See *al-Mustaqbal* (Beirut), February 21, 2009.

6 The concept of the “resisting society” / the society of resistance (*mujtama' muqawim*) derives from the word “resistance” (*muqawama*). The intention is a society that stands behind the “resistance” that was established to wage resistance against the West in general and against Israel in particular.

7 The deputy chairman of Hizballah's Political Council, Mahmud Qamati, clearly divides the Lebanese between “resistors” (*muqawimun*) and “those who place their trust in the American region and the victory of Israel.” *al-Mustaqbal* (Beirut), February 21, 2009.

8 Regarding the “institutions of the resisting society” (*mu'assasat al-mujtama' al-muqawim*), see at length in *Baqiyat Allah*, August 2001.

9 *Ibid.*

became political allies of Hizballah.<sup>10</sup>

3. Vis-à-vis the Arab and Islamic world: Creating a form of “resisting society” and “resistance” that can serve as a model for emulation and help in exporting the Iranian Islamic Revolution. An important Hizballah spokesman stated in this context that the “culture of resistance” had become the leading culture not only in Lebanon but also in Palestine.<sup>11</sup>

Dr. ‘Abbas Maznar writes in an article that Hizballah’s Islamic resistance succeeded in winning enthusiastic support in the Arab world because of its religious and Arab identity, on the one hand, and its messages, on the other hand. According to Maznar, the “resisting information campaign” (that is, the dissemination of information that shapes the “resisting society” in Lebanon) in its broad sense filled an important role in this success because it gave expression to the aspirations and hopes of the Arab and Islamic peoples. In his article, he writes that thanks to the “resisting information campaign,” a “resisting society” was also formed in Palestine – where its popular expression was the intifada.<sup>12</sup> The person in charge of Hizballah’s central cultural unit, Sheikh ‘Ali Da’mush, emphasized that “the culture of resistance” became the leading one in Lebanon and in Palestine. He added in another article that the Palestinian people emphasize via the al-Aqsa Intifada that the only way to restore Palestine is the way of Hizballah and the logic of resistance and martyrs (*shahada*).<sup>13</sup> On another occasion, Da’mush claimed that the victory of the “resistance” in May 2000 expressed the victory of the culture of resistance and helped to disseminate it.<sup>14</sup> These statements also reflect the view of Hizballah’s Secretary General, Hasan Nasrallah, who stated that the culture of the Islamic nation is advancing in large steps toward a program of “resistance,” and he says that this is a “product of belonging to the Qur’an.”<sup>15</sup>

There are two exemplary models of a “resisting society” and its culture in Islamic history. The first is the society that existed during the time of the Prophet Muhammad in Mecca and in Medina; the second is the Iranian society following the Islamic Revolution. A general, universal model of a “resisting society”<sup>16</sup> is also derived from these two examples. This type of society can arise in various countries and arenas, without affiliation to the Shiite group (for example, the “Palestinian resistance”) or even Islam as a religion. According to Hizballah’s view, this universal model of a “resisting society” includes common denominators, such as: resistance to Israel and to the West, led by the U.S.;<sup>17</sup> identification with certain principles of the Iranian Islamic Revolution (for example, the resistance to the oppression of the downtrodden); reference to the “internal strength” (that is, the corporal/military) as a necessary means for attaining political objectives and becoming established on “foundations of contemplation, leadership and emotion.”<sup>18</sup>

The vanguard: The resisters (*muqawimun*) or fighters (*mujahidun*) who bear arms are the vanguard of the “resisting society.” They are under the command of a leader who assigns directives to them and they must be in a state of readiness to carry out any action. They serve as an example of self-sacrifice / martyrdom (*shahada*) for the entire society. Thus, the martyr (*shahid*) who is killed from among the vanguard is not only a martyr of his family, but a martyr of the entire society.<sup>19</sup>

Foundations of the strength of the “resisting society”: The first basis of strength are institutions and companies that provide economic, social and spiritual backing for the “resistance” (that is, Hizballah’s militia). Prominent examples of these companies and institutions include: the Authority for the Support of the Islamic Resistance (Hay’at Da’m al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya), which conducts fundraising activity in Lebanon and abroad; the Martyr’s Association (Jam’iyyat Mu’assasat al-Shahid), which works to provide socio-economic and medical assistance for the families of fallen fighters (in addition to disseminating the culture of jihad and martyrdom); and the Jihad Building for Development Institution (Mu’assasat Jihad al-Bina’ al-Inma’iyya), which provides economic and social assistance to the “resisting society” in general, with a view of “strengthening its resilience vis-à-vis the enemy.” A central part of this institution’s activity is the rehabilitation of infrastructure and homes damaged during the war.

The second basis of strength is the voluntarism by the individual for the resistance, which makes the individual a partner in it. In light of this approach, the Islamic resistance has succeeded in mobilizing many Lebanese Shiites in jihad and resistance activity.<sup>20</sup>

Comparing the Islamic resistance in Lebanon to the Iranian Islamic Revolution: Spokespersons for Hizballah recognize the fact that the Islamic resistance is the project of, and fostered by, the leaders of the Islamic Revolution, led by Imam Khamene’i. Nonetheless, they try to aggrandize the “resisting society” and its core – the militia in Lebanon – by comparing it to the Iranian Islamic Revolution. Sheikh Muhammad Khatun portrays the “victory of the resistance in May 2000 over Israel” (the reference is to the IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon) as an event of the magnitude of the victory of the Iranian Islamic Revolution over its enemies, domestic and foreign, and as a formative event in the Middle East that was unprecedented in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Still, Khatun makes every effort to remove any illusion that in the wake

10 For example, two extreme Salafist Sunni movements support Hizballah and are even allies by virtue of their identification with Hizballah’s anti-American and anti-Israeli view. The movements are the Islamic Action Front (Jabhat al-‘Amal al-Islami) led by Fathi Yakan, and the Islamic Unification movement (Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islamiyya), Muhammad ‘Alush, [http://www.islamonline.net/servelet/Satellite?c=ArticleA\\_C&cid=1209357566616&pagename=Zone-Arabic-News/NWALayout](http://www.islamonline.net/servelet/Satellite?c=ArticleA_C&cid=1209357566616&pagename=Zone-Arabic-News/NWALayout), May 14, 2008; The Islamic Action Front recently called for disseminating the “strategy of resistance” so that it will be adopted as policy in the region. The movement argues for this policy particularly in light of its claim that the Lebanese resistance and the Palestinian resistance have attained achievements that all of the Arab armies together have never achieved. Lebanese Press Agency. See January 26, 2009: <http://www.nna-leb.gov.lb>

11 *Baqiyyat Allah*, August 2001

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 *Baqiyyat Allah*, February 2002

15 *Baqiyyat Allah*, July 2003.

16 *Baqiyyat Allah*, August 2001.

17 These are referred to by the general name “arrogance” (*istikbar*)

18 *Baqiyyat Allah*, August 2001.

19 Ibid. In the literature of the global jihad, the “vanguard” are the fighters (*mujahidun*), who are called The Group that Merits Allah’s Compassion (*al-ta’ifa al-mansura*).

20 For the interview with Sheikh Muhammad Khatun on the “resisting society,” see: *Baqiyyat Allah*, August 2001.

of the victory of the “resistance” in May 2000 it is possible to rest on its laurels. He states, for example, that even after this victory, the “resisting society” in Lebanon must continue to preserve its characteristics as a fighting society in order to continue to achieve additional goals, because its work is yet to be completed.<sup>21</sup>

These remarks are echoed by Hizballah’s Deputy Secretary General, Na’im Qasim, who notes that the Islamic resistance drew inspiration from and was influenced by the Islamic Revolution, and received assistance from the Revolutionary Guards, who helped to establish it. Qasim also describes the ideological principles guiding the two revolutions as principles that actually derive from the revolutionary worldview of Khomeini.<sup>22</sup>

The researcher ‘Abbas Maznar states that “it is impossible to ignore the important and tremendous role the blessed Islamic Revolution played in reinforcing the path of self-sacrifice / martyrdom (*shahada* / *istishhad*) and the choice of jihad and resistance. He notes that this choice was made since the establishment of Hizballah and the historic declaration of its ideological platform (*al-risala al-maftuha*),<sup>23</sup> which formed a strong and strategic connection between the party and the Islamic Revolution.”<sup>24</sup>

Sheikh Mahmud Karnib shares this approach and even expands it by drawing a mystical / religious line connecting the Prophet Muhammad’s act of “migration” (*hijra*) and the Islamic Revolution and Islamic resistance. He claims that the common denominator of these three phenomena is the motif of “migration” in its mystical / religious sense of abandoning a state of ignorance, exploitation and deviation, and transition to the light of faith and the straight path, which occurs by connecting (migration) to Allah. Karnib even sees this connection as “the proof of the superiority of Shi’ism and that it is the authorized and legitimate Islamic stream, deriving its authority from the founder of Islam himself – the Prophet Muhammad.” In the specific example of “the Islamic resistance” (that is, Hizballah), Karnib speaks about “migration from a place of defeat, surrender and desperation to a space of hope and the realization of victory over the enemy after a period in which no one hoped this would occur.” At the same time, the author notes that the Islamic resistance was formed under the watchful eye of Khomeini and his instructions, which were implemented by a group of religious sages and fighters (*mujahidun*) led by the “master of the martyrs” (*sayyid al-shuhada*) of the Islamic resistance, ‘Abbas al-Musawi.<sup>25</sup>

In summary, these and other documents indicate that “the resisting society” and its product – “the Islamic resistance” – draw their inspiration and basic principles from the philosophy of the fathers of the Islamic Revolution via the clerics of Hizballah. Moreover, the formation of these two bodies in Lebanon is, in fact, a result of the establishment of the Iranian Islamic Revolution and was executed according to the teachings and instructions of the instigators of the Islamic Revolution and based on the implementation of lessons from the conduct of this revolution.<sup>26</sup>

## Central Principles in Hizballah’s Ideology and Their Formation in the Spirit of Shi’ism and the Iranian Islamic Revolution

### General

The source of the name Hizballah, whose literal translation is “party of Allah,” is from the Qur’an. In general, Hizballah embraces a pan-Islamic ideology influenced by the religious-Shiite revolutionary view of the fathers of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, led by Imam Khomeini. This is expressed, first and foremost, in accepting the undisputed standing of Caliph ‘Ali – the founder of the *al-Shi’a al-Imamiyya*<sup>27</sup> stream in Shi’ism – and his 11 descendant Imams as the exclusive heirs of the Prophet Muhammad and, consequently, as the leaders of the Islamic nation.

In its ideological platform, published on February 16, 1985 as an “open letter” to the “downtrodden” in Lebanon and in the world (*risala maftuha li-al-mustad’afin*), Hizballah accepts the innovative idea of the Islamic Revolution pertaining to the *wali faqih* – the rule of the jurist – that derives, inter alia, from the status of ‘Ali as the heir of Muhammad in the Shiite heritage. In its platform, Hizballah also emphasizes its loyalty to Iran and its leader Khomeini – the *wali faqih* – while stating that the secretary general of Hizballah manages the organization’s everyday affairs as empowered by the leader of the revolution. In addition, the document emphasizes that the organization is an Islamic movement and rejects the Lebanese identity and the Lebanese regime’s right to exist, and expresses opposition to anyone who operates in the framework of the Lebanese constitution.<sup>28</sup>

This platform remains Hizballah’s only official political and philosophical document, despite the fact that the organization itself has revised and adjusted its policies. These revisions were evident in the parliamentary elections held in Lebanon during 1992-1996, but they did not reach the level of reexamining the party’s ideological and religious worldview.<sup>29</sup>

The revision of the traditional Shiite worldview by the fathers of the Islamic Revolution was conducted in a way that serves the political aims of the revolution: domestically – mobilizing the support of the masses for the Islamic Revolution and enlisting them in realizing its objectives (among other ways, by reinterpreting the idea of jihad); and abroad – promoting the interests of the Shiites vis-à-vis the Sunnis, particularly by emphasizing the principle of the transfer of inheritance from Muhammad to ‘Ali, as well as the lofty status of the latter and the need to be loyal

21 Ibid.

22 *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2001; see also in the Appendix 1: Hizballah-Iran – Shared Ideological Principles and Reciprocal Relations.

23 The reference is to Hizballah’s ideological platform from 1985. See more on this below.

24 *Baqiyat Allah*, August 2001.

25 *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2002.

26 On the Iranian role, including the roles of Iran’s embassies in Damascus and Beirut in regard to the cultural and Islamic direction of Hizballah, youth education and the establishment of economic and social aid institutions for the “resisting society,” see: Shapira, pp. 143-145.

27 This stream has two additional names: “*al-Shi’a al-lthna*” / “*Ashariyya*” (Twelver Shi’ism, named for the 12 imams) and “*al-Shi’a al-Ja’fariyya*” (named for the Sixth Imam, Ja’far al-Sadiq). The source of the word *Shi’a* is *Shi’at ‘Ali* – the faction of ‘Ali. Shi’ism describes ‘Ali with the title Commander of the Faithful – *amir al-mu’minin*.

28 Shapira, pp 125-126.

29 “The Hizballah Party and the Amal Movement,” *Al-Rashead Encyclopedia*, May 6, 2008, see: <http://www.alrashead.net/index.php?partd=18&derid=785>.

to him. Hizballah, which regards itself as a copy of the model of the Islamic Revolution and an inseparable part of it, follows the path of the revolution in all things related to this matter. This is expressed in the fact that Hizballah also employs its ideology to promote the interests of the organization, at home and abroad.

### **The View of the Leader, the Leadership and the Patterns of Rule**

#### **The Status of 'Ali as the Heir of the Prophet and the Founder of the "Imama," as well as His Spiritual Values**

A basic principle in the religious-political faith of the Shiites in Iran – which, in fact, constitutes a basis for the very existence of Shi'ism – is the transfer of inheritance to lead the Islamic nation from the Prophet Muhammad to the members of his family (*ahl al-bayt*) and, more specifically, to Caliph 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib. The Shiite tradition bases the veracity of its version of the handing down of power from Muhammad to Caliph 'Ali and his descendants – the imams – on an event that Muhammad conducted at a place called Ghadir Khumm. At this event, the Shiites claim, Muhammad declared to the community of believers that 'Ali would inherit his rule. (This announcement of the succession of rule is referred to in Shi'ism as the Day of al-Ghadir (*yawm al-ghadir*) for the name of this place.) The event of Ghadir Khumm is considered in Shi'ism as the formative event constituting the basis for its establishment, its justification for being the faithful continuer of Muhammad's path, its mission on behalf of Islam and all of humanity, and its lofty values, as embodied in the personality of 'Ali.<sup>30</sup> Shi'ism also deduces from certain passages in the Qur'an the divine command to Muhammad regarding the transfer of rule from him to 'Ali, as well as the principle of the "imama" in the sense of granting leadership to humanity.<sup>31</sup> The idea that 'Ali inherited the rule from Muhammad is ingrained in the Shiite consciousness in the sacred concept of *wilayat 'Ali* (or *al-wilaya*), which means the rule of 'Ali and his spiritual patronage.

A senior religious figure in Hizballah even states that the principle of *wilayat 'Ali* is the equivalent of the entire religion of Islam. In his view, without the existence of the *wilaya*, the religion of Islam loses all value, as if it had never been brought down to Allah and conveyed by Muhammad his messenger. Based on these beliefs, the Muslims are required to demonstrate their loyalty to 'Ali and his offspring.<sup>32</sup>

Shi'ism attributes to 'Ali exalted qualities of great spirituality, absolute religious devotion and fear of Heaven, which in fact constitute the peak of human spirituality. According to Shi'ism, 'Ali received the highest spiritual authority and patronage, in addition to the reigns of power. Khamene'i states in his commentary on the event that transpired at Ghadir Khumm that the Prophet Muhammad appointed 'Ali as his heir at this event because of his lofty spiritual qualities and his outstanding Islamic and human values. From this, he derives a model of the character of the leader a community and society should appoint. In his view, authoritative leaders should be appointed according to criteria of noble and lofty Islamic, social and spiritual qualities and characteristics. According to Khamene'i, the Iranian state implements this model and is now returning to "its Islamic identity" thanks to the criteria of the leader defined at al-Ghadir. However, Khamene'i states that the Islamic nation does not devote sufficient attention to Islamic values and places the weight of responsibility of leadership on its elected officials, while the West is trying to compel the Muslims to change their way of life and conducts attacks against the Iranian people due to its adherence to its Islamic culture.<sup>33</sup>

Khamene'i points to the special personality of 'Ali as reflected in the book attributed to him in the Shiite tradition – "Peak of Eloquence" (*nahj al-balagha*). Khamene'i calls 'Ali: "a heavenly man," and "a perfect model of Islam." Based on the "Peak of Eloquence," which enables us to get to know 'Ali as a person of knowledge and morality, Khamene'i states that the Islamic society should develop the Islamic person (through education) according to the character of 'Ali. He says in summary that much time has passed since Muslims have followed the path illuminated by the "Peak of Eloquence" and now is the time to return to this path and disseminate it throughout the entire Islamic world.<sup>34</sup>

In summary, the concept of *wilayat 'Ali* expresses, therefore, 'Ali's authority to rule as well as his qualities and spiritual patronage.

#### **The Doctrine of the Twelve Imams – Sole Repositories of Truth, Intercessors with Allah, Redeemers of Mankind, Infallible and Omnipotent**

Around the Caliph 'Ali (who is called the Commander of the Faithful – *amir al-mu'minin*) and his descendants (the 11 imams), who are portrayed as Muhammad's true heirs, the Twelver stream of Shi'ism (*al-shi'a al-ithna 'ashariyya*) developed, named for the 12 imams. This stream is dominant in Iran, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and other states in the Middle East. There are other streams in Shi'ism: the al-Zayyidiyya (in Yemen) and the al-Isma'iliyya. The Isma'iliyya stream believes that the successor of the sixth imam should have been Isma'il and not Musa Kazim, as the Twelvers believe, and that after the death of Isma'il, while his father was still alive, the rule should have passed on to his son Muhammad al-Maktub. This community is primarily found in Southeast Asia, with a minority in Iran.

#### **The View of the Rule of the Jurisprudent (*wilayat al-faqih*) and Its Integration in the System of Rule in the State**

The concept of *wali faqih* (ruling jurisprudent), which Khomeini developed and is implemented in practice in Iran, made an impact on Hizballah's ideology. Hizballah views this idea as an ideal pattern of leadership for running the state. The organization also regards the acceptance of this view as identification with the very heart of the Islamic Revolution and as a declaration of absolute loyalty to the leader of Iran, who embodies in his personality and education, as a religious sage, the patterns of the *wali faqih*. Against this background, the organization inculcates the idea of the *wilayat al-faqih* in the system of information and indoctrination it operates – in the framework of studies and courses – among its adherents.

In his essay *al-Jihad*, the leader of Iran, Khamene'i, explains the essence of the position of the *wali faqih* as "great divine benevolence, on the one hand, and as a central envoy of the Islamic movement, on the other hand, during the period of disappearance (of the hidden imam).

30 *Baqiyat Allah*, January 2005.

31 See, for example, *Qur'an*, Sura 5:67.

32 For an interview with the Islamic sage Ja'far Murtada on the Day of al-Ghadir and *wilayat 'Ali*, see: *Baqiyat Allah*, January 2005.

33 *Baqiyat Allah*, January 2005.

34 *'Awda Ila Nahj al-Balagha* (Returning to *Nahj al-Balagha*), Beirut, 2000, pp. 43-45, 55-56. The book contains three lectures of Khamene'i about *Nahj al-Balagha* ("Peak of Eloquence" – a collection of 'Ali's speeches that deal with all aspects of life).

This is because the *wilayat al-faqih* will dispel dangers, identify the interests of the nation, which will march together in one direction, since the *wali faqih* is the guarantee of the continuation of this march and non-deviation from it.” In other words, Khamene’i – in line with his predecessor Khomeini – attributes to the *wali faqih* a mystical status of substitute / representative of the hidden imam during the period of his disappearance and until his appearance as mahdi, which will bring redemption to the world. This status empowers the *wali faqih* with mystical capabilities for protecting the revolution from its enemies and advancing it safely and correctly toward the realization of its goals.<sup>35</sup> For emphasis, Khamene’i cites excerpts from Khomeini who demands from the fighters and the Republican Guard – which constitute the main stronghold of the regime of the Islamic Revolution – that “the issue of *wilayat al-faqih* flow in their veins and that they take upon themselves its constant supervision.”<sup>36</sup>

The decision of the Hizballah organization regarding the *wali faqih*, which is a controversial issue in the Shiite world, is clear. In Hizballah publications, Khamene’i is given the title of “substitute / general representative” (*al-na’ib al-’amm / al-na’ib bi-al-haqq*) of the hidden imam.

Further evidence of acceptance of the Khomeinist revolutionary concept of *wali faqih* by Hizballah and its dissemination among the ranks of the organization can be seen in the organization’s training booklets. One such example is the booklet used in the Hizballah training course that teaches about the essence of the concept of *wilayat al-faqih* and its connection to the Islamic government. According to this booklet, “*wilayat al-faqih* is not merely a conceptual theory discussed by scholars. Rather, it is reality, a way of life and a regime on which Islamic society is based, with the goal of attaining victories, one after another.”<sup>37</sup>

Another series of lessons expounded by Khamene’i, and which was translated from Farsi to Arabic for Hizballah personnel, explains the importance of the revolutionary idea that Khomeini formulated. Here he emphasizes that according to Khomeini the disappearance of the hidden imam – the leader of the Muslims who will appear in the future – must not create a vacuum of leadership and sound rule that guides and directs the Muslims. In accordance with Khomeini’s teaching, these lessons challenge traditional Shiite views that prohibit an active leadership and fateful decisions (such as a declaration of a jihad campaign) as long as the hidden imam has yet to appear. The lessons teach that a collection of laws for reforming the society is not enough, and there is a need for a government that takes action. Khamene’i argues that “no society can organize its affairs except under the existence of law and a ruler who ensures that this law is executed.” He states: “The establishment of a government is a duty; if not, many laws would stop operating – for example, in the areas of jihad and defense of the Muslim states and their property, and in the area of implementing the laws.”

Based on this outlook, it becomes a duty to establish a leadership, headed by the *wali faqih*, which will manage the affairs of the Muslims. Khamene’i notes the need for a government / rule to exist based on the ultimate authority of Caliph ‘Ali. In this context, Khamene’i states that there is opposition to the concept advocated by the stream that opposed ‘Ali in his day – the Khawarij. This ancient stream claimed that there was no need for a government and proclaimed the following slogan: “There is no rule except Allah” (*la hukm illa li-Allah*). ‘Ali stated in response to the challenge this group posed to his rule: “The people need a ruler.” He agreed that the only rule belongs to Allah, but argued that this does not mean that the society must remain without someone to direct it. According to ‘Ali, it is a natural social and human need to have someone lead a society, regardless of whether he is good or bad.”<sup>38</sup>

This series of lessons presents two models for implementing the idea of *wali faqih*: The first model is an existing state such as Iran, where the only source of rule in the Islamic regime is the *wali faqih*. The three branches – legislative, executive and judicial – enjoy independence, but their authority to rule derives from the *wali faqih*. The second model is the rule of the *wali faqih* in a non-state setting. As Khamene’i explains, “He [the *wali faqih*] rules over the Muslims whether a state exists in the country or not.” Obedience to those appointed by the *wali faqih* is obligatory for all people as long as the directives of these appointees remain within the domain of their authorities in the framework of the foundations of Islamic law. It seems that the second model suggests the situation in which Hizballah operates in Lebanon – a state where the rule is divided between Muslims and Christians and is not subject to the rule of the *wali faqih*. This model apparently grants legitimacy to Hizballah to accept the authority of the *wali faqih* – the leader of Iran, Khamene’i – and to enforce obedience to the leader of Hizballah as the representative of Khamene’i in Lebanon.<sup>39</sup>

The mystical / apocalyptic idea derived from the idea of *wali faqih* is that his leadership and policy constitute a guarantee for expediting the appearance of the hidden imam, and thus for bringing redemption nearer. This means that the decisions of the *wali faqih* should be obeyed and executed in order to advance the appearance of the hidden imam and, consequently, to realize this Shiite ideal.

In summary, the leadership of Hizballah uses the idea of the *wilayat al-faqih* – from which it derives its authority – in its propaganda in order to promote its vital interests:

- establishing the legitimacy of Hizballah’s leadership and the party’s institution of rule
- strengthening the patterns of discipline and obedience to Hizballah’s leadership on the part of the “resisting society”
- boosting motivation among the members of the “resisting society” and fighters of the “Islamic resistance” to carry out the directives of Hizballah’s leadership.

35 The Shiite tradition ruled that Islamic sages are *al-na’ib al-’amm* (the general representative), and that they are entitled to assume only some of the authorities of the hidden imam. Contrary to this view, Khomeini’s concept of *wali faqih* determined that Islamic sages, and the religious jurists in particular, are entitled to also fill the political roles of the hidden imam.

36 ‘Ali Khamene’i, *al-Jihad*. Beirut, 2004.

37 *Durus fi Wilayat al-Faqih*. Beirut, 2005.

38 *‘Awda Ila Nahj al-Balagha* (Returning to *Nahj al-Balagha*).

39 The leadership of the Imam al-Mahdi Scouts Organization traditionally sends blessings on Shiite Islamic religious holidays to the community of scouts, including a special blessing for three people: the hidden imam (who bears the title of Master of the Era and the Times – *sahib al-’asr wa-al-zaman*), his substitute / representative (Imam Khamene’i), and the secretary general of Hizballah (Hasan Nasrallah – who bears the title *sayyid al-mujahidin samahat hujjat al-Islam wa-al-Muslimin*). See: *al-Bayan*, November 2002.

## Exemplars of Leadership

The religious and ideological literature that Hizballah distributes via its publications and institutions are full of paradigms of leaders from the ancient and modern history of Islam and Shi'ism, exalting their qualities, attributes and leadership skills. The reliance on these examples is designed, inter alia, to reinforce the cohesion of the "resisting society" around the organization's leadership and to intensify religious adherence to Shi'ism. These examples of leaders can be divided into the following categories:

### A. The Prophet Muhammad:

The status of the Prophet Muhammad as the founder of Islam is emphasized through reliance on the Qur'an as the central source of authority. The appearance of these motifs is designed to create a broad common denominator with the Sunnis in Lebanon in order to bring them closer to Shi'ism and to emphasize its Islamic authenticity. Hizballah attributes supreme importance to attaining this objective in order to serve two important interests: A) to promote its aspiration to achieve wide national consensus around its strategy; B) to counter propaganda by extreme Sunni groups that depict Shi'ism as a religion that deviates from Islam and is considered heretical. For this purpose, Khamene'i promulgated a message about the need to forge "unity of the Islamic nation by exposing the true character of the Prophet Muhammad to Muslims and non-Muslims."<sup>40</sup>

Sheikh Karnib summarizes the Prophet Muhammad's attributes and patterns of leadership and, by analogy, those of Imam Khomeini too by noting the following main points: absolute reliance on Allah, and courage and strength to lead a complete nation, transforming it from a state of ignorance and weakness to a state of enlightenment, spirituality, faith in the oneness of God and in attaining victory. The leader's role is to communicate tidings and warnings, while also serving as a beacon that sheds light around it.<sup>41</sup>

### B. The Imam 'Ali:

There is a conspicuous effort to depict 'Ali as a central and formative figure in Islam, in line with the character of the Prophet Muhammad. Especially salient is the portrayal of 'Ali as the founder of the dynasty of imams, which constitutes the backbone of Shi'ism. Shiite interpretation finds Qur'anic authority for 'Ali, for his rule and for the *Mahdi*, his descendant. This also accords divine legitimacy to the status of 'Ali and his heirs as the leaders of Islam, and strengthens the Shiite claim to the handing down of rule from Muhammad to 'Ali. The collection of speeches attributed to 'Ali (*Nahj al-Balagha*) is sometimes presented as the second most important book in Islam after the Qur'an.<sup>42</sup> The character of 'Ali is also described as a universal Islamic figure in a way that enables Muslims outside of the Shiite community to identify with him.

### C. The fathers of Shi'ism after the Imam 'Ali, with an emphasis on his son – Hussein

(The reference is to Imam Hussein Ibn 'Ali and the other ten imams.) Imam Hussein is accorded special status due to his death as a *shahid* in the battle of Karbala. The '*Ashura*' ceremonies, which revolve around this event (observed as a memorial day and fast on the tenth day of the month of Muharram), have become a formative experience in Shi'ism and gained momentum in the wake of the Islamic Revolution. Shiite doctrine portrays Hussein as the exemplar of self-sacrifice and this is expressed in an even stronger way in the doctrine of the Islamic Revolution. Hussein is called the "Master of the Martyrs" (*sayyid al-shuhada*) in Shiite revolutionary terminology and Shiites are obliged to emulate him. Khamene'i attributes to Hussein "the revitalization of Islam thanks to his jihad."<sup>43</sup>

### D. The mothers of Shi'ism

(The reference is primarily to Fatima, Muhammad's daughter and the wife of 'Ali, as well as their daughter Zaynab.) The two women appear in Hizballah informational material as an exemplar of female scouts and commanders in Hizballah's Scouts organization. In an article on Fatima (who is referred to in Islam as *al-zahra* – that is, the "radiant" or "shining") published in the newspaper of the organization's Scouts organization, it is noted that Khomeini chose Fatima's birthday to be the "Muslim Woman's Day" and that this day was also chosen to be the "Day of the [Female] Commander" in Hizballah's Scouts organization. The newspaper explained this by the fact that Fatima is an example of an outstanding fighter and commander, and that Muslims can learn from her about courage, worshipping God and obeying Allah.<sup>44</sup>

### E. The leaders of the Islamic Revolution

(The reference is to Imam Khomeini and his successor, Imam Khamene'i.)<sup>45</sup> The status that Khamene'i attributes to Khomeini is particularly salient, placing him on the same level of the prophets. This is done by comparing Khomeini's attributes to those of the prophets by describing 17 qualities shared by the imam and the prophets.<sup>46</sup>

It should be noted that Hizballah recognizes the status of Khamene'i as *wali faqih* – as the "general representative of the hidden imam" – and also as the source of emulation (*marja' taqlid*).<sup>47</sup> Hizballah's publications also sing the praises of Khamene'i, his qualities and actions, as follows:

- symbolizes the way of Islamic culture, in the path of Khomeini

40 *Sada al-Wilaya*, (Beirut), January-February 2006.

41 *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2002.

42 '*Awda Ila Nahj al-Balagha* (Returning to *Nahj al-Balagha*).

43 See Khamene'i's speech marking the month of Muharram in a document released by Hizballah's Central Information Unit on April 17, 1999.

44 *Al-Mahdi* magazine, July 2005.

45 Khamene'i appears in Hizballah's publications with the title: "the leader" (*al-qa'id*), "leader of the Muslims (*wali amir al-Muslimin*)", "source of supreme authority (*al-marja' al-a'la*). He also appears with the title of "substitute for the missing imam" (*al-na'ib bi-al-haqq*).

46 *Al-Imam al-Khomeini kama Yarahu al-Imam al-Khamene'i* (The Imam Khomeini as Seen by the Imam Khamene'i). Beirut, 2000.

47 In a detailed article, Sheikh Akram Barakat – one of Hizballah's religious sages, writes that a number of the leading Shiite religious sages have published testimony regarding their recognition of Khamene'i as the source of emulation (*marja' taqlid*). This is based, inter alia, on their recognition of Khamene'i's erudition – which is a key condition among the qualities required of a source of emulation. See his article in *Baqiyat Allah*, August 2002; the Secretary General of Hizballah, Hasan Nasrallah also released a video declaring his recognition of Khamene'i as a source of emulation. See: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qeBbsZl5kUw>.

- guarantees the wellbeing of Islamic culture, keeping it from straying from its lofty mission
- maintains the continued support on issues of justice and the rights of Muslims in the global arena – first and foremost, the Palestinian issue
- guides the nation's activity toward moderation and the middle way, and distances it from extremism and exaggeration – characteristics that Islamic societies suffered from in the past and present
- shapes the holiness of the Islamic ruler among the nation. The ruler is considered the primary force in the Islamic leadership's ability to motivate Muslims to achieve their victories in the fields of policy, economics, the army and culture.
- defends Islamic unity against division
- blocks the cultural invasion, warns against it and exposes its plans<sup>48</sup>

#### F. Two of the founders of Hizballah

(The reference is to Raghیب Harb and 'Abbas al-Musawi.) There are biographical chapters devoted to these two men, extolling their personality, qualities, leadership and death on the holy altar of martyrdom.

There are two prominent motifs in the "exemplary" life of Raghیب Harb. The first motif is his behavior in accordance with "what he learned from the Messenger and the imams." This means that each leader in Shi'ism serves as an example for the leaders of the generations to follow him. The second motif is his joining and leading the fighters in jihad battles.<sup>49</sup>

One of many examples of memorializing the character of former Hizballah secretary general 'Abbas al-Musawi can be found in an article written in a Hizballah journal to illustrate his character. The article portrays al-Musawi as the epitome of true leadership from both the political and spiritual aspects, and as a model of moral human leadership – a model derived from the attributes defined by the Qur'an, the Messenger Muhammad and members of his family. These attributes are not acquired in a regular school, but rather in "the school of life," and based on a true desire to follow the attributes that Allah commanded. Khomeini is also mentioned as one of the exemplars from whom al-Musawi learned.<sup>50</sup>

#### **The Perception of the Enemy**

As the product of the Khomeinist Islamic Revolution and under its patronage, the Hizballah organization adopts and completely identifies with the revolution's perception of the enemy and regards it as an inseparable part of the perception of the strategic and operative confrontation with the enemies of the revolution and its rivals. The revolution's perception of the enemy – anchored in the Shiite religious and political tradition – was substantially updated and defined by Khomeini, based on the Islamic, regional and global strategy he charted.

#### **The Religious Basis for the Perception of the Enemy – "Disavowal and Faithfulness" (*al-bara'a wa-al-tawalli*)**

In an extensive article, Sheikh Malik Wahbi describes the principle of "disavowal and faithfulness" that underlies the Shiite tradition's perception of the enemy – a principle that was also adopted by Sunnism.<sup>51</sup> The concept of disavowal represents "disavowal of polytheism and unbelievers and anything that is opposed to the principles of the religion" (*al-bara'a min al-mushrikin wa-al-kafirin wa-min kull ma huwa didd al-din*). The parallel principle to disavowal is "loyalty" (*al-tawalli*) to Allah, to the faithful and to anyone whose rule Allah tells us to accept. The concept of "disavowal" not only represents a passive approach of identifying the enemy – polytheism and unbelievers – but also an operative approach to take action against it. According to Wahbi, the Qur'an is full of verses that prohibit loyalty to unbelievers and that call for disavowing them. In one of the verses (Sura 3:28), it is written:

Let not the believers take for friends or helpers unbelievers rather than believers: if any do that, in nothing will there be help from Allah, except by way of precaution, that ye may guard yourselves from them.

According to the Shiite tradition, the traditional / historic root of the concept of "disavowal and faithfulness" is the declaration made by 'Ali – upon the directive of Muhammad himself – during the period of the *hajj* (pilgrimage) to Mecca. The declaration was made before a large crowd in Mecca that included both believers and polytheists. In the framework of this declaration, 'Ali read a verse from the Qur'an (Sura 9:2-3) that contains – according to the Shiite tradition – the concepts of disavowal and faithfulness" in all their meanings:

So go about in the land for four months and know that you cannot weaken Allah and that Allah will bring disgrace to the unbelievers. And an announcement from Allah and His Messenger to the people on the day of the greater pilgrimage that Allah and His Messenger are free from liability to the idolaters; therefore if you repent, it will be better for you, and if you turn back, then know that you will not weaken Allah; and announce painful punishment to those who disbelieve.

Khomeini was able to endow the concept of "disavowal and faithfulness" with modern meaning and to identify the ancient enemy of Shi'ism – that is, polytheism and unbelievers – with the enemies of the Islamic Revolution in the modern era. These enemies were identified in Khomeini's thought with the West, the U.S. and Israel, which are referred to in the terminology of the Islamic Revolution and Hizballah by the name "arrogance" (*istikbar*). In other words, Khomeini drew from the Prophet Muhammad and the Imam 'Ali the legitimacy to declare "the arrogance" as the enemy of the revolution. In order to substantiate his perception that equated the polytheists and unbelievers of the period of Muhammad and 'Ali with the "arrogant ones" of our day, Khomeini decided that it was necessary to renew during the hajj season the declaration 'Ali had made in his day about "disavowing the polytheists and the unbelievers" – which, according to Sheikh Malik Wahbi, was tantamount to a declaration on

48 *Baqiyat Allah*, August 2003.

49 See for example: *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2002. Sheikh Raghیب Harb, one of the most prominent religious figures in southern Lebanon, was killed in February 1984. He became a Shiite martyr, a symbol of self-sacrifice and a symbol of Hizballah's struggle against Israel: Shapira, pp 120-121.

50 See for example: *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2002.

51 See Malik Wahbi's article and an additional article by Khamene'i on this subject in *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2002.

“disavowal from the arrogant ones.”<sup>52</sup> Thus, according to Khomeini’s view, the concept of “disavowal” not only represents a passive approach of identifying the enemy – polytheists and unbelievers – but also an operative approach of embarking on a confrontation against it, even if only on the level of propaganda.

It should be noted that the concept of “disavowal” in the Shiite tradition is not only identified with disavowing unbelievers (who are outside of the framework of Islam), but also the internal opponents of the imams (that is, the first three caliphs and some of the members of Muhammad’s family who firmly opposed ‘Ali). According to Sheikh Wahbi, “the disavowal in our days must also be carried out vis-à-vis ‘rulers’ [that is, from the Sunni community] who have handed over the rule to unbelievers, who seek to obliterate our religion.”<sup>53</sup>

After gaining power, the Iranian regime endeavored to implement Khomeini’s ruling that the ceremony of declaring “disavowal from polytheists and unbelievers” should be carried out and renewed during the period of the hajj in Mecca. However, the Saudi regime regarded Iran’s attempt to perform this ceremony in the midst of the hajj ceremonies as a serious deviation from the laws of the hajj – a deviation that amounted to heresy (*bid‘a*). The Saudi regime also regarded this as an Iranian attempt to exploit the hajj for political objectives. The Saudis ruled that any foreign delegation of pilgrims could perform its own ceremonies only within its defined area; under no circumstances could such ceremonies be performed in the open spaces where the public hajj ceremonies were conducted and controlled by the authorized Saudi religious officials.

During the hajj ceremonies in Mecca in 1987, a violent clash erupted between a procession of Iranian pilgrims, who conducted the “disavowal” ceremony in an open space, chanting “death to America and Israel,” and the Saudi security forces, who tried to prevent this ceremony from being conducted. Hundreds of people were killed or injured in this confrontation, most of them Iranians. As a result, Iran boycotted the hajj ceremonies during the years 1990-1998. Subsequently, Iran was careful to conduct the ceremony of declaring “disavowal” at the hajj only within its delegation’s tent encampment and without the involvement of the Saudi authorities.

However, during the hajj season in December 2008, a senior official in Iran’s delegation to the hajj announced that the Iranian pilgrims would carry out the ceremony of the “disavowal” declaration at Mount ‘Arafat, where the central and most sacred hajj ceremony is conducted, on December 8, 2008. This Iranian ceremony planned for the open space apparently was not conducted due to opposition from the Saudi authorities. Nonetheless, the head of the delegation of Iranian pilgrims read a speech to a group of pilgrims at the delegation’s dwelling at Mount Arafat while thousands of pilgrims – most of them from Iran, Lebanon, Iraq and Bahrain – chanted “death to America and Israel.”

This Iranian ceremony was broadcast on Iranian television and, during the ceremony, Hizballah’s delegation expressed its anger over the embargo Israel had imposed on Gaza. A letter from Khamene’i was read at the ceremony, stating that “after two centuries of collapse and defeat, the dawn is coming for the Islamic nation. The confrontation with the West – and particularly with the U.S. and Israel – has led to the defeat of the [Western] political and economic system. A number of Arab regimes have also suffered damage from this ordeal.”

In summary, it can be stated that the declaration of “disavowal from polytheists” during the hajj, as advocated by Khomeini, was designed for clear sectarian and political needs. From a sectarian and religious perspective, Khomeini sought to fill the hajj – whose ceremonies were defined and conducted by the Sunnis – with Shiite content for the Shiite pilgrims in order to glorify and empower the Shiites. From a political standpoint, Khomeini aspired to exploit the hajj as a catalyst for promoting two main political objectives: The first objective was to intensify propaganda against the U.S., the West and Israel, and to imbue it with global Islamic resonance, exploiting the holy occasion of the hajj and the massive concentration of Muslims there. The second objective was to exploit the call of “disavowal from polytheism” to denigrate Sunni Muslim rulers “who collaborate with the West” – a course of action that should be disavowed according to modern Shi’ism, as the West itself should be disavowed. For these reasons, the Saudi government opposes the exploitation of the hajj by Khomeinist Iran and seeks to prevent Iran from endowing this holy event with content that is foreign to Sunnism and utilizing it for its political purposes. The exploitation of the hajj for these objectives illustrates the activist religious and political facet that Shi’ism and the Iranian Islamic Revolution have adopted.

### **The Threats and Dangers Posed by the “Arrogance” to the Islamic Nation and Shiite Response to These Threats**

During the contemporary period, the perception of the enemy contends with the threats and dangers the leaders of the Islamic Revolution and Hizballah identify as a central enemy for them. As noted, this enemy is embodied in the term “arrogance.” The term “forces of heresy” (*quwwat al-kufr*) also sometimes appears in the literature of Hizballah and the Islamic Revolution as a name for this enemy. Khamene’i notes that the bitterest enemies of Khomeini were the Israelis and the Americans. According to his analysis, the Israelis are the leaders of the Jewish people, while the Americans are the leaders of the polytheists (*mushrikin*), and both confronted Khomeini – which proves that he was the leader of the believers. Among Khomeini’s important objectives was the war against “global arrogance.”<sup>54</sup>

From the perspective of the revolution and Hizballah, the “arrogance” is not only the enemy of the Islamic nation, but is also a global enemy of the “downtrodden peoples” – including the Muslim peoples. Khomeini raised the banner of the struggle of downtrodden peoples against the “arrogance” as part of an offensive of “exporting the revolution” to the broad world. (See the discussion below of Jerusalem (*al-Quds*) Day, which is celebrated as the day of the struggle of the downtrodden against the “arrogance.”)

In the view of the leaders of the revolution and Hizballah, the threats from the “arrogance” against the Islamic nation can be divided into several categories:

#### **A. Cultural offensive by America against the Islamic nation:**

This offensive operates as a pincer movement: on the one hand, by exerting pressure for changing the cultures and ideologies that exist in

52 “The declaration about disavowal from the arrogant ones (*mustakbirin*) during the hajj season is the best method for awakening the [Muslim] peoples. The hajj is the best platform for warning the people.” Ibid.

53 Sheikh Wahbi’s article indicates that “the disavowal” directly pertains to the Sunni world too. In general, Shi’ism divides the world into three camps – the believers (Shiites), Muslims (the Sunnis who do not accept the principle of ‘Ali’s rule) and the unbelievers.

54 *Al-Imam al-Khomeini kama Yarahu al-Imam al-Khamene’i*.



the region, and on the other hand, by infiltrating Western ideas and worldviews that are foreign to Islam, together with intervention in the cultural and religious program of the Muslims.<sup>55</sup> According to Musa Hussein Sifwan, a Lebanese journalist close to Hizballah, the American invasion of Iraq was primarily aimed at gaining a stronghold in the heart of the Arab and Muslim world that would make it easier for America to more effectively disseminate its ideology in the Middle East, while simultaneously facilitating its management of this region from a cultural, military and economic perspective. At the same time, the writer argues that the war the U.S. declared on terror in the wake of the September 11 events is used by the “arrogance” as a pretext to threaten the cultural, religious and even the political existence of the Islamic nation.<sup>56</sup>

According to senior Hizballah leaders, the Shiite response to this threat is expressed in various ways:

First, in the recommendations adopted by the Conference Against the American Cultural Attack, convened in Beirut in June 2003 and organized by Hizballah’s cultural unit. The conference’s recommendations included, inter alia: returning to the sources of the religion; developing cultural institutions; strengthening Shiite religious institutions; deriving benefit from the experience of Islamic movements, including Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as the experience of Iran in confronting these challenges; and in the execution of a meticulous examination of cultural programs coming from the outside.<sup>57</sup> It seems that underlying these recommendations is Hizballah’s aspiration to make the Shiites in general and Iran and Hizballah in particular the ones who set the tone in shaping the Islamic nation according to the Shiite path in the political and cultural realm in the world of Islam. Second, in adopting the Islamic culture and applying it in its most original form, with the belief – imbued with the Shiite apocalyptic-eschatological outlook – that “this culture is a divine culture that descended to God’s Messenger in order to bring salvation in this world and in the next world.”<sup>58</sup>

#### B. The West’s demand that Muslims interpret Islam in a more modern and moderate way in the spirit of the values of the West

The Shiite response states that the Islamic nation is capable of providing a more correct interpretation of Islam that competes with the Western outlook in regard to democracy, liberties and human rights.<sup>59</sup>

#### C. An active cultural offensive accompanied by the dissemination of corruption and abomination

This offensive includes the use of sex, drugs and alcohol, and aims to infect the Muslim youth with these afflictions and distance them from their original society. According to Khamene’i, this policy operates from the economic centers of “Zionism and the global forces,” which have set their sights on the resources of the poor and weak countries. The way these centers have found to destroy these countries is to corrupt the youth through drugs, alcohol and sex.

The Shiite response to these threats, according to Khamene’i, is to motivate the peoples who hold natural resources to place obstacles before this policy of corruption. In addition, Khamene’i argues for acting in accordance with the Qur’anic directives in Sura 3: 103-104: “enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong.” Khamene’i defines the fulfillment of this directive as the religious, revolutionary and political responsibility of the state mechanisms. In his view, this duty is even greater than the obligation of jihad.<sup>60</sup>

#### **Attitude to the Struggle against Israel in Light of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict**

The ideological basis for Hizballah’s armed struggle against Israel, the United States and the West relies to a great extent on the thought of Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah. In its ideological platform of February 1985, Hizballah adopted the goal of Israel’s liquidation and the liberation of Jerusalem as a stage to follow the expulsion of Israel from Lebanon’s territory.<sup>61</sup>

It can be assumed that Hizballah was also influenced by Khomeini in its outlook vis-à-vis the struggle against Israel. The director of Hizballah’s central unit for culture, ‘Ali Da’mush, explains Khomeini’s outlook vis-à-vis the struggle against Israel and its very existence in light of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as follows:

According to Khomeini, the existence of the State of Israel and its continuation do not derive from its own strength but instead from a number of reasons:

1. The unlimited support of the West for Israel.
2. Disputes among the Muslims and Arabs have divided the nation and made it weak facing the Zionists.
3. The adoption of the diplomatic channel in confronting Israel by a number of Arab and Islamic regimes.
4. The absence of “honest” governments in the Muslim states, together with the distancing of Islam from the struggle against Israel.

In regard to the nature of the struggle against Israel, Khomeini believed that:

1. The struggle against the Zionist entity is an existential and religious struggle.
2. The struggle takes place on multiple fronts, which is also conducted versus America, the shah and the despotic rulers. (The reference is to the Arab and Muslim rulers who are hostile to the Iranian revolution.) This assumption was based on Khomeini’s basic premise that the State of Israel was founded by the global forces of the “arrogance.”

55 *Baqiyat Allah*, December 2003.

56 *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2002.

57 The conference was convened under the patronage of the organization’s deputy secretary general, Sheikh Na’im Qasim under the title: “Cultural Programs in the Islamic World – The American Plan and Ways of Confronting It.” For an extensive article about the conference, see: *Baqiyat Allah*, August 2003.

58 *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2002.

59 *Baqiyat Allah*, December 2003.

60 See the speech by the leader Khamene’i marking the month of Muharram, in the publication of Hizballah’s central information unit, June 17, 2008; see also a letter from Khamene’i to the youth in *Sada al-Wilaya*, July 2004.

61 Shapira, pp. 127, 151.

3. In all matters related to the return of Palestine to its owners and confronting the “Zionist plan in the region,” Khomeini believed that the Arabs and Muslims have no alternative but to use the option of “resistance and disavowal” vis-à-vis the enemy. (See above regarding the concept of “disavowal” in Shiite doctrine.)<sup>62</sup>

### **The Attitude toward the Western Effort to “Deny Iran Its Nuclear Capability”**

In his articles published in Hizballah publications, the leader Khamene’i fiercely attacks the efforts of the West to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability. In his view, “the enemy seeks to deny us this capability so that we will consume oil until this resource runs out.” Khamene’i rejects the Western contention that Iran is in fact aspiring to achieve the capability of producing nuclear weapons. His remarks clearly indicate that Iran will continue to develop nuclear energy, because this development “is designed for the generation of electricity and the defense of independence.”<sup>63</sup>

### **The Domestic Sunni Rival**

The Shiite literature – disseminated by the Islamic Revolution and Hizballah – sometimes wrangles with its Sunni rival. This is especially true vis-à-vis the extremist elements in Sunnism who consider the Shiites a heretical community and refer to it with derogatory names such as “the insubordinate” (*al-rafida*) and “the group that abandoned the Islamic community (*ta’ifat al-rida*). In response, Khamene’i calls Sunnism “the deviant Islam” (*al-Islam al-munharif*) compared to Shi’ism, which represents the original Islam (*al-Islam al-asil*). According to his view and words, the deviant Islam has engaged in battle against the original Islam.<sup>64</sup>

The deputy secretary general of Hizballah, Na’im Qasim, strongly attacks the policy of *takfir* (charging fellow Muslims with unbelief) that “small groups” have adopted against the Shiites. He regards this policy, practiced mainly by fundamentalist Sunni groups, as “a deviation from Islam and the divine content.” Qasim promises that Allah will ultimately settle accounts with these groups.<sup>65</sup> The spiritual leader of Hizballah, Fadlallah, recently lashed out against the Sunnis and their “corrupt” leaders. (See the section on the ‘*Ashura*’ below.)

### **The Concept of “The Downtrodden of the World”**

Hizballah adopted the call of Khomeini to declare an international Jerusalem (*al-Quds*) Day as a day of revenge for the oppressed people in the world. Khomeini declared this day on August 7, 1979 and issued a directive that it be marked each year on the last Friday of the month of Ramadan. Hizballah organizes a military parade each year on this day with the participation of various groups, including the organization’s Scouts movement. The significance of global Jerusalem Day for the Islamic Revolution and Hizballah can be seen in the following text, which appears on an Iranian Web site devoted to Jerusalem: “The Imam Khomeini defined Jerusalem Day as a global day, not only as a special day for Jerusalem, but also as a day of confrontation of the downtrodden (*mustad’afin*) versus the ‘arrogant ones’ (*mustakbirun*).” The Iranian Web site attributes the following purpose to this day: “This is a day of confrontation of peoples suffering from America and others. It is a day of reckoning of those who adhere to religion versus the hypocrites (*munafiqun*). The former regard this day as Jerusalem Day, while the hypocrites – those who maintain relations with the great powers and friends of Israel behind the scenes – prevent their peoples from conducting demonstrations on this day.”<sup>66</sup>

### **The Concept of Jihad**

In the past, there was great doubt among the Shiites regarding their obligation to embark on jihad before the return of the hidden imam. The determining factor deferring the obligation to embark on jihad was the ruling that only a legitimate political authority could declare a jihad. Such a declaration was impossible to issue because from the perspective of the prevailing Shiite legal theory, no such legitimate authority has existed since the twelfth imam disappeared. Khomeini’s doctrine deviates sharply from this line of thinking and emphasizes the need for jihad.<sup>67</sup> Nonetheless, the Islamic Revolution has not formulated a firm and well-defined view of jihad – particularly in regard to the military confrontation with the enemy on the various fronts and in defining those who are obligated by this jihad – as the jihadist Sunni Salafists have done.<sup>68</sup>

In general, Hizballah’s literature focuses on jihad of a defensive nature – that is, jihad aimed at defending the sovereignty and integrity of Islamic territory against an offensive move by an external foreign enemy or to mobilize for an offensive military action to expel a foreign enemy that is occupying Islamic land. However, it should be noted that Hizballah’s literature also contains articles exalting the “jihadist personality of the Prophet Muhammad, his jihadist activity and that he was the first fighter (*mujahid*) and the “founder of the school for jihad and *mujahidin* in

62 *Baqiyat Allah*, August 2002.

63 *Sada al-Wilaya*, July 2004.

64 Ibid. See also the speech by the leader Khamene’i marking the month of Muharram, in the publication of Hizballah’s central information unit, June 17, 2008.

65 *Baqiyat Allah*, December 2003.

66 On the global Jerusalem Day, see: <http://www.tebyan.net/index.aspx?pid=29073>, October 17, 2006.

67 Shaul Shay, *The Axis of Evil – Iran, Hizballah and Palestinian Terror*, Herzliya, 2003, p. 27.

68 The ideologues of the Sunni / jihadist stream de-legitimize the Shiites by claiming, among other reasons, that Shi’ism block the jihad in its belligerent sense and does not fulfill this obligation as long as the hidden imam does not return as *Mahdi*. From the standpoint of these ideologues, the jihad is very central in the commandments of Islam and only belief takes precedence in importance. They describe two different types of jihad: The first is a defensive jihad that occurs when Muslims embark on a war to defend Islamic land from an approaching enemy that seeks to conquer it, or in a situation in which it is necessary to liberate Islamic land that has already been conquered. The second is an offensive jihad that occurs in a situation in which the Muslims initiate an attack against non-Islamic territory with the goal of conquering it and transforming it from *dar al-harb* to *dar al-Islam*. Moreover, they explicitly state that in the event it is necessary to liberate Islamic from the burden of foreign conquest, there is no need for a Muslim ruler to declare a jihad that is defensive in nature, and that the obligation to conduct jihad to liberate this land falls upon the shoulders of each individual in the Muslim community who is capable of pursuing it (*fard ‘ayn*).

Islam on the constitutional / legal and practical level.”<sup>69</sup> The fact that these articles appeared indicates that there are some circles in modern Shi’ism and in Hizballah who see the need to support jihad of an offensive nature, aimed at emulating Muhammad, and not only defensive jihad intended, as noted, to defend Islamic land.

According to this literature, the jihad on the battlefield that entails self-sacrifice constitutes the highest level of fulfilling God’s commandment (the jihad for Allah). However, it is also possible to carry out a jihad for the benefit of the war through non-military actions – for example, by a financial contribution or by conducting propaganda. There is also a view that regards jihad as a means to refine and perfect the soul, particularly when the jihad is taking place on the warfront.

This literature also emphasizes that it is possible to fulfill the obligation of jihad not necessarily on the military front, but rather on the fronts of science and society, as well as other non-military activity – such as financial contributions.

### **Jihad of a Defensive Nature**

The following are examples of jihad of a defense nature that appear in Hizballah’s literature:

#### The right to self-defense

The heavenly religions recognize the right to self-defense, including the right to defend the freedom of thought and the rights of nations and groups to independence and dignity. Waging war against aggression for the purpose of restoring rights and self-protection is a holy war from a religious and human perspective. This right of self-defense and counter-attack is anchored in the Qur’an.<sup>70</sup>

#### Expelling the enemy:

Sheikh Na’im Qasim argued that jihad is essential in order to expel the occupier of Islamic land and to purify it from exploitation and aggression. In his view, jihad cannot take place without maximal preparation and requires the mobilization of force in order to promote various situations. According to Qasim, there are two types of preparation:

#### Preparation for the purpose of deterrence:

“The acquisition of power and weapons, and the preparation for a confrontation against exploitation are likely to confer strength and to deter an exploiter from carrying out aggression.”

#### Preparation for the purpose of defense against possible attack or liberation of conquered territory:

Qasim argues that: “Just as the person is required to prepare himself to contend with the internal enemy (that is, the evil inclination), so is he required to prepare vis-à-vis the external enemies – the enemies of humanity and the enemies of the truth. This type of preparation derives from the need for self-defense. Allah commanded us to prepare in order to use force when necessary.” As it is written in the Qur’an, in *Surat al-Anfal* (Sura 8:60): “And prepare against them what force you can and horses tied at the frontier, to frighten thereby the enemy of Allah and your enemy.”

Qasim adds that: “If we are attacked, we use our force when necessary. If we will not be prepared, the enemy will defeat us with simple weapons and even with the threat to use them. [But] if we will be strong, we will be able to defend our rights, protect our arena, liberate our land and attain at least an opportunity to restore our land and rights.”<sup>71</sup>

#### Jihad in the sense of self-sacrifice:

In Hizballah religious and heroic literature on jihad and those who have fulfilled it, there is usually a motif claiming that: “the love of self-sacrifice is the most appropriate title for jihad and its driving force.” This literature argues that the Prophet embodies the full readiness for self-sacrifice, because he is the one who said: “The most honorable death is a death of self-sacrifice,” and he was present in all arenas of battle and self-sacrifice. Consequently, the believers should learn from the example of the Prophet and exhibit readiness to fulfill the jihad, even if it entails self-sacrifice.”<sup>72</sup>

### **A Perfect Combination of Two Types of Jihad**

The literature of the Islamic Revolution and Hizballah fosters the idea that fulfillment of the jihad in its most complete way can be done by combining the two types of jihad: the first is the lesser jihad (*al-jihad al-asghar*) – a jihad of material / corporeal action (such as preparing a military force or conducting a military action) and the second is the greater jihad (*al-jihad al-akbar*) – a jihad of spiritual preparation. This literature states that this complete fulfillment of jihad – by combining two types of jihad – can be performed in three parallel dimensions:

#### The combination conducted within the personal dimension of the fighter:

An article published in Hizballah’s journal develops the view that the battlefield is the ideal school for purifying the soul from indecent aspects, acquiring lofty attributes and ultimately attaining spiritual and ethical perfection of the soul. There are two conditions for attaining the supreme level of a fighter with spiritual perfection: The first condition is participation by the fighter in a violent confrontation (*muwajaha*), which is defined as the “lesser jihad.” The second condition is the spiritual change the fighter undergoes during the course of the confrontation itself – a change that entails purifying the soul and adopting noble attributes. This change is called “the greater jihad.” A person who engaged in a confrontation and did not undergo this “spiritual-educational change” – even if he is killed in the war and is considered a “*shahid*” – does not receive the same reward and high level as someone who experienced both the war and the “spiritual-educational change.” The message

69 *Baqiyyat Allah*, April 2006.

70 Sheikh Mustafa Qusayr writes at length about the battle for Islam in *Baqiyyat Allah* (December 2003) and cites the Qur’an (Sura 2:191): “And kill them wherever you find them, and drive them out from whence they drove you out, and persecution is severer than slaughter, and do not fight with them at the Sacred Mosque until they fight with you in it, but if they do fight you, then slay them; such is the recompense of the unbelievers.”

71 *Baqiyyat Allah*, February 2002.

72 *Baqiyyat Allah*, April 2006.

that Hizballah tries to disseminate among its fighters is that they each must make a personal effort to merge and combine these two types of jihad – the lesser jihad and the greater jihad.<sup>73</sup>

The combination conducted within the dimension of the fighting force:

Sheikh Na'im Qasim compares the practical experience of the Islamic resistance in Lebanon, which "achieved a victory over the enemies," to the lesser jihad. At the same time, he compares the "spiritual purity, the faith in the victory of Allah and the adherence to his directives" – without which "the weapons would be useless against the enemy" – to the greater jihad. According to Qasim, the latter is the more important of the two.<sup>74</sup> Nonetheless, he preaches for both "spiritual preparation and military preparation" – that is, for a combination of the two. Qasim quotes Khamene'i, who also emphasizes these two types of jihad. According to Khamene'i: "We should not limit ourselves only to fostering material or military strength (that is, the lesser jihad), but we should focus on its driving force, which is the fear of Allah, adherence to Him and 'the jihad of the soul' (that is, the greater jihad)."<sup>75</sup>

The combination conducted within the political dimension:

According to Khamene'i's outlook, to establish an Islamic society and regime entails their material development, but also involves creating change and revolution in the hearts of people, which is the more difficult jihad (the greater jihad).<sup>76</sup>

### **Jihad on the Fronts of Science and Civic Activity**

Khamene'i often addresses the question of jihad in his articles. From his point of view, it is possible to fulfill the obligation of jihad in various actions, all of which are directed to a single purpose that appears in the Qur'an – the jihad for Allah. However, in his view, from a practical perspective, the final objective of the jihad is to serve the Islamic Revolution. In one of his articles, he exhorts the youth to fulfill the jihad not necessarily on the battlefield but rather on the fronts of science, morality, political cooperation (that is, the youth should also be a partner in setting policy), research, culture and correct thinking in the society. According to Khamene'i, jihad on these fronts, which strengthen the Islamic Revolution, is actually a jihad directed against "the enemies fighting against Islam."<sup>77</sup>

### **The Holiest Jihad**

In an article by Khamene'i, the Iranian leader depicts the jihad in two aspects:

The first is the personal aspect – The individual must fulfill the will of Allah and be prepared for martyrdom (*shahada*). The imams of Shi'ism determined that martyrdom is an honor bestowed by Allah. Martyrdom is the action upon which all military activity is based. The jihad is one of the gates to the Garden of Eden. This is the routine type of jihad and martyrdom (*istishhad*) expressed by falling in regular battle against the enemy. According to Khamene'i, the most sacred and important jihad occurs when the *mujahid* is in a completely alien setting (*jihad fi al-ghurba*). The most prominent case of this type of jihad in Shi'ite history is the jihad Imam Hussein waged against his enemies at Karbala when operating in an alien setting. This jihad is the essence of the '*Ashura*'. This type of jihad exists when the person heads out to the battleground and the society around him is alien, an enemy or ignores him. The emphasis of this particular aspect of jihad is designed to motivate Hizballah fighters operating outside of their country and in an external setting, especially when operating on their own.

The second aspect of jihad pertains to organizations, especially military and security organizations. Khamene'i states that they must operate according to an organizational and disciplinary outlook and motivation that serves the jihad. In summary, he says that devotion to the *shari'a* gives a real identity to the jihad and serves as a guarantee of victory.<sup>78</sup>

### **The Eschatological / Apocalyptic View**

The eschatological / apocalyptic view of the Hidden Imam – the Twelfth Imam, Muhammad Ibn Hasan al-'Askari – whose return is awaited by the world: The *Mahdi* disappeared twice – the minor occultation (*al-ghayba al-sughra*) lasted 69 years and the major occultation (*al-ghayba al-kubra*) began after the death of the fourth emissary (*safir*) al-Samari in the year 329 of the *Hijra* (the four emissaries witnessed the imam's appearance) and continues to this day. The Shiites believe that it will continue until the end of days, and then the imam will return as the *Mahdi* to establish justice in the world.

The deeply rooted Shi'ite belief in the Hidden Imam and the *Mahdi* – whose return (*faraj; raj'a*) is slated to impose justice in a world ruled by injustice and exploitation – was developed and shaped by the Islamic Revolution. In its updated form, it has become the central motif in the ideology of both the Iranian Revolutionary and Hizballah. This view was shaped by the fathers of the Revolution in a way that was designed to serve a political interest that accords nearly unlimited authority to the leader of the Revolution. According to this view, the leader's authority derives from the delegation of authorities by the Hidden Imam. (Thus, the leader is given the title of *na'ib* – that is, the substitute / representative of the Hidden Imam.)

This view of the Hidden Imam also serves the activist approach that the Revolution seeks to instill in its supporters: The believers are called

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73 **Baqiyat Allah**, August 2001.

74 To illustrate this, Na'im Qasim cites a well-known *hadith* attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. In welcoming a group of Muslims after they completed their mission in one of the raids, the Prophet would start by saying: "Blessed are those who have carried out the lesser jihad and it remains for them to fulfill the greater jihad. They asked him: 'And what is the greater jihad?' And he responded – the jihad of the soul (*jihad al-nafs*). See: **Baqiyat Allah**, February 2002.

75 **Baqiyat Allah**, February 2002.

76 *Ibid.*

77 **Sada al-Wilaya**, (Beirut), March 2003.

78 'Ali Khamene'i, **al-Jihad**, Beirut, 2004.

upon to demonstrate activeness<sup>79</sup> and to do all they can to accelerate the return of the Hidden Imam<sup>80</sup> and not to wait passively until his appearance. Khamene'i determined that "the ground is ripe for the appearance of the *wali al-haqq*" (a moniker for the mahdi). He called upon the entire community of believers to act according to the principles of the 'Ashura' in order to bring rapid reform to the world and, by implication, to expedite the coming of the *Mahdi*.<sup>81</sup> In discussing the *Mahdi*, Nai'im Qasim employs the Qur'anic concept of *baqiyyat Allah* in the sense of "the remnant that Allah left"<sup>82</sup> – which is attributed to the *Mahdi* in Shi'ism. In the following text, he clearly expresses the idea of action aimed at hastening the coming of the *Mahdi*: "Many of those who do not understand the Islamic culture and its philosophical and theological content wonder how we believe that the future is for the benefit of the believers (that is, the Shiites). If it were not for our belief in the *Imam al-Mahdi*, we would not maintain faith and hope. This is an inseparable part of his promise to grant us victory. The important thing for us is to keep sight of this promise and [to feel] hope in *baqiyyat Allah* (Allah will hasten his appearance) in every step and action we undertake in our daily lives. This is so we can live the principle in a practical way and overcome the difficulties that delay our action and our victory for the sake of the future victory of Allah's law over heresy and deviance."<sup>83</sup>

## D. The Means and Motifs for Instilling the Ideology

The Hizballah organization follows the path of the Islamic Revolution to a great extent, making extensive use of means and methods of preaching, education, propaganda and indoctrination. The use of these means is designed to inculcate its worldviews in the organization's target community in Lebanon, in particular, and in other communities in general. It seems that Hizballah learned in this respect from essays written by the fathers of the Islamic Revolution (see below) about the importance of information about the essence of Shi'ism and the Islamic Revolution and its ideas, both at home and abroad.

These means can be divided into three broad categories: means of propaganda and information, formative events in Shi'ism in particular and in Islam in general, and motifs with messages of self-sacrifice, obedience and discipline.

### **Means of Propaganda**

#### **The Role of Information in Forming and Consolidating the "Resisting Society"**

Hizballah's spokesmen and leaders are proud of what they portray as their success in forming around "the Islamic resistance" a supportive "resisting society." This society is based primarily on the Shiite community, but its founders are proud of the fact that it enjoys support and identification from elements outside of the Shiite community that belong to the Sunni, Druze and Christian communities, and even from overseas. This success was achieved to a considerable extent by what is called the campaign of "resisting information" (*i'lam muqawim*) – that is, information with a character and attributes of dynamic and intensive resistance that succeeds in reaching a growing target audience within and outside of the Shiite community through the intelligent use of increasingly sophisticated means of mass media.<sup>84</sup>

This information campaign utilizes means of "mobilization and motivation" (*ta'bi'a wa-tahrid*) designed to mobilize the "resisting society" and motivate it to identify with the beliefs and views of Hizballah and to act according to its policy. From this perspective, the information fills a complementary role to the system of indoctrination conducted in limited frameworks of specific sectors in Hizballah (the youth movement, associations and courses). On the internal level, the information campaign includes the following main messages and content:

1. Religious content, including the principles of the tradition and heritage of Shi'ism.
2. The culture of jihad and self-sacrifice: This is based on reviving the Arab jihadist history in general and Shiite history in particular. Instilling this in the masses is designed to transform the society from one that supports Hizballah to a society of resistance and self-sacrifice. The ways of action and methods of disseminating this culture include:
  - Expanding the dissemination of the culture of jihad and self-sacrifice of Shi'ism – which was previously conducted only in limited circles and frameworks (*Husseiniyyat*),<sup>85</sup> mosques and 'Ashura' councils convened during the first ten days of the month of Muharram to commemorate the death of Hussein Ibn 'Ali – to the general public as well. An effort was made to instill among the general public a feeling of shared destiny and identification with the jihad and self-sacrifice by presenting exemplary models of self-sacrifice among the fathers of Shi'ism and the use of uniform patterns of language, messages and attire that express the idea of self-sacrifice.
  - Screening videos of "true jihadist events" that illustrate attacks of resistance fighters against "the Zionist enemy."
  - Using various means of propaganda such as slogans, anthems, proclamations, signs and television dramas preaching for a jihad of self-sacrifice. Starting in the 1990s, the emphasis was shifted toward disseminating this culture from the radio media to the visual media, which is considered to have a greater impact on the senses.
3. The culture of the Islamic Revolution, focusing on the principle of the religious sage (*wali faqih*). Through this principle, the information campaign works to unify the "resisting society" around the leadership of the leader of Iran and the substitute for the *Mahdi* – Khamene'i.

79 A central principle in Khomeini's doctrine deals with legitimizing Shiite activism. Most Shiite theologians advocated a passive approach, arguing that Shiites should wait for the return of the hidden imam and, until then, use the principle of *taqiyya* (dissimulation) – the obligation to conceal the faith in time of danger. This obligation has special importance for the Shiites because they have often been a persecuted minority. See: Shaul Shay, p. 25.

80 The Hidden Imam has a number of titles, such as "the exemplar" (*al-hujja*) and "the ruler of justice" (*wali al-haqq*).

81 See Khamene'i's speech marking the month of Muharram, published by Hizballah's Central Information Unit on April 17, 1999.

82 "That which Allah leaveth with you is better for you if ye are believers" (Qur'an: Sura 2:248).

83 *Baqiyyat Allah*, December 2005. Heresy here refers to Christianity / Judaism. Deviance refers to Muslims – with an emphasis on Sunnis – who do not follow the ways of Shi'ism.

84 *Baqiyyat Allah*, August 2001.

85 Shiite community centers named for Hussein Ibn 'Ali, The centers organize cultural and religious activities and provide social assistance.

In this framework, the organization emphasizes the contribution of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in building the Islamic resistance in Lebanon.

4. Political content that clearly distinguishes between the path of the Arab peoples, which is “paved with defeats and agreements with the enemy,” and the path of resistance, “which achieved an historic victory in 2000.” (The reference is to the IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon). This political content also includes illustrating “the danger inherent in the enemy.”

### The Role of the Preachers

Khamene'i points toward a hostile information campaign conducted against “the original Islam” (Shi'ism) and acceptance of Shi'ism as a religion (*tashyyi'*), and against the “Islamic government” (the Iranian Islamic Revolution). This campaign is attributed to two main forces: “the forces of heresy” (the West) and “the deviant Islam” (Sunnism). Khamene'i calls upon Shiite preachers at home and abroad to explain the essence of Shi'ism and the policy of “the Islamic government,” on the one hand, and to repel the hostile propaganda, on the other hand. According to Khamene'i, the information campaign should be based on the '*Ashura*' event.<sup>86</sup>

### Formative Events in Shi'ism

The day of '*Ashura*' – commemorated on the tenth day of the month of Muharram – was and remains the central date in the Shiite calendar. Originally, it was an optional fast day, which is still practiced today in Islam. The Shiites transformed it into a day of assembly and memorial, marking the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the son of 'Ali and Fatima, in the battle of Karbala on this day in the year 61 of the *Hijra*. (Hussein was born in the year 626.)<sup>87</sup> The myth of the martyrdom of Hussein – who is called *sayyid al-shuhada'* (the master of the martyrs) – and his fall in the battle of succession for Islamic rule was imbued with religious and political meaning in Shi'ism. The event is rooted in the Shiite historical consciousness – not only as the loss of rule but also as a need to restore it to Shiite hands.

The Islamic Revolution transformed the '*Ashura*' into an event with contemporary meaning that extends far beyond citing the martyrdom of Hussein Ibn 'Ali. It uses the '*Ashura*' as a powerful political catalyst for disseminating its ideas, and recruiting and integrating adherents into its ranks. The Islamic Revolution also uses the '*Ashura*' to help promote the export of the revolution and to manage an attack against its enemies within and outside of the Muslim world.

Khamene'i presents the '*Ashura*', which centers around the martyrdom of Hussein, as a formative event in Islam that influenced central processes of Shiite history and created values and norms that serve as guidelines for Shiites today. In a speech translated into Arabic for Hizballah members, Khamene'i references the '*Ashura*' in an effort to aggrandize the Iranian Islamic Revolution and to grant it legitimacy from the Shiite perspective by:

- Drawing a parallel between the Islamic Revolution and the '*Ashura*', and portraying the events as heralding the war against exploitation and injustice.
- Raising the status of Khomeini to the rank of Hussein Ibn 'Ali, depicting both men as “the sun shining light upon the world.”
- Presenting central values of the Islamic Revolution – self-sacrifice and jihad, in particular – as values that derive from the martyrdom of Hussein. This presentation obligates the believers to adhere to the revolution in a complete way.

Khamene'i attributes a central role to the system of propaganda / preaching (*da'wa*) about the revolution, designed to instill its beliefs and values. In his view, the main role of the '*Ashura*' and its advantage in *da'wa* (and of other texts) is expressed in its direct appeal to people's emotions and in preparing people to rationally accept – at a later stage – the beliefs, ideas and values that are initially foreign to them. Khamene'i presents as an example the Prophet Muhammad, who at the beginning of his preaching campaign, during the *Jahiliyya* period, appealed to the emotions of the idol worshippers in order to convince them to stop their pagan rites. Only later did he present rational evidence to them in order to convince them about the existence of God, His oneness, and the falsehood of idols. Accordingly, Hizballah indeed worked to make maximal use of the '*Ashura*' and other Shiite holidays (such as '*id al-ghadir*') to act upon the emotions of the various segments of the Shiite community, whether this was aimed at instilling values or goading its enemies and rivals.<sup>88</sup>

The Hizballah organization followed the lead of the Islamic Revolution in this matter. It adopted the revolution's view that developed around the day of '*Ashura*' and used this day – and the events and public ceremonies marking it and the other dates associated with it<sup>89</sup> – to convey its messages. In particular, the organization seeks to instill the principle of self-sacrifice and jihad in order to fulfill its ideals, and first and foremost, the ideal of resistance.<sup>90</sup> In addition, Hizballah has mobilized to serve the objectives of exporting the Islamic Revolution and goading its enemies.

Sheikh Na'im Qasim recently noted Hizballah's success in exploiting the outlook intrinsic to the '*Ashura*' and “the Husseinist path” for “cultural, educational, jihadist and political mobilization that restored the youth to the original, just path.” In his view, “the divine victory in July 2006 [the second Lebanon War] was one of the fruits of this effort. The *shahada* became a culture of life that is unwilling to accept surrender.”<sup>91</sup>

86 See Khamene'i's speech marking the month of Muharram, published by Hizballah's central information unit on April 17, 1999.

87 The day of '*Ashura*' is a central event conducted during the first ten days of the month of Muharram and on the tenth of this month in particular. It is a play portraying the suffering of Hussein Ibn 'Ali, called *ta'ziya* (literally: “the condolences”).

88 See Khamene'i's speech marking the month of Muharram, published by Hizballah's central information unit on April 17, 1999.

89 The reference is to the first ten days of the month of Muharram, including the day of '*Ashura*', as well as the fortieth day after Hussein's death.

90 '*Ashura*' ceremonies include the *latmiyyat* (poems that tell about tragedies that befell the martyred fathers of Shi'ism) and the *nadabiyyat* (the eulogies / lamentations read at ceremonies for the fathers of Shi'ism. It is derived from the word *nadab* – lamentation.)

91 These statements were made at a conference entitled “'*Ashura*' – Content, Role and Possibilities of Change” that Hizballah convened at the end of January 2009 to mark the fortieth day after the '*Ashura*'. The conference was conducted by the Institute for Study and Research of Modern Islamic Thought (Mu'assasat al-Fikr al-Islami al-Mu'asir li-al-Dirasat wa-al-Abhath). Participants included representatives of Lebanese political parties and representatives from overseas, including Iran. The conference adopted recommendations about fostering the tradition of the '*Ashura*' and disseminating it beyond the boundaries of the Shiite community. The Lebanese Information Agency, January 29, 2009. <http://www.nna-leb.gov.lb/>

Hizballah's spiritual leader, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, described the *'Ashura'* as a "Husseinit revolution" that goes beyond mourning the fall of Hussein and entails spiritual, theological and cultural content and purposes. In his view, the *'Ashura'* must not only be a movement reenacting the tragedy of its heroes and content. Instead, it must also be a movement of spiritual values that strives to generate changes and demonstrates openness toward the Islamic nation and the entire world. Fadlallah notes the contemporary aspects of the *'Ashura'* and their parallel to historical aspects. According to Fadlallah's historical analysis, Hussein Ibn 'Ali wanted to liberate the nation from those who seized control of its resources and turned its people into slaves (that is, the Umayyad Caliphate), while today the Islamic nation is undergoing a similar situation, suffering from those who expropriated its wealth for their benefit and for the benefit of their families. The nation no longer has wealth of its own and has become the property of a particular dictator or family in states living under appalling exploitation. (The reference is apparently to the rulers and ruling families in the Gulf States.)

Fadlallah also used the *'Ashura'* to instill the activist view of modern Shi'ism. In this context, he emphasized the connection between the *'Ashura'* and the current challenges facing the Islamic world and demanded practical action in order to escape the circle of poverty, weakness and silence, and to move toward the circle of action and strength. He blamed the weakness of the Islamic world and its marginal status on the loss of conscience, the distancing from pure Islam and from the path of Hussein, and the distortion of Islam by adopting foreign practices. In other words, Fadlallah issued a challenge to the Sunni world and its "despotic and corrupt" regimes and its practices, which are foreign to pure Islam, while presenting Shiite Islam as "the original and true Islam" and calling for openness toward Hussein – that is, Shi'ism – as "a symbol of Islamic unity."

### **Central Motifs**

The Hizballah organization works intensively to instill two basic norms of behavior among its supporters in general and its militia in particular. In fact, the organization's existence depends upon the maintenance of these norms. The first is readiness for self-sacrifice and the second is obedience and discipline.

#### **Self-sacrifice**

Sheikh Khadr al-Dirani devotes an article to presenting the value of self-sacrifice – a value the Islamic Revolution and Hizballah place at the top of their hierarchy of values, and which is accorded a dimension of sacredness and a divine mandate.

According to Dirani, self-sacrifice entails various aspects ranging from giving and investing money or effort, to jihad, to martyrdom (*shahada*) and risking one's life (*fida'*). Nonetheless, it should be noted that of all these, the most exalted and highest level of self-sacrifice is sacrificing one's life for Allah.

The value of self-sacrifice, in its various dimensions, is anchored on the one hand in sources of authority – the Qur'an and the *Hadith* – and, on the other hand, on the human and political experience of Hussein Ibn 'Ali, as expressed in Karbala. The self-sacrifice is executed in the framework of the individual and in the framework of the state. The supreme goal in these two frameworks is to realize dignity, freedom and independence. Without these, the individual and state will be relegated to humiliation and devastation.

The Iranian Islamic Revolution and the victory of the Islamic resistance in Lebanon (that is, the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000) are presented as the two salient phenomena in the Islamic world during the previous century and, by implication, bear the same historical weight. It is also argued that the self-sacrifice involved in them was the decisive factor in their victories.

Elevating the value of self-sacrifice and its holiness to the rank of a divine decree, and establishing this value on the empirical experience of peoples who have demonstrated self-sacrifice (and the Shiites in particular), is aimed at instilling this value in the "resisting society" in general and in the militia in particular. This was done with the aim of mobilizing them for the effort of realizing the goals of the resistance, even if this entails self-sacrifice.<sup>92</sup>

#### **Obedience and Discipline**

Sheikh Nabil Qawuq devotes an article to a very central issue for the ideology, and patterns of behavior, hierarchy and management of the Islamic Revolution and of the Hizballah organization. This is the issue of inculcating the principle of obedience and loyalty among Hizballah personnel and officials, and concretely, obedience and loyalty to the leader of the Islamic Revolution and the leader of Hizballah. Obedience is defined as a central pillar of the Islamic regime.<sup>93</sup>

The importance of attaining this goal is emphasized and discernable in its presentation in the article as the central factor for "the success of the path of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, on the one hand, and the Islamic resistance, on the other hand, and their reaching the shores of victory and security." This means that obedience and loyalty to those in authority must continue and serve as guidelines for the Islamic Revolution and the "Islamic resistance" in order for them to realize their objectives.

The obedience and loyalty to those in authority – which is elevated to the level of a sacred duty – are based on a number of pillars that are interdependent. The first is the pillar of obedience to God – the source of delegation of authority:

- Obedience to Allah and submission to Him
- The principle of *al-wilaya*, which means recognizing the rule of 'Ali and loyalty to him
- Obedience to *ahl al-bayt* (the Prophet's family), which actually overlaps the principle of the *al-wilaya*
- The role filled by the hajj in illustrating obedience and as an example of obedience to those in authority (the obedience of Ibrahim and Ishmael to the divine decree to sacrifice Ishmael)
- *Wilayat al-faqih*: the principle Khomeini formulated and instituted regarding the status of the *wali faqih* and obedience to him.

92 *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2002.

93 *Ibid.*

This principle is presented as directly derived from the aforementioned principles and foundations.

The Shiite tradition and the innovations of Khomeini in the area of *wali faqih* serve as a means of unequivocally imbuing Hizballah personnel, in general, and the organization's fighters, in particular, with the duty of completely fulfilling the principle of obedience to their leaders and commanders at all ranks of the organization's hierarchy. This principle is taught in the array of training and indoctrination of the organization's personnel, starting in the youth movements, continuing in training courses, and culminating in the training of fighters.

## E. Summary

The ideology of Hizballah, in its various components, constitutes not only a set of fundamental religious views and a political path. It also comprises a central tool for Hizballah in establishing a broad base of support among the Shiite population – which serves as the natural pool for its militia and party. In some of its aspects, the ideology is also intended to create a bridge to the mosaic of sectarian groups in Lebanon in order to mobilize their support for its resolute political views – or at least to prevent them from mounting an opposition against Hizballah. The practical and operative use of ideology is conducted among the hard cores in the Shiite population. This paper illustrated this use of Hizballah's ideology by describing different methods applied to them.

## Appendix 1:

### Hizballah-Iran: Shared Ideological Principles and Reciprocal Relations

In an interview with *Baqiyat Allah* (February 2001), a monthly published by Hizballah, the deputy secretary general of the organization noted the shared characteristics of the Iranian Revolution and Hizballah in terms of ideology, policy and practical experience.

#### The Parallel between the Two "Victories" of Iran and Hizballah

There are shared characteristics between the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the victory of Hizballah's Islamic Resistance in 2000 – each engendered a turning point in the local, Arab and international arena. (It should be noted that this parallel is often reiterated in Hizballah's political literature.)

#### The Shared Ideological Principles behind Both of the Victories

- The philosophy of Islam and its guidance are based on faith in Allah and his imams (that is, the Shiite view of Islam)
- The leadership embodied in the *wali faqih* (rule by the religious sage) – Khomeini and his successor Khamene'i. This leadership succeeded in leading the people from one victory to another, and awakening and mobilizing the nation. Hizballah has fulfilled its duty vis-à-vis this leadership.
- Readiness and expressions of self-sacrifice that both – the Revolution and the Resistance – have demonstrated, aimed at reviving Islam and implementing its path.

#### Hizballah's Sources of Influence

- The guidelines of Imam Khomeini, which shaped the format of Hizballah, led it toward confrontation with Israel and helped it to achieve victory.
- Members of the Revolutionary Guards, who influenced Hizballah in all areas by their moral and spiritual character and their Islamic conduct.

#### Shared Principles of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon

These principles, derived from Khomeini's guidelines, are:

- Islam is the solution.
- Jihad and confrontation against the oppressors and "arrogant ones" (*mustakbirun*), even if this requires many sacrifices.
- Refusal to be a pawn of the "arrogant" (*istikbar*), whether the East or the West.
- Preference for action that derives from morality and connects one to Allah.
- A call for Muslims to unify.
- Creating a reciprocal connection between peoples in order to utilize joint resources to stand up against "the bloc of oppression."
- Achieving a solution for conflict in the region in a way that Israel ceases to exist.

#### The Particular Attributes of the Islamic Resistance

- From the perspective of principle and ideology, there is no difference between the Islamic Resistance and the Islamic Revolution.
- The difference that exists is in the method of action, since Iran is a state and Hizballah is a movement.

#### The Lessons the Resistance Drew from the Islamic Revolution

- The victory of the will of the public over its lack of resources and over the great military power of the shah.
- The loyalty (*ikhlas*) of the people in Iran to the revolution and their great contribution to it.
- The readiness of the people to sacrifice themselves, carrying out the directives of the imam without question despite the casualties incurred
- Allegiance to the leadership embodied in the *wali faqih* and the imams, which imparted a high level of spirituality and morality to the revolution.

#### Khomeini's Method of Guidance versus that of Khamene'i

Khomeini guided Hizballah in a very general way. On the other hand, Khamene'i guides Hizballah in a more detailed way because he was responsible for the connection with Hizballah during the Khomeini era.

#### The Role of the Iranian Assistance

- The assistance by the Revolutionary Guards began in 1982, helping Hizballah to achieve real strength by training and arming its militia. In parallel, Iran provided extensive economic/social assistance and constant political support, while the regime in Lebanon remained idle.
- The Iranian assistance to Hizballah derived from Hizballah's identification with Iran's policy, as expressed in its stance alongside the oppressed of the region, as well as resistance to Israel and the superpowers.

## Appendix 2:

### Hizballah: The System of Indoctrination

#### 1. Sources of Religious Inspiration



- Shi'ism as the correct interpretation of Islam, an interpretation that will ultimately be accepted by all Muslims
- The Qur'an – the fundamental constitution in its Shiite interpretation
- The Imamate – the belief in the dynasty of Shiite imams. This is the essence of Shiite religion, differentiating it from Sunnism, and includes:
  - Faithfulness to Imam 'Ali as the legal successor to the Prophet Muhammad
  - The example of the imams as a guide to every Shiite Muslim
  - Active "anticipation" of the Hidden Mahdi; this requires preparing the ground for his appearance and belief in the imminence of the apocalypse.
- Self-sacrifice and martyrdom, exemplified in the death of Imam Hussein and the 'Ashura' event, which became the seminal event of Shi'ism
- Jihad as a value in itself – jihad as pro-active defense, the virtue of an individual's jihad

## 2. Sources of Political Inspiration

- The Iranian Islamic Revolution – a seminal event
- *Wilayat al-faqih* – rule of the jurisprudent – applies not only to Shiites, but to all Muslims and to the entire world
- Rebellion of the oppressed peoples, embodied in Iran's leadership in the Islamic world and in the Third World
- Hostility toward the West, and particularly the "arrogant axis of evil" – the U.S., Britain and Israel; belief in activism and in an armed struggle to achieve objectives
- Jihad
- The Lebanese reality – the sectarian / political divide in Lebanon; the Israeli-Arab conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

## 3. Means of Indoctrination and Dissemination

- Religious literature, nearly all of it from Iran
- Courses and workshops – organized by Iran and some conducted in Iran
- Lectures by senior religious and military figures, and meetings with them
- Experiential activity by visiting holy places
- Advanced training in Iran
- Use of examples and exemplars – the forefathers of Shi'ism and the Islamic Revolution, jihadists who died in the Islamic resistance
- Electronic and print media
- The Khomeini Emdad (Support) Committee
- Al-Shahid (The Martyr) Foundation
- Institutions that provide assistance to families of Hizballah's dead and wounded
- Jihad al-Bina' – Developmental Association, the jihad of construction – establishing civilian and military infrastructures to reinforce the organization
- Iranian institutions operating in Lebanon for the benefit of Hizballah

## 4. Target Population

- The Shiite community in Lebanon
- The young generation, which constitutes the hard core
- Organized associations
- The Sunni population in Lebanon
- Shiite communities overseas
- Sunni communities overseas and in periphery countries

## 5. Goals of the Indoctrination

- Local political objectives:
- Making Hizballah and Iran the central power in Lebanon by:
  - Maintaining a base of public support and preparedness for political activity
  - Maintaining a militia
  - Maintaining a political party
- Instilling a combative spirit in its fighters and readiness for self-sacrifice
- Strategic objectives:
  - Maintaining a magnet for mobilization and training of fighters for Iran, also outside of Lebanon
  - Instilling obedience toward the Iranian leader and his representatives in Lebanon
  - Deterrence against an attack on Hizballah and Iran from within and from abroad
  - Establishing an Islamic state, along the lines of the Iranian model, under Hizballah's leadership in Lebanon
  - Exporting the Islamic revolution
  - Implementing the objectives of the Islamic Revolution throughout the Islamic world

## Appendix 3:

### Index of Concepts for the Hizballah Project

#### 1. Shiite concepts

- **Baqiyat Allah** – The remnant that Allah leaves in your hand; a nickname and synonym for the Imam *Mahdi*, taken from the Qur'an – "That which Allah leaveth with you is better for you if ye are believers" (Sura 2:248). Hizballah published a political / cultural monthly entitled *Baqiyat Allah*.
- **The Hidden Mahdi** – the Twelfth Imam, Muhammad Ibn Hasan al-'Askari – whose return is awaited by the world.
- **'Id al-Ghadir** celebrates Ghadir Khumm, the occasion when Muhammad announced 'Ali's imamate before a multitude of Muslims. 'Id al-Ghadir is held on the 18<sup>th</sup> of Dhu al-Hijja. This occasion reflects the status of the Caliph 'Ali (referred to as *amir al-mu'minin*) and his descendants – the

imams – as the true heirs of Muhammad.

- **Taqiyya** (dissimulation) – the obligation to conceal the faith in time of danger
- **Bara'a** (disavowal) – the obligation to avoid all contact with the enemies of the imams
- **Shahada, istishhad** – the culture of martyrdom. This ideological concept grants religious Islamic legitimacy to suicide bombing attacks and is the cornerstone of the worldview of Iran and Hizballah.
- **Jihad** - holy war
- **Jihad fi al-ghurba** – The most sacred and important jihad occurs when the *mujahid* is in a completely alien setting.
- **Wilayat 'Ali** – the rule of 'Ali and his spiritual patronage
- **Al-wala' li-ahl bayt rasul Allah** – loyalty to the family of the messenger of Allah
- **Sayyid al-shuhada'** – the “master of martyrs” of Shi'ism, Imam Hussein

## 2. Concepts of the Iranian Islamic Revolution

Political

- **Al-thawra al-Islamiyya al-Iraniyya** – The Iranian Islamic Revolution
- **Wilayat al-faqih** – the rule of jurisprudence; the belief that this principle is a continuation of the rule of the imams
- **Al-na'ib bi-al-haqq, amir al-muslimin, al-Imam 'Ali al-Khamene'i** – substitute (for the mahdi), the leader of the Muslims, Imam 'Ali al-Khamene'i
- **Al-istikbar** – the arrogance, boastfulness: a nickname for the West, America and Israel
- **Yawm al-Quds al-'alami** – international Jerusalem Day; a day of revenge by the oppressed of the earth, declared by Khomeini. According to the leader Khamene'i, it is a call for jihad and holy defense against invaders, for fulfilling the obligation to Allah and all of the oppressed and casualties, and for exposing the treachery of negotiation. Celebrated very widely by Hizballah; it serves as a main propaganda tool for Hizballah in disseminating its ideology.
- **Al-amr bi-al-ma'ruf wa-al-nahi 'an al-munkar** – “Enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong” (Sura 3:104; Sura 3:110). This commandment is part of the legal, revolutionary and political responsibility of the revolution and will help in forming a sound society, cleansed of corruption.

Religious

- **Murtadd** – heretic / abandoning the Islamic community
- **The remembrance of Muharram and 'Ashura'** – Hussein Ibn 'Ali's martyrdom. Imam Hussein was a grandson of Muhammad, who was killed by Yazid Ibn Mu'awiya, the Sunnis' sixth caliph. 'Ashura', which occurs on the tenth of Muharram, is a day of deep mourning.
- **Ta'ziyya** – Condolences; reenactment of the suffering of Hussein Ibn 'Ali, held by Shiites during the first ten days of the month of Muharram and especially on the tenth day of the month (the date when Hussein and the ten companions were killed)

Military

- **Al-Haras al-Thawri** – the Revolutionary Guards
- **Quwwat at-ta'bi'a** – a paramilitary organizational framework for mobilizing teenagers and young people

## 3. Concepts of Hizballah

Political

- **Al-thawra al-Islamiyya al-Iraniyya** – the Iranian Islamic Revolution
- **Hujjat al-Islam wa-al-Muslimin** – Hizballah's Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah, “the exemplar of Islam and Muslims” (a title for a recognized status of religious sages in Iran)
- The leadership of Hizballah is the legitimate body authorized by the *wali faqih* (that is, by the leader Khamene'i)

Military – terrorism

- **Al-muqawama al-Islamiyya** – the Islamic resistance (appears as a parallel to the Iranian Islamic revolution)
- **Al-muqawama al-musallaha al-istishhadiyya** – the armed resistance that sacrifices its life for Allah (a name given to the resistance by Nasrallah; in his view, the resistance is a product of belonging to the Qur'an)
- **Shaykh shuhada' al-muqawama** – the sheikh of the martyrs of resistance; the name given to Sheikh Raghیب Harb, who “fell” in 1984
- **Sayyid al-shuhada'** – “master of martyrs” of the Islamic resistance, 'Abbas Musawi
- **Al-mujahid wa-al-muqawim** – the fighter in the holy war and the member of the resistance
- **'Amaliyyat istishhadiyya** – acts of martyrdom
- **Shahada** – death in sanctifying Allah (martyrdom)
- **Siyasat rad'** – policy of deterrence
- **Al-intifada, thawrat sha'b wa-khiyar umma** – the intifada, revolution of a people and choice of a nation (a name given by Hizballah to the Palestinian intifada)

## The Leader's Position in Shiite Life

Yair Minzili

### A. Preface

The position of the Leader in religious, political and social life in society, and the state in 'Twelver Shi'ism' (*al-shi'a al-ithna' ashariyya*) is most central and has become decisive in the Islamic Revolution undertaken by Khomeini in Iran. The leader constitutes, in fact, the central axis around which the Shi'a community revolves – in the past, the present, and the future.

The founding of Shi'a, which is credited to 'Ali, the fourth Caliph and cousin of Prophet Muhammad, the founder of Islam, was accompanied by traumatic events. These included the murder of 'Ali and his son Hussein, and the deep feeling of discrimination among 'Ali's supporters as a result of Islamic rule having been taken away from 'Ali and his son by the Sunni Umayyad government, and even before that by the first three Caliphs. According to Shi'a tradition, the only one worthy of being Muhammad's successor is 'Ali, his cousin, and 'Ali's progeny from Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad. This was the result both of a divine edict, and the legal transfer of the succession by Muhammad to 'Ali in a ceremony in front of a large Muslim crowd.

Belief in the Shi'a Leader – the Imam who is an offspring of 'Ali - and the implementation of the Shi'a leadership in particular, and of Islam in general, was the central factor in preserving the existence of the Shi'a, in its unity (in all the streams into which it split) and in its ability to stand up against the Sunni camp – both in its power and its scope in the Islamic World – that was rising up against it. Even if the Imam's dynasty ceased to exist with the disappearance of the Twelfth Imam, who is known by the Twelver Shi'a, amongst others, as the Hidden Imam – a temporary and partial solution was found for filling the leadership void by nominating a deputy for the Hidden Imam, who will rule until the return of the Hidden Imam. During the period of the Minor Occultation (*al-ghayba al-sughra*)<sup>1</sup> of the Hidden Imam, there were four deputies / agents. During the Major Occultation (*al-ghayba al-kubra*)<sup>2</sup> there were rulings that the religious leaders are the general representatives of the Hidden Imam. Even though there were rulings, according to which religious authorities were authorized to fulfill all the duties of the Imam – both religious and civil – in fact none of these were ever put into effect.

The complete consolidation of the concept of ruling jurisprudent (*al-wali al-faqih*) by Khomeini brought about a situation where the Shiite religious authorities received all the rights of the Hidden Imam, also in positions having political connotations. In Khomeini's philosophy, the *wali faqih* was given the position of an Imam, and even that of a deputy of the Prophet Muhammad (Caliph), in addition to his position as a deputy of the Hidden Imam – until "the appearance and return" of the Hidden Imam. The Hidden Imam will, upon his appearance on earth, turn into the *Mahdi* and will impose Divine Justice and Islamic government throughout the world.

The apocalyptic vision of the future appearance of the Hidden Imam as the *Mahdi* has enormous power to "move the wheels" of the Islamic State, both in the past and the present. First of all, this vision demands complete obedience to the current Imam's instructions, as the representative of the Hidden Imam. Secondly, it is imbued with fanatical belief, since all efforts and actions are directed at one purpose, which is to hasten the appearance of the Hidden Imam, so that through his appearance, redemption will be brought to Islam and the world in general.

In this paper, we will present central elements of the Shi'a philosophy, throughout its development, in relation to the Leader, the necessity for him, his position, his characteristics and his mission. We will also present the meanings that are embedded in the position of *al-wali al-faqih* in the Islamic Revolution and the eschatological belief concerning the mission of the Hidden Imam after his appearance and return as the *Mahdi* in the world.

### B. The Necessity for a Ruler and the Position of 'Ali as the Successor of Muhammad, and of the Twelvers

#### *The Necessity for a Ruler*

According to Shiite literature<sup>3</sup>, human necessity requires the existence of Law and Government. The Law must achieve justice for all. The ruler (*hakim*) is essential to the application of the Law. There are oral traditions that talk about the necessity for the existence of a Ruler. In the book "Nahj al-Balagha" (attributed by Shiites to the Caliph 'Ali), it says that when 'Ali heard the words of Khawarij that there is no rule except for Allah's, he said that this statement was true and that behind it was an untrue purpose. It is true that there is no rule except for Allah's, however there must be a Ruler (Amir), whether he be pure or degenerate, for the believers to obey.

1 The reference is to the first disappearance of the *Mahdi*, the Twelfth Imam, Muhammad Ibn Hasan al-'Askari, which lasted 69 years.

2 The second period of disappearance of the *Mahdi*, which started after the death of the 4<sup>th</sup> deputy (*safir*) Abu al-Hussein 'Ali Ibn Muhammad al-Samarri in the year 329 of the *Hijra* and continues till this day.

3 *Lessons in Wilayat al-Faqih (Durus fi Wilayat al-Faqih)*, Jam'iyyat al-Ma'arif al-Islamiyya al-Thaqafiyya (Cultural Islamic Al-Ma'arif Association), October, 2005.

## The Status of 'Ali as the Heir of the Prophet and the Founder of the "Imama," as well as His Spiritual Values

A basic principle in the religious-political faith of the Shiites in Iran – which, in fact, constitutes a basis for the very existence of Shi'ism – is the transfer of inheritance to lead the Islamic nation from the Prophet Muhammad to the members of his family (*ahl al-bayt*) and more specifically, to Caliph 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib<sup>4</sup>. The Shiite tradition bases the veracity of its version of the handing down of power from Muhammad to Caliph 'Ali and his descendants – the Imams – on an event that Muhammad conducted at a place called Ghadir Khumm. At this event, the Shiites claim, Muhammad declared to the community of believers that 'Ali would inherit his rule. (This announcement of the succession of rule is referred to in Shi'ism as the Day of al-Ghadir (*yawm al-ghadir*), named after this place.) The event of Ghadir Khumm is considered in Shi'ism as the formative event constituting the basis for its establishment, its justification for being the faithful continuer of Muhammad's path, its mission on behalf of Islam and all of humanity, and its lofty values, as embodied in the personality of 'Ali.<sup>5</sup> Shi'ism also deduces from certain passages in the Qur'an the divine command to Muhammad regarding the transfer of rule from him to 'Ali, as well as the principle of the *Imama* in the sense of granting leadership to humanity.<sup>6</sup> The idea that 'Ali inherited the rule from Muhammad is ingrained in the Shiite consciousness, in the sacred concept of *wilayat 'Ali* (or *al-wilaya*), which means the rule of 'Ali and his spiritual patronage.

A senior religious figure in Hizballah even states that the principle of *wilayat 'Ali* is the equivalent of the entire religion of Islam. In his view, without the existence of the *wilaya*, the religion of Islam loses all value, as if it had never been brought down to Allah and conveyed by Muhammad his messenger. Based on these beliefs, Muslims are required to demonstrate their loyalty to 'Ali and his offspring.<sup>7</sup>

Shi'ism attributes to 'Ali exalted qualities of great spirituality, absolute religious devotion and fear of Heaven, which in fact constitute the peak of human spirituality. According to Shi'ism, 'Ali received the highest spiritual authority and patronage, in addition to the reigns of power. Khamene'i states in his commentary on the event that took place at Ghadir Khumm that the Prophet Muhammad appointed 'Ali as his heir at this event because of his lofty spiritual qualities and his outstanding Islamic and human values. From this, he derives a model of the character of the leader a community and society should appoint. In his view, authoritative leaders should be appointed according to criteria of noble and lofty Islamic, social and spiritual qualities and characteristics. According to Khamene'i, the Iranian state implements this model and is now returning to "its Islamic identity" thanks to the criteria of the leader defined at al-Ghadir. However, Khamene'i states that the Islamic nation does not devote sufficient attention to Islamic values and places the weight of responsibility of leadership on its elected officials, while the West is trying to compel the Muslims to change their way of life and conducts attacks against the Iranian people due to its adherence to its Islamic culture.<sup>8</sup>

Khamene'i points to the special personality of 'Ali as reflected in the book attributed to him in the Shiite tradition – "Peak of Eloquence" (*nahj al-balagha*). Khamene'i calls 'Ali: "a heavenly man," and "a perfect model of Islam." Based on the "Peak of Eloquence," which enables us to get to know 'Ali as a person of knowledge and morality, Khamene'i states that the Islamic society should develop the Islamic person (through education) according to the character of 'Ali. He says in summary that much time has passed since Muslims have followed the path illuminated by the "Peak of Eloquence" and now is the time to return to this path and disseminate it throughout the entire Islamic world.<sup>9</sup> In summary, the concept of *wilayat 'Ali* expresses, therefore, 'Ali's authority to rule as well as his qualities and spiritual patronage.

### **The Doctrine of the Twelve Imams – Sole Repositories of Truth, Intercessors with Allah, Redeemers of Mankind, Infallible and Omnipotent**

Around the Caliph 'Ali (who is called the Commander of the Faithful – *amir al-mu'minin*) and his descendants (the eleven Imams), who are portrayed as Muhammad's true heirs, the Twelver stream of Shi'ism (*al-shi'a al-ithna' ashariyya*) developed, named for the twelve Imams. This stream is dominant in Iran, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and other states in the Middle East. There are other streams in Shi'ism: the al-Zayyidiyya (in Yemen) and the al-Isma'iliyya. The Isma'iliyya stream believes that the successor of the Sixth Imam should have been Isma'il and not Musa Kazim, as the Twelvers believe, and that after the death of Isma'il, while his father was still alive, the rule should have passed on to his son Muhammad al-Maktub. This community is primarily found in Southeast Asia, with a minority in Iran.

## C. The Leader in the History of Islam in General, and in Particular in Shi'a

### **The Mission of the Leader as a Generator of the Spiritual – Moral Revolution**

Shi'a ideological literature considers only a few individual leaders from among the Islamic world to be ground-breakers, who can be numbered among the founders and proponents of political and spiritual revolutions that placed their imprint on the fate of the Islamic nation. According to this literature's version, these "super-leaders" excelled in their high personal characteristics and virtues, and acted under divine inspiration, as emissaries of a supreme power and as its executor, in order to bring about these revolutions. Muhammad is the perfect, most sublime example of this kind of a "super-leader", as he is God's emissary, harbinger and founder of the Islamic faith. Imam 'Ali and his son the Imam Hussein, the successors of Muhammad to the leadership of the Islamic Nation, are presented in this literature as leading leaders that brought about a renewal of Islam and set it upon the path that constitutes, according to Shi'a, the true and original path of Islam. Their descendents – the ten Imams – are described as having super-natural characteristics and as being immune from erring

4 The Shi'a attribute only to 'Ali, who ruled as the fourth Caliph from 656-661, the title of *Amir al-Mu'minin*, whereas the Sunnis give this title also to the three Caliphs that preceded him.

5 *Baqiyat Allah*, January 2005.

6 See, for example, *Qur'an*, Sura 5:67.

7 For an interview with the Islamic sage Ja'far Murtada on the Day of al-Ghadir and *wilayat 'Ali*, see: *Baqiyat Allah*, January 2005.

8 *Baqiyat Allah*, January 2005.

9 'Ali Khamene'i, *Returning to Nahj al-Balagha* (*'Awda Ila Nahj al-Balagha*), al-Dar al-Islamiyya, Beirut, 2000, pp. 43-45, 55-56. The book contains three lectures of Khamene'i about *Nahj al-Balagha* ("Peak of Eloquence", a collection of 'Ali's speeches that deal with all aspects of life).

and sinning, as were their forefathers the Imams 'Ali and Hussein. The Twelfth Imam – the Hidden Imam – will appear, according to Shi'a belief, and become known as the *Mahdi*, who will lead the world by means of the just Islamic government that will arise throughout the world and impose divine justice. According to Shi'a ideological literature, in our generation a revolutionary 'super-leader' has also appeared – the Imam Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Revolution. Khomeini has been presented as someone of the same stature as the prophets who received divine inspiration, and as *al-wali al-faqih*, received the title of general representative of the Hidden Imam, which makes the mystical, almost super-natural status attributed to Khomeini into reality. His successor – the Imam Khamene'i – is, in his footsteps, also credited with this exalted title.

Sheikh Mahmud Karnib, a senior Hizballah official, proposes an ideal model of a leader, who must first of all serve as a guide, and primarily actualize a spiritual and moral mission. He bases this leadership model on the Qur'an:<sup>10</sup> "O Prophet! Surely we have sent you as a witness, and as a bearer of good news and as a warner and as one inviting to Allah by his permission, and as a light-giving torch."

According to Karnib, the leader's mission, based on these passages, is to bring the people from darkness into light, through a number of duties that he is to fulfill – "Witness, herald, warner and inviting to God." In order for him to fulfill these duties he must "be a light-giving torch". In other words, he must be a guide that has the virtues and qualities to lead the nation along the correct path. Karnib points to Muhammad on one hand and Khomeini on the other hand as those who exemplify by their personalities this model. Muhammad exemplified this when he led, as God's emissary, the spiritual *Hijra* of all his followers, from the dark *Jahiliyya* period to the enlightened age of Islam, thereby founding the Islamic Nation. Khomeini had fulfilled his destiny by leading the Islamic Nation, through the Islamic Revolution, "from a society sunk in materialism and atheism and submissive to arrogance (a nickname applied to the West) to a world of morality, oneness with God, independence, freedom and victory". These two "super-leaders" – Muhammad and Khomeini – from two extremes of history, succeeded in fulfilling their spiritual-moral missions, in the face of enormous dangers on one hand and negligible chance of success on the other hand, only due to complete dependence upon Allah, courage, audacity and willingness to take upon themselves risks.<sup>11</sup>

The leader Khamene'i chose to focus in his articles and speeches on the image of the Imam Hussein Bin 'Ali, the man behind the '*Ashura*' events, who left his mark on the Shi'a. Khamene'i credits the revival of Islam to Hussein: "Thanks to his jihad, his blood that was spilt and the revolution he led". Thus Khamene'i credits the '*Ashura*' events – identified with Hussein – with the inspiration that drove the wheels of the Iranian Revolution.<sup>12</sup>

The almost super-natural characteristics attributed to the 'super-leader' and founder of the revolution, along with his portrayal as operating under divine inspiration, had a great influence on the relationship of the Shi'a and the Iranian Islamic Revolution towards the image of the leader, his leadership abilities, his virtues, his position in setting policy and even the fate of the nation and reciprocal relations between the leader and the people.

### ***The Reciprocally Advantageous Connection between the Leader and the People***

The deputy secretary general of Hizballah, Na'im Qasim, insists on the importance of the existence of a fruitful and reciprocally advantageous connection between the leader and the people, as a central condition for the success of necessary changes and achieving victory over enemies. At the center of this reciprocally advantageous connection lies the necessary systematic obedience of the people to their leader. He presents three examples from ancient history and from present time, in order to emphasize the importance of this reciprocally advantageous connection:<sup>13</sup>

The failure of the Shi'a to achieve control over Islam during the period of the Imam Hasan, the son of 'Ali – the fourth Caliph. Qasim places the blame for this failure on the lack of one out of three components included in the necessary formula for achieving victory. The missing component is the existence of a people that is ready to sacrifice itself in order to achieve ideals. Despite the fact that the other two components of the formula – Islam, and the leader in the shape of the Imam Hasan the Infallible (*al-ma'sum*) did exist during the time of the Imam Hasan, the Shi'a suffered defeat by the Sunni due to the lack of readiness to sacrifice amongst the Shi'a at that time.

The victories of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Resistance. These were achieved on one hand – due to a very inspired and powerful leadership, having Khomeini's rare virtues, and on the other hand – the readiness to sacrifice among the peoples that acted according to the Leader's edict, despite the price of sacrifice that they paid in both cases.

The deaths of two of the founders of Hizballah – Sheikh Raghیب Harb and 'Abbas el-Musawi. These events clearly emphasized the reality where the leaders and the common people act on the same battlefield and share a common fate. This fact serves to further solidify the camp.

### ***The Linkage between the Imam and the Intellectual Elite***

The Iranian leader Khamene'i insisted upon the linkage between the Imam and the intellectual elite. Khamene'i, who takes care in his political articles to reach the necessary conclusions and learn lessons from Shi'a history, and especially from the Karbala event – brought up in one of his articles the mutual linkage that exists between the leader – whom he calls Imam – and the intellectual elite (*al-khawass*)

10 Q'uran, Sura 33:45-46.

11 Sheikh Muhammad Karnib, "*Hijra to Allah*", *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2002.

12 Speech by the Leader the Imam 'Ali al-Hussein al-Khamene'i, on the Occasion of the Holy Month of Muharram (*Khītab al-Qa'id bi-Munasabat Shahr al-Muharram al-Haram*), a pamphlet from Hizballah's Central Unit of Information, Beirut, April 17, 1999.

13 An interview in the monthly journal *Baqiyat Allah*, February 2001.

in the Islamic State.<sup>14</sup>

First of all, he decreed that in every society and state, there are two classes: The intellectual class and the uneducated class – the common people. The intellectual class is the important and most central, which constitutes the principle backbone of the nation, and upon which it will rise or fall. The intellectuals act from an understanding and awareness of their actions, through an analysis of their steps before taking them. They are divided into two types: the first type is a class of intellectuals that take the path of truth, distance themselves from the nonsense of this world and fulfill their responsibilities to society – in the way that the intellectuals in Iran do today. The second type are the intellectuals that are addicted to the nonsense of this world – materialism, wealth, prestige and luxury goods – and that choose the way of the lie.

Khamene'i sees the Imam's leadership, his choosing the straight path, his plans and his personal abilities as factors of major importance in the successful management of the Islamic Nation's affairs, its successful defense against its enemies, and strengthening its existence. In addition, he makes a clear differentiation between the Imam – the leader of the Shiite sect – and the Sultan – the leader of the Sunni sect. The Imam is a talented man, whose people follow him in faith and security. On the other hand, the Sultan is an oppressive leader, who rules his people through power, and as a result, his people do not accept his leadership. The Umayyad regime replaced the Imam's regime with a monarchic government that ruled the Islamic Nation for 90 years. The heads of the Abbasid regime that rules after the Umayyads saw themselves as the successors of Muhammad, but in reality they were kings who spent their time in acts of corruption and debauchery. Despite this, Khamene'i is convinced that the Islamic Nation will not be able to exist and survive unless the leadership of the Imam is accompanied by an educated and virtuous elite that chooses to follow the straight and true path. He studies the need for the existence of this necessary political condition, i.e. an elite of this type, as part of the lessons of the Karbala event, during which the Shi'a suffered a defeat – the Imam Hussein died a martyr's death, and the Islamic entity that he created collapsed in the face of the enemy – the Umayyad Caliph Yazid. According to Khamene'i, this downfall came about primarily since the Shi'a intellectual elite did not fulfill the criteria of a moral elite that follows the path of truth and protects it. In his opinion, a similar situation exists in our times, in all the Islamic countries governed by Sultans, with the exception of the Islamic Republic of Iran where "the intellectual elite follows the path of truth and the way of Allah and adheres to the Qur'an, the *Sunna*, the family of the Prophet (*ahl al-bayt*) and Islamic Values." Nonetheless, Khamene'i warns that the Karbala event will be forgotten in Shi'a history, unless an intellectual elite exists from among the "people of truth".

It appears that Khamene'i is trying to place the blame for the Shi'a's lack of success in establishing an Islamic Nation after the death of the Imam 'Ali on the lack of a class of intellectuals "that follow the true path". This, while trying to defend the leadership of the Imams, the progeny of 'Ali, and especially the Imam Hussein, and to clear them of all blame and responsibility for "this calamity". As is commonly known, these Imams are seen in Shi'a as "infallible" and having almost unlimited abilities.

### ***The Leader as a Personal Example for Carrying Out Jihad***

Traditional Shi'a, in effect, froze the Muslims' obligation to carry out jihad, by decreeing that only the *Mahdi* has the right to declare a jihad, and as long as the *Mahdi* has not appeared, in the person of the Hidden Imam, no leader has the right to declare a jihad. The Islamic Revolution has significantly changed the way that traditional Shi'a related to jihad. It has declared that jihad is an essential necessity for Muslims, in order to protect their rights. It emphasized the need for declaring jihad, and to carry it out, when a need exists to protect Islamic land that is under threat of occupation, or to liberate Islamic land that is already occupied by a foreign enemy.

The literature of the Islamic Revolution and of Hizballah made use of the founding fathers of Islam and of Shi'a in order to strengthen the awareness of the need to carry out jihad and to join in its service under the proper circumstances. They have presented them as a perfect example of carrying out the jihad obligation, and demanded to follow in their path.

A series of articles – written by senior Hizballah officials – published in one issue of a Hizballah journal, deal with a number of aspects where God's emissary surpassed himself in the field of carrying out jihad<sup>15</sup>:

Excellence in Jihadi characteristics – showing steadfastness and ability to withstand suffering in times of battle, and refusing to retreat from the battlefield, as difficult as that may be.

Complete preparedness to sacrifice one's soul (*shahid*).

Spreading the spirit of jihad among one's followers.

Showing leadership – as an Imam, as a guide, and as a military commander – in all Jihadi actions.

Standing at the head of the holy warriors (*mujahidin*) and personal involvement in all theaters of the jihad.

Establishing a philosophy for jihad and "holy warriors" on the legal, religious, moral and concrete planes in Islam.

### ***The Holiest of Jihads: The Example of Hussein Bin 'Ali***

Khamene'i presents the model that Hussein Bin 'Ali laid out:

In an article by Khamene'i, the Iranian leader depicts the jihad in two aspects: The first is the personal aspect – The individual must fulfill the

14 Khamene'i, *The Lessons of History: The Uneducated and the Intellectuals, the Lies and the Truth* (*Ibar min al-Ta'rikh, 'Awamm wa-Khawass, al-Batil wa-al-Haqq*), The Baqiyat Allah Center for Research and Distribution, Beirut 1999. pp 23-37.

15 Isma'il Hariri, "The Emissary: The Mujahidin's Guide"; An Interview with Sheikh 'Ali Damoush, "The Emissary – the Military Commander"; Sheikh Hasan al-Hadi, "The Prophet's Jihadi Personality"; Sheikh Hasan Fu'ad Hamada, "Sacrifice in the Prophet's Conscience", all articles are published in *Baqiyat Allah*, April 2006.

will of Allah and be prepared for martyrdom (*shahada*). The Imams of Shi'ism determined that martyrdom is an honor bestowed by Allah. Martyrdom is the action upon which all military activity is based. The jihad is one of the gates to the Garden of Eden. This is the routine type of jihad and martyrdom (*istishhad*) expressed by falling in regular battle against the enemy. According to Khamene'i, the most sacred and important jihad occurs when the *mujahid* is in a completely alien setting (*jihad fi al-ghurba*). The most prominent case of this type of jihad in Shiite history is the jihad Imam Hussein waged against his enemies at Karbala, when operating in an alien setting. This jihad is the essence of the 'Ashura'. This type of jihad exists when the person heads out to the battleground and the society around him is alien, an enemy or ignores him. The emphasis of this particular aspect of jihad is designed to motivate Hizballah fighters operating outside of their country and in an external setting, especially when operating on their own. The second aspect of jihad pertains to organizations, especially military and security organizations. Khamene'i states that they must operate according to an organizational and disciplinary outlook and motivation that serves the jihad. In summary, he says that devotion to the *Shari'a* gives a real identity to the jihad and serves as a guarantee of victory.<sup>16</sup>

### ***The Imam's Role in Establishing the Islamic State according to the Imam al-Sajjad***

The Iranian leader Khamene'i primarily refers to the role of the Imam in establishing the Islamic State, and its traditional appearance, in his comprehensive article on the history of the Imam al-Sajjad<sup>17</sup> and his religious philosophy.<sup>18</sup> It appears that the main purpose of this article was to present the position and role of the Imam in Shi'a, as someone who holds the reigns of religious and political power in the Islamic State and constitutes the highest authority in running the religious and political affairs in this country. This presentation serves Khamene'i, in order to promote three additional supplementary goals: The first goal – strengthening the concept of *al-wali al-faqih*, that the Imam Khomeini consolidated in its present form (see below), while not specifically naming it. Khamene'i in effect finds support for this concept in the principles that, according to him, the Imam al-Sajjad left in his writings on the principles of government in Shi'a. The second goal – strengthening Khomeini's legitimacy and that of the Revolutionary Islamic Government that was established in Iran, by presenting them as following in the footsteps of the Shiite Imam. The third goal – de-legitimization of Sunni governments throughout Islamic history, based on the assertion that Sunni leaders and their administrations did not meet the necessary standards according to Islamic law (*Shari'a*), and in effect, stole the primary position in Islam from the Shi'a and its leader the Imam.

### ***The Imam's Concept and His Roles in Government***

In his article on the history of the Imam al-Sajjad, Khamene'i dedicates an important chapter also to an explanation of the Imam's position, roles and authority in Shi'a. Concerning the definition of the position, he bases this on high authority – the Imam al-Sajjad and the other Shi'a Imams – and declares that these figures saw the concept of Imam as “a person that is responsible for teaching the people and guiding them in matters of religion and in the running of their affairs, and also in secular matters, in other words, a person acting as a replacement (*khalifa*) for the Prophet”. Khamene'i adds that “from the Imam's point of view, the concept of government (*wilaya*) is identical to the concept of *imama* which means “managing the affairs of the people” (who are led by the Imam). According to Khamene'i, the Islamic Revolution in Iran took upon itself this concept of the Imam – as opposed to the concept of Imam that was common before the time of Khomeini – and concludes that “the Imam is the leader of society, i.e. a person that teaches it religion and that runs our secular world.” Khamene'i studies the Imam's duties in managing people's affairs, from the example of the stories of Imam al-Sajjad's life, and his leadership. The Imam al-Sajjad displayed vitality and much activity. He especially preached to “believers”<sup>19</sup> – whom Khamene'i defines as followers of al-Sajjad, opponents of the Umayyad regime who believe in the ideas of “*ahl al-bayt*” – keeping one's hands clean, avoid luxurious living and corruption, and follow jihad. The purpose of Imam al-Sajjad's preaching to these believers was to train them as cadres that would in the near future set up an Islamic Government.

Concerning the Imam's authority, Khamene'i quotes Imam al-Sajjad who decreed that “it is obligatory to follow these orders, and to obey him, and to obey those whom Allah has ordained must be followed.” From this, Khamene'i concludes that “obeying the Imam in matters of religion and state has become obligatory for us.”

To summarize this subject, Khamene'i states that the Shi'a Imam has authority over matters of religion and state, and that his orders should be obeyed. He compares the Imam's authority with the broad authority that the Prophet had in all matters of religion and state.<sup>20</sup> Khamene'i dismisses a current position that, according to him, is that the Imam during the period of “absence” (i.e. the period when the Twelfth Imam is hidden, which continues to this day) is only a religious sage. Khamene'i acts to strengthen the basis of the concept of *al-wali al-faqih*, which Khomeini shaped, and he himself holds this title. He finds support for this position in the philosophies of some of the twelve Imams, and at their head, the Imam al-Sajjad. Khamene'i settles accounts with the *Sunna*, and protests against the historical injustices that the *Sunna* caused the Shi'a by keeping them from power. He protests that the Umayyad regime usurped, unjustly, the management of the Muslims' affairs from the true owners of this regime – the Shiite Imam.

### ***Establishment of the Islamic Government***

16 'Ali Khamene'i, *The Jihad* (Al-Jihad), The Imam Khomeini Cultural Center (Markaz al-Imam Khomeini Al-Thaqafi), Beirut, 2004.

17 The Imam 'Ali Zayn al-'Abidin, son of the Imam Hussein, born in Medina in the year 658. Died in the year 712 or 713 at the age of 57 or 58. Served as an Imam in the years 61-95 of the *Hijra*.

18 *Research on the History of the Imam al-Sajjad (Bahth hawl Sirat al-Imam al-Sajjad)*, the Iranian Embassy in Damascus, no date.

19 It should be noted that the term “believers” in Shi'a literature refers to Shiites, whereas the term “*Muslimin*” refers to Muslims outside of the Shi'a framework.

20 Khamene'i also bases this on the Shi'a Imam al-Sadiq, who according to him, would declare to the people that the Prophet is the Imam, thereby ordaining that the Imam is the person that manages the matters of religion and state.

Khamene'i notes in his article that both the Imam al-Sajjad as well as the other Imams had one primary and final goal – the establishment of the Islamic Government (*al-Hukuma al-Islamiyya*). However, al-Sajjad was of the opinion that in his time, the conditions for the establishment of an Islamic Government were not ripe, and that foundations should be laid that would prepare for its establishment at a later date. Al-Sajjad set out three projects for advancing this goal:

Preserving “the original Islamic philosophy”, i.e. in the Shi'a mould, in order that it will not be lost over time, and imparting it on the Islamic public. Al-Sajjad himself carried out an immense philosophical project, known as “*al-sahifa al-sajjadiyya*”. In the framework of this project, he wrote down “The Original Islamic Thought” on major subjects, including the oneness of God, the prophecy, man's moral standing and his linkage to Allah.

Assimilation of the acceptance among the people to recognize the Prophet's family (*ahl al-bayt*) as the true successors of the Prophet and the rightful inheritors of regime (*wilaya*), the leadership (*al-Imama*), and the government (Hukuma). Explanation of this subject was, in the time of al-Sajjad, dependent on the explanation that the government of the Umayyad-Sunni Caliph 'Abd al-Malik Ibn Marwan (685–705 CE) was not that which was in Islam's best interests<sup>21</sup>.

Establishment of apparatus and institutions that will be the basis for political activity. Al-Sajjad and his followers were not able to carry this out, and were satisfied with strengthening the apparatus that were in existence since the time of “*amir al-mu'minin*” 'Ali.

## D. The Development of the Concept of *al-Wali al-Faqih* in Shi'a History According to Shi'a Literature

### General

Shi'a literature presents the concept of *al-wali al-faqih* as one that was designed and implemented in one way or another throughout Shi'a history, according to the political conditions that the Shi'a lived under.

Among the Shi'a religious sages that specialize in the *Imama* rule of the twelve infallible and sin-less Imams that are part of the Prophet's family (*ahl al-bayt*), there is a general consensus that the twelve Imams are those chosen by the Divine prophecy and Muhammad to serve as Caliphs (replacements) after him.<sup>22</sup> From the point of view of the Shi'a religious sages, the twelve afore-mentioned Imams embodied completely the necessary talents and abilities needed by religious sages that held power – *al-wali al-faqih*.

In two articles that were published in the Hizballah Religious literature, an attempt was made to show that after the era of the twelve Imams, a Shi'a religious literature developed that gradually developed the concept of *al-wali al-faqih* in all matters concerning his position, and the abilities needed by *al-wali al-faqih* and the breadth of his authority. From all of the articles, it becomes clear that in effect, the Shi'a religious literature preceded Khomeini in consolidating the concept of *al-wali al-faqih*, even if this literature was not yet mature and complete.

Sheikh Hasan Fu'ad Hamada, a Hizballah religious philosopher, states that after the disappearance of the Twelfth Imam on God's orders had been determined, the concept of *al-wali al-faqih* developed (as a result of these circumstances) among the Shi'a in order to avoid a leadership vacuum and in order to implant an alternative regime operating within the framework of the *Imama*. At the head of the *wilayat al-faqih* government stands *al-wali al-faqih*, who serves as the representative of the Hidden Imam during the period of his absence. The main duty of *al-wali al-faqih* is to continue to operate according to the Divine plan, until the appearance of the Hidden Imam – the *Mahdi* - who will complete the implementation of this plan (see below).<sup>23</sup>

In his article, Sheikh Kazim Yasin<sup>24</sup> presents the development of the concept of *wilayat al-faqih* in the philosophy and tradition collected by prominent Shi'a religious sages: starting from the second half of the fourth century after the *Hijra* and up to the 10<sup>th</sup> century after the *Hijra*, the religious sages discussed within the academic-political framework of the *Imama* philosophy. They approved the rule of the infallible Imam and expressed a desire to achieve it. They related to the Sultans (who were the heads of the Sunni Caliphate) as illegal and oppressive rulers. Their interest in the subject of government and political activity was limited to the judicial framework and implementation of Islamic punishments (*al-hudud al-Islamiyya*).

From the 10<sup>th</sup> to the 13<sup>th</sup> centuries of the *Hijra*, senior Shi'a religious sages first recognized a “temporary government”. Al-Karaki (the chief justice and Sheikh al-Islam in the court of the Safavid ruler) and others recognized the Safavid government that reigned in Isfahan under the name “the Imamic school”, from a point of view of religious sages' responsibility to carry out canon law. Al-Karaki referred to *al-wali al-faqih* as the representative of the Hidden Imam. Despite this, he did not succeed in formulating a complete political concept about *al-wali al-faqih*, due to a conflict between himself and the Safavid rulers. In al-Karaki's time, there were other religious sages that used expressions that referred to the Rule of the Jurisprudent (*wilayat al-faqih*). However, the most important among the religious sages were Sheikh Ahmad al-Naraq (who died in the year 1245 of the *Hijra*) who wrote a document on *wilayat al-faqih* and established basic foundations for *wilayat al-faqih*, such as public interests, arranging affairs of this world and the next, the role of the religious sage, in addition to the subject of

21 At the basis of this concept lies the Shi'a's position that the government in Islam is passed on from Muhammad to his cousin and son-in-law 'Ali, and from 'Ali to his descendants. Thus, the Shiites believe only in the rule of 'Ali and his descendants the Imams as the legitimate rulers of the Islamic Nation. The Shiites also deny the legitimacy of the rule of the three honest Caliphs – Abu Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthman – who preceded the fourth Caliph, 'Ali.

22 According to the Shi'a, the Prophet's friends erred by accepting the leadership of the three first Caliphs of Islam, that preceded 'Ali, the founder of Shi'ism.

23 “The Position of *Wilayat al-Faqih* in Preparing the Ground for the Appearance of al-Hujja,” (*Dawr Wilayat al-Faqih fi al-Tamhid li-Zuhur al-Hujja*), *Baqiyat Allah*, Beirut, September 2005.

24 “The Rule of the Jurisprudent in the Philosophy of the Founders,” (*Wilayat al-Faqih fi Aqwal al-Salaf al-Salih*), *Baqiyat Allah*, Beirut, September 2005.



government and the Sultanate. Based on verbal evidence, he decreed the granting of complete power to the religious sage (*al-faqih*). He also ruled, on the basis of rational evidence, that he (*al-faqih*) was the representative of the Imam during the period of the absence. In addition, he ruled that the Rule of the Jurisprudent covers two areas: the powers that had been held by the Prophet and the Imam, and affairs in the area of religious worship.

A wide-reaching teaching pamphlet distributed among Hizballah followers on the subject of *wilayat al-faqih* (see below) presents, among other things, the application of the concept of the Rule of the Jurisprudent (*wilayat al-faqih*) in Shi'a history. The pamphlet notes that during the period of the twelve Imams, this concept was indeed applied by the twelve Imams, but under the power of the divine nomination given to them on one hand, and their abilities and characteristics that prepared them to be religious sages and to be leaders with the management abilities to run a country on the basis of Islamic law, on the other hand. However, the pamphlet ignores the government's plans if and when the concept of *wilayat al-faqih* will be applied during the Major Occultation (that will cease, according to Shi'a belief, with the reappearance of the Hidden Imam) and until the establishment of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which Imam Khomeini brought about within the framework of this concept. The pamphlet only states that the Hidden Imam placed the Rule (*wilaya*) during the period of the Major Occultation in the hands of religious sages having suitable abilities and characteristics, in order that they fulfill to the best of their abilities the position of general representative of the Hidden Imam. He directed the people to obey these sages in all matters of government, state and leadership of society. He ruled that the religious sages will act in accordance with the best interests of Islam.

Sheikh Hassan Fuad Hamada notes that since the start of the disappearance of the Twelfth Imam, only one successful attempt has been made, within the framework of *wilayat al-faqih*, to achieve a notable success that acts "to promote the return of the Hidden Imam". According to him, this great achievement, within the activities of *wilayat al-faqih*, was achieved in our generation and found expression in the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, by the Imam Khomeini. The most important developments achieved by this country and its young regime, that were lead in the beginning by the founder (Imam Khomeini) and later by the Imam Khamene'i are: preparing the way for the "country of all-encompassing justice" so that the countdown started (for the appearance of the Hidden Imam – the *Mahdi*, who will establish this country) and the enormous influence of the Islamic Revolution on the world of Islam in particular, and the whole world in general. The revolution and the state went through tens of tests, and they developed their powers in a way that made it seem that they were preparing the final stages before the blessed appearance (of the *Mahdi*). Khomeini gave expression to this when he said that the Iranian people's revolution was the starting point for the great revolution of the Islamic world, under the flag of the Hidden Imam.<sup>25</sup>

Following are the main points in the development of the concept of *al-wilayat al-faqih* and the characteristics required of someone who fills the role of *al-wali al-faqih*, according to the above-mentioned pamphlet.<sup>26</sup>

### ***Al-Wali al-Faqih during the Period of the Twelve Imams***

The Shi'a literature presents *wilayat al-faqih* as a concept that was shaped and applied in one form or another throughout Shi'a history, according to the circumstances under which the Shi'a lived.

During the period of the rule of the twelve "infallible and sin-less" Imams (*al-ma'sumun*), the concept of *wilayat al-faqih* as applied in its religious and political aspects. The Imams held positions in the regime (*wilaya*) and also in the field of religious jurisprudence, and they had characteristics and abilities in these fields. People would turn to them concerning both of these. They were a source of authority (*marja'iyya*) for the people in two dimensions: on the authority of their knowledge of Islamic canon law (*Shari'a*) that originated with Allah, and concerning execution of the Islamic Socio-Political program for running people's lives and for organizing their relations between themselves – i.e. running the government. These Imams appeared one after another, on the basis of divine nomination that specified them by name, until the period of the disappearance of the Hidden Imam.

### ***Al-Wali al-Faqih during the Period of the Major Occultation***

During the period of the Minor Occultation, the Hidden Imam nominated four deputies by name, who served one after another, and each of them represented the Hidden Imam. The era of the deputies that were nominated by name by the Hidden Imam came to an end during the period of the Major Occultation, which started with the death of the fourth deputy. [During the Major Occultation], the Imam's deputies were nominated on the basis of ability and not according to their names. The people were always guided by the religious sages (*al-faqih*) who were suitable for filling this task, based on certain abilities that they possessed. The ideal situation occurred when a religious sage (*al-faqih*) having managerial abilities, was also the source of authority (*marja' taqlid*) for the people that he guided and managed. In other words, the ideal situation was when a personality/religious sage had characteristics, source of authority and managerial abilities such as the infallible and sin-less Imams had, in both the above-mentioned fields: knowledge of religious law and running the government.

There is a difference between a source of authority (*marja' taqlid*) and *al-wali al-faqih*: a source of authority is satisfied with presenting Divine laws in general to the people that approach him with questions of religious law, after having arrived at them by searching through the sources (*masadir shar'iyya*). He refrains from making decisions on questions of Islamic canon law that were referred to him, and only presents the laws that are relevant to the questions, and leaves to the presenter of the question the decision concerning what to do and how to behave on the basis of the laws presented to him. On the other hand, *al-wali al-faqih* must have political, social and managerial

25 Ibid; "The Position of *Wilayat al-Faqih* in Preparing the Ground for the Appearance of al-Hujja," (*Dawr Wilayat al-Faqih fi al-Tamhid li-Zuhur al-Hujja*), *Baqiyat Allah*, Beirut, September 2005.

26 *Lessons in Wilayat al-Faqih (Durus fi Wilayat al-Faqih)*, Jam'iyyat al-Ma'arif al-Islamiyya al-Thaqafiyya (Cultural Islamic Al-Ma'arif Association), October, 2005.

skills in order to fulfill his position in the government. He is responsible for the general management of Islamic society, and the gamut of religious rulings that he decrees includes issues of government, society and state, and what are known as “laws of rule (*ahkam al-wilaya*)”. The rulings that the *wali al-faqih* issues cover a range of topics that includes: legal matters connected to quarrels, public issues of the highest importance connected to the running of the country, such as declaring jihad, concluding peace agreements, etc. He decides if conditions for jihad exist or not, and if it is in the Muslims’ interest to conclude Peace, or not. He also decides about matters of public safety. *Al-wali al-faqih* issues legal rulings after checking and identifying between the interests and the damages, i.e. it is his duty to decide what is permitted and what is forbidden, according to this check. It is not his duty to present the laws *per-se* without checking and identifying, as is the duty placed on the source of authority (*marja’ taqlid*). In effect, there is no contradiction between the *marja’ taqlid* and the *wali faqih* since each of them deals with issues that are different from those of his counterpart.

### **The Characteristics of al-Wali al-Faqih**

The Characteristics required of *al-wali al-faqih* are:

Expertise in religious law – the leader (*al-wali*) in charge of applying the Islamic regime needs to be a religious sage, an expert in religious law and its sources.

Integrity – integrity includes: Islam, faith, steadfastness in Allah’s laws and fostering these laws. A high degree of integrity is required of the leader. Only a righteous man is capable of dispensing justice as required.

Executive abilities – the personal ability to manage affairs and to oversee their execution in the required format, time and place. Will power, determination and courage to take essential decisions.

Khomeini’s personality personifies all the characteristics required of *al-wali al-faqih*, since he is a modest person, makes do with very little and is courageous. Khomeini exemplified these characteristics in initiatives and actions which eventually lead to the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

### **Unity in Government**

During the time of the “Major Occultation”, the question of who would be the ruler/leader (*wali*) from among the religious sages that had the required characteristics, was posed – whether all of them or just one of them. The answer is that the Muslim’s best interests require the Unity of Government, i.e. the placing of one personality only at the head of the government. The arguments for this – based on the Qur’an and the sayings of the Imams – are:

The regime (*wilaya*) is a branch of the *Imama* – in the same way that the situation requires that there be only one Imam (i.e. the twelve Imams), a ruler (*wali*) is required who is the Imam’s representative, only a single man. This holds true also for *al-wali al-faqih*.

The Islamic Nation is one nation, as set out in the Qur’an.

Al-Imam al-Sadiq declared that the Muslims will have one head. Multiple rulers lead to corruption and damages and divisions among the people of the nation. In addition, this causes inability to reach decisions such as deciding to go to war, in the event of an attack on the nation.

## **E. The Concept of the Rule of the Jurisprudent (*Wilayat al-Faqih*) and Its Integration into the System of Rule in the State**

The concept of *al-wali al-faqih* (ruling jurisprudent) that Khomeini developed has been implemented in practice in Iran.

A booklet used in Hizballah training courses teaches a lesson about the essence of the concept of *wilayat al-faqih*. According to this lesson, “*wilayat al-faqih* is not merely a conceptual theory discussed by scholars. Rather, it is a reality, a way of life and a regime on which Islamic society is based, with the goal of attaining victories, one after another.”<sup>27</sup>

The booklet presents an allegorical interpretation of traditions that appear in the Qur’an<sup>28</sup> and in the teachings of the Imams, that “verifies” that the government which has, in effect, been established by a decree from Allah to the Prophet and the Imams, has also been given to *al-wali al-faqih* during the period of the disappearance of the Hidden Imam. According to what is written in the booklet, an additional important principle is inferred, which is – obligatory obedience by the general public to *al-wali al-faqih*, an obligation which derives from the obligation to obey the Prophet and the Imams. According to this interpretation, the essence and the areas of the regime that were transferred to *al-wali al-faqih* include: management of Islamic society, application of Islamic laws and deciding what is permitted and what is forbidden, and ensuring the material and moral interests of the people. The ruling that *al-wali al-faqih* is the natural successor of the Imam’s regime during the period of the disappearance of the Hidden Imam, is a result of the argument that simply applying Islamic laws requires the presence of a man who is a religious sage, that is capable of carrying out this assignment.

In his essay *al-Jihad*, the leader of Iran, Khomeini, explains the essence of the position of the *wali faqih* as “great divine benevolence on the one hand, and as a central axis of the Islamic movement on the other hand, during the period of the disappearance (of the Hidden Imam). This is because *wilayat al-faqih* will dispel dangers, identify the interests of the nation, which will march together in one direction, since the *wali faqih* is the guarantee of the continuation of this march and non-deviation from it.” In other words, Khomeini – in line with his predecessor Khomeini – attributes to the *wali faqih* a mystical status of substitute / representative of the Hidden Imam during the period of

27 Ibid.

28 Qur’an, Sura 5:5; Sura 4:59.

his disappearance and until his appearance as *Mahdi*, which will bring redemption to the world. This status empowers the *wali faqih* with mystical capabilities for protecting the revolution from its enemies and advancing it safely and correctly toward the realization of its goals.<sup>29</sup> For emphasis, Khamene'i cites excerpts from Khomeini that demand from the fighters and the Republican Guard – which constitute the main stronghold of the regime of the Islamic Revolution – that “the issue of *wilayat al-faqih* flow in their veins and that [they] take upon themselves its constant supervision.”<sup>30</sup>

Another series of lessons by Khamene'i, which was translated from Farsi to Arabic for Hizballah personnel, explains the importance of the revolutionary idea that Khomeini formulated. Here he emphasizes that according to Khomeini, the disappearance of the Hidden Imam – the leader of the Muslims who will appear in the future – must not create a vacuum of leadership and sound rule that guides and directs the Muslims. In accordance with Khomeini's teaching, these lessons challenge traditional Shiite views that prohibit an active leadership and fateful decisions (such as a declaration of a jihad campaign) as long as the Hidden Imam has yet to appear. The lessons teach that a collection of laws for reforming the society is not enough, and there is a need for a government that takes action. Khamene'i argues that “no society can organize its affairs except under the existence of law and a ruler who ensures that this law is executed.” He states: “The establishment of a government is a duty; if not, many laws would stop operating – for example, in the areas of jihad and defense of the Muslim states and their property, and in the area of implementing the laws.”

Based on this outlook, it becomes a duty to establish a leadership headed by the *wali faqih*, which will manage the affairs of the Muslims. Khamene'i notes the need for the existence of a government / regime based on the ultimate authority of Caliph 'Ali. In this context, Khamene'i states that there is opposition to the concept advocated by the branch that opposed 'Ali in his day – the Khawarij. This ancient branch of Islam claimed that there was no need for a government and proclaimed the following slogan: “There is no rule except Allah” (*la hukm illa li-Allah*). 'Ali stated in response to the challenge this group posed to his rule: “The people need a ruler.” He agreed that the rule only belongs to Allah, but argued that this does not mean that society must remain without someone to direct it. According to him, it is a natural, social and human need to have someone lead a society, regardless of whether he is good or bad.”<sup>31</sup>

The concept of *al-wali al-faqih* (ruling jurist) made an impact on Hizballah's ideology. Hizballah views this idea as an ideal pattern of leadership for running the state. The organization also regards acceptance of this view as identification with the very heart of the Islamic Revolution and as a declaration of absolute loyalty to the leader of Iran, who embodies in his personality and education, as a religious sage, the behavior of the *wali faqih*. Against this background, the organization has assimilated the idea of the *wilayat al-faqih* in the system of information and indoctrination it operates – in the framework of studies and courses – among its adherents.

The decision of the Hizballah organization regarding the *al-wali al-faqih*, which is a controversial issue in the Shiite world, is clear. In Hizballah publications, Khamene'i is given the title of “substitute / general representative” (*al-na'ib al-'amm / al-na'ib bi-al-haqq*) of the Hidden Imam.

Further evidence of acceptance of the Khomeinist revolutionary concept of *al-wali al-faqih* by Hizballah and its dissemination among the ranks of the organization can be seen in the organization's training booklets. One such example is the booklet used in the Hizballah training course that teaches about the essence of the concept of *wilayat al-faqih*, as mentioned above.<sup>32</sup>

This series of lessons presents two models for implementing the idea of *al-wali al-faqih*: The first model is an existing state such as Iran, where the only source of rule in the Islamic regime is the *wali faqih*. The three branches – legislative, executive and judicial – enjoy independence, but their authority to rule derives from the *wali faqih*. The second model is the rule of the *wali faqih* in a setting where there is no state. As Khamene'i explains, “He [*al-wali al-faqih*] rules over the Muslims whether a state exists in the country or not.” Obedience to those appointed by the *wali faqih* is obligatory for all people as long as the directives of these appointees remain within the domain of their authorities in the framework of the foundations of Islamic law. It seems that the second model suggests the situation in which Hizballah operates in Lebanon – a state where the rule is divided between Muslims and Christians and is not subject to the rule of the *wali faqih*. This model apparently grants legitimacy to Hizballah to accept the authority of the *wali faqih* – the leader of Iran, Khamene'i – and to enforce obedience to the leader of Hizballah as the representative of Khamene'i in Lebanon.<sup>33</sup>

The mystical / apocalyptic idea derived from the idea of *al-wali al-faqih* is that his leadership and policy constitute a guarantee for expediting the appearance of the Hidden Imam, and thus for bringing redemption nearer. This means that the decisions of the *wali faqih* should be obeyed and executed in order to advance the appearance of the Hidden Imam and consequently to realize this Shiite ideal.

In summary, the leadership of Hizballah uses the idea of *wilayat al-faqih* – from which it derives its authority – in its propaganda in order to promote its vital interests:

Establishing the legitimacy of Hizballah's leadership and the party's ruling institutions;

Strengthening the patterns of discipline and obedience to Hizballah's leadership on the part of the “resisting society”;

Boosting motivation among the members of the “resisting society” and fighters of the “Islamic resistance” to carry out the directives of Hizballah's leadership.

29 The Shiite tradition ruled that Islamic sages are *al-na'ib al-'amm* (the general representative) of the Hidden Imam, and that they are entitled to assume only some of the authorities of the Hidden Imam. Contrary to this view, Khomeini's concept of *wali faqih* determined that Islamic sages, with an emphasis on the religious jurists in particular, are entitled to also fill the political roles of the Hidden Imam.

30 'Ali Khamene'i, *The Jihad* (Al-Jihad), The Imam Khomeini Cultural Center (Markaz al-Imam Khomeini Al-Thaqafi), Beirut, 2004.

31 'Ali Khamene'i, *Returning to Nahj al-Balagha* ('Awda Ila Nahj al-Balagha), al-Dar al-Islamiyya, Beirut, 2000

32 *Lessons in Wilayat al-Faqih (Durus fi Wilayat al-Faqih)*, Jam'iyyat al-Ma'arif al-Islamiyya al-Thaqafiyya (Cultural Islamic Al-Ma'arif Association), October, 2005.

33 The leadership of the Imam al-Mahdi Scouts Organization traditionally sends blessings on Islamic and Shiite religious holidays to the community of scouts, including a special blessing for three people: the Hidden Imam (who bears the title of Master of the Era and the Times – *sahib al-'asr wa-al-zaman*), his substitute / representative (Imam Khamene'i), and the Secretary General of Hizballah (Hasan Nasrallah – who bears the title *sayyid al-mujahidin samahat hujjat al-Islam wa-al-Muslimin*). See: *Al-Bayan*, Beirut, November 2002.

## F. The Hidden Imam –The Eschatological / Apocalyptic View

The eschatological / apocalyptic view of the Hidden Imam – the Twelfth Imam, Muhammad Ibn Hasan al-Askari – whose return is awaited by the world: The *Mahdi* disappeared twice – the Minor Occultation (*al-ghayba al-sughra*, which lasted 69 years) and the Major Occultation, which began after the death of the fourth emissary (*safir*) al-Samari in the year 329 of the *Hijra* (the four emissaries witnessed the Imam's appearance) and continues to this day. The Shiites believe that it will continue until the end of days, and then the Imam will return as the *Mahdi* in order to re-establish justice in the world.

The deeply rooted Shiite belief in the Hidden Imam and the *Mahdi* – whose return (*faraj; raj'a*) is due to impose justice in a world ruled by injustice and exploitation – was developed and shaped by the Islamic Revolution. In its updated form, it has become the central motif in the ideology of both the Iranian Revolutionary and Hizballah.

Sheikh Hasan Fuad Hamada declared that the primary goal of the Hidden Imam is “the establishment of the Just Islamic Government” (also known as the All-encompassing State of Justice) over the entire world, elimination of corruption, oppression, and falsehood, and realization of the Prophets' dream. Allah prepared the Hidden Imam for this divine, blessed goal and promised him that his religion would be victorious over all the religions. Even if the Imam left this world, and is close by Allah, no-one other than him can carry out this task. Imam Khomeini once said that we will not be able to destroy all the “arrogant ones” (the West) in the world, and establish the “All-encompassing State of Justice”. Achieving this goal requires the appearance of the *Mahdi*, but we must act to the best of our abilities in order to achieve this goal<sup>34</sup>.

This view of the Hidden Imam was shaped by the fathers of the Revolution in a way that was designed to serve a political interest that accords nearly unlimited authority to the leader of the Revolution. According to this view, the leader's authority derives from the delegation of authorities by the Hidden Imam. (Thus, the leader is given the title of *na'ib* – that is, the substitute / representative of the Hidden Imam.)

This view of the Hidden Imam also serves the activist approach that the Revolution seeks to instill in its supporters: The believers are called upon to demonstrate activeness<sup>35</sup> and to do all they can to accelerate the return of the Hidden Imam<sup>36</sup> and not to wait passively until his appearance. Khamene'i determined that “the ground is ripe for the appearance of *wali al-haqq*” (an alias for the *Mahdi*). He called upon the entire community of believers to act according to the principles of the '*Ashura*' in order to bring rapid reform to the world and, by implication, to expedite the coming of the *Mahdi*.<sup>37</sup> In discussing the *Mahdi*, Na'im Qasim employs the Qur'anic concept of *baqiyyat Allah* in the sense of “the remnant that Allah left behind”<sup>38</sup> – which is attributed in Shi'ism to the *Mahdi*. In the following text, he clearly expresses the idea of action aimed at hastening the coming of the *Mahdi*: “Many of those who do not understand the Islamic culture and its philosophical and theological content wonder how we believe that the future is for the benefit of the believers (i.e. the Shiites). Were it not for our belief in *al-Imam al-Mahdi*, we would not maintain faith and hope. This is an inseparable part of his promise to grant us victory. The important thing for us is to keep sight of this promise and [to feel] hope in *baqiyyat Allah* (Allah will hasten his appearance) in every step and action we undertake in our daily lives. This is so we can live the principle in a practical way and overcome the difficulties that delay our action and our victory for the sake of the future victory of Allah's law over heresy and deviance.”<sup>39</sup>

### **Obedience and Discipline**

Sheikh Nabil Qawuq devotes an article to a very central issue in the ideology, and patterns of behavior, hierarchy and management of the Islamic Revolution and of the Hizballah organization. This is the issue of instilling the principles of obedience and loyalty among Hizballah personnel and officials, and concretely, obedience and loyalty to the leader of the Islamic Revolution and the leader of Hizballah. Obedience is defined as a central pillar of the Islamic regime.<sup>40</sup>

The importance of attaining this goal is emphasized and brought home in its presentation in the article as a central factor for “the success of the path of the Iranian Islamic Revolution on the one hand, and the Islamic resistance on the other hand, and their reaching the shores of victory and security.” This means that obedience and loyalty to those in authority must continue and serve as guidelines for the Islamic Revolution and the “Islamic resistance” in order for them to realize their objectives.

Obedience and loyalty to those in authority – which is elevated to the level of a sacred duty – are based on a number of pillars that are interdependent. The first is the pillar of obedience to God – the source of delegation of authority:

Obedience to Allah and submission to Him

The principle of *al-wilaya*, which means recognizing the rule of 'Ali and loyalty to him

Obedience to *ahl al-bayt* (the Prophet's family), which is tangential to the principle of the *al-wilaya*

The role filled by the Hajj in illustrating obedience and as an example of obedience to those in authority (the obedience of Ibrahim and Ishmael to the divine decree to sacrifice Ishmael)

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34 The position of *Wilayat al-Faqih* in preparing the ground for the appearance of *al-Hujja*.

35 A central principle in Khamene'i's doctrine deals with legitimizing Shiite activism. Most Shiite theologians advocated a passive approach, arguing that Shiites should wait for the return of the Hidden Imam and, until then, use the principle of *taqiyya* (dissimulation) – the obligation to conceal the faith in time of danger. This obligation has special importance for the Shiites because they have often been a persecuted minority. See: Shaul Shay, p. 25.

36 The Hidden Imam has a number of titles, such as “the exemplar” (*al-hujja*) and “the ruler of justice” (*wali al-haqq*).

37 Speech by the Leader the Imam 'Ali al-Hussein al-Khamene'i, on the Occasion of the Holy Month of Muharram (*Khitab al-Qa'id bi-Munasabat Shahr al-Muharram al-Haram*), a pamphlet from Hizballah's Central Unit of Information, Beirut, April 17, 1999.

38 “That which Allah leaveth with you is better for you if ye are believers” (Qur'an, Sura 2:248).

39 *Baqiyyat Allah*, December 2005. Heresy here refers to Christianity / Judaism. Deviance refers to Muslims – with an emphasis on Sunnis – who do not follow the ways of Shi'ism.

40 “Obedience to the Leader,” (*Ta'at al-Wali*), *Baqiyyat Allah*, Beirut, February 2002.

*Wilayat al-faqih*: the principle Khomeini formulated and instituted regarding the status of the *wali faqih* and obedience to him. This principle is presented as directly derived from the aforementioned principles and foundations.

The Shiite tradition and the innovations of Khomeini in the area of *al-wali al-faqih* serve as a concrete means of unequivocally imbuing Hizballah personnel in general, and the organization's fighters in particular, with the duty of completely fulfilling the principle of obedience to their leaders and commanders at all ranks of the organization's hierarchy. This principle is taught in the training and indoctrination apparatus of the organization's personnel, starting in the youth movements, through training courses, and culminating in the training of fighters.

## G. Summary and Implications

The Islamic Revolution in Iran was in no small measure a result of a combination of a religious-revolutionary concept of a Leader personality with mystic aspect – *al-wali al-faqih*, representative of the Hidden Imam – and the charisma of a popular leader, in the form of Khomeini. This is in addition to other influential factors – internal and regional. The question is, whether this combination is capable of surviving over time, whether it is sufficient by itself to preserve the impetus of the Islamic Revolution in the Islamic world and in the world as a whole, and what the points of strength and weakness are of this combination.

This question needs to be examined first of all from the point of view of the leader who succeeded Khomeini – 'Ali Khamene'i – to what extent he succeeded in taking Khomeini's place as an authoritative leader capable of inflaming the masses, and one that is capable of preserving the impetus of the Islamic Revolution both at home and abroad. There is a general consensus that Khomeini's leadership personality is a rare phenomena and perhaps unique, and that Khamene'i needed to anchor his authority on the support of people and institutions from within the Iranian leadership. This question will reappear when a successor to Khamene'i will take his place.

According to analyses that appear in the Shiite literature concerning failures and successes of Shiite regimes, it appears that the leadership – with all its importance – is only one component of the power of the Shiite state. The existence of a public that believes in Shi'a values and is prepared to sacrifice, and is also loyal and obedient to the leader – is a no less important component of this power. In this connection, warnings by the leader Khamene'i and the deputy secretary-general of Hizballah, Na'im Qasim have been heard that existential disasters – such as the example of the Karbala disaster – may reappear and descend upon the Shiite Islamic State, if the people, and in particular the intellectual elite, do not preserve a high level of preparedness for sacrifice and motivation. There is no doubt, that the war that was imposed upon Iran by the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was a difficult test for the Iranian people, especially since it happened only shortly after the Iranian Revolution broke out. It seems that success in this test by the Iranian Revolution is credited to no small degree to Khomeini's leadership that was wise enough to initiate its end.

There is no doubt that centers of power in the Islamic Revolution, and at their head the Revolutionary Guards and the army, had a primary importance in the fact of the existence of the current regime under its current leadership. So far, they have demonstrated loyalty to the regime and the leadership, but this loyalty may be undermined under circumstance of economic / social collapse, or by traumatic Iranian involvement in a military adventure.

The apocalyptic / eschatological belief of the revolutionary regime, anchored in Shi'a traditions, constitutes for the leadership an important means for increasing motivation and mobilizing the public, through these centers of power, towards realization of the revolution's goal. This belief expedites promises that all achievements and progress in realizing the revolution's goals bring the return of the *Mahdi* closer, since only he is capable of fulfilling the Shiite / Islamic ideal of establishing "the Shiite Kingdom" over the whole world, and not only over the Islamic world. In this connection, this belief is used as a basis for the steadfastness of the Iranian leadership to achieve unconventional military abilities, and in particular, nuclear arms.

This belief carries within it the potential for the leadership to slip into an adventurous policy with no thought of dangers – a policy that may cause on one hand the spark of violence on a regional scale, and on the other hand, a mortal blow to the Islamic Revolutionary regime.

## The Leadership Paradigm of Ayatollah Sistani

Prof. Isaac Hasson

### Àyatullah al-'UÛma Sayyid 'Ali Sistani- Aspects of his ideology and political behavior

Since the American-British intervention in Iraq in 2003, the name of Àyatullah al-'UÛma (Grand Ayatullah) al-Sayyid 'Ali al-Ûsaini al-Sistani has been raised as the most important moderate religious leader of the Shi'a in Iraq. He played and continues to play a crucial political role aiming to pacify Iraq and to enable the Shi'ites to take the share that they deserve in the state's leadership. Many journalists, analysts and researchers dedicated articles or chapters to Sistani, to his political, religious and social activities, and to his place in the Shi'ite hierarchy in and outside Iraq<sup>1</sup>. There is no doubt that some of these articles are very important and can explain the behavior of this enigmatic leader, since he prefers maintain a distance from the media spotlights and even from his followers<sup>2</sup>. However, there are some aspects of Sistani's activities and behavior which were not handled and explained suitably: how is it possible to explain his quietism with his efforts to encourage the expansion of Shi'ism in Muslim countries and all over the world, the absorption of new adherents, the revival and spreading of the classical Shi'ite literature, and the task of answering Sunni arguments against Shi'ites and Shi'ism. Or, in other words, taking a very active part in the modern/actual polemics between the Shi'ites and the Salafii-Wahhabi Muslims. The aim of this chapter is to elucidate the ideology of Sistani in matters dealing with (a) the role of religion in the Iraqi state and society, specially in light of the fact that Iraq is not homogenous neither ethnically nor religiously (b) the relations with the different Shia establishments and communities all over the world.

Some biographical details can help to explain the attitudes of Àyatullah al-'UÛma Sistani towards Wilayat al-faqih, (the governance of jurist), which forms the basis of the Iranian Khomeinist regime, and towards many other issues such as relations with the American forces and with the Sunnis of Iraq. The official site of Sistani indicates that he was born in 1349 H/[1930 AD] in Mashhad, Iran. His family originated from IÒpahan (Iran), and his forefather, Sayyid Mu'ammad, was appointed by the Safavid Shah (sometimes entitled Sul'ân) Ûsain (reigned 1105/1693-1134/1722) as *Shaiikh al-Islam* in Sistan.<sup>3</sup> The family settled there and received the *nisba* (origin title) Sistani. His grandfather, Sayyid 'Ali, who became a famous scholar<sup>4</sup> moved to Mashhad. It seems that his career influenced the grandson: the most important centers of his studies were al-Najaf, Samurra' (Iraq), Mashhad and Qumm (Iran). The grandson started his studies in Mashhad and Qumm, but in al-Najaf he spent ten years under the guidance of Àyatullah al-'UÛma al-Sayyid Ab' al-Qasim al-Kh'Û'i (died 1992) who was his real mentor, and Ûsain al-'illi. Al-Kh'Û'i accorded him the title of *Mujtahid*. This title grants Sistani the right to teach and to pass his own judgments on religious matters. It seems that al-Kh'Û'i was the teacher who influenced Sistani more than any other one. Therefore, it is important to know al-Kh'Û'i's attitude towards the activism of the *fuqaha'* in political affairs.

The second half of the twentieth century was a period of religious-political agitation inside the Shi'i establishment in Iraq. Al-Kh'Û'i was one among the leaders of the quietist '*ulama'*' of the *Ûwza* (Shi'i religious seminary) of Najaf. The struggles inside the Shi'i establishment in Iraq in that period are clearly detailed by Y. Nakash in his book *The Shi'a in the Modern Arab World – Reaching for Power* (pp. 94-98).

Sayyid Mu'ammad al-Ñadr, a well known Shi'ite Iraqi leader, reported that Sistani told him: "*ma ana illa ka-âladikum, wa-la Ûjibu 'alaykum ittiba'i, wa-laysa min Ûqqi dhalika, wa-ana ata'arraku min bab al-'Ûsba wa-'l-kifaya*"<sup>5</sup> (I am no better than any other one of you, I can't impose on you to imitate me, I have no right to do so, I am acting in conformity to [the duties of the cleric who is in charge of administrating his community for God's sake] and must perform these community duties [which could be left aside by others if some one person performed them satisfactorily]). This declaration is very important and could open the way to a better understanding of Sistani's behavior: he refers here to *al-Wilaya al-'Ûsbiyya*, a legal Shi'i theory which rose as a reply to Khomeini's theory of *wilayat al-faqih*, adopted and applied in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

1 Among these prominent articles: Babak Rahimi, "Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the Democratization of Post-Saddam Iraq", *MERIA, The Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (December 2004); Ahmed H. al-Rahim, "The New Iraq – The Sistani Factor", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 16, Number 3, July 2005, pp.50-523; Reidar Visser, "Sistani, The United States and Politics in Iraq. From Quietism to Machiavellianism?", *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*, (2006), No.700; Mehdi Khaleji, "The Last Marja. Sistani and the End of Traditional Religious Authority in Shiism", *Washington Institute for NE Policy, Policy Focus #59*, September 2006; Juan Cole, "The Decline of Grand Ayatollah Sistani's Influence." *Die Friedens-Warte: Journal of International Peace and Organization*. Vol. 82, nos.2-3 (2007), pp. 67-83; Yitzhak Nakash, *Reaching for Power. The Shi'a in the Modern Arab World*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2006, index and specially pp. 148-163; Vali Nasr, *The Shia Revival. How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future*, W. W. Norton & Co, New York – London, 2007, index; A. Allawi, *The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace*, Yale University Press, 2007 ( I was unable to see this book. I read only the review of Ahmed H. al-Rahim in *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 19, Number 1, January 2008). This list is far from being exhaustive.

2 Sistani has not been seen in public since August 2004, shortly after returning from medical treatment in London. (*Associated Press*, 11.06.2008).

3 The exact duties of the bearer of this title and his place in the religious hierarchy are not clear.

4 Àghā Bozorgh Tahrānī, *A'Ûm al-Shi'a*, vol. 4, 1423.

5 Raed Qāsem, "Shu'Ûb wilāyat al-faqih, in [www.mettransparent.com](http://www.mettransparent.com)

At this point it is important to explain the principles of this doctrine and its origins, and to examine to what extent it is practiced by Sistani. Since Sistani did not write much or express his views publicly on critical issues that constitute a bone of contention between the school of Khomeini and his disciples, which adheres to Wilayat al-faqih, and the remaining Shiite scholars who still believe in the principal of traditional religious authority in Shiism, which rejects this theory, and of which Sistani is considered it's most renowned representative, it would be appropriate to examine the positions of the person who the biggest influence on him, Al-Khuyi. Furthermore, as far as I know, Al-Khuyi dedicated the most detailed and clear discussions to this issue.

Al-Khuyi began his teaching career at the lawza of Najaf, the Najaf Shi'i center for theological studies, in the year 1377/1957, and continued teaching there till his death in 1992. He was considered to be one of the central pillars of that lawza. Al-Khuyi's works started to be published after his death by *Mu'assasat i'ya' athar al-imam al-KhU'i*, and they are actually a rewriting of his lectures which was done by his students or his son Mu'ammad Taqi al-KhU'i who was murdered at the beginning of the American invasion of Iraq. Among the 34 volumes of his work, which deal mostly with fiqh, Ayyatollah al-KhU'i dealt with the subject of *marja'iyya* (the right to guide the believers in the path of Allah and his prophet, Muhammad), as well as with the subject of wilaya in general and the subject of wilayat al-faqih in particular. Following is a summary of his words, as they appear in a publication called *Muqaddimat MawsU'at al-Imam al-KhU'i*, edited by his pupil Sayyid Murta'aa al-fakami.

### **The Marja'iyya**

The *Marja'iyya* in Islam began with the believers turning to the Prophet (*raja'U*, they had recourse to the Prophet and the Imams, on every subject that was determined by Allah and required interpretation. The recourse to the Imams was done because they were the heirs and substitutes for the Apostle of Allah (*li-khilafatihim 'an al-RasU*)), and owing to the knowledge, the jurisprudence and Authority/governance (*'ilm wa-qa'aa' wa-ukm*) that Allah granted them with. Afterwards the *Marja'iyya* was passed on personally (*al-niyaba al-khaOa*) to the four substitutes (*al-nuwwab al-arba'a*) during the twelfth Imam's 'lesser occultation' (*al-ghayba al-Oughra*). At the last stage, it was passed on to the most accomplished among the *fuqaha* which were proven worthy of being 'general substitutes' (*niyaba 'amma*) During the period of the 'greater occultation' (*aOr al-ghayba al-kubra*).

*Al-KhU'i* summarizes this subject by saying: Islam began with divine inspiration and transmission to men (*wahi wa-balagh*), and ends with ruling and imitation (*fatwa wa-taqlid*).

*Al-KhU'i* thinks that power in Islam is based first and foremost, on the Quran and on the 'itra (=the Imams and the Prophet's descendants), and that it is supported by the *imama* and the *niyaba 'amma*. The *niyaba 'amma* originates from the hidden Imam and that is what gave the substitutes, the *nuwwab*, the comprehensive responsibility (*wilaya 'amma*) and created the existing *Marja'iyya*. The following is a discussion of each of these important subjects:

### **The meaning of al-niyaba al-'amma**

With the end of the *al-niyaba al-khaOa*, the Imam Al-Mahdi continues to guide the Muslims throughout the generations. He does not leave them without a Sheppard who will take care of them, without a certified counselor (*ujja*) to lead them, which is the Imam that will "illuminate them with his light and benefit them with his *wilaya* even during his occultation, just as the sun benefits people even when it is covered by clouds" (*tafsir al-burhan*, 1, 381). The Imam left the transmitters of traditions (*ruwat al-ahdath*) as substitutes (*nuwwab*) for specific functions, such as reporting the events of the Imams' lives, in order to serve as proof that the stories were transmitted. This can be deducted from the following traditions which are related to the hidden Imam:

- "As to the events that occur, turn regarding them to the transmitters of our tradition, for they are my proof to you that [I transmitted what was entrusted with me] and I am the proof for Allah [that I transmitted the stories to them]" (*Wasail al-Shia*, 18, ch. 11). *Al-KhU'i* adds that the meaning is transmitters which are worthy of being proff (*hujja*). He concludes the following from these traditions:
  - The *nuwwab* were granted *niyaba 'amma* without being original or independent (*min dUn aOala aw istiqlal*).
  - They received the *niyaba* to convey the Imams' traditions in order to use them to solve people's problems and conduct the flow of life, on condition of being able to reach God's will through *ijtihad* and *fatwa*.
  - The *niyaba* which gave them *wilaya* (custodianship) over men was not absolute to the extent that they would be exempt from requiring the hidden Imam to be proof for them or to be satisfied with them.
  - This *wilaya* did not remove the *masum's* (the infallible Imam's) absolute *wilaya*. This would demand passing on the infallibility from him to them, as well as passing on his knowledge of hidden matters, and the impossibility of imitating him (*i'jaz*), and all the other extraordinary qualities (*khasais*) which gave him the *wilaya* as it is.

However, this does not prevent passing on this *wilaya* due to the general substitution (*al-niyaba al-'amma*) at the level of the leadership, in the boundaries of the responsibility for governance or jurisdiction (*masuliyat al-hukm*). The transmitters of traditions do not possess the right to pass on this *wilaya* to others, even if it is a matter which is determined (*mawdi'*), and not by divine law (*hukm*). This is due to the fact that they were personally ordered to discuss all matters. Therefore, the meaning of this limited substitution is *mujtahidin* who make decisions about laws and hand out *fatawa*, just as when one says *faqih* one means the biggest expert on religious matters (*al-afqah fi al-din*), who understands best the needs of the *umma*, so that people can turn to him and not to somebody else.

- "The flowing matters of life and the judicial rulings are given to those who have knowledge of the rules of [Allah]" (*al-ulama' bi-llah*), who are trained in Allah's rights and wrongs" (*Mustadrak al-wasa'il*, 3, 188; *Tulaf al-ukul*, 238). This tradition says that the *fuqaha* are given the responsibility for judgment, including dealing with *fatawa* and general matters concerning the Muslims' life and survival.

- “He among the *fuqaha* who guards his soul and practices his religion, who resists his desires and obeys his lord, the simple people must imitate him” (*Wasail al-Shia*, 18,94). Here, Al-Khuy emphasizes that even if the chain of reporters of this tradition is criticized, reason determines that whoever wants to rule as a substitute must embody the qualities and the conditions that were mentioned above; just as the Imam’s absence determines that he must have public/general substitutes in the same manner that he had private substitutes, and these general substitutes are chosen according to their talents and not decided by their names.

### The absolute Wilaya

Some *fuqaha* tend to equalize between *wilayat al-Ma’sum* – whether a prophet or an Imam – and *wilayat al-faqih*, the religious scholar who has authority over the Muslims, without discerning between them or showing the differences between them: The first is at the level of prophecy or *Imama*, and the second is at the level of substitution, the *niyaba* of the *ma’sum Imam*.

Whatever *wilaya* either side receives, one will always be proof of the other (*ihdahuma hujja ‘ala al-ukhra*): prophecy cannot be raised to the level of divinity, *Imama* cannot be raised to the level of prophecy, and all the more so *faqaha* cannot be raised to either levels of *wilaya* that were mentioned earlier. Even if the *‘ulama* conduct matters, and even if the masses have a right to appoint them to this divine function, the *wilaya* which is based on *‘isma*, knowledge of esoteric things, and the ability to perform miracles which others can’t perform, is never similar to the *wilaya* which is based on integrity and is justified by means of the *niyaba ‘amma* which was given to the prophecy and to the *Imama*, and this is because the special terms which were given to the prophets and Imams and made them worthy of the unique *wilaya* which was given to them.

The common denominator of what passes from the prophet’s *wilaya* on to the Imam is the *imama* which exists in the prophet and in the Imam; but, in regards to what passes on to the *faqih*, the common denominator is not the *imama* but the *niyaba ‘amma* and the leadership of the Muslims regarding current affairs and solving problems. Allah entrusted the prophecy and the *Imama* with the *wilaya takwiniya*, the establishing *wilaya*, but the *faqih* does not possess *wilaya takwiniya* nor does he possess legislative *wilaya*. All he has is the *fatwa*, jurisdiction and leadership according to the measure of his suitability to the role of substitution in leading the *umma*. Al-Khuy sees in the verse “O believers, obey God, and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you” (*Qur’an*, Women, 59) the origin of all kinds of *wilaya*: *Wilayat Allah*: total obedience and submission to Allah *Wilayat al-Nabi*: this includes, among other things, the believer’s willingness to sacrifice himself and his family, and to sacrifice his property. This is based on the verse: “The Prophet is nearer to the believers than their selves” (The Confederates, 6) *Wilayat al-Imam*: “Those in authority among you”

*Wilayat al-faqih*: by permission of the Hidden Imam who appointed them as deputies (*nuwwab*). The *faqih* can be right or wrong in his judgments. He can be forgiven for that. But the Prophet and the Imam are themselves the undisputed divine text. Expanding the *faqih’s* dominion will not bring him to the stature of the prophet and the Imams in matters of governance and legislation.

One can see from the discussions that were brought above, how al-Khuy navigated his students, and through them the masses who recognize him as a *marja’ taklid* and even beyond that, to reject the theory that was adopted by Khomeini, which expands the function of the *faqih* far beyond what was accepted in traditional Shi’ism. His fundamental argument here is that the proponents of *wilayat al-faqih* ignore the difference between the *ma’sum* (a prophet or an Imam) and the *faqih*, who, no matter how educated and influential on the powers at be or on the masses he is, will never reach *‘isma*. His *wilaya* will always remain confined to solving everyday and judicial problems. Al-Khuy specifies several differences between *wilayat al-faqih* and the *ma’sum*, and here is a mere sample of these:

- Declaring Jihad is entrusted solely to the Imam. It is interesting to note that he relies here on one of Khomeini’s fatwas (Tahrir al-wasila), 1, 463, question 2)
- The *faqih* does not have *wilaya* over other *fuqaha*. Here too al-Khuy relies on Khomeini (*wilayat al-faqih*, 66)
- No man who is inferior to the Imam has the right to give forgiveness on the punishments that were determined by Allah – the *Hudud Allah*
- The prophet and the Imam have *wilaya takwiniya* (*Al-Hakimiyya fi al-Islam*, 61, citing *Usul Al-Kafi*). This *wilaya* was not given to the *faqih*.
- The prophet and the Imam have freedom of action regarding some divine laws (Haqq al-Tasaruf), based on plenipotentiary *wilaya* (*wilayat al-tafwid*)
- Freedom of action regarding property and human lives is given only to the Prophet and the Imam, and to no one else. It is deprived of the *faqih* even if he meets the requirements of *faqih wali*. (*l-faqih al-jami’ li ‘l shara’iŕ*)(*al-Shaykh al-A’Ŕam al-AnŔari*, *al-Makasib al-mu’arrama*, 153).
- The *faqih* does not have legislative authority (*wilayat al-tashri’*). The authority given to him to judge and issue legal judgment (*wilayat al-Ŕukm wa ‘l-fatwa*) is inferior to the Imam’s and the prophet’s *wilayat al-tafwid* Al-Khuyi mentions that throughout the generations there were deliberations regarding the principle of absolute dominion, i.e. granting the Prophet or the Imam freedom of action concerning the life and the wealth of human beings. Some *fuqaha’* insisted that this *wilaya* is restricted to cases that involve the well being of Muslims (*Al-Mu’laqqiq al-Irwani*, *lashiyat al-Makasib*, 155). Al-Khuyi refutes this restriction relying on Sayyid Mu’ammad Ŕal Ba’r al-’UŔum in his work *Bulghat al-Faqih*, 3, 217, but, in the same time, he declares that there is no evidence that *al-faqih al-jami’ li ‘lshara’iŕ* has *wilaya muŔlaqa*. He is only allowed to solve everyday problems (*al-umŔr al-Ŕisbiyya*). In the case of *iqamat al-ŔudŔd* (carrying out of the punitive laws of Islam), *al-Khuyi* has some reservations: this must occur only after the establishment of an Islamic government, able to meet out these punishments. There is no need for the presence of *al-Imam*. The aim of *iqamat al-ŔudŔd* is the public interest.



## Hizballah and Wilayat al-Faqih

Dr. Uri Rosset

### Background

One of the characteristics of the Shiite Muslim world is pluralism of religious authority. A Shiite believer is entitled to choose a figure of religious authority, follow his rulings and turn to him with any questions pertaining to Islamic law. Sometimes, the believer chooses a religious authority who is not affiliated with his country of residence or national identity. For example, an Iraqi or Lebanese believer can choose an Iranian religious authority, or vice versa. However, due to reasons of national affinity, convenience and accessibility (the ability to communicate in the same language, the possibility of direct access to the religious authority), most Shiites prefer to choose a local religious authority from their own country and sometimes even one who lives nearby.

In addition, there is no organized system in Shiite Islam that evaluates, ordains and ranks religious sages. A person who studies at one of the prominent Shiite centers of learning (and particularly in Najaf in Iraq and Qom in Iran) is likely to receive various titles, depending on the type and length of study. An extended period of study in Islamic law bestows upon the student the formal title of *Mujtahid* – someone who is authorized to interpret Islamic law in a way that obligates the believers. When a scholar reaches the level that entitles him to authorize others as *Mujtahidun*, he receives, through broad yet informal recognition, the title of *Ayatollah*. The highest rank is *Ayatollah 'Uzma* (Grand Ayatollah), which is also considered a source of emulation (*Marja' Taqlid*) for his followers.

As noted, the entire process of bestowing authority is amorphous and based on the success of the religious sage to create for himself a wide community of believers, or an image of himself as someone who enjoys such support. Sometimes, a person who calls himself (and is called by his supporters) *Ayatollah 'Uzma* is not defined as such by others. Usually, there are more than ten religious sages in the Shiite world who receive this title.

It is also important to note that the overwhelming majority of Shiite religious sages – until the Islamic Revolution in Iran – believed that they should focus solely on religious matters and leave the political rule in the hands of the “secular” rulers (that is, secular in the sense that they are not religious figures), while making an effort to convince them to avoid crossing certain “red lines” on issues of religion and Islamic law. This approach is based on the fundamental Shiite outlook of anticipating the return of the hidden imam, who, upon his return, will lead the *Umma* [the Islamic community] in all aspects. And until then, there is no one who can “step into his shoes.”

The Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) introduced a new outlook into the Shiite world, inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini, whose famous work *Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih)* argued that it was no longer necessary to wait for the return of the hidden imam and that religious sages should take the reins of government into their own hands, in accordance with the model the Prophet Muhammad himself established: a combination of religious and political leader at one and the same time. According to Khomeini, there should be no separation between religion and state (the separation is an imperialist plot) and “Islam is political or is nothing at all.” Khomeini placed himself at the top of the pyramid as *Wali Faqih* [supreme jurist], also bearing the title of “the leader” (*Rahbar* in Farsi).

Khomeini also instituted a revolutionary change in Iranian Shiite thought on the subject of nationalism. While the traditional approach was closely linked to Iranian nationalism, Khomeini formulated an approach that denies the existence of peoples and states in Islam, and aspires to implement Islamic unity on the basis of “the Muslim *Umma*” – as in the days of the Prophet Muhammad. He defined himself, first and foremost, as a “Muslim” and not as an “Iranian” or as a “Shiite,” and also regarded the revolution as an Islamic revolution rather than an Iranian or Shiite one. According to Khomeini, the concept of nationalism is contrary to Islam, which is designed to rise above feelings of local affinity and create a united Islamic world. He argued that it was Western imperialism that introduced the national idea in order to divide the “Islamic homeland” into “ephemeral states.” The principle of “exporting the revolution” (*Sudur Inqilab*) also derives from this teaching, because seizing control of the government in Iran was no more than a starting point for a comprehensive Islamic revolution that will lead to the liberation of the oppressed (*al-Mustaz'afin*) in all of human society.

And indeed, Shiite believers outside of Iran also began to regard the Iranian *Wali Faqih* – Ayatollah Khomeini and subsequently his successor Khamene'i – as the surrogate for the hidden imam and also, in this capacity, as the successor to 'Ali (around whose heroic image Shi'ism developed) and the twelve imams who succeeded him. Since 'Ali and the imams are defined as “infallible” and are accorded a degree of sanctity, the attribution of such qualities to contemporary leaders, who are mortal human beings, is problematic. This is controversial even in Iran itself, and all the more so outside of Iran.

This issue became even more problematic following the death of Khomeini (in 1989), who enjoyed a status of holiness among a large part of the public in Iran, and the appointment of Khamene'i to the role of leader (and *Wali Faqih*). Khamene'i was chosen for the position by his colleagues in the religious leadership primarily because of his political skills, and less for his religious qualifications as an arbiter of Islamic law. During the ensuing years, an ongoing effort has been made to improve Khamene'i's image as a religious adjudicator worthy of the title

of *Wali Faqih*, and the list of his writings on religion and Islamic law grew much longer. Nonetheless, his lack of charisma enabled other religious sages in Iran and throughout the Shiite world, including Lebanon, to free themselves from the “shadow” of Khomeini and present themselves as an alternative Islamic authority to the Iranian leader.

## Hizballah and the Wilayat al-Faqih: The Early Years

The success of the Islamic revolution in Iran instilled a new spirit among the Shiites in Lebanon. However, there were many differences in approach between the Iranian revolutionary leadership and Amal, the main group that represented the Shiites in Lebanon during that period. Most importantly, Amal did not recognize the notion of *Wilayat al-Faqih* and opposed the vision of exporting the Iranian Revolution. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 destabilized the balance of power within the Shiite community as well, and Iran began to regard Lebanon as the ideal place to realize its vision. Inspired by Iran, which operated in Lebanon primarily via the Revolutionary Guards, a new echelon of clerics arose who were not dependent on the Shiite establishment. This new echelon felt and acted like representatives of the Imam Khomeini. This was the foundation upon which the Hizballah movement was built.

And indeed, from the outset, Hizballah developed a pan-Islamic ideology that called for a state in Lebanon that would be based on the *Shari'a* [Islamic law] and would be an integral part of an all-embracing Islamic state, centered in Iran and ruled by the *Wali Faqih* – Ayatollah 'Uzma Ruhollah Khomeini. This scenario includes discarding the Lebanese national identity and adopting the Iranian flag as the movement's flag.

This approach is expressed in the movement's first manifesto (in February 1985) in the form of a public letter (An Open Letter – The Hizballah Program) published by the organization. The letter states unequivocally:

- “We are often asked: Who are we, the Hizballah, and what is our identity? We are the sons of the *Umma* [Muslim community] - the party of God (*Hizb Allah*) the vanguard of which was made victorious by God in Iran. There the vanguard succeeded to lay down the bases of a Muslim state, which plays a central role in the world. We obey the orders of one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and *Faqih* [jurist] who fulfills all the necessary conditions: Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini. God save him!
- By virtue of the above, we do not constitute an organized and closed party in Lebanon, nor are we a tight political cadre. We are an *Umma* linked to the Muslims of the whole world by the solid doctrinal and religious connection of Islam, whose message God wanted to be fulfilled by the Seal of the Prophets, i.e., Muhammad. This is why whatever touches or strikes the Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines and elsewhere reverberates throughout the whole Muslim *Umma* of which we are an integral part. Our behavior is dictated to us by legal principles laid down by the light of an overall political conception defined by the leading jurist (*Wilayat al-Faqih*).
- As for our culture, it is based on the Holy Quran, the Sunna and the legal rulings of the *Faqih* who is our source of imitation (*Marja' al-Taqlid*). Our culture is crystal clear. It is not complicated and is accessible to all.”

This public ideological stance was possible as long as Hizballah maintained its pure jihadist identity, focused primarily on the struggle against “the Zionist enemy,” and as long as the fervor of the Iranian Revolution was at its peak and the revolutionary shock waves also echoed outside of Iran, including in the Lebanese Shiite community (which was already in the midst of an ongoing civil war that severely eroded the sense of Lebanese national identity).

## The Gradual Change in the Public Stance

However, a series of developments subsequent led Hizballah to gradually blur its declarative stance on this issue. Eventually, for example, the Open Letter from 1985 could no longer be found on the movement's Internet sites. Instead, Hizballah gave prominence to its election platforms for the Lebanese parliament, which refrained from mentioning the *Wilayat al-Faqih*. There were various reasons for this change:

- A gradual reduction in revolutionary fervor in Iran itself, Iran's recognition of its lack of success in “exporting the revolution” to the Muslim world, which, in general, overwhelmingly rejected the notion that a Shiite, non-Arab religious sage would serve as a spiritual authority – and even a political authority – for the entire Muslim nation. (Iran did not succeed in gaining real influence in any Sunni state. And even in the Shiite world, Hizballah constitutes the only significant success.)
- The death in 1989 of Khomeini – the symbol of the revolution – and the appointment of Khamene'i as his replacement. Khamene'i, as noted, did not enjoy a lofty religious status.
- The gradual change in Hizballah as it began to operate in areas other than jihad, including its entry into political life in Lebanon, which led it to gradually adopt national Lebanese symbols and rhetoric (the process of “Lebanonization” of the movement).

## The Challenge of Fadlallah

In addition to these substantial reasons, the movement was forced to contend with a challenge “from within” – by Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, based on the fundamental Shiite principle of pluralism of religious authority. Fadlallah, born in 1935, is the son of a Lebanese

scholar who emigrated to Najaf in Iraq to pursue religious studies. He was born and grew up in Najaf in an ascetic and scholarly atmosphere, was identified as a prodigy at a young age, and displayed unusual interests for an Islamic cleric – writing poetry and reading Western and secular Arab literature. He returned to Beirut in the mid-1960s and began to establish the *da'wa* network (health clinics, youth clubs, schools) and to establish his religious authority among the Shiite population in Lebanon. The Islamic revolution in Iran presented a dilemma for him. On the one hand, he expressed great excitement over the precedent of the rise of an Islamist force to power. On the other hand, the pretension of Ayatollah Khomeini to serve as a religious and political authority for all Muslims and, even more so, for all Shiites, hurt his growing status as an arbiter of Islamic law.

Against this background, Fadlallah – who was identified in Lebanon and elsewhere as the spiritual mentor of Hizballah in its early years – preferred to maintain his independence and to express ideas that were not acceptable to Iran. Among other issues, he defined the idea of a single Islamic state headed by Khomeini as impossible: “The modern circumstances in which we live today as Muslims ... have made the idea of a single global state irrelevant.”

As long as Khomeini was alive, Fadlallah operated in the shadow of a higher religious authority. Khomeini's death in 1989 freed him from this and he began to prepare himself to join the small list of grand (*'Uzma*) ayatollahs – the handful of Shiite clerics to be able to claim worldwide support. Fadlallah's supporters began to hint that he was no lesser than Khamene'i from a religious perspective, and he himself expected Khamene'i's religious authority to reign only within the bounds of Iran. When this failed to occur, he announced that the *Marja'iyya* is not a monopoly of Iran and that he recognizes the authority of 'Ali al-Sistani from Najaf (today the predominant religious figure in Iraq).

However, Fadlallah later began to also criticize the large Shiite academies in Najaf and Qom. In 1995 (about ten years after his followers began to call him “ayatollah”), he advanced another step when he published a thick volume (1,200 questions and answers on a variety of religious issues) that is considered an essential condition for being recognized as a *Marja'*. A year later, the Masjid al-Imamayn mosque was inaugurated in the Harat Hreik neighborhood, financed by a rich Kuwaiti donor, and Fadlallah began to conduct mass prayer services on Fridays. From this point, he worked to position himself as one of the two or three great lights of Shi'ism in his generation, whose influence extended beyond Lebanon and embraces half of the Shiite world (that is, outside of Iran).

Fadlallah's decision to become a *Marja'* is explained on his Internet site as follows: “...following the deaths of the great Islamic leader, Sayyid al-Khoei and Imam Khomeini, and after the passing away of all the symbols of the first generation [of *Maraji'*] such as Sayyid al-Kalbakani, who undertook the task of issuing *Fatwas* as a religious authority, a great vacuum was left. People from various regions came to the Sayyid and asked him to undertake this task.”

(See: <http://english.baynat.org.lb/biography/index.htm> ). This clearly indicates that according to Fadlallah, the leader of Iran, Khamene'i, was unable to fill the vacuum his predecessors left behind. Later, Fadlallah has also developed the idea that religious authority should not be embodied in a single personality but instead should be expressed by establishing an institution of Islamic law that comprises a collective of clerics.

Over the years, Fadlallah has come under attack for these and other views he holds. Proclamations have been issued against him in Lebanon and elsewhere, and he has consistently refrained from visiting Iran. Nonetheless, Fadlallah, until his death in July 2010, had a large community of supporters in Lebanon, apparently also among those who define themselves as supporters of Hizballah. (We lack data that would enable us to assess this.) Consequently, Hizballah showed great sensitivity on this issue and refrains from emphasizing its disagreements with Fadlallah, who was once considered to be the spiritual mentor of the movement. Thus, for example, the code of behavior for Hizballah activists explicitly stipulates that they refrain from any attack, even an implicit one, against the religious sages (*'Ulama*), and that it is forbidden to even engage in arguments that are liable to lead to this.

## The Art of Mixed Messages

In light of all this, the movement developed a vague declarative policy, which could be based also on the Shiite principle of *Taqiyya* – the possibility of concealing or blurring the message if it has the potential of endangering the interests of the Shiite community.

Thus, on the one hand, in the mass demonstrations the movement occasionally organizes, the flag of the Lebanese state is prominently displayed alongside the Hizballah flag. The secretary-general, Nasrallah, and the rest of the movement's spokesmen frequently portray Hizballah as an organization working on behalf of the Lebanese national interest, and the struggle against Israel is presented as designed to liberate the Lebanese lands occupied by Israel (today, after the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon, The Shebaa Farms). The Iranian directive to fight in the name of Islam against “the Little Satan” (i.e. Israel) until its destruction, is generally downplayed in favor of the “national” arguments especially in Hizballah public statements.

Similarly, the notion of absolute loyalty to the Iranian *Wali Faqih* (Khamene'i) is also downplayed. It is almost never mentioned in the speeches of the secretary-general, Nasrallah. When he deviated from this practice and declared in May 2008 that, “I declare today, and there is nothing new in this, that I am proud to be a member of the party of *Wilayat al-Faqih* – the Lebanese newspaper *al-Nahar* expressed surprise (on June 12, 2008) about the timing of this explicit and direct statement “for the first time in the 25-year history of Hizballah.”

Nonetheless, in the movement's ideological literature and periodicals (*al-Bayan*, *Baqiyyat Allah*, *Sada al-Wilaya*), and also on its Internet sites, the absolute loyalty to the Iranian leader is not concealed at all, though there is no longer a call for abolishing the Lebanese political entity, as there was during the initial years. The loyalty to the leader is presented in classical Shiite terms: The leader is the successor of 'Ali and the surrogate for the Imam al-Mahdi. Therefore, loyalty to Khomeini in the past and to Khamene'i today is the natural continuation of the loyalty (*Wilaya*) to 'Ali that is required as an institutional basis for Shi'ism and for which Shi'ism finds support in the Koran itself.<sup>1</sup>

1 Al-Bayan, June 2004.

Moreover, the obedience to the *Wali Faqih* is a continuation of obedience to Allah. This is because: "Obedience to the *Wali Faqih* is the driving force of the life and activity of the resistance [Hizballah] and the factor that gives it strength and security. If not for this obedience, the movement would not have achieved its holiness, would not have mobilized the holy fighters [*Mujahidin*] and would not have reached the banks of victory."<sup>2</sup>

The *Sada al-Wilaya* [Echo of Governing] periodical, published by Hizballah's main cultural unit, mainly focuses on the current Iranian leader, 'Ali Khamene'i, who is referred to as the *Wali Amr al-Muslimim* – that is, the leader of all Muslims. The aim of this periodical, which primarily includes articles, speeches, memoirs and rulings by Khamene'i, is to instill in the consciousness of the activists the character of the leader as a source of authority and as a pan-Islamic leader.

In Hizballah's publications, Khamene'i is portrayed as a teacher of religious law in regard to both global and everyday issues, responding to the religious questions of the believers. Occasionally, other Islamic sages are also mentioned, such as Musa Sadr – the leader of the Shiite in Lebanon during the 1970s and the founder of the Amal movement (who, as a martyr, cannot pose a threat to the leader's standing) – or Iraqi sages. However, on the other hand, Fadlallah and his lofty religious status are completely ignored.

In Hizballah's publications, the words of praise for the religious-legal abilities of the leader Khamene'i are designed also, to contend with the prevailing views regarding his weaknesses in these areas. Thus, one of the leading religious sages in Iran - Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi - after listening to the Iranian leader's words at a religious conference, is quoted as saying: "The words of the leader lasted two hours, but were so comprehensive and complete that the listener might assume that, despite the heavy pressures he bears in his position, he did nothing else for two months other than prepare this lecture."<sup>3</sup>

The art of mixed messages is prominently expressed in a book by Na'im Qasim, the deputy secretary-general of the movement, entitled: *Hizballah – The Path, the Experience and the Future* (published in Beirut in 2002). On the one hand, Qasim argues that any Muslim who is committed to his Islamic faith and its *Shari'a* necessarily incorporates the goal of establishing a single Islamic state as one of the natural expressions of his faith. Thus, there is no alternative to adopting a general plan for linking the parts of the nation to each other.<sup>4</sup> This can be possible only through the rule of the *Wali Faqih*. The idea of *Wilayat al-Faqih* represents continuity with the rule of the Prophet and the Imams, and the *Wali* is the deputy of the Imam or his surrogate in leading the nation.<sup>5</sup>

The Muslim person needs a religious mentor (*Marja' Taqlid*) to guide him in all things pertaining to the religious commandments and rules of behavior in his everyday life, and he also needs a leader (*Wali Faqih*) to set the general policy of the nation's life, including issues of war and peace. Since it is impossible to separate everyday issues from the general issues the nation faces, the *Marja' Taqlid* and the *Wali Faqih* merge into a single person – the Iranian leader. This *Wilaya* is essential for preserving and implementing Islam, and it is impossible to pursue the completion of the grand Islamic plan via private initiatives or separate action.<sup>6</sup>

In addition, according to Qasim, there is no connection between the national origin of the *Wali Faqih* and his rule, just as there is no connection between the national origin of the *Marja' Taqlid* and his *Marja'iyya* (field of religious authority). He can be Iraqi, or Iranian, or Lebanese, or Kuwaiti, or from any another origin – the main thing is that he acts on behalf of Islam. The areas of his rule are limited by the extent of his support from the believers.<sup>7</sup>

On the other hand, Qasim argues, one must distinguish between an ideological outlook and its implementation in practice: Ideologically, one should call for the establishment of the Islamic state and encourage others to accept it. However, on the practical level, this requires the agreement of the Lebanese people and an Islamic state cannot be established by a particular group that imposes its view on the other groups.<sup>8</sup>

Moreover, Qasim argues that the loyalty to the *Wali Faqih* is an obligation of every Muslim, including those who affiliate themselves with another *Marja' Taqlid* in regard to everyday matters. This is because the reins of governance in all things pertaining to the general Islamic destiny are in the hands of the *Wali Faqih*.<sup>9</sup> Thus, Qasim contradicts his previous argument that the *Marja' Taqlid* and *Wali Faqih* merge into a single person – the Iranian leader – and grants indirect legitimacy to Shiites in Lebanon to choose a *Marja' Taqlid* who is not Khamene'i. In our view, what stands behind these verbal acrobatics is Qasim's recognition of the fact that there are Shiites, even within the Hizballah movement itself, who regard other religious sages (such as Fadlallah) as their *Marja' Taqlid* on everyday questions of Islamic practice.

In regard to the decision-making process in the movement, Qasim makes it clear that Hizballah basically adheres to the *Wali Faqih*. However, the ongoing management of affairs in the various areas (the Lebanese political arena, the struggle against Israel, culture and society) are in the hands of the elected leadership in Lebanon – the consultative council (*Majlis al-Shura*) – headed by the secretary-general, who derives his authority from the *Wali Faqih*. The council has broad decision-making authorities and there is no need for the *Wali Faqih* to supervise it on a daily basis.<sup>10</sup>

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2 *Baqiyat Allah*, Volume 125, February 2002.

3 *Baqiyat Allah*, Volume 160, 2005.

4 Qasim, *al-Minhaj, al-Tajruba, al-Mustaqbal* (Beirut, 2002), pages 38-39.

5 Qasim, pages 80-81.

6 Qasim, pages 68-72.

7 Qasim, page 75.

8 Qasim, page 38.

9 Qasim, page 75.

10 Qasim, page 76.

## Teaching the Idea of Wilayat al-Faqih

In contrast to the cautious, vague and downplayed public position, documents captured during the Second Lebanon War indicate that Hizballah never ceased to inculcate the idea as a basic ideological concept, as part of the indoctrination administered to those who join the organization.

Hizballah already begins to instill the idea in its “Imam al-Mahdi Scouts” Association, whose publications state that one of the objectives of the youth movement is “to build an improved Islamic generation, based upon the principle of *Wilayat Faqih*”.

During the stage of recruitment for the movement, the candidates who are in the “preparation” stage (a one-year preliminary stage for acceptance into Hizballah) are asked about their current views. This includes such questions as: “Define the religious leadership that constitutes a continuation of the rule of the Imams, peace be upon them?” “Is obedience to *Wilayat al-Faqih* mandatory or optional, and on which issues?” “Who constitutes the religious leadership in Lebanon?” “Do you think that it is an obligation to establish the Islamic state, and when?” In addition, the candidates are asked: “Who is the source of emulation for you, in the past, in the present and from which point in time?” These questions are designed to probe the internal makeup of those wishing to join the organization. It is possible that in the early stage there are no “wrong” answers to any of those questions for new comers, which would disqualify them.

Subsequently, however, as part of the educational program the trainees undergo, they need to internalize the organization’s views. And among the subjects taught during the “preparation” stage are, for example, “the role of the blessed Islamic Republic (Iran) in motivating Muslims,” “granting refuge to the Islamic resistance [that is, Hizballah] and supporting it,” “the biography of Imam Khomeini,” and “The question of the source of authority of Imam Khamene’i.”

In order to verify the success of the indoctrination on these topics, a reassessment of the recruits’ abilities and beliefs is conducted every few months. Thus, a document from Hizballah’s personnel administration unit in Jabal ‘Amil on the subject of “Setup and Program – The Preparation Stage,” which discusses the training program for the candidates, explicitly defines loyalty to the *Wali al-Faqih* as one of the four mandatory conditions for acceptance into the organization. The three other conditions are: faith, the spirit of jihad and the spirit of mission. Loyalty to the *Wali al-Faqih* is defined as “the continuation of loyalty to the imams.” Thus, obedience to the *Wali al-Faqih* is obligatory.

It should also be noted that those who have worked for at least a year in an organized framework (including as a volunteer) at institutions that operate under the patronage of the *Wilayat al-Faqih* (Iranian-sponsored institutions in Lebanon) even receive an exemption from the “preparation” stage and can immediately join the organization.

## Ramifications for the Status of Secretary-General Nasrallah

The fact that the Hizballah movement instills in its personnel the principle of *Wilayat al-Faqih*, according to which the supreme authority on religious and political matters is in the hands of an ostensibly “foreign” leader (the ruler of another state, and even a non-Arab one), was liable to hurt the standing of the movement’s leader. However, this did not happen and Hassan Nasrallah became a symbol of success even beyond the borders of Lebanon and one of the most admired figures in the Arab world.

In our view, a central reason for this is the fact that Nasrallah heads a movement and is not a head of state. As such, the support of a regional power actually strengthens rather than weakens him. The fact that a regional power stands behind the Hizballah movement and provides military, financial and moral assistance empowers it with state-like capabilities, while at the same time enabling it to maintain “ideological purity” as a “revolutionary” movement.

In addition, Nasrallah, despite the fact that he does not refrain from speaking on religious topics and incorporates Islamic motifs in his speeches, does not present himself as a senior authority on questions of Islamic law, but primarily as the movement’s political and military leader. Consequently, his subordination to the Iranian *Wali Faqih* on religious issues cannot harm his status

(as opposed to the status of Fadlallah, who constituted before his death a challenge to the very notion of *Wilayat al-Faqih*).

An additional factor, of course, is Nasrallah’s natural charisma (which sharply contrasts with the lack of charisma of the Iranian leader, Khamene’i). This has enabled Nasrallah to turn himself into an impressive public “brand name,” without seeking refuge in the shadow of the leader.

## Summary

The Hizballah movement’s absolute loyalty to the idea of *Wilayat al-Faqih*, which subjects it to the authority of a non-Lebanese figure (the Iranian leader), was and remains a central element in the movement’s life. During its early years, it proudly emphasized this idea. Subsequently, however, a variety of reasons (the death of Khomeini, Hizballah’s entry into political life in Lebanon, the challenge of Fadlallah) led the movement to downplay this idea in its public statements and to make relatively scarce mention of it.

Nonetheless, in its internal publications and ideological periodicals, expressions of absolute loyalty to the Iranian leader have continually

appeared. Adherence to this principle is presented as a basic tenet of belief that is incumbent upon all Shiite believers.

Moreover, documents captured during the Second Lebanon War indicate that contrary to the cautious public position, which blurs and downplays the issue, Hizballah has never ceased to instill the idea as a fundamental ideological concept in its indoctrination process for those joining the organization. The idea is already inculcated in Hizballah's Scouts movement ("Imam al-Mahdi Scouts" Association) and among older recruits, and the extent of its assimilation is periodically assessed.

The fact that the Hizballah movement indoctrinates its personnel with the principle of *Wilayat al-Faqih*, according to which the supreme authority on religious and political matters is in the hands of an ostensibly "foreign" leader (the ruler of another state, and even a non-Arab one), was liable to hurt the standing of the movement's leader. However, this did not happen and Hassan Nasrallah became a symbol of success even beyond the borders of Lebanon and one of the most admired figures in the Arab world.

A central reason for this is the fact that Nasrallah heads a movement and is not a head of state. As such, the support of a regional power actually strengthens rather than weakens him. In addition, Nasrallah, despite the fact that he does not refrain from speaking on religious topics and incorporates religious-legal motifs in his speeches, does not present himself as a senior authority on questions of Islamic law, but primarily as the movement's political and military leader. Consequently, his subordination to the Iranian *Wali Faqih* on religious issues cannot harm his status. An additional factor, of course, is Nasrallah's natural charisma (which sharply contrasts with the lack of charisma of the Iranian leader, Khamene'i). This has enabled Nasrallah to demonstrate loyalty to the Iranian leader without seeking refuge in his shadow.

In summary, Hizballah has succeeded in enjoying both worlds – operating as a legitimate Lebanese movement, while continuing to regard the Iranian leader as the supreme authority and to receive religious, political, economic and military backing from a strong regional power.

## Virtual Leadership in Radical Islamist Movements: Mechanisms, Justifications and Discussion

Philipp Holtmann

### A. Introduction

The Internet is the main arena for the dissemination of radical Islamist discourses serving Jihadist propaganda and motivation. Virtual leadership and decision-making are part of this discourse nexus. It can be observed that radical Islamist activists are currently adapting classical Islamic mechanisms of decision-making to the virtual space, so called “virtual leadership”.

#### *Definition of “Virtual Leadership”*

Islamic authority and leadership rely on certain Islamic legal rules and mechanisms. In Islamist networks, movements and groups, leaders are often personally elected. Moreover, group members take part in, pass on and execute decisions oriented at classical Islamic processes of consultation, election and advice. Interpretations of Islamic law and adoptions of Islamic decision-making have worked especially well in radical Islamist groups. They are smaller than popular Islamist movements. Therefore, the group cohesion is stronger. Moreover, it is drastically strengthened through classical election rituals such as the *bay'a*. But since 9/11, traditional group structures have become difficult to maintain. There are now more independent cells with different command structures, sometimes virtual as much as physical. Radical Islamist activists are systematically adapting classical Islamic processes of decision making, advice and mobilization to the Internet. They create “virtual Islamic states”, take “virtual pledges of allegiance” and give “virtual consultation” to radical Islamists in the real world. This leads to vivid discussions among them. And it means that an internet-based discourse around Islamic leadership and cyber-authority evolves.

“Virtual leadership” means leadership and guidance through the internet. It lacks a hierarchical chain of command and direct contact and has come into existence out of the need for compartmentalization and secrecy of radical Islamist movements.

To understand “virtual leadership” and “cyber-authority” we have to analyze three main factors; its mechanisms, its Islamic legal justifications; its applications; and the discourses around it.

In a state military, a strict hierarchy exists. A military chain of command is formal, official and legitimate. A typical chain of command would go from general to major, colonel, captain, lieutenant, and staff-sergeant. Every authority receives orders (personally) from the next higher authority. “Virtual leadership”, in contrast, is a result of and answer to a state of anarchy. If the surrounding world looks anarchic, in a state of chaos and threatens the existence of a movement, it may become clandestine. Very similar to the idea of “virtual leadership” is the command mechanism of communist and Trotskyist movements of the 1940s. Such movements built clandestine cells. Obedience depended upon a set of codes. Underground members received encoded orders by somebody they had either never met, or were not able to keep meeting personally due to security risks. A similar process took place in Islamist movements in the 1980s. Some groups, such as the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, were divided into outside and inside leaderships. The exiled leadership sent encoded orders to the local leadership. This bears some resemblance to “virtual leadership” via the internet. However, when we discuss “virtual leadership”, we have to add the factor of Islamic tradition to the analysis. Western political culture and movements seem to be less friendly toward the idea of indirect leadership. They prefer direct contact. Islamic tradition, however, is strongly textually based and leans on chains of authority like X said on the strength of Y said on the strength of Z. Motivation and decisions often rely on judgments of long-gone authorities. Some radical Islamists have legitimized terror attacks with statements, *fatwas* and tractates of classical Muslim authorities. Moreover, scriptural, i.e. virtual authority in Sunni Islam is exceptionally strong. For example, the practice of issuing of *fatwas* (religious scholarly opinions) does not require direct contact between an inquirer and an authority. Why do some Muslims accept rulings and guidelines via the internet and listen to persons they have never seen or met? Thus, it needs to be researched if radical Sunni Islamism is traditionally more open to “virtual leadership” than Western political culture.

#### **Characteristics of Virtual Leadership**

- 1) No direct contact
- 2) No formal chain of command
- 3) Authority may be dead or fictive

## Factors Causing Virtual Leadership

- 1) The need to compartmentalize, need for secrecy
- 2) Anarchic circumstances, lack of hierarchy and traditional organization
- 3) Clandestine activity
- 4) Islamic political culture?

## Topics to Be Researched to Explain Virtual Leadership and Cyber-authority

- 1) Mechanisms of virtual leadership in terms of guidance, order, advice, counsel, incitement
- 2) Discourses around virtual leadership among radical Islamists
- 3) Islamic legal justifications of virtual leadership
- 4) Applications and cases of virtual leadership

This preliminary analysis shall shed some light on the following questions:

- How do radical Islamists discuss virtual leadership?
- What is virtual leadership? How does it function?
- Who are virtual leaders and what are their characteristics?  
(alive/dead, classical/ modern, real-fictive, personal-textual)
- What are the differences between virtual and classical Islamic leadership and is Islamic political culture more open to virtual leadership than Western political culture?
- How is virtual leadership justified in Islam legally?
- How have classical Islamic legal mechanisms been adapted to the internet?
- Are radical Islamist discourses also a form of virtual leadership? (textual guidance) and what are the main doctrines?
- Is virtual leadership an alternative to traditional organizational structures?

## B. Radical (Sunni) Islamist Movements

### 1. Theological and Ideological Basis: Salafism

This analysis is concerned with virtual leadership in radical Islamist movements and among activists that belong to the Salafi-Jihadi strand of Sunni Islam. Salafis are Sunni Muslims whose theological doctrine (*'aqida*) is based on the principle of emulating the correct Islamic example of the first three generations of Muslims, called the "pious forefathers" (*al-salaf al-salih*). Salafi-Jihadists try to realize this by violent means. The first three Muslim generations are seen by Salafis as epitome of the golden age of Islam in terms of piety, morality, spirituality, strength, and guidance. The self-reflection of modern Salafis as pious elite among corrupted Muslim masses is, among others, based on the Prophetic saying: "One sect (*ta'ifa*) of my *umma* remains that stands up for truth until the Hour of Resurrection."<sup>1</sup>

The Salafi movement is fractionalized, disunited and – within the limits of its own ideology – informed by a shady kind of egalitarianism – un-egalitarian in the sense that non-followers are despised, pressured and excommunicated, yet pondering on the argument that Islamic reform and change is a moral and religious obligation based on the principle of consensus. But who is authorized to initiate reform or, for example, close an agreement of loyalty (*bay'a*) with an *amir*, *imam*, *khalifa*? Regime clerics, popular scholars and radical preachers have quite different ideas about these questions.

While *'aqida* refers to the sectarian theological doctrine, *minhaj* means the adherence to certain methodological principles. Salafis deduce where possible from the Qur'an and the *sunna* - religious legislation can be derived directly from the Qur'an or indirectly from the *sunna* on the basis of precedence, i.e. analogy (*qiyas*) or consensus (*ijma'*). They favor transmitted dogma (*naql*) from the Qur'an and *sunna* over reasoning (*'aql*), and reject voluble interpretation (*ta'wil*) as well as personal opinion (*ra'y*) and dialectic debate on Islamic theology (*kalam*), which in their view leads to innovation (*bid'a*) and is seen as the opposite of the *sunna*. In spite of their rejection of opinion and debate Salafis are heavily opinionated on religious, political and social issues and defend their fundamentalist views in heated debates. Main differences concern how strictly monotheism (*tawhid*), deviations from it like sin (*kufr*) and idolatry (*shirk*), and the principle to follow Muhammad's example (*ittiba'*) are to be interpreted and judged.<sup>2</sup>

This in turn affects how sects and their leaders behave in reality. Salafis may follow an orthodox strategy of acquiescence and support Muslim regimes, they may be quietist, religiously, politically or violently activist or even totally isolate themselves from the surrounding Muslim society which they regard as unbelievers who live in a state of ignorance (*Jahiliyya*).

Thus, Salafis are roughly split into three groups according to the method (*minhaj*) by which their doctrine is put into practice. Quietist Salafi-Sheikhs want to proselytize Muslim society; political Salafi-Ikhwanis try to participate in the political systems of their home countries; and

<sup>1</sup> "La tazal ta'ifa min ummati zahirin 'ala al-haqq hatta taqum al-sa'a", quoted in: Abi Usama Salim bin 'Aid al-Hilali, *Al-Jama'at al-Islamiyya fi dau' al-Kitab wa-al-Sunna bi-Fahm Salaf al-Umma* (Islamic movements in the light of the Qur'an and the *sunna* according to the forefathers of the *umma*), (Al-Dar al-Athariyya: Amman, 2003), p. 45.

<sup>2</sup> Al-Hilali, pp. 558-562.



violent Salafi-Jihadists wage revolutionary and terrorist struggles — respectively, for instance, Jama'at al-Tabligh, or the al-Albani movement; the Muslim Brothers; and al-Qa'ida. Statements, however, even by moderate followers, give reason to believe that all three strands follow a Jihadist long-term strategy, that is, if their power is consolidated, they will wage jihad.<sup>3</sup> But a strict methodological distinction does not apply since also regime or popular clerics often follow Salafi principles, which are regarded as the basis of orthodox Islam. Moreover, a radical Salafi must not necessarily appear or behave like a pious Salafi. In terms of dress code, prayer and social etiquette he may hide all outward signs of his belief. Thus, he will not be discernable as a Salafi at all in his environment.

It might also be useful to distinguish between a more open form of Salafism, by which scholars try to derive the “spirit” of the *Shari'a* according to their understanding of the *al-salaf al-salih*, called interpretive Salafism (*salafiyya ijthadiyya*), and a more puritan and literal form of Salafism (*al-salafiyya al-nassiyaa*). Interpretive Salafism certainly exists, although it is in the minority and refers mainly to the late 19<sup>th</sup> century Islamic reform efforts to reconcile Western scientific and technical advance with an enlightened form of Islam by scholars like Muhammad 'Abduh and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. Modern representatives of this trend, who mix(ed) extremist opinions with a popular approach, are, for example, the Qatar-based Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, or the late Egyptian Muhammad al-Ghazali (1917-1996). Today, literal Salafism (*al-salafiyya al-nassiyaa*), based on the exact emulation of the example of the *al-salaf al-salih*, dominates the Salafi scene. It is based on radical elements of the jurisprudence of the 13<sup>th</sup> century Damascene Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyya. Moreover, it is associated with today's ultra-literal Saudi-Wahhabism, a radical Salafi sect which has heavily influenced Salafi thought over the last 20 years.

The most radical Salafi-branch is Salafi-Takfiris (a sub-sect of the Salafi-Jihadists). *Takfir* means to excommunicate another Muslim which equals a death sentence. Takfiris have waged ferocious terrorist campaigns against fellow Muslims regarded as sinners (*kuffar*), like in the Algerian civil war in the 1990s and in Iraq. Yet, the line between Salafi-Jihadists and Salafi-Takfiris cannot be drawn clearly since the doctrine of the former is based on the selective excommunication of Muslim rulers and their entourage. An especially dangerous radicalization process within Jihadist movements happens if the pendulum swings over from a selective to an indiscriminate *takfir*.

Salafis consider themselves as “Salafi” without qualifications and use the description *minhaj* to decry other sects. But the reference to their method is also used as a tactic by some Salafi movements to distinguish themselves positively. For example, the al-Albani movement in Jordan undertakes great efforts to present itself as a moderate (*mu'tadili*), not a “*jihadi*” branch of the Salafis in order to avoid government repression. Yet, the common discourse of Salafism (shared by all strands) is informed by a paranoid, apocalyptic, salvatory, anti-Semitic, anti-Western, and Jew-hating tone, which should be taken into consideration if we use the term “moderate”.

Common to all Salafis, radicals and moderates, is the idea of being more qualified than common Muslims to interpret Islamic law and to participate in electing leaders and advising them (or, respectively, dethroning and killing them). After all, it is a “divinely ordained” task to remember and guide the “corrupted” *umma* until Judgment Day: “Then let those beware who withstand the Messenger's order, lest some trial befall them, or a grievous penalty be inflicted on them” (Qur'an 24:63). Salafis, thus, introspect themselves as successors of the classical “victorious sect” (*al-ta'ifa al-mansura*) or “surviving group” (*al-firqa al-najiya*), which unlike 71 other sects will not be perished in the Hereafter. A complementary self-view is that of “disciples of the *sunna*” (*ahl al-hadith*), who adhere to the body of traditions on Muhammad's exemplary life (*sira*) and his deeds (*athar*). As the “moderate” Salafi-Sheikh al-Hilali states:

The majority [of Muslims] have no idea of the *Shari'a*. And Islam is not a republican or public religion, nor about a democratic majority, which is ruled according to the opinion of the public. Islam settles the rule of Allah in every matter.

And for the intelligible: The people of truth (*ahl al-haqq*) are only a few compared to the people of falsehood. This is an existential Prophetic tradition which means that the multitude does not have any weight in this course. An explanation of the “victorious sect” and “surviving group” as the majority of the populace, masses, or common people cannot last under the scrutiny of [religious/legal] scientific critique. There is no evidence for this, it lacks proof, and it depreciates the right evidence (*dalil*; i.e. evidence from the Qur'an and *sunna*).<sup>4</sup>

## 2. Authority and Leadership

The medieval Muslim sociologist Ibn Khaldun defined the caliphate (*khilafa*) as “representation of the Lord of Allah's law in protecting the religion”.<sup>5</sup> The caliph shall administrate the Islamic empire, enforce the *Shari'a* and emulate the customs of Muhammad (*sunna*) in his political leadership. Ideally, the Muslim leader is both a political and religious authority, expressed in the dual character of the term “Prince of the Faithful”. In classical Sunni theory, the election of the ruler (*khalifa*, *imam*, *amir al-mu'minin*) is based on consensus (*ijma'*) and takes place through a pledge of allegiance (*bay'a*), which is a contract of obedience between the ruler and the ruled that, according to Ibn Khaldun, resembles a sales contract.<sup>6</sup>

Orthodox Sunni Islam follows the doctrine that it is better to stand united behind a ruler, even if he is corrupted, than to be disunited and in a state of civil strife (*fitna*). This is best illustrated by the Qur'an injunction: “Obey God, and obey the Apostle, and those charged with authority among you” (4:59).<sup>7</sup> Sunni Islam stands for supporting state structures and central authority over religious dogma. Sunni clergy have over centuries adapted their ideology and jurisprudence to ruling regimes. Thus, Sunni Islam became accepted as mainstream religion, defined as *din*. In parallel, other – non-mainstream- Muslim communities have adopted rebellious ideologies rejecting state structures. They have assumed a peripheral, sectarian position.<sup>8</sup> Among them are today's radical Islamist movements.

3 Interview of the author with Jordanian Salafi, Amman, Jordan, March 2006.

4 Al-Hilali, p. 46.

5 “*Al-niyaba 'an sahib al-shari'a fi hafz al-din*”, Ibn Khaldun, *al-Muqaddima* (Cairo: Dar al-Fajr li-al-Turath, 2004), p. 244.

6 *Bay'a* and *mubaya'a* (proclamation) are derived from the root *ba'a*, which means to sell. Ibn Khaldun observes that shaking hands between Muslims and a newly proclaimed leader resembles the conclusion of a sale between a seller and a buyer. Ibn Khaldun, *al-Muqaddima*, p.266.

7 The disposal of the ruler is seen as creating *fitna*, which must be prevented by all means, and there is no possible excommunication of the ruler as long as he has professed faith (*shahada*).

8 *Din* means religion in the sense of “judgment”; “faith”, and “law” (*Shari'a*). See Fouad I. Khuri, *Imams and Emirs: State, Religion and Sects in Islam* (London: Westbourne Grove, 1990), p. 34.

The Sunni claim for unity, even if it does not exist in reality, has led to the suppression of Islamic sects (*ta'ifa*, pl. *tawa'if*) throughout Islamic history. Today's presidential "elections" in Sunni-Muslim Arab countries with a turn-out 99.9 percent in favor of the candidate reflect a "should-be-in-consensus-society". There is no place for sects in Sunni Islam which deviate from this construed vision of unity. The orthodox mainstream (Sunnis) claims not only to have the right to elect the caliph, but also to represent the whole Islamic *umma*, which is imagined as a universal community of brothers ("The faithful are brothers", 49:10). The *hadith* "My *umma* does not agree on an error" is often cited as proof for the infallibility of the Sunni community in the choice of its leader, which is based on consensus (*ijma'*).<sup>9</sup>

The questions of leadership and authority are heavily discussed issues among radical Islamists. Radical Islamists despise the orthodox Sunni concept of authority. They hold the ruler and their supporters, in the best case, or even the whole Muslim community for sinners and reject a regime co-optive approach.<sup>10</sup> Their concept of authority and consensus, then, is in no way connected to the Sunni mainstream approach. To legitimate authority, they use the mechanisms of consultation (*shura*) and pledge of allegiance, which we will further discuss in the section on "virtual bay'a".

However, some "moderate" Salafis adapt the orthodox Sunni approach to authority ("Obey God, and obey the Apostle, and those charged with authority among you", 4:59). A *fatwa* collection of Saudi Arabian Wahhabi and Jordanian Salafi scholars illustrates this. It is mandatory to obey Muslim rulers, one must refute suicide bombings and *takfir*, they claim, which is a good example of a common stance against radical Islam.<sup>11</sup> They have adapted their jurisprudence and ideology to central authority.<sup>12</sup> Yet, it remains unclear if this is merely tactical, or really a call for moderation. It could also be seen as Salafi propagation with the goal to become better accepted by the Sunni-mainstream, i.e. the orthodox "consensus society".<sup>13</sup>

But even if some moderate Salafis support Muslim regimes, they are far away from exerting any real influence over their rulers. Expert delegations ("men of resolution and contract"), who are supposed to elect leaders on behalf of the population or to determine state-policies based on the *Shari'a* through consultative councils (*majlis al-shura*), do not really matter as the Saudi example shows. The same goes for official clerics in other Sunni countries. Sunni states prevent this and keep their clerics tightly under control.<sup>14</sup>

## C. Factors Facilitating Virtual Leadership

### 1. Changes in Islamic Authority and Knowledge Production in the Islamic World

Modern Sunni Islam, theologically and institutionally, is in a state of virtual anarchy.<sup>15</sup> Among the root causes are the lack of central authority and hierarchy and the reduction of the clergy's legitimacy. Regarding the lack of authority and hierarchy, four causative factors come to mind. First, the egalitarianism of Sunni Islam also extends to equal rights to interpret religion. Second, Different sects and schools of jurisprudence compete with each other. Third, there is no formal hierarchy of scholars. Individual scholars can issue religious edicts. Fourth, numerous religious-judicial centers bolster different state policies. This leads us to the second root cause, the reduction of the clergy's legitimacy. Modern Sunni Muslims do not believe in the independence and trustworthiness of official clerics. Among the reasons are: Muslim states have co-opted the clergy and transformed them into salaried employees. They control the religious endowments (*awqaf*) that once sustained the clergy. And states use the pulpits of the clergy as a forum to present their own policies, making official scholars look as corrupt as themselves, dependent from and aligned with an all-consuming imperialist West.

As early as in the 11<sup>th</sup> century the Seljuk *wazir* Nizam al-Mulk created his own school (*madrassa*, pl. *madaris*) for religious scholars in Baghdad and kept it under administrative control. The independence of scholars ceased to exist. This process continued all over the Islamic world. By installing moderate and regime-friendly scholars as official *'ulama*, Muslim governments have always tried to indirectly

9 "La *tajjami* 'ummati 'ala al-khata'", *hadith* cited by the medieval Islamic theologian Muhammad al-Ghazali (1058-1111), quoted in Ilya A. Bello, *The Medieval Islamic Controversy Between Philosophy and Orthodoxy: Ijma' and Ta'wil Between Al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd*, (Leiden: Brill, 1989), p. 35.

10 This is due to their radical interpretation of what constitutes sin (*kufr*). *Takfir* means to label the judgment of apostasy on a Muslim, which is punishable by death. In the radical Islamist discourse, the *takfir* doctrine became popular with 'Abd al-Salam Faraj's manifesto *Al-Farida al-Gha'iba* (the neglected duty) for justifying the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat in 1981. Faraj compared Sadat and other contemporary Muslim rulers to the 13<sup>th</sup> century Mongol invaders of the Abbasside Caliphate, who converted to Islam, yet were eventually excommunicated. He based this on a legal edict of the medieval Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyya. Faraj's was a selective *takfir*, yet he opened the gates for much more radical interpretations. Nowadays, the doctrine is stronger connected to the question of *al-wala' wa-al-bara'* (loyalty toward Muslims and taking distance from *kuffar*) due to the influence of Salafi and Wahhabi thought into the Jihad-movement since the 1980s. It promotes a dichotomous worldview and facilitates a broad interpretation of *takfir*, not only of rulers and their entourage, but also of ordinary Muslims who cannot keep up with the strict Islamic behavioral standards laid down by the doctrine.

11 The former stand more or less for a form of ultra-orthodox Salafi mainstream, officially integrated into the Saudi regime, and the latter for a popular "moderate" Salafi-sectarian tendency. The collection *Al-Fatawa al-Muhimma* ("The important *fatwas*") contains religious opinions by – among others – the Saudi State-Mufti 'Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, the Saudi scholars Ibn 'Uthayman and al-Sheikh Salih bin Fauzan al-Fauzan, as well as the late Jordanian based scholar Muhammad al-Albani. Besides authority questions they deal with issues like the overthrow of the ruler (*al-khuruj 'ala al-hakim*) excommunication (*takfir*), and suicide-attacks (*amaliyat intihariyya*). Jamal bin Farihan al-Harithi, *Al-Fatawa al-Muhimma fi Tafsir al-Umma* ("The important *fatwas* in educating the Nation") (Cairo: Dar al-Minhaj, 2003).

12 It is also important to remember that Saudi Arabia is a fundamentalist state built on the tenets of ultra-literal Wahhabism, which cannot be compared to Sunni-Arab states led by secular regimes. Moreover, both the Saudi-Wahhabis regime clerics and the "moderate" Jordanian al-Albani sect despise democracy or liberal interpretations of Islam.

13 This way the *Salafi-mu'tadili* and *Salafi-Wahhabi* scholars (among them the prominent Saudi cleric Sheikh bin Baz (1910-1999) may have tried to get rid of their negative Salafi image is connected to fundamentalism and sectarianism.

14 Supportive clerics serve as puppets whose task it is to bolster states policies. If they fall out of line, which frequently happens over issues like militancy and resistance connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and US-Intervention in the Muslim world, they are replaced or reprimanded. Within the Wahhabi milieu of Saudi Arabia, it might be useful to remember that, "in an ironic twist, Ibn Baz's disciples included al-Ikhwan's Juhayman al-'Utaybi as well as the Salafiyyun of the 1990s, both of which parted company with their elder teacher for his support of the government." R. Hreir Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995), p. 146.

15 We can associate Western political thought at present with (relative) hierarchy and order and Sunni Islam with anarchy and disorder. Heterodox Islam is much more hierarchically organized than orthodox Sunni Islam. This concerns all its sects, movements, brotherhoods and sheikh-cults, but also radical Islamist movements. In terms of anarchy versus hierarchy, we can also speak about underdevelopment, social quarrels and civil strife in the Muslim world in contrast with political, social and economic order in the Western world. If Western colonial, political, economic and military intervention in the Muslim world are the root cause for this situation is a matter of heated debate.

exercise power over religious authority and its political dimension. With the increasing proximity of religious scholars to worldly affairs also popular mistrust towards the scholars developed, all of which further contradicts the Sunni myth of unity. The nationalization and integration of religious institutions into socialist Arab states in the post-independence era since the 1950s led to the creation of alternative and informal centers of learning where ordinary Muslims can acquire religious education. First, these were mosques; nowadays the internet has become a virtual mosque and alternative centre for learning.

Since the raise of political Islam in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, ever more independent scholars have filled the gap created by the lack of trusted official religious institutions. As Lindholm observes, the authority of the learned “has never been completely accepted by the egalitarian masses. Suspicion of the *faqih* (scholar) has been metaphorically expressed in popular discourse through a comparison with secular leadership. Sultans and princes are viewed as frankly self-interested individuals reliant on their personal abilities in their eternal struggle to gain and hold power. Their values are the values of manly warriors: bravery, generosity, honor, autonomy, power. Religious figures present themselves as the opposite, that is, as servants of God emptied of personal ambition. But they can also be accused of being the converse, namely effeminate, cowardly, miserly and dishonorable.”<sup>16</sup>

The reduction of the clergy’s legitimacy has been accompanied by significant changes in Islamic authority and knowledge production. Traditional (Sunni) religious authority is based on textuality, i.e. the Qur’an and the *sunna* and discursive method, i.e. norms of juridical theory and praxis within Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*). This is complemented by the personification and localization of authority and knowledge, which are linked to reputed scholars and schools of learning. Modern Islamic authority, however, is based on new forms of textuality, i.e. discursive method based on philosophical ideas, modern populism, an ultra-literal reading of the Qur’an and *sunna* out of historical context, personal pious narratives and political ideas. Personification and localization have given way to virtualization of authority via the internet and the development of hybrid forms of authority centered on transnational thematic networks and charismatic New Islamist Intellectuals (NII), i.e. laymen who are not authoritative in the classical sense.<sup>17</sup>

The revolutionary increase in knowledge production is also connected to rising literacy rates and mass education in the Muslim world, the emergence of new technologies and modes of communication, especially the internet and satellite television. Moreover, a shift from “traditional” to “modern” attitudes has contributed to a revolution in Islamic authority, which is more and more dominated by laymen (NII), or alliances of (radical) laymen and jurists.

According to Mandaville (2007), the effects of the digital age on Islamic authority can be summarized as follows<sup>18</sup>:

1. Functional pluralization: Changes in social purpose and ends of knowledge seeking
2. Spatial pluralization: Changes of spaces in which Muslims seek authority
3. Mediative pluralization: Changes of textual forms and figures through which Muslims seek authority

## 2. Fragmentation of Traditional Organizational Structures of Radical Islamist Movements

There are two major reasons for the fragmentation of traditional organizational structures: The global War on Terrorism and strategic Jihadi self-critique in the sense that traditional organizations do not work anymore. First, since the beginning of the War on Terrorism, international security campaigns have led to the break-up of many radical Islamist networks and groups. This impedes traditional organizational structures and personal guidance within groups. It created the need to search for new organizational structures on the side of radical Islamists. Radical Islamists have recognized that they cannot keep on fighting guerrilla struggles, especially not against the superior aerial power of western states, first and foremost the U.S.. Neither can they maintain secure bases in most Muslim countries which cooperate with western powers. Nor can they rely anymore on open networks abroad, for example in Europe.

The awareness of vulnerability has led to intensive strategic self-critique by Jihadi thinkers. This literary output that originated from this trend has been coined “Jihadi strategic studies”. Radical Islamists have formulated new strategic guidelines for the third generation of Jihadi activists (following the first of the 1960-70s and second of the 1980-90s). Among them is the call for the fragmentation of organizational structures and individualization of action, yet globalization of common ideology. Virtual leadership is one of the solutions offered by Jihadi strategists. Via the internet, global jihad shall run under a common ideological umbrella (Global Islamic Resistance), claims the al-Qa’ida strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri. He radically breaks with hierarchical organizations and advocates individualization. Guidance is mainly based on the internet (See table 1). Factors that can facilitate the development of virtual leadership are manifold. For example, Islamic counsel is very textual and letter-based (*istifta*); also Islamic authority is strongly based on textuality, i.e. religious-political texts can govern the behavior of Muslims as strong as personal guidance does in western political culture. Moreover, the possibilities of information distribution in the digital age strengthen the idea to transform elements of Islamic leadership to the virtual level.

Table 1

Al-Suri’s comparison between traditional Jihad groups and the system of Global Islamic Resistance (GIR: *al-Muqawama al-Alamiyya al-Islamiyya*) cells

Feature	Traditional Organizations	System of GIR Squadrons
Size	up to several thousands	10–1

16 Charles Lindholm, *The Islamic Middle East: Tradition and Change* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), p.163.

17 Gilles Kepels, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), p.14.

18 Peter Mandaville, “Globalization and the Politics of Religious Knowledge: Pluralizing Authority in the Muslim World”, *Theory, Culture and Society*, Vol.24, No. 2, pp. 101-115 (2007).

Objective	overthrow of the government and formation of an Islamic regime in a specific state	resistance against occupiers and their allies wherever possible
Program	Jihad organization	Global Islamic Resistance Call
Leadership	central <i>amir</i> and leadership	general informational guidance for squadrons globally and a specific <i>amir</i> for each squadron
Financing	often interest-bound financing from abroad, donations	primarily self-financing, donations; at a later stage distribution of foreign assets and treasuries of overthrown regimes
Allegiance	pledge of allegiance ( <i>bay'a</i> ) to a central <i>amir</i>	unmediated contract ( <i>ahd</i> ) with Allah and contract of obedience to a squadron's <i>amir</i>

Source: Al-Suri, *Da'wat al-muqawama*, Chapter 8, subsection 5.

## D. Mechanisms of Virtual Leadership

### 1. The Virtual Bay'a

#### The Classical Bay'a and Its Discussion among Radical Islamists

According to classical Sunni legal theory, the election of the ruler is based on consensus (*ijma'*) and takes place through a pledge of allegiance (*bay'a*), which is a contract of obedience between the ruler and the ruled. The includes consultation (*shura*) and proclamation (*mubaya'a*), ritualized by a handshake (*musafaha*) and exercised by "the men of resolution and contract" (*ahl al-hall wa-al-'aqd*), who are those qualified to elect or depose a caliph or *amir* or sultan on behalf of the Muslim community (*umma*).<sup>19</sup> In the eyes of the medieval scholar Ibn Khaldun, the ritual of shaking hands between Muslims and a newly proclaimed leader resembles the conclusion of a sales contract between a seller and a buyer. Both "*bay'a*" and *mubaya'a* are derived from the verbal root *ba'a*, which means to sell.<sup>20</sup> Islamic historiography narrates that the *bay'a* means to follow Muhammad or another Muslim leader under all conditions until death. The ritual was sometimes repeated before battle to strengthen the fighting spirit of Muslims (*mubaya'a 'ala al-maut*). In battle, the pledge was also given to field commanders.<sup>21</sup>

While the *bay'a* ritual is a mere formality in many Sunni Muslim states to legitimize the election of a secular ruler, it plays an important role in Radical Islamist movements.<sup>22</sup> The *bay'a* translates into a tight and personal knitting together of a group and strong relationship between its followers and leaders. For radical Islamists, the *bay'a* agreement creates an island of hierarchy within the anarchy of Sunni Islam with its multitude of rivaling trends, power centers and heterodox sects.

In radical Islamist groups, the *bay'a* leads to the election of an ordinary person as the group's military leader (*amir*). An *amir* has much less power than a classical *imam* or sultan. His authority is limited to the group and does not expand to the Islamic *umma*. A major question among Islamist thinkers is, if a *bay'a* may be pledged under such circumstances. The Jihadi ideologue 'Abd al-Qadir bin 'Abd al-'Aziz answers this question affirmatively and claims that the *bay'a* and thus the nature of leadership (*imara*) in Islamist groups is fundamentally different from the classical pledge of allegiance to a Muslim *imam* or caliph. 'Abd al-Qadir makes a clear distinction between pledges of allegiance to people (*bay'at al-nas*), which he also calls agreements of obedience (*'uhud 'ala al-ta'a*); and pledges of allegiance to the *imam* (*bay'at al-imam*).<sup>23</sup> The legitimation of *imara* in Islamist groups is thus based on the distinction between *bay'at al-nas* and *bay'at al-imam*. 'Abd al-Qadir cites the following differences between the classical and modern uses of *bay'a*:

**1) "Contractors":** The *bay'at al-imam* is exercised by "people of resolution and contract", while for the Islamist groups a relevant adoption of *bay'at al-nas* is exercised by group members.

**2) Duties:** The *imam* must fulfill certain qualifications to be elected and oblige himself to enforce Islamic law universally and with all its aspects in the Islamic *umma*, which in turn is obliged to follow the *imam*. The *amir* of an Islamist group has no control beyond his group, or over the Islamic *umma*. Moreover, obedience to the *amir* is voluntary under *bay'at al-nas*, whereas obedience to the *imam* under the *bay'at al-imam* – pledged by an expert delegation on behalf of the *umma* - is obligatory for all Muslims.

**3) Time-span:** The *bay'at al-imam* is in theory valid until the death of the *imam*. The *bay'at al-nas* is timely restricted and elections within an Islamist group enable a change of leadership.

Several difficulties are connected to the *bay'a* in radical Islamist movements and should be mentioned. The al-Qa'ida ideologue Abu Mus'ab al-Suri observes that the nature of the *bay'a* in jihad organizations is very problematic: The rights and duties of the *amir* and the

19 "Ahl al-Hall wa'l-Aqd." in: John L. Esposito (ed.) *The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, Oxford Islamic Studies Online*. 18 February 2009. <<http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e73>>. In medieval political theory, the term refers to legal scholars whose task it was to offer the caliphate to the most qualified person. Because, in practice, most rulers designated their successors, the task was generally a mere formality. Some modern thinkers have tried to accommodate this task to that of a parliament.

20 Ibn Khaldun, *al-Muqaddima*, p. 266.

21 Such as before the battle of Yarmuk, where Muslim fighters pledged a "death-bay'a" to a low rank Muslim leader.

22 In orthodox Islam represented by official clerics, the pledge of allegiance to the newly "elected" leader is just a formal issue. The broad population who does not participate can probably not identify with the pledge exercised on its behalf by an expert group of scholars. For example, the Saudi Bay'a Council is made up of sons and senior grandsons of the Kingdom's founder. (<http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2006/loi/061106-turki-succession.html>) Also the political impact of other institutions that seem to give more weight to religious authority are questionable, like the Saudi Shura Council, for example. Nagi observes: "In the early 1990s, Saudi Arabia began a program of political reform, establishing the appointed Majlis al-Shura, Consultative Council. Nevertheless, this step did not lead to a significant shift in authority or more democratic institutions. In 2005, half of the council seats were open for election, and the other half were appointed by the monarchy". See Farouk S. Nagi, "The Rising Conflict For Democracy in the Arab World," honors thesis presented in May 2008 to the Department of Political Science of the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, 20 February 2009, (<http://ojs.uccs.edu/index.php/urj/article/viewFile/1/3>).

23 'Abd al-Qadir bin 'Abd al-'Aziz, *Al-'Umda fi l'dad al-'Udda fi Sabil Allah* ("Laying the foundation for the equipment for jihad in the ways of Allah"), chapter: "*fa-hal yajuz tasmiyat al-'uhud bayn al-nas bay'a?*" ("Can one call agreements between people a 'bay'ah'"), retrieved 17 March 2009 (<http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=85ud42ss>).

members, or the relationship between *amir*, members and organizations are unclear. At times, different jihad organizations in the same country fight each other over the pledge of allegiance. If a member wants to leave an organization, he may be excommunicated. In addition, the *amir* or a consultative council (*shura*) can also expel a member. Leaders of traditional jihad organizations have altogether too much power.<sup>24</sup> In addition, early experiments with virtual, i.e. indirect leadership in clandestine Islamist movements failed, claims al-Suri. In the 1980s, the leadership of the Syrian Muslim Brothers, for example, established itself in Baghdad and Amman, and issued unsuitable encoded military and political directives to the local leadership in Syria. The local leadership obeyed because it needed the money that came with the orders and felt bound by the pledge of allegiance, which in al-Suri's view was contestable given the mismanagement by the exiles, who had lost touch with reality.<sup>25</sup>

This offers radical Islamists three possible strategic approaches:

- 1) Sticking to the "classical *bay'a*" that creates a strict hierarchy within a group, according to 'Abd al-Qadir
- 2) Abolishing the *bay'a* altogether and building upon a "contract with Allah", according to al-Suri.
- 3) Creating a middle-way: the "virtual *bay'a*" via the internet

### The Virtual *Bay'a* and Its Legitimization

Over the last years the virtual *bay'a* has developed among radical Islamists as an alternative means to gather followers via the internet. The virtual ritual is very different from the classical one (see also above). Yet it is supposed to be a viable alternative and to have the same binding character. The main differences are the following:

- The **classical *bay'a*** ritual is very personal, even physical. This concerns consultation, proclamation, and especially the final handshake (*musafaha bi-al-'aiday*) between an expert delegation ("men of resolution and contract") and a newly elected leader or Jihadist group members and an *amir*. According to the classical ritual, a secondary pledge of allegiance is afterwards supposed to be taken by the Muslim populace in front of their respective *imam* in the mosque. However, this is not the election itself, but a mere confirmation of the decision that has been taken by the "men of resolution and contract".
- The **virtual *bay'a*** ritual is a written proclamation via the internet. The classical ritual (consultation (*shura*) - proclamation (*musafaha*) - final handshake (*musafaha*) has been drastically shortened. While the primary electorate commission ("men of resolution and contract") is missing, the secondary electorate-pool and those qualified to pledge allegiance and proclaim has been drastically enlarged. An undefined number of Muslims can "proclaim" directly via the internet by a simple blog entry stating "I pledge allegiance" (*ubayi*). Consultation and final handshake are probably supposed to be included into the written proclamation.

### Case: The internet *Bay'a* to Usama bin Laden – the "Death-*Bay'a*" (*Bay'at al-Maut*) on 24 April 2006 (26 Rabi' al-Awwal 1427 H)

In April 2006, a chatter named "alyasa" called for a "death-*bay'a*", i.e. a pledge to follow Usama bin Laden until death, on the Islamist internet forum *al-Buraq*. The author offered a detailed instruction for the mechanisms of internet-*bay'a*, which he justified in Islamic legal terms. Within a one-month period as many radical Islamist internet users as possible should consent to kill themselves for the cause of Bin Laden and al-Qa'ida; "Alyasa" referred to "the month of the greatest *bay'a*" (*shahr al-bay'a al-kubra*) and chose for special significance the month Rabi' al-Awwal of the Islamic calendar which is also the birth month of Muhammad (*shahr al-mawlid*). The two clearly defined goals of the *bay'a* were to pledge allegiance to Usama bin Laden as "leader of the Muslim armies" (*qa'id juyush al-muslimin*) and his terrorist campaign against the West; and to consent to die for this cause. The "death-*bay'a*" is a very illustrative example of virtual leadership: Nobody knows the author, or was in touch with him. Yet, several visitors of the site enthusiastically declared their consent. The call has clear terrorist implications, since it must be expected that some of those who declared their consent will sooner or later "sacrifice themselves" in terrorist operations.

The author presents himself like a simple intermediate who acts on behalf of al-Qa'ida. Even though he tries to appear as if he is irrelevant, he plays a crucial role in calling up conscripts for al-Qa'ida. He himself is a virtual leader, probably autonomous and self-motivated, highly aware of the propaganda effects of the internet.

"Alyasa"s goal is to support Usama bin Laden's build-up of an "enormous army", he says. In addition to the two "armies in Afghanistan and Iraq" a third army shall be created via the internet, consisting of conscripts "on a waiting list all over the internet". He clearly tries to revive the tradition of the classical death *bay'a* that was pledged before battle to strengthen the fighting spirit of Muslims. It is indeed very symbolical to choose this name. Isn't it a global, large scale battle without distinction between civilians and warriors before the end of times that he wishes? The "death-*bay'a*" is also a test-run: For future purposes, a statistic shall be drawn up at the end of the month to analyze the participation in detail.

### The Importance of the Internet: "The Only Gateway to Inform the Fighters" (*al-manfadh al-awhad li-i'lam al-mujahidin*)

"Alyasa" knows about the strategic-organizational problems that inform the radical Islamist movement. Security apparatuses focus internationally on detecting radical Islamist terror cells and groups. This bears a direct effect on direct leadership and guidance. Therefore, the Internet is like a blessing for the purpose of coordinating global jihad, he claims. His frantic laudation on the Internet in a poetic style is

<sup>24</sup> Al-Suri, *Da'wat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya al-'Alamiyya* (Global Islamic Resistance Call), Part 1, Chapter 7, "Structural Mistakes" (*Akhta' fi-al-bunya wa-al-haykal*).

<sup>25</sup> Al-Suri says he experienced this first-hand as member of the Syrian al-Tali'a al-Muqatila (Fighting Vanguard). He claims that exiled leaderships lose touch with the local reality. Al-Suri, *GIRC*, Part 1, Chapter 7.

an example that shows us how much effort radical Islamists may put in developing the Internet into a virtual command tool:

This Internet was created miraculously by Allah to serve jihad and the fighters.

It became their benefit,

Since half of the battle of the fighters

Takes places on the pages of the Internet,

Since it is the only gateway to inform the fighters

Glory and strength to Allah

#### The Islamic Legal Justification for the Virtual *Bay'a*: the *Bay'a* in the Written Form (*Kitaba*)

"Alyasa" justifies the virtual *bay'a* with an analogy to another classical case that refers to a pledge of allegiance in written form (*al-kitaba*). Accordingly, the ritual can be adapted to the Internet, argues "Alyasa". After he has explained the need to support global jihad and die for its cause, he introduces the Islamic legal argument on the importance of *bay'a*. Then he follows up with an argument on its different forms. To prove his case, he goes through four simple steps: He stresses the *shari'atic* importance, definition, description and possible forms of the ritual.

According to Muslim, a famous classical *hadith* transmitter, the Prophet Muhammad said: "Who dies without a pledge of allegiance in his throat, dies an ignorant death" (No. 1851). This proves the *shari'atic* importance of the ritual, so "Alyasa". "Ignorant" refers to the pre-Islamic era of tribal infighting (*Jahiliyya*), which is an appeal to every "true" Muslim that he must give a pledge of allegiance to Bin Laden. Otherwise he is a sinner and behaves like in pre-Islamic times. The technical details of the classical *bay'a* ritual as per Ibn Khaldun's standard work *Muqaddima* (meaning: the *bay'a* exercised through hand-shake as quasi sales-contract, see above) are less important than its implications: it translates into total obedience to an *amir* and binds forever, which is also the major point "Alyasa" wants to convey to possible radical followers: The *bay'a* is an integral part of the Islamic leadership, authority and command complex. For the consentor, it means the strict following of orders until death, may they be bad or good in his view. In this case, the order is simply to be prepared to die for Bin Laden, probably in an autonomously planned terror attack.

The rest of "Alyasa's" argument is concise and simple. He does not want to overdo it with the Islamic legal argument. After all, his target audiences are not Islamic clerics, but operatives who need a simple explanation.

Similar to 'Abd al-Qadir, he describes two different levels of the pledge. Yet, in slight contrast to 'Abd al-Qadir, he stresses the order in which the rituals have to follow more than their meanings. These are the primary **pledge of convention** (*bay'at al-in'iqad*) and the secondary **general pledge** (*al-bay'a al-amma*), which he also calls **pledge of obedience** (*bay'at al-ta'a*). The pledge of convention is the task of the "people of resolution and contract" (*ahl al-hall wa-al-'aqqd*), who had to resolve the dispute around the succession of the caliph. The most famous example is the election of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs (*al-Khulafa' al-Rashidun*), says "Alyasa". The secondary, general pledge is a **popular pledge** (*bay'a sha'biyya*). Traditionally, claims "Alyasa" Muslims confirmed the choice of the Muslim leader with a pledge in their local mosque. The fact that modern Arab thinkers already describe the internet as the "new mosque"<sup>26</sup> gives ample hint at the possible future popularity of the virtual *bay'a*.

In the last part of his Islamic legal justification, "Alyasa" lists three possible forms to pledge allegiance. The question is not only how people exercised the ritual in the lifetime of the Prophet, but how it evolved historically. "The observer of history from the aspect of our Lord Muhammad – may Allah bless him – until the beginning of this Christian century when the caliphate was abolished - must comprehend that there are numerous forms of the *bay'a*." Only the third form is interesting for the author, since it serves him to prove the Islamic legality of the virtual ritual:

- Handshake and speech (*musafaha wa-kalam*), traditional and most common way.
- Speech only (*kalam faqat*), mainly for women, who are not allowed to touch men.
- Writing (*al-kitaba*), a form that is adaptable to the Internet

"Alyasa" quotes a letter from a Muslim convert to Muhammad as proof for the written pledge of allegiance (*al-kitaba*):

The best example for this proclamation can be found in the writing of al-Najashi to the Prophet – may Allah bless him – where he said: "In the name of Allah, the most merciful compassionate, to Muhammad, the Prophet of Allah – may Allah bless him – from al-Najashi, peace be upon You, Prophet of Allah, and may the mercy of Allah be with the horse of Allah who has no gods beside him and who led me to Islam. Your letter surely arrived me, oh Prophet of Allah, in which you mentioned the matter of 'Aysa' ... until he [al-Najashi] said: 'I pledged you allegiance, and I pledged allegiance to the son of your uncle, and your companions, and I submitted myself under the hand of Allah, Lord of the worlds.'

26 'Abdallah el-Tahawy, "The Internet is the New Mosque - Fatwa at the Click of a Mouse," <http://www.arabinsight.org/aishowarticle.cfm?id=188>, retrieved 1 May 2009.

### Preliminary Conclusion on the Nature of the “Death-Bay’a”

Technically, it is a popular pledge adapted to the internet in the form of a “death-pledge”. The death-pledge in its classical form is neither a pledge of allegiance to a general Muslim leader, nor to the leader of a simple terror cell, organization or medium-sized group, but to a battlefield commander before a single battle. However, our example is a hybrid, an adaptation oriented at the classical Islamic battle pledge. Instead of a single specific battle, the pledge is to the worldwide organization and ideology of al-Qa’ida led by Bin Laden. Pledging allegiance and membership are equivalent with death according to the martyr-cult of al-Qa’ida.

The role of Bin Laden seems evident from what “Alyasa” has written on him in the introduction to his blog entry. Yet, Bin Laden’s true role is difficult to look through. Bin Laden is pictured as “*sheikh*” and “*qa’id juyush al-mu’minin*”, not however, as “*amir*”. The role of “*amir al-mu’minin*” is attributed to Mullah Omar, former leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. But since Bin Laden is neither an ordinary battlefield commander, nor al-Qa’ida’s fight a simple battle, there is more meaning to the virtual pledge. Bin Laden, as we remember, has already been hailed as “*mujaddid*” (divinely ordained reformer) in some Salafi circles, a characteristic that is attributed only every hundred years to a Muslim with *mahdi*-like powers.<sup>27</sup> It also shows that a formal hierarchy exists in the mind of the author. The internet author “Alyasa” presents the roles of Mullah Omar as *amir* and Bin Laden as *qa’id* like facts. Only the (primary) *bay’at al-in’iqad* determines the succession of Muslim leaders. However, Mullah Omar was bestowed with the title in Kandahar 1996 by gowning him in a coat attributed to Muhammad. The ritual symbolized the succession of the caliphate. This way the Taliban supported their claim to be the only Islamic state.<sup>28</sup>

### The Role of the Internet Participants

The role of the internet participants is to confirm by proclaiming their submission and agreement. They are common “*muba’iyun*” (pledgers) and therefore excluded from the election process. This reminds us of the classical rules of the *bay’a* election ritual, divided into “primary” and “general pledge”. They form an electorate pool without the power to choose. Theirs is not the task to elect a leader of choice according to democratic rules, but to confirm the choice of a representative leader according to a “divine nomocracy”. The actual choice takes place according to tribal electoral mechanisms (*shura*); moreover, they have to execute the orders that come along with this choice (here: to give their life for the sake of Bin Laden’s battle against the West). In addition, says “Alyasa”, they may not break their pledge, which is a crime and sin punishable by death.

### The Role of the Expert Commission

The “people of resolution and contract” formed the first guard of the classical Islamic electoral system. They chose a new leader. However, “Alyasa” is unclear about their present role. In his description, they lure in the background like an invisible, perhaps imaginary administrative expert elite. We learn that they should exist and what their task is, but yet, do not find them taking part in the virtual scenario. Mullah Omar, for example, according to his role as “Leader of the Faithful”, must theoretically have been elected in agreement with classical rules by an expert commission. But he was elected by a different ritual (see above) As far as the virtual “death-bay’a” is concerned, no expert commission is mentioned.

### Possible Weakness of the Islamic Legal Argument: The Missing Primary Pledge

“Alyasa” ponders on the argument that the “death-bay’a” to Bin Laden is like a battlefield pledge. This makes a primary pledge by an electoral commission unnecessary. All the fighters have to do is to confirm their willingness to execute a certain action and order (to go to battle and die). But this line of argumentation may be inconsistent in view of the authority attributed to Bin Laden.<sup>29</sup> Muslim jurists with adverse political opinions might be able to refute the Islamic legal argument on such grounds. If this detail will be perceived as a weak point in internal Islamic discussions on virtual *bay’a* needs to be further researched.

“On a final note: In a survey on the jihadist forum al-Hesba in 2006, 171 persons voted in favor of the death-bay’a - However, it seems that no-one put it into effect.”<sup>30</sup>

(reference: Hanna Rogan, Jihadism Online - A study of how al-Qaeda and radical Islamist groups use the Internet for terrorist purposes”)

## **2. The Virtual Fatwa: The Mechanisms of Radical Islamic Jurisprudence**

The Islamic *Shari’a*, or system of Islamic law, is considered by Muslims as divinely revealed law regulating all religious, political, social, domestic and private aspects of Muslim life. Due to the detailed code of *shari’atic* laws governing the private and public spheres, Islam can be described as a *nomocracy*. A dispute between academic and common understanding of the *Shari’a* has prevented a clear definition of it. Strictly seen, the *Shari’a* consists of the Qur’an and the *sunna*, which are the immutable basic codes of Islamic law. They are extended by the ever-evolving and human-interpreted Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*). However, often, the *Shari’a* is defined as Qur’an, *sunna* and *fiqh* altogether. Critiques say that this definition generates the impression that the revealed and the unrevealed are equal. This in turn creates the assumption that scholarly interpretations are as sacred and beyond revision as the Qur’an and the *sunna*.<sup>31</sup> It is important to keep this in mind, when thinking about the directives of radical Islamists issued via the internet.

27 See Abu Jandal al-Azdi, *Usama bin Ladn ... Mujaddid al-Zaman wa Qahir al-Amrikan* (Usama Bin Ladn ... Reformer of our times and defeater of the Americans) (<http://www.abu-qatada.com/a?a=6sbcw2ch>), retrieved 24 May 2009.

28 Rüdiger Lohker, *Dschihadismus – Materialien* (Wien: Facultas Verlag, 2009), 37-38.

29 “Alyasa” does not contend himself with presenting Bin Laden as a simple battlefield commander. His true role in the global Salafi-Jihadi hierarchy needs to be further researched.

30 Hanna Rogan, Jihadism Online - A study of how al-Qaeda and radical Islamist groups use the Internet for terrorist purposes”

31 Ali Khan, “The Second Era of Islamic Creativity”, *University of St. Thomas Law Journal*, Vol.1, p.341, 2003.

The *Shari'a* is put into practice through Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*), and its mechanisms are called *fatwa* (Bar, 2005). Technically, a *fatwa* is a written or oral religious legal opinion on a specific subject that requires clarification based on the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (*usul al-fiqh*). These principles are in authoritative order the Qur'an; the *sunna*, i.e. the practice of the Prophet as transmitted through his sayings and laid down in the literary genre of *hadith* (oral transmission, which was later written down); scholarly consensus (*ijma'*); and analogical deduction (*qiyas*). Within *usul al-fiqh*, the Qur'an and *sunna* are considered as primary sources and divine principles, while consensus and analogy are human interpretation by religious scholars. A classical *fatwa* consists of a request (*istifta'*) posed by a petitioner (*mustafti*, pl. *mustaftun*) and a reply (*jawab* issued by an authorized Islamic scholar (*mufiti*).

The concept of *fatwa* developed as an answer to corruption and bad governance under the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates in the 9<sup>th</sup> century AD. It must be seen as an integral part of the nascent Islamic legal system and the scholarly institutions connected to it (*madrasa*, pl. *madaris*). Thus, the famous early *hadith* collectors al-Bukhari (AD 810-870, H 194-256) and al-Hajjaj (AD 821-875, H 206-261) started collecting prophetic traditions in order to reconstruct the form of governance customary under Muhammad and the four Righteous Guided Caliphs following Muhammad. They initiated a scholarly trend called *ahl al-hadith*, which gained popularity among Muslims who regarded the luxury and worldliness of their rulers with critical eyes. Gradually, a relationship of trust developed between Muslims and *ahl al-hadith* scholars, who were able to answer pressing questions regarding religion and life according to customs of the Prophet Muhammad. This initially paved way for a division between political-administrative and religious-scholarly authority. Yet, religious schools and scholarly institutions soon became incorporated into Muslim states. As early as in the 11<sup>th</sup> century their independence ceased to exist. (For more on this process see section C.1 Factors Facilitating Virtual Leadership - Changes in Islamic Authority and Knowledge Production in the Islamic World of this paper (pp. 9)

Unlike in Shiite Islam, a Sunni *fatwa* is a non-obligatory religious opinion that can be disputed (*ikhtilaf*) since there is no central authority for issuing *fatwas*, religious learning, or central hierarchy of scholars.<sup>32</sup> The nature of authority in radical Islamist movements, i.e. the subordinate status of followers under their leaders, and the direct pledge of allegiance (*bay'a*) often enhances the binding character of *fatwas*. Also the massive proliferation of virtual *fatwas* via modern mass media like the internet and satellite television makes it increasingly difficult for petitioners to discern authentic from spurious legal opinions. Moreover, it facilitates the issuing of extremist *fatwas*.

Islamic legal discourses are experiencing a massive proliferation via the Internet. The Internet-hype also concerns the giving of *fatwas*. An ever increasing number of websites offer *fatwa*-services, for example *IslamOnline.net*, *Fatwa-Online.com*, *Ask-Imam.com*.<sup>33</sup> They compete with traditional *fatwa*-institutions such as the Egyptian Dar al-Ifta', which has doubled the number of *fatwas* it issues per day to 1,000 and runs a telephone-hotline. Also in India we find a strong competition between the afore mentioned transnational online-*fatwa* services and traditional institutions like the 141 years old Dar al-'Ulum in Deoband, or the Islamic Peace Foundation of India, which itself has started an online-*fatwa* service, the "Onlinefatwa.org". Alarmed by the ever growing independent digital *fatwa* services, the Fiqh Academy of the Saudi Muslim World League convened in late January 2009 an international conference to regulate the uncontrolled issuing of *fatwas*. 170 scholars participated in the conference and issued a "*fatwa*-charter" consisting of 41 articles dealing with the abuse and violent impact of spurious *fatwas*.<sup>34</sup> But it is doubtful that this will have an impact on the radical scene.

Some researchers claim that the phenomenon of digital religious guidance through *fatwas* can be positive. Online *fatwas* have the potential to change and reform the theology of Islam, claims Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim. Yet, Ibrahim himself has been the focus of violent denunciation by radical Islamists via the Internet.

In addition, so-called "tele-*imams*" have become additional prominent figures, adding to official jurisprudents, virtual *fatwa*-services and free-lance sheikhs. In the 1980s, tape-recorded sermons of Sheikh Kishk could be heard all over the streets of the Arab world. Nowadays, "tele-*imams*", who preach on the internet and Arabic satellite stations (like the Egyptian 'Amr Khaled and the Saudi Muhammad al-Shanqiti), represent a new form of clergymen who weaken the influence of the "classical" Islamic establishment.

Online *fatwas* and digital religious propaganda have also hyped in the Salafi-Jihad scene. While there was only a handful of websites in the late 1990s, their number had already increased to more than 4,000 websites, chat-rooms, forums and blogs by 2006.<sup>35</sup> Online-ideologues seem to have influenced the radicalization-processes of Jihadi-terrorists like Richard Reid, Zacarias Moussaoui, Asif Hanif. Especially alarming is the example of the impact of radical contents in the internet on the German "suitcase-bombers". Two radical Islamists were looking in the internet for a *fatwa* to legitimize the killing of civilians in 2006. After they had found such a *fatwa*, they put two bombs on regional trains in

32 Shiites, in contrast to the Sunni concept, see no division between political and religious authority. This goes back to the *ahl al-bayt* concept within the main Twelver Shiite-doctrine (the lineage of the Twelve *Imams*). *Ahl al-bayt* are Muhammad's daughter Fatima, his son-in-law 'Ali and their descendants up to the twelfth Shiite *imam*. They are, according to Shiite view, endowed with special spiritual knowledge about the matters of Allah and the only ones who can apply this knowledge to guide the Islamic *Umma*. In Principle, only Shiite-scholars descending from the line of Fatima and 'Ali are authoritative to give *fatwas*, which in contrast to Sunni *fatwas*, are obligatory and binding edicts (*marsum*).

33 The *fatwa* bank of "IslamOnline.net" alone contained about 12,000 Arabic and 3,000 translated English *fatwas* in 2008. See Dalia Yusuf, IslamOnline.net's European Muslims managing editor, "Online Fatwas and Concerns of Muslims in Europe" on [www.islamonline.net](http://www.islamonline.net), [http://www.islamonline.net/servelet/Satellite?c=Article\\_C&cid=1212394804591&pagename=Zone-English-Euro\\_Muslims%2FEMELayout](http://www.islamonline.net/servelet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1212394804591&pagename=Zone-English-Euro_Muslims%2FEMELayout), retrieved 2 February 2008.

34 For a summary of the conference and the covenant see the forum *Islam Message*, "170 'aliman wa-faqihan yasdaron awwal mithaq li-al-fatwa fi-al-ta'rikh" (170 scholars and jurisprudents issue the first fatwa-covenant in history), <http://muntada.islammmessage.com/showthread.php?t=6125>, retrieved 13 March 2009. Organizer of the conference was Sheikh Salih bin Zabin al-Marzuqi, the Secretary General of the Fiqh Academy of the Muslim World League, host was the Saudi King 'Abd al-Aziz. See also "Al-Amin al-'amm li-al-majma' al-fiqhi al-islami li «al-Sharq al-Awsat»: Mu'tamar al-fatwa yas'a li-ijad mithaq yuwahhid al-muslimin fi-al-qadaya al-'amma" (The secretary general of the Fiqh Academy to «al-Sharq al-Awsat»: The Fatwa-Conference aims to draft a covenant that unites Muslims behind common questions), *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 13 January 2004; *Mu'tamar Mecca yabath wada' "mithaq fatwa" yuwahhid al-ifta' lada al-muslimin* (The Mecca-Conference seeks to outline a "fatwa-covenant" that sets common principles for the issuing of *fatwas* among Muslims), Moheet.com, [http://www.moheet.com/show\\_news.aspx?nid=211209&pg=1](http://www.moheet.com/show_news.aspx?nid=211209&pg=1), retrieved 12 February 2009.

35 Akil N Awan, "Virtual Islamo-Jihadist media and the Ummah as transnational audience: Function, legitimacy, and radicalising efficacy [Work in progress, March 2006]", retrieved 25 April 2009 ([http://www.mediatingsecurity.com/documents/\\_private/March%2010%20chapters/Akil.doc](http://www.mediatingsecurity.com/documents/_private/March%2010%20chapters/Akil.doc)).



Cologne.<sup>36</sup>

Observing these processes, the Israeli researcher Shmuel Bar states that: "The age of information revolution has opened up a new venue for Muslims to acquire religious instruction without coming in direct contact with the consulting Sheikh. The internet now allows a Muslim to send a query to any learned Sheikh by e-mail and to receive his ruling either directly or in the public domain of websites dedicated to such *fatwas*."<sup>37</sup>

Online *fatwas* are an important element of virtual leadership. Sometimes, it may mean that fictive, only digitally present characters assume authority. It becomes obsolete to ask if they are fictive or real characters. What matters is the virtual presence that can have the gravest effect on reality. Virtual leaders do not only issue commands, but also influence distant followers in religious-spiritual, ideological and tactical matters. Although two poles, issuer and receiver, are physically disconnected, an asymmetric and authoritative relationship seems to exist between them. A major research question is if this relationship is endogenous to Islamic political culture and the organization and leadership of its movements.

It is especially interesting that that the issuing of a *fatwa* has never required direct contact between an inquirer and the consulting Sheikh. If we imagine an historical case, it may have happened that an inquirer sent his request in the middle-ages from Spain to Cairo and received the answer months, maybe a year later. During this time, the *mufti* may have died from a disease, for example. Nevertheless, his *fatwa*, if it arrived, was valid and the inquirer acted according to it. That is, he did not even know if the consulted cleric was still alive. Our example is further supported by the fact that the *fatwas* of deceased authorities are highly respected. The greater the authority of a scholar, the more reliable and respected his religious opinions. We only have to think of often cited scholars like al-Shafi'i, al-Tirmidhi, al-Shawkani, and in the radical Islamist discourse al-Hanbali, Ibn Taymiyya and 'Abd al-Wahhab. Their legacy is textual, i.e. virtual. But the discursive power of their texts and their influence are unquestioned and still valid. Even though they are not alive, classical clerics can influence the radicalization of Islamist terrorists via the internet, as our next example will show.

### Two Virtual *Fatwa*–Cases: Bouyeri and the German Train Bombers

Classical and modern *fatwas* calling for violence are like highly selective shrapnel of Islamic jurisprudence. For a radicalized Muslim, they seem to explain perfectly how to deal with present problems. He or she seldom questions the difference between the historical and the present context. Blindly following religious authority depends on a strong socio-religious conditioning, which is particularly characteristic for young Islamist militants like Muhammad Bouyeri and the German train bombers of Lebanese origin. Not only circles of radical friends, but also the Internet guidance played a decisive role in their radicalization.

This can be partly explained if we look at Islam with its highly developed codices of law as a quasi-legislative religion. The judgments of reputed scholars and schools are being followed for centuries. An intermediary virtual leader can exploit such cultural-historic and socio-religious characteristics to guide followers with classical *fatwas*. He throws a directive into the vast virtual space hoping that someone will execute it. In the Bouyeri-case, the classical text underwent redaction by a radical Muslim cleric, was uploaded on the internet and – that is the assumption – played an important role in the assassination van Gogh.

#### First Case: The Theo van Gogh Murder by Muhammad Bouyeri

**Main Question:** Was the assassin of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, Muhammad Bouyeri, guided by a classical *fatwa* on the internet?

In November 2004, Dutch filmmaker and political activist Theo van Gogh was brutally murdered in the Netherlands. The perpetrator, Muhammad Bouyeri, belonged to an independent local network, the Hofstadgroep or Hofstadnetwerk, which was influenced by a radical preacher. But he acted autonomously. Over a period of years, he developed from a well-integrated second-generation Muslim immigrant into an ultra-radical Salafi *takfiri* militant.<sup>38</sup> Bouyeri chose to strike at a person critical of Islam in order to deliver a political message, namely a warning to all people expressing adverse comments about Islam, especially to the Dutch politician Ayan Hirsi, who worked closely together with Van Gogh. His attack on van Gogh was part of the Salafi-Jihad strategy of exemplary punishment (*tankil*), applying the tactic of assassination (*ighthiyal*) based on a Salafi-Jihad hero-ethos. Terrorists are called upon to identify with the Muslim Ibn Maslama who volunteered to kill Muhammad's critic Ka'b bin al-Ashraf. Pamphlets about this proto-assassination are widely distributed on the Internet.

**The *Fatwa*:** The *fatwa* exists in two forms. One is a shorter 37-pages tractate containing the concise Islamic legal argument for assassinations by the medieval jurist Ibn Taymiyya.<sup>39</sup> The other one is a book-length exhortation on the same topic by the Saudi cleric Abu Jandal al-Azdi, who has been incarcerated in Saudi Arabia since 2003. We will summarize al-Azdi's text, which also contains the legal argument of Ibn Taymiyya.

Al-Azdi's "Incitement of the Heroic Believers to Revive the Tradition of Assassinations – Who will for me (kill another) Ka'b bin al-Ashraf" was first uploaded in 2002 on the Jordanian Salafi scholar al-Maqdisi's website *Minbar al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad* ("Pulpit of Monotheism and

36 Alev Inan, "Cyber Islam und Online Fatwas" (Cyber Islam and Online *fatwas*), Qantara.de, retrieved 14 April 2009 ([http://de.qantara.de/webcom/show\\_article.php/\\_c-469/\\_nr-912/i.html](http://de.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-469/_nr-912/i.html)).

37 Shmuel Bar, "Jihad Ideology in Light of Contemporary Fatwas", Hudson Institute, 2006, retrieved 12 January 2009 (<http://www.futureofmuslimworld.com/research/detail/jihad-ideology-in-light-of-contemporary-fatwas>), p.4.

38 His radicalization was probably caused by personal problems. His mother died of cancer during this period and Bouyeri was unable to realize the establishment of a youth center for immigrants in his community. See Annieke Kranenberg, "Nachbarsjunge, Gotteskrieger," *Die Zeit* (28 Juli 2005) ([http://nurtex.zeit.de/2005/31/Van\\_Gogh\\_31](http://nurtex.zeit.de/2005/31/Van_Gogh_31)).

39 On the same website there was also a pdf-version in leaflet-form in 2007, which has been substituted by the 37-pages tractate. The title is "The drawn sword against those who insult the Prophet" (*Al-Sarim al-maslul 'ala shatim al-rasul*) (<http://www.tawhed.ws/a?a=syed5680>) (retrieved and 7534 downloads as per date: 7 May 2009).

Jihad"). Until today, it has been downloaded 12,717 times.<sup>40</sup> The text is divided into two parts. The first part contains an Islamic legal explanation. We find opinions of classical jurists like Ibn Taymiyya and modern jihad ideologists such as 'Abdallah 'Azzam on jihad and assassinations, as well as political-ideological statements of the author himself. The main argument to kill everyone who insults or harms Islam is based on the example of the assassination of the Medina Jew Ka'b bin al-Ashraf. The center of the jurisprudential debate is a *fatwa* on the assassination by the classical jurist Ibn Taymiyya. The second part of the 120-pages long text details assassination techniques such as strangling, shooting and stabbing. The text is part of the ideology and strategy of global Jihad, a mixture derived from the doctrines of the Egyptian Jihad, Saudi neo-Tawhid, and the globalization of jihad propagated by 'Abdallah 'Azzam, as well as the strategic post 9/11 guideline to form small independent terror cells.<sup>41</sup>

Al-Azdi is very clear about the strategic-operational purpose of his "assassination-guide". Although it was originally probably thought for Islamists in the Saudi scene, the van-Gogh murder has proven that it applies also worldwide and fits into the strategy of global jihad. This strategy is based on the idea to learn as much as possible from the enemy and act autonomously in smallest possible cells. It seems that the Islamist militant Bouyeri modified and adapted the Islamic legal justification and operational advice to his own situation.

In the "Definition of Assassinations" al-Azdi explains the strategic goals and build-up of terror cells:

The assassination is a surprising kill executed against a specific hostile target with the goal to prevent it from inflicting damage on the Muslims or to deter other criminals...

Technically, assassinations are military operations. Yet, in their nature they are security operations and belong to the activities of secret services (special units). They must be exactly organized, and it needs elements with special abilities to form a special apparatus that is not linked to other organizational matters to secure that it remains undetected.

Assassinations belong to the executions-department (*qism al-tanfidih*) and the number of members should not exceed seven persons. No one should know them personally but the responsible for general security matters of the fighters. The general leader and the assassinations-apparatus are directly subordinated under the military leader. There are not more than two in every main region (*mintaqah ra'isiyya*) and they are directly subordinated to the responsible of the main region – if the fighters have power and influence [over their matters]. However, in our present situation there is more to the issue than has been mentioned and the young men must act [autonomously], yet with all precautions according to what will be explained in the study.

The job of the assassination-apparatus is to assassinate influential and harmful elements in the apostate-states, among them the leaders of unbelief and the original unbelievers (non-Muslims), which will be described in detail in the study.

The Islamic legal argument of Al-Azdi centers on a *fatwa* by the medieval Hanbali jurist Ibn Taymiyya. First al-Azdi quotes *shari'atic* evidence from the Qur'an to justify surprise tactics. Then he turns toward the specific argument. His main Qur'anic evidence for the legality (*mashru'iyya*) of assassinations is to "fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war);" (9:5).<sup>42</sup> The second *shari'atic* evidence is a *hadith* attributed to Jabir bin 'Abdallah, "[the Prophet Muhammad] said, may Allah bless him, who is responsible for Ka'b bin al-Ashraf. He has insulted Allah and his Prophet? Then Muhammad Bin Maslama stood up and said: 'Oh Prophet of Allah, I would love to kill him. [The Prophet] said 'yes'."<sup>43</sup>

Regarding the assassination of al-Ashraf, al-Azdi turns toward the medieval Hanbali jurist Ibn Taymiyya, who concludes by analogical reasoning (*qiyas*) that an insult "makes it necessary to kill the insulter of Allah, He is exalted, and His Prophet, even to kill a man who has a pact with the Muslims (*mu'ahid*). It is known that insulting Allah and his Prophet damages both of them...insulting Allah and His Prophet constitutes a reason (*'illa*) to send the Muslims to kill the perpetrator among the contracted people. This proof (*dalil*) is obvious (*zahir*).

The text calls for terrorist assassinations, using the Islamic legal argument as a pretext. Yet, in Islamic legal terms there is no obligation to kill an insulter. There are five Islamic legal categories of human actions - individual obligation (*fard 'ayn*) and collective obligation (*fard kifaya*); recommended action (*mansub; mustahabb; sunna*); permitted action (*mubah*); condemned action (*makruh*), and forbidden action (*haram*).

The description "*sunnat al-ightiyal*", which is part of the title, indicates that assassinations are "recommended actions". According to Islamic law they are being rewarded. Refraining from recommended actions, however, is not being punished. Killing an insulter is mentioned as *mubah* at another place in the text, a legal category according to which the individual may decide by himself if he omits or fulfils the deed. In this case, Islamic law neither stipulates award nor punishment. It should be researched if this may be a starting point for a debate of moderate jurists to refute the inciting argument.

Before Bouyeri murdered van Gogh, he must have downloaded and studied the tractate attentively. Shortly before he killed van Gogh, he circulated the theological tractate on the "heroic deed" of Ibn Maslama per e-mail to his friends.<sup>44</sup> It is one of 56 texts Bouyeri wrote or distributed. The *fatwa* of Ibn Taymiyya was among them also in a short leaflet-form downloadable from [www.tawhed.ws](http://www.tawhed.ws) titled "The drawn sword against the insulter of the Prophet" (*al-sarim al-maslul didda shatim al-rasul*).<sup>45</sup> It is likely that the text influenced not only Bouyeri's decision to assassinate van Gogh, but also his method.

The text details how and why to kill targets, first of all because of insult (*shatm, sabb, adhan*) of Islam. Bouyeri tried to sever van Gogh's head with a big knife after he had shot him several times. In the text we find the following passage: "the cutting of the head without mercy

40 Abu Jandal al-Azdi, *Tahrid al-Mujahidin al-Abtal 'ala Ihyay Sunnat al-Ightiyal*, (Incitement of the heroic believers to revive the tradition of assassinations), <http://66.45.228.133/~tawhed/a?a=6sbcw2ch>, retrieved 7 May 2009.

41 On the worldview of global jihad see an excellent paper by Reuven Paz, "Sawt al-Jihad: New Indoctrination of Qa'idat al-Jihad, The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) - Series of Global Jihad, Volume 1 (2003), No.8, (October 2003).

42 Qur'an translation by Yusuf A. Ali, <http://www.sacred-texts.com/isl/quran/00901.htm>, retrieved 7 April 2009.

43 Different classical transmitters have narrated that Muhammad sent an assassin to kill the Jewish tribal leader al-Ashraf. Probably, the power-game between the nascent Muslim community and other tribes in the Medina area were the background of the assassination.

44 Kranenberg, "Nachbarsjunge, Gotteskrieger".

45 See Rudolph Peters, *Overzicht teksten geschreven of vertaald door Mohammad B. - Opgesteld door R.Peters als bijlage bij het deskundigenrapport "De ideologische en religieuze ontwikkeling van Mohammed B."*. The Dutch title of the translation of the tractate is "Verplichting van heet doden van degene die de Profeet (allallahu alaihe wa sallam) uitsheld."

is legal if the Prophet does not disapprove it.” Moreover, the text advises multiple times to use the assassination as an act of deterrence. The slaughter of van Gogh in open daylight seems like a one-to-one translation into reality of the directives we find in the text (the shorter, but especially the longer version).

**A Note on the Circulation:** The “Incitement of the Heroic Believers to Revive the Tradition of Assassinations” by the Saudi al-Qa’ida ideologue Abu Jandal al-Azdi and Ibn Taymiyya’s “The drawn sword against the insulter of the Prophet” have been downloaded thousands of times.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, the al-Qa’ida ideologue al-Suri treated it extensively in his work Global Islamic Resistance Call (GIRC), and in April 2006 al-Qa’ida leader Bin Laden used the example of al-Ashraf to call for assassinations worldwide to take revenge for the Muhammad caricatures.<sup>47</sup>

### Second Case: The German Train Bombers

In July 2006, the Lebanese students al-Hajj Deeb (22) and Jihad Hamad (21) tried to bomb two German trains with improvised firebombs. The trigger was the publication of the Muhammad caricatures in two German newspapers in the spring of 2006. The instructions for building the bombs had been downloaded from the Internet. The material for each bomb cost less than 300 Euro. The time span between radicalization and planning, as well as between preparation and execution, was very short. and Hamad first met in April 2006. They immediately started searching the Internet, and preparing terrorist acts. The preparation of the improvised explosive devices took about two weeks, from the beginning of July. Then the attack was delayed for two weeks because the Israeli bombardment of Beirut Airport had blocked the escape route. In addition, the suitcase bombs on two trains did not explode because of a minor technical flaw.<sup>48</sup> At no point did Hajib or Hamad plan a suicide operation.

The two perpetrators were not members of a radical group or network. But both come from northern Lebanon, the area around Tripoli, where a lot of radical Islamists live. Al-Hajib’s family is connected to the Hizb al-Tahrir, a proselytizing Salafi movement. “Therefore, one can assume that they had already experienced a yearlong radicalization in the family environment.”<sup>49</sup> However, the real process of radicalization probably occurred in Germany, where al-Hajj Deeb and Hamad, the two perpetrators, downloaded jihad propaganda from the Internet.<sup>50</sup>

According to Professor Rotraud Wielandt, an expert advisor to court during the trial of al-Hajj Deeb and Hamad in Düsseldorf, a *fatwa* served the terrorists for ideological guidance.<sup>51</sup> The terrorists searched the internet for a *fatwa* to justify the massive killing of civilians. They found a religious opinion by the Palestinian-Jordanian Salafi cleric Muhammad al-Maqdisi from 1994. The *fatwa* calls for the killing of anyone who insults Islam, Allah or the Prophet. The Islamic legal argument is the same as in the Bouyeri-case. The context in the attempted double-train bombings was the re-publication of the Danish Muhammad caricatures in German newspapers in early 2006. Together with the *fatwa*, it served as motive for the attacks.

Al-Maqdisi has not distanced himself from the *fatwa*. He has put a similar *fatwa* on his website titled “Erroneous legal arguments around the excommunication of an insulter who hurts the religion”.<sup>52</sup> The text contains the same legal argument described above and deals with killing Muslims. But it can be applied to non-Muslims and Muslims alike. An excerpt of al-Maqdisi’s “apologetic” approach shows that the judgment will always be in the eye of the beholder:

Insult without intent is not judged as a sin. But intentional insult counts as belligerent act and there is no excuse for it in the interpretation of the jurisprudents. Sheikh Ibn Taymiyya repeatedly states in this book “The drawn sword against the insulter of the Prophet” that it [intentional insult] is weighted with slaughtering (*dhabah* – i.e. cutting of the throat)

The German train bombers followed, at least partly, virtual leadership. They probably used a *fatwa* for ideological guidance. It does not mean that they did not have real contact to other radicals. But what does “virtual leadership” in this case mean? Ibn Taymiyya is dead, but al-Maqdisi is alive. Moreover, was it a person or an idea that influenced them? Virtual leadership becomes more complex if we try to divide into different elements.

Virtual authority is a command complex with a number of elements. The train bombers, for example, followed a form of posthumous-authority insofar as Ibn Taymiyya is dead. However, his *fatwa* is the basis of the legal argument around assassinations. The *posthumous virtual leader* requires an intermediary who uploads his classical directive on the web, or quotes him in a text. Al-Maqdisi, with his website and as a jurisprudent-ideologue, fulfils two roles. He is an *intermediate-manipulative virtual leader* who uses texts of others to serve his radical goals. And he is a *direct-personal virtual leader* who runs a website under his own “brand-name”. Finally, we know that the motive of the train bombers sprang out of an idea. They needed ideological guidance. The Islamic text itself has a certain power. It is an interpretation of divinely revealed law, and therefore not human. We may speak – according to the power of the text itself – about *textual-discursive virtual leadership*. In radical Islamist discourses, persons are not more important than the ideological power of the text itself.

### **3. Topics for Further Research**

46 Abu Jandal al-Azdi, *Tahrid al-Mujahidin al-Abtal 'ala Ihya' Sunnat al-Ightiyal* (Incitement of the heroic fighters to revive the tradition of assassinations), <http://www.tawhed.ws/files/802.zip>.

47 Usamah bin Laden, *Qatilu A'immat al-Kuffar; La'allahum Yuntahun*, (Kill the leaders of the unbelievers: maybe they will stop [insulting the Prophet]) <http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=3872>; Eng. trans.: "Arab Reformists Under Threat By Islamists: Bin Laden Urges Killing of 'Freethinkers,'" *The Middle East Media Research Institute* (MEMRI) No. 1153 (3 May 2006), <http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi? Page= subjects&Area =reform&ID=SP115306>.

48 Focus, "Bombe getestet," 30 October 2006, pp. 46–48.

49 Author's interview with Guido Steinberg, senior researcher on radical Islam at the *Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik* (SWP), Berlin, 25 January 2006.

50 Focus, "Ein ernster Warnschuss," interview with Jörg Ziercke, Präsident, Bundeskriminalamt, 4 September 2006, pp. 42–44.

51 "Kofferbomber beriefen sich auf islamische Fatwa," <http://www.blubbry.com/pinews/260175/kofferbomber-beriefen-sich-auf-islamische-fatwa/>, retrieved 28 April 2009.

52 Al-Maqdisi, "Shubuhāt hawla Takfīr Shatīm Sab al-Dīn," (Erroneous legal arguments on the excommunication of the one who insults the religion) <http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=k6u8vwzm>, retrieved 8 May 2009.

### a. The Development of Virtual *Shura*

Until now, we have spoken about *bay'a*, which is based on the idea of *shura* and consultation. Consultation can take a lot of forms and influence many decisions, not only in the electoral field. Virtual *shura*, i.e. consultation via the Internet is steadily developing among radical Islamists, for example when they discuss plans and actions by storing them in draft folders of common email accounts. However, it is much more difficult to research on this mechanism than on virtual *bay'a* and *fatwa*.

### b. Virtual *Dawla*, *Imama* and *Imara*

In light of the proclamation of the “Islamic State of Iraq” and the development of the virtual pledge to install its amir, further research should focus on the construction of “virtual Islamic state” (*dawla elektroniyya*), virtual imamate and emirate as well as the construction of virtual institutional structures for command and propaganda purposes.

## E. Example: The Islamic State of Iraq and Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi

In October 2006 the Shura Council of Mujahidin (*Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin*) announced the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq (*Dawlat al-Iraq al-Islamiyya*). The Shura Council of Mujahidin is supposed to be the umbrella for a coalition of Iraqi and foreign Sunni insurgent groups allied with al-Qa’ida. The Islamic State of Iraq would be its political and institutional manifestation. Much has been written on the Council and State. This part of the analysis will deal with the electoral mechanisms that led to the confirmation of its supposed leader, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi via the internet.

With the Shura Council, the chief-planners of the Islamic State of Iraq have tried to create an Islamic legislative body. Western parliaments are mainly based on the Westminster System. But *shura* is based on pre-Islamic tribal mechanisms of consultation and election. A Shura Council as understood by radical Islamists has not only monitorial and legislative, but also electoral powers.<sup>53</sup> It also fulfils the task of the “people of resolution and contract” (*ahl al-hall wa-al-‘aqd*), who are authorized to elect and proclaim a new leader.

This allegedly happened in the case of al-Baghdadi. He was elected *amir* by the *Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin*. Yet, a secondary pledge of allegiance took place via the internet, which reminds of the “death-*bay'a*” to Bin Laden (see above pp.14). A great deal of al-Baghdadi’s authority was thus created virtually. The pledge to al-Baghdadi took place in a two-steps process, adopted from the classical ritual, in which the Shura Council of Mujahidin did the primary pledge (actual election, *‘aqd al-in’iqad*). The secondary virtual pledge followed via the internet. With the primary pledge supposedly confirmed, the secondary pledge gained strength in Islamic legal terms.

In April 2009 Iraqi authorities announced al-Baghdadi’s arrest like several times before.<sup>54</sup> But it still remains unclear if al-Baghdadi really exists, or not. This, too, has caused a big debate among radical Islamists since his “election” in 2006. It directly touches upon the question of his legitimacy and the legitimacy of the announced state. Do they exist or not, how are leadership and state justified and how does the debate around them approximately look like? We will try to shed some light on those questions.

### **The Discussion of the Virtual *Bay'a* to al-Baghdadi – Supporters and Opponents**

In September 2007 an anonymous “from one of the Jihadi media-platforms” announced the “*bay'a* to the leader of the faithful” (*amir al-mu’minin*) in a discussion forum of [www.aljazeeraatalk.net](http://www.aljazeeraatalk.net).<sup>55</sup> The discussion that followed gives us important insight into the justification of virtual leadership and its electoral mechanisms. Physical contact, acquaintance or knowledge of a virtual leader is not necessary according to the jurisprudence of radical Islamists. The call for allegiance to al-Baghdadi by the anonymous says:

We strongly request from our fighting brothers in the border regions (*thughur*) to gather under the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and under the command of the caliph of the Muslims, the leader of the faithful, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi.

Oh Allah, we pledge allegiance to the leader of the faithful Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi, may Allah protect him, we shall be soldiers under his command, so Allah wishes, in the arena of the media and fighting.

Let us all sign here the proclamation (*mubaya’a*) and remove [what obstacles are] in the souls and unite against the enemies of the religious community and monotheism.

A group by the name of Ansar Allah (Supporters of Allah) added a graphic which depicts an old brownish linen document that hangs on a golden stick and is surrounded by a Victorian-style frame. The kitschy-ancient graphic contains a text similar to the one above that shall be copy-pasted to confirm the proclamation of al-Baghdadi.

Most of the 17 Jihadi chatters confirmed the pledge of allegiance to al-Baghdadi and used the exact wording proposed in the introduction by anonymous. Some used the wording of the graphic or a slight modification. One of the chatters even asked if it was legal to pledge allegiance via SMS. Every proclamation started with “Oh Allah, we pledge allegiance to the leader of the faithful Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi” and contained the classical phrase “to the command” (*‘ala al-sam’ wa-al-ta’a*). Some added “*fi-al-manshat wa-al-mukrah* (in good and bad times). However, one participant expressed doubts. Ibn al-Imarat wrote:

I want to proclaim him (*ana uridu mubaya’tahu*)

But I do not know who this is, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and who will be [the *amir*].

And how the Islamic State of Iraq will look like, what its borders are and its characteristics among the states?

And if it is like the states of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and how!!

53 In many Muslim countries the parliament is called *Majlis al-Shura*, although the way it functions is closer to the Western models.

54 *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, 29 April 2009, p. 1.

55 <http://www.aljazeeraatalk.net/forum/showthread.php?t=77767v>, retrieved 1 May 2009.

## The Justification of the Virtual *Ba'ya* to al-Baghdadi

Al-Jarmani, a discussion-participant under the flag of Senegal, responded immediately to Ibn al-Imarat. He seems to know the Iraqi radical Islamist scene well and explains in length why it is not necessary for every Muslim to know his leader personally. This also applies to the pledge of allegiance and proclamation of al-Baghdadi, he claims. His argument is central to the justification of virtual *bay'a* and virtually created leadership. Similar justifications resurface in other Internet discussions around the topic. Al-Jarmani writes (translated in excerpts; important sections underlined):

My dear brother, in terms of Islamic law you do not need to know the *amir* or make his acquaintance at any time. This does not invalidate the *bay'a*.

There is no doubt that Abu 'Umar al-Baghdadi is known. Thus, it has been negated that he is unknown, praise be to Allah. There are people who pledged allegiance to him – the Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin, the Alliance of the Anointed<sup>56</sup>, and others. With them the ignorance (*jahala*) about the *amir* stopped, because the ignorance stops with the knowledge (*ma'rifa*) of some. The knowledge of the whole community is not necessary. Neither is it necessary that everyone, who pledges allegiance to him, knows him.

As far as I know, no jihad group mentioned that the *amir* is unknown. No group apologized for the *bay'a* with this invalid excuse, because Abu 'Umar is known by some of the Jihad groups. This means: The heads and *amirs* and leaders of the Jihad groups. The soldiers, however, are retinue and do not need to know the *amir*.

It is also known that the other groups may get to know him if they want to proclaim Abu 'Umar al-Baghdadi. They will not be told: "pledge allegiance to an anonymous man!" On the contrary, they know him without a doubt. And it is also known that the *amir* Abu 'Umar al-Baghdadi established the Shura Council with three persons from every group that joined the State [and that the influence was being distributed] according to their number and the size of their operations. ...The State did not tell them: Pledge allegiance without knowing me!

But rationally, it is neither possible, nor Islamic legally (*shar'an*) correct that all the people of Iraq must know the *amir* completely (*ma'rifa kamila*). Al-Mawardi said in "The rules of power" (*al-ahkam al-sultaniyya*): The masses should know that knowing the *imam* is obligatory for a sufficient number out of the entirety [of Muslims] without further detail. Not everyone must know him by his eye and his name [see him and know him].

The *amirs* and leaders of the Islamic State of Iraq are the most known of all the Iraqi groups. The Islamic Army (*al-Jaysh al-Islami*), for example, does not even know the *kunya* (nom de guerre) of its *amir*. He did not appear with a voice-message a single time, but his statements are read by one of the fighters. The famous leaders are unknown, except for Dr. Ibrahim al-Shamri, the speaker of the group. The voice and the *kunya* of the leader of the Ansar al-Sunna (Supporters of the *Sunna*) is known. The same goes for groups that are less famous. But the leaders of the State [Islamic State of Iraq] even appear with their voices and their bodies, and perhaps they sometimes also uncover their faces.

In a specific period and under certain circumstances the *bay'a* may be sort of concealed (*nau' min al-khafa'*), like it happened in the *bay'a* of 'Umar bin 'Abd al-'Aziz, may Allah have mercy with him. The people pledged allegiance to who is in this book without knowing his name [sic] . . . We are in a state of war with the enemy, our lands were conquered and our homes occupied. There is no state on earth that governs according to the *Shari'a* of Allah and Islam...This requires some changes in some questions [regarding the process of *bay'a*]

In conclusion, not knowing (*al-jahala*) according to the *Shari'a* is divided into ignorance of state (*jahalat hal*) and ignorance of eye (*jahalat 'ayn*), and both do not apply to Abu 'Umar, may Allah the Exalted protect him. He is free of the ignorance of eye without doubt for everyone knows that there is a man with the *kunya* "Abu 'Umar al-Baghdadi", which is a truth that is not imagined. He is a leader who fights the unbelievers and leads the Muslims.

Concerning the ignorance of state, he is free of it, too, by way of the *bay'a* of the people of resolution and contract (*ahl al-hall wa-al-'aqd*) from the groups that pledged allegiance to him and by way of the knowledge of other groups which did not proclaim him...

Concerning the condition that the *imam* of the people must step outside and get to know them by himself and that they see him, so he will not be unknown (*majhul*): The [fulfillment of this] condition is impossible in the present circumstances where the House of Islam is occupied. Moreover, it is not necessary because the ignorance [as explained above] has stopped without it, blessings to Allah!

Al-Jarmani understands the problem of the inquiring chatter. Ibn al-Imarat is highly motivated to participate in jihad and is looking for authority via the internet. Yet, he feels helpless. The problem is that the virtual pledge to al-Baghdadi sounds striking, but there is nothing physical to it. He does not even know who al-Baghdadi is. But al-Jarmani wants to make him feel perfectly comfortable in accordance with his Islamic belief system. He simply relaxes him and gives him the feeling that "Your doubts are understandable, but believe me, the way you describe your ignorance is perfectly legitimate. You do not need to change anything. You do not need know your leader!"

## Conclusion on the Islamic Legal Justification Proposed by al-Jarmani

It is quite difficult to refute the Islamic legal argument of al-Jarmani. It centers on the questions of "ignorance" (*jahala*) and knowledge (*ma'rifa*). They are solved by the classical argument that "not every Muslim needs to know the *imam* with his eye and by his name". The virtual pledge is the secondary pledge for confirmation and submission. Al-Jarmani states that the primary pledge was already given by the "people of resolution and contract", mainly members of the Shura Council of Mujahidin.<sup>57</sup> This invalidates the argument that al-Baghdadi is "unknown", since he is known by "some", namely the "people of resolution and contract". Chatters are equated with "soldiers who are retinue". They must not know their leader in order to submit themselves according to classical rules.

A second, very important argument to justify virtual *bay'a* is practical. "In a specific period and under certain circumstances the *bay'a* may be sort of concealed (*nau' min al-khafa'*)...This requires some changes in some questions [regarding the process of *bay'a*]." Al-Jarmani thus admits that it is not a classical *bay'a*, but a highly modified version. It is "concealed" in the sense that it is secretive. Thus, the ignorance about the leader (*jahala*) is intentionally created and not comparable to the classical condition (but rather caused by the security situation). In this light it remains to be asked if the questions of ignorance (*jahala*) and knowledge (*ma'rifa*) have truly been solved as al-Jarmani proposes. It may sound punctilious, but the question is central to justifying virtual leadership.

A participant named al-Muqatil al-'Iraqi (Iraqi Fighter) criticized the pledge to al-Baghdadi. "Pledge allegiance to who you want. That is your problem. But do not force any Muslim to pledge this allegiance! Refrain from spilling the blood of Muslims and clerics and fighters! And protect the inviolateness (*hurma*) of the blood of Muslims and innocents! Do not explode the homes of Muslims with explosive belts

<sup>56</sup> In 2006, Zarqawi's alleged successor Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, meanwhile also believed to be dead, tried to reverse Zarqawi's policy of brutal intimidation. He integrated armed groups from friendly Iraqi Sunni tribes into an Alliance of the Anointed / Good People (*tahalluf al-mutayyabin / al-mutayyibin*). *Al-sharq al-Awsat*, 13 October 2006, p. 1.

<sup>57</sup> The primary pledge is the ritual by which the actual election of the leader takes place (*in'iqad al-khilafa*).

claiming that an apostate lives in it – according to your thinking! Listen to clerics who are older and wiser and more pious than you!” He immediately received a death-threat from another chatter.

### Critical Voices against the Islamic State and the Virtual Pledge to al-Baghdadi

Another interesting discussion on the virtual pledge to al-Baghdadi appeared on [www.muslm.net](http://www.muslm.net) a few months before (August 2007). The jihad-supporter al-Subh al-Mushriq (The Shining Morning) asked for answers to detailed questions on the Islamic legitimacy of *bay'a*.<sup>58</sup> The unwillingness to discuss the topic critically on Jihadi forums made him start a discussion on [www.muslm.net](http://www.muslm.net): “After I found the topic ‘Here is the pledge to the leader of the faithful Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi’ on one of the Jihadi forums, I proposed a topic there, but I was surprised that it was deleted and I was stopped.”

Internet discussions like this one indicate that some supporters seem to take the Islamic legal aspect very seriously, while others just look for simple justifications for their terrorist activity. The questions of al-Subh al-Mushriq reveal some skepticism. He also points out that the virtual pledge may easily be manipulated. But nevertheless he seems to support the idea of virtual leadership. However, he wants to be very sure about its Islamic legal rules. Let us look at a short excerpt of this important discussion, which is but one exemplary piece that illustrates the treatment of the topic among radical Islamists. Al-Subh al-Mushriq asks:

Must they [the Muslims] actually pledge this *bay'a*?

If someone took this kind of pledge, must he keep his pledge to Abu ‘Umar [al-Baghdadi]?

I fear that some intriguing figures may abuse topics like this to announce a pledge for themselves. Sympathizers of jihad will suffer from the illusion that they belong to them while in reality they [the ones who called for the pledge] are enemies of jihad.

The first participant gives an answer based on his own common sense. Muhammad Salim al-Nabil writes: “I believe that this [*bay'a*] is invalid (*batil*) because the names are made-up and it is not known who the pledgers (*al-mubayyi'un*) are.” The chatter Ibn Khaldun al-Jaza'iri adds: “The ignorant pledger does not know that his pledge - if it were sound in Islamic legal sense – obliges him to emigrate to the Islamic State of Iraq. And if Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi ordered him to explode himself in his country, then he would have to do it because he has to follow his command unconditionally (in what he likes and hates)...”

Slightly out of context, an Ahmad al-Muharib asks: “Is the *bay'a* via telephone *shari'atically* valid? The commander is in Baghdad, and the pledger in Kirkuk or Ramadi...and there is no means but the telephone to pledge allegiance...?”

In the meantime another chatter frantically pledges allegiance to Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi but al-Subh al-Mushriq calls him to order and asks for a scientific, not an emotional discussion of the topic. Chatter samy7 is especially critical and comments on the questions of al-Subh al-Mushriq: “The whole issue evolves in the internet, which means completely in the electronic space like the situation of this electronic state [the Islamic State of Iraq] and the situation of this electronic *amir* ...There is no *bay'a*. Even if the one calling for *bay'a* were honest or actually credible with his claim of the existence of his state or the *amir* whose name is al-Baghdadi, he would have to come out [appear, show himself], but...” Al-Subh al-Mushriq accepts the critique against al-Baghdadi. But he vehemently rejects samy7's idea that the Islamic State of Iraq does not exist. On the contrary, it has “might and extend” (*saula wa-jaula*).

Another chatter, al-Radi, has a severe moral conflict with the concept of virtual *bay'a*. On the one hand he supports jihad, but he doubts the validity of virtual *bay'a*. He is aware that the pledge may implicate death and is not sure if such decisions should be decided via the internet:

Now things are tricky . . . you will find that a lot of the members [of the forums] are zealots for jihad and its people and then you will find them in the hereafter.

I will not pledge allegiance because the things are different and not clear. What would be my duties if I pledged allegiance to Abu ‘Umar or someone else? I ask Allah that he will assist the fighters to win. But concerning the *bay'a*, the topic is very difficult. With all due respect, those present in the forum do not look credible to me – because some of them may have entered for other reasons. I will not pledge allegiance because the issue is not clear.

The moderator of the topic, al-Sabah al-Mushriq, scolds chatter samy7 for his jihad critical views. This especially concerns samy7's critique of Sunni terrorist attacks against civilians, which, according to the majority of the participants, are merely a US-Shiite-Iranian conspiracy. What is more important, al-Subh al-Mushriq rejects samy7's claim that Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi is anonymous (*majhul*). According to classical legal theory (mentioned before in *al-Ahkam al-sultaniyya* by al-Mawardi) it suffices that the “people of resolution and contract” know the *imam*. But samy7 counters immediately saying: “Please explain to me who the “people of resolution and contract” are if you mention them and who supposedly know Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi [personally]!”

Again, the same central Islamic legal argument for the virtual *bay'a* is used. The leader who is known by some must not be known by the masses (see also al-Jarmani in the discussion above, pp.30). The ignorance (*jahala*) of all is canceled by the knowledge (*ma'rifa*) of some. Several months before al-Jarmani uses this argument we can already find it in this thread led by al-Sabah al-Mushriq. A chatter called Abu Yusuf al-Bashir is the contributor. But it is probably also not his pen. Maybe a radical jurist prepared it for distribution via the Internet to legitimize the election of al-Baghdadi, since we can find it in other discussions, too.<sup>59</sup>

The argument limbs if al-Baghdadi is a fictional character. It has been repeatedly stated in the discussions that “...the *amir* Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi established the Shura Council...” Should the *amir* be a fictional character, then the Shura Council of Mujahidin and its “people of resolution and contract” would be fictional, too. The whole institutional structure of the Islamic State of Iraq could be a virtual construct.

58 “*Bay'a 'abr al-Internet!!!*” (Pledge of allegiance via the Internet!!!) [www.muslm.net/vb/showthread.php?t=304962](http://www.muslm.net/vb/showthread.php?t=304962), retrieved 16 April 2009.

59 For example, “*La ajidu audah min kalimat al-sheikh bin Laden raddan 'ala al-ba'd hadahum Allah'* (I cannot find clearer words than those of Bin Laden with his answer to some who Allah may guide), <http://www.aljazeeraatalk.net/forum/showthread.php?t=136357>, retrieved 28 April 2009.

## F. Conclusion and Recommendations

Radical Islamists discuss virtual leadership vividly. This discourse and the discussions on it are part of the development and construction process. Critical voices are silenced or threatened in the Internet forums. Mostly, the discussions turn around the Islamic legal specifics that may be used to justify virtual leadership. However, the discussions also show that some participants have severe doubts about its legality. They see that classical and modern political circumstances are in contradiction. However, most activists look for rather simple explanations. They need a working virtual command structure, which is gradually being offered to them by the “developers” of the phenomenon.

Virtual leadership is contradictory in the sense that it is impersonal, yet personal. The lack of direct contact is a specific characteristic of virtual leadership that derives from the adaption of classical Islamic legal and political mechanisms to the Internet. Virtual leaders may be alive as much as dead, classical and modern figures, real or fictive. Leadership may even be described as “textual” in some cases, since the political culture of Sunni Islam is so heavily text-based that “sacred” texts themselves may be described authoritative.

In this context, we must ask ourselves if Islamic political culture is more open to virtual leadership than Western political culture. It needs further research to answer the question if virtual leadership may even be endogen to Islamic political culture. Certainly, the differences between classical Islamic leadership and virtual leadership are big. Geopolitical, historical and cultural changes in a globalized world have also changed the multiple faces of Muslim political culture. Yet, virtual leadership is justified by classical rules of Islamic governance. The adaption of classical Islamic legal mechanisms to the Internet works partly, as we have seen. Yet, it would be premature to speak about a viable alternative to traditional organizational structures of radical Islamist movements. Striking are the propaganda effects, the motivational effects and, in some cases, the operative effects of virtual leadership. Even if an “Islamic State”, an “*amir*”, a “*fatwa*”, or a “*bay’a*” are “just” virtual, it does not matter because an action is the child of the idea. The Islamic legal justifications for virtual leadership are elaborate and steadily being developed. They should be countered with a different discourse. Islamic legal arguments for violent virtual leadership and its mechanisms should be invalidated. Therefore, one needs to support different voices. Moderate jurists and western scholars should tackle this task.

### 1. Forms and Functions of Virtual Leadership

Virtual leadership is a command network with numerous manifestations. They complement each other in a complicated way, yet the network is easy to infiltrate if its threads are known. From the preceding research, we can conclude that some of the forms include:

*The intermediate-manipulative form of virtual leadership:* The upload of an Islamic legal tractate or a *fatwa* requires an intermediary. An intermediary-virtual leader may stay in the background and use texts of others to serve his goals. He can be a programmer, a blogger, chatter or a webmaster who creates an internet platform and may remain anonymous. Together with other ideologues or jurists, who create Islamic legal and ideological substructures, he is a part of the virtual-leadership command.

*The fictive form of virtual leadership:* A real life activist or radical network may create a *fictive virtual character or entity*. In the name of the fictive character or entity, directives, orders and propaganda are being issued. A whole personal cult may be created around the virtual jihad hero who only exists on the internet. Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi may be such a character. Also the “virtual state”, i.e. Islamic State of Iraq may be glorified. It does not matter if it only exists in the virtual space as long as it motivates followers.

*The direct-personal form of virtual leadership:* a *real person* such as an influential radical jurist creates an internet platform such as a blog or website under his own name. Through the virtual presence he/she acts as an intermediary, ideologue, propagandist and commander with his “brand name”. An example is the Palestinian-Jordanian jurist Muhammad al-Maqdisi.

*The posthumous form of virtual leadership:* A dead authority such as Ibn Taymiyya can exercise as much power and influence as a living person. Opinions and directives of classical jurists are used to justify violence. They require an intermediary who uploads the opinion of the classical jurist on a website, a blog, or a forum. Often, a modern ideologue quotes the classical authority as central Islamic legal argument. Thus, the classical directive is embedded into a modern political context uploaded by a fictional and explained by a real character.

*The textual-discursive form of virtual leadership:* The Islamic text itself has a certain power. It is an interpretation of divinely revealed law. Accordingly, the text itself has *textual-discursive* power and is a form of *virtual leadership*. Radical Islamist discourses contain evidence from the *Shari’a*, i.e. pieces of text from the Qur’an, the *sunna*. A virtual command may be issued on the basis of *shari’atic* evidence. This means authority of the text, not of the person. However, the text needs an intermediary who uploads it.

### 2. Characteristics of Virtual Leaders

The highest ideal of radical Islamist authority, that is, with the strongest attraction, is that of a leader-scholar figure who combines the qualities of a fighter and a learned, such as Muhammad himself, or in modern times, the popular Jihad ideologue ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam. An attempt to create such a figure virtually was the proclamation of Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi as *Amir* of the Islamic State of Iraq.

The virtual leader claims to be “unknown” (*majhul*) and known (*ma’ruf*) at the same time. If some people know him and testify to this, the mass of people does not need to know him. This is his big deficit. At the same time, he behaves like a Big Brother who watches every step of over his fellow Muslims. He assumes the role of an Islamic “Grand Inquisitor” in the tradition of Dostojewski. But this creates doubts in the minds of modern Muslims. They do not live in an anachronistic parallel world, but in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Not everything can be justified Islamic legally. It is clear that the security situation does not allow the virtual leader to show up openly and that it forces him to remain anonymous. But this is a political issue. Many Muslims may turn away from virtual leadership if they understand that radicals themselves have caused this situation.

### **3. Virtual Leadership in Islamic Political Culture**

Virtual leadership seems to be more endogen to Sunni Islamic than to Western political culture. Certain political-cultural and Islamic legal rules support the creation of virtual command structures. These rules have survived over many centuries through jurisprudential and electoral mechanisms like *fatwa* and *bay'a*. The lack of any physical contact between a commander and a follower, for example, is based on the example of an inquirer and a sheikh who gives a *fatwa*. Moreover, a classical rule says that a leader must not be known by the masses, but just by a certain number of people, which has been adapted to virtual leadership. It is stretched so far that a follower shall obey blindly after he has pledged allegiance to a virtual leader. Thus, it may be said that Sunni political culture facilitates virtual command structures via the Internet, which needs to be further researched. Moreover, the authority attributed to texts seems to open venues for virtual Islamic authority and governance.

### **4. Recommendations**

The Islamic legal justification is the weakest link in the construction of virtual leadership. It should be monitored, researched and, perhaps, invalidated. Western scholars can take part in Islamic legal discussions as much as Muslim scholars participate in secular political discussions. Moderate Muslim scholars who refute the Islamic legal reasoning should be encouraged.



## צמצום הפערים הכלכליים, אינטגרציה חברתית וקידום אוכלוסיות ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך כיעד אסטרטגי למדינת ישראל

ד"ר שמוליק בכר  
נייר עבודה

### סיכום מנהלים

כנס הרצליה האחד-עשר ביקש להציב את סוגיית הפערים החברתיים והכלכליים בחברה הישראלית במרכז סדר יומו מתוך אמונה שחוסנה הלאומי של מדינת ישראל אינו מושגת אך ורק על יכולותיה הצבאיות והביטחוניות, אלא גם – ובראש ובראשונה – על חוסנה החברתי והכלכלי. האירועים המתרחשים באזורנו בחודשים האחרונים מעידים כי לא לעולם חוסן. כבר עתה אנו עדים לכרסום בסולידריות החברתית ובצביון הדמוקרטי של ישראל. כשם שהתסיסה החברתית הגוברת גרמה למיליוני בני אדם ברחבי העולם הערבי לצאת לרחובות בתביעה לשיפור מהותי במצבם הכלכלי, כך אין זה מן הנמנע שהעמקת הפערים הכלכליים בחברה הישראלית, ובמיוחד הפגיעה המתמשכת במעמד הביניים ההולך ומתכווץ, תוביל למחאה ציבורית רחבה ואף למהומות אזרחיות שתפגענה בחוסנה וביציבותה של מדינת ישראל.

על אף הצטרפותה של ישראל ל-OECD ולמרות הנתונים הכלכליים המחמיאים (קצב צמיחה גבוה, יחס חוב-תוצר יורד, מערכת פסקלית יציבה), בכל אלה אין כדי לחפות על העוני הקשה, על האלימות, על האפלייה ועל הקיפוח שהם מנת חלקה של חצרה האחורית של המדינה, קרי: הפריפריה הגיאוגרפית, שכונות המצוקה וסקטורים נרחבים בציבור הסמוכים על שולחנה של מערכת הרווחה הקורסת, ובמיוחד מגזרי המיעוטים והחרדים, שהאבטלה הכרונית בקרבם פושה ושפיערי החינוך בינם לבין שאר האוכלוסייה משמעותיים ביותר בשל היעדר השקעה ראויה בהון אנושי ובשל חסמים חברתיים ותרבותיים פנים-קהילתיים וחיצוניים שמונעים מאוכלוסיות אלה להשתלב כראוי בשוק התעסוקה. שיעור העניים בישראל הוא הגבוה ביותר בעולם המערבי, ובמקביל שיעור המועסקים במשק הוא מהנמוכים במערב. אשר על כן, מדדי אי-השוויון מציבים את ישראל במקומות האחרונים בכל הדירוגים הבינלאומיים. ישראל מדורגת במקומות האחרונים גם בכל המבחנים הבינלאומיים בתחום החינוך. תלמידי ישראל הטובים הם החלשים שבין הטובים, והתלמידים החלשים הם החלשים שבין החלשים, כאשר יש מתאם ברור בין נתוני הרקע של התלמידים לבין תוצאותיהם הלימודיות.

נייר מדיניות זה, שהוגש לקראת כנס הרצליה האחד-עשר, עוסק בדרכים להתמודד עם הקיטוב בחברה, תוך שימת דגש על הצמיחה הכלכלית שעשויה מדינת ישראל להפיק אם תצליח להוביל מדיניות אקטיבית, יסודית, נבונה וארוכת טווח של צמצום פערים. נתמקד בתחום החינוך הבסיסי להקניית מיומנויות תעסוקה ובהשכלה העל-תיכונית וכן בתחום עידוד התעסוקה וההכנסה ממנה בקרב אוכלוסיות ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך, ובייחוד המגזרים החרדי והערבי, וכן בקרב אנשים בעלי מוגבלות. בנייר זה אנו מבקשים להציג יעדים אסטרטגיים ארוכי טווח וכן תוכניות בנות-ביצוע שיכלולן לשמש "ארגז כלים" למקבלי החלטות לשם השגתם של יעדים אלו.

### הנחות יסוד בתחום החינוך להקניית מיומנויות תעסוקה

נייר זה מציב יעד מרכזי: להגדיל את ההון האנושי, את התעסוקה ואת ההכנסה מעבודה של אוכלוסיות מרקע סוציו-אקונומי נמוך. הנייר מתמקד בממשק שבין חינוך לתעסוקה, כלומר בצומת שבו פוגש הבגיר המסיים את לימודי התיכון את שוק העבודה בסיום התהליך ונבחן:

- מהן המיומנויות הנדרשות כיום מצעירים הנמצאים על סף כניסה לעולם התעסוקה?
- האם כיום מגיעים אותם צעירים לשוק העבודה עם ידע מתאים?
- האם ערוכה מערכת החינוך לספק את "ארגז הכלים" הנדרש לצורכי שוק התעסוקה בעידן של שינויים טכנולוגיים מהירים?

חשוב לזכור, כי כיום פחות ממחצית מהתלמידים בכל שנתון זכאים לתעודת בגרות. למעשה, נראה כי מערכת החינוך אינה מצליחה לייצר כיום דור של מעמד ביניים בעל מסה קריטית לחברה הישראלית. ראוי, על כן, לבחון האם תעודת בגרות עיונית הנה בהכרח הדבר הנחוץ ביותר לכל תלמיד במערכת החינוך בישראל, והאם תחת זאת ראוי, אולי, להשקיע תשומות ומשאבים גדולים יותר במתן הכשרות מקצועיות. מדעיות וטכנולוגיות ראויות שתאפשרנה לכל

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מר ליאור שוחט, ממונה קשרי חוץ ופניות הציבור, מנהלת השירות האזרחי-לאומי, משרד המדע והטכנולוגיה

עו"ד רוני שוקן, מנהל מחלקת קשרי ממשל ושכנוע ציבורי, יוזמות קרן אברהם

מר טומי שטיינר, מנהל כנס הרצליה, המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה, המרכז הבינתחומי הרצליה

מר אראל שרמן, עוזר מחקר, המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה, המרכז הבינתחומי הרצליה

בוגר ובוגרת מערכת החינוך בישראל, גם ובעיקר לאלה מביניהם שאינם בוחרים במסלול העיוני (ומאוחר יותר האקדמי והאוניברסיטאי), לצאת אל שוק התעסוקה מצוידים ב"ארגז הכלים" הטוב ביותר ובמיומנויות הכוללות, בין היתר, חינוך פיננסי והבנת השווקים הפיננסיים, היכרות יסודית עם העולם העסקי, יזמות עסקית, הכרת שוק העבודה, מיומנויות בכתיבה ויכולת עבודה טובה בסביבה ממוחשבת. כך, יהיו מוכנים להתמודד היטב עם אתגרי השוק והיו מסוגלים לעשות כן בהצלחה יתרה ומתוך אפשרות להשתלב בעבודה ההולמת את כישוריהם ולהשיג מוביליות חברתית וכלכלית. זאת, מבלי להמעיט בערכה ובחשיבותה של תעודת הבגרות כשלעצמה ובצורך להעלות באופן מתמיד את אחוז הזכאים לה כתנאי סף לכניסה למערכת ההשכלה הגבוהה.

יש לציין, כי לאחר שנים רבות של הזנחת התחום והדרתו לשוליים על חשבון החינוך העיוני, מכירות כיום מדינות מפותחות ומתועשות יותר ויותר בצורך לספק לתלמידי מערכות החינוך הלאומיות שלהן כלים חינוכיים טכנולוגיים, מדעיים ומקצועיים ראויים על מנת להכשירם לקראת עולם העבודה העתידי באופן שיענה על צרכי שוק התעסוקה בעשורים הקרובים ושיאפשר לאותן מדינות להתחרות כראוי בזירה הכלכלית הגלובאלית.

אם כן, אחת המסקנות המרכזיות העולות מנייר מדיניות זה היא הצורך בקידומו של החינוך להקניית מיומנויות תעסוקה על מנת להזניק את החינוך בישראל ואת כלכלת המדינה קדימה באופן משמעותי ומהיר יותר. חינוך מדעי, טכנולוגי ומקצועי ראוי יאפשר רצף יעיל ומוצלח בין הלימודים, הצבא וההשתלבות בחברה ובתעסוקה לאחר מכן. אם יעבור שינויים מערכתיים הכרחיים יוכל לשמש תשתית ראויה להתפתחותה של ישראל ולהצלחתה בתחומים רבים, כמו ביטחון, תעשייה, חקלאות, אנרגיה, בריאות, תקשורת ואיכות הסביבה. עוצמתה של ישראל וחוסנה תלויים בראש ובראשונה בבוגרי מערכת החינוך ובהכשרה המדעית והטכנולוגית שלה, במיוחד אם ברצונה לעמוד בשורה אחת עם המדינות המפותחות בעולם ולהובילן.

#### המלצות מרכזיות בתחום החינוך

מעבר למגוון התוכניות המפורטות בנייר זה לקידומו של החינוך המדעי, הטכנולוגי והמקצועי בקרב אוכלוסיות ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך, ובמיוחד בני נוער מן המגזרים החרדי והערבי, אנו ממליצים על ביצוען של ההמלצות הבאות:

- ברמה הלאומית והממשלתית יש לעודד את שיתוף הפעולה בין משרדי החינוך והתמ"ת לשם קידומו של החינוך הטכנולוגי, המדעי והמקצועי להקניית מיומנויות תעסוקה. לחילופין, לאור העובדה שמתקיימות כיום, למעשה, שתי מערכות חינוך והכשרה נפרדות לתחום זה, הן במשרד החינוך (החינוך הטכנולוגי) והן במשרד התמ"ת (החינוך המקצועי), יש לבחון ביתר שאת האם הפיצול הנוכחי מיטיב עם שתי המערכות הללו, וכיצד הפיצול הקיים משרת את האינטרס העליון של טובת התלמידים הלומדים בשתייהן.
- נדרש שיתוף פעולה יעיל בין הממשלה, האיגודים המקצועיים והמעסיקים, על מנת להבטיח שעולם הלמידה של תלמידי החינוך המקצועי והטכנולוגי יהיה מחובר ככל האפשר לעולם התעסוקה. לצורך זה, יש לשתף את המעסיקים ואת האיגודים המקצועיים בפיתוח תכני הלימוד. כמו כן, יש לבחון אפשרויות לשילוב צעירים עד גיל 18 בשוק התעסוקה בענפי המסחר והתעשייה ובתחום הממשלתי.
- יש ליצור בסיס של כישורים ומיומנויות תעסוקתיות שיאפשרו לתלמידים להתפתח במהלך חייהם לא רק בכיוון אחד ויחיד אלא באופן שיקנה להם אפשרויות הסבה מקצועית אם רק יחפצו בכך. לצורך זה, יש להבטיח, בין היתר, שלכל תלמידי החינוך המקצועי והטכנולוגי יהיו כישורים נאותים והולמים בתחום החשיבה הכמותית ובכישורי שפה.
- יש ליצור תוכניות לימודים הכוללות תחומים שמקנים מיומנויות למידה לכלל תלמידי מערכת החינוך בתחום הפיננסיים, החשבונאות, העסקים ושוק העבודה על מנת לציידם בכלים נאותים שעמם יוכלו להשתלב היטב בתעסוקה בעתיד.
- תקצוב ריאלי של תלמיד במסלול הלימוד הטכנולוגי צריך להיות גבוה בכ-4,000 ש"ח מזה של תלמיד תיכון עיוני. כלומר, נדרשת תוספת של כ-400 מיליון ש"ח בשנה, המהווים פחות מ-2% מהתקציב השנתי של משרד החינוך.
- יש לשדרג את דמיון של החינוך להקניית מיומנויות תעסוקה, הן בקרב מקבלי החלטות במשרדי הממשלה (משרד החינוך, משרד התמ"ת, משרד האוצר) ובכנסת, והן במרחב הציבורי הישראלי, ובמיוחד בתקשורת.

#### הנחות יסוד בתחום התעסוקה וההכשרה המקצועית והאקדמית

נייר זה מתמקד לא רק בחינוך ובהכשרה לעולם התעסוקה בקרב בני נוער, אלא גם בהשכלה גבוהה. בהכשרה מקצועית ובתעסוקה בקרב בוגרים (בני 18 ומעלה) המשתייכים לאוכלוסיות ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך (בעיקר ערבים וחרדים) ו**לקבוצות מיוחדות** (דוגמת אנשים עם מוגבלות). חברי צוות החשיבה סבורים כי לשם מתן מענה הולם לבעיית הפערים החברתיים והכלכליים יש צורך בהצגת תוכניות והמלצות לאותם אלמנטים בחברה שניתן לסייע להם באופן מהותי לרכוש מוביליות חברתית וכלכלית ולהתגבר על אותם חסמים פנים-קהילתיים וחיצוניים המונעים מהם כיום למצוא את הפוטנציאל הגלום בהם בצורה מיטבית. התוכניות המוצעות במסמך זה כוללות: סיוע בהשתלבות בלימודים אקדמיים במגוון רחב של תחומים (לגברים ונשים מהמגזר החרדי), הכוונה תעסוקתית וסיוע בהשמה (הן לחרדים, הן לערבים, תוך שימת דגש על נשים ערביות, והן לאנשים עם מוגבלות) וכן הכשרות מקצועיות לאוכלוסיות אלה. מעבר לכך, אנו ממליצים על ביצוען של ההמלצות הבאות:

#### המלצות מרכזיות בתחום התעסוקה

##### המלצות כלליות

- יש למנות במשרד התמ"ת אגף עבודה והון אנושי שיתמקד בהגברת התעסוקה באוכלוסיות מעוטות השתתפות, ולו פרויקטור ייעודי לכל אחת מהאוכלוסיות. באגף זה אמורים להתכנס גורמים מכל משרדי הממשלה הרלוונטיים (רה"מ, התמ"ת, האוצר, החינוך, הרווחה, הבריאות, המשפטים, המוסד לביטוח לאומי, הרשות לפיתוח כלכלי במגזר הערבי וכל גורם רלוונטי אחר). על האגף לקבל סמכויות להתוות מדיניות ולבצע את החלטות הממשלה בנושאי השכלה ותעסוקה.
- יש לפעול להקמת מרכזי הכוונה תעסוקתית והכשרה מקצועית במתכונת של One Stop Centers המתמחים בהשמה של אוכלוסיות מעוטות השתתפות. גישת One Stop Center יעילה במיוחד בשל הגישה המערכתית שהיא מספקת לפרטים ולקבוצות המבקשים לקבל מענה במרכזים אלה. יש לבחון את כל התוכניות הקיימות כיום להכוונה תעסוקתית ומקצועית וליצור האחדה מערכתית – הכל צריך להיות תחת מטה אחיד ומתכלל.

- יש לאחד את מאגרי המידע הממשלתיים ולהוסיף להם מידע עדכני מהמעסיקים, וזאת על מנת לגבש אסטרטגיה ברורה לשנים הקרובות באשר למקצועות שיידרשו למשק הישראלי.
- על האגף להכשרה מקצועית במשרד התמ"ת לפעול ליצירת התאמה מירבית בין הענפים שבהם מכשיר האגף את הלומדים לבין שיעור המשרות הפנויות במשק המרוכזות בענפים אלה. על מערכת ההכשרה המקצועית להתאים עצמה במהירות רבה יותר לשינויים ולתנודות במשק ובשוק התעסוקה, תוך התאמת תוכניות הלימודים לצורכי השוק העתידיים. כמו כן, יש ליצור תוכניות להכשרה תוך כדי עבודה על-פי צורכי המעסיקים והמשק.
- יש ליצור את המנגנונים המתאימים והיעילים ביותר לאכיפת חוקי העבודה ותנאי שכר הולמים במשק בכלל, ובקרב המועסקים הנמנים על אוכלוסיות ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך ובעלי השכר הנמוך ממילא בפרט. אכיפה יעילה של שכר המינימום (שאמור להוות 47% מהשכר הממוצע במשק לפחות) תוביל לעליית השכר הממוצע באופן טבעי. אכיפת חוקי העבודה כוללת גם טיפול יסודי בהעסקת עובדים זרים לא-חוקיים.
- יש להקים ברחבי הארץ מכללות טכנולוגיות המעניקות לבוגריהן תעודה מקצועית (אין מדובר בתואר ראשון) בתחומים ספציפיים בתוך לימודים שיימשכו עד שנתיים. בוגרים מצטיינים ובעלי פוטנציאל גבוה יוכלו להמשיך ללימודים אקדמיים אם יחפצו בכך בתחומים רלוונטיים למסלול המקצועי שבו בחרו. המכללות הטכנולוגיות הללו אמורות לפעול תחת פיקוחה של הוועדה לתכנון ולתקצוב (ות"ת), ולהציג תוכניות לימודים מסודרות עם יעדים לביצוע, קורסים, שעות הוראה וסילבוסים כמקובל במערכת האקדמית.
- יש להגביר את המודעות הציבורית לצורך למנוע מניעת אפליה נגד אוכלוסיות מיוחדות, ובעיקר נגד חרדים, ערבים ואנשים בעלי מוגבלות. כמו כן, יש לפעול לעידוד הגיוון האנושי בסקטור הציבורי והעסקי על מנת ליצור אחדות לאומית.

### המגזר החרדי

- יש לעמוד ביעדים הבאים להגדלת שיעור התעסוקה במגזר החרדי:
 

גברים חרדיים:	מ-40.4% (2008) ל-63% (2020)
נשים חרדיות:	מ-56.7% (2008) ל-63% (2020) <sup>1</sup>
- על משרד התמ"ת לגבש תוכנית אסטרטגית לעשור הקרוב לקידום התעסוקה במגזר החרדי, שעניינה התמודדות עם העובדה שכיום התועלת הכספית הגלומה בהמשך לימודים בכלל עובר גבר חרדי עולה על התועלת שבהשתלבות בתעסוקה.
- יש ליצור מנגנון במשרד התמ"ת שישמש כתובת לכל בעיותיו של המגזר החרדי בתחום החינוך, התעסוקה וההכשרה המקצועית. יש לצרף למנגנון מעין זה נציגים מן הארגונים השונים הפועלים כיום בתחום זה, בהם תב"ת וקמ"ח, וכן נציג מאגף התקציבים במשרד האוצר, נציג מנהל הכשרות מקצועיות בתמ"ת, ונציגות ות"ת ומל"ג.
- יש להקים מרכזי הכוון ממשלתיים אקדמיים לחרדים, שיעניקו שירותי יעוץ והכוונה, יווסתו כראוי את הביקושים ללימודים אקדמיים וישמשו כתובת ממלכתית לנושא.
- על המדינה להגדיל את השתתפותה בסיוע בשכר לימוד לנשים וגברים אלה, ולא להותיר את הזירה לפילנתרופיה לבדה.
- מן הראוי לשקול הכרה (ולו חלקית) בלימודי ישיבה של גברים חרדיים ובלמודי סמינר של נשים חרדיות כל עוד אין דרישה ספציפית לתעודת בגרות כתנאי קדם.
- יש לעודד ביתר שאת לימודים אקדמיים לגברים חרדים במקצועות ההנדסה, המחשב ומדעי הטבע, או מקצועות אחרים בעלי אופק כלכלי שיכולים להתאים למגזר החרדי.
- יש להרחיב את האבחון הבסיסי שמספקים מסלולים כמו אלה שמציע קמ"ח (קידום מקצועי חרדי) ולהוסיף מערך יעוץ הכולל אנשים שמכירים היטב הן את שוק התעסוקה והן את צורכי המגזר החרדי ובעיותיו.
- יש לשלב את המודל שפותח במרכזי מפת"ח (מרכזי פיתוח תעסוקת חרדים) בפלטפורמה של One Stop Center בעל כלי סיוע בתעסוקה מעבר לכלים הקיימים במרכזים אלה, תוך הישענות על מארג הקשרים הקיימים בחברה החרדית. יש להקים לשם כך מרכזי הכוון תעסוקתי נוספים מטעם המדינה שיפעלו בשיטה דומה.
- יש לפעול לחיזוק ההון האנושי התעסוקתי באוכלוסייה החרדית באמצעות היצע של קורסי הכשרה מותאמים הנעשים בשיתוף מעסיקים (בדגש על השמה).
- יש להעמיק את שילובם של חרדים בחברות ובגופים ציבוריים, וכן במשרדי הממשלה, תוך מתן העדפה מתקנת לבני מגזר זה.

### המגזר הערבי

- יש לעמוד ביעדים הבאים להגדלת שיעור התעסוקה במגזר הערבי:
 

גברים ערביים:	מ-74.1% (2008) ל-78% (2020)
נשים ערביות:	מ-23.4% (2008) ל-41% (2020) <sup>2</sup>
- יש להביא לפריסה ארצית של תוכנית "מרווחה לעבודה" (מודל ויסקונסין) במתווה "אורות לתעסוקה" – מודל זה של הכוון תעסוקתי הוכח כיעיל במיוחד לעידוד תעסוקה בקרב האוכלוסייה הערבית המקבלת קצבאות הבטחת הכנסה.
- יש לפתח דרכים להגדלת הנגישות למקום העבודה: לשם כך יש לשפר את התשתיות תומכות התעסוקה בישובים הערביים, לרבות

1 יעדים אלה מבוססים על המלצות דו"ח הוועדה לבחינת מדיניות התעסוקה שהוגש לממשלה ביוני 2010. להרחבה, ראו נספח 3.

2 יעדים אלה מבוססים על המלצות דו"ח הוועדה לבחינת מדיניות התעסוקה שהוגש לממשלה ביוני 2010. הוועדה הגדירה יעדי משנה גם לגברים ערביים ולנשים ערביות בגילאי 20-24.

גברים ערביים: מ-61% (2008) ל-65% (2020)  
נשים ערביות: מ-20% (2008) ל-42% (2020)

להרחבה, ראו נספח 3.

תחבורה ציבורית למוקדי תעסוקה אזוריים, וכן יש לשדרג את תשתיות מרכזי התעסוקה בישובים הערביים.

- על מנת לצמצם את החסמים המונעים השתלבות נשים ערביות בשוק התעסוקה יש לפתח ביתר שאת תשתית מעונות יום לפעוטות ולילדים ולהגדיל באופן משמעותי את היצע הגנים המסובסדים בישובים הערביים ברחבי הארץ.
- חיזוק הקשר בין דורשי עבודה מהמגזר הערבי לבין מעסיקים מיתר מגזרי המשק – יש חשיבות רבה לסיוע בתיווך וביצירת קשר בין דורשי עבודה ערבים לבין מעסיקים שאינם מהמגזר הערבי, בפרט בכל הקשור למשרות מיומנות.

#### אנשים בעלי מוגבלות

- יש לעמוד ביעדים הבאים להגדלת שיעור התעסוקה בקרב אנשים בעלי מוגבלות:  
ירידה של 1% בשיעור יהודים לא-מועסקים בשל מגבלה גופנית ל-5% (כיום 6%) עד שנת 2020;  
ירידה של 1% בשיעור ערבים לא-מועסקים בשל מגבלה גופנית ל-7.2% (כיום 8.2%) עד שנת 2020;  
העלאת שיעור התעסוקה מ-43.2% ל-53%.
- יש לפעול להגברת האכיפה של חוקי העבודה בכלל ושל תקנות שכר מינימום מותאם בפרט.
- יש לפעול באופן תמידי להגברת המודעות של האוכלוסייה בכלל ושל המעסיקים בפרט לנושא התעסוקה של אנשים עם מוגבלות, החשיבות של נושא זה והיתרונות.
- יש להתמקד בשתי אוכלוסיות יעד חשובות: בראש ובראשונה אוכלוסייה הערבית, אשר שיעורי המוגבלות בקרבם הנם גבוהים ביותר ועומדים על כ-25%. שנית, אוכלוסיית האנשים עם מוגבלות מהמגזר החרדי.
- בתחום החקיקה יש לשפר את תקנות השתתפות המדינה במימון התאמות לעובד עם מוגבלות.
- יש לשפר את הקשר בין המסגרות התעסוקתיות השונות על פני הרצף התעסוקתי ולשאוף לכך שאנשים עם מוגבלות יוכלו לעבור מעבודה במפעלים מוגנים להשמה בשוק התעסוקה הרגיל.

## **א. מבוא**

דומה כי בשני העשורים האחרונים במיוחד, על רקע גל העלייה ההמונית ובעקבות תהליכים גלובליים שהשפיעו באופן ניכר גם על ישראל, צפו ועלו בעיות חברתיות קשות. הקיטוב החברתי והכלכלי בין קבוצות אוכלוסייה שונות הולך ומעמיק; יהודים מול ערבים; ילידי הארץ וותיקיה מול עולים חדשים, מהגרי עבודה ומבקשי מקלט מדיני; חילוניים מול דתיים וחרדים; מרכז מול פריפריה, וכן הלאה. מדדים בינלאומיים שמתפרסמים חדשות לבקרים ממחישים עד כמה חמור המצב במגוון רחב של תחומים, ובראשם החינוך (ישראל ניצבת בתחתית דירוג המדינות המפותחות בהשקעה הממשלתית בתלמידיה, וכן בציוני מבחנים ומדדים בינלאומיים; המורים בישראל מרוויחים פחות מכל עמיתיהם במערב) וההשכלה הגבוהה (בשנים האחרונות ירד דירוג האוניברסיטאות הישראליות באופן מדיאג) וכן הפערים החברתיים והכלכליים העמוקים בין שכבות האוכלוסייה השונות (ישראל ניצבת בצמרת דירוג אי-השוויון והעוני בין המדינות המפותחות), כמו גם שיעור הנמוך של המועסקים במשק ביחס למדינות המתועשות במערב (בעיקר לאור העובדה שכשני שלישים מהגברים החרדיים ושיעור גבוה מכך של נשים ערביות אינם מועסקים).

בשנים האחרונות מתחדדת בשיח הציבורי בישראל ההכרה בדבר הצורך ליצור שינוי יסודי בחלוקת המשאבים על מנת לאפשר העדפה מתקנת לאוכלוסיות ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך באופן שיאפשר להן שוויון הזדמנויות וזכויות מחד גיסא וכן נכונות ורצון לחלוק בנטל החובות מאיך גיסא. בכנס הרצליה האחד-עשר נבקש לדון בדרכים להתמודד עם הקיטוב בחברה, תוך שימת דגש על הצמיחה הכלכלית שעשויה מדינת ישראל להפיק אם תצליח להוביל מדיניות אקטיבית, יסודית, נבונה וארוכת טווח של צמצום פערים, במיוחד בתחום החינוך הבסיסי להקניית מיומנויות תעסוקה וההשכלה הגבוהה וכן בתחום עידוד התעסוקה וההכנסה ממנה בקרב אוכלוסיות ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך, ובייחוד המגזרים החרדי והערבי, וכן בקרב אנשים בעלי מוגבלות. בנייר זה אנו מבקשים להציג יעדים אסטרטגיים ארוכי טווח וכן תוכניות בנות-ביצוע שיכולות לשמש "ארגז כלים" למקבלי ההחלטות לשם השגתם של יעדים אלו.

נייר מדיניות זה, המוגש לקראת כנס הרצליה האחד-עשר, מציב יעד מרכזי: להגדיל את ההון האנושי. את התעסוקה ואת ההכנסה מעבודה של אוכלוסיות מרקע סוציו-אקונומי נמוך. נייר המדיניות מתמקד בממשק שבין חינוך לתעסוקה, כלומר בצומת שבו פוגש הבגיר המסיים את לימודי התיכון את שוק העבודה בסיום התהליך ונבחן:

- מהן המיומנויות הנדרשות כיום מצעירים הנמצאים על סף כניסה לעולם התעסוקה?
- האם כיום מגיעים אותם צעירים לשוק העבודה עם ידע מתאים?
- האם ערוכה מערכת החינוך לספק את ארגז הכלים הנדרש לצורכי שוק התעסוקה בעידן של שינויים טכנולוגיים מהירים?

חשוב לציין, כי כיום פחות ממחצית מהתלמידים בכל שנתון זכאים לתעודת בגרות: בשנת 2009 עמד שיעור הזכאים על 46.1% בלבד, כשבקרב אוכלוסיות ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך היה שיעורם נמוך במיוחד (34.4% בקרב ערבים, 29.4% בקרב הבדואים, 47.3% בקרב עיריות הפיתוח, וזאת לעומת שיעור זכאות של 66% בישובים המבוססים). המשמעות היא שפחות מ-40% מכלל התלמידים בשנתון זה יעמדו בעתיד בסף הקבלה לאוניברסיטאות. למעשה, נראה כי מערכת החינוך אינה מצליחה לייצר כיום דור של מעמד ביניים בעל מסה קריטית לחברה הישראלית.

ראוי, על כן, לבחון האם תעודת בגרות עיונית הנה בהכרח הדבר הנחוץ ביותר לכל תלמיד במערכת החינוך בישראל, והאם תחת זאת ראוי, אולי, להשקיע תשומות ומשאבים גדולים יותר במתן הכשרות מקצועיות, מדעיות וטכנולוגיות ראויות שתאפשרנה לכל בוגר ובוגרת מערכת החינוך בישראל, גם ובעיקר לאלה מביניהם שאינם בוחרים במסלול העיוני (ומאוחר יותר האקדמי והאוניברסיטאי), לצאת אל שוק התעסוקה מצוידים ב"ארגז הכלים" הטוב ביותר ובמיומנויות הכוללות, בין היתר, חינוך פיננסי והבנת השווקים הפיננסיים, היכרות יסודית עם העולם העסקי, יזמות עסקית, הכרת שוק העבודה, מיומנויות בכתיבה ויכולת עבודה טובה בסביבה ממוחשבת. כך, יהיו מוכנים להתמודד היטב עם אתגרי השוק ויהיו מסוגלים לעשות כן בהצלחה יתרה ומתוך אפשרות להשתלב בעבודה ההולמת את כישוריהם ולהשיג מוביליות חברתית

וכלכלית. זאת, מבלי להמעיט בערכה ובחשיבותה של תעודת הבגרות כשלעצמה ובצורך להעלות באופן מתמיד את אחוז הזכאים לה כתנאי סף לכניסה למערכת ההשכלה הגבוהה.<sup>3</sup>

אם כן, שינוי מהותי ותפישתי כאמור לעיל, שיוביל לשינוי יסודי במערכת החינוך בישראל, ישפיע לחיוב על רמות ההכנסה העתידיות של התלמידים שישתלבו במסגרות ראויות שתאפשרנה להם לעמוד בקריטריונים הנדרשים, יקטין את התלות של אותם אנשים במדינה בעתיד, יגביר את הכוח היצרני שלהם ויאפשר להצמיח דור ביניים שמצבו הכלכלי יהיה טוב לעין ערוך לעומת הפערים הקיימים כיום. במילים אחרות, השקעות בחינוך בצורה נכונה ויעילה תשפיענה על אידיקטורים כלכליים מובהקים כגון: אחוז הבלתי-מועסקים<sup>4</sup> והמועסקים במגזרים שונים (כשהמטרה היא לעמוד ביעדים שהציבה לעשור הקרוב הוועדה לבחינת מדיניות התעסוקה בראשות פרופ' צבי אקשטיין בדו"ח שהגישה לממשלת ישראל ביוני 2010, ראו נספח 3), ממוצע הכנסות למשק בית, התוצר הלאומי הגולמי, ההוצאה לצריכה פרטית, ההוצאה הממשלתית על תמיכות לאוכלוסייה זו, מדד ג'יני להערכת אי-השוויון במשק ועוד.

נייר זה מתמקד לא רק בחינוך ובהכשרה לעולם התעסוקה בקרב בני נוער, אלא גם בהשכלה, בהכשרה מקצועית ובתעסוקה בקרב בוגרים (בני 18 ומעלה) המשתייכים לאוכלוסיות ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך (בעיקר ערבים וחרדים) ולקבוצות מיוחדות (דוגמת אנשים עם מוגבלות). חברי צוות החשיבה סבורים כי לשם מתן מענה הולם לבעיית הפערים החברתיים והכלכליים יש צורך בהצגת תוכניות והמלצות לאותם אלמנטים בחברה שניתן לסייע להם באופן מהותי לרכוש מוביליות חברתית וכלכלית ולהתגבר על אותם חסמים פנים-קהילתיים וחינוכיים המונעים מהם כיום למצות את הפוטנציאל הגלום בהם בצורה מיטבית. התוכניות המוצעות להלן לבוגרים כוללות: סיוע בהשתלבות בלימודים אקדמיים במגוון רחב של תחומים (לגברים ונשים מהמגזר החרדי), הכוונה תעסוקתית וסיוע בהשמה (הן לחרדים, הן לערבים, תוך שימת דגש על נשים ערביות, והן לאנשים עם מוגבלות) וכן הכשרות מקצועיות לאוכלוסיות אלה.

חלקו הראשון של הנייר עוסק בממשק שבין חינוך לתעסוקה, תוך התמקדות במיומנויות הנדרשות לצורך השתלבות נכונה בעולם התעסוקה כיום ובעיקר בעתיד לאור השינויים המהירים וההתפתחויות הטכנולוגיות האדירות. בחלק זה אנו מבקשים להצביע על הצורך בקידומו של החינוך הטכנולוגי, המדעי והמקצועי בישראל ביתר שאת על מנת להכשיר את הדור הצעיר בצורה טובה יותר לאתגרים שבפניהם יתייצבו ביצאם אל מחוץ למערכת החינוך, לתעסוקה ולהמשך לימודים גבוהים.

חלקו השני של הנייר מציג תוכניות קונקרטיות והמלצות לפעולה בתחום החינוך בכל הקשור לבני נוער ממגזרים ומאכלוסיות שונות. אנו שמים דגש על אוכלוסיות ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך ופריפריאליות, על נוער בסיכון ובמצוקה, וכן על נוער חרדי וערבי. תשומת לב מיוחדת ניתנת בחלק זה לתוכניות בתחום החינוך להקניית מיומנויות תעסוקה והמלצות לפעולה למקבלי ההחלטות הן במשרד חינוך והן במשרד התמ"ת בעיקר בנושא זה. חשוב לציין, כי גם התוכניות העוסקות בחינוך העיוני בחלק זה של הנייר מתמקדות בו בראייה טכנולוגית ובדרכים לשלב את תכני הלימוד העיוניים במסגרת של סביבה טכנולוגית, במיוחד לצורך קידומו של אוכלוסיות מן הפריפריה.

בחלק השלישי מוצגות תוכניות קיימות והמלצות לקידום התפישה התעסוקתית בתחום השירות האזרחי-לאומי (עבור חרדים וערבים) ובתחום השירות הצבאי (עבור חרדים), מתוך הנחה שמדובר בצורך לתת מענה לאותן אוכלוסיות ייחודיות הנפלות כיום בין הכיסאות על קו התפר שבין היציאה ממערכת החינוך לבין הכניסה לשוק העבודה.

בחלק הרביעי אנו מציגים תוכניות קיימות והמלצות לפעולה בכל הקשור לתעסוקה, להכשרה מקצועית ולסיוע ברכישת השכלה אקדמית לבוגרים בני 18 ומעלה מן המגזרים שבהם אנו עוסקים בנייר זה באופן מובחן ומודגש, קרי: חרדים (בעיקר גברים, שאחוזי התעסוקה בקרבם נמוכים), ערבים (במיוחד נשים ערביות, ששיעורי התעסוקה בקרבן נמוכים ביותר) ואנשי בעלי מוגבלות. נקודת המוצא היא הידרדרות מתמשכת בתחום ההכשרה המקצועית והתעסוקתית בישראל באופן שאינו מאפשר כיום ביצוע הסבה מקצועית יעילה לתחומים עתירי ידע, ובהיעדר חשיבה ותכנון לטווח ארוך של מערך ההכשרה המקצועית מתוך ראייה נכוחה של צורכי המשק ושוק התעסוקה בישראל כיום, ובעיקר בעתיד.

בחלקו האחרון של המסמך אנו מציגים המלצות כלליות לפעולה במישור המערכתי והממשלתי מתוך ראייה כוללת של הצורך לספק פתרונות ומענים קונקרטיים לבעיות המועלות בנייר זה ומתוך בחינת צורכי המשק הישראלי בעתיד. ככלל, יש לציין כי מרבית ההמלצות בנייר זה מכוונות לאותם גורמים במשרדי החינוך והתמ"ת האמונים על הטיפול באותן אוכלוסיות. מאחר שהאוכלוסיות שבהן אנו עוסקים בנייר זה נידונו באופן אינטנסיבי הן בשיח הציבורי, הן בשיח האקדמי והן במגזרים הממשלתי והעסקי, בדו"חות ובהמלצות לרוב, בחרנו להתמקד בגוף הנייר בעיקר בתוכניות חדשניות וייחודיות ובהמלצות שחלקן טרם הוצגו למקבלי ההחלטות וחלקן הועלו בעבר וטרם ניתן להן מענה הולם.

יתר על כן, מאחר שהנתונים והרקע לכל בעיות היסוד הללו של החברה הישראלית הופיעו ונידונו במסמכים רבים בעבר בחרנו להציג במסגרת נספח לנייר זה. הנתונים כוללים: מידע כללי על מצב מערכת החינוך בישראל, על הפערים בין יהודים לערבים, על בני המגזר החרדי ועל נוער בסיכון. כמו כן, נכלל בחלק זה מידע על השירות האזרחי-לאומי (בעיקר נתונים על בני המגזר החרדי והערבי שהשתלבו במערך זה). בנוסף, מוצג מידע העוסק במצב התעסוקה במשק הישראלי: נתונים כלליים, נתונים ביחס לחרדים ולערבים, וכן נתונים ביחס למצבו של מערך ההכשרות המקצועיות כיום. נספח נוסף מוקדש לנושא החסמים הניצבים כיום בפניהן של האוכלוסיות הנידונות בנייר זה, תוך שימת דגש על החרדים, על הערבים ועל האנשים בעלי המוגבלות בשוק העבודה. נספח שלישי מציג את ההמלצות לעדכון יעדי הממשלה ביחס להגדלת שיעור המועסקים במשק, כפי שאלה הוצגו בדו"ח הוועדה לבחינת מדיניות התעסוקה שהוגש לשר התמ"ת ביוני 2010.

3 נייר זה אינו עוסק באופן ממוקד בנושא החינוך העיוני בקרב בני נוער. לנתונים מפורטים יותר לגבי מצבה של מערכת החינוך ועל מצבן של קבוצות האוכלוסייה השונות בתחום החינוך העיוני, ראו נספח 1.

4 קרי: מי שאינם עובדים אך מחפשים עבודה באופן פעיל וזמינים לעבודה.

## ב. ממשק החינוך והתעסוקה: מיומנויות המאה העשרים ואחת

1. מהן המיומנויות הנדרשות להשתלבות בתעסוקה כיום ובעתיד?

המאה העשרים ואחת תצריך מערך שונה לחלוטין של מיומנויות הן בתחום החינוך והידע, הן בתחום התעסוקה והן בתפר שבין שני העולמות הללו, כפי שניתן לראות אם בוחנים את המתרחש סביבנו בעשור האחרון לבדו. הכישורים והמיומנויות הנדרשים בשוק העבודה משתנים בשנים האחרונות יותר ויותר כתוצאה מהתפתחותן של טכנולוגיות המידע והתקשורת (ICT: Information and Communication Technology) וחדירתן המהירה לחיי היומיום, לשוק העבודה ולמערכת הכלכלית הגלובלית, במיוחד בתחומי העסקים, הניהול, הפיננסים והשירותים, לצד המשך פיתוח תחומי המדע, הרפואה והטכנולוגיה. מערכת החינוך בישראל, כמו מערכות חינוך אחרות בעולם המפותח והמתועש, נדרשת להתאים עצמה במהרה לשינויים אלה, על מנת שתוכל להכשיר את הדור הצעיר של ימינו אנו לעולם העבודה העתידי, וכן על מנת שיוכלו להפוך לאזרחים ולעובדים מועילים לחברה ולמדינה במסגרת חברת הידע של המאה העשרים ואחת.

אם כן, מהם אותם מיומנויות וכישורים שעמם יש לצייד את בוגרי מערכת החינוך כיום ובעיקר בעתיד? העולם המתועש נדרש כיום יותר ויותר לסוגייה זו. הארגון לפיתוח ולשיתוף פעולה כלכלי (OECD), אליו הצטרפה ישראל במאי 2010, בחן בשנת 2009 עד כמה המדינות החברות בו שקדו על הגדרת המיומנויות והכישורים הנדרשים כיום מבוגרי מערכות החינוך הלאומיות שלהן. נראה כי אין כיום הגדרות ברורות ואוניברסליות, לבד ממספר מיומנויות מפתח שהוגדרו על-ידי חלק מן המדינות:<sup>5</sup>

- יצירתיות וחדשנות
- חשיבה ביקורתית ומערכתית
- יכולת פתרון בעיות וקבלת החלטות
- יכולת תכנון חיים וקריירה
- כושר הסתגלות מהיר
- ניהול ופיתוח עצמיים
- תקשורת בין-אישית ועבודת צוות
- כושר מנהיגות
- אוריינות לשונית, מדעית ומתמטית
- אוריינות מידע ואוריינות טכנולוגית
- אזרחות מקומית וגלובלית
- אחריות אישית וחברתית
- מודעות וגמישות רב-תרבותית

על-פי דו"ח ה-OECD, המדינות המתועשות מבינות כיום את הצורך בביצוע שינויים מרחיקי לכת במערכות החינוך שלהן במטרה להתאימן לצורכי עידן המידע והכלכלה הגלובלית. מדינות כמו מנסיקה ונורווגיה הצליחו לשלב את הגדרת המיומנויות הנדרשות כיום ובעתיד במסגרת רפורמה שבוצעה בתוכניות הלימודים; אוסטרליה הגדירה לעצמה תוכנית לימודים חדשה לחלוטין על מנת להתאים את מערכת החינוך למיומנויות אלה; ובמדינות כמו אוסטרליה, ספרד ואיטליה שולבה הגדרת המיומנויות כחלק מפרויקטים ספציפיים ברמה הלאומית. עוד עולה מסקירת ה-OECD כי יש כיום מעט מאוד תוכניות להכשרת מורים על-פי מיומנויות ה-ICT הנדרשות.<sup>6</sup>

כישורים אלו, הנדרשים כיום בעיקר בתעשיות ובמקצועות עתירי ידע, יידרשו לעוד ועוד עובדים. בעשורים הקרובים, מי שלא יהיה "עובד ידע" (knowledge worker), יתקשה להשתלב בחברה ובכלכלה. "עובדי הידע" של העתיד ידרשו להיות בעלי חינוך פיננסי ראוי; יהיה עליהם להכיר מושגי יסוד בתחום החשבונאות ולהכיר את העולם העסקי ואת שוק העבודה; וכן יהיה עליהם לרכוש מיומנויות גבוהות בכתיבה ובהבעה. מעל לכל אלה, חשוב לציין כי הטכנולוגיה היא הגורם המניע והמחבר בין מערכת החינוך לבין מיומנויות המאה העשרים ואחת. הטכנולוגיה מאפשרת גם לתת מענה לשונות שבין התלמידים ולהתאים את התכנים ואת דרכי ההוראה לתלמידים ברמות שונות, לתלמידים בפרפריה ולתלמידים מרקע סוציו-אקונומי נמוך.<sup>7</sup>

2. בין חינוך לתעסוקה: על חשיבותו של החינוך להקניית מיומנויות תעסוקה<sup>8</sup>

כאמור לעיל, מדינות מפותחות ומתועשות מכירות כיום יותר ויותר בצורך לספק לתלמידי מערכות החינוך הלאומיות שלהן כלים חינוכיים ומקצועיים ראויים על מנת להכשירם לקראת עולם העבודה העתידי באופן שיענה על צרכי שוק התעסוקה בעשורים הקרובים ושיאפשר לאותן מדינות להתחרות כראוי בזירה הכלכלית הגלובלית. מעבר לכך, תחומי עיסוק שאינם מצריכים השכלה מינימלית כמעט שנעלמו מן העולם המערבי, או משום שהוחלפו בטכנולוגיה חדישה או משום שמדינות המערב אינן יכולות להתחרות במדינות פחות מפותחות בעלויות התעסוקה. על כן, מדינות מתועשות מכירות בצורך להתחרות ביניהן על רמת הטובין והשירותים שהן מספקות. תחרות מעין זו מצריכה כוח עבודה מיומן ומוכשר בעל יכולות מקצועיות, טכניות ומסחריות ראיות, שעליהן אמון מערך החינוך המקצועי והטכנולוגי בכל מדינה ומדינה.

5 הרשימה המופיעה לעיל הנה שילוב של מיומנויות וכישורים שהוגדרו הן על-ידי המרכז לטכנולוגיה חינוכית (מטח) והן בדו"ח ה-OECD. המרכז לטכנולוגיה חינוכית (מטח): קידום תלמידים מאוכלוסיות מוחלשות – חזון ומעשה, דצמבר 2010.

הרחבה על אודות ממצאי דו"ח ה-OECD, ראו: Katerina Ananiadou and Magdalen Claro, 21<sup>st</sup> Century Skills and Competences for New Millenium Learners in OECD countries, OECD Education Working Papers, No. 41, OECD Publishing, 2009, <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/fulltext/5ks5f2x078kl.pdf?expires=1294062621&id=0000&acname=quest&checksum=BF35E16401D446A1BF9419FBD31A847F>.

6 Ananiadou and Claro, op. cit

7 המרכז לטכנולוגיה חינוכית (מטח): קידום תלמידים מאוכלוסיות מוחלשות – חזון ומעשה, דצמבר 2010.

8 הדיון על אודות החינוך וההכשרה המקצועיים והטכנולוגיים בחלק זה של הנייר מבוסס על דו"ח ה-OECD בנושא: Learning for Jobs: Synthesis Report of the OECD Reviews of Vocational Education and Training, OECD, 2010.

על אף ההכרה בחשיבות זו של החינוך וההכשרה המקצועיים (VET: Vocational Education and Training), מדינות רבות בעולם המערבי (ובכללן ישראל) הזניחו את הנושא משך עשרות בשנים והדירו את הדיון הציבורי על אודותיו לשוליים, לעיתים קרובות על חשבון מתן דגש גובר והולך לטובת השכלה אקדמית כללית, מתוך ראיית מערכת החינוך הציבורי ככלי שאמור להכין את התלמיד לקראת השתלבותו בלימודים אקדמיים באוניברסיטה. מעבר לכך, ההכשרה המקצועית סבלה (ועודנה סובלת) מדימוי ציבורי שלילי, ובמדינות רבות (בהן גם ישראל) טרם התחולל השינוי הנדרש ביחסו של הציבור לנושא. כמו כן, תוכניות ההכשרה מקצועית, שנמצאות לרוב תחת השגחתה של מערכת החינוך, מפתחות לעיתים קרובות דינמיקה משלהן תוך נטייה להיות מנותקות מהשינויים המתרחשים במהירות בכלכלה המודרנית.

ככלל, תחום ההכשרות המקצועיות צריך להיות באחריותה של הממשלה ולא באחריותם של גורמים פרטיים, היות שמעבר להכשרה תעסוקתית ספציפית המסופקת על-ידי המעסיק בהתאם לצרכים הנדרשים מבחינתו, הפרט היוצא לעולם העבודה זקוק להכשרה מקצועית ראשונית מספקת שתאפשר לו לעמוד בדרישות שוק התעסוקה. כמו כן, המדינה צריכה לדאוג לכך שמספר התלמידים בכל תחום מקצועי יענה על הביקוש לבעלי אותו מקצוע, משמע שיש לדאוג לכך שיהיה איזון בין האינטרס האישי לבין האינטרס הציבורי, הלאומי והתעסוקתי. מעבר לכך, מדינה שמשקיעה כראוי בהכשרה מקצועית לתלמידיה בבתי הספר התיכוניים מצליחה בצורה טובה יותר להתמודד עם אבטלה בקרב צעירים ועם משברים הפוקדים את כלכלתה.

במרבית מדינות המערב, בני נוער משתלבים בהכשרה תעסוקתית ראשונית כבר בגילאי 14-16. בגרמניה ובשווייץ, למשל, מונהגת מדיניות חינוכית לאומית, שבמסגרתה למעלה מ-50% מבוגרי בתי הספר התיכוניים מסיימים את לימודיהם עם תעודות גמר מקצועיות ובמהלך הלימודים הם נדרשים כחלק מובנה מתוכנית הלימודים לעבור התמחות (טאז) במסגרת שוק התעסוקה. אלה התומכים בשיטה זו סבורים כי כך יכול צעיר שאינו שואף להשתלב בלימודים אקדמיים בשלב מאוחר יותר לבחור לעצמו כיוון מעשי בחיים באופן שיקל עליו למצוא תעסוקה נאותה לאחר סיום לימודי התיכון. אלה המתנגדים לרעיון שבחירת המקצוע תיעשה מוקדם ככל האפשר סבורים כי צעירים מתבגרים מתקשים לקבל החלטות שקולות בבחירת הקריירה שלהם וכי הכשרה מעשית בשלב כה מוקדם עלולה למנוע מהם אפשרות להתפתח לכיוון אקדמי בעתיד.

כך או אחרת, לצד כישורי תעסוקה מיידיים נזקקים תלמידי ההכשרות המקצועיות גם ליכולות קוגניטיביות רחבות יותר ולכישורים "רכים" על מנת לפתח קריירה, במיוחד אם המטרה היא לאפשר להם לא לדבוק בתחום מקצועי אחד ויחיד כל חייהם אלא להתפתח בעתיד הרחוק יותר ולהיות מסוגלים לעבור הסבה מקצועית אם רק יחפצו בכך.<sup>9</sup> יתר על כן, כיום גם מי שמשלב בצעירותו בחינוך תיכוני מקצועי וטכנולוגי מפתח ציפיות למוביליות כלכלית וחברתית, ורבים מצליחים להשתלב מאוחר יותר גם בהכשרה מקצועית שלישונית (כך, בהולנד, כרבע מכלל תלמידי בתי הספר העל-תיכוניים ממשיכים להכשרה מקצועית שלישונית, ובדרום קוריאה עומד שיעורם על 75%). על כן, מן הראוי כי תוכניות ההכשרה המקצועית תכשרנה את התלמידים הצעירים לא רק לשוק העבודה אלא גם תספקנה להם מיומנויות כלליות (כמו חשיבה כמותית ומילולית, שכיום מרבית תלמידי החינוך להקניית מיומנויות תעסוקה לוקים בה) על מנת להרחיב את אופקיהם ולאפשר להם לפנות לכיוון מקצועי אחר.

### 3. חשיבותן של מיומנויות מקצועיות וטכנולוגיות עבור ישראל

בישראל, בניגוד לאירופה, החינוך להקניית מיומנויות תעסוקה מפוצל בין שני משרדי ממשלה, כאשר במושב VET (ראו לעיל) נכללים שני תחומים: האחד הוא חינוך טכנולוגי מקצועי והשני חינוך מקצועי.<sup>10</sup> על נתיב הלימודים הטכנולוגי-מקצועי אחראי משרד החינוך באמצעות המנהל למדע ולטכנולוגיה, ואילו משרד התמ"ת מקיים מסגרות לימודים על-יסודיות המקנות הכשרה מקצועית טכנית.<sup>11</sup> מתוך כ-360 אלף תלמידי ישראל בחטיבה העליונה (כיתות י"ב, י"ג), לומדים 37% בחינוך הטכנולוגי. אחוזים אלה כוללים יחדיו את תלמידי משרד התמ"ת ותלמידי הנתיב הטכנולוגי בפיקוח משרד החינוך. לשם השוואה, במדינות האיחוד האירופי, לומדים כ-68% במסגרות החינוך הטכנולוגי, ובמדינות ה-OECD עומד שיעורם על 46%.

היקף הלומדים בחינוך הטכנולוגי (נכון לשנת הלימודים 2008 לפי נתוני הלמ"ס): בנתיב הטכנולוגי בפיקוח משרד החינוך, בכיתות י"ב, למדו 115,764 תלמידים, בכ-18 מגמות. בנוסף על הלומדים בחטיבה העליונה, לומדים כ-4,600 תלמידים במסלולי טכנאים והנדסאים בכיתות י"ג-י"ד, ומשתלבים ישירות בשוק העבודה או עובדים במסגרת הצבא במקצוע שרכשו. זאת ועוד, בנתיב הטכנולוגי, ממשיכים כ-33% ממסיימי י"ב

9 הדבר בולט במיוחד בקרב תלמידים הממשיכים לאוכלוסיות החיות בסיכון והדרה חברתית ומשפחתית, מאחר שהמשרות שאליהן נחשפים בני נוער אלה הן בדרך-כלל פוגעניות ונחותות ומנציחות את השכר הנמוך ואת חוסר היכולת להתפתח מבחינה מקצועית.

10 החינוך הטכנולוגי והמקצועי בישראל החל להתפתח בעיקר משנות ה-70 של המאה הקודמת ואילך. עד אז פעלו בעיקר בתי ספר מקצועיים שסיפקו הכשרה מקצועית ללא זכאות לבגרות במקצועות כמו מכונאות רכב וחברות. בשנות ה-70, על רקע העלייה מברית המועצות והתפתחות התעשייה הביטחונית ותעשיית המתכת, גובר הביקוש לכוח אדם מקצועי בתעשייה, קרי: טכנאים, הנדסאים ופועלי יצור. באותן שנים בוצעה רפורמה גדולה במערכת החינוך שכללה מעבר מהכשרה מקצועית לחינוך טכנולוגי. הוקמו בתי ספר מקיפים שכללו הן נתיב עיוני (מסלול זכאות לבגרות) והן נתיב טכנולוגי עם שלושה מסלולים בהתאם לרמת התלמיד.

לאור התפתחותן של תעשיות ההיי-טק, הכימיה והמזון בשנות ה-80 גדל הביקוש לכוח אדם הנדסי ומוכשר, בוצעה רפורמה נוספת שעיקרה פיתוח השיטה המודולרית, ביטול שיטת המבחנים, פיתוח מגמות בעלות סיוע רחב ויצירת סביבת למידה עתירת טכנולוגיה. הרפורמה הביאה לשינוי הזדמנויות בין הנתיב העיוני לטכנולוגי בבתי הספר המקיפים. כל מגמה טכנולוגית כללה מקצועות מבווא, מקצועות ליבה ומקצועות התמחות. התלמיד למד את כל מקצועות המגמה וניגש לבגרות מודולרית (1, 3 או 5 יחידות לימוד [יח"ל]) על-פי יכולתו ורצונו.

על רקע התפתחות המוצאת של תעשיות ההיי-טק, התוכנה והתקשורת בשנות ה-90 ולאור גלי העלייה המסיביים גובשו דו"ח מבקרת המדינה על הרפורמה בחינוך הטכנולוגי (של שנות ה-80) ודו"ח "מחר 98", ובו הולצה להחיל חינוך מדעי-טכנולוגי לכל התלמידים מהגן ועד לגמר התיכון. פותח מקצוע חובה חדש – מדע וטכנולוגיה – שכל תלמיד מהגן ועד חטיבת הביניים חויב ללמודו. כמו כן, שולב התקשוב בתהליכי ההוראה והלמידה ונדרש פיתוח סביבת למידה עתירת מדע וטכנולוגיה.

בשנות האלפיים, לאור התפתחות נוספות בתעשיות מבוססות הידע ועל רקע תהליכי גלובליזציה מתחזקים, הוחלט על גיבוש מבנה חדש לחינוך הטכנולוגי במערכת החינוך בחטיבה העליונה, שהעיקרון המנחה בו הוא שילוב מדעים מדויקים עם טכנולוגיות מתקדמות, תוך עדכון נושאי הלימוד. על-פי המבנה החדש, לימודי החטיבה העליונה מהווים המשך ישיר ללימודי המקצוע "מדע וטכנולוגיה" הנלמד בחטיבות התחונות. החינוך הטכנולוגי פועל על-פי עיקרון המודולריות, כאשר בכל מגמת לימוד נלמדים שלושה מקצועות: מקצוע מדעי (פיזיקה, כימיה או ביולוגיה) או מקצוע חדש – "מדעי הטכנולוגיה" (2-5 יח"ל); מקצוע מוביל אחד לכל מגמת לימוד (1, 3 או 5 יח"ל); ומקצוע התמחות (1, 3 או 5 יח"ל), שבמסגרתו מביעים רוב התלמידים פרויקט גמר. ישנם שלושה אשכולות של מקצועות צבירים לבגרות במסגרת החינוך הטכנולוגי: א. מגמות מדעיות הנדסיות – הנדסת מכונות, הנדסת אלקטרוניקה, הנדסת מחשבים, ביטונטכנולוגיה מדעית-טכנולוגית; ב. מגמות טכנולוגיות – מערכות בקרה ואנרגיה, מערכות ייצור ממוחשבות, הנדסת בנייה ואדריכלות, תעשייה וניהול, אומנויות העיצוב, טכנולוגיות תקשורת, מידע ופרסום, מערכות מידע; ג. מגמות תעסוקתיות – ניהול עסק, מערכות בריאות, חינוך, תיירות ופנאי, מלונאות. בתוך כל אחת מהמגמות נלמדים מקצוע מוביל ומקצועות התמחות רלוונטיים. זכאות לבגרות מוגשת באמצעות לימוד שבעה מקצועות חובה ושלושה מקצועות בחירה במגמה ובהתמחות: או "מדעי הטכנולוגיה" בצירוף שני מקצועות טכנולוגיים (מקצוע מוביל ומקצוע התמחות), או מקצוע מדעי בצירוף שני מקצועות טכנולוגיים. זכאות לתעודה טכנולוגית, המעניקה הסמכה והמונה תנאי קדם להמשך לימודים בכיתות י"ג-י"ד, מוגשת באמצעות שלוש בחינות במקצועות טכנולוגיים ברצף של מגמה והתמחות: מקצוע מדעי ושני מקצועות טכנולוגיים או "מדעי הטכנולוגיה" ושני מקצועות טכנולוגיים.

להרחבה נוספת, ראו: אלי איזנברג, "החינוך הטכנולוגי בישראל – מסמך עמדה", עיונים, גיליון 6, מאי 2008, <http://c3.ort.org.il/APPS/Public/GetFile.aspx?inline=yes&f=Files/6202BF2E-DF58-4347-9B32-1ECFD84803A3/F298DBF7-382A-4A0A-A74C-B6B5E19148EA/256E86DD-97AF-4849-A98B-AF926530F0A7/1CBF6535-5951-4899-B750-6B1B1542A553.pdf&n=07-10.pdf>

11 לעיתים קרובות, מיועדים מסלולים אלה לבני נוער שאושר להם לפרוש ממערכת החינוך העיוני הסדירה, והם נחשבים לנושאים ולא לתלמידים מן המניין. יש לכך משמעות הן מבחינת סוג תעודת סיום הלימודים והן מבחינת סוג תעודת שחרורם שחלקם משיגים (אקסטרניט ואל אינטרניט).

בתוך שמונה שנים מסיום לימודיהם ללימודים אקדמיים במכללות ובאוניברסיטאות, ולעומת זאת בנתיב העיוני, ממשיכים למוסדות השכלה גבוהה כ-56% ממסיימי י"ב, תוך שמונה שנים מיום סיום לימודיהם.

במסגרות החינוך המקצועי לנוער בפיקוח משרד התמ"ת למדו 13,485 תלמידים בכיתות ט'-י"ב (בלמעלה מ-80 מסגרות קיימות), מחציתם מאזורי פריפריה בצפון הארץ ובדרומה. כ-70% מהם מרקע סוציו-אקונומי נמוך ביותר, ו-38% מהם משתייכים למגזר הערבי והדרוזי. כמו כן, נפתחו עד כה ארבעה בתי ספר מקצועיים לכ-900 בני המגזר הבדואי בנגב ובית ספר נוסף מתוכנן להיפתח בשנת הלימודים הבאה. בנוסף, למעלה מ-350 תלמידים חרדיים השתלבו עד כה במסגרות ההכשרה המקצועית של משרד התמ"ת (על כך גם בהמשך נייר זה). נתוני התאחדות התעשיינים מצביעים על מחסור ניכר בטכנאים בתעשייה בישראל, המוערך בכ-5,000 איש. מחסור זה ניצב בבסיס הטענות על אודות הצורך לחזק את החינוך המקצועי והטכנולוגי בישראל על מנת להקנות לתלמידים מיומנויות תעסוקה, וכך לענות על צרכי המשק והכלכלה.<sup>12</sup>

חשוב לציין, כי תקציב החינוך הטכנולוגי קוצץ בכ-35% בשנים האחרונות. קיצוץ זה בא לידי ביטוי בגידול מספר התלמידים בכיתות המגמה הטכנולוגית (מ-26 ל-36), ממש כמו בכיתות המגמות העיוניות. הקיצוץ אף פגע משמעותית באיכות ההוראה וביכולת לרכוש ציוד חדיש למגמות הטכנולוגיות. מגמות טכנולוגיות רבות נסגרו, במיוחד בבתי ספר פריפריה; חלה ירידה במספר שעות ההוראה, במיוחד במספר שעות ההתנסות בסדנאות; וכן, פוטרו מורים צעירים וחדשניים באופן שגרם להזדקנות מערך ההוראה.

לאור האמור לעיל, יש להדגיש כי חינוך מתקדם להקניית מיומנויות תעסוקה הוא התשתית להתפתחותה של ישראל ולהצלחתה בתחומים רבים, כמו ביטחון, תעשייה, חקלאות, אנרגיה, בריאות, תקשורת ואיכות הסביבה. עוצמתה של ישראל וחוסנה תלויים בראש ובראשונה בבוגרי מערכת החינוך ובהכשרה המדעית והטכנולוגית שלה, במיוחד אם המדינה מעוניינת לעמוד בשורה אחת עם המדינות המפותחות בעולם ולהובילן. מעבר לכך:<sup>13</sup>

- ההנחה הבסיסית היא שהידע ומיומנויות התעסוקה המוקנים בחינוך הטכנולוגי, המדעי והמקצועי אמורים לשמש נכסי צאן ברזל של כל בוגר מערכת חינוכית האמור להשתלב בעולם רווי טכנולוגיה ותקשוב.
  - רבים מהתלמידים יהיו נכונים להשקיע מאמץ רב יותר בלימוד מקצועות מדעיים רק אם יחוו שהידע הנלמד הוא שימושי, רלוונטי וחדשני עבורם.
  - כפי שראינו לעיל, במדינות מפותחות רבות במערב לא כל התלמידים ניגשים לבחינות בגרות עיוניות. במדינות אלה מתקיימות מערכות חינוך מקצועי מסועפות עבור מי שמבקש ללמוד מקצוע בנעוריו. השאיפה המוכרת שכל תלמיד יהיה זכאי לתעודת בגרות אינה סותרת את זכותו לרכוש תשתית ידע מקצועית בגיל הנעורים, שתעזור לו לפתח קריירה תעסוקתית בהמשך חייו.
  - מקצועות טכנולוגיים והנדסיים שדורשים ידע ומיומנות בהפעלת כלים ומערכות טכנולוגיות הם מרכיב חיוני בכלכלת מדינה מודרנית ובתעשיית טכנולוגיה עילית. מחקרים מראים כי מי שעתידי להיות טכנאי – מוטב שיחל ללמוד כיצד להפעיל מערכות טכניות כבר בגיל הנעורים ולא בשנות העשרים לחייו.
  - לעיתים קרובות חינוך טכנולוגי הנו קריטי מבחינת התלמיד ומשפחתו. משפחות רבות, בעיקר ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך, שואפות לכך שילדיהן ישיגו תעודת בגרות, אך רואות גם כורח בכך שהבן או הבת יסייעו לכלכלת המשפחה כמפרנסים נוספים. אם יידחה הלימוד המקצועי והטכנולוגי עד לאחר השירות הצבאי עלול הדבר להוביל לפגיעה קשה באוכלוסיות פריפריאליות הסובלות ממצוקה כלכלית.
  - לימוד מקצוע טכני בגיל הנעורים נחוץ גם למערכת הביטחון, ובמיוחד לצה"ל. הצבא זקוק כיום ליותר בוגרי מגמות אלקטרוניקה מאשר בעבר, לעיתים גם על חשבון שיבוצם כלוחמים.
- בחלקו הבא של הנייר נעסוק בתוכניות קונקרטיים שהוצעו על-ידי חברי צוות החשיבה לקראת כנס הרצליה ושעניין המרכזי הוא השאיפה לקדם הן את החינוך העיוני והן את החינוך המקצועי והטכנולוגי בישראל בקרב בני נוער על מנת להכניס לקראת היציאה אל עולם התעסוקה. כפי שנראה להלן, גם אותן תוכניות שעוסקות בחינוך העיוני ולא בזה המקצועי או הטכנולוגי הן תוכניות מוכוונות טכנולוגיה, דהיינו כאלה המופעלות בסביבה ממוחשבת, מתוקשבת וטכנולוגית בקרב אוכלוסיות פריפריאליות ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך (חלקן מיעודות לכלל האוכלוסיות הללו וחלקן ממוקדות בקבוצות אוכלוסייה ספציפיות).

## ג. תחום החינוך להקניית מיומנויות תעסוקה (נוער עד גיל 18): תוכניות קיימות והמלצות לפעולה

1. תוכניות המיועדות לכלל האוכלוסיות ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך

אגף שח"ר במשרד החינוך חבר לפיילוט של תוכנית "מוטב יחדיו" שיזמה עמותת ג'וינט אשלים הפועלת זה חמש שנים ב-14 ישובים (22 שכונות) ברחבי הארץ, ובעיקר באזורים פריפריאליים, בכדי להרחיב את מעגל ההשפעה ואת היקף החשיפה של התוכנית. שח"ר וג'וינט אשלים פיתחו במשותף את תוכנית "מנהלת שח"ר חדש" שמטרתה לקדם צמצום פערים בחינוך, לסייע בשיקום שכונות מצוקה ולספק רווחה חינוכית לילדים מגיל אפס ועד גיל 18. התוכנית מבוססת על עקרון הרצפים: רצף גילאים, רצף מענים (פיזי, רגשי, לימודי, חברתי, העשרתי ותעסוקתי), רצף שעות (מענה לאורך כל שעות היממה), רצף סיכון (מתלמידי "קצה" ועד לתלמידים מצטיינים), רצף שירותים (חינוך, רווחה, בריאות, קליטה), רצף מגזרים (עירוני, ממשלתי, עסקי, שלישי, התנדבותי), רצף מסגרות חינוך (פורמאלי ובלתי-פורמאלי) ורצף השכלתי (מעון, גן, יסודי, תיכון, צבא, השכלה גבוהה והכשרה מקצועית). התוכנית, המופעלת כרגע כפילוט בארבעה ישובים, מבקשת לאפשר לתלמידים שמשתלבים בה לזנק קדימה על-בסיס ההנחה שלא ניתן לטפל בפרט מבלי לדאוג לקהילה כולה. אף על פי שכל המערכות העוסקות בנושא החינוך, הרווחה והתעסוקה קיימות ניכר כי לעיתים קרובות אין סנכרון ביניהן ומוקצים משאבים כפולים תוך בזבז תקציבים ממשלתיים בצורה בלתי-ראויה ובלתי-מאורגנת. תוכנית "מנהלת שח"ר חדש" פועלת בתוך גבולות תחומים (שכונות מצוקה בתוך ערים) ובמסגרת של מנהלת

12 רפאלה בלס, החינוך הטכנולוגי בישראל במבחן האיחוד האירופי – ממצאי הדוח ETF-2010, עמלנט, גיליון 12, 18 באוקטובר 2010, [http://www.amalnet.k12.il/AmalNewsLetter/Letters/18.10.2010/ISREL\\_VET.aspx](http://www.amalnet.k12.il/AmalNewsLetter/Letters/18.10.2010/ISREL_VET.aspx)

13 רשת אורט אלי איזנברג, "החינוך הטכנולוגי בישראל – מסמך עמדה", עיונים, גיליון 6, מאי 2008, <http://c3.ort.org.il/APPS/Public/GetFile.aspx?inline=yes&f=Files/6202BF2E-DF58-4347-9B32-1ECFD84803A3/F298DBF7-382A-4A0A-A74C-B6B5E19148EA/256E86DD-97AF-4849-A98B-AF926530F0A7/1CBF6535-5951-4899-B750-6B1B1542A553.pdf&n=07-10.pdf>



חברתית-כלכלית שמטפלת ב-2,500 ילדים ובני נוער ובמשפחותיהם (כ-20 אלף איש). המנהלת פועלת בשיטת One Stop Center, ובראשה עומד case manager שאמון על ראיית התמונה הכוללת, דהיינו לא רק דאגה לחינוכו של הילד אלא גם לתעסוקה של הוריו. המנהלת משלבת בתוכה אנשי מקצוע (חינוך, רווחה, בריאות וקליטה) מהמערכת הקיימת לצד ההנהגה המקומית (ועד השכונה), פעילים, מתנדבים וגורמי חוץ (עמותות, קרנות, מגזר שלישי והמגזר העסקי) שמוכנים לפעול יחד למען הגשמת היעדים. עלות הקמתה ותפעולה של כל מנהלת כזו היא כ-400 אלף ש"ח. המטרה היא להרחיב את התוכנית בהמשך לפריסה כלל-ארצית ולהקים כ-200 מנהלות חברתיות-כלכליות אזוריות-שכונתיות, וכך להקיף כחצי מיליון בני אדם ברחבי הארץ.

מטח מפעיל זה כמה שנים את תוכנית "נחשון" לקידום מצוינות בפריפריה, לאור העובדה שבשנים האחרונות ניכר מיעוט של מספר התלמידים הניגשים לבגרות במקצועות הריאליים ברמה של 4 ו-5 יח"ל. כאשר מדובר על תלמידים מן הפריפריה הגיאוגרפית והחברתית, הנתונים נמוכים עוד יותר. אוכלוסיית היעד של תוכנית נחשון היא תלמידים החיים בפריפריה הלומדים בבית הספר העל-יסודי, שהנם בעלי יכולת להגיע ללימודים מוגברים בתחומי המתמטיקה, הפיזיקה, הכימיה והביולוגיה, ואשר אינם מגיעים לכדי מימוש יכולת זו מסיבות שונות. מטרת התוכנית היא לפתוח בפני התלמידים בפריפריה, ובהם תלמידי החינוך הערבי, את שערי האקדמיה ולתת להם הזדמנות לרכוש השכלה בפקולטות המובילות, כדי שיוכלו לממש את יכולותיהם במלאן ולהשתלב בחייהם הבוגרים כאזרחים שווים ותורמים בחברה הישראלית.

נחשון הוא מיזם חדשני, שבו סטודנטים מצטיינים חונכים תלמידים לקראת בחינת בגרות במתמטיקה ובפיזיקה ברמה הגבוהה ביותר (4 ו-5 יח"ל) באמצעות טכנולוגיות מתקדמות של הוראה וחניכה מרחוק שפותחו עבור פרויקט זה על-ידי מטח. החונכים משמשים מעין מורים פרטיים איכותיים שיכולים לתת תמיכה ועזרה אישית מעבר לשיעורי המתמטיקה, הפיזיקה, הכימיה והביולוגיה. השיעורים מובנים ומתבצעים באמצעות מערכת לימוד הכוללת תרגילים, הפעלות וחומרי למידה חדשניים, כגון סימולציות ומעבדות וירטואליות, המותאמים לתלמיד, לחונך ולמורים בבית הספר בו לומד התלמיד. סביבת הלמידה הייחודית והאינטראקטיבית של נחשון הוכיחה את עצמה במהלך השנים האחרונות כתומכת בלמידה ומשפרת באופן משמעותי את הישגי התלמידים. בשנת הלימודים הנוכחית משתתפים בתוכנית כ-3,500 תלמידים, בתמיכת משרד החינוך. עד היום השתתפו בתוכנית למעלה מ-10,000 תלמידים. מבין כלל התלמידים שהשתתפו בתוכנית לפחות שנה אחת יותר מ-75% זכאים לתעודת בגרות, ומתוכם יותר משני שלישים קיבלו ציון 80 ומעלה.

## 2. תוכנית חינוך והכשרה מקצועית ותעסוקתית לנוער בסיכון<sup>14</sup>

עמותת ג'וינט אשלים ישראל פיתחה את תוכנית "נקודת מפנה", שם כולל למספר תוכניות שמטרתן לעשות שימוש בכלים של תעסוקה ויזמות כשדה אלטרנטיבי לעבודה עם נוער במצבי סיכון, קרי: נערים ונערות בגילאי 15-18 שאינם לומדים במסגרות החינוך העיוניות. בנקודת מפנה נכללות 4 תוכניות: NFTE, רשתות, מיזמים עסקיים (שלב קיימות) ודרך המלך (השתיים האחרונות נמצאות כעת בשלבים מתקדמים של גיבוש והתאמה). כל אחת מהתוכניות שמה דגש על חלק אחר של הכנה לעולם התעסוקה והיזמות וההיכרות עמו. מטרה נוספת של התוכניות הללו היא למשוך את בני הנוער בסיכון להשתלב במסגרות נורמטיביות ולהבהיר להם באמצעות שימוש בשדה התעסוקה את חשיבות הלימודים וההשכלה. מתוך עקרון יסוד של ג'וינט אשלים כל התוכניות שפותחו פועלות בשיתוף פעולה עם משרדי החינוך והרווחה ומיומן הראשון של התוכניות מתקיימים תהליכי הטמעה הדרגתיים במערכות הממשלתיות על מנת לאפשר לאנשי המקצוע שהוכשרו בתוכנית להעביר את הידע לתלמידים במסגרות האלטרנטיביות השונות גם בטווח הארוך. בכל המסלולים של "נקודת מפנה" משולבים מתנדבים בוגרים המהווים מודל ללמידה ולחיקוי עבור בני הנוער שמפגשים מסוג זה הם לרוב ראשוניים עבורם.

תוכנית NFTE (Networks for Teaching Entrepreneurship) היא תוכנית שפותחה בארה"ב והותאמה לישראל. הוחל בהפעלתה בארץ משנת 2007 ואילך. בימים אלה מסתיים שלב ההערכה השני של התוכנית על-ידי מכון ברוקדייל. בשנת 2010 פעלו 43 קבוצות ב-27 ישובים ברחבי הארץ במגוון מסגרות, בהן: קידום נוער-משרד החינוך, רשת אורט, בתי הספר של משרד התמ"ת, רשת המפתנים והמיתרים שמפעיל משרד הרווחה, רשת בתי הספר ע"ש ברנקו-וייס, פרויקט הבתים החמים של קרן רש"י ועמותת תפוח. המשתתפים בתוכנית לומדים כיצד להקים ולנהל עסק קטן, תוך רכישת מיומנויות וכישורי חיים מגוונים ורלוונטיים. התוכנית מועברת באמצעות פעילויות חווייתיות ומגוונות. מטרת התוכנית הן לפתח בקרב בני הנוער היכרות ויצירת עניין עם העולם היזמי והעסקי כמנוף לרכישת השכלה ומיומנויות "רכות"; לפתח רגשות מסוגלות וחיזוק הדימוי והאמונה העצמיים; ולפתח כישורים ומיומנויות שסייעו לבני הנוער בפתיחת עסק עצמאי. התוכנית בנויה מ-65 שעות לימוד חווייתיות כשבכל קבוצה 12-15 בני נוער. בין התכנים הנלמדים: מבוא ליזמות, כלכלה ושיווק; הכרת מושגי המפתח בתחום; פיתוח רעיונות וניתוח הזדמנויות; ביצוע בדיקות היתכנות כלכלית ומחקרי שוק; הכנת תוכנית עסקית. הכשרת אוכלוסיית היעד נעשית דרך הכשרת מורים שיוסמכו להעביר את התוכנית בשישה ימי לימוד מרוכזים. המורים מעבירים את תכני התוכנית בעזרת מערכים כתובים של תוכנית הלימודים שנכתבו והותאמו לקהילות שונות על-ידי ג'וינט אשלים, כולל המגזרים החרדי והערבי. התוכנית מקיימת שני אירועים ארציים בשנה: אירוע הסרת הלוט – שבמהלכו חושפות הקבוצות את הרעיונות העסקיים שלהן ומלטשות אותם בעזרת סיעור מוחות משותף ובסיוע מתנדבים מעולם העסקים; ותחרויות חצי הגמר והגמר – בהן מציגות הקבוצות את התוכניות העסקיות המוגמרות שלהן, כאשר נציג מן הקבוצה המנצחת מייצג את NFTE ישראל בתחרות העולמית בניו יורק.

בתוכנית רשתות בני הנוער לומדים ומתרגלים פיתוח וחיזוק של רשתות קשרים, כיצד בנוי שוק התעסוקה הישראלי וכיצד לחפש עבודה בצורה חכמה. התוכנית החלה בשנת 2009 כפיילוט עם 14 קבוצות, והוכשרו במסגרתה כ-150 בני נוער מרחבי הארץ (בכל קבוצה לפחות 15 בני נוער). בשנת 2010 נפתחו 30 קבוצות ב-28 ישובים. בין המסגרות המפעילות את התוכנית: קידום נוער-משרד החינוך, רשת המפתנים והמיתרים של משרד הרווחה, רשת בתי הספר ע"ש ברנקו-וייס, עמותת עלם ומועדוני הפרויקט הלאומי של עמותת דרור בתי חינוך. שלישי מהקבוצות שייכות לחברה הערבית והפעלתן מתאפשרת הודות לתרומה והתאמה תרבותית שנעשו לתוכנית במהלך שנת הפיילוט. בתוכנית משתתפות גם קבוצות מהמגזר החרדי, תוך התאמה של תכני הלימוד. התוכנית בנויה מ-40 שעות לימוד, הפרושות על פני חצי שנה של מפגשים חווייתיים, והיא מקנה למשתתפיה מודעות והבנה של תהליכים העומדים בבסיס שוק העבודה והתנסויות מעשיות בתרגול שאיפות תעסוקתיות ותכנון נתיבי התפתחות תעסוקתית. התוכנית שמה דגש על עבודה קבוצתית ככוח מניע לפעולה, ובנוסף משכללת כישורים ומיומנויות "רכות", דוגמת עבודה בצוות, ניתוח סביבה והזדמנויות, יכולת הצגה עצמית, חיפוש מידע, תכנון לטווח ארוך ועוד. בדומה ל-NFTE,

14 בישראל נמצאים כיום כ-350 אלף ילדים ובני נוער (מגיל לידה עד גיל 18) במצבים המסכנים אותם במשפחתם ובסביבתם, וכתוצאה ממצבים אלו נפגעו זכויותיהם לקיום פיזי, בריאות והתפתחות, להשתייכות למשפחה, ללמידה ולרכישת מיומנויות, לרווחה ולבריאות רגשית, להשתתפות ולהשתייכות חברתית ולהגנה מפני אחרים ומפני התנהגויות מסכנות שלהם עצמם. להרחבה נוספת בנושא נוער בסיכון בישראל, ראו נספח 1.

גם רשתות מקיימת שני אירועים ארציים בשנה: אירוע התרשנות – נערך בתחילת השנה ובו מתרגלים משתתפי התוכנית בניית רשתות קשרים (networking) עם משתתפים מקבוצות אחרות ומתנדבים בוגרים, בעלי מקצועות מתחומים מגוונים; ואירוע סיום – תערוכה בה מוצגים מיצבים של כל הקבוצות המתארים את תהליך העבודה שעברו.

עלות הפעלתן של כל אחת מהתוכניות היא כ-20-18 אלף ש"ח לשנה עבור קבוצה בת 12-15 בני נוער. כיום מסוגלת עמותת אשלים להכשיר 60 מנחים חדשים מדי שנה בכל תוכנית, כלומר ניתן לפתוח 30-40 קבוצות חדשות כשבכל כיתה שני מנחים, וזאת רק אם קיימות מסגרות שתחייבנה על הטמעת התוכניות כחלק אינטגרלי ממערכת הלימודים אחרי הכשרת אנשי המקצוע על-ידי ג'וינט אשלים.

### 3. תוכנית לחינוך המקצועי והטכנולוגי

תוכנית "טכנאי ובגרות" (ט"ב)<sup>15</sup> פותחה מתוך תפישה, לפיה יש צורך לאפשר לתלמידים המעוניינים בכך להשלים תוכניות הכשרה מקצועיות לצד מערכת התעודה-הסמכה הקיימת, על מנת שיוכלו להמשיך ולפתח את יכולותיהם בעתיד. מטרת התוכנית היא להגדיל את מספר התלמידים המסיימים את בית הספר התיכון עם כלי משמעותי ואיכותי לחיים, ובכך להגדיל את מספר התלמידים היצרניים כדי שיוכלו לתרום לעצמם ולכלכלת ישראל. מטרה אחרת היא לאתר תלמידים בעלי פוטנציאל ללימודים טכנולוגיים כדי לתת מענה לצורכי צה"ל והתעשייה, בהתאם לצרכים המשתנים של המשק. כמו כן, נועדה התוכנית לאפשר לאותם תלמידים מובילים כלכלית וחברתית טובה יותר, וכן לצמצם את הפער החינוכי-השכלתי בחברה הישראלית.

לקראת סוף לימודי חטיבת הביניים מוצעת לתלמידים ברמה בינונית-גבוהה הניגשים לבגרות מלאה, או לתלמידים ברמה בינונית הניגשים לבגרות חלקית (בהתאמה לתנאי הקבלה לחטיבה העל-תיכונית) התוכנית, המיועדת לאלה שמגלים כישורים טכנולוגיים ונטיות לתחומים יצרניים, תעשייתיים ותעסוקתיים. בסיומה של התוכנית הייחודית בוגריה זכאים לתואר טכנאי וכן זכאים לתעודת בגרות. בעתיד יוכלו להתקבל ללימודי המשך לתואר הנדסאי או ללימודים במכללות אקדמיות במסלולים טכנולוגיים, עסקיים ותעשייתיים.

תוכנית הלימודים כוללת את תוכנית הליבה העיונית בהיקף מינימלי של 12 יח"ל, בנוסף לתוכנית ללימודי טכנאי הכוללת שלושה מקצועות: מקצוע מדעי או מדעי הטכנולוגיה, מקצוע מוביל במגמה ומקצוע התמחות, כאשר זכאות לבגרות מחייבת מינימום של 9 יח"ל, וסה"כ 21 יח"ל מינימליות. על מנת לסייע להם מוצע לתלמידים תגבור במקצועות המתמטיקה, הפיזיקה והאנגלית כבר בכיתה ט'. הם זכאים לפריסה נוחה יותר של בחינות הבגרות, וכן מתאפשרת דחיית שירות לשם השלמת בגריות חסרות. הקריטריונים לבחירת מגמות הלימוד הם: התאמה למקצועות נדרשים שיהיו רלוונטיים לצורכי המשק (התעשייה והצבא) בעשור הקרוב; מגמות בעלות פוטנציאל גבוה להשמה תעסוקתית; ומגמות שתיתנה מענה להטרונגיות של צורכי המשק והפרט ואשר תענקנה לתלמידים גאווה והערכה עצמית. מרכיב יסוד בתוכנית זו הוא מעבדות התנסויות, קרי: מעבדות עדכניות ומתקדמות לצורך התנסות וביצוע פרויקטי גמר. כמו כן, מתבצעים פרויקטים בשיתוף גורמים בתעשייה ובצה"ל, המשמשים חונכים ומנחים לתלמידים. צה"ל מספק כ-100 מורים חיילים במקצועות הנדסה לבתי הספר. מורי התוכנית עוברים השתלמות רציפה ומתמדת על מנת לעמוד בשינויים ובדינאמיקה של מקצועות הלימוד.

בסיום הלימודים בכיתה י"ב יכול תלמיד שלא היה באפשרותו למלא את הדרישות לתואר טכנאי להמשיך את לימודיו בכיתה י"ג לצורך הסמכה כטכנאי. תלמידים מצטיינים שירצו בכך יוכלו להמשיך לכיתה י"ג לקראת תואר הנדסאי. במסגרת התוכנית מתאפשרת גם השתלבות במערך הטכנולוגי של צה"ל במסגרת השירות הצבאי.

התוכנית הציבה לעצמה יעד של 2,500 בוגרים בשנה בחישוב של 100 כיתות לימוד בכל מחזור. יעד נוסף הוא להגיע ל-80% בעלי תנאי קבלה למסלול טכנאים בסוף כיתה י"א כבר במחזור הראשון וליעד של 90% תוך שלוש שנים. יעד שלישי הוא להגיע ל-80% זכאים לדיפלומת "טכנאי מוסמך" מקרב אוכלוסיית הניסוי המסיימת 12 שנות לימוד כבר במחזור הראשון ולהגיע תוך שלוש שנים ליעד זכאות של 90%. יעד רביעי הוא להעלות ב-20% את שיעור הזכאות לבגרות בקרב האוכלוסיות המתחילות את המסלול בבגרות חלקית.

תוכנית זו עשויה להוות פתרון איכותי עבור תלמידים רבים שנכון להיום מסיימים את חוק לימודיהם במערכת החינוך ללא קבלת "ארגז כלים" מתאים לחיים. לכל התלמידים בתוכנית יש אפשרות להתפתח מקצועית ולרכוש מוביליות חברתית-כלכלית. הטובים מביניהם יוכלו בעתיד לרכוש השכלה אקדמית. מעבר לכך שהתוכנית עשויה להגדיל את מספר הזכאים לבגרות, יש ביכולתה להעלות את איכותה של תעודת הבגרות באופן שיכיל בסיס מדעי-טכנולוגי משמעותי. נדרשות הוכחות להצלחה של הפיילוט

### 4. תוכנית למגזר החרדי

במטח פיתחו בשנים האחרונות תוכנית לקידום לימוד מקצועות הליבה בחינוך העצמאי החרדי, מתוך הנחה שזהו אחד האתגרים העומדים כיום בפני מערכת החינוך העיוני. לצורך זה פותחו חומרי לימוד עדכניים במתמטיקה לכיתות א'-ט' עבור תלמידי החינוך העצמאי. פיתוח הסדרה "מסלולים", המיועדת לתלמידי החינוך העצמאי ומוריו, מבוסס על הסדרה "שבילים", המיועדת לחינוך הממלכתי, ונעשתה בה התאמה תרבותית לחינוך החרדי. הפיתוח נעשה בידי מורות בכירות מתוך המגזר החרדי בהנחיית צוות המתמטיקה של מטח, ועבר את בקרת המפקחות על הוראת המתמטיקה במגזר. תהליך הפיתוח וההטמעה של הסדרה התבסס על יצירת דיאלוג בין צוות הפיתוח של מטח לבין אנשי המפתח של "מרכז החינוך העצמאי". התאמת חומרי הלימוד לתלמידי החינוך העצמאי נעשתה בשלושה מישורים: הקשרים (בעיות מילוליות המתאימות לתרבות החרדית); שמות (שמות המקובלים במגזר); וגרפיקה – המאירת היא גרפיקאית מתוך המגזר המכירה את "המותר והאסור".

כיום, מרבית בתי הספר לבנות (בית יעקב, אורח חיים, בית הספר של גור ועוד) לומדים מתוך הסדרה, וגם בתי ספר רבים לבנים (תלמודי תורה [ת"ת]). צוות המתמטיקה של מטח מספק הדרכה בתוך בתי הספר, וימי עיון לקבוצות של בתי ספר. קורסים אלו מוכרים להליך ההסמכה של המורים. הקורסים עוסקים בהוראת המתמטיקה לפי תוכנית הלימודים החדשה של משרד החינוך כפי שהיא באה לידי ביטוי בסדרה מסלולים.

בתי הספר התעשייתיים לנוער חרדי: בשנה"ל תש"ע פעלו שש מסגרות עבור נוער חרדי (בנים ובנות שנשרו ממערכת החינוך החרדית). בהן למדו כ-175 תלמידים. בשנה"ל תשע"א נפתחו שלוש מסגרות חדשות והורחבו אלה הקיימות, כך שכיום לומדים במסגרות אלה למעלה מ-350 תלמידים. המגמות לבנים כוללות את התחומים: תחזוקת מחשבים, גננות נוי, סופרי סת"ם, מכונאות רכב (אוטוטרניקה), עיבוד עץ, תכנון באמצעות מחשב (תיב"ם), חשמל. המגמות לבנות כוללות את מגמות המנהל ופיאנות. עלות כיתת נוער – כ-550 אלף ש"ח (הסכום אינו כולל:

15 אלי איזנברג, "החינוך הטכנולוגי בישראל – מסמך עמדה", עיונים, גיליון 6, מאי 2008, <http://c3.org.il/APPS/Public/GetFile.aspx?inline=yes&f=Files/6202BF2E-DF58-4347-9B32-1EFCFD84803A3/F298DBF7-382A-4A0A-A74C-B6B5E19148EA/256E86DD-97AF-4849-A98B-AF926530F0A7/1CBF6535-5951-4899-B750-6B1B1542A553.pdf&n=07-10.pdf>

מעטפת ליום לימודים ארוך עם הזנה, ציוד, מעבדות ובינוי כיתות חדשות).

## 5. תוכניות למגזר הערבי

אחד החסמים המרכזיים בקרב בני המגזר הערבי היוצאים לשוק התעסוקה כיום הוא השליטה הלקויה בשפות, הן שפת אמם – ערבית, והן עברית.<sup>16</sup> מטח פיתח לשם כך תוכניות לקידום לימוד שתי השפות והטמעת השליטה בהן במגזר הערבי כבר בכיתות א' ו-ב'. בשנתיים האחרונות הוקמה במטח מחלקה מקצועית לפיתוח תכנים בתחום השפה הערבית, המורכבת ממומחים ומפתחים בתחום החינוך הלשוני שערבית היא שפת אמם. הצוות עוסק בפיתוח חומרי למידה מודפסים ודיגיטליים ובהטמעתם בבתי ספר בחינוך הערבי, מנחה השתלמויות מורים ועוד.

בשנת 2009 הושלם פיתוח מילון ערבי-ערבי לילדים, ראשון מסוגו. המילון המצויר, "מילה ומשמעותה", פותח על בסיס מחקר שבחן את אוצר המילים של ילדי גן בערבית המדוברת לצד אוצר המילים המופיע בספרי הלימוד לרכישת הקריאה. בהמשך פורסם קול קורא לכתיבת סיפורים קצרים בערבית לילדים בגילאי 5-7, נבחרו חמישה סיפורים אשר עובדו, אוירו ויצאו לאור בשנת 2010 כספרונים בעיצוב צבעוני ועשיר. סדרת הספרים נשלחה לכל כיתות א' בבתי הספר דוברי ערבית במסגרת שנת השפה במערכת החינוך בישראל.

בהמשך למחקר הוקם צוות מקצועי לכתיבת ספרי לימוד לרכישת הקריאה, בגישה עדכנית התואמת את תוכנית הלימודים החדשה בתחום זה. הסדרה "הערבית שפתנו" (חלקה עדיין בפיתוח) כוללת ספרי לימוד בחינוך לשוני לכל כיתות בית הספר היסודי ותעמיד סדרה כוללת ושלמה לכיתות א'-ו' עד שנת 2012. לצד הספרים מפותח אתר אינטרנט ובו פעילויות אינטראקטיביות לילדים (בסביבת אופק) וסביבה מתקשבת למורים. לצורך הטמעת הספרים בכיתות א' ו-ב' מתקיימות השתלמויות בקרב כ-30 קבוצות מורים ברחבי הארץ. כמו כן, מתקיים מחקר מלווה רחב היקף של הסדרה, בשיתוף עם אוניברסיטת חיפה, הבוחן את הרכיבים המשפיעים על רכישת הקריאה בערבית. במסגרת פיתוח כלים מתוקשבים לשיפור יכולות הקריאה של התלמידים, פותח השנה מחולל חדשני שנועד לבסס את שטף הקריאה בערבית. המחולל הוא אתר מראה לאתר זהה בעברית ובאנגלית וכולל כ-50 טקסטים בארבע רמות קריאה. האתר מתאים לתלמידים הנמצאים בשלב אחרון של רכישת הקריאה, ולתלמידים שזקוקים לאימון ותרגול.

בשנת 2008 הסתיים במטח פיתוח סדרה חדשה להוראה ערבית לדוברי ערבית – "עברית לדרך". בבסיס הסדרה גישות עדכניות להוראת שפה שנייה והיא נכתבה בהלימה לתוכנית הלימודים לעברית כשפה שנייה בבתי ספר דוברי ערבית. לצד ספרי הסדרה (כיתות ג'-ו') פותח אתר עשיר למורים ומדריכים. בימים אלו החל פיתוח של סדרת המשך לחטיבת הביניים ולחטיבה העליונה.

## 6. המלצות לפעולה בתחום החינוך להקניית מיומנויות תעסוקה<sup>17</sup>

המלצות מערכתיות כלליות למשרדי הממשלה הרלוונטיים (משרדי החינוך, התמ"ת, האוצר) ולמעסיקים:

- ברמה הלאומית והממשלתית יש לעודד את שיתוף הפעולה בין משרדי החינוך והתמ"ת לשם קידומו של החינוך הטכנולוגי, המדעי והמקצועי להקניית מיומנויות תעסוקה. לחילופין, לאור העובדה שמתקיימות כיום, למעשה, שתי מערכות חינוך והכשרה נפרדות לתחום זה, הן במשרד החינוך (החינוך הטכנולוגי) והן במשרד התמ"ת (החינוך המקצועי), יש לבחון ביתר שאת האם הפיצול הנוכחי מייטיב עם שתי המערכות הללו, וכיצד הפיצול הקיים משרת את האינטרס העליון של טובת התלמידים הלומדים בשתייהן.
- יש לבצע הערכה לאומית תקופתית ומסודרת של תחום ההכשרות המקצועיות והחינוך המקצועי והטכנולוגי על מנת להבטיח עקביות בשילוב שבין המיומנויות הנדרשות בעולם התעסוקה, הצורך בעידוד חדשנות ויצירתיות, והצורך לספק את שאיפותיהם של תלמידי החינוך המקצועי.
- יש לשדרג את דימויו של החינוך הטכנולוגי, הן בקרב מקבלי ההחלטות במשרדי הממשלה (משרד החינוך, משרד התמ"ת, משרד האוצר) ובכנסת, והן במרחב הציבורי הישראלי, ובמיוחד בתקשורת.
- על הממשלה לקדם את החינוך להקניית מיומנויות תעסוקה באופן שמשקף בצורה מאוזנת הן את הצרכים המשתנים של המשק ושל המעסיקים והן את צורכי התלמיד, את שאיפותיו ואת נטיותיו.
- נדרש שיתוף פעולה יעיל בין הממשלה, האיגודים המקצועיים והמעסיקים, על מנת להבטיח שעולם הלמידה של תלמידי החינוך המקצועי והטכנולוגי יהיה מחובר ככל האפשר לעולם התעסוקה. לצורך זה, יש לשתף את המעסיקים ואת האיגודים המקצועיים בפיתוח תכני הלימוד. כמו כן, יש לבחון אפשרויות לשילוב צעירים עד גיל 18 בשוק התעסוקה בענפי המסחר והתעשייה ובתחום הממשלתי.
- יש ליצור בסיס של כישורים ומיומנויות תעסוקתיות שיאפשרו לתלמידים להתפתח במהלך חייהם לא רק בכיוון אחד ויחיד אלא באופן שיקנה להם אפשרויות הסבה מקצועית אם רק יחפצו בכך. לצורך זה, יש להבטיח, בין היתר, שלכל תלמידי החינוך המקצועי והטכנולוגי יהיו כישורים נאותים והולמים בתחום החשיבה הכמותית ובכישורי שפה.
- המלצות קונקרטיביות ואופרטיביות לביצוע במשרדי הממשלה הרלוונטיים (משרדי החינוך, התמ"ת, כל אחד בתחום אחריותו לחינוך הטכנולוגי ולהכשרות המקצועיות, וכן משרד האוצר):
- יש ליצור תוכניות לימודים הכוללות תחומים שמקנים מיומנויות למידה לכלל תלמידי מערכת החינוך בתחום הפיננסים, החשבונאות, העסקים ושוק העבודה על מנת לציידם בכלים נאותים שעמם יוכלו להשתלב היטב בתעסוקה בעתיד.
- תקצוב ריאלי של תלמיד במסלול הלימוד הטכנולוגי צריך להיות גבוה בכ-4,000 ש"ח מזה של תלמיד תיכון עיוני. כלומר, נדרשת תוספת של כ-400 מיליון ש"ח בשנה, המהווים פחות מ-2% מהתקציב השנתי של משרד החינוך.
- יש לפתח ולהרחיב את תוכנית "טכנאי ובגרות" (ראו לעיל) של רשת אורט. התוכנית מופעלת בפילוט על-ידי המנהל למדע ולטכנולוגיה במשרד החינוך בתשעה בתי ספר של רשתות אורט ועמל. היעד הוא להגיע תוך שלוש שנים למצב בו 2,500 תלמידים לומדים

16 להרחבה בנושא החסמים המונעים כיום השתלבותם של ערבים בצורה נאותה בשוק התעסוקה, ראו נספח 2.

17 במושב ששק בנושא צמצום הפערים בחברה הישראלית במהלך כנס הרצליה האחד-עשר הודיע מנכ"ל משרד החינוך, ד"ר שמשון שושני, על כך שמשרדו הציב יעד להגדלת מספר הלומדים בחינוך הטכנולוגי בשלוש השנים הבאות על מנת להגיע לממוצע הלומדים בחינוך הטכנולוגי במדינות ה-OECD, דהיינו כ-46%, כמצוין לעיל. בסעיף זה אנו מציגים המלצות כלליות וקונקרטיביות להשגת יעד זה.

בתוכנית לקראת זכאות לבגרות ולתעודת טכנאי עם סיום 12 שנות לימוד.

- יש להתאים את מבנה הלימודים החדש של החינוך הטכנולוגי לתלמידים בעלי יכולות שונות, ויש לפעול ביתר שאת למימוש הפוטנציאל של שילוב בנות במסלולים אלה.
- יש להרחיב את החטיבה העל-תיכונית תוך מתן דגש למסלולי טכנאים והנדסאים בתחומים הנדרשים למשק, ובעיקר לצה"ל.
- יש לבחון העמקת הקשר בין החינוך הטכנולוגי התיכוני והמכללות הטכנולוגיות (לבוגרים) לבין מפעלים בתעשייה ולשלב מפעלים בתהליך ההכשרה.
- יש להציע את כוח ההוראה בחינוך הטכנולוגי וליצור מערכת השתלמויות קבועה וסדירה של המורים.
- יש לצייד את המעבדות והסדנאות בבתי הספר על-פי סטנדרטים טכנולוגיים עדכניים.
- יש לפתוח בתי ספר טכנולוגיים מתאימים לאוכלוסיות מיוחדות דוגמת בני המגזר החרדי ולקדם את לימודי היסוד.
- יש לשפר את הוראת השפה העברית בקרב בני הנוער הערביים בכל מערכת החינוך; בחינוך הטכנולוגי והמקצועי במגזר הערבי יש לתת תשומת לב יתרה לחינוך לקריירה ולחשיבה תעסוקתית.<sup>18</sup>

## ד. תחום השירות האזרחי-לאומי והשירות הצבאי (בני 16 ומעלה): תוכניות קיימות והמלצות לפעולה

### 1. השירות האזרחי-לאומי

עד כה לא נעשו פעולות לגיבוש תוכניות להכשרה מקצועית במנהלת השירות האזרחי-לאומי, ומרבית המתנדבים יצאו מן השירות האזרחי כלעומת שבו, ללא הכשרה מספקת שתאפשר להם להשתלב כראוי בשוק התעסוקה. כעת נבנית תוכנית בשיתוף עם משרד האוצר, עם קרן קמ"ח (קידום מקצועי חרדי), עם הג'וינט ועם המכללה החרדית ירושלים שתכליתה לאפשר לכל מתנדב חרדי לרכוש הכשרה מקצועית. עלותה של התוכנית עבור הכשרת אלף מתנדבים בהיקף של 250-500 שעות של קורסים מקצועיים הנה כ-10 מיליון ש"ח, כאשר המדינה צפויה להשתתף במימון מחצית העלות. הכוונה היא שהתוכנית תציע מספר סוגי הכשרות: החל מהשלמת בגרות, דרך קורסים מקצועיים, וכלה בתואר אקדמי.

הכשרה מקצועית מעין זו חיונית גם עבור מתנדבי השירות האזרחי-לאומי מן המגזר הערבי, שמרביתם בנות. יש לפתח כלים להעצמה נשית, יש לסייע להן לרכוש כלים לטובת תעסוקה ויש לסייע להן בחיזוק יכולותיהן בתחום השפה, שכפי שצוין לעיל מהווה חסם מהותי.

### 2. שח"ר (שילוב חרדים בשירות צבאי)

מסלול שח"ר טוב (גילאי 16-17): המסלול מיועד לנערים שנשרו משיבות ומאפשר להם לימודים בבתי ספר תעשייתיים. מסגרת יום הלימודים הארוך כוללת לימודי מקצוע, לימודי קודש, העצמה אישית, הסעדה והסעות. בהמשך מגויסים הנערים למערך הטכני של צה"ל.

מסלול שח"ר רגיל (גילאי 22-27): תוכנית שח"ר, שהחלה בחיל האוויר בשנת 2007 כשיתוף פעולה בין צה"ל, משרד התמ"ת (האגף להכשרה ופיתוח כוח אדם) וג'וינט תב"ת,<sup>19</sup> התרחבה לזרועות אחרים (חיל הים, אמ"ן, אט"ל, חיל התקשוב, החטיבה הטכנולוגית של זרוע היבשה – חט"ל) ומהווה מודל מוצלח לשילוב חרדים בעולם העבודה ובצה"ל. זרועות הצבא מבקשות ליצור מסלולים חדשים לשירות חרדים בצבא במקצועות בעלי פוטנציאל תעסוקתי באזרחות. הגיוס לצה"ל כאפשרות ליציאה לעולם העבודה נעשה יותר ויותר לגיטימי בקהילה החרדית. בשנת 2010 התגייסו כ-530 חרדים ואברכים לשירות סדיר במסגרת המסלולים הייחודיים הללו, ואם נכלול בנתון זה גם את המתגייסים לנח"ל החרדי (גדוד "נצח יהודה") – 455 חיילים – הרי שמדובר בכאלף צעירים חרדים שהתגייסו השנה, גידול של 25% במספר המתגייסים לעומת 2009. צעירים אלה מגיעים מכל הקהילות החרדיות ומכל החצרות, ורובם אינם נרתעים כיום מלבישת מדים במרחב הציבורי החרדי. מסלולי הגיוס לחרדים מתוקצבים כיום על-ידי עמותות פרטיות המקבלות, בין השאר, תרומות מחו"ל, וכן על-ידי הג'וינט והצבא. אף שבמסגרת רפורמה כוללת בנושא החליטה הממשלה בינואר 2011 להקצות 130 מיליון ש"ח לגיבוש מסגרות גיוס חדשות וייחודיות לחרדים, ו-70 מיליון ש"ח לפיתוח מסגרות חדשות בשירות האזרחי, ימים יגידו האם ניתן יהיה לעמוד ביעדים השאפתניים שהוצבו לשירות חרדים בצבא.<sup>20</sup>

במסגרת המסלול, לאחר הטריונות משתלבים חיילי שח"ר במכניות קצרות של כ-200 שעות במרכזי ההכשרה של משרד התמ"ת ללימודי מקצועות הליבה. חלק מהחיילים ממשיכים ללמוד במרכזי ההכשרה בכיתות ייעודיות לשח"ר, לעיתים במקום ההכשרות הצבאיות, במקצועות כמו: חשמלאי מעשי ומכונות CNC. אותם בוגרים מקבלים תעודות ממשלתיות של משרד התמ"ת. במסגרת הפרויקט, מאפשר צה"ל לחיילים שהתגייסו לשלוש שנות שירות חובה ללמוד כחצי שנה טרם שחרורם בקורס מקצועי מתוקצב של האגף להכשרה מקצועית במשרד התמ"ת. בוגרי הפרויקט זכאים גם לסדנאות העצמה וסיוע בהשמה בשיתוף ג'וינט תב"ת.

## ה. תחום התעסוקה וההכשרה המקצועית והאקדמית (בני 18 ומעלה): תוכניות קיימות והמלצות לפעולה

ההכשרה המקצועית למבוגרים נועדה להקנות מקצוע לבוגרים בני 18 ומעלה המבקשים ללמוד מקצוע או לעשות הסבה מקצועית, על מנת לשפר את סיכויי התעסוקה וההכנסה שלהם. שירות התעסוקה מפנה להכשרה מקצועית בעיקר דורשי עבודה שלא נמצא עבורם פתרון

18 ההמלצות שלעיל מבוססות על דו"ח ה-OECD בעניין החינוך המקצועי והטכנולוגי למקבלי ההחלטות במדינות החברות. להרחבה, ראו: OECD, 2010, Learning for Jobs: Synthesis Report of the OECD Reviews of Vocational Education and Training.

וכן על: אלי איזנברג, "החינוך הטכנולוגי בישראל – מסמך עמדה", עיונים, גיליון 6, מאי 2008, <<http://c3.ort.org.il/APPS/Public/GetFile.aspx?inline=yes&f=Files/6202BF2E-DF58-4347-9B32-1ECFD84803A3/F298DBF7-382A-4A0A-A74C-B6B5E19148EA/256E86DD-97AF-4849-A98B-AF926530F0A7/1CBF6535-5951-4899-B750-6B1B1542A553.pdf&n=07-10.pdf>>

19 תנופה בתעסוקה, תוכנית משותפת לג'וינט ולממשלת ישראל שמטרתה להסיר חסמים חברתיים לתעסוקה בקרב אוכלוסיות ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך; התוכנית מספקת מגוון רחב של שירותים ופרויקטים.

20 ראוי לציין בהקשר זה, כי צוות בראשות מנכ"ל משרד רה"מ הגיש לאחרונה מסמך לממשלה המציע יעדי גיוס שאפתניים של בחורים חרדיים לצה"ל (במסגרת פרויקט שח"ר) ולשירות האזרחי-לאומי – כשהכוונה היא להגיע עד שנת 2015 ל-5,000 מתגייסים חרדיים לשני המסלולים, הצבאי (לפחות 2,500 חרדים אמורים להתגייס לשירות בצה"ל בשנת 2015, על-פי התוכנית) והאזרחי, תוך שילובם במסגרת הכשרות מקצועיות. התוכנית אושרה על-ידי הממשלה בינואר 2011, אם כי הדיון הציבורי והמחלוקת לגביה עדיין בעיצומם, בעיקר לאור העובדה שלמעשה אברכים ללא ילדים יוכלו לקבל פטור מלא מהצבא בתמורה לשירות אזרחי, בן שנה כבר בגיל 22 במקום בגיל 26 כפי שנהוג כיום. חשוב לציין, עם זאת, כי השירות האזרחי אמור להתבצע בשירותי החרים (כבי אש, בתי הסוהר ומד"א), ולא בעמותות אזרחיות חרדיות, אם כי עדיין לא הגדרו המנגנונים שאמורים לאפשר זאת ולפקח על ביצוע המהלך.

תעסוקתי מספק או שבחרו לעשות הסבה מקצועית. אוכלוסיית היעד של האגף להכשרה מקצועית במשרד התמ"ת כוללת מגוון רחב של אוכלוסייה: אקדמאים, חיילים משוחררים, עולים חדשים, אוכלוסיות מיוחדות כמו ערבים וחרדים, בעלי מוגבלויות, אסירים משוחררים ואימהות חד-הוריות.

הקורסים כוללים מגוון ענפים, כמו בניין וסביבה, דפוס צילום והפקה, הארחה, חשמל ואלקטרוניקה, טקסטיל, מחשבים, מנהל, רהיטים ורכב. הקורסים נערכים באמצעות בתי ספר ומכללות פרטיים שזכו במכרז פומבי, וחלקם במרכזי הכשרה ממשלתיים. משך הקורסים נע בין כמה עשרות שעות לימוד ליותר מ-1,000 שעות, בהתאם למסלול ולמקצוע. בתקופת הלימודים משתתף התלמיד בתשלום שכר לימוד סמלי, ובסוף כל חודש מועבר למוסד לביטוח לאומי דיווח על ימי השתתפותו בלימודים. בהתאם לכך, הוא מקבל דמי אבטלה או השלמת הכנסה מהביטוח הלאומי. בסיום הלימודים מתקיימות בחינות עיוניות ומעשיות, בהתאם למקצוע. מי שעומד בהצלחה בבחינות מקבל תעודת סיום קורס ותעודת מקצוע, עמן הוא יכול לבקש הפנייה לעבודה במקצועו.

חשוב לציין, כי בתחילת שנת 2003 חלה ירידה דרמטית בהיקף המשתתפים בתוכנית ההכשרה המקצועית. הדבר קרה בשל החלטת הממשלה לקצץ משמעותית את תקופת דמי האבטלה, כך שמי שמבקש ללמוד יצטרך לממן את מחייתו בעצמו. בנוסף, המובטלים "נקנסו" בכך שדמי האבטלה שלהם קוצצו ב-30%. עד 2003 השתתפו כ-15 אלף איש בקורסי ההכשרה המקצועית. היום עומד מספרם הממוצע על כ-900 בחודש בלבד. אחת הסיבות המרכזיות לכך היא ההחלטה לבטל את קורסי ההיי-טק המבוקשים ולהשאיר הכשרות במקצועות כמו חקלאות ובניין, בניסיון להחליף את העובדים הזרים. כתוצאה מכך, ההחלטות שהתקבלו ב-2002 משפיעות באופן קשה גם על מובטלי.<sup>21</sup> 2009

מעבר לכך, למרות קיומו של מערך מסודר של הכשרות מקצועיות במסגרת משרד התמ"ת (האגף להכשרות מקצועיות), דומה שאין לו כיום הכלים הנדרשים לנווט את הנרשמים לקורסי ההכשרה תוך חשיבה לטווח ארוך. במקום להישען על חשיבה אסטרטגית דומה כי ההכשרה המקצועית מתבססת בעיקר על היצע וביקוש מול כמה וכמה גופים, בהם שירות התעסוקה של משרד התמ"ת, לשכת התיאום של המעסיקים במשק, מועצות מקומיות גדולות בעלות מנהל תעסוקה והג'וינט. למעשה, אין כיום אף גורם מוסמך בישראל שיכול לתת תחזית לטווח ארוך לגבי הביקוש לעובדים. בהיעדר יכולת לחזות את תנודות שוק התעסוקה בעתיד, קובע האגף להכשרה מקצועית את נושאי הקורס, את מיקומו ואת עיתוי פתיחתו על-פי הדרישות של שירות התעסוקה ועל-פי דרישות המעסיקים בהווה בלבד.

חולשה נוספת בהתנהלותו של מערך ההכשרות המקצועיות נובעת מכך שהיעד הכמותי שהוא שם לעצמו מתייחס למספר המשתתפים בקורסים ולא למספר הנרשמים שמצאו עבודה בתחום. מנתוני משרד התמ"ת עולה כי רק כ-44% מאלה שנרשמו לקורסים בין השנים 2007-2010 מצאו עבודה בתחום שבו למדו (שיפור מסוים לעומת נרשמים לקורסים שסיימו את לימודיהם בשנים 2002-1996, אז מצאו כ-40% עבודה בתחום הכשרתם). על-פי נתונים נוספים לגבי שנת 2009 עולה כי שיעורי ההשמה בשוק העבודה לאחר קורס הכשרה מקצועית נמוכים יחסית: בקרב גברים - 48.7%; בקרב נשים - 34.9%; בקרב גילאי 26-34 - 49.6%; בקרב גילאי 35 ומעלה - 37.9%; במגזר היהודי - 45.2%; במגזר הערבי - 33.5%; בקרב עולים (שהגיעו בשנות ה-90) - 46.6%. דומה כי יעילותן של התוכניות להכשרה מקצועית אינה נבדקת כראוי ובמשרד התמ"ת משקיעים משאבים במקצועות בעלי שיעור השמה נמוך ללא בחינה ראויה של שיעור המשרות הפנויות במשק באותם ענפים וללא הסתגלות מהירה לשינויים המתרחשים במשק ובשוק התעסוקה.<sup>22</sup>

בחלק זה של הנייר נציג להלן תוכניות קיימות ועתידיות להכשרה מקצועית, תעסוקתית ואקדמית לגברים ולנשים בני אוכלוסיות ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך, תוך שימת דגש על החרדים, על הערבים ועל בעלי המוגבלות. בנוסף לכך, נציע המלצות אסטרטגיות וקונקרטיים לפעולה למשרדי הממשלה הרלוונטיים על מנת לקדם ביתר שאת טיפול יסודי, מבני ומתכלל של סוגיית ההכשרות המקצועיות, התעסוקתיות והאקדמיות לאוכלוסיות אלה.

#### 1. תוכניות למגזר החרדי

קמ"ח (קידום מקצועי חרדי):<sup>23</sup> קמ"ח הנה קרן עצמאית ללא מטרת רווח שהוקמה בשנת 2007 בתמיכת תורמים פרטיים בראשות הפילנתרופ היהודי הבריטי ליאו נו על מנת לסייע לחרדים להשתלב בשוק התעסוקה באופן שיאפשר עצמאות כלכלית ופרנסה מכובדת להם ולבני משפחותיהם.<sup>24</sup> הנחת היסוד של הקרן היא שהכשרה מקצועית ראויה תספק לחרדים משכורת ראויה, שתהווה עבורם תמריץ לדבוק בעולם העבודה והפרנסה. הגישה הארגונית של קמ"ח הנה הוליסטית, קרי: בחינה לעומק של מצבו של הפרט ומתן ייעוץ וליווי לכל אורך התהליך במטרה לספק לכל אחד את הכיוון התעסוקתי הנכון והטוב ביותר עבורו. כל אדם שמגיש מועמדות לקבל מלגת קמ"ח עובר תהליך של סינון ובקרה, עובר מבחני התאמה לניתוח יכולותיו וכישוריו, פוגש פסיכולוג תעסוקתי ומופנה לאנשי מקצוע בתחום הרלוונטי לו על מנת ללמוד על מסלולי הלימודים הקיימים בארץ, על סביבת העבודה ועל דרישות המקצוע. היכולת האישית של הפרט, בצירוף המלצת היועץ, משפיעות על תחום הלימודים שנקבע עבור המועמד. משנמצא המועמד מתאים לתנאי הקבלה של הקרן הוא זכאי לסיוע במימון שכר הלימוד עד לגובה של 85% משכר הלימוד. במקרים חריגים יש מועמדים הזכאים אף לקבל מלגות מחיה. הקרן מספקת ליווי ומעקב לכל אורך תקופת הלימודים של הסטודנט, ועם סיום לימודיו מסייעת לו בחיפוש עבודה.

קמ"ח מפעילה שני מסלולים עיקריים: השכלה אקדמית והכשרה מקצועית. במסלול האקדמי יש שתי תוכניות: "קמ"ח אקדמי" ו"חרדים לעתידם". במסלול המקצועי שתי תוכניות גם כן: "קמ"ח מקצועי" ו"פרנסה בכבוד". על-פי נתונים מעודכנים לדצמבר 2010, בשלוש השנים האחרונות פנו לקמ"ח 8,100 איש (84% מהם גברים), ומהם 7,600 נמצאו מתאימים על-פי הקריטריונים של הקרן. 2,000 איש נמצאים בשלבים שונים של רישום, ייעוץ ואישור. 3,500 איש קיבלו ומקבלים מלגה, מהם: 128 ממתנינים לתחילת לימודיהם, 2,447 תלמידים בפועל במסלולי "קמ"ח אקדמי" (44% מהתלמידים) ו"קמ"ח מקצועי" (53% מהתלמידים; 3% במסלול ההנדסאי), 428 נוספים לומדים במסגרת "חרדים לעתידם"

21 <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3711275,00.html>

22 דה מארקר, 6 בינואר 2011.

23 מחקר מקיף שבחן את יעילותה של התוכנית נעשה על-ידי מכון ברוקדייל, ולפירוט מלא של תוצאות הסקר ראו:

Lisa Cave and Hamutal Aboody, The Benefits and Costs of Programs Implemented by the Kemach Foundation, Myers, JDC, Brookdale Institute, November 16, 2010

24 על-פי נתונים של קרן קמ"ח, ההנחה היא כי ניתן לשפר באופן משמעותי את מצבה הכלכלי של האוכלוסייה החרדית אם שני בני הזוג יפרנסו את משפחתם. כיום, משפחה חרדית ממוצעת עם שישה ילדים, שבה שני בני הזוג אינם עובדים, מצליחה באמצעות קצבת ילדים, השלמת הכנסה, מלגת לימודים לבעל האברך ותרומות להרוויח בין 3,650 ל-4,650 ש"ח לחודש. כאשר הבעל יוצא לעבוד ואשתו נשארת בבית הכנסת המשפחה צומחת ל-5,120-6,320 ש"ח לאחר ניכוי הוצאות. כאשר שני בני הזוג עובדים צומחת הכנסת המשפחה ל-6,500-7,700 ש"ח לאחר ניכוי הוצאות, כלומר בכ-3,000 ש"ח מעבר להכנסתה של משפחה חרדית בה שני בני הזוג אינם עובדים. גידול משמעותי שכזה בהכנסותיה של משפחה חרדית ממוצעת מבהיר עד כמה חיוני לקדם במיוחד את יציאתם של הגברים החרדיים לעבוד ולחלץ את ילדיהם ממעגל העוני.

(המסלול האקדמי), 319 נוספים לומדים במסגרת "פרנסה בכבוד" (המסלול המקצועי). 537 סיימו את לימודיהם. 111 איש נשרו ממסלולי הלימודים (כ-3.5% מכלל התלמידים). 84% ממקבלי המלגה, למעלה מ-3,100 איש, הם גברים. 83% מהתלמידים נשואים ובעלי משפחות (3.5 ילדים בממוצע). כ-11.5% בני 23 ומטה, כרבע מהם בגילאי 24-27, ואחוז דומה בגילאי 28-32.

המסלול המקצועי: תוכנית "פרנסה בכבוד" החלה במסגרת תב"ת בשנת 2005, ומקיימת מדי שנה קורסים ברחבי הארץ במגוון רחב של תחומים. התוכנית מיועדת לגברים חרדיים מעל גיל 23, ומורכבת בעיקרה מלימודי ערב, פעמיים עד שלוש פעמים בשבוע. מאפריל 2009 קמ"ח היא המפעילה המרכזית של תב"ת. קמ"ח החלה להפעיל מסלול מקצועי נוסף משלה מ-2007 בתחומים ש"פרנסה בכבוד" לא הציעה. "קמ"ח מקצועי" מתמקד בתחומים כגון תכנות, הנהלת חשבונות, ייעוץ מס וייעוץ השקעות. על-פי סקר שנעשה בקרב 388 בוגרי "פרנסה בכבוד" ו"קמ"ח מקצועי" (מתוך 419 בוגרים), שכ-90% מהם גברים, עולה כי 81% מהבוגרים מצאו עבודה לאחר סיום הכשרתם (67% במשרה מלאה, 14% במשרה חלקית) וכל השאר עדיין בלתי-מועסקים (לפני תחילת התוכנית 15% מהבוגרים עבדו למחייתם, דהיינו גידול של 61% בשיעור העובדים. 73% מהמועסקים עובדים בתחום הכשרתם, 5% עובדים בתחום הקשור חלקית לתחום הכשרתם, וכל השאר עובדים בתחום שאינו קשור להכשרתם הישירה. 70% מהבוגרים דיווחו על גידול משמעותי בהכנסת משפחתם, לעומת כרבע שדיווחו כי לא חל גידול בהכנסה (נתון העולה בקנה אחד עם שיעור הבלתי-מועסקים מקרב בוגרי התוכנית). ההכנסה הממוצעת של בוגרי התוכנית עלתה מ-3,850 ש"ח לחודש ל-5,300 ש"ח.<sup>25</sup> התחום המבוקש ביותר בהכשרה המקצועית הוא הוראה (17%), ולאחריו ייעוץ והדרכה (אחוז דומה), הנהלת חשבונות (13%), גרפיקה (12.5%) ותכנות (7%). תחומים נוספים: תחזוקת מחשבים ורשתות, הנדסאי אלקטרוניקה, ניהול ושיווק, טבחיות, אדריכלות ועוד. התלמידים משתלבים במגוון רחב של מוסדות לימוד, בהם: לומדה, מכון למורים, מכון אחיה ואחרים.

המסלול האקדמי: התוכנית "חרדים לעתידם" החלה ב-2009 בשיתוף בין משרדי האוצר והתמ"ת לבין הג'וינט (תב"ת). התוכנית, בהפעלתם של קמ"ח ועמותת "ידידות טורונטו", נועדה לעודד לימודים אקדמיים בקרב גברים חרדים נשואים, בוגרי ישיבות וללא השכלה תיכונית, באמצעות תמיכה במימון שכר הלימוד וליווי מקצועי בתהליך הכניסה ללימודים גבוהים ובמהלכם, עד להשתלבות בעבודה בתחום הנלמד ו/או במסגרות איכותיות ובעלות השתכרות גבוהה. לתלמידים במסלולי הנדסה ניתנת תמיכה כלכלית נוספת כפיצוי על אובדן הכנסה מלימודים תורניים וכן בשל העומס הלימודי הרב המוטל עליהם. במקור יועדה התוכנית לכ-650 סטודנטים, שמתוכם 90 אמורים היו להשתלב במסלולי הנדסה או מדעים מדויקים. התוכנית הצליחה לחולל שינוי בנומרות הרווחות בקהילה החרדית בנוגע ליציאת גברים ללימודים ולעולם העבודה. עלות התוכנית (מסלול ללא מלגת קיום ומסלול להנדסאים הכולל מלגת קיום) – כ-25 מיליון ש"ח. לבד מ"חרדים לעתידם", קמ"ח מממנת לימודים אקדמיים גם לאלה מבין המגישים מועמדות לקרן אשר לא נמצאו זכאים למלגה במסגרת "חרדים לעתידם". עד כה השלימו 27 איש את לימודי התואר הראשון שלהם במסגרת מסלול "קמ"ח אקדמי". תחום הלימודים המבוקש ביותר הוא משפטים (31%), ולאחריו מנהל עסקים (22%), ראיית חשבון (14%) וחינוך (10%). תחומים נוספים: פארא-רפואי, עבודה סוציאלית, הנדסה, מחשבים, פסיכולוגיה וכלכלה. הסטודנטים החרדיים משתלבים במגוון רחב של מוסדות אקדמיים, בהם הקרייה האקדמית אונו (כ-40% מהסטודנטים לומדים בה), מכון לב, האוניברסיטה הפתוחה והמכללה החרדית.

עלות-תועלת למדינה: מחקר שנעשה לבדיקת עלות-תועלת של תוכניות קמ"ח מקצועי הראה כי מבחינה כלכלית התועלת הטמונה בתוכנית עולה באופן משמעותי על כל עלויותיה, הן עבור המשתתף, הן עבור החברה והן עבור הממשלה, היה וזו תחילת ליטול על עצמה את מימון התוכנית. הממשלה תיהנה בעיקר מחיסכון תקציבי (הפחתת תשלומי הבטחת הכנסה וביטוח לאומי וגידול בתשלומי מיסים כתוצאה מהשתלבות החרדים בתעסוקה). עלות ממוצעת לסטודנט בתוכניות קמ"ח השונות (אקדמיות, מקצועיות, הנדסאיות) עומדת על כ-9,700 ש"ח, מהם כ-7,900 ש"ח ניתנים לסטודנט כמלגה ויתרת הסכום בהשתתפות עצמית של הסטודנט. מהמחקר עולה כי לאחר ניכוי הוצאות מימון התוכנית מרוויחה הממשלה למעלה מ-22 אלף ש"ח עבור כל סטודנט. לאחר 5 שנות עבודה מגיע הרווח של הממשלה לכ-144 אלף ש"ח, ולאחר שהשלים הסטודנט 30 שנות עבודה מגיעה התמורה הממשלתית ממימון לימודיו למעלה מ-630 אלף ש"ח.<sup>26</sup>

גברים במסלול הנדסאים: על תחום הכשרת הנדסאים אחראי האגף להכשרה מקצועית של משרד התמ"ת, שבמסגרתו פועלות המכללות להכשרה טכנולוגית (מה"ט). במסגרת מה"ט למדו בשנה"ל תש"ע כ-2,000 סטודנטים חרדיים, הן במסגרות חרדיות והן במסגרות חוץ-חרדיות (בשנה"ל תש"ט החלו גברים חרדיים ללמוד בפרויקטים מיוחדים גם במכללות רגילות). אותן מכללות רגילות להנדסאים ביצעו התאמות על מנת שמקום הלימודים ומסגרת הלימודים יהלמו את צורכי הציבור החרדי. בשנה"ל תש"ע"א נפתחו מסגרות נוספות לגברים במה"ט. עלות הכשרת סטודנט הנדסאי הנה כ-41 אלף ש"ח (כולל תשלומי ש"ל ומכינה להנדסאים; לא כולל הסעות, דמי קיום וסדנאות).

מסלולי הנדסאים במכללות החרדיות מתקיימים במרכז החרדי בירושלים ובבני ברק, ובסמינר "מקור המעינות" בבני ברק המספק מכינות טכנולוגיות לחיילי הנח"ל החרדי.

במכללות הרגילות מתקיימים מסלולי הנדסאים במכללה למונהל באשדוד (פרויקט מגמת אלקטרוניקה בשיתוף קמ"ח והג'וינט); בבית הספר להנדסאים בטכניון בחיפה (מסלול שנה א' להנדסאי אלקטרוניקה); ובמכללה הטכנולוגית באר-שבע (מכינה טכנולוגית).

צופיה: תוכנית "צופיה" משמשת מסלול הכשרה תעסוקתית לנשים במגוון מקצועות בשיתוף בין האגף להכשרה ופיתוח כוח אדם של משרד התמ"ת לבין ג'וינט תב"ת. התוכנית כוללת סדנאות הכנה למומנויות תעסוקתיות, מכינות להשלמת השכלה והכשרות מגוונות מכוונות תעסוקה. בשנה האחרונה למדו במסגרת התוכנית כ-500 נשים.

מסלולי הנדסאים למגזר החרדי (בעיקר לנשים): בשנה"ל תש"ע למדו כ-2,000 סטודנטים מהמגזר החרדי בכ-20 מכללות ושלוחות במסלולי הנדסאים. 90% מהסטודנטים הללו הם נשים, ו-73% מאותן נשים למדו במסלולי הסמינרים החרדיים. 75% מהנשים לומדות הנדסת תוכנה ו-13% אדריכלות ועיצוב פנים. כשליש מהנשים החרדיות לומדות במסלול הנדסאים בתוכנית ח"ן (חוכמת נשים) במסלול הכשרה חלופית.<sup>27</sup>

25 Cave and Aboody, pp. 12-16

26 נתונים מלאים ניתן למצוא במחקר:

Cave and Aboody, pp. 17-24

27 בעבר כל הבנות למדו במסלול הוראה וחלק קטן מהן למדו במקביל גם במסלול הנדסאים. כיום, המאמץ הוא להקטין את מספר הבנות שלומדות במקביל את שני המסלולים. בנות בסמינרים שלומדות רק מסלול הנדסאים (ללא מסלול הוראה) שייכות למסלול "ההכשרה החלופית", אם כי יש לציין כי קיימים קשיים הלכתיים בנושא זה.

תוכנית ח"ן נועדה להרחיב את תכני ההכשרה בסמינרים כחלופה למקצועות ההוראה, מאחר שמרבית הנשים החרדיות רכשו את השכלתן התעסוקתית בתחומי החינוך וההוראה (כ-4,500 נשים מסיימות מדי שנה). התוכנית מקנה כלים לחיי עבודה ושילוב בתעסוקה, וכן ליווי ארוך טווח. במסגרת התוכנית נחשפות הנשים המשתתפות למסלולי הכשרה ותעסוקה מגוונים הנדרשים בשוק העבודה והתואמים את ערכי הקהילה החרדית.

מפת"ח – מרכזי פיתוח תעסוקת חרדים: מרכזי מפת"ח הנם מרכזי השמה והכוון תעסוקתי המיועדים לחבר בין מחפשי עבודה חרדיים למעסיקים על-פי כללים מקצועיים של מיון והתאמה איכותית. התוכנית מתמקדת בגברים ונשים חרדיים שאינם משתתפים בעולם העבודה ומעוניינים להשתלב בתעסוקה, אך חסרים כלים ואמצעים למצוא מקום המתאים לכישוריהם ולפוטנציאל התעסוקה שלהם. מפת"ח מספק מגוון שירותים המתמקדים בהכוונה ובייעוץ תעסוקתי, סדנאות הכנה לעולם העבודה, כלים לחיפוש עבודה באופן עצמאי, שירותי השמה וליווי תעסוקתי לאורך זמן. המרכז מסייע לפרט ברכישת כלים ומיומנויות נדרשות בעולם העבודה, בכתיבת קורות חיים, בהכנה לראיונות עבודה ועוד.

ביוצאם מנקודת הנחה ששילוב בתעסוקה של אוכלוסיות ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך במאה העשרים ואחת חייב לקחת בחשבון פיתוח של מיומנויות הקשורות להתמצאות בעולם הדיגיטלי, פנו למטח מספר גופים במטרה לפתח סביבת למידה אינטרנטית שתיתן בידיהם כלים עדכניים לקידום מטרה זו. במסגרת זו פותח במטח בשנים האחרונות עבור תוכנית מפת"ח אתר אינטרנט שהוא פרי שיתוף פעולה בין תב"ת לבין מטח. אתר מפת"ח הוא אתר חדשני המבוסס על התאמות לאוכלוסייה החרדית הן בבחירת המשלב הלשוני, התכנים והסוגיות והן בניצול הפוטנציאל של הכלים הטכנולוגיים (האתר סגור בשבתות ובחגים, יש מנוע סינון בין פריטים לגברים לפריטים לנשים). ההתאמה מכוונת לכך שחרדים וחרדיות שמחפשים עבודה ירגישו שהם בסביבה "ידידותית". האתר עונה לצרכים של מחפשי עבודה חרדיים, היכולים להרחיב את היכרותם עם שוק העבודה, להתנסות בסיומולציה של ראיון עבודה, לכתוב קורות חיים (ולשלוח), לצפות בסרטונים של חרדים שהשתלבו בהצלחה בעבודה ולהצטרף לסקרים על דילמות דומות לדילמות שהם עצמם מתלבטים בהם במעבר מהכולל לעולם העבודה. רכזי תעסוקה במפת"ח יסייעו באתר למתן שירותי הכוונה לתעסוקה. מעסיקים ימצאו באתר מפת"ח רשימת כתובות של רכזי סניפים ודרך קלה ומהירה ליצור עמם קשר. האתר נכלל ברשימת האתרים שגולשים חרדיים יכולים להיכנס אליהם ללא כל בעיה.

## 2. תוכנית למגזר הערבי

מרכז הכוון תעסוקתי לצעירים ערבים: אוכלוסיית היעד של מרכז הכוון הנה נשים וגברים מעל גיל 18 שאינם משתתפים בשוק העבודה, מועסקים בתעסוקה שאינה הולמת את כישוריהם ו/או את השכלתם, וצעירים הנמצאים בשלב של בחירת מקצוע לעתיד. מרכז הכוון, שהוא יזמה של הרשות לפיתוח כלכלי של המגזר הערבי, הדרוזי והצ'רקסי במשרד רה"מ, ושעלות הקמתו והפעלתו 3 מיליון ש"ח בשנה, אמור לפעול על-פי תפישה אזוטרית שתיתן מענה לכארבעה ישובים במרחב הרלוונטי, המונים עד כ-80 אלף תושבים. המרכז יפעל בשיטת One Stop Center, וייתן שירותי ייעוץ ואבחון תעסוקתי, ייעוץ מקצועי לבחירת מקצוע בהתאם למאפיינים האישיים של כל מקבל שירות, בהתאם לכללי מיון, התאמה ואבחנה מקצועיים. כמו כן, המרכז יספק כלים להשתלבות נאותה בעולם העבודה, כגון כישורים "רכים", כתיבת קורות חיים, קורסים לשיפור כישורי השפה העברית, הכנה לראיונות עבודה ועוד. במרכז תפעל פונקציה שתהיה אחראית על קשר עם המעסיקים, על מנת לחבר בין דורשי העבודה למעסיקים תוך שימת דגש על הסרת חסמים תעסוקתיים.

הטיפול בפרט מחפש העבודה מתנהל באמצעות אבחון הממקם אותו בנקודה מסויימת על פני סקאלת השכלה/הכשרה:

- רמה נמוכה (אנשים ללא מקצוע) – טווח זה כולל את מי שהם נעדרי השכלה וכישורים בסיסיים להשתלבות בשוק העבודה, וכן את מי שניתן לקדםם לרמה של עובדים מקצועיים למחצה (סמי-מקצועיים). עבור אלה הנמצאים בטווח קיימות מספר אפשרויות: השמה מיידית בתעסוקה; שילוב של השמה ובמקביל הכשרה במסגרת מקום העבודה; הכשרה מקצועית.
- רמה אמצעית (מתאים לנשים עם מקצוע והשכלה בסיסית) – טווח זה כולל את מי שהם בוגרי השתלמות בסיסית או כאלה שעבדו קודם ולא מוצאים עבודה בתחום המקצוע, בעלי 12 שנות לימוד, ועד בעלי תעודות השכלה על-תיכוניות (לא כולל). עבור אלה הנמצאים בטווח זה קיימות מספר אפשרויות: מתן סיוע בחיפוש עבודה מתאימה ההולמת את כישורי הפרט; מיומנויות הקשורות לחיפוש עבודה; הפנייה להכשרה מקצועית מתאימה; השלמת תעודת בגרות למי שקרובים לסף; שיפור תעודת בגרות; מכינה לבחינה הפסיכומטרית או לבחינת קבלה למוסדות לימוד על-תיכוניים וכן הכוונה ללימודים אקדמיים-מקצועיים; תוכנית יזמות עסקית.
- רמה עליונה (אקדמאים ובעלי מקצוע וניסיון בשוק העבודה שאינם מוצאים עבודה הולמת) – בעלי השכלה על-תיכונית ואקדמאים, וכן סטודנטים בשנת לימודיהם האחרונה. המרכז יספק להם השלמה לאחר סיום הלימודים למקצוע בעל ביקוש בשוק העבודה; הכוונה לעמותת "קו משווה" (המקדמת שוויון תעסוקתי לאקדמאים ערביים) ולקורסים זמינים בשוק המיועדים לשלב אקדמאים ערביים בעבודה הולמת; תוכנית יזמות עסקית.

באשר לאוכלוסיית הצעירים המצויים בשלב בחירת המקצוע לחיים, במסגרת אבחון תעסוקתי מקדים נבחנות נטיותיו האישיות ותכונותיו של המשתתף, ותוצאות האבחון נותנות אינדיקציה לפסיכולוג התעסוקתי לאיזה מקצועות ניתן לכוון את המשתתף, או מהם המקצועות הפוטנציאליים היכולים להבטיח הצלחה תעסוקתית בעתיד למשתתף. בהמשך, יזמן המשתתף לראיון אצל הפסיכולוג התעסוקתי ובמסגרתו יתבצע תהליך של הכוונה אישית שסייע לנבחן להבין את כישוריו ואת נטיותיו המקצועיות. הפסיכולוג יכין את המשתתף לקבלת החלטה על מקצוע או קריירה מתאימה עבורו, התואמת את צרכיו, כישוריו ואישיותו. המשתתף יופנה ל"ספריית מקצועות", יקבל רשימה של מקומות בהם ניתן לקבל את ההכשרה המתאימה לפרופיל שלו (אוניברסיטאות, מכללות). התהליך יכול הסברים על המקצועות מאנשי מקצוע, מעסיקים במקצוע וחשיפה למסלולי הלימודים במקצועות אלו.

המרכז אמור לטפל בכ-300-400 פניות במהלך שנת ההקמה, ובשנים שלאחר מכן אמור לתת מענה ל-400-500 איש מדי שנה. המרכז יציב לעצמו יעד השמה של כ-100-120 משתתפים במקומות עבודה, ויספק הכוון תעסוקתי ל-250-200 צעירים. כמו כן, יפעל המרכז להעלות את המודעות ליזמות עסקית בחברה הערבית, כאשר בסוף שנת ההקמה היעד הוא להגיע ל-15-10 יזמות לעסקים קטנים-בינוניים באזור פעילותו של המרכז. המרכז יפעל ליצירת אופק תעסוקתי והגברת יכולת ההשתכרות בחברה הערבית, וכן יפעל לפיתוח שותפויות במסגרת התוכנית שתאפשרנה המשך תפעול התוכנית לקראת הפצה ארצית, מתוך הנחה שמודל מוצלח של מרכז תעסוקה יוכל בעתיד לעודד הקמתם של מרכזי הכוון נוספים בחברה הערבית. התוכנית תתקיים באחד מתוך 13 הישובים הנכללים בתוכנית החומש של הרשות לפיתוח כלכלי במשרד רה"מ.

תוכנית "שותפות לחיים" (שִׁרְיָאָת חַיָּאָה) של יוזמות קרן אברהם – מודל התערבות לקידום תעסוקת נשים ערביות: התוכנית מיועדת לנשים ערביות נשואות או חד-הוריות עם ילדים, בנות 25-45, ללא השכלה אקדמית (בעלות השכלה תיכונית מלאה או חלקית), שאינן רשומות בלשכות התעסוקה כמחפשות עבודה ושאין מקבלות קצבה.<sup>28</sup> עליהן להיות בעלות מוטיבציה גבוהה לעבודה. הנשים העומדות בתנאי הסף ממלאות שאלון, עוברות ראיון אישי, ולאחר מכן בוחן צוות המיזם את מידת התאמתן לתוכנית. בסופו של דבר נבחרות 25-30 הנשים המתאימות ביותר. התוכנית נוסדה כפילוט בשנים האחרונות והצליחה להגיע שיעורי השמה של 85%.

צוות המיזם מייחס חשיבות עליונה לבחירה נכונה של יושבי היעד (אזור ראשי ורשויות מקומיות הכפופות לו) כתנאי להצלחת הפרויקט. הבחירה נעשית על-סמך מיפוי מקיף של הישוב וסביבתו, הכולל נתונים דמוגרפיים (אבטלה, הכנסה, שיעורי עוני וכדומה), מצב חברתי-כלכלי, נוכחות של גופים ממשלתיים וארגוני חברה אזרחית אחרים המקיימים תוכניות התערבות באזור, נגישות תחבורתית, וכן מיפוי של העסקים הפועלים בישוב ופוטנציאל ההעסקה בהם. כמו כן, יש חשיבות רבה לרתימת המנהיגות המקומית בישוב לנושא תעסוקת נשים מחוץ לבית ולנכונותה של ההנהגה לסייע באופן ממש לגיבוש המיזם ולהפעלתו, בכל הקשור להקצאת משדר עבור הרקצת הישובית ומבנה עבור פעילות ההכשרה. כמו כן, יש לגייס את ראש הרשות לטובת נטילת חלק פעיל בוועדת ההיגוי הישובית של התוכנית, ויש לרתום את הרשות ליטול חלק גם בפעולות המיזם (יום עיון, יריד תעסוקה). תמיכה פעילה של ראש הרשות והשתתפותו בפעילות הסברתית למען יציאת נשים למרחב הציבורי לתעסוקה הנה חיונית ביותר.

לאחר בחירת האזור והרשויות המקומיות יתבצע איוש של בעלי התפקידים, הן ברמה האזורית והן ברמה הישובית, כדלקמן: מנהלת אזורית שתהיה אחראית על הפעלת המיזם כולו באשכול הישובים הנבחר; רכזת אזורית לקשרי מעסיקים שתהיה אחראית על איתור מעסיקים יהודיים וערביים ועל יצירת הקשר עמם, וכן על סיוע במציאת מקומות עבודה עבור הנשים המשתתפות בפרויקט; רכזת ישובית שתהיה אחראית על גיוס, איתור ומימון המועמדות בישוב, על ליוויין ברמה האישית והקבוצתית ועל טיפוח הקשר עם הנהגת הרשות המקומית; מנחות ומורות מקצועיות שתהיינה אחראיות על לימוד התכנים בתוכנית; רכזת אדמיניסטרטיבית שתהיה אחראית על התיאומים בין אנשי הצוות לבין השותפים במיזם בכל ישוב ובאזור ועל כל הלוגיסטיקה וענייני המנהלה.

כמו כן, תוקם ועדת היגוי אזורית, בה יהיו חברים ראשי הרשויות בהן פועל המיזם, נציגי גופים ממשלתיים (הרשות לפיתוח כלכלי של מגזרי המיעוטים, שירות התעסוקה, הרשות לפיתוח הגליל ועוד), מנהלי אזורי התעשייה ומרכזי התעסוקה באזור ונציגי תב"ת ויוזמות קרן אברהם. הוועדה תתכנס פעמיים בשנה ותופעל על-ידי המנהלת האזורית. תפקידה הוא ללבן דילמות עקרוניות הקשורות לתעסוקת נשים, לסייע בחשיפת התוכנית והצלחותיה בפני מקבלי ההחלטות, לבנות בסיס תמיכה ומשאבים להמשך המיזם, לסייע בגיוס מעסיקים אזוריים ועוד. בנוסף, תוקמנה ועדות היגוי בכל ישוב, בה יהיו חברים המנהלת האזורית, ראש הרשות, נציגי גופים ועמותות שמקדמים תעסוקה, נציגי המעסיקים בישוב ונציגת הנשים המשתתפות בתוכנית. על הוועדה הישובית לבסס את הקשר בין הרשות המקומית, המעסיקים והארגונים הפועלים בישוב, וכן לעקוב אחר התקדמות הפרויקט על-פי המטרות והיעדים שהוצבו.

מאחר שעבור נשים רבות הנכללות בקהל המטרה של התוכנית יציאה לעבודה מחוץ לבית ולישוב נתפשת כמעט בלתי-אפשרית בשל חסמים חיצוניים, פנימיים וחברתיים-תרבותיים (ראו להלן נספח 2), נדרשת פעילות הסברה ושכנוע אינטנסיבית על מנת להבהיר לאותן נשים ולבני משפחותיהן מהם היתרונות הגלומים ביציאה לעבודה. אמצעי ההסברה רבים ומגוונים: פניות ושיחות אישיות עם הנשים ועם בני המשפחות (באחריותן של הרכזות הישוביות); חלוקת עלונים; חוגי בית; שילוט חוצות; פרסום סיפורי הצלחה בעיתונות ובאתרי אינטרנט פופולריים; ימי עיון להעלאת מודעות הציבור למיזם וליתרונותיו, בהשתתפותן של נשים מנהיגות שתסברנה את הקשר בין העצמה כלכלית לבין מעמד האישה; ושיטת "חברה מביאה חברה", קרי: נשים שהשתתפו בתוכנית והצליחו להשתלב בתעסוקה בזכות פעילותן בה.

הכשרת הנשים בתוכנית כוללת ארבעה מרכיבים:

- קורסים – הכנה לעולם העבודה (הקניית מיומנויות "רכות", העצמה אישית, בניית חזון אישי, היכרות עם מאפייני עולם התעסוקה, שיפור יכולת השיעור האישית, כולל כתיבת קורות חיים, הכנה לראיון עבודה ולמבחני קבלה, חיפוש עבודה יעיל, שיפור התקשורת הבין-אישית, היכרות עם זכויות העובדים), הכרת המחשב (לנשים רבות זו חשיפה ראשונה למחשב ובמסגרתה הן לומדות יישומי מחשב בסיסיים) ועברית תעסוקתית (העשרת הידע בעברית תוך שימת דגש על מונחים חיוניים בסביבת העבודה). סה"כ: 160 שעות.
- סיוורים לעסקים ולמפעלים – במהלך הקורסים משתתפות הנשים בשני סיוורים מאורגנים למפעלים ולעסקים גדולים על מנת לבוא במגע עם סביבת העבודה ועם נשים מועסקות. לרוב, סיוורים אלה מגבירים את המוטיבציה בקרב הנשים המשתתפות בקורס להשתלב בעבודה.
- ליווי פרטני – העבודה הפרטנית כוללת שני מפגשים חודשיים, כאשר הרכזת בונה יחד עם המשתתפות תוכנית התקדמות אישית הכוללת יעדים ומשימות לביצוע בין מפגש למפגש.
- מועדון "שיריאת חיה" – בכל ישוב מוקמת מסגרת למפגש לימודי-חברתי של הנשים המופעלת על-ידי הרכזת הישובית, והיא משמשת את הנשים במהלך תקופת ההכשרה וחיפוש העבודה, כמו גם את בוגרות התוכנית. במועדון נערכים מפגשים חודשיים לתמיכה ולעידוד הדדיים, להחלפת רעיונות, לגיבוש קבוצתי ולהרצאות העשרה.

תהליך ההשמה והליווי כולל מיפוי של המעסיקים בישוב המיזם ובאזור כולו, כולל פירוט היקף כוח האדם בעסק ופוטנציאל הגידול העסקי. המידע מרוכז באופן ממוחשב והחומר מועבר לרכזות הישוביות. כמו כן, מבוצעת פעילות הסברה בקרב מעסיקים פוטנציאליים על מנת לשכנעם לקלוט את נשות "שיריאת חיה" בעסקיהם. לקראת סיום ההכשרה נערך יריד תעסוקה שמטרתו לחשוף את מחפשות העבודה (כולל בוגרות מחזורים קודמים שאינן מועסקות ונשים שאינן חלק מהתוכנית) למגוון רחב של מעסיקים ולמשרות מוצעות. תהליך ההשמה של כל משתתפת כולל ליווי צמוד של הרכזת הישובית המסייעת לכל אישה לבנות "פרופיל אישי" על-סמך כישוריה, השכלתה, תחומי ההתעניינות שלה וכיווני התעסוקה האפשריים עבורה. הרכזת הישובית ורכזת המעסיקים מסייעות בהכנה לראיונות עבודה באמצעות סימולציות, ואם המועמדת

28 להרחבה ונתונים בנושא תעסוקת נשים ערביות, ראו נספח 1; להרחבה בנושא החסמים התרבותיים, הפנים-קהילתיים והחוץ-קהילתיים המונעים כיום את השתלבותן של נשים ערביות בתעסוקה, ראו נספח 2.



מקבלת הצעת עבודה היא זוכה לליווי בתהליך המ"מ על תנאי העבודה. כמו כן, זכות המשתתפות לליווי גם לאחר ההשמה על מנת לעקוב אחר תהליך קליטתן ולוודא שהשתלבו היטב ושזכויותיהן אינן מופרות על-ידי המעסיקים. כמו כן, נועד הליווי לאחר ההשמה לסייע להן לשפר את תנאי העסקתן ולהתקדם במקום העבודה.

### 3. תוכניות לאנשים בעלי מוגבלות<sup>29</sup>

בשנת 2005 הוקם במשרד התמ"מ המטה לשילוב אנשים עם מוגבלות בשוק העבודה. עם הקמתו החל המטה בהפעלת תקנות שכר מינימום מותאם ושנה לאחר מכן בהפעלת תקנות השתתפות המדינה במימון התאמות במקום העבודה לעובד עם מוגבלות, בהתאם לחוק שוויון זכויות לאנשים עם מוגבלות ולהמלצות ועדת לרון.<sup>30</sup> במרוצת השנים החל המטה בהפעלה, בייזום ובפיתוח של תוכניות נוספות. בין יתר תפקידיו של המטה: יצירת כלים לעידוד העסקת אנשים עם מוגבלות והתאמת הכלים הקיימים; פיתוח ויישום של תוכניות לקידום גיוס וקליטה של אנשים עם מוגבלות בעבודה; העלאת המודעות הציבורית (ובעיקר זו של מעסיקים) לחשיבות שילובם של בעלי מוגבלות בעבודה; ייזום ויישום חקיקה; קידום בעלי מוגבלות במקום העבודה, הן בתפקיד והן בשכר.

להלן כמה מן התוכניות שמבקש המטה לקדם:

מרכז לשילוב אנשים עם מוגבלות בשוק העבודה בשיטת One Stop Center: מרכזים אלו מוקמים בשיתוף עם משרדי ממשלה נוספים ומטרתם לספק ליווי ותמיכה לאנשים עם מוגבלות בכל השלבים של תהליך ההשתלבות בעבודה, החל באבחון ומתן סדנאות והכשרות וכלה בהשמה במקום העבודה וליווי בו לתקופה של עד 24 חודשים. על-פי התכנון יוקמו ארבעה מרכזים, בכל אחד מהמחוזות בארץ.

פיתוח תוכניות לשילוב של אנשים עם לקויות למידה בשוק העבודה: הקמת מרכז להכשרה ולהשמה של לקויי למידה, כך שיינתן מענה ופתרון לאוכלוסייה זו, הן לאקדמאים והן לבוגרי הכשרה מקצועית. הפעלת המרכז תהיה במתכונת של One Stop Center, בדומה למרכז ההשמה עבור כלל אוכלוסיית האנשים עם מוגבלות. לצורך קידום התוכנית, המטה, בסיוע עמותת "לשם", הקים ועדת היגוי שמלווה את הקמת המרכז וכן את המחקר המלווה בנושא זה.

רכישת שירותים על-ידי הממשלה שיבוצעו על-ידי אנשים עם מוגבלות: המטה לשילוב אנשים עם מוגבלות סייע למנהל הרכש הממשלתי בחשב הכללי בכתיבה ובפרסום של מרכז לקניית שירותים שיבוצעו על-ידי אנשים עם מוגבלות במשרדי הממשלה, באמצעות שלושה ספקי שירות אזוריים. על-פי תנאי המכרז, על הספק המעסיק את נותני השירותים לספק גם שירותי ליווי ותמיכה, על מנת להבטיח את השתלבותם המיטבית של נותני השירותים בעלי המוגבלות בתעסוקה. מטרת התוכנית היא לעודד את משרדי הממשלה להעסיק אנשים עם מוגבלות ולהרחיב את אפשרויות התעסוקה הקיימות עבור אנשים עם מוגבלות היכולים להשתכר עד למעט מעבר לשכר מינימום. משרד התמ"מ הקצה מיליון ש"ח לטובת העניין והמטה גיבש צוות שמטרתו לסייע למשרדים האחרים באיתור משרות מתאימות לקליטת עובדים עם מוגבלות ואף במתן ייעוץ וליווי למשרדים בהטמעת המסלול.

מרכז תמיכה למעסיקים: מטרת מרכז התמיכה לתת סיוע למעסיקים אשר מבקשים לקלוט בבית העסק אנשים עם מוגבלות. המרכז יספק סיוע טלפוני נקודתי, כמו גם מסלול של ליווי ובניית תוכנית לעסק, אשר תכלול איתור משרות המתאימות לאיש על-ידי אנשים עם מוגבלות, מיפוי תפקידים, הדרכה אודות כלי המשרד הקיימים וסיוע במילוי טפסים. לאחר מכן, יופנה המעסיק אל מקורות היצע כוח אדם. כמו כן, על המרכז יהיה לפנות באופן יזום אל מעסיקים בעניין העסקת אנשים עם מוגבלות.

פרויקט קידום עובדים עם מוגבלות במקומות עבודה: זהו פרויקט נרחב שמפעיל המטה, אשר מטרתו היא לשפר את יכולותיהם, מעמדם, תפקידים ושכרם של עובדים עם מוגבלות, וזאת בשיתוף מלא עם מעסיקהם וגורמי ההשמה המלווים אותם. לאחרונה התוכנית גם מופעלת בשיתוף עם מעסיקים שעדיין לא משלבים אנשים עם מוגבלות, אך מעונינים לעשות זאת. עבור העובדים שמאותרים לעבוד אצל מעסיקים אלו נבנית תוכנית הכשרה והעצמה שתסייע להם להיקלט ולהשתלב טוב יותר במקום העבודה, ובכך להתקדם לתפקידים אחרים שבצד מעמד ושכר גבוהים יותר.

הקמת פורום המעסיקים הישראלי לקידום העסקת אנשים עם מוגבלות: תכליתו היא לסייע לעסק לשפר את פעילותו בתחומים של גיוס וקליטה של עובדים עם מוגבלות, הגדלת תרומתם של עובדים עם מוגבלות לעסק, שימור עובדים אשר הפכו לאנשים עם מוגבלות בזמן עבודתם ומתן שירות נגיש ללקוחות עם מוגבלות. מודל העבודה של הפורום מבוסס על מודל פורום מעסיקים הפועל בהצלחה בבריטניה זה שנים רבות ואשר הותאם על-ידי המטה למאפייני המשק הישראלי ולצרכיו. הפעילות מבוססת על למידה הדדית ועל יצירת מוטיבציה בקרב העסקים החברים לפעול להחלת סטנדרטים ביצועיים גבוהים. בשנים הראשונות ינוהל הפורום במשותף על-ידי המטה והמעסיקים, באמצעות ועדה מנהלת, ולאחר התבססותו תפחת משמעותית מעורבות המטה עד לניהול מלא על-ידי המעסיקים.

מעבר לתוכניות הנ"ל שואף המטה לקידום אנשים עם מוגבלות בשוק העבודה לקדם גם כלים חקיקתיים, ביורוקרטיים ומעשיים, כדלקמן:

מסלול תעסוקה: מסלול תעסוקה הנו כלי שנועד לתמרץ מעסיקים להעסיק אוכלוסיות המוגדרות כבעלות שיעור תעסוקה נמוך ונכללת בהן, בעקבות פעילות המטה, גם אוכלוסיית אנשים עם מוגבלות. בסיס התוכנית הנו תמריץ כספי בדמות השתתפות הממשלה בעלות שכר העבודה החודשי של העובד. מכיוון שעד כה מכרזי ההקצאה לא הביאו לכך שמעסיקים ביקשו להעסיק אנשים עם מוגבלות באמצעות המכרזים, הציע המטה למרכז ההשקעות במשרד התמ"מ להגמיש את תנאי הכניסה להשתתפות במכרז וכן המליץ בפניו לנהל את מכרז ההקצאה הבא באופן נפרד לאוכלוסיית האנשים עם מוגבלות. הצעות המטה התקבלו ובקרוב תחל הפעלת המסלול.

שינויים בחוק המכרזים לטובת העסקת מעסיקים של אנשים עם מוגבלות: ועדת מנכ"לים שהוקמה בעקבות החלטת ממשלה 4231 בעניין מתן העדפה לגופים המעסיקים אנשים עם מוגבלות, אשר נועדה לבחון את הנושא ולהגיש את המלצותיה בנידון, הקימה ועדת משנה בראשות סגן החשב הכללי, שאמורה להגיש את המלצותיה ומסקנותיה בשני הנושאים הבאים: (1) מתן עדיפות/תמריצים לגופים אשר יעסיקו אנשים עם מוגבלות; (2) מתן עדיפות במכרזים ממשלתיים לגופים אשר מעסיקים אנשים עם מוגבלות. בפברואר 2010 החלו דיונים בוועדת המשנה ונבחנים התמריצים הכספיים שניתן להעניק למעסיקי אנשים עם מוגבלות וכן האמצעים שבהם ניתן לתת עדיפות במכרזים ממשלתיים למעסיקי אנשים עם מוגבלות. בהקשר של מתן עדיפות במכרזים אף גובשה במשרד החשב הכללי טיוטא של הוראות שעה, אשר מבוססת בין

29 להרחבה, נתונים ומידע בנושא אנשים עם מוגבלות בישראל, ראו נספח 1; להרחבה על אודות חסמים המונעים שילובם של בעלי מוגבלות בתעסוקה, ראו נספח 2.

30 הוועדה הציבורית לבדיקת ענייני הנכים וקידום שילובם בקהילה. הוועדה, בראשות השופט אפרים לרון ז"ל, הגישה את מסקנותיה לממשלה באפריל 2005.

היתר על המלצות שהתקבלו במהלך הדיונים.

חוק להענקת אותות ומענקים לעסקים המעסיקים אנשים עם מוגבלות: המטה ניסח הצעת חוק המבוססת על מודל שהתקבל בחוק עידוד העסקת נשים, תוך ביצוע ההתאמות הנדרשות, לפיו יינתנו מענקים כספיים ואותות הוקרה לעסקים המעסיקים אנשים עם מוגבלות שיקיימו אמות מידה שתיקבענה על-ידי המועצה הציבורית שתמונה על-ידי שר התמ"ת, לשמש לו צוות מייעץ לקידום חוק זה. הצעת החוק שניסח המטה מטופלת כעת בלשכה המשפטית של המשרד.

יצירת תו חברתי בנושא העסקת אנשים עם מוגבלות: אמות המידה שעל-פיהן יחולקו האותות והמענקים במסגרת החוק להענקת אותות ומענקים תהוינה תחילתו של דיון לקידום הרעיון של הענקת תו חברתי המעיד על העסקת עובדים עם מוגבלות, במטרה לתת הד לנושא ולעודד מעסיקים נוספים לקלוט עובדים עם מוגבלות. לצורך כך, המטה למד את הנסיון הבינלאומי בנושא זה ומגבש צוות בין-מגזרי לקידום הנושא.

הכשרה מקצועית: בשנתיים האחרונות פועל המטה להתאמת מערכי ההכשרה המקצועית שמצויים במשרד ומשמשים כיום את האוכלוסייה ללא מוגבלות, לצורכי האוכלוסייה עם מוגבלות תוך הוספת מסלולים ותכנים ההולמים את האוכלוסייה ומאפייניה. בעיקר מדובר ביצירת מסלולים של הכשרה פנים מפעלית, תוכניות שדרוגים, קורסים מקצועיים מיוחדים וכיו"ב.

4. המלצות לפעולה בתחום התעסוקה וההכשרה המקצועית והאקדמית

המלצות לחברה החרדית

המלצות למשרדי החינוך, התמ"ת והאוצר ולמערכת ההשכלה הגבוהה בתחום ההכשרה המקצועית וההשכלה האקדמית:

- לאור קשיי ההשתלבות של חרדים המבקשים לרכוש לימודים אקדמיים, יש להקים מרכזי הכוון ממשלתיים אקדמיים לחרדים, שיעניקו שירותי ייעוץ והכוונה כבר בתחילת הדרך, ויוסו כראוי את הביקושים ללימודים אקדמיים וישמשו כתובת ממלכתית לנושא.
- מאחר שרובם המכריע של הסטודנטים החרדיים מגיע מרקע סוציו-אקונומי נמוך על המדינה להגדיל את השתתפותה בסיוע בשכר לימוד לנשים וגברים אלה, ולא להותיר את הזירה לפילנתרופיה לבדה.
- יש להקים מרכזים אקדמיים נוספים עבור נשים וגברים צעירים מן המגזר החרדי תוך התחשבות בפנייה הגיאוגרפית של אוכלוסייה זו.
- יש לאפשר תקצוב הולם לצורך פתיחת כיתות לימוד קטנות לסטודנטים מן המגזר החרדי, אף אם הן מתחת לתקן המאושר, וזאת על מנת לבנות אמון בקרב ציבור זה, המעדיף ללמוד באווירה חרדית ובאקלים המתאים לאורח חייו זה (לימודים נפרדים לגברים ונשים, שעות לימוד שונות).
- בשיתוף עם מערכת ההשכלה הגבוהה (הוועדה לתכנון ולתקצוב [ות"ת], המועצה להשכלה גבוהה [מל"ג]), מן הראוי לשקול הכרה (ולו חלקית) בלימודי ישיבה של גברים חרדיים כל עוד אין דרישה ספציפית לתעודת בגרות כתנאי קדם.
- יש לשלב קורסים אקדמיים במכינה הקדם-אקדמית; ויש לאפשר פתיחת מסלולי מכינה ייחודית מקוצרת לבעלי רקע לימודי קודם.
- יש לעודד ביתר שאת לימודים אקדמיים לגברים חרדים במקצועות ההנדסה, המחשב ומדעי הטבע, או מקצועות אחרים בעלי אופק כלכלי שיכולים להתאים למגזר החרדי.
- בשיתוף עם מערכת ההשכלה הגבוהה (ות"ת, מל"ג) מן הראוי לשקול הכרה בלימודי הסמינר למורות כשווי ערך לתעודת בגרות, ולשם כך יש לשקול, למעשה, הכרה במבחני החוץ של מכון סאלד כמקבילים לבחינות הבגרות, במיוחד כאשר אין דרישה ספציפית לתעודת בגרות כתנאי קדם. כיום, בחורה חרדית שמסיימת סמינר מקבלת שכר נמוך יותר מזה של מי שהשיגה תעודת בגרות. כאמור לעיל, במצב הקיים, בחורה חרדית המבקשת לרכוש השכלה אקדמית נדרשת לעבור מכינה קדם-אקדמית שנמשכת זמן רב ונתקלת בתנאי סף קשים ביותר וכמעט בלתי-עבירים מבחינתה (מתוך 2,500 מועמדות התקבלו 200 סטודנטיות בלבד למכללת בית יעקב). הכרה בלימודי הסמינר כשווי ערך לבגרות תאפשר קיצור המכינה וקבלה של מספר רב יותר של בחורות חרדיות.
- יש לאפשר לאותן נשים להשתלב בלימודי שנה א' במכללה האקדמית ולחייב להשיג ממוצע ציונים גבוה (85 לפחות) כתנאי מעבר לשנה ב'. הוכח בשנים האחרונות כי פתרון מעין זה מאפשר לבחורות חרדיות לצלוח את לימודי שנה א' בהצלחה רבה ובאחוזים גבוהים ביותר.

המלצות למשרדי התמ"ת, המדע (האחראי על השירות הלאומי-אזרחי) והאוצר בתחום התעסוקה:

- יש לעמוד ביעדים הבאים להגדלת שיעור התעסוקה במגזר החרדי:  
גברים חרדיים: מ-40.4% (2008) ל-63% (2020)  
נשים חרדיות: מ-56.7% (2008) ל-63% (2020)<sup>31</sup>
- יש לפעול להסרת החסמים העומדים בפני שילוב האוכלוסייה החרדית בכל הממדים – החוקי, הכלכלי, התרבותי והמקצועי.
- על משרד התמ"ת לגבש תוכנית אסטרטגית לעשור הקרוב לקידום התעסוקה במגזר החרדי, שעניינה התמודדות עם העובדה שכיום התועלת הכספית הגלומה בהמשך לימודים בכלל עבור גבר חרדי עולה על התועלת שבהשתלבות בתעסוקה.
- יש ליצור מנגנון במשרד התמ"ת שישמש כתובת לכל בעיותיו של המגזר החרדי בתחום החינוך, התעסוקה וההכשרה המקצועית. יש לצרף למנגנון מעין זה נציגים מן הארגונים השונים הפועלים כיום בתחום זה, בהם תב"ת וקמ"ח, וכן נציג מאגף התקציבים במשרד האוצר, נציג מנהל הכשרות מקצועיות בתמ"ת, ונציגות ות"ת ומל"ג.
- יש לתמוך בתוכניות השירות הצבאי והאזרחי-לאומי באמצעות קורסי הכשרה וסיוע בהשמה תעסוקתית של בוגריהן.
- יש לפעול לחיזוק ההון האנושי התעסוקתי באוכלוסייה החרדית באמצעות היצע של קורסי הכשרה מותאמים הנעשים בשיתוף מעסיקים (בדגש על השמה).
- יש להרחיב את האבחון הבסיסי שמספקים מסלולים כמו אלה שמציע קמ"ח ולהוסיף מערך ייעוץ הכולל אנשים שמכירים היטב הן את שוק התעסוקה והן את צורכי המגזר החרדי ובעיותיו.

31 יעדים אלה מבוססים על המלצות דו"ח הוועדה לבחינת מדיניות התעסוקה שהוגש לממשלה ביוני 2010. להרחבה, ראו נספח 3.

- יש לחזק את מודל ההכשרה החלופית בקרב נשים חרדיות, המכניס לימודי הנדסאים לסמינרים להוראה, מודל שהוכח כמוצלח מאוד. יש לחזק את ההשמה ואת הקשר למעסיקים בתוכניות אלה, ולהרחיב את היצע מגמות הלימוד.
- יש לספק פתרונות לבעיית המשורות החלקיות בקרב נשים חרדיות, בעיקר תוך מתן מענה למסגרות לילדיהן (מעונות יום ומשפחתונים לפעוטות, צהרונים לילדים עד גיל 9), בשיתוף פעולה עם הרשויות המקומיות.
- יש לשלב את המודל שפותח במרכזי מפת"ח בפלטפורמה של One Stop Center בעל כלי סיוע בתעסוקה מעבר לכלים הקיימים, תוך הישענות על מארג הקשרים הקיימים בחברה החרדית. יש להקים לשם כך מרכזי הכוון תעסוקתי נוספים מטעם המדינה שיפעלו בשיטה דומה.
- יש לשווק את יתרונותיהם של הסטודנטים והסטודנטיות מן המגזר החרדי הן בסקטור הציבורי והן בקרב מעסיקים פרטיים.
- יש להעמיק את שילובם של חרדים בחברות ובגופים ציבוריים, וכן במשרדי הממשלה, תוך מתן העדפה מתקנת לבני מגזר זה.

#### המלצות לחברה הערבית

המלצות למשרדי החינוך, התמ"ת והאוצר בתחום התעסוקה וההכשרה המקצועית והאקדמית:

- יש לעמוד ביעדים הבאים להגדלת שיעור התעסוקה במגזר הערבי:
  - גברים ערביים: מ-74.1% (2008) ל-78% (2020)
  - נשים ערביות: מ-23.4% (2008) ל-41% (2020)<sup>32</sup>
- דורשי עבודה בעלי השכלה נמוכה – מתן קורסי הכשרה מקצועית מותאמים (יש לשים דגש על ליבה מעשית ולא תיאורטית).
- בוגרי תיכון (גברים ונשים) – יש לעודד השכלה אקדמית טכנולוגית ומקצועית, וכן לפעול לצמצום היקף הפונים ללימודי הוראה, לטובת מקצועות מדעיים ואחרים בעלי פוטנציאל גדול יותר למוביליות חברתית וכלכלית ולהשמה תעסוקתית.
- אקדמאים – מתן סיוע בהשמה לצעירים וצעירות אקדמאים, כולל מתן קורסים להסבת אקדמאים.
- יש להביא לפריסה ארצית של תוכנית "מרווחה לעבודה" (מודל ויסקונסין) במתווה "אורות לתעסוקה" – מודל זה של הכוון תעסוקתי הוכח כיעיל במיוחד לעידוד תעסוקה בקרב האוכלוסייה הערבית המקבלת קצבאות הבטחת הכנסה.
- יש לפתח דרכים להגדלת הנגישות למקום העבודה: לשם כך יש לשפר את התשתיות תומכות התעסוקה ביישובים הערביים, לרבות תחבורה ציבורית למוקדי תעסוקה אזוריים, וכן יש לשדרג את תשתיות מרכזי התעסוקה ביישובים הערביים ולהרחיבם באופן משמעותי, בעיקר לאור המחסור החמור בשטחי תעשייה במגזר הערבי (רק 3% משטחי התעשייה בישראל מצויים ביישובים הערביים). בין היתר, יש להכריז בהקדם על אזור תעשייה בשפרעם כאזור תעשייה מרחבי, וכן להרחיב את אזור התעשייה בסכנין כחלק מיישום תוכנית החומש של הממשלה בנושא.
- על מנת לצמצם את החסמים המונעים השתלבות נשים ערביות בשוק התעסוקה יש לפתח ביתר שאת תשתית מעונות יום לפעוטות וילדים ולהגדיל באופן משמעותי את היצע הגנים המסובסדים ביישובים הערביים ברחבי הארץ.
- חיזוק הקשר בין דורשי עבודה מהמגזר הערבי לבין מעסיקים מיתר מגזרי המשק – יש חשיבות רבה לסיוע בתיווך וביצירת קשר בין דורשי עבודה ערבים לבין מעסיקים שאינם מהמגזר הערבי, בפרט בכל הקשור למשרות מיומנות. כמו כן, על הממשלה לסייע לאותם אנשי עסקים וחברות מן המגזר היהודי להשקיע בקידום התעשייה במגזר הערבי באמצעות מתן תמריצים והטבות לאזורי פיתוח, וכן לפעול להסרתם של חסמים ביורוקרטיים ואחרים.<sup>33</sup>
- עידוד יזמות עסקית הנו פתרון חשוב למחסור הקיים כיום במשרות פנויות במגזר הערבי. יש לסייע לאותם אנשים – גברים ונשים מן המגזר הערבי – בעלי כישרון, מוטיבציה, ידע וחזון לזהות את היתרון היחסי שלהם ולהתקדם. יש ליצור נגישות להון ומימון לעסקים עבור אנשים אלה, המתקשים להשיג מימון באופן עצמאי מן המערכת הבנקאית.
- על המדינה לשמש דוגמה ומופת לשאר הכוחות במשק ובחברה הישראלית במיגור תופעת האפלייה והקיפוח נגד אזרחי ישראל הערבים. לשם כך, יש ליישם בצורה יעילה ומהירה את החוקים הקיימים נגד אפלייתם.

#### המלצות לאוכלוסיית בעלי מוגבלויות

המלצות למשרדי החינוך, התמ"ת, הבריאות, הרווחה והאוצר, וכן למוסד לביטוח לאומי, בתחום התעסוקה וההכשרה המקצועית:

- המטה לשילוב אנשים עם מוגבלות במשרד התמ"ת ממליץ כי היעדים התעסוקתיים בעשור הבא יהיו כדלקמן:
  - ירידה של 1% בשיעור יהודים לא-מועסקים בשל מגבלה גופנית ל-5% (כיום 6%) עד שנת 2020; ירידה של 1% בשיעור ערבים לא-מועסקים בשל מגבלה גופנית ל-7.2% (כיום 8.2%) עד שנת 2020.
  - העלאת שיעור התעסוקה מ-43.2% ל-53%.
  - הגדלת שיעור העובדים מקרב מקבלי קצבאות נכות מ-7% ל-13%.
  - נידוד כ-4,000 עובדים עם מוגבלות מהמפעלים המוגנים<sup>34</sup> אל השוק החופשי.

32 יעדים אלה מבוססים על המלצות דו"ח הוועדה לבחינת מדיניות התעסוקה שהוגש לממשלה ביוני 2010. הוועדה הגדירה יעדי משנה גם לגברים ערביים ולנשים ערביות בגילאי 20-24:

גברים ערביים: מ-61% (2008) ל-65% (2020)  
נשים ערביות: מ-20% (2008) ל-42% (2020)

להרחבה, ראו נספח 3.

33 ההמלצות שלהלן לגבי המגזר הערבי מבוססות על דו"ח הוועדה לבחינת מדיניות התעסוקה (יוני 2010).

34 מפעל מוגן הוא מפעל בו עובדים אנשים המצויים בתהליך שיקום תעסוקתי. מפעל כזה מהווה שלב בתהליך השיקום שממנו ניתן להתקדם בבוא העת לתעסוקה נתמכת או להישאר בו ולהתקדם בתוכו ככל האפשר, במגוון עבודות. במפעלים המוגנים, שהנם ברובם יצרניים, עוסקים בעבודות ברמות שונות, החל מעבודות מיון, ספירה ואריזה פשוטים וכלה בעבודות מתכת, חשמל, נגרות, הרכבות מורכבות ועבודות היי-טק ואלקטרוניקה. בכל מפעל אמור להתקיים מגוון של עבודות המאפשר התקדמות על רצף תעסוקתי (לתעסוקה נתמכת). על הבעייתיות הגלומה במפעלים המוגנים בכל הקשור לתעסוקת אנשים עם מוגבלות, ראו הרחבה בנספח 2.

- הכפלת מספר המעסיקים של אנשים עם מוגבלות ל-15 אלף מעסיקים.
- הגדלת שיעור ההעסקה העצמית בקרב אנשים עם מוגבלות ל-20%.
- העלאת שיעור המשרות האיותיות לאנשים עם מוגבלות.
- הגדלת השכר של עובדים עניים עם מוגבלות.

מילוי אחר היעדים הכמותיים הללו ישפר את מצבם התעסוקתי של אנשים עם מוגבלות ויצמצם את ממדי העוני, תוך כדי העלאת רמת הרווחה של אוכלוסייה זו.

- יש להתמקד בשתי אוכלוסיות יעד חשובות: בראש ובראשונה באוכלוסייה הערבית, אשר שיעורי המוגבלות בקרבם הנם גבוהים ביותר ועומדים על כ-25%. שנית, אוכלוסיית האנשים עם מוגבלות מהמגזר החרדי.
- יש לשפר את הקשר בין המסגרות התעסוקתיות השונות על פני הרצף התעסוקתי ולשאוף לכך שאנשים עם מוגבלות יוכלו לעבור מעבודה במפעלים מוגנים להשמה בשוק התעסוקה הרגיל. זאת, בעזרת הסדרת מעמדן של המסגרות המעבריות למיניהן והקשר ביניהן, לרבות אפשרות של חקיקה לצורך זאת (להרחבה בנושא ראו להלן בנספח 2, העוסק, בין היתר, בחסמים המונעים השתלבות אנשים עם מוגבלות בתעסוקה).
- בתחום החקיקה יש לשפר את תקנות השתתפות המדינה במימון התאמות לעובד עם מוגבלות.<sup>35</sup> כמו כן, יש לשקול חקיקה שתגביר את מקומות העבודה במסגרת תוכניות מיוחדות כמו שימוש חוזר של פסולת אלקטרונית.
- יש למקד מאמצים בשנים הבאות ביצירת מסלולים המגדילים את סיכוייהם של הלומדים במסגרות החינוך המיוחד להשתלב בשוק העבודה. זאת, תוך הוספת תוכניות לימודים המכניסות את התלמידים לשילוב בשוק העבודה, לרבות התנסויות אצל מעסיקים.
- יש לפעול להגברת האכיפה של חוקי העבודה בכלל ושל תקנות שכר מינימום מותאם בפרט.<sup>36</sup>
- יש לפעול באופן תמידי להגברת המודעות של האוכלוסייה בכלל ושל המעסיקים בפרט לנושא התעסוקה של אנשים עם מוגבלות, החשיבות של נושא זה והיתרונות.<sup>37</sup>
- יש לפעול בתיאום ובשיתוף פעולה מלאים עם האגף לשיקום במשרד הרווחה, עם משרד הבריאות ועם המוסד לביטוח לאומי לצורך קידום המטרות והיעדים שלעיל.

## ו. המלצות כלליות לפעולה

המלצות כלליות בתחום החינוך להקניית מיומנויות תעסוקה לבני נוער:

אחת המסקנות המרכזיות העולות מנייר מדיניות זה היא הצורך בקידומו של החינוך הטכנולוגי והמקצועי על מנת להזניק את החינוך בישראל ואת כלכלת המדינה קדימה באופן משמעותי ומהיר יותר. כפי שצוין בראשיתו של נייר זה, בתי הספר הטכנולוגיים מאפשרים רצף בין הלימודים, הצבא וההשתלבות בחברה ובתעסוקה לאחר מכן. התלמידים יוצאים עם ניסיון מקצועי עשיר, יכולת התפרנסות ומיומנויות של השתלבות במקומות עבודה. מעבר לכך, החברה הישראלית כולה יוצאת נשכרת מבתי הספר הטכנולוגיים: היא מגדלת אזרחים בעלי ערך עצמי גבוה, אחראיים, יצרניים, תורמים לחברה ואלה שערך העבודה הוא חלק מהשכלתם העיונית והמעשית. כל תלמיד שרכש השכלה טכנולוגית יוכל להחליט בעתיד האם להמשיך להתמקצע בתחום בו כבר רכש ניסיון או לפנות לכיוונים חדשים.

לאור האמור לעיל:

- יש לאמץ את הגישה האירופית והמערבית כלפי בתי הספר המקצועיים והטכנולוגיים ולשנות את התפישה לפיה החינוך המקצועי והטכנולוגי הנו ברירת מחדל נחותה המיועדת לחלשים בלבד. בתי הספר הללו ראויים להיות חלק מכובד מהחינוך במדינת ישראל. אוכלוסיית התלמידים בבתי ספר אלה היא הטרוגנית ולכן יש להציע לה מגוון אפשרויות לימודיות. שינוי זה יהיה הן לטובת התלמידים שיוכלו לממש את עצמם והן לטובת המדינה שתכשיר עובדים מקצועיים וראויים.
- כמו כן, יש לדרוש מהגורמים האחראים לכך בממשלה (קרי: משרדי החינוך, התמ"ת והאוצר) ליטול אחריות מלאה על תחום החינוך הטכנולוגי וההכשרות המקצועיות, ולא להותיר את התחום פרוץ לגורמים פרטיים או פילנתרופיים כאלה ואחרים לבדם. זאת, מאחר שמעבר להכשרה תעסוקתית ספציפית המסופקת על-ידי מעסיק פרטי בהתאם לצרכיו על-ידי קרן פרטית בעלת עניין וכוונות טובות כשלעצמן, הפרט היוצא לעולם העבודה זקוק להכשרה מקצועית ראשונית מספקת שתאפשר לו לעמוד בדרישות שוק התעסוקה. זהו תפקידה של המדינה לספק לתלמידיה את "ארגז הכלים" הבסיסי הזה. כמו כן, עליה לדאוג לכך שמספר התלמידים בכל תחום מקצועי יענה על הביקוש לבעלי אותו מקצוע, משמע שיש לוודא שיהיה איזון בין האינטרס האישי לבין האינטרס הציבורי, הלאומי והתעסוקתי. משימה תכלולית ומערכתית זו חייבת להיות בידיהם של משרדי הממשלה הרלוונטיים.
- יש לחזק ולהדק את שיתוף הפעולה והתיאום הבין-משרדי בין הגורמים האמונים על תחומי החינוך הטכנולוגי והחינוך המקצועי במשרדי החינוך והתמ"ת (בהתאמה), לאור העובדה שמתקיימות כיום שתי מערכות חינוך והכשרה נפרדות אך משיקות ומשלימות.

35 המטה לשילוב אנשים עם מוגבלות בשוק העבודה מפעיל החל מאוקטובר 2007 את תקנות השתתפות המדינה במימון התאמות סביבת העבודה לעובדים עם מוגבלות. התקנות [תקנות שוויון זכויות לאנשים עם מוגבלות (השתתפות המדינה במימון התאמות) התשס"ו – 2006], באות מתוקף חוק שוויון זכויות לאנשים עם מוגבלות התשנ"ח – 1998. מטרת התקנות הן לקדם את שוויון ההזדמנויות בתעסוקה בין האוכלוסיות השונות בשוק העבודה וכן להגביר את שיעור התעסוקה של אנשים עם מוגבלות. זאת על-ידי הפחתת העלויות למעסיקים, הכרוכות בהתאמת סביבת העבודה לעובד עם מוגבלות. השתתפות במימון ההתאמות במקום העבודה הנה מסלול שבמסגרתו המדינה מסייעת למעסיק, הנדרש להתאים את סביבת העבודה לעובד עם מוגבלות, על מנת שזה יוכל לבצע את תפקידו ולהתנהל במקום העבודה ככלל העובדים.

36 המטה לשילוב אנשים עם מוגבלות בשוק העבודה מטפל בבקשות לקביעת שכר מינימום מותאם לעובד עם מוגבלות בעל יכולת עבודה מופחתת, בהתאם לתקנות שכר מינימום מותאם 2002 וחוק זכויות אנשים עם מוגבלות המועסקים כמשותקים 2007. מטרת התקנות והחוק היא לעודד מעסיקים לקלוט אנשים עם מוגבלות, לשלבם בעבודה וכן להסדיר את יחסי ההעסקה. החוק והתקנות מאפשרים לקבוע לעובד עם מוגבלות בעל יכולת עבודה מופחתת, שכר נמוך משכר המינימום הקבוע בחוק. גובה השכר המותאם נקבע באמצעות אבחון לקביעת יכולת העבודה של העובד, בהשוואה לעובד ללא מוגבלות בתפקיד דומה. בתקנות קבועות שש מדרגות של שכר מינימום מותאם, לפי רמת ההפחתה ביכולת העבודה של המאובחן ביחס לעובד ללא מוגבלות. עובד עם מוגבלות שיכולת עבודתו גבוהה מ-80% ביחס לעובד ללא מוגבלות בתפקיד דומה, זכאי לשכר מינימום מלא קבוע בחוק.

37 לשם כך, המטה לשילוב אנשים עם מוגבלות מפיק כבר עתה ידעון ונכס שנתי, יוצא בקמפינים במדיה התקשורתית, מפיק דו"ח סיכום שנתי של פעילות המטה, פועל ברשתות חברתיות באינטרנט, מקיים יריד תעסוקה רדיופוני שבועי וכן פינות ברדיו קהילתי.

לחילופין, יש לבחון ביתר שאת האם הפיצול הנכחי מטיב עם שתי המערכות הללו, וכיצד הפיצול הקיים משרת את האינטרס העליון של טובת התלמידים הלומדים בשתייהן.

המלצות כלליות בתחום התעסוקה וההכשרה המקצועית והאקדמית לבוגרים:

- יש למנות במשרד התמ"ת אגף עבודה והון אנושי שיתמקד בהגברת התעסוקה באוכלוסיות מעוטות השתתפות,<sup>38</sup> ולו פרויקטור ייעודי לכל אחת מהאוכלוסיות. באגף זה אמורים להתכנס גורמים מכל משרדי הממשלה הרלוונטיים (רה"מ, התמ"ת, האוצר, החינוך, הרווחה, הבריאות, המשפטים, המוסד לביטוח לאומי, הרשות לפיתוח כלכלי, במגזר הערבי וכל גורם רלוונטי אחר). על האגף לקבל סמכויות להתוות מדיניות ולבצע את החלטות הממשלה בנושאי השכלה ותעסוקה.
- יש לפעול להקמת מרכזי הכוונה תעסוקתית והכשרה מקצועית במתכונת של One Stop Centers המתמחים בהשמה של אוכלוסיות מעוטות השתתפות. גישת One Stop Center יעילה במיוחד בשל הגישה המערכתית שהיא מספקת לפרטים ולקבוצות המבקשים לקבל מענה במרכזים אלה. יש לבחון את כל התוכניות הקיימות כיום להכוונה תעסוקתית ומקצועית וליצור האחדה מערכתית – הכל צריך להיות תחת מטה אחיד ומתכלל.
- יש לפתח כלים לחיזוק ההון האנושי התעסוקתי שמוטאמים לצרכיהם הייחודיים של אוכלוסיות אלה.
- לאור היעדר היכולת כיום לחזות את צורכי שוק העבודה בישראל בטווח הארוך יש לערוך סקר שוק מקיף בישראל, וכן יש לאחד את מאגרי המידע הממשלתיים ולהוסיף להם מידע עדכני מהמעסיקים, וזאת על מנת לגבש אסטרטגיה ברורה לשנים הקרובות באשר למקצועות שיידרשו למשק הישראלי.<sup>39</sup>
- יש להיערך לכך שבעתיד יצמצם הצורך במקצועות המבוססים על עבודה שגרתית וטכנוקרטיה שאינה מצריכה כישרון ייחודי, כמו מסגרות, רתכות ועבודת טקסטיל (לטובת כוח האדם הזול והמיומן העובד במדינות כמו סין). מנגד, יש להיערך לעלייתם של מקצועות אומנותיים (craft) הדורשים ידע ייחודי, כמו עיצוב (תעשייתי, ממשקי משתמש ועוד), וכן לחדש את ההכשרות המקצועיות בתחום המחשוב וההיי-טק ולחזקן ביתר שאת.<sup>40</sup>
- על האגף להכשרה מקצועית במשרד התמ"ת לפעול ליצירת התאמה מירבית בין הענפים שבהם מכשיר האגף את הלומדים לבין שיעור המשרות הפנויות במשק המרוכזות בענפים אלה. על מערכת ההכשרה המקצועית להתאים עצמה במהירות רבה יותר לשינויים ולתנודות במשק ובשוק התעסוקה, תוך התאמת תוכניות הלימודים לצורכי השוק העתידיים. כמו כן, יש ליצור תוכניות להכשרה תוך כדי עבודה על-פי צורכי המעסיקים והמשק.
- יש לפקח על מערך העוסקים בהכוון תעסוקתי ביתר שאת, על מנת לוודא שהאנשים הממלאים את תפקידם במוסדות ההכשרה המקצועית בקיאים דיים בצורכי השוק ומסוגלים להעניק לתלמידים הצעירים הנחייה והכוונה אקטיביות ובעלות ידע רב באשר לצורכי השוק והכיוונים המקצועיים והתעסוקתיים הנכונים לכל פרט. כמו כן, על ההכוון התעסוקתי להתנהל ככל הניתן במנותק מהייעוץ הפסיכולוגי. לבסוף, תחום ההכוונה התעסוקתית צריך להיות מתוקצב כראוי במסגרת ההכשרות המקצועיות.
- על מורים ומנחים מקצועיים לשהות במקומות העבודה כדי לעדכן את רמת הידע שלהם על בסיס קבוע; מנגד, מן הראוי כי אלה המשמשים מנחים מקצועיים במקומות עבודה ובבתי עסק שעובדים בחברות אלה לשהות במוסדות ההכשרה המקצועית על מנת לחזק את היכולות הפדגוגיות שלהם.
- על מערכת ההכשרה המקצועית להפוך למערכת בעלת רמת שקיפות גבוהה. לשם כך, יש לאמץ מסגרות הערכה ומדידה סטנדרטיות ברמה הלאומית למערכת זו, ולהפיץ את המידע בקרב הגורמים הרלוונטיים.
- יש ליצור את המנגנונים המתאימים והיעילים ביותר לאכיפת חוקי העבודה ותנאי שכר הולמים במשק בכלל, ובקרב המועסקים הנמנים על האוכלוסיות המוחלשות ובעלי השכר הנמוך ממילא בפרט. אכיפה יעילה של שכר המינימום (שאמור להוות 47% מהשכר הממוצע במשק לפחות) תוביל לעליית השכר הממוצע באופן טבעי. אכיפת חוקי העבודה כוללת גם טיפול יסודי בהעסקת עובדים זרים לא-חוקיים.
- יש להגביר את המודעות הציבורית לצורך למנוע מניעת אפלייה נגד אוכלוסיות מיוחדות, ובעיקר נגד חרדים, ערבים ואנשים בעלי מוגבלות. כמו כן, יש לפעול לעידוד הגיוון האנושי בסקטור הציבורי והעסקי על מנת ליצור אחדות לאומית.
- יש להקים ברחבי הארץ מכללות טכנולוגיות המעניקות לבוגריהן תעודה מקצועית (אין מדובר בתואר ראשון) בתחומים ספציפיים בתוך לימודים שיימשכו עד שנתיים. בוגרים מצטיינים ובעלי פוטנציאל גבוה יוכלו להמשיך ללימודים אקדמיים אם יחפצו בכך בתחומים רלוונטיים למסלול המקצועי שבו בחרו. המכללות הטכנולוגיות הללו אמורות לפעול תחת פיקוחה של הוועדה לתכנון ולתקצוב (ות"ת), ולהציג תוכניות לימודים מסודרות עם יעדים לביצוע, קורסים, שעות הוראה וסילבוסים כמקובל במערכת האקדמית.

## נספח 1: רקע ונתונים על מצב החינוך והתעסוקה בישראל בקרב אוכלוסיות ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך

### 1. כללי: מצב החינוך בישראל

מבנה מערכת החינוך הציבורי כיום הוא מקור הבעיה בכל הקשור להעמקת הפערים החברתיים ולקיטוב החברתי ההולך ומעמיק. אם נצא מנקודת הנחה שיש מתאם בין השכלה להכנסה, אי-טיפול ראוי בחינוך ואי-שילובה של מערכת החינוך בכל היעדים לא יאפשרו פתרון הולם ויסודי למצב הנוכחי. לצד סקטור ציבורי ריכוזי, שיטת משילות בעייתית, היעדר תכנון ממשלתי ראוי לטווח הרחוק ושלל בעיות מבניות נוספות שממנה סובלת הבירוקרטיה הישראלית ככלל חשוב לציין את משרד החינוך, המרכז בידיו את מרבית הסמכויות ואינו מבזרן בין מנהלי חינוך עצמאיים ובקרב מנהלי בתי ספר בצורה מספקת. פחות ממחצית קבוצת הגיל הנה בעלת תעודת בגרות ועוד פחות מכך מצליחה לעמוד בתנאי הסף ללימודים אקדמיים. יש מכללות רבות, אך אין פתרונות הולמים לפריפריה והמצוקה בתקנים אקדמיים באוניברסיטאות רבה. יש מאות תוכניות לעידוד השכלה גבוהה

38 הכוונה היא לעסוק לא רק באוכלוסיות ובקבוצות שנידונו בנייר זה, קרי: חרדים, ערבים ובעלי מוגבלות, אלא גם בעולים חדשים (בעיקר מאתיופיה ומחבר המדינות) וכן בתושבי שכונות ואזורי מצוקה בעירות הפיתוח ובישובים פריפריאליים אחרים, שקצרה יריעת נייר מדיניות זה מלעסוק בהם.

39 ההמלצה מבוססת על ראיון שנערך עם ד"ר אשר עידן, מנהל התוכנית לניהול עתיד בפקולטה לניהול באוניברסיטת תל-אביב, דה מארקר, 6 בינואר, 2011.

בפריפריה שניצבות כיום לפתחה של המל"ג, אך טרם זכו לאישורה.

בישראל יש כיום אחוז גבוה יחסית של בעלי השכלה גבוהה (שלישית) בקרב כלל האוכלוסייה (44%), אך בניגוד לרוב חברות ה-OECD הפער בישראל בין שיעור האקדמאים הצעירים (25-34) לבין שיעור האקדמאים בכלל האוכלוסייה (25-64) הנו שלילי. השיעור הגבוה בקרב כלל האוכלוסייה והשיעור הנמוך יותר בקרב הגילאים הצעירים - שניהם משקפים את העובדה שישראל קלטה בעבר עלייה עתירת השכלה ושתרומתו של מרכיב זה להרכב ההשכלתי של האוכלוסייה פוחתת על פני זמן.<sup>41</sup>

ההוצאה לתלמיד בישראל נמוכה מההוצאה לתלמיד כמעט בכל מדינות ה-OECD בכל שלב חינוך. היא נמוכה גם מזו של מדינות בעלות תוצר מקומי גולמי (תמ"ג) לנפש דומה לשלה. מעבר לכך, הגידול בהוצאה לתלמיד בישראל קטן משמעותית ממדינות ה-OECD (בין 1998 ל-2007 נרשמה עלייה של 24% בהוצאה לתלמיד גן בישראל לעומת עלייה של 52% במדינות ההשוואה; עלייה של 31% בהוצאה לתלמיד בית ספר יסודי לעומת 71% במדינות ההשוואה; ועלייה של 18% בהוצאה לתלמיד תיכון לעומת עלייה של 56% במדינות ההשוואה). כמו כן, היחס בין ההוצאה לתלמיד לבין התמ"ג לנפש נמוך בישראל לעומת מדינות ההשוואה.<sup>42</sup>

הישגי תלמידי ישראל בהשוואה בינלאומית, כפי שבאים לידי ביטוי במבחני פיז"ה,<sup>43</sup> מראים כי בכל שלושת המקצועות הנבדקים (קריאה, מתמטיקה ומדעים) ציוניהם של תלמידי ישראל נמצאים מתחת לממוצע במדינות הנבחנות, ונמוכים הרבה יותר מהציונים הממוצעים במדינות ה-OECD.<sup>44</sup> בשנת 2009 מוקמה ישראל במקום ה-36 מבין 64 מדינות בתחום הקריאה (שיפור קל לעומת המבחנים הקודמים שנערכו ב-2006), ובמקום ה-41 בתחומי המדעים והמתמטיקה. תוצאות המבחנים מעידים על פער עמוק בין מרכז לפריפריה, ובמיוחד בין יהודים לערבים.<sup>45</sup>

משכורות המורים בישראל נמוכות בהרבה מאשר במדינות ההשוואה, וחומר מכך, בישראל, בניגוד למדינות ההשוואה, היחס בין שכר מורה לשכר חלופי של בעלי השכלה שלישונית במשרה מלאה במשק, הנו נמוך (60-50% בישראל לעומת 60-130% במדינות ההשוואה), עובדה הפוגעת באיכות הפונים להוראה.

דוגמה אחת מני רבות לכשליה של מערכת החינוך הציבורי היא התמודדותה הלקויה עם תופעת הנשירה – הן הגלויה והן הסמויה – בקרב אוכלוסיות ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך. אף שבמשרד החינוך פועל אגף שח"ר (שירותי חינוך ורווחה), שאמור לטפל בנושאים, יכולתה של מערכת החינוך למגר את התופעה אינה מיטבית. נשירה גלויה משמעה אותם בני נוער (גילאי 15-17) שחדלו מלהגיע לבית הספר ושהמערכת לרוב אינה מצליחה לטפל בהם (מדובר בכ-8% מכלל התלמידים בכל שנתון; שיעור הנושאים בקרב ערביי ישראל עומד על כ-15%, ואף שמדובר בירידה משמעותית לעומת המצב ב-1980, אז עמד שיעורם על 35%, עדיין מדובר בתופעה רחבה ביותר, במיוחד בקרב הבדואים).<sup>46</sup> עבור התלמידים הללו מפעילה מערכת החינוך תוכנית לאומית בשם "הילה" (מופעלת כיום על-ידי רשת "עתידי") שאמורה לסייע לתלמידי תיכון להשלים בגרויות, ובמקביל פועלים במערכת החינוך קב"סים (קציני ביקור סדיר), שתפקידם לוודא שכל הילדים ובני הנוער אכן מגיעים לבתי הספר בצורה סדירה.

נשירה סמויה מתייחסת לאותם מקרים של תלמידי תיכון שמגיעים לבית הספר, נמצאים בכיתות, אך למעשה אינם מתפקדים כתלמידים מן המניין בדרגות משתנות – חלקם כלל אינם ניגשים לבחינות, חלקם ניגשים לחלק מן הבחינות או לכולן ונכשלים, וכדומה. קשה לאמוד את שיעור התלמידים הללו, אך נראה כי מדובר בכ-15% מכלל התלמידים בכל שנתון. אגף שח"ר במשרד החינוך אמור לטפל גם באותה קבוצה של נושאים סמויים. כיתות הלימוד בבתי הספר מוסללות בהתאם לרמות התלמידים, ובבתי ספר מקיפים ישנן כיתות "אומץ" או "אתגר", בהן לומדים תלמידים שהפוטנציאל שלהם להשיג בגרות מלאה נמוך מאוד. לעיתים קרובות, התוכניות הללו אינן מצליחות לעמוד בהצלחה יתרה באתגר ההתמודדות עם נושא הנשירה הסמויה.<sup>47</sup>

## פערים בין החינוך היהודי לערבי

תוצאות בחינות המיצ"ב<sup>48</sup> האחרונות (2009) מעידות על פערים גדולים בין קבוצות תלמידים במערכת החינוך. יש פער ניכר בהישגים בין דוברי עברית לדוברי ערבית. כמו כן, בכל אחד מהמגזרים יש פער בין תלמידים מרקע חברתי-כלכלי גבוה, לתלמידים מרקע חברתי-כלכלי בינוני ותלמידים מרקע חברתי-כלכלי נמוך. יתר על כן, בקרב דוברי העברית הפערים מתרחבים עם השנים, כלומר – הפערים בכיתות ח' גדולים מהפערים בכיתות ה' וב'.<sup>49</sup>

41 מערכת החינוך בישראל בראייה השוואתית בינלאומית על-פי Education at a Glance (EAG) 2010, רות קלינוב, 2010, פרק 1.

42 מערכת החינוך בישראל בראייה השוואתית בינלאומית על-פי Education at a Glance (EAG) 2010, שם, פרק 3.

43 מבחן פיז"ה (PISA: Programme for International Student Assessment) הוא מבחן הנערך כחלק ממחקר בינלאומי בתחום החינוך, המתקיים אחת לשלוש שנים, מאז שנת 2000. המחקר נערך על-ידי מנהל החינוך של ה-OECD. במסגרת המחקר נבחנו תלמידי בתי ספר בגילאי 15 במבחן בשלושה נושאי לימוד ונשאלים על אודות הסביבה החינוכית ועמדותיהם כלפי נושאי הלימוד. כמו כן, נשאלים מנהלי בתי הספר על אודות מדיניות בית הספר והאקלים הביתי ספרי. במחקר מושוות תוצאותיהם של המבחנים במדינות שונות בעולם, במטרה לשפר את שיטות החינוך וההוראה במערכות חינוך בעולם.

44 מערכת החינוך בישראל – סוגיות מרכזיות בעבודתה של ועדת החינוך, 2009, הכנסת – מרכז המחקר והמידע, עמ' 17.

45 הארץ, 7 בדצמבר 2010, <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1202643.html>.

46 <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4005614,00.html>.

47 לאור הקשיים שעמם מתמודדת מערכת החינוך באשר לטיפול בבעיות נשירה (במיוחד הנשירה הסמויה), ראוי לציין את תוכנית "תפנית" (או "סטארט") שמפעילה קרן רש"י בבתי הספר התיכוניים שעמם היא משתפת פעולה, ושמתירה לזהות מסיימי כיתות ט' עם פוטנציאל גבוה יותר (ציון שלילי ב-7 מקצועות ומעלה) ולקדם אותם לקראת השלמת לימודיהם בתיכון בהצלחה ותוך השגת תעודת בגרות מלאה. בראש ובראשונה, מנסה התוכנית לשנות את "התודעה הכוזבת" שבה שבוי התלמיד (יחד עמו גם כל הסביבה העוטפת אותו), ולפיה אין הוא מסוגל להגיע להישגים מרשימים, באמצעות הפעלת תהליכים לימודיים המובילים לרשרת הצלחות לימודיות אמיתיות ודיאלוג בו מובן לתלמיד הקשר שבין השקעה להצלחה. מעבר לכך, נעשה שימוש בדרך פעולה הותנת מענה מובנה למשתתפים הפנים בית-ספריים והוחץ בית-ספריים המסבירים את אי-ההצלחה בלימודים: קבוצות למידה קטנות, מתן מענה לצרכים הרגשיים של התלמיד, למידה מואצת של כמות חומר לימוד גדולה יחסית בפרק זמן קצר יחסית (שיטה מסטטריאלית הכוללת גם למידה בשעות אחה"צ והערב, להבדיל מן השיטה המקובלת במערכת החינוך של פריסת תוכנית הלימודים לאורך שנת לימודים מלאה). כמו כן, פועלת התוכנית לשילובם של כל המעגלים סביב התלמידים החלשים, קרי: הורים, מורים והנהלה. מחקר שביצעה הקרן להערכת יעילותה של "תפנית" הראה כי כמעט שני שלישים מהתלמידים שנטלו בה חלק הצליחו להשיג תעודת בגרות מלאה או שחסר להם מקצוע אחד בלבד להשלמת הבגרות, בעוד שבקבוצת הביקורת אף אחד מהתלמידים לא הצליח לסיים עם תעודת בגרות.

להרחבה על התוכנית, ראו: בוגרי תוכנית תפנית לבגרות – סטארט, תוכנית משותפת לקרן רש"י, משרד החינוך, אגף שח"ר ורג"י חינוך ברשויות השותפות, דו"ח סיכום ממצאי מחקר, יוני 2008.

להרחבה בנושא הנשירה במערכת החינוך בישראל, ראו: הוועדה המיוחדת לנושא הנשירה מבתי הספר בראשות ח"כ תמר גוז'נסקי, מסקנות הוועדה והמלצותיה (מבוססות על עבודת הוועדה ועל דו"ח מחקר בנושא הנשירה הגלויה והסמויה בקרב בני נוער, ירושלים, יולי 2002).

48 אחד הכלים של מערכת החינוך לתמוך בשיפור תממדי של הלמידה נעשה באמצעות מבחני מדידה, הנערכים על ידי הרשות הארצית למדידה והערכה בחינוך (ראמ"ה). מבחני ההישגים במיצ"ב (מדדי יעילות וצמיחה בית ספרית) נערכים אחת לשנה והם נועדו לבחון באיזו מידה עומדים תלמידי בית הספר היסודי ותלמידי חטיבת הביניים ברמת הדרישות המצופה על-פי תכנית הלימודים בארבעת מקצועות הליבה: מדע וטכנולוגיה, אנגלית, שפת-אם (עברית/ערבית), ומתמטיקה, בשתי דרגות כיתה: ה' ו-ח' כאשר בשפות-אם נערכת בחינה גם בכיתה ב'. על מנת לאפשר השוואה רב-שנתית של ציוני המיצ"ב, ציוני המבחנים מתורגמים לסולם מיצ"ב רב-שנתי. שנת הבסיס להשוואה הרב-שנתית נקבעה להיות תשס"ח כך שבשנת הבסיס (תשס"ח) הציון הממוצע של כל תחום דעת הוא 500, וסטיית התקן היא 100. מבחני המיצ"ב האחרונים נערכו בשנת 2009.

49 מערכת החינוך בישראל – סוגיות מרכזיות בעבודתה של ועדת החינוך, 2009, הכנסת – מרכז המחקר והמידע, עמ' 17-16.

יש פער עקבי בהישגים לטובת התלמידים דוברי העברית בהשוואה לעמיתיהם דוברי הערבית, וזאת בכל שלושת תחומי הדעת (מדע וטכנולוגיה, אנגלית, מתמטיקה).<sup>50</sup> יחד עם זאת, בהסתכלות רב-שנתית הפער מצטמצם בחלק מהמדדים (מתמטיקה לדוגמה).

מעבר לכך, נתוני דו"ח שפרסם מרכז אדווה מראים כי בחמש השנים האחרונות נרשמה ירידה מתמשכת בשיעור הזכאים לתעודות בגרות במגזר הערבי (ובעיריות הפיתוח), מ-42.2% ל-34.4%, בעוד שבישובים המבוססים מבחינה חברתית-כלכלית לא חל כל שינוי בשיעור הזכאות לבגרות, שעמד על 66%, קרי: התרחבות מתמדת של הפערים בין קבוצות האוכלוסייה השונות.

### החינוך במגזר החרדי

על-פי תחזיות הלשכה המרכזית לסטטיסטיקה, בשנת 2012 שיעורם של התלמידים במגזר החרדי יהיה 22.4% מכלל התלמידים בחינוך היסודי ו-30.9% מכלל התלמידים בחינוך היסודי במגזר היהודי.<sup>51</sup>

פרופ' מנחם פרידמן, סוציולוג וחוקר החברה החרדית, הטביע את המושג "חברת הלומדים" לתיאור החברה החרדית שרוב בניה מנהלים אורח חיים של לימודי קודש בלבד, כבר מגיל בית הספר היסודי. המדינה מתקצבת בתי ספר יסודיים חרדיים, על אף שחלק מהם אינם מלמדים מקצועות ליבה כגון מתמטיקה, אנגלית, מדעים ועוד, סוגייה הנמצאת כיום במחלוקת קשה בשיח הציבורי הישראלי. מאז 2008, בעקבות חוק שעבר בכנסת, המוסדות החרדיים התיכונים אינם מחויבים ללמד לימודי ליבה. יש לזכור כי כבר בעת מיסודה של מערכת החינוך הממלכתית ב-1953 המצב בו מערכת החינוך החרדית הנה נפרדת ממערכת החינוך הכללית קיבל משנה תוקף. אי לכך, למדינה אין כיום דריסת רגל או השפעה באשר לקביעת תכני החינוך של המגזר החרדי.

כך להשכלתה של האוכלוסייה החרדית, המשכילה ביותר מבחינת שנות לימוד, שאינן כוללות לימודי ליבה, אין תמורה כספית, ובניגוד למגזרים אחרים בהם השכלה היא אחת הדרכים המרכזיות לצאת ממעגל העוני הרי שהשכלתם הייחודית של בני המגזר החרדי אינה בת-המרה בשוק העבודה (ראו להלן דיון נרחב יותר על אודות החסמים המונעים השתלבותם של חרדים בתעסוקה).<sup>52</sup>

### נוער בסיכון

בישראל נמצאים כיום כ-350 אלף ילדים ובני נוער (מגיל לידה עד גיל 18) במצבים המסכנים אותם במשפחתם ובסביבתם, וכתוצאה ממצבים אלו נפגעו זכויותיהם לקיום פיזי, בריאות והתפתחות, להשתייכות למשפחה, ללמידה ולרכישת מיומנויות, לרווחה ולבריאות רגשית, להשתתפות ולהשתייכות חברתית ולהגנה מפני אחרים ומפני התנהגויות מסכנות שלהם עצמם. בנובמבר 2003 החליטה ממשלת ישראל על הקמת ועדה ציבורית בראשות פרופ' הלל שמיד לבדיקת מצבם של ילדים ובני נוער בסיכון ובמצוקה. במרס 2006 הוגש הדו"ח הסופי של הוועדה, ותוכנית שמיד אומצה כתוכנית לאומית לטיפול בילדים ונוער בסיכון ובמצוקה. ב-2007 הוקמה ועדת מנכ"לים בין-משרדית לצורך יישום המלצות תוכנית שמיד. משרד הרווחה מוביל את התוכנית באמצעות מנהלת משותפת יחד עם משרדי החינוך, הבריאות, ביטחון הפנים והקליטה, ובשיתוף מרכז השלטון המקומי וג'וינט ישראל. התוכנית פועלת כיום ב-78 ישובים ואגדים (בהם חיים למעלה מ-20 אלף תושבים) באשכולות 1-4 (ישובים במצב סוציו-אקונומי נמוך), ועד כה הוכנסו למאגר מידע כ-150 אלף ילדים ובני נוער בסיכון הנמצאים במעקב ובטיפול של הרשויות ומשרדי הממשלה השונים. 31% מהנוער בגילאי 17-12 מהישובים הללו נחשבים לנוער בסיכון. בחלוקה על-פי קבוצות באוכלוסייה נמצא כי 29% מהילדים והנוער סיכון הנם יהודים ותיקים, 46% ערבים, 10% עולים ו-15% חרדים.

## 2. תחום השירות האזרחי-לאומי

מנהלת השירות האזרחי מפעילה כיום למעלה מ-14,000 מתנדבים, מהם כ-1,500 מן המגזר הערבי (בעיקר נשים) ומספר דומה מקרב החרדים (כולם גברים, רובם נשואים בעלי ילד אחד או יותר). על-פי חוק טל, מתנדבי השירות האזרחי החרדיים יכולים להתנדב לשירות בתחומים הבאים: רווחה, בריאות הציבור, קליטת עלייה, הגנת הסביבה, בטחון פנים, שירותי הצלה. קהל היעד הנו גברים חרדים בעלי משפחות מגיל 22 או רווקים מגיל 26, לאחר ארבע שנות דחיית שירות מצה"ל, ובמעמד "תורתם אומנותם". רובם המכריע של המתנדבים החרדיים הנם נשואים עם ילדים. ההתנדבות הנה בהיקף של כ-20 שעות שבועיות על פני שנתיים או 40 שעות שבועיות על פני שנה. עד כה סיימו את שירותם כ-930 מתנדבים. בסיום השירות האזרחי המשרתים בו יוצאים לרוב ללא ערך מוסף מהשירות בכל הקשור להכשרה מקצועית המאפשרת השתלבות בשוק התעסוקה.

## 3. תחום התעסוקה

### ממדי העוני בישראל

תוחלת העוני בישראל,<sup>53</sup> הן בקרב משפחות, הן בקרב נפשות והן בקרב ילדים, עלתה בשנת 2009. על-פי נתונים רשמיים היו בישראל בשנה החולפת 435,100 משפחות עניות, בהן 1,774,800 נפש,<sup>54</sup> ומתוכם 850,300 ילדים. תוחלת העוני של המשפחות בישראל עמדה על 20.5% ב-2009 ביחס ל-19.9% בשנה שקדמה לה. עלייה זו בתוחלת העוני הפכה על פיה יציבות שהסתמנה בתוחלת העוני בשנתיים שלפני כן (-2007) (2008). שיעור הנפשות החיות במשפחות עניות גדל מ-23.7% לשיא של 25%. תוחלת העוני בקרב ילדים, שנסקה בעשור החולף בשיעור של כ-60% והיתה במגמת ירידה בשנים 2007-2008, גם היא חצתה שיא קודם והגיעה ל-36.3% ב-2009 לעומת 34% ב-2008 ו-35.8% ב-2006.<sup>55</sup>

50 מיצ"ב תשס"ט – ראמ"ה (הרשות הארצית למדידה והערכה בחינוך, משרד החינוך, 2009, עמ' 22-23).

51 מערכת החינוך במגזר החרדי – תמונת מצב, הכנסת מרכז המחקר והמידע, 2007, עמ' 1.

52 איריס גרבי וגל לוי (בהנחיית פרופ' רות גביון), השסע החברתי-כלכלי בישראל, המכון הישראלי לדמוקרטיה, 2000, עמ' 72-73.

53 קו העוני ב-2009 לאדם בודד היה 2,270 ש"ח, לזוג 3,630 ש"ח ולמשפחה מרובת ילדים (7 ילדים) 10,162 ש"ח.

54 לאחר תשלומי העברה (קצבת ילדים, קצבת זקנה ושארים, הבטחת הכנסה, קצבת נכות, דמי אבטלה), ההשפעה הכוללת של הממשלה בצמצום העוני דרך תשלומי העברה השונים מהווה 88% (76% מתוכם משלומים דרך תשלומי העברה מהביטוח הלאומי) מסך התרומה של תשלומי העברה למשפחות.

55 המוסד לביטוח לאומי, ממדי העוני והפערים החברתיים בישראל לשנת 2009, עמ' 14.

מדד ג'יני<sup>56</sup> לאי-שוויון בהתחלקות ההכנסות באוכלוסייה עלה בכאחוז בין השנים 2008-2009, ומורה על ירידה מצטברת בשיעור דומה בין השנים 2006-2009. המגמה של המדד לאי-שוויון בין השנים 2002-2009 חושפת עלייה של 5.8% במדד זה בישראל. מדד ג'יני לאי-שוויון גבוה בישראל בכ-22% מהמוצע של מדינות ה-OECD. אחת הבעיות המרכזיות של אי-השוויון בישראל היא הקיטוב הגובר בין עשירים לעניים: הכנסות העשירון ה-9 היו גבוהות פי 6.2 מהעשירון התחתון (העניים ביותר).<sup>57</sup> כך גם לגבי ההכנסה של העשירון ה-5, שהיתה גבוהה פי 2.8 מהעשירון התחתון.

תחת הקטגוריה של "העניים ביותר" ניתן למנות אחוז ניכר מקרב בני המגזרים החרדי והערבי. מגמת הירידה בתוחלת העוני בקרב אזרחי ישראל הערבים בשנתיים האחרונות התהפכה ותוחלת העוני של משפחות ערביות עלתה מ-49.4% ב-2008 ל-53.5% ב-2009. במקביל, עלה חלקם של הערבים באוכלוסייה הענייה מ-33.8% ב-2008 ל-35.9% ב-2009. כן הוחמר מצב העוני שלהם, כפי שהדבר בא לידי ביטוי דרך פער ההכנסות (יחס פער ההכנסות הממוצע, קרי: המרחק הממוצע של הכנסות העניים מקו העוני) שעלה מ-36% ב-2008 ל-38.3% ב-2009. תרומתם של האמצעים להפחתת העוני (תשלומי המוסד לביטוח לאומי, העברות ממשקי בית ופרטים ותשלומי מוסדות ממשלתיים אחרים) פחתה אצל הערבים ב-2009, מ-13.5% ב-2008 ל-11.4% ב-2009, והיא קטנה בהרבה בהשוואה לרמתה אצל היהודים – כ-47%. ההסבר לפערים הגדולים בתחום זה נובע מ מבנה הקצבאות: קצבאות הזקנה והשאריות הן הקצבאות הגדולות ביותר, ואילו האוכלוסייה הערבית צעירה יחסית ומאופיינת במספר גדול של ילדים.<sup>58</sup> תוחלת העוני של משפחות עם ילדים עלתה באופן ניכר בכלל האוכלוסייה, מ-24.5% ב-2008 ל-26.4% ב-2009. עלייה חדה נרשמה בקרב משפחות עם 1-3 ילדים, מ-17.8% ב-2008 ל-20.2% ב-2009. העלייה בתוחלת העוני של המשפחות הגדולות משקפת בין היתר עלייה בתוחלת העוני של חרדים המאופיינים במשפחות גדולות. תוחלת העוני בקרב החרדים נעה בין 54.9% (ממוצע נע של שנתיים, 2006-2007) ל-56.9% בשנים 2008-2009.<sup>59</sup>

**שיעור התעסוקה** (המוגדר כאחוז המועסקים מכלל האוכלוסייה) בקרב בני 15-64 ירד ל-69.9% בשנת 2009 בהשוואה ל-71.0% בשנת 2008 (75.6% בקרב הגברים ו-64.2% בקרב הנשים). **מספר המועסקים** גדל בשנת 2009 בכ-9,000 בלבד והגיע ל-2,786 מיליון נפש. מספר הנשים המועסקות גדל בכ-21 אלף (עלייה של 1.7% לעומת שנת 2008), ואילו מספר הגברים המועסקים ירד בכ-12 אלף (ירידה של 0.8% לעומת שנת 2008). **מספר הבלתי-מועסקים** עלה בשנת 2009 בכ-49 אלף והגיע לכ-230 אלף – עלייה של 27.2% לעומת שנת 2008. זאת, לאחר ירידה של 14.8% ב-2008 בהשוואה לשנת 2007. אחוז הבלתי-מועסקים הגיע ב-2009 ל-7.6%, בהשוואה ל-6.1% בשנה הקודמת. אחוז הגברים הבלתי-מועסקים עלה מ-5.7% ל-7.6%, ואחוז הנשים הבלתי-מועסקות עלה מ-6.5% ל-7.6%.<sup>60</sup>

### מצב התעסוקה בחברה החרדית

האוכלוסייה החרדית מונה כ-650 אלף נפש, המהווים בין 8%-9% מכלל האוכלוסייה בישראל. האוכלוסייה החרדית בגילאי העבודה (20-64) מונה כ-235 אלף נפש (מתוכם כ-120 אלף גברים). אוכלוסייה זו גדלה בשיעור שנתי ממוצע של 7%, זאת בשל הריבוי הטבעי הגבוה של ציבור מגוון זה. **שיעור התעסוקה** של המגזר החרדי בכללותו (נשים וגברים) הנו 43.2% (על-פי נתוני משרד התמ"ת 2010). שיעור המשתתפים בכוח העבודה עמד על 48.5% בהשוואה לשיעור ההשתתפות בקרב האוכלוסייה החילונית אשר עמד על 79%. בממוצע רב-שנתי **שיעור התעסוקה של גברים חרדיים** עמד על 37% בלבד והוא נמוך באופן משמעותי משיעור התעסוקה של גברים חילוניים-מסורתיים העומד על כ-80% (ממוצע לשנים 2002-2007 לגילאים 20-64). שיעור הגברים החרדיים הבלתי-מועסקים עמד על 10% (בהשוואה ל-7% בקרב הגברים החילוניים-מסורתיים). גם **שיעור התעסוקה בקרב נשים חרדיות**, אשר עמד על 49%, נמוך באופן משמעותי משיעור התעסוקה בקרב נשים חילוניות (70%). שיעור הבלתי-מועסקות בקרב ציבור זה עמד על 13% בהשוואה ל-9% בלתי-מועסקות בקרב הציבור החילוני-מסורתי. אחוז גבוה מהמועסקים בציבור החרדי עובדים בשירותים ציבוריים, ובעיקר בתחום ההוראה והחינוך בתוך המגזר החרדי פנימה. תופעה זו רוחת בייחוד בקרב הנשים (72% מהמועסקות בענפים אלו ו-56% מועסקות בענף החינוך בלבד), אשר כ-70% מהן עובדות במשרות חלקיות. 45% מהגברים החרדיים מועסקים במגזר הציבורי ובחינוך, 13.7% בלבד מהגברים החרדיים מועסקים בענפי התעשייה בהשוואה ל-22.3% מהגברים החילוניים. 4.8% מהנשים החרדיות מועסקות בענפים אלו בהשוואה ל-11% מהנשים החילוניות-מסורתיות. כמו כן, 31% בלבד מהנשים החרדיות עובדות במשרה מלאה (35 ש' שבועיות ומעלה) בהשוואה ל-71% מהגברים החרדיים העובדים במשרה מלאה. כ-26.5% בלבד מהעובדים החרדיים במגזר העסקי מועסקים על-ידי מעסיק חילוני. עוד נמצא כי 8% בלבד מהעסקים במגזר העסקי בישראל מעסיקים עובדים חרדיים.<sup>61</sup>

כתוצאה מהגורמים שצוינו לעיל נוצרו בארץ פערים גדולים ברמות השכר וברמות ההכנסה בין חרדים ללא-חרדים: (א) רמת ההכנסה הממוצעת למשק בית חרדי עומדת על כ-6,100 ש"ח בחודש והיא נמוכה במחצית מההכנסה החודשית הממוצעת למשק בית שאיננו חרדי העומדת על כ-12,000 ש"ח (ב) השכר החודשי הממוצע של אישה חרדית עמד על כ-3,700 ש"ח בלבד בהשוואה לשכר החודשי הממוצע של אישה חילונית אשר עמד על 5,700 ש"ח (פערי שכר של 54%). השכר החודשי הממוצע של גבר חרדי עמד על כ-6,100 ש"ח בעוד שהשכר החודשי הממוצע של גבר חילוני עמד על 8,950 ש"ח (פערי שכר של 46%).

כ-56% מהחרדים מוגדרים כעניים. כמו כן, על אף העובדה ששיעור האוכלוסייה החרדית נע בין 8%-9% מכלל האוכלוסייה בישראל, מהווים החרדים כ-19% מכלל העניים בארץ.<sup>62</sup>

56 אי-השוויון בהכנסות מצביע על ההבדלים ברמת החיים בין אוכלוסיות. מדד ג'יני מאפשר להשוות את מידת אי השוויון בין מדינות. אזורים שונים וקבוצות אוכלוסייה. המדד נע בין 0 ל-1 כאשר ציון 1 מתאר אי-שוויון מלא בהכנסות (ריכוז הכנסות בידי חלק מהפרטים בחברה) בעוד שציון 0 מתאר מצב של שוויון מלא (לכל פרט בחברה אותה רמת הכנסה).

57 השוואה לפי ההכנסות הגבוהות ביותר בכל עשירון.

58 המוסד לביטוח לאומי, ממדי העוני והפערים החברתיים בישראל לשנת 2009, עמ' 22.

59 המוסד לביטוח לאומי, ממדי העוני והפערים החברתיים בישראל לשנת 2009, עמ' 23.

60 הלמ"ס, הודעה לעיתונות - נתונים מסקר כוח אדם לרבע הרביעי ולשנת 2009, פברואר 2010.

61 משרד התמ"ת, הודעה לעיתונות - תוכנית התמ"ת לשילוב חרדים בשוק העבודה, מאי 2010.

62 משרד התמ"ת, הודעה לעיתונות - תוכנית התמ"ת לשילוב חרדים בשוק העבודה, מאי 2010.

[http://www.moital.gov.il/cmsTamati/InternalPage.aspx?FRAMELESS=false&NRNODEGUID=%7B1038AA92-A76D-4C39-ACD2-631572E573F4%7D&NRORIGIN\\_ALURL=%2FNR%2Fexeres%2F1038AA92-A76D-4C39-ACD2-631572E573F4.htm&NRCACHEHINT=Guest](http://www.moital.gov.il/cmsTamati/InternalPage.aspx?FRAMELESS=false&NRNODEGUID=%7B1038AA92-A76D-4C39-ACD2-631572E573F4%7D&NRORIGIN_ALURL=%2FNR%2Fexeres%2F1038AA92-A76D-4C39-ACD2-631572E573F4.htm&NRCACHEHINT=Guest)

[http://www.moital.gov.il/cmsTamati/InternalPage.aspx?FRAMELESS=false&NRNODEGUID=%7B1038AA92-A76D-4C39-ACD2-631572E573F4%7D&NRORIGIN\\_ALURL=%2FNR%2Fexeres%2F1038AA92-A76D-4C39-ACD2-631572E573F4.htm&NRCACHEHINT=Guest](http://www.moital.gov.il/cmsTamati/InternalPage.aspx?FRAMELESS=false&NRNODEGUID=%7B1038AA92-A76D-4C39-ACD2-631572E573F4%7D&NRORIGIN_ALURL=%2FNR%2Fexeres%2F1038AA92-A76D-4C39-ACD2-631572E573F4.htm&NRCACHEHINT=Guest)



הציבור הערבי מהווה כ-20.3% מכלל האוכלוסייה בישראל (כ-1.5 מיליון נפש). שיעור התעסוקה בקרב הערבים עומד על 42%, לעומת 59% בקרב היהודים. שיעור ההשתתפות של הגברים הערבים במעגל העבודה בשנת 2008 היה 62.4%, גבוה יותר מזה של הגברים היהודים (61.5%). מנגד, שיעור ההשתתפות של הנשים הערביות נמוך מאוד (21.1% בשנת 2008) ביחס לנשים היהודיות (57%)<sup>63</sup>. בשנת 2007 עמד השכר החודשי הממוצע ברוטו במגזר הערבי על 5,419 ש"ח, בעוד השכר הממוצע בקרב היהודים עמד על 8,056 ש"ח. כמו כן, שכר העבודה לפי שעה של שכיר ערבי נמוך בכ-30% משכר עמיתו היהודי בעל השכלה דומה. כ-50% מהמשפחות הערביות חיות מתחת לקו העוני (לאחר תשלומי העברה ומסים), לעומת כ-15% מהמשפחות היהודיות.<sup>64</sup>

הבינתן תנאי שוויון בין גברים ערביים לגברים יהודיים הפוטנציאל הכלכלי הטמון בשוק העבודה הערבי מוערך בכ-37 מיליארד ש"ח, לעומת 27 מיליארד כיום. בתנאי שוויון בין נשים ערביות ליהודיות התמורה לשכירות בכוח העבודה הנשי היתה יכולה לעמוד על 28 מיליארד ש"ח, לעומת 7 מיליארד ש"ח בהווה. לפיכך, הפוטנציאל של המשק הישראלי כתוצאה מאי-מימוש הפוטנציאל של כוח העבודה של נשים וגברים ערבים מסתכם בכ-31 מיליארד ש"ח בשנה (על-פי נתוני 2006), ומכאן ששיעורי ההשתתפות הנמוכים של ערביי ישראל בכלכלה מביאים להפסד של כ-4% מהתמ"ג.

### מצב התעסוקה בקרב אנשים עם מוגבלות<sup>65</sup>

בשנת 2009 הגיע מספרם של אנשים עם מוגבלות בישראל בגילאי 20-64 ל-742 אלף, כאשר 280 אלף מתוכם מוגדרים בעלי מוגבלות המפריעה מאוד לתפקודי היומיום שלהם ו-462 אלף בעלי מוגבלות מפריעה, כאשר מוגבלות מוגדרת כבעיה פיזית או בריאותית כלשהי הנמשכת שישה חודשים לפחות ואשר מפריעה במידה כלשהי לתפקודי היומיום. חלוקה של סך האוכלוסייה עם מוגבלות לשלוש קבוצות תפקוד: תפקוד גבוה, בינוני ונמוך, מלמדת כי כ-65% מסך בעלי המוגבלות הנם בתפקוד גבוה יחסית, כ-30% בתפקוד בינוני וכ-6% בתפקוד נמוך.<sup>66</sup> אנשים עם מוגבלות הנם מבוגרים יותר, כאשר ממוצע גילם עומד על 45.5 שנים, בהשוואה ל-36.5 שנים בקרב אנשים ללא מוגבלות. שיעור הנשים עם מוגבלות (54.2%) הנו גבוה יותר משיעור הגברים עם מוגבלות (45.8%). כמו כן, ראוי לציין כי ישנו ייצוג יתר לערבים עם מוגבלות בהשוואה לחלקם באוכלוסיית האנשים ללא מוגבלות (22.0% בהשוואה ל-15.6% בהתאמה).<sup>67</sup> מנגד, ניתן לראות כי ישנו ייצוג חסר לחרדים עם מוגבלות בהשוואה לחלקם של החרדים באוכלוסייה ללא מוגבלות (5.2% ו-9% בהתאמה), דבר אשר מייצג ככל הנראה את הנטייה של בני העדה החרדית שלא "להוציא דברים החוצה".

מאפייני ההשכלה של אנשים עם מוגבלות מעידים על נחיתות של אוכלוסייה זו, ובייחוד בקרב בעלי התפקוד הנמוך, בהשוואה לבעלי התפקוד הגבוה ולאנשים ללא מוגבלות כלל. שיעור האנשים עם מוגבלות שהם בעלי השכלה נמוכה, כלומר תיכונית בלבד (שאינה כוללת תעודת בגרות), הנו גבוה יותר משמעותית מאשר שיעור בעלי השכלה זו באוכלוסיית האנשים ללא מוגבלות (55.7% בהשוואה ל-33.7% בהתאמה). כמו כן, שיעורי בעלי תעודת בגרות והשכלה אקדמית בקרב אנשים עם מוגבלות (14.5% ו-13.3%) הנם נמוכים משמעותית מאשר בקרב אנשים ללא מוגבלות.<sup>68</sup> מאפייני ההשכלה קשורים למאפיינים נוספים המשפיעים על ההשתלבות בחברה ועל היכולת להשתלב בעבודה איכותית, כגון שימוש במחשב וידיעת אנגלית. בעלי המוגבלות המדווחים כי יש בבעלותם מחשב עומד על כ-60% בלבד, בהשוואה ל-74% בקרב אנשים ללא מוגבלות. בהתייחס לידיעת השפה האנגלית, נראה ייצוג חסר לאנשים עם מוגבלות יודעי אנגלית בהשוואה לחלקם של יודעי השפה באוכלוסיית האנשים ללא מוגבלות (21.4% בהשוואה ל-42.7% בהתאמה). גם כאן ניתן לראות כי שיעור המדווחים שידועים אנגלית פוחת ככל שרמת התפקוד נמוכה יותר. עוד עולה כי שיעור האנשים עם מוגבלות ששירתו בצבא או בשירות לאומי נמוך משמעותית מהשיעור המקביל בקרב אנשים ללא מוגבלות (51.4% לעומת 72.3% בהתאמה).

ממוצע שיעור התעסוקה של אנשים עם מוגבלות עומד על 43% בהשוואה לשיעור של 71% בקרב אנשים ללא מוגבלות. שיעור המועסקים הולך ופוחת ככל שרמת רמת התפקוד של הפרט, כך ששיעור המועסקים מקרב בעלי התפקוד הגבוה עומד על 55% ויורד ל-24% בקרב בעלי התפקוד הבינוני ול-13% בלבד בקרב בעלי התפקוד הנמוך. שיעור הבלתי-מועסקים בקרב אנשים עם מוגבלות הנו גבוה באופן משמעותי מאשר בקרב אנשים ללא מוגבלות ועומד על 15.5% בהשוואה ל-8.5% בקרב אנשים ללא מוגבלות. זאת ועוד, שיעור הבלתי-מועסקים הנו נמוך יותר בקרב בעלי התפקוד הגבוה (14%) והוא הולך וגדל ככל שפוחתת רמת התפקוד, כך ששיעור הבלתי-מועסקים בקרב בעלי התפקוד הנמוך עומד על 24%. הדבר מלמד על הרצון החזק של אנשים אלו להשתלב בשוק העבודה, במיוחד בקרב בעלי התפקוד הנמוך ששיעורי התעסוקה שלהם הנם נמוכים.

שכרם הממוצע של אנשים עם מוגבלות נמוך יותר משכרם הממוצע של אנשים ללא מוגבלות, כאשר הפער בין השכר הממוצע של בעלי התפקוד הנמוך לבין השכר הממוצע של אנשים ללא מוגבלות הנו גבוה מ-2,000 ש"ח. גם בהתייחס לפרמטר זה, השכר תלוי ברמת התפקוד, כך שהוא גבוה יותר בקרב בעלי התפקוד הגבוה (5,518 ש"ח) ופוחת בקרב בעלי התפקוד הבינוני (4,595 ש"ח) והנמוך (4,862 ש"ח). חלק מהפערים בין שכרם של אנשים עם מוגבלות לבין שכרם של אנשים ללא מוגבלות נובע מממוצע שעות העבודה של אנשים עם מוגבלות, שהוא נמוך יותר מאשר בקרב אנשים ללא מוגבלות, משתי סיבות עיקריות: ראשית, עד לאחרונה אנשים עם מוגבלות נמנעו מלהגדיל את שעות העבודה שלהם בשל ההפחתה בקצבת הנכות (המצב תוקן לאחרונה בעקבות חוק לרון). שנית, חלק מבעלי המוגבלות מתקשים פיזית לעבוד שעות רבות יותר ולכן אינם יכולים להשוות את שעות העבודה שלהם לשעות העבודה של אנשים ללא מוגבלות. אולם, ההבדל בממוצע שעות העבודה לבדו אינו מצליח להסביר את הפער הגדול בין שכרם של אנשים עם מוגבלות לבין שכרם של אנשים ללא מוגבלות וככל הנראה פער זה מעיד בין היתר גם על אפליית אנשים עם מוגבלות במקום עבודתם. מעבר לכך חשוב לציין, כי אנשים עם מוגבלות נתפשים ככוח עבודה זול ולעיתים כתחליף לעובדים זרים. ישנו ייצוג יתר לאנשים עם מוגבלות במקצועות בלתי-מקצועיים ומקצועיים למחצה ומאידך ייצוג חסר במשלחי יד הנחשבים ליוקרתיים, כגון אקדמאים ומנהלים.

63 ב-20 השנים האחרונות חלה עלייה משמעותית בשיעור הנשים הערביות המועסקות, כאשר מ-10% ב-1990 הוכפל שיעורן. ובכל זאת, כאמור, שיעור זה נמוך משמעותית משיעור התעסוקה בקרב נשים יהודיות. אף שחלקן של נשים ערביות בכלל אוכלוסיית הנשים בגיל העבודה בישראל הוא 20.7% שיעור המשתתפות בכוח העבודה האזרחי בישראל הוא 6.7% בלבד. בשנת 2009 השתתפו בכוח העבודה האזרחי כ-86,100 נשים ערביות, שהן 18.8% מהנשים הערביות בנות 15 ומעלה. מרבית הנשים הערביות העובדות מועסקות במשכורות נמוכות מהשכר הממוצע במשק. מרביתן (כ-45%) מועסקות בחינוך ובריאות ורווחה (כ-15%).

64 פורום קיסריה – המכון הישראלי לדמוקרטיה – תעסוקת ערבים בישראל, האתגר של הכלכלה הישראלית, יוני 2010, עמ' 7-12.

65 הנתונים בסעיף זה הועברו על-ידי המטה לשינוי אנשים עם מוגבלות במשרד התמ"ת.

66 יודגש כי רמת התפקוד נקבעה על בסיס תשובותיו של הפרט לשאלות הבדיקות את מידת יכולתו להתרחץ, לאכול, להתלבש ולהתהלך מחוץ ובתוך הבית באופן עצמאי וללא עזרה.

67 כמה סיבות לייצוג היתר של ערבים באוכלוסיית בעלי המוגבלות: ראשית, בקרב קבוצות מסוימות באוכלוסייה הערבית רווחת תופעה של נישואי קרובים המגדילה את הסבירות להולדת ילדים עם לקויות שונות. הסבר שני מתייחס לשימוש המופחת ברפואה מונעת בקרב האוכלוסייה הערבית. הסבר שלישי מתייחס לנגישות המועטה לשירותי רפואה בהשוואה לנגישות של האוכלוסייה היהודית.

68 בקרב בעלי התפקוד הבינוני והנמוך שיעור בעלי תעודת בגרות נמוך אף יותר ועומד על 9.6% ו-9.9% בהתאמה. כמו כן, ישנם פערים גבוהים בשיעור האקדמאים בין אנשים עם מוגבלות בתפקודים הנמוכים (7.6% בתפקוד הבינוני ו-9.8% בתפקוד הנמוך) לבין אנשים עם מוגבלות בתפקוד גבוה (18.4%).

## נספח 2: החסמים המונעים השתלבות של אוכלוסיות ממעמד סוציו-אקונומי נמוך בשוק התעסוקה

### חרדים

למרות התמורות המהותיות ביחס בני המגזר החרדי להשכלה אקדמית ולהשתלבות בעולם התעסוקה הכללי, נושא זה עדיין אינו נמצא בראש השיח הציבורי החרדי ורבים בו אינם רואים בתעודה אקדמית כלי אפקטיבי הממתאים לאורח חייהם ולהשתלבותם בחברה הכללית.

בכל הקשור לתחום הלימודים האקדמיים, בחורי הישיבה כיום הנם בעלי השכלה גבוהה שאינה בת-המרה לפרנסה. בעוד שבעבר יכלו בעלי תורה להתפרנס בתחום הכשרתם ולימודיהם, היום הדבר כמעט שאינו נדרש. חרדים שמבקשים להתפרנס עוברים הכשרה מקצועית קצרת-מועד, שלאחריה הם מקבלים שכר מינימום ואף למטה מזה. רבים מהם מתקשים לוותר על מעמדם כבני ישיבה לטובת יציאה לעולם התעסוקה, ולעיתים קרובות אינם מודעים לאפשרויות חדשות בשל היעדר ייעוץ והכוונה מתאימים.

על מנת להמיר חיי לימודים תורניים בפרנסה של ממש נדרש האדם החרדי לפחות לחמש שנות השכלה והכשרה לאחר צאתו מן הישיבה, כשלוש מדובר בגברים נשואים ובעלי משפחות בנות 2-3 ילדים לפחות. זאת, משום ששנות הלימוד הרבות שרכשו במוסדות התורניים אינן מוכרות ואינן מעניקות להם כל זכאות, גם לא בתנאי קבלה. יתר על כן, אלה מהם שמגיעים לאקדמיה עושים כן ללא הבנה ורקע כלליים באשר למהותה של האקדמיה, באופן שמגדיל את חששם ואת קשיי השתלבותם בלימודים גבוהים כלליים. גברים חרדיים בני 30 ומעלה אינם זכאים להשתתף במכינה מקוצרת (הם נדרשים למכינה בת שנה) המתאימה לגילם אף שהם מגיעים עם משמעת עצמית גבוהה, יכולת התמדה וחשיבה אנליטית גבוהה. אלה המתקבלים למכינות קדם-אקדמיות זכאים למלגה מטעם משרד החינוך, אך הם נדרשים להיות נוכחים בשיעורים באופן מלא גם כאשר רמת המכינה נמוכה מרמתם (למשל, אלה מביניהם שהם דוברי אנגלית כשפת אם ובכל זאת נאלצים לנכוח בשיעורי אנגלית במכינה כדי לא לאבד את הזכאות למלגה). תנאי הקבלה בחלק מהמקצועות מחייבים ראיונות אקדמיים מקדימים שאינם מותאמים לאופייה של האוכלוסייה החרדית ורבים נפסלים כתוצאה מכך, אף ללא קשר לרמתם האקדמית.

באשר לנשים חרדיות, אף שרבות מהן עובדות (ראו נתונים לעיל), רובן מקבלות משכורות נמוכות ביותר היות שלעיתים קרובות הן נאלצות לעבוד במשרות חלקיות. נשים רבות כלל אינן נכללות בסטטיסטיקה היות שהן משמשות מורות ממלאות מקום במשרה חלקית ביותר. כאמור לעיל, המציאות היא כזו שגם נשים בעלות השכלה של שנים רבות במוסדות תורניים (לימודי תיכון וסמינר) נאלצות ללמוד במכינות קדם-אקדמיות תקופה ארוכה (תשעה חודשים) בטרם תוכלנה להשתלב בלימודים אקדמיים, אף שלעיתים קרובות הן מכירות את החומר הנלמד ממסגרות הלימוד הקודמות בתיכון ובסמינר. הסיבה לכך היא שהן אינן נבחרות בבחינות בגרות אלא במבחני החוץ שנערכים על-ידי מכון סאלד, מבחנים שאינם מוכרים במקצועות בהם תעודת בגרות היא תנאי סף (כמו סיעוד ומקצועות פארא-רפואיים, וכן מגוון מקצועות בסקטור הציבורי).

מעבר לחסמים הכלכליים ולהיעדר תמריצים נאותים לעידוד השכלה בקרב חרדים, גם הבחינה הפסיכומטרית מהווה חסם מהותי בפניהם. אחת ההנחות היא כי מדובר בבחינה תלוית תרבות שאינה משקפת בהכרח את יכולותיהם האמיתיות של סטודנטים אלו. יתר על כן, בחינה זו מצריכה תקופת לימודים ושכר לימוד נוספים שלרבים מהסטודנטים הפוטנציאליים, שרובם המכריע בעלי משפחות ומרקע סוציו-אקונומי נמוך, אין היכולת לעמוד בו, וכך נמנעת כניסתם ללימודים.

באשר לתעסוקה, אחד החסמים הבולטים להשתלבותם של חרדים בשוק העבודה הוא חוסר נכונותם של מעסיקים חילוניים להעסיקם (כ-95 אחוז מהמעסיקים החילוניים מסרבים לאפשר לחרדים לעבוד אצלם) מחשש פן יבקשו החרדים לשנות את פני מקום העבודה (הפרדה בין המינים למשל) וכן מתוך תפישה סטריאוטיפית ולפיה החרדים אינם עובדים חרוצים דיים.<sup>69</sup>

דוגמה אחרת לחסמים הניצבים כיום הן בפני האוכלוסייה החרדית והן בפני המדינה המבקשת לשלבם בשוק התעסוקה ניתן למצוא בתחום השירות האזרחי-לאומי. להלן כמה מהחסמים העיקריים שבהם נתקלת מנהלת השירות האזרחי-לאומי בניסיונותיה להרחיב את מעגל המתנדבים החרדים:

- אין אפשרות לצאת בקמפיין רחב וגלוי, בגלל החשש מהתנגדות הרבנים.
- חוסר המודעות בתוך החברה החרדית - הן לקיומה של אופציית השירות האזרחי והן ליתרונותיו והטבותיו בסוף השירות.
- ההנהגה הרבנית המשמעותית אינה נלהבת מרעיון השירות האזרחי ובמקרה הטוב מביעה את דעתה על-ידי הסכמה שבשתיקה.
- תדמית בעייתית של המתנדבים החרדיים בעיני החברה החרדית.
- ישנו חשש של האברכים/מתנדבים להגיע לגופים ציבוריים ממלכתיים, בשל החשש ממפגש עם תרבות שונה ובעיות צניעות.

למרות האמור לעיל, חשוב לציין כי מספר המתנדבים החרדים בשירות האזרחי עולה בעקביות מדי חודש. זאת, בעיקר בשל שמועות 'מפה לאוזן', שהן כלי חשוב במגזר החרדי. בדצמבר 2010, במסגרת קמפיין תקשורתי כללי לשירות האזרחי-לאומי, נערך לראשונה קמפיין לשירות באתר אינטרנט חרדיים מובילים. התגובות לקמפיין זה נבחנות בימים אלה.

### ערבים

החסמים העיקריים שבהם נתקלים ערבים בבואם להשתלב בשוק התעסוקה הנם בתחום השפה, קרי: אי-ידיעת עברית ברמה גבוהה, בנוסף לשליטה בלתי-מספקת דיה גם בשפה הערבית. על אף המוטיבציה הגבוהה לצאת ולעבוד (במיוחד בקרב 48 אלף נשים ערביות ששואפות להשתלב בשוק התעסוקה), מחסום השפה מונע מערבים שסיימו את לימודיהם בבתי הספר התיכוניים (ומאוחר יותר במערכת ההשכלה הגבוהה) להשתלב במקצועות ההולמים את כישוריהם, ומכאן שעניין שיפור איכות השפה הנו קריטי.

בשל בעיות השפה, וכן בשל האיכות הירודה של השכלתם התיכונית בנוסף לחסם הבחינה הפסיכומטרית, מחליטים ערבים ישראלים רבים (למעלה מ-8,000 איש) ללמוד מחוץ לישראל, בעיקר בירדן. אלו מהם שלומדים בישראל משתלבים בעיקר בתחומים כמו רוקחות ועריכת דין באופן שגורם ל"הצפת" שוק העבודה ולתת-תעסוקה.

חסמים נוספים בפני אינטגרציה חברתית הנם מדיניות מפלה כלפי האוכלוסייה הערבית בישראל וכן היעדר השקעה בתשתיות הולמות (תחום התחבורה הציבורית מהותי במיוחד, לאור העובדה שבהיעדרה ישובים ערביים רבים בפריפריה מנותקים ממרכזי תעסוקה שנמצאים בישובים היהודיים), בחינוך

ובשירותים חברתיים (היעדר מעונות יום ומסגרות טיפול לילדים, לדוגמה), בנוסף להיעדר אזורי תעשייה סביב הערים והישובים הערביים. היעדר תחבורה ציבורית נאותה בישובים הערביים הנו חסם מהותי במיוחד עבור נשים ערביות, שרק ל-18.5% מהן יש רישיון נהיגה.

כמו כן, בדומה לבעיה שעמה מתמודדים חרדים בנסותם להתקבל למקומות עבודה, גם ערבים נתקלים ברתיעה מצדם של בעלי עסקים מלקבלם לעבודה. גם כאשר עובדים ערביים מתקבלים למקומות עבודה מחוץ למגזר הערבי רבים מהם מתקשים להשתלב בצוות ויש נטייה לשלם להם שכר נמוך יותר מאשר למקביליהם היהודיים. הם אף נתפשים כמי שמתקשים לעמוד בדרישות העבודה.<sup>70</sup>

בעיה אחרת היא יציאתם המוקדמת של גברים ערבים משוק התעסוקה (בגילאי 45-50), באופן שמפחית לפחות עשר שנים מסך שנות העבודה שלהם. הם אינם מצליחים למצוא תעסוקה מחודשת, בהיעדר הכשרה מקצועית שתתאים להם.

באשר לנשים ערביות, מעבר לבעיות שהוזכרו לעיל, יש לציין כי אלו מביניהן שאינן מועסקות מאופיינות ברמת כישורים תעסוקתיים נמוכה שמקשה על השתלבותן בשוק העבודה. רובן המכריע אינו יודע כיצד להפעיל מחשב וכיצד להשתמש באינטרנט. נשים רבות בגילאי 55 ומעלה כלל אינן יודעות קרוא וכתוב (35% מן הנשים בגילאי 55-64, ו-68% מן הנשים בגיל 65 ומעלה הן אנאלפביות). כמו כן, נשים ערביות רבות עדיין סובלות מחסמים חברתיים ותרבותיים הנובעים מהשתייכותן לחברה פטריארכלית ומסורתית, בה יציאתן של נשים אל מחוץ לגבולות הישוב אינה נתפשת כדבר חיובי, במיוחד לנוכח העובדה שנשים ערביות הן האחראיות על גידול הילדים ועל עבודות משק הבית. אף שתהליכי מודרניזציה משפיעים כיום לחיוב על מעמדן של נשים בחברה הערבית, השפעתן של הנורמות התרבותיות הללו עדיין רחוקה מלפוג. חשוב לציין, עם זאת, כי הקשר בין השכלה לתעסוקה ברור: ככל שהשכלתן של נשים גבוהה יותר כך גדל שיעורן בשוק העבודה. בעוד ששיעור ההשתתפות בשוק העבודה בקרב ערביות בוגרות תיכון עומד על 18.5%, הרי שבקרב בעלות תואר ראשון שיעור ההשתתפות במשק עומד על 73%.

בתחום השירות הלאומי, ישנם חסמים הניצבים גם בפני המתנדבים (בעיקר בנות) מן המגזר הערבי. אלה נתקלים בהתנגדות עיקשת מצדם של פוליטיקאים ומנהיגים ערביים הסולדים ממה שנתפש כשיתוף פעולה עם הממסד, עם הממשלה ועם המדינה. בנות שירות אזרחי מסולקות לעיתים קרובות מבתי הספר וסובלות מנידוי חברתי בוטה.

## אנשים עם מוגבלות

כפי שראינו לעיל, עיקר החסמים של אנשים עם מוגבלות הם בהשכלה נמוכה יחסית ביחס לאנשים ללא מוגבלות, אי-ידיעת אנגלית ושימוש מופחת במחשב. לנוכח הדרישות של שוק העבודה כיום, כל אלו מהווים חסם לתעסוקה בכלל ולתעסוקה איכותית בפרט.

מעבר לכך, ישנם חסמים מהותיים מצדם של המעסיקים. רק 5% מכלל המעסיקים במשק, שהם כ-7,000 בתי עסק, מעסיקים אנשים עם מוגבלות. אחוז דומה העסיק בחמש השנים האחרונות בעלי מוגבלות, אך חדל מלעשות כן. בקרב מעסיקים רבים שוררות לא מעט סטיגמות על אודות אנשים עם מוגבלות. מעסיקים נוטים לתפוש אנשים עם מוגבלות כעובדים לא יעילים, לא מיומנים, כבעלי פריון קטן יותר וכמי שנוטים להיעדר רבות מהעבודה בשל מוגבלותם. בפועל, מחקרים מהעולם מדווחים על תמונת מצב הפוכה לגמרי, בה אנשים עם מוגבלות הנם יעילים ביותר, אינם מחסירים עבודה ובקרבם שוררים שיעורי תחלופה נמוכים יותר מאשר בקרב עובדים עם מוגבלות. קיומן של דעות קדומות אלו הנו סיבה מרכזית להימנעות מהעסקת אנשים עם מוגבלות.

בנוסף, מעסיקים רבים אינם נוטים להכיר בערך הכלכלי שבהעסקת אנשים עם מוגבלות, ואלו שכן מעסיקים עובדים עם מוגבלות נוטים לעשות זאת מתוך תפישה של חסד ורחמים. כמו כן, מעסיקים רבים נוטים לסבור כי להעסקת עובדים עם מוגבלות תהיה השפעה שלילית הן על העסק והן על יתר העובדים, ולכן נמנעים מכך. בפועל, ממצאי מחקרים מראים כי להעסקת עובדים עם מוגבלות ישנה השפעה חיובית הן על העסק והן על יתר העובדים, דבר אשר בא לידי ביטוי אף במידת היעילות, הביצועים והתפוקה של העסק. יתר על כן, מעסיקים רבים נמנעים מלשלב עובדים עם מוגבלות בשל החשש מפיטוריהם אם ידרש הדבר.

חסמים נוספים להעסקת אנשים עם מוגבלות הנם מבניים. ראשית, במשך שנים שררה, הן בעולם והן בארץ, תפישה של גורמי הטיפול השונים כי הפתרון לשילוב אנשים עם מוגבלות בקהילה מצוי במפעלים המוגנים ולא בשוק החופשי. אולם, בעוד שבמדינות מערביות אחרות התפתחה ההבנה כי הפתרון הרחב יותר הנו השילוב בקהילה ובשוק העבודה הרגיל, בעוד שההסדר המוגן הוא בבחינת ברירת מחדל לאותה אוכלוסייה הזקוקה להגנה, בישראל התקבעה התפישה ההיסטורית של התבססות על המפעלים המוגנים. על רקע זאת, אפשר להבין כי ניתן למצוא עד היום במסגרות המוגנות קבוצה לא מבוטלת של עובדים עם מוגבלות שהם בעלי כישורים שיכולים לעבוד בשוק העבודה הרגיל, אך מסיבות כאלו ואחרות נשארים במפעל המוגן. השערה זו קשורה גם במבנה הארגוני של שוק העבודה - השמתם של אנשים עם מוגבלות בעבודה אמורה לנוע על פני רצף תעסוקתי שמצדו האחד השמה במפעל מוגן ומצדו השני השמה בשוק הרגיל. לו היה מתפתח בישראל רצף זה מוקדם יותר, היה נוצר ביקוש בשל המעבר הטבעי בין שלבי הרצף ובסופו של דבר חלק לא מבוטל מהעובדים עם מוגבלות היו מגיעים לשוק העבודה הרגיל.

שנית, במהלך 30 השנים האחרונות, התפתחו בישראל דפוסי העסקה לא חוקיים ופוגעניים שנבעו מתפישה שהיעדר של המדינה היה שילוב בתעסוקה ולא משנה איזו ובאלו תנאים וכל זאת במסגרת של העסקת אנשים עם מוגבלות כמעשה של חסד ורחמים ולא מתוך תפישה שהעסקתם יוצרת ערך כלכלי, הן לפרט והן למעסיק. במשך שנים רבות עורר הדבר תסכול ומצוקה בקרב אנשים עם מוגבלות, שחלק גדול מהם הנם בעלי כישורים וזמימנויות שעבדו בליט ברירה (ועובדים עד היום) בעבודות שהן מתחת לכישוריהם, דבר שהביא לאובדן פוטנציאל ברמת הפרט ולאובדן תוצר ברמת המשק.

שלישית, עד לאחרונה, התקיימה בישראל (כמו גם במספר מדינות אחרות בעולם) חקיקה שלא עודדה שילוב בעבודה בשל איבוד הקצבה. המצב שונה רק לאחרונה עם קבלת המלצות ועדת לרון וקבלת התיקון לחוק הביטוח הלאומי.

סימולציה שביצע המטה לשילוב אנשים עם מוגבלות בשוק העבודה במשרד התמ"ת עולה, כי אילו היו החסמים הללו מוסרים ניתן היה לשלב עוד כ-63 אלף איש עם מוגבלות בתעסוקה (למעלה מ-37 אלף איש בעלי תפקוד גבוה, והיתר בעלי תפקוד בינוני ונמוך) ולהעלות את שיעור התעסוקה בקרבם מ-43.2% ל-53%.

### נספח 3: המלצות דו"ח הוועדה לבחינת מדיניות התעסוקה לעדכון יעדי הממשלה לשם הגדלת שיעורי התעסוקה (יוני 2010)

בדו"ח הוועדה לבחינת מדיניות התעסוקה, שהוגש לממשלת ישראל ביוני 2010 הוצע לאמץ כמה יעדים מרכזיים (קצרי טווח, ביניים וארוכי טווח) שיש לעמוד בהם על מנת להגדיל באופן משמעותי ומהותי את שיעורי התעסוקה בישראל בעשור הקרוב.

- יעד קצר טווח: הגדלת שיעור התעסוקה בקרב גילאי 25-64 מ-71% (נכון ל-2008) ל-73% עד שנת 2013
- יעד ביניים: הגדלת שיעור התעסוקה בקרב גילאי 25-64 מ-71% (נכון ל-2008) ל-76.4% עד שנת 2020
- יעד ביניים: הגדלת שיעור התעסוקה בקרב גילאי 20-24 מ-44.7% (נכון ל-2008) ל-56.3% עד שנת 2020
- יעד ארוך טווח: הגעה לשיעור תעסוקה של כלל האוכלוסייה בגילאי 20-64 הזהה לשיעור התעסוקה של מדינות ה-15 Top ב-OECD תוך המשך צמצום פערי התעסוקה בין כלל קבוצות האוכלוסייה בישראל

באשר לטווחי הגילאים 25-64 יש להגדיל את שיעור התעסוקה בשיעורים הבאים:

גברים חרדיים: מ-40.4% (2008) ל-63% (2020)

נשים חרדיות: מ-56.7% (2008) ל-63% (2020)

גברים ערביים: מ-74.1% (2008) ל-78% (2020)

נשים ערביות: מ-23.4% (2008) ל-41% (2020)

יתר האוכלוסייה: מ-77.4% (2008) ל-83.3% (2020)

כמ, נקבע יעד משנה להשתתפות בתעסוקה של בעלי מוגבלות בגילאי 25-64:

ירידה של 1% בשיעור יהודים לא-מועסקים בשל מגבלה גופנית ל-5% (כיום 6%) עד שנת 2020

ירידה של 1% בשיעור ערבים לא-מועסקים בשל מגבלה גופנית ל-7.2% (כיום 8.2%) עד שנת 2020

כאמור לעיל, הוועדה ממליצה להגדיר יעד נפרד לטווח הגילאים 20-24 מתוך רצון להתמקד בשילובם בעבודה של צעירים מקרב אוכלוסיות מעוטות השתתפות אשר נוטות שלא לרכוש השכלה גבוהה או להתגייס לצבא או לשירות לאומי.

עבור הגברים הערביים בגילאי 20-24 מוצע להציב כיעד גידול בשיעור התעסוקה ל-65% עד 2020 (כיום 61%), שהוא שיעור התעסוקה הממוצע של גברים בגילאים אלה במדינות ה-OECD. בשנים 2003-2008 גדל שיעור התעסוקה של הגברים הערביים בגילאים אלה בקצב ממוצע של 1.2% בשנה.

עבור הנשים הערביות בגילאי 20-24 מוצע להציב כיעד גידול בשיעור התעסוקה ל-42% (כיום 20%) עד 2020. המשמעות היא המשך במגמת הגידול בתעסוקה של כ-1.8% בשנה, אשר התקיימה בשנים 2006-2008 (עבור כל שנות הצמיחה 2004-2008 היה באוכלוסייה זו גידול ממוצע בשיעור התעסוקה של כ-0.8%).

ביתר האוכלוסייה בגילאי 20-24 יש להציב כיעד גידול בשיעור התעסוקה ל-57% עד 2020 (כיום 45.8%), קרי שיפור של 0.9% בשנה.

ככלל, היעד הוא להגדיל את שיעור התעסוקה בקרב גילאי 20-24 ל-60% עד שנת 2020, כשמשמעות הדבר היא שיש להוסיף כ-6,000 עובדים מדי שנה מעבר לגידול הטבעי באוכלוסייה.

## מדיניות מו"פ לאומית כמערכת כלים שלובים

פרופ' יצחק בן-ישראל ואורי סלונים  
סיכום מושב המו"פ כמערכת כלים שלובים: ממשלה, תעשייה ואקדמיה

דיון בכלל מרכיבי החוסן הלאומי אינו יכול שלא להתייחס למרכיב המחקר והפיתוח (מו"פ), שהפך בשני העשורים האחרונים לייסוד חשוב, אף יותר ממשאבי טבע, בהבטחת עוצמתה של מדינה. משמעות המו"פ בניתוח הערכת עוצמתה של מדינת ישראל מרכזי אף יותר וזאת על רקע הנתונים היחודיים בהם היא מתקיימת.

המו"פ, כנושא מובחן העומד בפני עצמו, נכלל בשלושת כנסי הרצליה האחרונים. העיסוק במו"פ במסגרת הכנס מדגיש את חשיבות הנושא ונועד לעודד שכלול של השיח והדיון הציבורי בנושאי מו"פ, והטמעת מערכת השיקולים והמושגים המאפיינת את עולם המו"פ בהערכה לאומית-אסטרטגית כוללת. בשני הכנסים הקודמים עסקו מושבי המו"פ בנושא תשתיות מחקר לאומיות ובשאלות מבוניות הנוגעות לעיצוב מדיניות מו"פ ממשלתית. בכנס השנה הוקדש מושב המו"פ לאפיון וניתוח הקשרים והזיקות הקיימים בין כלל הגורמים הפועלים במערכת המו"פ הישראלית.

נייר זה הוא עיבוד שיח הפאנל שהתקיים בכנס, הכולל הרחבה של הניתוחים, התובנות והדוגמאות שלא יכלו להגיע לכדי מיצויים המלא במסגרת מגבלות הדיון. בנייר שולבו תובנות ודוגמאות שהופיעו בדיוני המו"פ בשני הכנסים הקודמים וכן בדיוני ההכנה. בהזדמנות זו ברצוננו להודות לצוות המועצה הלאומית למחקר ולפיתוח (המולמו"פ) על הסיוע ושיתוף הפעולה בעבודה על מושבי המו"פ. אנו מקווים כי מסמך זה יסיע בקידום גיבושה של מדיניות מו"פ לאומית מושכלת לשמירת יתרונה האיכותי היחסי של ישראל.

### יושב ראש הצוות ומנחה המושב

אלוף (מיל.) פרופ' יצחק בן-ישראל,  
ראש המועצה הלאומית למחקר ולפיתוח  
(מולמו"פ); אוניברסיטת תל אביב

### עיבוד ועריכה

אורי סלונים, המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה

### משתתפי המושב

אלוף (מיל.) פרופ' יצחק בן-ישראל, ראש המועצה  
הלאומית למחקר ולפיתוח אזרחי;

פרופ' יוג'ין קנדל, ראש המועצה הלאומית לכלכלה;

אבי חסון, המדען הראשי, משרד התמ"ת;

ד"ר יוסי ורדי, יזם;

תא"ל (מיל.) עוזי עילם, לשעבר ראש מפא"ת.

מאת הפרופ' יצחק בן ישראל, ראש המועצה הלאומית למחקר ופיתוח מערכת המו"פ ככלים שלובים (Eco-System)

מערכת המו"פ בעולם כולו מתפקדת כאקו-סיסטם במסגרתה הגורמים הלקוחים בה חלק מזינים האחד את המוזנים ע"י האחרים. הגורמים במערכת הם:

1. האקדמיה ומכוני המחקר
2. התעשייה
3. הממשלה בכלל ומערכת הביטחון בפרט
4. גורמי הרגולציה
5. הציבור הרחב ובמיוחד "הממציאים" ו"היזמים"
6. מערכת החינוך (במיוחד העל-יסודי).

תכרעם המירזם לשמל רכ. ולא סימרוג יב וילמוגה יסחי לש הקיעמ הנבה אלל, לשמל, לארשי תנידמב פ"ומה תא ראתל השק סימעפו, ינושארה רוריבה. (קט-ייה) עדימ תיגולונכט לע שגדב, תויגולונכט חותיפל ילארשיה קשמל הנש לכ קתע ימוכס ווחטיבה הרישכמ הימדקאה. קט-ייהל שורדה סדאה-חוכ תרשכהל ירקיעה רוקמה תא סג הווהמ וז. הימדקאהמ אב, תונויערה רוקמ תובר תכרעמב פ"ומה יזכרמב הרשכה רבוע, (הדותע) ל"הצל כ"חא סייגתמ סקלחו, עדמהו הסדנהה תועוצקמב סירגוב יפלא הנש לוכ תא סיווהמ ליעל ונמש סימרוגה לוכ יב סיבכרומה וילמוגה יסחי. תומזייל רוניחו וייסינ סע יחרזאה קשמל רחואמ רזוחו ווחטיבה Startup Nation – "קנזה תמוא" ששב הנורחאל הנוכח המל תיתוברתהו תילכלכה, תיתרבחה תיתשתה.

האופי המיוחד של "כלים שלובים" של מערך המו"פ גורם לכך שכול צעד שנעשה באחד המגזרים, עשוי להשפיע ולשנות, באופן בלתי צפוי, גם את הנעשה במגזרים אחרים. כך למשל ירידה במספר הילדים הבוחרים לעשות חמש נקודות במקצועות ה"קשים" (מתמטיקה, אנגלית, מדעים) עשויה להתבטא בסופו של דבר (באיחור של עשר שנים ויותר) בירידה ביכולת ההתמודדות של ההי-טק הישראלי עם השוק העולמי.

האופי הזה גם מקשה על קביעה נכונה של כללי המשחק ("רגולציה"). חלק נכבד מהתקציב הממשלתי "הפנוי" מוצא על מחקר ופיתוח. בימים אלו עומד להתפרסם מחקר מקיף על "מדדים למדע, לטכנולוגיה ולחדשנות בישראל". המחקר בוצע ע"י מוסד נאמן למחקר מתקדם במדע וטכנולוגיה בשיתוף עם הלשכה המרכזית לסטטיסטיקה ביוזמת ובמימון המועצה הלאומית למחקר ופיתוח (המולמו"פ). ממחקר זה עולה כי בעשור האחרון הוצאו בישראל כול שנה כ-30 מיליארד ש"ח על מחקר ופיתוח אזרחי (32.8 מיליארד ש"ח ב-2009). כאחוז מהתל"ג אנו נמצאים במקום הראשון בעולם (4.3% בשנת 2009, לעומת 1.8% במוצע למדינות OECD). רוב המימון בישראל מגיע מהסקטור העסקי (79%). הממשלה מממנת באופן ישיר כמעט 5 מיליארד ש"ח מהמו"פ האזרחי ולכך יש להוסיף עוד את המו"פ הביטחוני. בעיקרון המימון הממשלתי אמור להיות מוצא בהתאם לצרכי השוק, ללא הכוונה, מלבד באותם השטחים בהם מאותר "כשלי שוק". אלא שאיתור הכשלים הללו הוא בעייתי בפני עצמו, והשאלה עד כמה צריכה הממשלה לכוון את המו"פ ולהתערב בתחומים אותם היא מממנת, היא סבוכה ביותר. בהשוואה בינלאומית מתברר כי גם כיום ישנה עדיפות לתחומים מסוימים, גם אם אין מדיניות מפורשת הקובעת זאת. כך למשל בישראל מוצא 81% מהמו"פ האזרחי לקידום טכנולוגיות תעשייתיות ולאקדמיה (ות"ת) לעומת כ-41% במוצע למדינות OECD.

עד כמה צריכה המדינה להתערב בנושאים, או בתחומים, בהם ממומן המו"פ האזרחי?

מחד, כול הרעיון של חברה פתוחה מבוססת מידע עם כלכלה בריאה, בנוי על מנגנוני "היד הנעלמה" ועל ההנחה שצרכי המשק, הייזמות הטבעית, והסקרנות האנושית הם מדריכים טובים יותר להתפתחות מאשר הכוונה "מלמעלה".

מאידך, הסכומים הגדולים המוצאים ע"י הממשלה נועדו לקדם את הכלכלה בהתאם ליעדים וערכים שנקבעים ע"י הממשלה, ויש לכן מקום לדעה כי על הממשלה לכוון את מאמצי המו"פ.

מושב המו"פ בכנס הרצלייה עסק בשאלות המרכזיות הרלוונטיות לדילמה זו:

- איפה עובר האיזון הנכון בין שתי המגמות – יד חופשית או הכוונת המו"פ?
- מהו האיזון הנכון בין מדיניות ניטרלית ובין מדיניות מכוונת?
- האם הממשלה צריכה לבחור תחומים מועדפים? אם כן – מהי המתודולוגיה לבחירתם?
- מהם הכלים הנכונים לקביעת מדיניות ממשלתית בתחומי המו"פ?
- עד כמה דרוש תיאום ומדיניות אחידה בין גופי הממשלה המממנים את המו"פ?

חלק זה מתבסס על דיון הפאנל שהתקיים במסגרת הכנס.

מחקר ופיתוח מדעיים וטכנולוגיים הפכו בעשורים האחרונים לנושאים הנמצאים במרכז תשומת הלב והעשייה של ממשלות בעולם מתוך חשיבותם המכרעת לעוצמת המדינה ולחוסנה הכלכלי. פעילות מו"פ נחשבת כמנוף לצמיחה מתמשכת ברת-קיימא המבטיחה חדשנות ותחרותיות של המשק בכלכלה הגלובלית. ברמה הלאומית מערכת המו"פ מורכבת ממערכת ההשכלה הגבוהה, שבמרכזה אוברסיטאות ומכוני המחקר, הממשלה כגורם רגולציה והתעשייה. גישות עדכניות כוללות גם הבחנה בין פירמות גדולות לבין פירמות בינוניות וקטנות, ויזמים (שיכולים גם להיות אנשי אקדמיה או שכירים בתעשייה). הגופים העוסקים במו"פ נתפשים גם כאיברים במערכת אקולוגית ("אקו-סיסטם") המקיימים מערכת קשרים דו-כיוונית ורב-מימדית מורכבת ביניהם, כששינוי באחד משפיע על כל היתר.

דימוי ה"אקו-סיסטם" התחזק מאד בשנים האחרונות כתוצאה מההתקרבות שבין מדע ליישומים טכנולוגיים הנגזרים ממנו, התפתחות עיסוק מדעי בינתחומי וההכרה בערך הטמון ברעיונות העשויים לצמוח במקומות שונים במערכת ומחוצה לה. במערכת שכזו פועלים בו-זמנית, ובלגיטימציה שווה, הן מוטיבציות מסחריות והן מחקר מוטה סקרנות. הקשר החזק שנוצר בין פעילות מדע, פיתוח טכנולוגי וכלכלת שוק מציב את החדשנות כיעד אופרטיבי המקנה לכלכלה הלאומית את העוצמה והיחידניות המבוקשים. הצבת החדשנות כיעד מקנה למושג ה"רעיון" משמעות מרכזית בשיח העדכני הקשור במו"פ. "רעיון" יכול להתייחס לשאלות המבקשות לבחון היבט חדש של תופעות, לפתרון חדשני לבעיות מוכרות, לזיהוי צורך וכד'. "רעיון" נתפש גם כמושג קומפקטי שיכול להתפתח בקרב אנשים יצירתיים, כאינדיבידואל או כקבוצה, בכל מקום, ולעבור בירור ופיתוח בכל מקום אחר. במסגרת המערכת האקולוגית רעיונות יכולים להתפתח באקדמיה ולהגיע לכדי יישום, או לצמוח בשוק או בתעשייה, להגיע לביור באקדמיה ולהתפתח משם לפיתוח יישומי ומסחרי. באופן כללי ניתן לומר כי תפישה רווחת רואה את האינדיבידואל כ"יחידת הייצור" הפורה ביותר של רעיונות ולכן מדיניות לעידוד חדשנות כוללת מסגרות חופשיות יותר עבור עובדים מתאימים. זאת לצד היבט מבני השם דגש על עידוד החלפה ומעבר ידע, הן במסגרת מערכות ממשלתיות בירוקרטיות והן במסגרת תאגידים עסקיים גדולים. חשוב לציין כי קשה מאד להעריך א-פריורית ערכיותם של רעיונות והצלחתם המדעית והמסחרית, ישנה נטייה לראות רעיונות שמתפתחים באופן כמעט אקראי במערכת כמוצלחים יותר מבחינה מסחרית מול כאלה שנוצרים בתהליך מתוכנן.<sup>1</sup>

ההכרה בערך החדשנות ובקשר שבין כל חלקי מערכת המו"פ, כפי שבאים לידי ביטוי במסגרת דימוי המערכת האקולוגית, הביא מדינות רבות בעולם למסקנה כי יש לקיים מערכת תיאום והכוונה ממשלתית של כלל פעילות המו"פ ברמה הלאומית כדי להבטיח תנאים מיטביים ליצירה של "אקו-סיסטם". בחינה של פעילות מו"פ ברמה הלאומית הכוללת מגלה כי בתחום זה מתקיימים עיוותים מבניים בלתי נמנעים, בראשם ההשקעה העצומה הנדרשת לצורך הקמה ותפעול של תשתיות מחקר והכשרת כח אדם ולצד קושי של הסקטור הפיננסי להתמודד עם הסיכונים הכרוכים בהשקעה, עם ההיקף ועם משך הזמן הנדרש עד להשגת תשואה על ההשקעה והסיכון. הממשלה, או ארגון רב לאומי, הם הגורמים היחידים המסוגלים לטפל בעיוותים וב"כשלי שוק" מבניים הקשורים בפעילות המו"פ. הממשלה היא הגורם היחיד המסוגל לספק את התנאים להתפתחות של מערכת אקולוגית וכן לקדם מבחינה לאומית שימוש אופטימלי במשאבים וזאת אפילו במקרה האמריקאי בו קיימת כלכלת שוק חזקה ורחבה, ומערכת פיננסית משוכללת. ההוצאה הלאומית הכוללת על מו"פ בארה"ב הסתכמה בשנת 2010 בכ-395.8 מיליארד דולר (כ-2.8% מהתוצר), כשמתוכה 65% מקורם בתעשייה כשהממשלה אחראית לנתח נכבד של 28%<sup>2</sup> תכניות מו"פ לאומיות אינן חידוש לכשעצמו, וממשלות עסקו מאז העידן התעשייתי בפיתוח תשתיות מחקר ובנגזרות טכנולוגיות שלהם, אלא שהעיסוק המסורתי במו"פ התמקד במוצרים ציבוריים ולא כלל את הסקטור העסקי והאזרחי כשותף שווה משקל. תכניות המו"פ הלאומיות העדכניות כוללות גם שילוב הדוק של הסקטור העסקי והאזרחי כשתפישת ה"אקו-סיסטם" משמשת כקו מנחה בעיצובן.

תכניות מו"פ לאומיות של שני העשורים האחרונים מתאפיינות בניסיון מודע מלהמנע מרמת תכנון שליטה ובקרה בסגנון "קומוניסטי", אך מאידך להבטיח את היתרונות אותם מקנה תכנון מרכזי ארוך טווח. באופן כללי נראה ופעילות ממשלתית שתכליתה טיפוח "אקו-סיסטם" שהתנאי לקיומו הוא תנועה דו-כיוונית של רעיונות ומידע בין כל יחידות המערכת. הפעילות הממשלתית משתדלת להתבצע כ"הכוונה רכה" של פרויקטים המתקשרים למספר תחומים כלליים המוגדרים בתכנית המו"פ הלאומית. ההכוונה הממשלתית במסגרת זו מחייבת עיצוב מערכת בעלת רכיבים תכנוניים TOP-DOWN ובה-בעת מערכת גמישה דיה לאיתור וקליטה BOTTOM-UP של רעיונות וידע שנוצרו במקומות שונים במערכת האקולוגית: בתעשייה, באקדמיה ובשוק עצמו. קביעת האיזון בין שני היבטים אלה היא קשה, במיוחד לנוכח התרבות הארגונית המאפיינת ממשלות. תרבות ארגונית הכוללת בירוקרטיה היררכית ורמות גבוהות של פיקוח ובקרה. חשוב לציין שמודל אינטר-אקטיבי זה נוגע בעיקר למידע ורעיונות אך הוא איננו מחליף את מחזור המו"פ המסורתי בו מתבצע תהליך חד-כיווני ממחקר בסיסי<sup>3</sup>, דרך מחקר יישומי ועד פיתוח אפליקציות שימושיות או מסחריות. תנועת המידע מאפשרת הנעת מחזורי מו"פ חדשניים ויעילים יותר ולעתים קרובות בעלי ערך כלכלי רב יותר. באופן כללי ניתן לאפיין תכניות מו"פ לאומיות כתוכניות הכוללות מפת דרכים ארוכת טווח לפיתוח תשתיות מחקר (ראה הרחבה בהמשך) וכתכניות המציעות כלים לפיתוח רעיונות ומימושם בכל הצירופים המקובלים במו"פ העכשווי: כלים המיועדים ליזם או החוקר היחיד, קבוצות מחקר, מערכי מחקר ציבוריים ופרטיים, למטרות מדעיות טהורות ולמטרות מסחריות. בנוסף מאפשרות תכניות המו"פ פעילות בצירופים שונים של האלמנטים הנזכרים לעיל, מדען במוסד ציבורי הפועל במסגרת תאגיד מסחרי, תאגיד מסחרי המבצע מחקר במוסד ציבורי וכד'<sup>4</sup>.

1 ראה זאב תדמור, "המדיניות הלאומית במדע וטכנולוגיה של מדינת ישראל". מוסד שמואל נאמן, הטכניון (2011). תדמור עוסק בשאלה תוך דיון וסקירה מקיפה של פיתוח מדיניות מדע לאומית.

2 מתבסס על נתוני קרן המטבע הבינלאומית כפי שמצוטטים בתחזית המו"פ העולמית של (R&D Magazine (Dec. 2010 <http://www.rdmag.com/Featured-Articles/2010/12/Policy-And-Industry-Government-Funding-2011-Global-RD-Funding-Forecast-Stability>Returns-To-RD-Funding>

בסין, מקום שני בעולם מבחינת ההקצאה הלאומית למו"פ הגיע היקף ההשקעה במו"פ ל-141.4 מיליארד דולר בשנת 2010. בסין אחראית הממשלה ל-75% מההשקעה במו"פ לעומת 21% שמקורם בתעשייה (השקעה מצד חברות זרות המפעילות מרכזי פיתוח בסיסי).

3 ראה גם הערת שוליים מס' 5

4 במקרה הישראלי למשל, משרד המדען הראשי במשרד התמ"ת מפעיל כ-30 מסגרות מימון שונות האמורות להתאים לכל הצירופים המקובלים.

## הגדרת יעדי מו"פ לאומיים

נקודת המוצא להכונה הממשלתית היא ניתוח והגדרה של יעדי מו"פ לאומיים. כחלק מעיקרון ה"הכונה הרכה" מוגדרים יעדים אלה כתחומים כלליים והם אינם מפרטים התמחויות או "נישות" בתוכם. לעתים נגזרים תחומים אלה מתכנון אסטרטגי רחב יותר של יעדים לאומיים או על-לאומיים (שינוי אקלים או ביטחון אנרגיה, כמו בתכנית האירופית Europe 2020 אליה מתייחסת תכנית המו"פ שתפורט להלן). הגדרה של תחומי מו"פ לאומיים מבטאת בד"כ הערכה לפיה תחומים אלה מקיימים הן פוטנציאל צמיחה משמעותי מבחינת היקף והן סיכוי טוב למובילות עולמית בכל רמות ה"אקו-סיסטמה", משלב המחקר הבסיסי ועד לישומים ואפליקציות. שיקול זה קשור ליכולתיה של אותה מדינה, מבחינת יכולת כלכלית ותשתית וניסיון קיימים בנקודת המוצא של התכנית. במקרים מסויימים מיקוד תחומי המו"פ נובע בראש ובראשונה מצורך לאומי ספציפי, לעתים בעל פוטנציאל שוק עולמי אך זאת כשיקול משני ולא הכרחי. ההשקעה הישראלית במו"פ ביטחוני, או ההשקעה הסינית בטכנולוגיה לפיתוח מקורות מים הן דוגמאות לשיקולים מסוג זה.

הגדרת תחומי המו"פ הלאומי משמשת כבסיס לפעילות הכונה ממשלתית המתבצעת באמצעות שלושה כלים מרכזיים: 1. תכניות מימון, 2. תכניות לפיתוח כח אדם, 3. הקמה, תיאום וארגון של תשתיות מחקר. בכל הנוגע לתכניות מימון ישיר של פרויקטים (להבדיל ממימון של תשתיות מחקר) תפקידה של הממשלה מתמקד בעיקר בשלבים האחרונים של מעגל המו"פ<sup>5</sup>. רמת אי-הוודאות הכרוכה בפיתוח מוצרים ושירותים חדשניים נחשבת בעיני המערכת הפיננסית כגבוהה מדי וכחורגת מנורמת הסיכון בה היא פועלת. פעילות מו"פ נחשבת מבחינה סטטיסטית כפעילות מסוכנת שקשה מאד להעריך לגביה הסתברויות הצלחה או את התנאים שיובילו להצלחה. ניסיון השנים האחרונות מראה כי גם גופי מימון שמודל פעילותם מותאם לרמות גבוהות אלה של אי-וודאות, קרנות הון-סיכון למשל, מתקשות להעריך רעיונות ופרוייקטים בתחומים חדשניים שלא קיימת לגביהם היסטוריה של הצלחה מסחרית או אירועים של תשואה גבוהה על ההשקעה (אירועי "אקזיט"). ולכן נמנעות מלבצע השקעה. מבחינה זו תכניות המימון הממשלתיות לפרוייקטים הן בגדר טיפול בכשל שוק, המתקיים בעיקר ביחס לשלבים ראשוניים בפיתוח רעיון, שלב ה-SEED וה- PRE-SEED, שלבים קונספטואליים "בוסריים", טרם הוכחת התכנות טכנית או/ו מסחרית. הממשלה מממנת פרויקטים מסוג זה בד"כ תמורת שיתוף ברווחים או זכויות בקניין הרוחני של הפרוייקט. היזמים או הגופים המעורבים בפרוייקט אינם שותפים למקרה של הפסד ההשקעה.

במסגרת תכניות המימון הממשלתי מושם דגש מיוחד על עידוד פעילות בפרוייקטים שמקורם בארגונים קטנים ובינוניים (SME), הן משום חשיבותם המשקית והן משום ערכיותם הגבוהה בפיתוח חדשנות. ניסיון שני העשורים האחרונים מצביע על מקומן של יזמות אלה בשמירה על חיוניות המשק, בשמירה על גמישותו, תרומתו לצמיחה ולפעילות הכלכלית וביכולתו לאמץ ולפתח רעיונות חדשים. מדובר באיכויות שקשה מאד להשיגן במסגרת תאגידים גדולים ומבוססים, ובמיוחד לא במסגרת תאגידית ממשלתית.

היבט תכנוני נוסף לסדרי העדיפויות בתחום המו"פ אותן מגדירה הממשלה קשור לפיתוח תשתיות מחקר ותכניות הכשרה של כח אדם. להיבטים אלה משמעות אסטרטגית עקב המשאבים הגדולים הנדרשים לפיתוחם ומשמעותן ארוכת הטווח של החלטות המתקבלות ביחס אליהם<sup>6</sup>. במדינות רבות נמצאים היבטים אלה במרכז תכנית המו"פ הלאומית מבחינת תקציב ותשומת לב. לעומת תכניות המימון שנועדו לקידום פרויקטים מבוססי רעיון או קונספט, תשתיות מחקר והכשרת כח אדם מוגדרים באופן רחב יותר, כתוך המאפשר את פיתוחם של הרעיונות והיישומים והם מתייחסים לשלבים המוקדמים של תהליך המו"פ. מחקר בסיסי מוגדר בהקשר זה כמחקר המכוון להגדלת הידע וההבנה של תופעות ללא תכלית מסחרית או יישומית מיידי<sup>7</sup>. מחקר בסיסי, ובעיקר תשתית לעריכת מחקר בסיסי, הוא תחום יקר מאד, במיוחד אם מדובר בתשתית מחקרית האמורה להציב את המדינה כמובילה עולמית בתחום מסויים. אחת המגמות המרכזיות בתחום המחקר הבסיסי הוא התארגנות רב-לאומית וסינדיקציה של תשתיות מחקר מתקדמות לצורך הוזלה יחסית של עלות השימוש וההקמה של המתקנים. ישנם מקרים, דוגמת מעבדות CERN בז'נבה בהן מספר מדינות שותפות למימון הפרוייקט כשמדינות נוספות מוזמנות לרכוש "זמן שימוש" לביצוע מחקרים במסגרתו. לעתים, בעיקר ביחס למחקר גנרי<sup>8</sup>, נוצרות שותפויות מחקר הכוללות מספר מדינות ואף גופים מסחריים פרטיים המתעניינים בנושא המחקר. מדובר על תפישה מרחיבה שאף כוללת במערכת מימד ש"פ רב-לאומי. מדיניות מו"פ עדכנית כוללת מרכיבים רבים של תיאום בינלאומי ועידוד חילופי ידע ונהלים להעברת טכנולוגיות.

נושא פיתוח והכשרת כח אדם הוא משלים לפעילות פיתוח תשתיות מחקר וכאמור יכול אף להיחשב כחלק מהן. הכשרה זו כוללת מימד של ביקוש החל משלב בית הספר (למשל מספר התלמידים הניגשים להיבחן במתמטיקה או פיזיקה ברמת 5 יחידות) ודרך השלבים השונים במערכת ההשכלה הגבוהה. מימד נוסף הוא פיתוח פעילותם של חוגי לימוד ותכניות לימודים באוניברסיטאות בהתאם לתכנית המו"פ הלאומית. השגת רמה גבוהה של הכשרה כוללת כמובן פעילות מחקרית ומכאן שמתקיים קשר הדוק בין רמת תשתיות המחקר ורמת ההוראה. תכניות מו"פ כמו זו היפנית או זו של סינגפור נוקבות בעידים כמותיים דוגמת מספר פרסומים מדעיים ומספר של תלמידי דוקטורט ומתמחי פוסט-דוקטורט הקשורים בתחומים בהם מתמקדת התכנית. תכנית המו"פ היפנית של שנת 2001 כללה תכנית להכפלה של מספר תלמידי הדוקטורט בתחומים הרלוונטיים ואף הציגה יעד שאפתני של 30 זוכי פרס נובל תוך 50 שנה.

במסגרת מודל ה"אקו-סיסטם" האקדמיה ואנשיה אינם מתקשרים אך ורק למחקר בסיסי והכשרה אלא גם לשלבים המאוחרים, הישומיים יותר, של מערכת המו"פ. אנשי אקדמיה נחשבים כמקור מרכזי לרעיונות בעלי פוטנציאל ערך גבוה, כמרכזי ידע וכבעלי ניסיון מעשי במחקר<sup>9</sup>. מדיניות מו"פ שתכליתה חיזוק מאפייני המערכת האקולוגית כוללת רכיבים שנועדו לעודד יחידים לשתף ולהעביר ידע בין מקומות שונים במערכת. במקרה של אנשי אקדמיה מדובר למשל על מסגרת מיסוי המעודדת פיצול המשרה בין האוניברסיטה או מכון המחקר ובין

5 התייחסות שלבית לתהליך המו"פ, משלב המחקר הבסיסי ועד לאפליקציה, מצריכה לעתים פירוט ברזולוציה גבוהה יותר. השלבים האחרונים של התהליך כוללים: הגדרת קונספט, הוכחת הקונספט (היינו בנייה של אב-טיפוס), בחינה של הקונספט, הדגמה והרצה של "פילוט" בתנאי שטח, עיבוד הממצאים וגיבוש מפרט לתחילת שימוש/יצור. שלבים אלה כוללים פעילות נלווית הנוגעת לקבלת משוּב ממשתמשים, עיבודו והטמעתו, פעילות הקשורה בתקינה, רישום פטנטים וכן הקמת מערך תמיכה במשתמשי הפילוט.

6 תשתיות מחקר לאומיות מוגדרות כמתקני מחקר יקרים במיוחד שתכליתם השגת פריצת דרך או "דחיפת חזית המחקר" המוקמים באתר אחד המאפשר גישה ושיתוף פעולה של גורמים נוספים באקדמיה, בממשלה ובתעשייה.

7 מדרוך פרסקטי FRASCATI MANUAL של ארגון OECD משמש לרוב כמדגיר מושגים לניתוח מדיניות ופעילות מו"פ. ראה: [http://www.oecd.org/document/6/0,3343,en\\_2649\\_34451\\_33828550\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_00.htm](http://www.oecd.org/document/6/0,3343,en_2649_34451_33828550_1_1_1_00.htm)

8 מו"פ גנרי מתייחס למחקר טרום-תחרותי שאינו בעל משמעות מסחרית מיידי.

9 קהילת המו"פ הישראלית הישראלית למשל מונה כ-17,800 אלף איש לערך, כשמתוכם רק 1,800 מדענים הם אנשי אקדמיה והיתר משתייכים לתעשייה. הנתונים מצוטטים מהרצאתו של משה אורון, לשעבר ראש הוועדה לקשרי אקדמיה-תעשייה של המולמו"פ במסגרת מושב בנושא תשתיות מחקר, כנס הרצליה העשירי, 2010.



התעשייה, הקמת תאגידים אוניברסיטאיים שמטפלים בפיתוח יישומי של רעיונות אנשי סגל תוך שמירה על זכויותיהם במיזם<sup>10</sup>, אפשרות לביצוע שנת שבתון בתעשייה וכו'.

כביטוי לדומיננטיות הממשלה במסגרת המערכת האקולוגית של המו"פ הוקמו במקומות רבים בעולם גופים לאומיים העוסקים בגיבוש תכנית המו"פ הלאומית והמדיניות הנגזרת ממנה בנפרד מעיסוק בניהול השותף של ביצוע התכנית. בישראל הוקמה מועצה לאומית למחקר ופיתוח בשנת 2003 והיא פועלת במסגרת משרד המדע. הצורך בהגדרה של גופים יעודיים למטרה זו נובע מהצורך בהתמקצעות הנדרשת לניתוח והערכת מגמות טכנולוגיות, ניהול מו"פ וידע כדיספלינה מובחנת וכן באיסוף וניטור מידע ונתונים הקשורים בפעילות המו"פ ונגזרותיה. היבט חשוב נוסף בהפרדה בין גיבוש מדיניות מו"פ וניהולה בפועל הוא הצורך לנתק את החשיבה על המו"פ משיקולים פוליטיים, ארגוניים וכלכליים ספציפיים של שחקנים המשפיעים על המערכת וכן מה"רעש" שעשוי הניהול היומיומי להביא להטיה שגויה של התכנית<sup>11</sup>. הגדרת תכנית אב למו"פ מאפשרת ביזור פעולות התקצוב וגיוון שיטות הניהול והביצוע. הקצאה לאומית למו"פ בתחום האנרגיה למשל יכולה להתבצע באמצעות מינהלת מו"פ מרכזית ובמקביל באמצעות משרד האנרגיה, וכן במימון ישיר או באמצעות הטבות מס, כמו במקרה האמריקאי.

שתי תכניות מו"פ גדולות מדגימות את העקרונות שהובאו להלן, תכנית המו"פ האירופית ותכנית המו"פ של סין. תכנית המו"פ האירופית, המכונה תכנית המסגרת השביעית למחקר ופיתוח של המועצה האירופית למחקר, היא דוגמה לתיאור קשר זה בין הכוונה ממשלתית, פתיחות לרעיונות "מלמטה", עידוד חילופי ידע והפרייה הדדית באמצעות עבודה בקבוצות ומימון. התכנית השביעית מוגדרת למסגרת הזמן שבין שנת 2006 ושנת 2013 והיא בהיקף כולל של 50 מיליארד יורו. 64% מסכום זה מוקצים למו"פ יישומי, 15% לרעיונות למחקר בסיסי, 11% לפיתוח הון אנושי ו-10% לפיתוח תשתיות מחקר, פרוייקטים בסקטור העסקים הבינוניים והעסקיים, מדע בקהילה וקשרי חוץ. התכנית עוסקת במספר תחומים רחבים: בריאות, חקלאות, אנרגיה, תקשורת, סביבה, תחבורה ואבטחה. תחומים אלה מפורטים באמצעות פירוט "קול קורא" המזמין גורמים מהאקדמיה ומהתעשייה להשתתף בפרוייקטים המתייחסים לשלבים שונים בין מדע לטכנולוגיה, ובין טכנולוגיה ליישום. מקור היוזמה לפרסום ה"קול הקורא" יכול להיות מטה התכנית או הצעה המוגשת מצד גורם אקדמי או יזמי אחר (מכונה "שותף יוזם" המקבל את המימון הגבוה ביותר לפרוייקט) ועוברת תהליך הערכה ועיבוד בידי צוות התכנית. הפרוייקטים הממומנים במסגרת התכנית מבוססים על שותפות של מספר שחקנים (בד"כ 4-5 שותפים) כשהשתתפותם ממומנת לעתים באופן מלא ולעתים באופן חלקי ע"י מדינת המקור שלהם.

קבוצות מו"פ מסוג זה משיגות שני יעדים. הראשון הוא יעול השימוש בתשתיות המחקר והוזלה משמעותית של עלות המחקר עבור השחקן הבודד. למשל חברה בתחום הביו-טכנולוגיה שמקבלת במסגרת הפרוייקט נגישות לניסויים קליניים או מאגרי מידע שאין ביכולתה להשיגם בעצמה במסגרת משאביה והתשתית העומדת לרשותה. יעד שני הוא השפעת העבודה המשותפת על קצב התקדמות הפרוייקט, הפרייה הדדית ויצירת קשרים בין אישיים. ניסיון העבר מעיד על העוצמה שמקנים קשרי מדע לאיכות ולקצב הפיתוח המדעי-טכנולוגי. לעתים מדובר על "קשרי מדע" בלתי רצוניים בצורה של ריגול.

דוגמה חשובה נוספת לתכנית מו"פ לאומית היא הדוגמה הסינית. חשיבותה נובעת מהיעדים השאפתניים שהציבה ומהיקפה העצום. המהדורה העדכנית של תכנית המו"פ הסינית פורסמה בחודש אוקטובר 2010 והיא מציבה כיעד מרכזי את הצבת סין כמרכז עולמי מוביל לחדשנות עד שנת 2020 וכח מדעי עולמי מוביל עד שנת 2050. בניסוח המשתייך לתחום הפולקלור מעוניינת סין להיחלץ מדימויה כ"מפעל" של העולם ואף להפיתע באמצעות מהפיכה טכנולוגית בסגנון ההפתעה שיצרה ברה"מ עם שיגור הספוטניק בשנת 1957. סין מנסה כיום להגיע לפריצת דרך ממוקדת בתחום הפעילות בחלל, הרכב החשמלי ובתחום המיחשוב. תכנית המו"פ הסינית פועלת במסגרת ארגונית שנוצרה בשנות ה-80 כתכנית 863 למו"פ יישומי, וכתכנית 973 לפיתוח תשתיות מחקר<sup>12</sup>. במהדורתה העדכנית מודגש פיתוח של יכולות תעשיתיות בשבעה תחומים מובילים: אנרגיה ואנרגיה ירוקה, תקשורת, ביוטכנולוגיה, כלי טיס אזרחיים וטכנולוגית חלל, הנדסת חומרים וכלי רכב חשמליים. בכלום מעוניינת סין לפתח תשתית ידע עצמאית לצורך פיתוח תעשייה וייתר את הצורך ביבוא ידע. התכנית מתוקצבת בכ-1.5 טריליון דולר. בשנת 2010 היתה ההוצאה הלאומית למו"פ בסין כ-13% מההוצאה העולמית<sup>13</sup>. גם התכנית הסינית, המתבצעת במסגרת תרבות בירוקרטית כבדה של תכנון מרכזי, כוללת התייחסות וניסיון לעודד יוזמה וקבלת רעיונות "מלמטה". בפועל מתייחס הדבר לעידוד תאגידים בינלאומיים להקים מרכזי מו"פ בסין. תכנית המו"פ הסינית אינן מותאמת לפעילותם של גורמים קטנים ואף בינוניים.

## מו"פ לאומי - מערכת המו"פ של ישראל

ישראל היא מקרה מיוחד בהקשר זה מאחר ומתקיימת בה מערכת מו"פ משוכללת וחיונית אך בה בעת מדובר במערכת שהתפתחה אורגנית על בסיס ההתפתחות במו"פ הביטחוני באופן בלתי מאוזן וללא תכנית אב. במערכת זו נוצרו רכיבים מפותחים וחזקים דוגמת מערכת המו"פ הביטחוני ומשרד המדען הראשי ולצדם רכיבים מפותחים פחות או אף מנוונים דוגמת תשתית למחקר בסיסי וקושי במימון תכניות הכשרה מתקדמות במסגרת האקדמיה (הכוונה להשקעה בתשתיות מחקר, במימון מחקרים שוטף וארוך טווח, למלגות פוסט-דוקטורט ולתקנים חדשים של משרות הוראה ומחקר).

עד אמצע שנות ה-90 דמה המו"פ הישראלי במאפייניו לשילוב שנוצר בארה"ב ובבריטניה במהלך מלחמת העולם השנייה ושהמחיש את היתרונות הגלומים בחיבור שבין אנשי מדע, תשתית תעשייתית וממשלה. בדומה לחיבור שנוצר במהלך מלחמת העולם בין צורך קונקרטי בעל משמעות לאומית קיומית ואנשי מדע ואקדמיה מהשורה הראשונה גם בארץ התקיים חיבור דומה שהביא להישגים יוצאי

10 מודל זה כולל גם התייחסות לרעיונות שמקורם במערכת הבריאות: בתי חולים, מעבדות וכד'.

11 הצגה של מגוון השיקולים והלחצים הכרוכים בניהול מו"פ ברמה הלאומית (פוליטיים, טכנולוגיים, כלכליים וביטחוניים) מופיעה בספרו של עוזי עילם, לשעבר ראש הוועדה לאנרגיה אטומית וראש מפא"ת. עוזי עילם, קשת עילם. תל אביב: ידיעות אחרונות (2009).

12 בתכנית הסינית מבטאות שתי הספרות הראשונות את השנה והסיפורה השלישית מבטאת את החודש בו הונהגה התכנית. תכנית 985 למשל, מחודש מאי 1998, משלימה את תכנית 973 ועוסקת בתכנית להפיכת סין לאוניברסיטאות מופת ברמה העולמית.

13 R&D Magazine, ibid

דופן באיכותם ובמהירות בה תורגמו רעיונות וקונספטים ליישומים מבצעיים. חיבור יחודי זה יצר בהמשך מובילות ישראלית באלקטרוניקה מחשבים ותקשורת שמקורם במו"פ ביטחוני על כל היבטיו, בהם הכשרה מעשית של מהנדסים ואנשי מקצוע. מבחינה זו ממלא העיסוק במו"פ ביטחוני תפקיד שניתן להגדירו כמחקר בסיסי או מחקר טרום-פיתוח. ההישגים של ישראל בכל הנוגע לחדשנות ויכולת לממש רעיונות טכנולוגיים מבחינה מסחרית ("אומת הסטרט-אפ") הם תוצר של התפתחות אורגנית, כמעט בלתי מכוונת, על בסיס הניסיון והידע שהתפתח במערכת הביטחון בהתאם לצרכיה הספציפיים. המוקד הביטחוני הוא המקור למו"פ היישומי שמשמש כבסיס לתעשייה העילית של ישראל. התפתחות נסיבתית זו הביאה את מערכת המו"פ של ישראל להיות מורכבת ממרכז כובד בעל אוריינטציה ביטחונית, שבמרכזו נמצאת מפא"ת, וממרכז יישומי שהתפתח ממנו שבמרכזו נמצא משרד המדען הראשי של משרד התמ"ת. מבנה זה בא לידי ביטוי בחלוקת תקציבי המו"פ האזרחי. מתוך הוצאה של 34 מיליארד שקל על מו"פ אזרחי בשנת 2009, שהם כאמור כ-4.4% מהתמ"ג (ההקצאה הגבוהה בעולם), כ-80% מתבצע בסקטור התעשייתי, כשרק 13% מכלל השקעות המו"פ הן השקעות במחקר בסיסי. זאת לעומת ממוצע של 22% הוצאה על מו"פ בסיסי בקרב מדינות ה-OECD<sup>14</sup>. יתר על כן, החלק הארי בהקצאת תקציבי המו"פ מתבצע בתחום התקשורת והמחשבים (מכונה בשיח הציבורי כ"היי-טק") שהתפתחו במסגרת הפיתוח הביטחוני ובהם לישראל יתרון תחרותי מובהק בשוק העולמי.

המדען הראשי במשרד התמ"ת (להלן המדע"ר) הוא הזרוע המרכזית להקצאת תקציבים ממשלתיים לפעילות מו"פ מסחרית-יישומית בסקטור האזרחי. מלבד הקצאה וניהול של כספי מו"פ ממשלתי עוסק המדע"ר בפעילויות נוספות בהן קשרי חוץ, איסוף נתונים ומחקר. אחת מפעילויות המדע"ר לצד מפא"ת (מפא"ת: מנהל המו"פ ולתשתיות טכנולוגיות במשרד הביטחון), הוא שחקן דומיננטי בפעילות המו"פ האזרחי בישראל, כשדומיננטיות זו מבטאת את המשקל הגבוהה של המו"פ היישומי בארץ. רכיבים רבים בעבודתם של מפא"ת ומשרד המדע"ר מזכירים במאפייניהם עבודת מטה שבמדינות אחרות מתבצעת בגופי מו"פ לאומיים, דוגמת מועצה לאומית למדע. ההצלחה המוכחת של שני הגופים מעידה על איכותם ועל תרומתם לעוצמה הלאומית ולמשק, אלא שבמקרה שהתפתחות אורגנית זו של מערכת המו"פ הלאומית מתמקדת במקטע מדע-טכנולוגי אחד, מחשבים ומידע, ופעולתם של שני הגופים אינה חלק מתכנית אב לאומית למו"פ, תכנית האמורה לשקלל את כל היבטיו של נושא המו"פ, להציג חזון ארוך טווח ותכניות למימושו. התמקדות זו אף כוללת סיכון אסטרטגי מאחר והיא מזניחה פיתוח של תחומים אחרים.

אחת מפעילויות המדע"ר שניתן לראות בה כבעלת משמעות החורגת מהתחום היישומי והנוגעת לתחומים מוקדמים יותר במחקר בסיסי או הטרם יישומי (applied research - expository research) היא תכנית מגנט (מו"פ גנרי טכנולוגי). תכנית זו מיועדת לקידום התפתחות של קבוצות המורכבות מפירמות עסקיות וגורמים באקדמיה בעלי עניין משותף במחקר של נושא מסוים. מדובר במחקר גנרי, היינו כזה המתייחס לרמת הידע הטרם-תחרותי. פעילות המחקר במסגרת זו מתבצעת ברובה המכריע במימון משרד המדע"ר. שילוביות מסוג זה בין גורמי תעשייה ואקדמיה בהיקפים גדולים יותר היא חלק גם בתכנית המו"פ של האיחוד האירופי, בה מוזמנים לקחת חלק גם גורמים ישראלים מהתעשייה והאקדמיה. היבט נוסף של קבוצות המחקר מסוג זה ייעול השימוש בתשתיות מחקר, כשחברים בקונצורסיום המתארגן במסגרת מגנט יכולים להתשמש במתקנים הקיימים באוניברסיטאות או בתעשייה ובכך מיייתרים את הצורך בהקמת תשתית מקבילה וכן מעודדים חילופי ידע ורעיונות דו-כיווניים. גם משרד המדע"ר מתמודד עם הצורך באיזון בין הכוונה ותכנון ובין יכולת לאתר ולטפל ברעיונות המתייחסים לתחומים הנמצאים מחוץ לתכנית. ניסיון העבודה של משרד המדע"ר מגלה פתיחות המבוססת על איכות היזם, קבוצת היזמים או הארגון היוזם ומאפשרת מתן מימון לפרוייקטים מכל תחום. פעילות משרד המדע"ר לאורך השנים היתה חלק מרכזי בעיצוב האתוס היזמי המיוחס לישראל ("אומת הסטרט-אפ").

לצד מפא"ת והמדען הראשי כגורמים מרכזיים, פועל בארץ גוף נוסף, תל"מ (תשתיות לאומיות למדע) המזכיר במאפייניו פעולת מטה ברמה הלאומית. מדובר בגוף וולונטרי המכנס נציגים מכל הגופים במערכת המו"פ הישראלית (מפא"ת, ות"ת, מדע"ר, משרד המדע, משרד האוצר ומדענים בכירים באקדמיה). הגוף הוקם ביוזמת האקדמיה הישראלית למדעים בשנת 1997 לצורך ריכוז מאמץ בפיתרון בעיות וחסימים ממוקדים בתחום תשתיות מחקר פיזיות. יחסית לסכומים המושקעים במו"פ בארץ מדובר על סכומים קטנים יחסית, כשלאורך שנות פעולתו הסתכם היקף הפרוייקטים בהם טיפל בכ-300 מיליון דולר בלבד. תל"מ מבצע מיפוי יעדים וחסימים אסטרטגיים בתשתית המו"פ של ישראל וכן תיעודף, במסגרת אפשרויותיו המוגבלות, של הפרוייקטים השונים. כינוסם של כל הגורמים המעורבים, רמתם הגבוהה של השותפים והקצנצנוס בו מתקבלות החלטותיו מסייע מאד בקידום הפרוייקטים. פורום תל"מ מזוהה עם ההצלחה הישראלית בתחום הננו טכנולוגיה, בפרוייקט זה הצליח הפורום להביא להקצאה של יותר מ-170 מיליון דולר מאז שנת 2003 לפיתוח תשתית מחקרית שהציבה את ישראל בחזית העיסוק העולמי בנושא. מדובר במקרה נדיר ברמה העולמית בו השקעה בסדר גודל צנוע יחסית הצליחה להביא למובילות עולמית תוך פרק זמן קצר. לצד הננו טכנולוגיה עסק תל"מ בפיתוח פרוייקטים נוספים, צנועים בהרבה מבחינה היקפם הכספי, בהם הקמת תשתית תקשורת רחבת פס "אינטרנט דור 2" (השקעה בהיקף 38 מיליון דולר), הקמת מאיץ חלקיקים במרכז הלאומי שורק (25 מיליון דולר) והשתתפות ישראל במתקן הסינכרוטרון האירופי<sup>15</sup>, ה-ESRF בהיקף של 10 מיליון דולר<sup>16</sup>.

באחרונה התווספה דוגמה נוספת של פעילות מו"פ בעלת מאפיינים ומשמעות ארוכת טווח אך שאינה חלק מתכנית אב לאומית. מדובר בתכנית המועצה הלאומית לכלכלה לעידוד פיתוח של תעשיית תחליפי נפט. מדובר בתכנית ממשלתית המתקצבת למשך כעשור בהיקף כולל של מיליארד וחצי שקל. היקף התכנית ומשכה מיועדים להקנות את מרווח ההבשלה המספיק עבור רעיונות וידע משלב גולמי ועד שלב יישומי מסחרי מלא. תכנית זו נחשבת אחת המקיפות בעולם לקידום מו"פ בתחום תחליפי הדלק וגם במסגרתה ישנה תשומת לב לאיזון שבין הכוונה ובין פתיחות לרעיונות מהסביבה. התכנית מגדירה ארבעה תחומים (ביו-דלקים, מצברים, יעילות אנרגטית ודלקים סינטטיים) כתחומי עניין מרכזיים אך היא אינה מגדירה תת-התמחויות במסגרתם. בדומה לפעילות משרד המדע"ר, גם תכנית זו כוללת מיסוד קשרי עבודה עם פרוייקטים דומים במדינות שונות בעולם, ובנוסף מוגדרים במסגרתה הקמתם של מרכזי מצוינות. מרכזים אלה יוקמו במוסדות להשכלה גבוהה ויתוקצבו על בסיס הצטיינות החוקרים והסטודנטים שיועסקו בהם לעבודת מחקר סביב נושאים המוגדרים במסגרת התכנית.

14 זאב תדמור, שם.

15 במסגרת שת"פ זה בוצעו הניסויים בפרוייקט המחקר של זוכת פרס הנובל לכימיה לשנת 2010, עדה יונת ממכון ויצמן למדע.

16 [http://www.academy.ac.il/asp/projects\\_new/projects\\_body.asp?project\\_id=26](http://www.academy.ac.il/asp/projects_new/projects_body.asp?project_id=26)

## סיכום

בשנים האחרונות הפכה החדשנות, והמו"פ שיוצר אותה, לגורם הנתפש כמוביל צמיחה והתעצמות כלכלית כשממשלות ומבנים על-מדיניים הם גורמים הכרחיים בפעילות תקינה וחיונית של מערך מו"פ ציבורי ופרטי. בשני העשורים האחרונים הפכו תכניות המו"פ הלאומי כאמצעי מוביל לעידוד חדשנות ולפיתוח יישומים המתבססים עליה וממצים את הערך הטמון בה. ניהול מערכת מו"פ במסגרת תפישה הרואה פעילות מו"פ כמערכת אקולוגית ("אקו-סיסטם") רחבה, במסגרתה כל הגורמים במערכת נמצאים בזיקה מטריציאית, נחשבת כבסיס המתאים ביותר לעידוד חדשנות ולמיצוי מיטבי של ערכיתה.

מימוש בפועל של עקרונות אלה מחייב מדיניות מו"פ לבצע איזון בין הכוונה "מלמעלה" של מטרות וכיווני מחקר ובין יכולת לספוג ולפתח רעיונות ומגמות שצמחו מחוץ למערכת התכנון, במעבדות מחקר, בשוק, בתעשייה ובקרב יזמים. ניתוח תכניות מו"פ לאומי מגלה כי איזון נדרש זה מתבצע באמצעות "הכוונה רכה" הכוללת הגדרה כללית של מספר נושאים תוך מתן אפשרות לגורמי המחקר עצמם, כמעט מכל סוג וגודל, להעלות הצעות ורעיונות לפיתוחים. תכניות מו"פ לאומיות דומות מאד במרכיביהן במדינות רבות, הן כוללות התייחסות כמעט לאותם נושאים (אנרגיה, חקלאות, בריאות וכד'), וכן באופן בו הן מתבצעות. תכניות המו"פ מבוססות על תכניות מימון המיועדות לסוגים שונים של יוזמות, הממשלה נוטלת על עצמה את הסיכון הפיננסי או את רובו והן שמות דגש עם עידוד יצירת קבוצות עבודה.

המקרה הישראלי הוא מקרה חריג ביחס לפעילות מו"פ לאומית, מרכיבים רבים במקרה הישראלי יצרו בה רמה גבוהה של חדשנות מדעית וטכנולוגית, המבטאים קיומה של מערכת אקולוגית חיונית. לכאורה במקרה הישראלי כלל לא נדרש גיבוש של תכנית אב לאומית למו"פ, כשבמערכת קיימים אלמנטים רבים שהתפתחו אורגנית ללא צורך בתכנון מרכזי ארוך טווח. יחד עם זאת התפתחה בעשור האחרון גישה שמזהה סיכונים רבים בהמשך פעילות מו"פ ללא הכוונה אינטגרטיבית, וטוענת כי המערכת האקולוגית שהתפתחה היא חלקית והתפתחה למעשה סביב תחום יחיד, תחום טכנולוגית המידע שמקורו בפיתוחים צבאיים. תחומים נוספים בהם קיים בישראל פוטנציאל פיתוח של מערכת אקולוגית מלאה, דוגמת תחום החלל, לא התפתחו וייתכן שהדבר נובע מהעדרה של תכנית אב. ריכוז יכולותיה הטכנולוגיות מסחריות של ישראל בתחום המידע גורם לניוון איטי אך מתמשך של תחומי מדע אחרים ובטווח הארוך הוא אף סיכון אסטרטגי.

בשלוש השנים האחרונות ישנם סימנים רבים להכרה ממשלתית בצורך לטיוב מחדש של מערכת המו"פ הישראלית. שורת פעולות הכוללת הזרמה תקציבית חסרת תקדים למערכת ההשכלה הגבוהה, הקמתם של מרכזי מצוינות באונברסיטאות ותכניות מו"פ לעידוד תחומים החורגים מתחומי הפעילות המסורתיים של התעשייה, דוגמת תכנית לפיתוח תחליפי נפט, מעידים כולם על מגמה זו. יחד עם זאת, צעדים אלה עדיין אינם מוגדרים במסגרת של תכנית אב לאומית ארוכת טווח למו"פ.

## הסטת הסחר הישראלי לאסיה: היבטים לגיבוש מדיניות

אורי סלונים

### הקדמה

אחת המגמות החשובות ביותר בהיסטוריה של השנים האחרונות היא התחזקות של כלכלות סין והודו באופן המאיים על הדומיננטיות של ארה"ב ואירופה כמוקדים כלכליים מובילים. על-פי המגמות הנוכחיות תהפוך סין תוך שנים ספורות לכלכלה הגדולה בעולם, ויחד עם הודו ומדינות נוספות באסיה יוכלו לשנות תרבות ונורמות בהתנהגות הכלכלית העולמית. השינוי במבנה הכלכלה העולמית מציב בפני ישראל, כמו מול יתר מדינות העולם, הזדמנויות אך גם סיכונים. כלכלת ישראל היא כלכלה מוטת יצוא הממוקדת כיום בעיקר בשוק האמריקאי ולאחריו בשוק האירופי, כך שהמשך צמיחת המשק הישראלי תלוי במידה מכרעת בפיתוח וצמיחה של היצוא. התחזקותם של השווקים באסיה מצריכה לכאורה שינוי והתאמה של האוריינטציה המסחרית של ישראל, כך שיכוונו לשווקים אלה. התאמה זו נדרשת לצורך מיצוי פוטנציאל הצמיחה הטמון בהם וכן לקזז את החלשות השווקים המערביים, החלשות העשויה לפגוע בהיקף היצוא מישראל.

שינוי והתאמה של האוריינטציה המסחרית לעבר המזרח אינה משימה קלה מאחר והשווקים באסיה מבטאים תרבות עסקית, פוליטית וכלכלית שונה לחלוטין מהשווקים בהם רגילים ארגונים במערב, ובהם ארגונים ישראלים, לפעול. עבור יצואנים ישראלים מציבים שווקים אלה אתגר קשה במיוחד מאחר ובכל המודלים לפעילות ישירה בשווקים אלה מתקיים יתרון מכריע לגודל הפירמה או ליכולתו של היצואן לגייס משאבים כספיים משמעותיים לפיתוח הפעילות באסיה. בתחום מוצרי הצריכה מתקיים קושי נוסף הנוגע לאפיון מוצרים והתאמתם לכח הקנייה, לטעם ולדפוסי הצריכה המתקיימים בשווקים אלה. אל קשיים אלה נוסף קושי נוסף הנובע מהיותם של השווקים הצומחים באסיה מזוהים על ידי חברות וממשלות בעולם כולו כזירות מתאימות לביסוס צמיחה ופיתוח עסקי, וכולן עוסקים בפיתוח מודלים ובפעילות להעמקת הנוכחות בשווקים אלה.

נסיבות אלה מחייבות בחינת עומק של משמעויות הסטת הסחר למזרח עבור המשק הישראלי: במה כרוכה הסטה זו והאם הצעדים שנועדו לממש אותה באים על חשבון הפעילות בשווקים בארה"ב ובאירופה? מהי הסתברות ההצלחה של חברות ישראליות בשווקים באסיה ומהם התחומים ומאפייני הפעילות שיבטיחו את סיכויי הצלחה הגבוהים ביותר עבור חברות ישראליות בשווקים אלה? שאלה חשובה נוספת בהקשר זה היא מידה ואופי המעורבות הממשלתית בכל הקשור להעמקת פעילות היצוא הישראלית בשווקים באסיה.

נייר זה מסכם שני דיונים שהתקיימו במסגרת כנס הרצליה האחד-עשר, האחד מפגש צוות חשיבה שהתכנס לקראת הכנס והשני דיון פאנל שהתקיים במהלך הכנס עצמו. בשני הדיונים לקחו חלק מומחים ואנשי מקצוע המעורבים בחשיבה, בתכנון ובפעילות הקשורה בשאלה מרכזית זו. הנייר מציג את התובנות, הערות והרעיונות שהועלו בדיון ביחס לשאלות הנ"ל, הוא אינו מבטא עמדה רשמית של הגופים אליהם משתייכים המשתתפים. אנו מבקשים להודות למשתתפי הדיונים על נכונותם לסייע לנו בניית הנושא והעלאתו במסגרת הכנס.

סיכום דיוני הכנס ומפגש צוות החשיבה

### יושב ראש הצוות ומנחה המושב

הרצל מקוב, ראש מרכז מורשת מנחם בגין

### עורך

אורי סלונים, המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה

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## שינוי במבנה הכלכלה העולמית ומשמעותה לישראל

התחזקות כלכלות אסיה היא בגדר מגמה מובהקת שתוביל לבסוף לסדר כלכלי-עולמי, במסגרתו יעלה חלקן של כלכלות סין והודו לנתח של 30% עד 40% מהתוצר העולמי, ואילו ארה"ב ואירופה יקטינו את חלקם בתוצר ל-30%. בחינת נתוני הסחר העדכניים של ישראל מגלה כי המשק הישראלי אכן מתאים עצמו לשינוי האמור במבנה הכלכלי העולמי. עפי" נתונים אלה, בשנת 2009 וברבעונים האחרונים של 2010 היצוא הישראלי למדינות אסיה עלה ביותר מ-100%. יחד עם זאת, היבוא ממדינות אלה התרחב גם הוא, ועדיין מתקיים מאזן מסחרי שלילי בין ישראל ואסיה.

הצורך בגיבוש מדיניות יעודית, והגדלת המשאבים המוקצים לצורך הרחבת היצוא לאסיה, הוא בגדר קונצנזוס במערכת הממשלתית ומקובל גם על רבים בסקטור העסקי. קונצנזוס זה מתבסס על הערכה לפיה בטווח הקצר והבינוני צפויות כלכלות אירופה וארה"ב להמשיך ולהתמודד עם בעיות מבניות מדכאות צמיחה, בהן בעיית חוב וגרעונות וכן עם המשבר מוניטרי של גוש היורו. העמקת הסחר עם מדינות אסיה, שצפויות להמשיך ולצמוח בקצב שנתי של 6%-7% במשך העשור הקרוב, עשויה לאפשר למשק הישראלי לקזז את האטה הנובעת מהקשיים באירופה ובארה"ב.

הגדרת מדיניות ממשלתית מתאימה להגדלת היקף היצוא למדינות אסיה היא מורכבת, זאת על רקע העדר היסטוריה ארוכה של יחסי מסחר, ועל רקע העדר היכרות עמוקה עם השווקים, הכלכלות והתרבות המתקיימת בהם. בחלק מהמדינות מתווספים לקשיים אלה סגירות וסרבול בירוקרטי של ממש. נסיבות אלה יוצרות עבור ישראל מספר דילמות בהן צריכה להתחשב מדיניות מוצעת לנושא:

1. הגדרה ותיעדוף מדיניות יעד על פי תכונותיהן: ההתייחסות לאסיה כיחידה אחת היא מטעה. קיימת שונות רבה בין המדינות. האם סין והודו הן קבוצה המתנהגת שונה מיתר מדינות אסיה? האם מדינות אסיה (ללא סין והודו) מתנהגות כמדינות מתפתחות "רגילות", ויש לגבש כלפיהן מדיניות גנרית המתאימה גם לברזיל, מקסיקו וכד'.

2. הגדרה ותיעדוף של מדיניות יעד על פי "קלות" גישה מבחינת ישראל: האם לתעדף מאמצים מדיניים והקצאת כספים ממשלתית בהתאם לקושי של ישראל וישראלים לפעול במדינות השונות? התשובה לדילמה זו היא דו-כיוונית: מיקוד הפעילות במדינות "קלות" יותר לפעילות ישראלית (למשל הודו ביחס לסין) או דווקא למקד את הפעילות במדינות "קשות" יותר לפעילות של ישראל ושל ישראלים. יש לציין כי מדיניות הכוללת מרכיב מתודולוגי של תיעדוף יש בה גם סיכונים אובדן הזדמנויות והזנחת גזרות פעילות העלולות להתברר בדעבד כמחומצות.

3. כלכלות ארה"ב ואירופה הן עדיין שחקניות מרכזיות וחשובות בכלכלה העולמית: גם בתרחישי הצמיחה המיטיבים ביותר עם כלכלות אסיה, ארה"ב ואירופה עדיין נשארות שחקניות חשובות בסחר העולמי. ייתכן וגודלה של כלכלת ישראל מאפשר לה למצות טוב יותר את יחסיה עם שווקים אלה, ובכך להמשיך ולבסס את הצמיחה על יצוא אליהם. אלמנט נוסף, שעשוי להעלות את רמת הסיכון הכרוכה בכיול מחדש של מבנה הסחר הישראלי כלפי אסיה, הוא האפשרות למשבר אסיאתי משנה מגמה ואשר יפריך את התחזיות הנוכחיות. הכלכלה הסינית, למשל, מתבססת על מבנה מוניטרי בעייתי וכן על סביבה פוליטית העשויה להתערער במהירות. בהקשר זה צוינה הכלכלה הדרום קוריאנית ככזו הנשענת על יסודות יציבים מאד, בהם ההסתברות למשבר נמוכה יותר והמאפשרים ספיגה טובה יותר של זעזועים.

4. כדאיות יחסית של הסתת הסחר לאסיה: דילמה זו נוגעת בעיקר למקרים בהם מיקוד הסחר באסיה מתבצע בכלים שמשמעם ויתור על מאמצים לקידום סחר עם אירופה. הכוונה היא בעיקר לדרישות רגולציה מצד השוק האירופי ועלותן למשק. האם ההצטרפות לגוש מדינות ה-OECD (הכולל מדינות מובילות באסיה ובפסיפיק) מאפשר מתן תשומת לב ומשאבים קטנים יותר להיבטי רגולציה הנדרשים לצורך הרחבת הסחר לשוק האירופי?

מעבר לדילמות אלה ישנה שאלה כללית לגבי תפקיד הממשלה כמכוונת בסחר החוץ, לעומת התנהגות הסקטור הפרטי במסגרת כללי ה"יד הנעלמה". נתוני הסחר מעידים כי הסקטור העסקי מתנהג בהתאם למגמות העולמיות, היינו ירידה מסיימת ביצוא לארה"ב ובמקביל עלייה ביצוא לאסיה. ניתוח הנתונים מעלה כי מספרים אלה אינם מצביעים על פריצת דרך בסחר עם אסיה, ויתכן ונדרשת על כן בחינה של תפקיד הממשלה והכלים העומדים לרשותה במשימה זו. ככלל, במדינות אסיה נחשבת מעורבות ממשלתית למרכיב

המעודד פיתוח עסקי, לעתים אף כתנאי הכרחי. סין היא דוגמה מובילה לכך, כמדינה עתירת בירוקרטיה ומסורת בירוקרטית ארוכה, בה פעילות ברמת ממשלה מול ממשלה (בכל הדרגים, מהשלטון המרכזי ועד מנהל מקומי בפרובינציות ובערים) היא כמעט האפשרות היחידה לפיתוח יעיל של עסקים.

ישנם מספר כלים המזוהים כמנופים ממשלתיים לעידוד הסחר עם מדינות אסיה. כלים אלה הם כולם בגדר מאפשרי או מעודדי סחר (Facilitators), יותר מאשר מכווני סחר. האמצעי החשוב ביותר במסגרת זו הם הסכמי סחר חופשי. (ישנם מגעים מתקדמים לגיבוש הסכמי הסכם אס"ח בין ישראל והודו ובין ישראל לדר' קוראיה). לצד אמצעי זה קיימים כלים נוספים, שעלותם התקציבית נחשבת כבינונית ונמוכה:

1. הרחבת המסגרות הממשלתיות לביטוח סיכונים הסחר עם שווקים שונים באסיה: שינוי בהגדרות פעילות החברות לביטוח סיכונים סחר חוץ.
2. פיתוח כלי ביטוחי יעודי להגנה על קניין רוחני/פטנטים בשווקים בעייתיים מבחינה זו. צוין כי מדובר בעלות נמוכה יחסית המתייחסת רק לסיכונים הנובעים מפגיעה בקניין היוצרת הפסד בשווקים אלה.
3. פיתוח מערכת ערביות והלוואות לצורך רכישת חברות מקומיות בשווקים אלה. החברות הנרכשות ישמשו במקרה זה כמנוף לכניסה של חברות ישראליות לשווקים.

4. יצירת מערכת מימונית תומכת במסגרת זמן של 3 עד 5 שנים, זמן הנחשב כמתאים לפיתוח עסקים במדינות אסיה. זמן ההבשלה של מהלכים עסקיים באסיה הוא יחסית ממושך ונובע משוני תרבותי המצריך לימוד ארוך של הפרטנרים העסקיים ושל השוק המקומי, זמן להתגבר על תהליכים וחסמים בירוקרטיים ומרחב מספק לניסוי וטעיה.
  5. פיתוח תשתית לעיסוק אקדמי בלימודי אסיה. הפיכת ישראל למרכז אקדמי מוביל עולמית בעיסוק ובניתוח של מדינות אלה. בכלל זה פיתוח העיסוק האקדמי בהיבטים עכשוויים לנעשה באסיה, מבחינה פוליטית וכלכלית. מרכיב זה הוא חלק חשוב ביצירה של סביבה תומכת לעסקים עם מדינות אסיה. מדינות רבות בעולם סימנו סטודנטים ממדינות אסיה שלמדו במוסדות האקדמיים במערב, וכן סטודנטים מקומיים שלמדו לימודי אסיה כעוגן וכתשתית לפיתוח קשרי כלכלה בין המדינות.
  6. קיום ירידי סחר ישראליים במדינות אסיה (בדיון צויין שהדבר מתבצע בפועל: מכון היצוא מייעד חלק גדול מפעולותיו ותקציבו לאירועים מסוג זה במדינות אסיה).
  7. עידוד חילופי סטודנטים בין ישראל למדינות אסיה. דגש על סטודנטים לתוכניות MBA. קשר שיכול תוך זמן קצר להניב תוצאות בתוך הסקטור העסקי.
  8. הגברת הפעילות הישראלית במסגרת פורומים מסחריים מולטי-לטרליים המתמקדים באסיה, דוגמת APEC.
  9. הפעלת סוכנים מקומיים, חברות בארצות היעד שתפקידן לאתר הזדמנויות ולשמש כחידת פיתוח עסקי עבור פירמות ישראליות. מרכזי סחר מסוג זה פועלים מזה שלוש שנים בסין ונהנים מעמלת "הצלחה". סוכנים אלה משמשים גם כמרכז מידע בנוגע להזדמנויות מסוג "Low hanging fruits". המידע משמש לעתים כבסיס לפנייה יזומה של יחידות ממשלתיות לשחקנים פוטנציאליים בסקטור הפרטי לניצול הזמנויות אלה.
- כאשר מתמקדים בסין ובהודו יש לציין בהקשר זה כי בכל הקשור למוצרי צריכה מציבים שווקים אלה רף כניסה בסיסי ומשמעותי בנוגע לחוזק מותג, עוצמה פיננסית וכן יכולת ייצור. יוצאנים המתמודדים בשוק מוצרי הצריכה של מדינות אלה אמורים להיות בעלי יכולת יצור בהיקפים גדולים מאד, בעלי אמצעים להשקיע בחדירה שיווקית עמוקה ובפריסה רחבה. מעבר לכך, בשווקים אלה מתפתחים דפוסים ייחודיים של צריכה ומוצרי צריכה, במיוחד ביחס לאלה המיובאים מהמערב. מדובר במוצרי צריכה האמורים לספק למשתמש חווית שימוש דומה באיכותה לזו המתקיימת לגביהם במערב אך בעלות נמוכה באופן משמעותי. קיימים כיום מעט מאד יצרנים ישראליים בתחום מוצרי הצריכה המסוגלים לעמוד ברף זה.
- ייתכן ובתחום זה חדירה לשווקים של הודו וסין עבור יצרנים ישראלים היא כמעט בלתי אפשרית.
- סחר מבוסס טכנולוגיה והעברת ידע הוא היבט מהותי נוסף בהקשר הישראלי ובהקשר של מעורבות ממשלתית. ישראל נחשבת במדינות אסיה כמוקד וכמודל לפיתוח חדשנות ברמה העולמית. פעילות מסחרית מבוססת מו"פ היא אולי המנוף המשמעותי ביותר ליצירה של פריצת דרך משמעותית בהיקף הסחר עם מדינות אסיה. בתחום זה לממשלה תפקיד חשוב הן במיסוד אפיקי שת"פ והן בגידור הסיכונים הכרוכים בו. בעיות הקשורות בהפרה של זכויות יוצרים הן משמעותיות בשיטת פעולה, השקעות והעברת ידע בעולם כולו אך במקרה למשל של סין הן בגדר בעיה של ממש המטרידה כל חברה המבקשת לפתח עסקים במדינה זו. מקובל להתייחס לבעיה זו במסגרת מאזן המערך את ההזדמנויות הנמצאות בפעילות עסקית בסין למול הסיכונים הכרוכים בהפרת זכויות יוצרים. חברות רבות מבססות את פעילותן בשוק הסיני על חדשנות מתמדת שלמעשה מקזזת את הסיכון. במקרה הישראלי הועלתה אפשרות לפיה תפתח הממשלה כלי ביטוחי כנגד הפרת נורמות זכויות יוצרים במדינות אסיה, בדגש על סין. מדובר בביטוח שיכסה מקרים שכאלה רק בטריטוריה הסינית ומכאן שעלותו הכוללת תהיה נמוכה יחסית.
- מרכיב ממשלתי נוסף בניתוח פעילות מסחרית מבוססת טכנולוגיה הוא תכנית מו"פ לאומית לפיתוח תחומי מובילות ישראלית עולמית ("נישות"). מדובר במדיניות גנרית, שאינה מכוונת בהכרח כלפי אסיה או מדינות בתוכה. מדיניות זו נועדה ליצור עבור ישראל מקום של ערך מוסף, ללא תחרות כמעט, במספר תחומים ספציפיים, בהם מים, חקלאות וננו-טכנולוגיה. בהקשר האסייתי, במיוחד בהקשר הסיני, יש לבחון כיצד משתלבים תחומי המובילות הישראליים עם פרוייקטים לאומיים בתחום המו"פ המקודמים ע"י הממשלה הסינית. תכנית
- החומש העדכנית של סין לתעשייה (לשנים 2011-2016) שמה דגש על אנרגיה, ביו-טכנולוגיה וטכנולוגית מידע. במסגרת זו תופס העיסוק באנרגיות מתחדשות והנדסת חומרים (בהם חומרים לייעול השימוש והצריכה של אנרגיה ובמידה מסויימת תשתית מידע לניהול מערכות אנרגיה) מקום מרכזי. ענפים הנכללים במסגרות אלה זוכים לתכניות עידוד הכוללות מענקים ואף סובסידיות נדיבות. חברת אפלייד-מטיריאלס למשל, העבירה את כל פעילות היצור בתחום הפאנלים הסולריים לסין על בסיס תמריצים אלה.
- ההשקעה הסינית בפרוייקטים אלה היא עצומה, כ-300 מיליארד דולר בשנה במשך 5 השנים הבאות. קיימת הערכה הטוענת כי השתלבות ישראלית בפרוייקטים הלאומיים של סין היא כמעט בלתי אפשרית. פרוייקטים אלה מתאפיינים בבירוקרטיה, ויתכן אף שחיתות, בדרגה גבוהה אף בסטנדרטים סיניים, והם מנוהלים כחלק מאתוס לאומי החותר לחדשנות מקומית בכל מחיר. היקפים העצום, וההתכנסות הסינית ביחס לעיסוק בהם, הם חסמי כניסה עבור חברות ישראליות.
- יחד עם זאת חסות ממשלתית למודל שיתוף פעולה המבוסס על העברת ידע או פיתוח משותף (מודלים מבוססי מודל מגנט או תכנית המו"פ עם האיחוד האירופי, בהם מתקיים שיתוף פעולה הנוגע למחקר בסיסי ויישומי בין גורמים באקדמיה ובתעשייה בישראל ובמדינה נוספת בחו"ל) יכול להעלות את סיכויי ההצלחה. התרבות העסקית והממשלית של מדינות רבות באסיה מקנה ערך חיובי גבוה למעורבות ממשלתית. ניתוח התייחסות ממשלית פומבית להתפתחות בתחום המו"פ עשוייה להצביע על דאגה מצד הממשל בנוגע לקצב ההתקדמות של הפרוייקטים. בהקשר זה ייתכן ויזומה ממשלתית ישראלית בתחומים מוגדרים היטב הנוגעים לפרוייקטים הלאומיים עשוייה להצליח.
- במקרה הסיני, לצד הפרוייקטים הלאומיים נמצאים שורת נושאים הזוכה לתשומת לב מיוחדת מצד השלטון, בהם נושאים המזוהים

עם חדשנות ישראלית ובראשם חקלאות ומים. פיתוח כלים מסורתיים דוגמת חוות הדגמה חקלאיות עשוי להתברר כעוגן כניסה משמעותי לשווקים בסין ובמדינות אסיאתיות נוספות. יש לציין כי בתחום זה מתחרה ישראל מול מדינות נוספות בעלות התמחות חקלאית מובהקת, דוגמת הולנד בתחום החלב המשקיעה משאבים ומאמצים רבים לפיתוח שוק החלב הסיני. במדינות אסיה הנמצאות על סף פריצה כלכלית, דוגמת לאוס ומינאמר, הגברת פעילות אגף מש"ב במשרד החוץ עשויה למקם את ישראל במקום העשוי להתברר כמרכזי לכשתתרחש קפיצת המדרגה הכלכלית הצפויה.

קושי בפעילות באסיה בא לידי ביטוי בכל הרמות וכמעט בכל המדינות. בעבר נעשו מספר נסיונות לקיים פעילות ממשלתית ישירה, ללא משמעות מסחרית ישירה, למשל בייעוץ לממשלה ההודית בנושא עדכון תקן המים. מקרה זה לא הניב תוצאות ולא התממש לכדי תקן מים הדומה לזה הישראלי. ייתכן וכדאי להתייחס למקרה מסוג זה באופן הסתברותי, כחלק מראיה רחבה המניחה תכנונית שיעור גבוה של כשלונות. יחס הצלחות נמוך מתקיים גם בסקטור הפרטי, בקרב יצואנים ישראלים בקבוצת מכירות 100 מיליון דולר ומעלה, כאשר הניסיון מראה שרק 1/3 מהניסיונות למסד יצוא לסין צולח. הנחה זו צריכה לכלול גם הנחה נוספת לפיה 2-3 פרויקטים מוצלחים יובילו ל-10 פרויקטים נוספים בשלב הבא.

בניתוח התפתחות הסחר עם מדינות אסיה יש להתייחס להיבטים נוספים:

1. הקושי בחדירה לסין והודו איננו מיחד רק את ישראל אלא משותף ליצואנים ככלל.
2. קיימים היבטים של שוני תרבותי כללי ושל תרבות עסקית בין המדינות.
3. משקלם של יהודים וקהילות יהודיות בקידום והעמקת היצוא הישראלי.
4. לעומת סין והודו, יש לציין את יפן, דר' קוריאה וטייוואן צוינו כשווקים בעלי פוטנציאל גדול זמין להגדלת הסחר עם ישראל.
5. היבט חשוב נוסף ביצוא הוא יצוא של ענפי השירותים. מדובר בענף מפותח מאד במשק הישראלי, האחראי לכ-65% מהתוצר העסקי ולכ-67% ממקומות העבודה במשק. היצוא בתחום השירותים הניב לישראל עודף מסחרי בהיקף של 6 מיליארד דולר ללא כל תמיכה או הקצאה ממשלתית. ענף זה מגלם עבור ישראל הן כושר תחרותי גבוה והן פוטנציאל צמיחה בפעילות במדינות אסיה.

## סיכום

דיון בהיבטים השונים הקשורים בהסטה של הסחר הישראלי לעבר אסיה מעלה תמונה מורכבת שבמרכזה קושי עבור חברות ישראליות לבסס ולפתח יצוא לשווקים אלה, במיוחד לזה של סין. קושי זה מורכב מקשיים בהכרה ובהבנה של התרבות העסקית והפוליטית, ומקשיים הנובעים מהגודל הקטן-בינוני של רב הפירמות הישראליות, וזאת ביחס למשאבים ולעומק האסטרטגי הדרוש לחדירה והתבססות בשווקים המובילים של אסיה. בהקשר זה הופכת הממשלה לגורם משמעותי בפיתוח היצוא למזרח, הן משום הערך הייחודי אותו מקנה התרבות העסקית בשווקים אלה למוסד הממשלה, והן משום יכולותיה לגשר על החוסרים ולסייע בהסרת חסמים העומדים בפני יצואנים בשווקי אסיה. ניתוח שיטתי של הכלים העומדים לרשות הממשלה לצורך סיוע בקידום היצוא אינו מגלה "פתרון קסם", כלי אולטימטיבי שייסיע בביצוע קפיצת המדרגה בסחר עם אסיה.

נראה וסחר מבוסס חדשנות ישראלית הוא העוגן לפיתוח של יצוא ישראלי למזרח, אלא שהיכולת לתרגם פיתוחים חדשניים ליצוא שיביא לצמיחת הכלכלה הישראלית היא עדיין מוגבלת. חלק גדול מהחדשנות הישראלית מתבצע בחברות קטנות, חסרות יכולת להביא את הפיתוח לכדי מוצר סופי בשל. הן בדרך כלל נדרשות לשותפים ולהשקעות נוספות על מנת להשלים את מעגל הפיתוח. הנורמות המאפיינות את הפעילות במרבית השווקים האסייתים הופכת מאפיין זה לבעייתי במיוחד. שאיבת ידע שפותח בישראל ומיצוי הפוטנציאל הכלכלי שלו ללא תיאום וחלוקת רווח עם מפתחיו היא סיכון מרכזי בפיתוח עסקים מבוססי חדשנות באסיה.

ישנם מקרים ספורים של הצלחה ישראלית בפיתוח וביסוס עסקים באסיה מבוססי יצוא מישראל. דוגמה בולטת היא מפעלים לתרכובות ברום שהוקמו ע"י קונצרן כ"ל בסין. מפעלים העושים שימוש בברום המיוצר בים המלח ובידע והניסיון לייצור התרכובות בסין. דוגמה נוספת, שעדיין נמצאת בשלביה הראשונים, היא שיתוף הפעולה בין חברת תמי 4 (בבעלות קונצרן שטראוס) לבין החברה הסינית האייר לייצור מתקנים לטיהור מים בסין, על בסיס ידע ישראלי ורכיבים שימשיכו להיות מיוצרים בארץ. שתי הדוגמאות חורגות ממודל "יצר בסין/הודו בידע ישראלי" אך שתיהן מבטאות מעורבות של גופים גדולים מאד בקנה מידה ישראלי.

ניתוח אפשרויות הרחבת היצוא לאסיה מתמקד בעיקר בסין, ובמידה פחותה יותר בהודו, שני המשקים המובילים את השינוי במבנה הכלכלה העולמית. על פניו נראה כי חדירה של יצואנים ישראלים לסין היא כמעט בלתי אפשרית, ומכאן שההשקעה הממשלתית בכלי סיוע מדרג בינוני (מרכזי פיתוח סחר, נספחות מסחרית, ירידים וכד') היא מתאימה. יש לבחון גם את משמעות הסכומים הכוללים אותם צפויים חברות ישראליות להשקיע בנסיונות התבססות בסין ובהודו במאזן עלות-תועלת, במיוחד ביחס להשקעתם בשווקים במערב. כמו כן, נראה והזדמנויות בעלות הסתברות הצלחה גדולה יותר נמצאות בשווקים קטנים יותר או בדרגת פיתוח נמוכה יותר, וייתכן שיש להסיט משאבים להעמקת הנוכחות הישראלית במדינות אלה גם על חשבון השקעה נוספת בסין.

יש להוסיף התייחסות למרכיבי טווח ארוך, שהמרכזיים בהם: האם הכלכלות המערביות המפותחות של ארה"ב, אירופה ויפן אכן נמצאות בתהליך שקיעה וניוון?; האם הצמיחה המהירה של סין יש בה סיכונים מערערי יציבות מערכתית, הן ברובד הפוליטי והן ברובד הכלכלי (בועת נדל"ן, קיבוע שער היואן, שינוי בפער הריבית בין זו הנהוגה כיום במערב וזו בסין וכד')? יש לציין כי חלק ממרכיבי אי-יציבות אלה תקפים גם לגבי הודו. התשובה על שתי השאלות עשויה להתברר ככזו המבטאת העדפה עבור ישראל להעמיק את פוטנציאל הסחר עם השווקים אליהם היא "מכוילת" כיום.

## 200\$ לחבית נפט: הערכה ומשמעות

אורי סלונים

מסמך מסכם - טיוטה לדיון

אחת התופעות המרכזיות של השנה החולפת היא עלייה מחודשת של מחירי הסחורות ובהן הנפט. עלייה זו יש בה היבטים חיוביים הנוגעים להתאוששות הכלכלה העולמית אך יש בהם גם היבטים מדאיגים בכל הנוגע לצמצום היצע הסחורות בעולם. מבחינה אמפירית התקיים לאורך ההיסטוריה מתאם בין עלייה במחיר הנפט, עלייה במחיר הסחורות ומחזורים כלכליים של מיתון והאטה וגם עתה עולה החשש כי האמרת מחירי הסחורות תוביל למשבר כלכלי חמור מקודמיו. לעומת משברים קודמים העליה במחיר הנפט אינה חלק ממחזור כלכלי קצוב בזמן אלא נובעת מקשר בין המבנה הנוכחי של שוק הנפט ובין הדלדלות הנפט הזמין להפקה.

אל נתוני יסוד אלה הצטרפו בחודשים האחרונים ההתפתחויות הפוליטיות במזרח התיכון שהביאו להפסקת יצוא הנפט מלוב (1.3 מיליון חביות ליום) וחשש ממשי מהתערעור היציבות במדינות נוספות ובהן סעודיה. ארועים אלה האיצו את מגמת העליה במחירי הנפט שהחלה בחודש מאי 2010, וכיום "תרחיש ה-200\$" נראה ממשי מתמיד. עוד טרם המשבר הפוליטי במזרח התיכון נמצאו סימנים להכרה בשינוי סביבת הסחר של הנפט על רקע גידול קבוע בביקוש מול קיפאון בצד ההיצע. משמעות של סביבה זו אינו נוגע רק לתחום הכלכלי אלא גם לתחום הביטחון הלאומי ובשנה האחרונה התפרסמו שתי עבודות, דו"ח של משרד ההגנה האמריקאי ודו"ח של הצבא הגרמני<sup>1</sup>, שעסקו במשמעות מחירי נפט גבוהים מאד על הביטחון הלאומי.

המשמעות הנובעת מרמות המחיר החזויות, עפ"י הדו"חות, בעתיד הקרוב והבינוני הן בגדר התפתחות אסטרטגית משנה מציאות. העליה במחיר הנפט צפויה לשנות את אופיין של מדינות המערב מבחינת רמת חיים ויציבות פוליטית ולשנות את מבנה ואופי המערכת הבינלאומית. זאת על רקע החלשות יכולתן של מדינות עשירות לאכוף במקומות שונים בעולם נורמות בינלאומיות מקובלות. כבר כיום מוביל החשש מהדלדלות בהיצע הנפט ליצירת קשרים מדיניים, העוקפים את מנגנוני הסחר החופשי, בין צרכניות נפט ויצואניות נפט. סין היא הדוגמה המובילה כיום ל-petrol diplomacy, באמצעות רכישת זכויות לחיפוש והפקת נפט באזורים באפריקה, השתתפות בפרוייקטים אנרגטיים דוגמת צינורות נפט וגז בקווקז ובאיזור הכספי, וכן השקעה בבתי זיקוק ברחבי העולם ובניה של צי מכליות נפט.

התרחישים המניחים סביבה בה מחירי הנפט יאמירו ל-200\$ מציינים כי רמת מחיר זו תיצור בעולם השפעה מדורגת, במסגרתה תתקיים האטה כלכלית משמעותית במדינות המפותחות, שתלך ותגבר ככל שרמת הפיתוח של מדינה, בנקודת התחלת המשבר, תהיה נמוכה יותר. ביחס למדינות העניות באפריקה צפוי כי רמת מחירים זו תסיג לאחור כל התקדמות שנעשתה בהן, כבר כיום נובע חלק גדול מהחוב של מדינות אלה מיבוא של נפט ודלקים כשחלק גדול מההתקדמות והייצוב של מדינות באפריקה הוא תלוי דלקים, דוגמת יבוא והפצה של דשנים לחקלאות. נפט ברמות מחיר גבוהות במיוחד נראה ויחזיר את רובה של אפריקה לתקופה פרימיטיבית טרום-מודרנית. נסיגה שתלווה בתופעות של רעב ומחסור וכן הרג המוני מולן יעמוד העולם חסר יכולת סיוע ממשית.

### גורמים כלכליים לעליה במחיר הנפט

בחודש יולי 2008 הגיע מחירה של חבית נפט ל-\$149, השיא הגבוה ביותר אליו הגיע מחיר הנפט מעולם. תוך שלושה חודשים ירד המחיר לרמה של \$120 באוקטובר, ובסוף דצמבר 2008 הגיע לשפל של \$30, רמה שנשמרה עד מרץ 2009. העליה החדה במחירי הנפט של שנת 2008 הפתיעה רבים מאחר והתרחשה על רקע תחילתו של המשבר הכלכלי, 8 חודשים קודם לכן. בהסברים שניתנו אז לעליה במחיר הוקצה מקום נכבד למקומם של ספקולנטים שפנו להשקעה בנפט ובסחורות על רקע מדיניות הורדת הריבית בה נקטה ארה"ב והירידה בערך הדולר. עליית מחירי הנפט, וכלל מחירי הסחורות, במחצית השניה של שנת 2010 מעלה חשש כי הכלכלה העולמית מתקרבת שוב לרמות המחירים של שנת 2008 ואף מעבר להן, והפעם על רקע כלכלי-משברי בו ההקשר של רמות מחיר אלה חמור הרבה יותר מזה של 2008. האמרת המחירים מוסברת כמשקפת כמובן גם את ההתאוששות בכלכלה

1 US Joint Forces Command: Joint Operating Environment 2010

<http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2010/pa031510.html> (נבדק 22.6.11)

"Stephan Shultz, 'Peak Oil' and the German Government: Military Study Warns of a Potentially Drastic Oil Crisis

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,715138,00.html> (נבדק 22.6.11)

.US military warns oil output may dip causing massive shortages by 2015. The Guardian, 11 April 2010

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/apr/11/peak-oil-production-supply> (נבדק 20.6.11)



העולמית, אך גם כמעידה על התפתחות מקבילה הקשורה בה, והיא הדלדלות המשאבים הטבעיים, או לפחות על צמצום המרווחים בין היצע וביקוש. אל גורמים אלה מצטרפת כמובן אי-היציבות המתפתחת במדינות ערב, שפגעה עד כה בהפקת הנפט בלוב אך מקיימת פוטנציאל ממשי ליצור שיבושי הפקה במדינות נוספות ובראשן בסעודיה. העלייה במחירי הנפט מתרחשת כחלק ממגמה כללית של עלייה בביקוש למול כמעט קיפאון ברמות היצע בכל מגזר הסחורות. צמצום המרווחים בין היצע לביקוש חמור במיוחד בתחום הסחורות החקלאיות. שם הגידול בביקושים מתרחש על רקע צמצום בהיצע הנובע מאסונות טבע שפגעו קשה השנה בכמות היבולים ואיכותם.

הגורם שנחשב כמסביר העיקרי לצמצום המרווח שבין היצע וביקוש היא צמיחתם המואצת בשנים האחרונות של השווקים המתעוררים, במיוחד השוק הסיני. הגידול בביקוש לנפט בסין הביא באמצע העשור הקודם לקפיצת מדרגה של ממש בביקוש העולמי. קפיצת מדרגה שהתרחשה במהירות על רקע קיפאון ביכולת ההפקה. בכל הנוגע לנפט הפכה סין כבר כיום לצרכנית הנפט הגדולה בעולם. סין צורכת מדי יום בממוצע כ-8.5 מיליון חביות של דלק נוזלי, מתוכן יבוא של כ-5.1 מיליון חביות של נפט גולמי. הצריכה הסינית היא כ-10% לערך מכלל הצריכה היומית של העולם כולו. תחזית ה-IEA מעריכה כי עד לשנת 2035 יגדלו צרכי האנרגיה של סין ב-75% לעומת צריכת האנרגיה בשנת 2008<sup>2</sup>. בצד ההיצע מוערך כיום כושר ההפקה העולמי של נפט גולמי עומד על כ-91 MBD<sup>3</sup>, כ-4.5 MBD מעל רמת הביקוש הממוצעת, שהם מרווח של 6% בין ביקוש להיצע<sup>4</sup>. במשבר ההפקה האחרון, בשנת 2007, בו הגיעה הצריכה לרמת שיא של 86.5 MBD, נרשמה עליה חדה במחירים כאשר ירד המרווח בין היצע לביקוש מתחת לרמה של 2.5 MBD. שיא המחיר הנומינלי עד כה הגיע כאמור ביולי 2008 כשהוא מלווה היה במגמה מקבילה של עליה במחירי המזון. השפעת הביקוש מסין ומהודו על מאזן היצע וביקוש לנפט מורגשת משנת 2002, מאז הגידול בביקוש מצד המדינות המתפתחות ממשיך לגדול בקצב ממוצע של 1% לשנה. בשנת 2010 לבדה עלה הביקוש העולמי לנפט ב-2.7 מיליון חביות ליום. בתחזית שפירסמה לאחרונה סוכנות האנרגיה הבינלאומית (IEA) נקבע כי צמיחת הכלכלות המתעוררות תוביל לעלייה בביקוש לנפט שתביא תוך ארבע שנים למחיר ברמה של מעל ל-115 דולר חבית<sup>5</sup>. תחזית זו מתחזקת על רקע מגמת העליה במחירי הנפט, המתרחשת גם על רקע משבר כלכלי, ומצטרפת לשורה של תחזיות קודמות לפיהן צפוי הביקוש העולמי לנפט להגיע עד שנת 2030 לרמה של 105 מיליון חביות ליום (MBD), לעומת כ-87.7 מיליון חביות כיום<sup>6</sup>. ישנן תחזיות נוספות לפיהן צפוי הביקוש לנפט בשנת 2030 לעמוד על רמה של 118 MBD, ומחירו יגיע עד שנת 2015 לרמה של \$200 לחבית. יש לציין כי תחזיות הגידול בביקוש לנפט נגזרות מהנחות גידול בתמ"ג העולמי. על רקע אי הוודאות הנובעת מהמשבר הכלכלי העולמי משתמשים גורמי החיזוי, התכנון וההערכה (IEA, OECD, IMF, DOE, UN) בתרחישי צמיחה הנעים בין שיעור גידול שנתי של 4.5% ל-2.7%. התרחישים כולם מניחים צמצום במרווח שבין ביקוש להיצע ועליית מחירים מתאימה. בשנה האחרונה החלו חלק מגורמים אלה להציג תרחיש נוסף המניח החמרה בתקינה וברגולציה הנוגעת לצמצום פליטה של גזי חממה, במסגרתה תעלה כדאיות השימוש בתחליפי נפט. גם במסגרת תרחישים אלה עולה רמת הצריכה של הנפט אלא שבשיעור מתון יותר (גידול שנתי של 1% לעומת 1.4% בתרחישים שאינם משקללים מדיניות אגרסיבית של צמצום פליטת גזי חממה) וגם במסגרתם מתקיים משבר. יש לציין כי תרחישים אלה אינם משקללים פריצת דרך טכנולוגית המשנה את הביקוש לנפט. עפ"י הנתונים המצויים בידינו עתה אף לא אחד מתחליפי השימוש בנפט (הנעה חשמלית באמצעות מצברים, שימוש בתאי דלק מסוגים שונים ודלקים אלטרנטיביים) איננו נמצא לקראת פריצת דרך טכנולוגית שתביא לשינוי מהיר בהתנהגות השוק.

התרחישים הצופים משבר על רקע מחסור בנפט ועליית מחירים חדה בשנים שעד 2015, מתבססים על ניתוח לפיו תוך שנים ספורות יצמצם מאד העודף הקיים ביכולות ובפוטנציאל ההפקה, על רקע שילוב של עלייה בביקוש והגעה לנקודה המצינית שיא במצאי הנפט העולמי (peak oil) ממנה ירד היקף עתודות הנפט. הנחת ה-peak היא שנויה מאד במחלוקת ומולה ניצבות טענות להימצאותו של נפט בכמויות ניכרות באיזורים ובסביבות גיאולוגיות שעדיין לא נחקרו דיין. מושג ה-peak oil כנקודת שיא המבטאת שיא בתפוקה העולמית, ממנה תלך התפוקה ותרד, הוא מושג שנתבע באמצע שנות ה-60 של המאה הקודמת, לתאור עקומת התפוקה של שדות נפט<sup>7</sup>. אמפירית, השימוש במושג זה לא הוכיח עצמו עד היום כמדויק. נקודת ה-peak oil זוהתה ע"י מומחים כבר בשנות ה-60, ולאחר מכן מספר פעמים נוספות בשנות ה-70 וה-80. הנחת ה-peak נובעת בעיקר מניתוח נתוני השדות הקיימים המלמדים כי מתוך 70,000 שדות נפט פעילים בעולם רק 110 מניבים כמחצית מהתפוקה העולמית<sup>8</sup>, ובקבוצה זו כ-10 שדות גדולים אחראים לכחמישית מהתפוקה העולמית<sup>9</sup>. בתוך כך, 300 הבארות החשובות בעולם נמצאות לאחר נקודת שיא התפוקה<sup>10</sup>. למרות שבשנים האחרונות נתגלו מאגרי נפט חדשים אין מדובר במאגרים השווים בהיקפם לשדות הגדולים הפועלים היום והאחראים לנתח

2 תחזית מקבילה של ה-World Economic Forum מעריכה כי בשנת 2035 יגיע הביקוש העולמי לנפט ל-99 מיליון חביות, 57% מתוכו מקורם בסין כשמדינות ה-OECD צפויות לצמצם עד אז את צריכתן, ביחס לשנת 2010, בכ-6 מיליון חביות ליום.

3 קיים קושי מהותי בהערכת התפוקה היומית. חלק מנתוני ההפקה והמסחר הוא חסוי אפילו בין מדינות אופ"ק.

4 ארגון אופ"ק מקפיד לציין כי ביכולתו של הארגון יכולת הפקה עודפת של כ-6 מיליון חביות ביום. לעומת הערכה זו מעלים מומחים הערכה לפיה עודף התפוקה של חברות הארגון עומד על כ-4.5 מיליון חביות בלבד. הערכה זו אינה מביאה בחשבון את השונות בין סוגי נפט והמתאם בינם לבין בתי זיקוק. בתי הזיקוק האירופיים, הותאמו לנפט הלבן והם אינם מסוגלים לטפל בנפט שמקורו בסעודיה. שיקולי יכולת הזיקוק בבתי זיקוק שונים מעצים מאד השפעתם של שיבושים, אפילו קטנים, באספקת הנפט. ראה: The Economist: Oil markets and Arab Unrest. The Economist, March 5, 2011.

5 Goldman Cuts Oil Price Forecasts on Financial Crisis (Update2). 13 October 2008. [http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a8QGoc\\_WdFEM](http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a8QGoc_WdFEM) (נבדק 20.6.11)

6 בחודש ינואר 2011 פרסמה סוכנות האנרגיה הבינלאומית, גוף המסונף לארגון ה-OECD, הערכה מעודכנת לצריכת נפט ב-2011. עפ"י הערכה זו תגיע צריכת הנפט העולמית בסוף 2011 לכ-89.1 מיליון חביות ליום. גידול של 1.6% לעומת 2010. בפרשנות לדוח הזהיר הארגון כי עליית מחירים ל-\$95 חבית משמעה במדינות ה-OECD נטל של 5% על התוצר הפוטנציאלי. בתגובה להערכה זו מיהר ארגון OPEC, אחראי כיום על 42% מהיצע הנפט הגולמי בעולם, להודיע על העלאת התפוקה באופן שיאזן את העליה בביקוש.

7 הגרף המתאר תפוקת שדה על פי מודל זה מכונה Hubert Curve.

8 (Steve Sorrell, Richard Miller, Roger Bentley and Jamie Speirs, "Oil futures: A comparison of global supply forecasts". Energy Policy, Vol. 38 (2010).

9 השדה הגדול העולם הוא שדה ג'ואר בסעודיה, נמצא בין הברירה ריאד לרצועת החוף של המפרץ הפרסי. השדה פעיל במשך 50 שנה ובעל תפוקה יומית של מעל 5 מיליון חביות. מוערך כי השדה הגיע לנקודת בסביבות שנת 2005 אך מעריכים כי ניתן להגדיל את תפוקתו לכ-6 מיליון חביות ביום.

10 יש לסייג קביעה זו ולציין כי. גרף המתאר את תפוקת הבאר אינו מתאפיין בדרך כלל בצורת "פעמון" אלא בצורה "טרפזית" המשמרת לאורך תקופה מסוימת את רמת ההפקה המקסימלית.

כה גדול מהתפוקה. יתר על כן, מדובר במאגרים שאותרו בסביבת הפקה קשה ויקרה המצדיקה את פיתוחם רק מעל לסף מחיר של 70-80 דולר לחבית (הרחבה בהמשך).

שני העשורים בהם שמר הנפט על רמות מחיר נמוכות, במקביל ליציבות בביקושים, הביאו לקיפאון כמעט מוחלט בפיתוח מקורות נפט חדשים ובהגדלה של תשתית ההפקה. מאז משבר האנרגיה של שנות ה-70 התייעל מאד, באופן ממוצע, השימוש באנרגיה במדינות המפותחות. משקל הנפט בכל יחידת תוצר (oil intensity index) ירד מאז 1980 בכ-2.4%. לשנה. ההתרחבות הכלכלית של המדינות המפותחות התרחשה על רקע צמצום ניכר בצריכת האנרגיה, במיוחד זו המבוססת מוצרי נפט, צירוף שהפחית באופן ניכר את התמרוץ הכלכלי לחפש ולפתח מקורות נפט חדשים, וכן תשתית הפקה, שינוע וזיקוק. כלכלת ארה"ב הכפילה עצמה מאז 1980 אך צריכת הנפט גדלה אך במעט, מ-17.4 מיליון חביות ב-1980 ל-17.8 מיליון חביות בשנת 2009. דפוס זה מתקיים גם באירופה וביפן.

הפעילות בתחום פיתוח מקורות נפט החלה להתעורר רק בשנים האחרונות על רקע הביקושים החדשים והחזקים מצד המדינות המתפתחות, כשהעידן הנוכחי של פיתוח מקורות נפט חדשים מתאפיין בעיקר בפעילות ימית בעומק רב. מדובר בסביבת חיפוש, קידוח והפקה קשה ויקרה, בעלת רמת סיכון גבוהה בסדרי גודל מזו המסורתית ביבשה. אסון מפרץ מנסיקו באפריל 2010 הוא דוגמה לסיכונים המאפיינים את קידוחי המים העמוקים. פעילות קידוח והפקה בסביבה הימית היא קשה הנדסית ותפעולית ופגיעה יותר לתקלות ושיבושים, הן כאלה הנובעים מפעילות הקידוח (באסון מפרץ מנסיקו התבצע קידוח ניסיון בעומק מים של 1500 מטר ולעומק 5000 מטרים בקרקעית הים, כשהלחץ במאגר עמד על 1500 אטמוספירות שנוצר ע"י גז טבעי דליק – הסיבה לפיצוץ שהובילו לאסון) ומהתנאים הסביבתיים (הוריקן למשל). מדובר בעלות הפקה יקרה משמעותית מעלות הפקה של נפט בשדות קונבנציונליים ביבשה. מחיר הפקה של חבית נפט סעודית נע עפ"י הערכות בין 4-6 דולר לחבית, לעומת 40 דולר עלות הפקה של חבית בקידוחי מים עמוקים מאד, במאגרים גדולים<sup>11</sup>. עקב הגידול הדרמטי בשנים האחרונות בפעילות הקידוח וההפקה הימיים עלו מאד גם מחירי ציוד החיפוש והקידוח. מחיר הפעלת אסדת קידוח המיועדת לעומקים גדולים הוא בממוצע כ-450,000 דולר ליום פעילות לעומת כ-150,000 דולר לפני חמש שנים<sup>12</sup>.

## שינוי אסטרטגי בשוק הנפט - גידול רציף בביקושים מול היצע מצטמצם

המשבר, המופיע באופן דטרמניסטי בכל תחזיות גופי התכנון וההערכה המרכזיים, איננו רק תוצר של הגידול בביקוש מול צמצום ההיצע אלא גם נובע ממאפייניו של הנפט כמוצר בעל מגוון מוגבל של מוצרים תחליפיים. ישנם מחקרים המתבססים על השוואה בין משברי נפט קודמים, החל ממשבר הנפט של שנות ה-70, המראים כי באופן מצרפי לאורך השנים השפעות המחיר על הביקוש הכולל הולכות ומצטמצמות. יחד עם זאת ניסיון שלוש השנים האחרונות מגלה דיפרנציאציה במאפייני הביקוש, במיוחד לגמישות הביקוש, בין מדינות מפותחות (אשכול היחוס של מדינות אלה בתחזיות ה-IEA הוא גוש מדינות ה-OECD) ובין מדינות מתפתחות. נתוני צריכה של מוצרי נפט בשנת 2008, שנת שיא המחירים, מגלים כי במדינות המערב המפותחות ירד בתקופה זו הביקוש למוצרים אלה ב-10%<sup>13</sup>. הדבר מוסבר בהתייעלות האנרגטית שעברו הכלכלות המפותחות מאז שנות השבעים של המאה הקודמת, ובמקביל בסבסוד הנפט הנהוג במדינות מתפתחות. סבסוד המקזז עבור האוכלוסייה את העליה במחירי הדלקים<sup>14</sup> על מנת למתן או למנוע מתיחות חברתית העלולה להתפרץ כתוצאה מעליה במחיר.

כמוצרי אסטרטגי חסר תחליף הופך הנפט למוצר שהתנהגות הצרכנים ביחס אליו היא א-לינארית. לנפט משמעויות שהן מעבר לפעילות כלכלית, משמעויות הנוגעות ליציבות פוליטית וחברתית כשמול הנהגה הפוליטית ניצבים מראות משנות ה-70 של המאה הקודמת, מראות של מחסור בדלק ותחנות סגורות. שיקולי ביטחון אנרגיה יחד עם פעילות ספקולטיבית והיחס הא-סימטרי ארוך השנים בין יצרנים לצרכנים הם הגורמים לקפיצת המחיר הדרמטית המתרחשת כאשר הביקוש לנפט נמצא בסביבת שיא ההיצע. בשנים בהם שמר שוק הנפט על יציבות הוא התקבע כשוק איזורי במסגרתו קובעו שרשראות אספקה ארוכות טווח בין שדות נפט, אמצעי שינוע (צינור או שינוע ימי באמצעות מיכליות) ומתקני זיקוק. שלב הזיקוק הוא החוליה הבעייתית ביותר בשרשרת זו עקב הקושי לבצע התאמות של תהליך הזיקוק לשינוי בסוגי נפט, במיוחד בכל הקושר לנפט "כבד" יותר מזה שאליו תוכנן במקור בית הזיקוק.

מול התפתחות שוק הנפט כשוק איזורי התפתחה, בעיקר כתוצאה מפעילות ארגון אופ"ק, התייחסות לנפט כאל סחורה הומוגנית ודינמיקה שהקנתה למפיקות הנפט יכולת התנהגות אסטרטגית בכל הנוגע למחיר. הארגון אמנם אינו נוקב ישירות במחיר אך הוא מתאם מכסות ייצור המקנות לו שליטה עליו. המאפיין העיקרי שאיפשר זאת היה קביעה של המחיר בהתאם לנפט שמקורו במדינות להן עלות ההפקה הגבוהה ביותר. התייצבות הביקוש החל מאמצע שנות השמונים ועד לתחילת שנת 2003, התרחשה במקביל להצטמצמות חלקו של אופ"ק בצד ההיצע. בתחילת שנות ה-70 היו מדינות הארגון אחראיות ל-50% מתפוקת הנפט בעולם ותוך עשור ירד שיעור זה לכ-35% מכלל התפוקה, ירידה המוסברת בהגברת התפוקה במדינות שאינן חברות הארגון (בשנים האחרונות התרחב בחזרה נפח השוק של ארגון אופ"ק). התייצבות הביקושים הביאה למעשה להתייצבות השוק כשהגידול במרווח בין ביקוש והיצע הביא מצד אחד להתפתחות חוזי אספקה ארוכי טווח בין מוכרים וקונים ספציפיים ומאידך להשתכללות המסחר בנפט בעסקאות מסוג ספוט ופיתוח מסחר בחוזים עתידיים. גם החברות בארגון אופ"ק החלו להשתתף במסחר מסוג ספוט.

מצב זה החל להשתנות באופן מהיר כאשר ההתפתחות הכלכלית של סין, וגם הודו במידה פחותה אך משמעותית להדגשת המגמה,

11 Reuters: FACTBOX-Oil production cost estimates by country (בדק ב-20.6.11) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/28/oil-cost-factbox-idUSLS12407420090728>

12 Rigzone: Offshore Rig Day Rates (בדק בתאריך 20.6.11) <http://www.rigzone.com/data/dayrates>

13 U.S Energy Statistics & Information: Petroleum and other liquid supply (בדק בתאריך 20.6.11) [http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet\\_cons\\_psup\\_dc\\_nus\\_mbbldpd\\_a.htm](http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_cons_psup_dc_nus_mbbldpd_a.htm)

EIA: Short term Energy Outlook for 2011. (בדק בתאריך 20.6.11) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/gifs/Fig6.gif>

14 (Robert K. Kaufmann, "The role of market fundamentals and speculations in recent price changes for crude oil", Energy Policy, Vol. 39 (2011)

החלה להיות מורגשת ברמה העולמית. גודלו של המשק הסיני ועוצמת הפיתוח שלו יצרו ביקושים משמעותיים לנפט שצמצמו את המרווח שבין היצע וביקוש. סין אחראית לכ-95% מהגידול בשנים האחרונות של הביקוש העולמי. הגידול בביקוש הסיני לנפט מוסבר בהתרחבות מתמדת של צי הרכב. התרחבות זו היא תוצר התרחבות והתבססות המעמד הבינוני אך היא גם תוצר ותנאי להמשך הצמיחה. המשך הגידול בצמיחה מותנה בתחרותיות המשק הסיני, תחרותיות זו הולכת ונשחקת באיזורים הסמוכים לחוף המערבי (רצועת החוף לאורכה ממוקמים נמלי היצוא הגדולים, ובראשם נמל שנחאי) אך היא עדיין גבוהה ביותר, ברמה עולמית, בפרובינציות המערביות, מרחק אלפי קילומטרים מנמלי החוף. התשתית התחבורתית לפרובינציות המזרחיות, במיוחד זו המסילתית, עדיין נמצאת בשלבי פיתוח ולכן מיצוי פוטנציאל הצמיחה של איזורים אלה תלוי בגידול מקביל של צי הרכב, בעיקר המסחרי<sup>15</sup>. יש לציין כי משק התחבורה הסיני מתבסס על רכבים מדורות טכנולוגיים קודמים שיעילותם האנרגטית נמוכה. נסיבות אלה קושרות באופן הדוק את המשך הצמיחה הסינית עם עלייה בצריכה של דלקים.

החל משנת 2003 החלו מחירי הנפט במגמת עלייה שהגיעה כאמור לשיא של 149 דולר לחבית בקיץ 2008. ניתוח כרונולוגי של נקודת שיא מחיר זו הוא מרכזי בהבנת ההתנהגות הנוכחית של מחירי הנפט ולמעשה ניתן אף לקבוע כי מתקיים רצף בין שתי תקופות שיא המחיר, כאשר הירידה שהתרחשה במחיר הנפט בין ספטמבר 2008 וחודש מאי 2010 היתה הפוגה זמנית מרמות מחיר גבוהות שיאפיינו בשנים הקרובות את השוק, עד לשינוי במאפייניו. ניתוח הסטורי של שיאי מחיר מגלה כי עד כה נרשמו ארבע תקופות שיא מקומי: משבר הנפט של השנים 1973-1974, המשבר שנוצר בעקבות המהפיכה האסלאמית באיראן ומלחמת איראן-עיראק, מלחמת המפרץ הראשונה ושיא המחיר של שנת 2008. שלושת הראשונים נבעו כולם מגורמים פוליטיים אך האחרון מבטא צירוף של נסיבות כלכליות ושורשיו בעליית הביקוש מול קיפאון בצד ההיצע. גם בניטרול השפעות אי-היציבות הפוליטית במדינות המזרח התיכון והחשש מהתערערות השלטון בסעודיה, הסיבות שאיפשרו את האמרת המחיר הדרמטית ב-2008 עדיין תקפות כשדפוס הזינוק האחרון במחירי הנפט (החל בנובמבר 2010, מגמת עלייה רציפה מרמה של 70 דולר לחבית, עוד לפני המהפיכות בתוניס, במצרים ובלוב) דומה מאד לנסיבות שהתפתחו אז.

אחד הכלים המרכזיים שפותחו להתמודד עם משברי אספקה מהסוג הראשון היו מאגרי הנפט האסטרטגיים, שנועדו להבטיח אספקה למשך 60-80 יום במוצע (במצב של העדר אספקה) ובכך לגשר על מחסור הנובע כתוצאה ממשבר נקודתי. המאגרים האסטרטגיים יכלו גם לשמש כמקור להגברת ההיצע בשוק ובכך להביא למיתון נקודתי של מחיר הנפט. מאגר החירום של ארצות הברית הוא בהיקף של 720 מיליון חביות, ומאחר וארה"ב מיבאת כ-12 מיליון חביות נפט ליום הרי שמאגר זה מתוכנן להשלים פערי יבוא במשך 60 יום. בנסיבות שהתפתחו בשנים האחרונות יורד משקלו של כלי זה כגורם מרכזי בייצוב אסטרטגי של השוק.

## א-סימטריה: שוק של מוכרים

כפי שצויין קודם, עבור רוב הנפט הנסחר כיום בעולם, מרכיב עלות ההפקה במחיר הסופי של הנפט הוא זניח כאשר כשלי שוק והתנהגות צרכנים מובילים למרווח העצום בין עלות ההפקה והמחיר הסופי. הדינמיקה בה נקבע המחיר והכוללת התייחסות לנפט כאל מוצר הומוגני, פיצול בין מסחר ספוט, חוזים ארוכי טווח ואופציות למסחר עתידי מאפשרת תשואה מירבית למדינות המפיקות במגוון תרחישים כל עוד נשמר מרווח צר בין היצע וביקוש. עד לאחרונה נראה היה כי השליטה על היקף התפוקה היא חלק ממדיניות השימור של דינמיקה זו, במיוחד לאור העובדה כי השארת הנפט בבטן האדמה אינה כרוכה בעלויות תפעוליות או מימוניות כלשהן, אך בשנתיים האחרונות ישנם מספר אינדיקטורים לכך שהמרווח הצר בין היצע וביקוש מבטא קושי ממשי להגדיל את הביקוש. כך למשל הזדרזה סעודיה להודיע ב-16.4.11 כי היא מצמצמת בחזרה את התפוקה ב-770,000 חביות על רקע נתונים לירידה בביקוש וזאת למרות שהשוק המשיך במגמה של עליית מחיר והוא עדיין רחוק מיציבות. הסעודים וחברות נוספות בארגון אופ"ק מביעים בפומבי הסתייגות וחשש מהאמרת מחירים לרמה העשויה להביא לשינוי אסטרטגי בהתנהגות השוק, שינוי שיוביל להתעיילות ולקיצוץ בשימוש בנפט או האמרת מחיר שתוביל למיתון עולמי עמוק שיפחית את הביקוש באופן משמעותי. צמצום התפוקה עליו הכריזה סעודיה, בתקופה של הפסקת יצוא הנפט מלוב והמשך אי היציבות האיזורית, עשוי להעיד על קושי בהגדלת התפוקה למרות המסרים המרגיעים היוצאים מריאד. סעודיה מצהירה כי ביכולתה להפיק כ-15 מיליון חביות נפט ביום. בשנים האחרונות השקיעה חברת הנפט הלאומית ARAMCO בפיתוח יכולת ההפקה אך תוצאות ראשונות להשקעות אלה צפויות להגדיל את ההיצע רק בשנת 2014 ותוספת משמעותית יותר צפויה בשנים 2016-2017<sup>16</sup>. מומחים מעריכים כי יכולת ההפקה בפועל של סעודיה עומדת על 12.5 מיליון חביות ביום כשהתפוקה הסעודית היומית הממוצעת בשנת 2010 עמדה על 8.2 חביות ביום ובחודשים האחרונים עלתה ל-9 מיליון חביות ביום<sup>17</sup>.

עבור חלק ניכר מהיצואניות מהווה הנפט מרכיב עיקרי מכריע בתוצר הלאומי כך שלקביעת המחיר משמעות קיומית עבורן. ניתוח שיא המחיר של 2008 ממחיש מערך שיקולים זה ומעיד על הקשר שבין ערך הדולר ובין רמת המחיר בה נסחר הנפט. לפי ניסיון שיא המחיר של 2008 ליצואניות הנפט הנמצאות במפרץ, ולמבנה המוניטרי של כלכלותיהן, השפעה גדולה מאד על המחיר. למעט כווית, מדינות ה-GCC מצמידות את שער המטבע שלהן אל הדולר (קיבוע שער חליפין במודל PEG) כך שפיחות בערך הדולר מוביל בהכרח לפיחות בכח הקנייה של כלכלותיהן. ירידה בערך הדולר, כמו זו שהתרחשה במהלך 2007 הובילה למהלך נגדי של

15 בתחום התחבורה אחראיות המשאיות הקלות לכ-52% מצריכת האנרגיה, משאיות כבדות ואוטובוסים ל-21%, תעופה וספנות ל-10%. הנתונים לקוחים מתוך דוח של ה World Economic Forum בנושא תחזית אנרגטית לתחבורה. הדו"ח מרכז נתונים מכמה מקורות איכותיים ומביא גרפים טובים במיוחד. ראה:

World Economic Forum: Repowering Transport (April 2011) (נבדק ב-20.6.11) <http://www.weforum.org/reports/repowering-transport-2011>

16 עפ"י הדו"ח השנתי של חברת ARAMCO צפויה תוספת תפוקה של 400,000 חביות משדה מיניפה בשנת 2014 ותוספת של 1.7 מיליון חביות ליום מפיתוח שדות חדשים (א-סייד, נמל, קמראן וארסאן) ופיתוח הפקה קיימת בשדות חורסניה וקורייס. במקביל פועלת סעודיה להגדיל את תפוקת בית הזיקוק, שה"כ מתכננת ARAMCO השקעה של 100 מיליארד דולר בפיתוח שדות חדשים וכ-50 מיליארד דולר בפיתוח כושר זיקוק עד שנת 2015. ראה דוח ARAMCO לשנת 2010: <http://www.aramco.com/content/www/en/home.html#news%2527C%252Fen%252FHome%252Fnews%252Fpublications-and-report%252FAnnualreview.baseajax.html> (נבדק בתאריך 20.6.11)

Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 7 March (2011) p. 13 17

ייקור הנפט, שמחירו נקוב בדולרים. קשר זה הסביר אז את העליה במחיר הנפט, עליה שהתרחשה על רקע גלישה למיתון עולמי, מאחר ובנסיבות אלה התווסף מרכיב מרכיב הורדת הריבית. במסגרת הורדה זו הופנו כספים להשקעה בסחורות, ובכך נוצר לחץ נוסף לעליית מחירי הנפט וכלל שוק הסחורות. היחס ההפוך בין ערך הדולר ומחיר הנפט התרחש בשנים 2007-2008 על רקע עלייה בשיעור האינפלציה במדינות המפרץ לרמות שיא, סביב ממוצע של 10%. תנודות המחיר החדות הובילו למהומות ולחשש רציני אז מאי-יציבות פוליטית שתיווצר על רקע הצירוף של ירידה חדה בהכנסות והעליה באינפלציה. ב-2008 סירבו מדינות ה-GCC לבקשת ארה"ב להגדיל את התפוקה.

להיבטים הנוגעים לקשר בין היצע וביקוש על קביעת המחיר ניתן להוסיף את המרכיב הספקולטיבי הקשור במסחר בנפט. מסחר זה מתבצע במסגרת חוזים ארוכי טווח, חוזים מסוג ספוט וחוזים עתידיים. רמת הריבית הנמוכה הנהוגה בעולם בשנתיים האחרונות יחד עם שער חליפין הנתפש כמבטא חולשה של הדולר מעודדים משקיעים לפעול בשוק הסחורות, בהן הנפט. הדיווחים על עלייה בביקוש וצמצום ההיצע מעודדים הפניית כספים לשוק האופציות על סחורות עתידיות. הספקולציות בשוק זה מתבססות על איתור הזדמנויות ארביטראז', היינו קניית אופציות לרכישה עתידית של נפט ומכירתן כאשר מחירן בשוק עולה אך בטרם הגיע מועד פקיעתן. במסגרת דינמיקה זו מתחרים על האופציות הן גורמי השקעה והן גופים הזקוקים להבטחת אספקה ריאלית. מעגלי המסחר תוך כדי ימי חייה של האופציה מביאים לעלייה במחירה. מדובר בעליית מחיר הגוררת באופן ישיר עליה במחירי הספוט ועליה הלכה למעשה של מחיר הנפט. הצלילה החדה של מחיר הנפט משיא של \$149 ל-\$30 תוך שבועות ספורים בשנת 2008 עשויה להעיד על משקל המסחר הספקולטיבי בעליית המחיר של הנפט. המחיר הגבוה הוביל לירידה בביקוש, ממשלות וגורמים מסחריים שהיו זקוקים לאחזקה ממשית באופציות שיקנו להן ביטחון אספקה יכלו למתן פעילותן בשוק החוזים העתידיים כך שלקראת פקיעת מועד האופציה היו חייבים גורמי ההשקעה למכרה כמעט בכל מחיר.

## ריסון המחיר באמצעות שימוש בתחליפי נפט

הדיון ב-peak oil ובתרחיש ה-\$200 מציינים הכרה בשינוי סביבת הצריכה בכל הנוגע לדלקים. דיון זה כולל הכרה לפיה התממשות התרחיש, או לפחות רמות מחיר קבועות של מעל \$100 חבית, היא בעלת הסתברות לא מבוטלת בטווח הקצר והבינוני כשפתרונות שיביאו לערעור במשקלו האסטרטגי של הנפט נמצאים רק בטווח הבינוני והארוך. בטווח הקצר עומדים לרשות הצרכנים רק כלים העשויים לאפשר ריסון של העלייה במחיר או הפחתה מתונה שלו, בבסיס כלים אלה נמצא השימוש באתנול ומתנול, יעול השימוש האנרגטי בדלקים, פיתוח מקורות נפט חדשים וכן נקיטה בצעדים להגברת השקיפות בשוק תוך צמצום המימד הספקולטיבי הקיים בו. חשוב לציין כי השימוש בכלים אלה אין בכוחו להחזיר את מחירי הנפט לרמות המחיר בהן נסחר עד אמצע העשור הקודם מאחר והצידוק הכלכלי לשימוש בהם מתקיים רק מעל רמת מחיר של \$70 לחבית נפט קונבנציונלי. רכבים חשמליים ואפילו רכבים היברידיים אינם נכללים במסגרת כלים אלה עקב העדר טכנולוגיה מספקת ואמינה בתחום המצברים או בתחום תאי הדלק.

השימוש באתנול ובמתנול הוא הכלי שנחשב כיעיל ביותר לשינוי פני השוק בטווח הקצר והבינוני. שני הדלקים כמעט זהים בהרכבם הכימי כשהשוני ביניהם נובע בעיקר מתהליכי הייצור, כאשר מדובר במתנול מדובר על ייצור דלק נזולי, דומה בתכונותיו לזה של הבנזין שמקורו בנפט, המופק בתהליך כימי מגז טבעי ומפחם. המתנול רעיל יותר לבני אדם מהבנזין אך נחשב כמזהם פחות. טכנולוגיה זו זמינה ומוכרת וישנן דוגמאות עבר בהן נעשה באתנול שימוש כדלק עיקרי במקרים של מחסור בנפט, דוגמת גרמניה הנאצית במהלך המלחמה ודרום אפריקה של סוף תקופת האפרטהייד, שנמצאה תחת משטר סנקציות. אתנול הוא דלק נזולי המופק מצמחים והוא נחשב כאנרגיה מתחדשת ומכאן כאנרגיה ירוקה. מהילת אתנול בבנזין רגיל עד לשיעור של 15% מהנפח נחשבת כאפשרית ואף כמייעלת פעולתם של מנועים רגילים, אך מאידך מדובר בדלקים בעלי תכולה אנרגטית נמוכה מזה של בנזין ומכאן שטווח הנסיעה לכל ליטר מתקצר. הגדלת שיעור האתנול בדלק יוצרת בעיות קורוזיה למנוע ובמקרה של ביו-דיזל (מנועי דיזל המוזנים בדלק שמקורו שמנים צמחיים) לבעיות הצתה בטמפרטורות נמוכות. ייצור מנוע המסוגל להשתמש בדלקים בעלי תמהיל מרכיבים משתנה (flexible fuels vehicles) יקר רק בכ-\$100 לערך מיצור אותו מנוע המיועד לפעולה באמצעות בנזין בלבד, כאשר תוספת העלות מתמקדת בחלקי איטום חזקים יותר.

הממשל האמריקאי נוקט מאז שנת 2005 במדיניות שתכליתה הרחבת ייצור האתנול מ-24 מיליון חביות לשנה כיום לפי 7.5 היינו לכ-178 חביות אתנול בשנה. שני הממשלים האחרונים העבירו חקיקה מקיפה שתכליתה עידוד השימוש באתנול הן בצד הצרכן (גלון דלק מהול באתנול מסוג E90 זול בכ-10 סנט מגלון דלק רגיל ו-E85 זול בכ-20 סנט) והן בצד היצרן, כשחלק גדול מהחקיקה מיועד לתמריצי מס לעידוד פיתוח תעשיית אתנול, בשלב ראשון בטכנולוגיות הקיימות ובהמשך לדלק ביולוגי ולביו-מסה (דלק המיוצר מפסולת חקלאית ושאריות מזון) מדורות מתקדמים יותר. ההתמקדות האמריקאית בעידוד השימוש באתנול מיועדת בראש ובראשונה להתמודד עם העליה במחירי הנפט ולחזק את עצמאותה האנרגטית של ארה"ב. מעבר ליעדים אלה מעורר קו מדיניות זה מחלוקת על רקע החשש לתחרות על התוצרת החקלאית בין שימושי דלק ושימושי מזון (דלקים ביולוגיים מדור ראשון מתבססים על שימוש בתירס, חיטה וסוכר), וכן על רקע ספקות בתועלתה הסביבתית בכל הקשור לצמצום פליטות פחמן. בהקשר זה יש לציין כי שינוי במבנה הסובסידיה על הבנזין נחשב כאחד הכלים לעידוד השימוש בדלקים אלטרנטיביים<sup>18</sup>.

הרחבת השימוש באתנול כמהלך אסטרטגי תפחית את הביקוש הכולל לנפט אך כתגובה לתקופת שיאי מחיר הוא עלול לגרום לעלייה במחירי התוצרת החקלאית, כאשר יותר ויותר שטחים יוסבו לגידולים שתכליתם ייצור דלק. קיימים חילוקי דעות ביחס לקשר זה<sup>19</sup> ומול טענה לפיה חתימת חוזה עם יצרן אתנול מקנה לחקלאי הכנסה מובטחת ומשחררת אותו מדאגה לאיכות קיימת

Coady et al., "Petroleum Product Subsidies: Costly, Inequitable and Rising". IMF Staff Position Note (2010) [www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1005.pdf](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1005.pdf) (נבדק ב-20.6.11)

Sayed H. Saghaian, "The Impact of the Oil Sector on Commodity prices: Correlation or Causation?", *Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics*, Vol. 19 (42/3) (2010)

טענה המציינת כי שוק האתנול מיעל את הייצור החקלאי כשמפעלי אתנול קולטים עודפי תוצרת או סחורה לא איכותית. לעומת ארה"ב, שהיא גם מעצמה חקלאית, מבצעת אירופה ככלל נסיגה ממדיניות עידוד גורפת שאימצה בתחילת העשור שעבר. המדיניות האירופית העדכנית מתמקדת בעידוד שימוש ופיתוח ביו-דיזל וביומסה מדורות מתקדמים.

כלי נוסף לריסון עליית המחיר באמצעות הגמשת הביקוש השולי הוא הגברת השקיפות לנעשה בשוק הנפט והגבלת מקומם של ספקולנטים. הן הממשל האמריקאי והן האיחוד האירופי ציינו בהזמנות שונות כי השוק רחוק מלהתנהל כשוק חופשי וכי שכלול המידע בנוגע לסחר בנפט עשוי ליעל את השוק. שוק הספוט למשל הוא שוק שהמידע לגביו חלקי ביותר מבחינת כמויות ומחירים כאשר שחקנים מבססים החלטותיהם על מדד המסכם נתונים של 60 עסקאות יומיות בלבד. סיכום זה אינו מבטא את השונות הרבה המתקיימת בפועל בשוק ואת הזיקה המתקיימת בין שוק הספוט לשוק העסקאות העתידיות. ניתוח התנהגות הצרכנים מלמד כי רבות מההחלטות ביחס לחוזי נפט מתייחסות לתחום הכלכלה ההתנהגותית והן נגזרות מההתייחסות לנפט כאל מוצר הומגני בעל מחיר אחיד (למרות שבפועל מתקיימות מספר מערכות מחירים לנפט מסוגים ומאיזורים שונים)<sup>20</sup>. הבנק האירופי וקרן המטבע הבינלאומית ביצעו מספר עבודות שנועדו לבחון את השפעת השימוש במטבעות נוספים לדולר במסחר בנפט על התנהגות המחירים<sup>21</sup>. עבודת הבנק האירופי מצביעה מטבע הדברים על היתרונות שמקנה השימוש ביוור בכל הנוגע למשטר המחירים אך מעבר לכך הדו"ח מציינ כי פיצול השוק למספר שווקים הפועלים במטבעות שונים עשוי לצמצם את השיקולים הכרוכים בהתחשבות בדולר כמכשיר לשמירת ערך ריאלי, ומכאן לצמצם את הקשר בין עליית מחירים ופיחות בערך הדולר.

בכל הנוגע למחקר ופיתוח בתחום תחליפי הנפט הפכה ישראל בשנה האחרונה לדוגמה מובילה בעולם בכל הנוגע למדיניות ייעודית לנושא. החלטת ממשלה מחדש ינואר 2011 מקצה סכום של מיליארד וחצי שקלים לתקופה של 10 שנים לפיתוח טכנולוגיות ויישומים בתחום תחליפי הנפט. התכנית הישראלית מתמקדת בארבעה תחומים עיקריים, ביו-דלקים, הנעה חשמלית ומצברים, יעילות אנרגטית ודלקים סינטטיים. הפרוייקט כולל השקעה במחקר בסיסי וגם הקמתם של מרכזי מצוינות ומו"פ עם מדינות נוספות. תגליות הגז של השנים האחרונות הופכות דלק זה למרכיב מרכזי בהתמודדות האסטרטגית עם הקשיים שיוצר שוק הנפט. הדגש שמקבל בישראל תחום הרכב הממשלתי הוא חלק מאסטרטגיה זו, ובמסגרתו מומר הגז באמצעות תחנת כח לחשמל שישמש להנעת רכבים. פיתוח תעשיית מתנול על בסיס גז הוא דוגמה נוספת.

## תרחיש ה-200\$: היבטים של ביטחון לאומי

מעבר לניתוחים הכלכליים ולתחזיות הביקוש, ההכרה כי צמצום ההיצע יביא להאמרה דרמטית במחיר הביא גופי ביטחון לאומי במספר מקומות בעולם לעסוק בניתוח המשמעות הביטחונית-אסטרטגית של העליה החדה במחירי הנפט. שני דוחות, אחד של משרד ההגנה הגרמני ואחד של משרד ההגנה האמריקאי זכו לתשומת לב רבה במסגרת הדיון הכללי בנושא העליה במחירי הנפט ושאלת ה- peak oil. שני הדוחות מצביעים על שורה של תמורות גיאו-פוליטיות חמורות שינבעו מעלית המחיר לרמות גבוהות של 200\$ לחבית. הדוחות מצביעים הן על סיכונים מערכתיים, שהסתברותם וחומרתם תעלה לינארית במקביל לעליה במחירי הנפט, והן על סיכונים נקודתיים במדינות מתפתחות. סיכונים שהם בעלי השפעה ישירה על המדינות המפותחות ועל יציבות המערכת הבינלאומית כפי שאנו מכירים אותה כיום.

במסגרת הסיכונים המערכתיים ניתן לציין את הקשר שבין העליה במחירי הנפט לבין ירידה בצמיחה, שלא כחלק ממחזור כלכלי, והוא משותף לכל המדינות המפותחות. משמעותיותה של התפתחות זו הן ברורות והן כוללות השפעה על המערכת הפיננסית וההיגיון הכלכלי המפעיל אותה, במיוחד זה הנוגע לתכנון גרעון ואשראי טווח-ארוך. מעבר לכך מדובר על משבר אמון במטבעות ובקושי מהותי לקיים סחר. משבר מסוג זה יוביל כמובן לגידול משמעותי באבטלה ולירידה ברמת השירותים אותם מספקות ממשלות במדינות המפותחות. גורמים אלה צפויים להוביל לירידה ביציבות הפוליטית ולעלייה בכוחם של גורמים קיצוניים. יש לציין כי במדינות רבות, במיוחד במערב, המס הקשור בדלק הוא מקור הכנסה חשוב ממסים. ניטרול העליה במחירי הנפט באמצעות הפחתת המס המוטל על דלק משמעותה תהיה אובדן של מקור מסים חשוב עבור ממשלות, שתוביל גם היא לירידה באיכות השירותים אותם מספקת המדינה.

עפ"י התרחיש, העליה במחירי הנפט, בעיקר על רקע צמצום אסטרטגי בהיצע, תוביל בהכרח לחיזוק במעמדן של המדינות מיצאות הנפט. חיזוק שיתבטא בירידה בלחץ אותו יוכלו מדינות המערב להפעיל עליהן ביחס לשורת נושאים, דוגמת נושאים איזוריים וזכויות אדם. העליה במחירי הנפט, על רקע של משבר כלכלי, תצמצם כמובן גם את יכולתה של הקהילה הבינלאומית להפעיל כוחות צבא באיזורים שונים בעולם ובכך יתכנסו נורמות של התערבות בינלאומית המקובלות כיום. כבר עתה קיימים נסיונות מצד מדינות לגדר עצמן מעליה במחירי נפט, על רקע צמצום בהיצע, באמצעות שליטה אנכית בגורמי יצור לכל אורך שרשרת האספקה. חברת הנפט הסינית (בשליטה ממשלתית) CNPC למשל פועלת להשגת זכויות חיפוש באיזורים בסודן, מקימה בתי זיקוק בוונצואלה ועוד. מדיניות מסוג זה עשויה להקנות לסין נגישות לנפט זול יותר מזה הנסחר בשוק ה-spot אך במקביל היא מובילה לשחיקה במאפייני השוק החופשי של הסחר בנפט וכן לחיזוק הדומיננטיות של "oil related diplomacy". גם לצעדים המיועדים להתמודד עם העליה במחירי הנפט צפויה להיות השפעה גיאו-אסטרטגית רבת סיכונים. המתוחות שכבר מתפתחת בין רוסיה לקנדה ביחס לשאלות טריטוריאליזם באיזור הארקטי היא דוגמה לכך. מדובר באיזור הנחשד כבעל פוטנציאל גדול להמצאותם של שדות נפט. התמודדות עם המחסור הצפוי באמצעות מעבר לשימוש מסיבי בדלקים ביולוגיים (אתנול) עשוי לערער את שוק המזון.

היבט נוסף העשוי למתן במקצת את תקפות התרחיש היא המשמעות השונה המוקנה למושג "תרחיש" בתחום הכלכלה המקצועית ובתחום הביטחון הלאומי הוא שונה. בתחום הכלכלי "תרחיש", אפילו אם נוסח בשפה טבעית, מבטא מודל פורמלי. לעתים קרובות,

20 (James L. Smith, "World Oil: Market or Mayhem?", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 23/3 (2009).

21 Elizia Mileva and Nikolaus Siegfried, *Oil market structure, network effects and the choice of currency for oil invoicing*. European Central Bank: 21 (Occasional Paper Series No. 77 (2007).

עפ"י הנורמה המקצועית הנהוגה בשטח זה, המודל הוא מודל אקונומטרי מבוסס רגרסיה. היינו כזה המשקלל באמצעות כלים סטטיסטיים, המנתחים פיזור ומתאם, נתוני עבר כבסיס לניבוי העתיד. הנספחים המצורפים לתחזיות ארגון האנרגיה הבינלאומי מציינים מודלים אקונומטריים מפורשים עליהם מסתמכים. בכל הנוגע לנפט, כפי שצויין קודם, היקף המרכיבים הנשענים על הערכות חסרות תימוך אמפירי הוא גדול מאד, ומכאן שתוקף הניבוי עשוי להיחשב כבעייתי. ב-40 השנים האחרונות כשלו המודלים בחיזוי של מחירי נפט. ה-IEA נוהגת לעדכן הערכותיה ותחזיותיה מדי רבעון, לעתים באופן מהותי.

לעומתם, בתחום הביטחון הלאומי מבטא המושג "תרחיש" גישה נרטיבית לניתוח העתיד, המניחה נקודת מוצא מסוימת בעתיד ו"מגלגלת" התפתחות/התפתחויות הנובעות ממנו. בתרחישים מסוג זה ישנה חשיבות לדין הנוצר סביב לסיפור התרחיש ולהיבטים שונים הקשורים לאופן התפתחותו. תרחישי ה-200\$ חבית" מדגימים היבט זה תרחישים מתחום הביטחון הלאומי. התרחיש משתמש בהסתברות נסיבתית, שלא ניתן לבטלה כמופרכת, המצביעה על האמרת המחיר. נקודת המוצא של התרחיש היא מחיר עתידי של 200\$ ולא הדרך למחיר זה. התרחיש מנתח השתלשלות אירועים הנובעת ממחיר זה ואת ההשלכות הנובעות מהן. בנוסף יש לשים לב כי התרחישים הנזכרים מקורם הוא במסד הצבאי, הנוהג (ולעתים מחוייב) להציב לעצמו כתרחישי ייחוס תרחישים מחמירים.

## סיכום

העליה הרציפה והקבועה שנרשמה בעשור האחרון בביקוש לנפט הובילה במקביל לעליה במחירו, גם על רקע המשבר הכלכלי של השנים האחרונות. למול העליה בביקוש, בצד ההיצע כמעט ולא נרשם גידול ביכולת ההפקה ובעתודות המוכחות. בפער מצומצם זה קיימים כיום שחקנים מעטים (בעיקר סעודיה וכוויית) המסוגלים לגשר נקודתית, באמצעות הגדלת ההיצע, על נקודות שיא ביקוש או אירועים פוליטיים/סביבתיים הקשורים בהפקת הנפט. פער מצטמצם זה בין ביקוש והיצע מתפרש ע"י רבים כמבטא חצייה של נקודת ה-peak oil. תיאור מצב זה הוא בסיס לתחזיות לפיהן יגיע מחירה של חבית נפט עד לשנת 2015 לכ-200\$.

על פניו הביקוש הגדל לנפט הוא קשיח ומכאן שתחזיות ה-200\$ הן דטרמיניסטיות. בפרק הזמן הקצר יחסית אליו מתייחסות התחזיות (עד שנת 2015) לא ניתן לעשות הרבה מבחינת פיתוח תחליפים לתלות העולמית בנפט, לפיתוח מקורות נפט חדשים ולפיתוח תשתית הובלה וזיקוק משוכללת יותר.

יחד עם זאת, בחינת הגורמים המשפיעים על מחיר הנפט מגלה אינטרס המשותף הן לרוב יצרניות הנפט והן לצרכנים לשימור המחיר ברמות נמוכות בהרבה מרמת ה-200\$ לחבית. בנוסף קיימים מספר אמצעים המקנים יכולת השפעה על המחיר. הכוונה היא במיוחד לאמצעים שבטווח הקצר יכולים למתן את העליה בביקוש ולהגדיל, אפילו במעט, את הפער שבין היצע וביקוש. באמצעים אלה ניתן לכלול את הנהגתם של תקנים לייצור רכבים דו-דלקיים לצד הגברת יצור אתנול ומתנול ותמרוץ מעבר לרכבים חסכוניים יותר. קבוצה נוספת של אמצעים נוגעת להגברת שקיפות הסחר בנפט בכל הנוגע לעתודות טבעיות, מאגרים אסטרטגיים הנמצאים בידי מדינות, מידע על יכולת זיקוק ושינוע וכד'. הגדלת רמת האמינות והדיוק של נתונים מסוג זה תביא לצמצום במימד הספקולטיבי המלווה את המסחר בנפט, מימד הכולל היבטים פסיכולוגיים והתנהגותיים המשפיעים על התנודתיות במחירים.

## Women Empowerment and Leadership

Lea Landman

### Foreword

The Eleventh Annual Herzliya Conference on the Balance of Israel's National Security and Resilience was held on the campus of the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya in February 2011. For the first time, Susan G. Komen and the Herzliya Conference partnered to deal with the issue of women empowerment and leadership as a comprehensive aspect of national security and resilience.

The Women Empowerment and Leadership session at the Conference was preceded by a high-level taskforce, whose work composed of influential women from the following sectors: policy and decision-making, science and health, defense and security, economy and business, and the legal world. The purpose of this taskforce was to devise methods to strengthen women's status and empower them within the main sectors of social, economic and public life. The taskforce intended to show that women's empowerment affects positively not only economies, but welfare and health, issues of social disparity and the overall strength and resilience of nations.

The taskforce concluded that it is imperative that the empowerment of women in the above-mentioned sectors be cultivated, and that concrete solutions exist and should be implanted at all levels, in all sectors. Such cultivation will enable policy makers to address those sectors' existing gender discrepancies based on a gender perspective.

Based on the taskforce findings, the Women Empowerment and Leadership session at the Herzliya Conference presented in a comprehensive manner the taskforce's research, as well as the ideas and insights of its additional participants. The session examined the challenges women face in five sectors: Health, policy-making, business, third-sector, military and management. All challenges were presented with concrete solutions. A special focus was given to health diplomacy as powerful tool for women empowerment.

Based on the Women Empowerment and Leadership session recordings and written documents, this paper reports the speakers' main observations, each from a completing aspect of empowerment. By tackling the issue from a wide perspective, the taskforce and session allow to outline key observations, including challenges and solutions.

The Women Empowerment and Leadership session created an opportunity for decision-makers in Israel and abroad to convene and deliberate on how to best impact policy, as it will place recommendations directly into the hands of policy-makers.

## The Historical Perspective

Prof. Galia Golan

Prof. Galia Golan is a member of the faculty at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at the IDC Herzliya. She is International Fellow at the Center for Ethics, Law and Public Life at Brandeis University. Her areas of specialization include globalization, international crises and contemporary political affairs. She was a Member of the Faculty at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where she served as Chairperson of the Department of Political Science, the Lafer Center for Women and Gender Studies and the Mayrock Center for Russian, Euro-Asian and East-European Research. Prof. Golan served as a visiting professor at research centers and universities in the US and England, and as an advisor to the IDF and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She published eight books on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. She is recipient of several awards, among which the Lifetime Achievement Award from the Israeli Association for Political Science. Prof. Golan received a doctorate in Political Science from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

### Proceedings

The purpose of the women's movement first wave of feminism in the early 20th Century was to enable women to vote and stand for public office. This first wave can be considered the first breakthrough for the women's movement, at least in the industrial world. At the time, and in the effort to achieve the right to vote, **women based their demands on two principles, the first being equality: in terms of democracy, women make up approximately 50 percent of the population and thus should be represented and have the right to vote and stand for office. The second principle was that of difference: this principle was based on the idea that women can offer a different viewpoint to the world of politics.** In many ways it corresponded to the breakdown between the public sphere and the private sphere, between the public life and home. Women began to move out of the home or in addition to the home, into the public sphere. The 1960s and 1970s witnessed the second wave of women's movement which saw a tremendous step forward in the number of women involved in the public sphere to the point where today society has become relatively accustomed to seeing women in leadership positions. But the statistics certainly indicate that women none the less make up a very small percentage of the leaders around the world, whether in politics, business, law or academia; thus, in reality, women are still a minority.

The panel on Women Empowerment discussed various reasons why women still remain a minority in the top positions, even though they have been "freed", so to speak, to work outside their home and are involved in the public and political spheres. Prof. Golan commented that often society does not like to discuss the obstacles to women in reaching leadership positions. In most cases, women wish to be seen as equal to men, up to the task and certainly not in need of "special treatment." Yet, most would admit that there are obstacles – statistics demonstrate that women are far behind in leadership positions. In view of this, once in a leadership position, women may be able to empower other women, by removing some of the obstacles and alleviating some of the problems. Moreover, given the different ways in which women have been socialized and educated by most societies and cultures, in whatever society, once women reach leadership roles, they might introduce new leadership and management customs.

Some of the questions that the panel intended to examine were as follows: 1. Which obstacles still exist on the path of women to positions of leadership and if so, identifying those obstacles; 2. Do women consciously or unconsciously adopt and adapt to the norms of behavior of the style of men in order to achieve the same positions and functions or whether they bring something different to the table; 3. What can be done to encourage women to aim for influential positions in business, politics, etc; 4. Should women achieving influential positions press for the advancement of other women and issues related to women, and whether said women "have a responsibility" to pursue a women's agenda; 5. Is there in fact a woman's way of doing things?; 6. Finally, what steps should be taken in order to implement and enforce existing legislation on gender equality.

## Health Diplomacy

Amb. Nancy Brinker

Amb. Nancy Brinker is Founder and CEO of Susan G. Komen for the Cure, the most well-known breast cancer organization in the US. She also serves as a Goodwill Ambassador for Cancer Control for the UN World Health Organization. Previously, Amb. Brinker served as Chief of Protocol of the United States, and as US Ambassador to the Republic of Hungary under President George W. Bush. She was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian honor, by President Obama. Amb. Brinker graduated from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

### Proceedings

Amb. Brinker founded Susan G. Komen for the Cure 30 years ago, and the organization has changed the way society talk about and treat breast cancer in America. Amb. Brinker stated that Susan G. Komen is implementing the lessons learned in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. This global health diplomacy approach, with its focus on better access to care, is empowering women worldwide, and it is critical if research and doctors were to save lives through early detection and resolve the growing global cancer crisis.

Amb. Brinker recalled that her fight began 30 ago with a promise she made to her sister Suzy to do everything she could to find a cure for breast cancer. When her sister was first diagnosed, the world was much different. People crossed the street in her hometown because they thought the disease was contagious. There were no Internet and information hotlines. There were no global campaigns to educate people and spread awareness. Millions of women were facing death because they knew nothing of early detection, or cancer screening, or because even the most routine cancer treatments were unattainable.

While serving in the Bush Administration as ambassador to Hungary and later as Chief of Protocol to the President, Amb. Brinker witnessed



firsthand the power to change women's lives through health diplomacy. **Better health for women is an end in itself, but it can also be a means of improving the political status of women in places where they have been marginalized. By focusing on health Susan G. Komen builds relationships within countries where traditional foreign policy has failed to do so.**

Health programs have become extremely important over the last 50 years in bilateral and multilateral development initiatives. Amb. Brinker recalls traveling around Africa with President Bush and visiting a United States President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) clinic in Ghana. The US has spent tens of billions of dollars to build and supply PEPFAR clinics. HIV/AIDS victims in Africa knew their lives had been improved because of the anti-retroviral drugs the US provides.

Amb. Brinker is especially proud of the work Susan G. Komen has done in Israel to help women since the mid-1990s, donating almost USD3 million to research institutes, hospitals, universities, and advocacy groups in Israel. The activities in Israel include:

Susan G. Komen's first Race for Cure in Jerusalem in October and managed to gather women from many nationalities and religions to race through the streets of Jerusalem. Susan G. Komen set a new course for more treatments, more hope, and more life, which is important because in Israel breast cancer is the leading cancer killer of women in the country.

Susan G. Komen met with Israeli government leaders at the Knesset, partnered with the mayor, worked with Mrs. Netanyahu, toured medical facilities such as the Hadassah Women's Health Center at Abu Gosh, attended a women's health fair for Orthodox Jewish women, and met with doctors serving Jewish, Arab and Christian women in the region. Susan G. Komen also convened in Tel Aviv scientists from around the world and challenged them to find new biomarker and detection technology.

Susan G. Komen's approach in Israel is similar to the one taken around the world to empower women and fight breast cancer. As cancer is universally deadly, Susan G. Komen's response is equally universal. Holding a race for the cure is important because it mobilizes people at the grass roots level. But as important is the need to engage government leaders, corporations, women's groups, hospitals, and scientists in country. Both combined are the basis of health diplomacy in action. Komen has more than 1.6 million people who participate annually in races in more than 140 cities around the world. Susan G. Komen's experience proves the approach is working to save lives and empower women.

The 5-year survival rate for breast cancer is now 98 percent in the US compared to 74 percent in 1982 when Komen was founded. Although Komen achieved tremendous progress in the past 30 years, there is still much more work ahead. **The fight for breast cancer must be taken everywhere, especially to places where cancer victims often have no defenses, no advocates, and little understanding of what they are up against** (breast cancer takes more lives every year than tuberculosis, malaria, and AIDS combined).

More so is to do that this leading world killer is often marginalized, and in many countries, flat out ignored. In the public health reports of many countries, cancer is not even mentioned by name. In the UN Millennium Development Goals, cancer is hidden away in the category of "other diseases." Last year, 7.6 million lives were lost to this "other disease."

An important factor for change and success is the grass root movement to change policy and create an economic response, gaining success over time. Therefore it is essential to gain access and connectivity to the grass roots.

## Women in Diplomacy, Security and Policy

### The Hon. Dr. Ursula Plassnik

Dr. Ursula Plassnik is a Member of the Austrian Parliament and Special Envoy for International Women's Affairs of the Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs. She is former Minister of Foreign Affairs. Earlier Dr. Plassnik served as Chief of Staff for Wolfgang Schüssel, former Federal Chancellor of Austria. She also served as Austrian ambassador to Switzerland. Dr. Plassnik is a lawyer by training. Finally, she is a graduate of the University of Vienna and a postgraduate from the College of Europe in Bruges.

## Proceedings

Dr. Plassnik believes that **in terms of global resources management, the energy of women is not sufficiently utilized around the globe in this age of energy shortage, which, in itself, is a waste of energy.** Women need to be involved more directly, not only on the decision-making level but also on the grass roots level, particularly in those regions where peace really has to be rebuilt. All peace initiatives are locally and regionally determined; hence women must be involved on the local and regional levels.

A true landmark in the matter of women's involvement in international affairs, Dr. Plassnik continued, was the passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 10 years ago which calls upon governments to include women in all matters of decision-making connected with war, peace and human security.

**Resolution 1325 embraces two aspects of women's involvement in peace making, the first being violence against women and the second being the empowerment of women leadership.** Regarding violence against women, remarkable progress has been made in the world's awareness of what women on the global, regional and local levels are willing to accept. For the first time, a statute of the International Criminal Court determines systematic sexual violence to be a crime, and under certain circumstances a crime against humanity.

Efforts are being made around the globe to bring perpetrators of violence against women to justice and thus to send the message to future perpetrators that this kind of violence will not be tolerated any longer by the international community. The Democratic Republic of Congo is one example of a country where this statute is gradually being implemented.

In 2007 Dr. Plassnik, then her country's minister of foreign affairs, implemented Resolution 1325's second aspect of empowering women and integrating them into leadership positions, when she organized a conference in Vienna on women leaders in the Middle East. Drafted by

high level women decision-makers such as Former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, a letter was sent to UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon pointing out that of the 56 special representatives to the UN Secretary General to various conflict areas, not even one representative was a woman, and that said ratio was unacceptable. During the 2011 Munich Security Conference, the female participants in the conference organized their own meeting for the first time on the margin of the Security Conference. Moreover, Secretary General Ban Ki Moon chose to speak on one subject which was Resolution 1325. Today, female special representatives of the UN are leading large UN missions, such as UN Special Representative Ellen Margrethe Løj who is leading the mission in Liberia that includes 10,000 UN soldiers, and UN Special Representative Rosalind Marsden, who is the Special Representative of the EU to Sudan.

Nevertheless, even today, women still find themselves having to explain and justify their added value as women and the need to include women both in the top and grass roots levels in peace work. The solution, according to Dr. Plassnik, is for women to continue to argue the case and continue to do the work until the integration of women into peace keeping becomes a non-issue.

Moreover, peace building and international affairs have to tackle three categories –that have to be addressed by men and women alike - in order to enhance women empowerment:

Awareness: Women and men to change their mindset and know the challenges;

Access: Women need to access information, education, healthcare and finances in order to increase their participation in the public sphere;

Rules: There is a need to channel the rules to the grass root on the one hand and work on the international community level on the other.

## Strengthening Women Leadership

Ms. Nehama Ronen

Ms. Nehama Ronen is Chairwoman of Maman Cargo Terminals & Handling. She also serves as Chairwoman of the ELA Recycling Company. Ms. Ronen previously served as Director-General of the Ministry of Environmental Protection. She was a member of Knesset representing the Center Party and served as Deputy Speaker of the Knesset. She received a master's degree in Public Administration from the University of Haifa.

### Proceedings

Ms. Ronen started by paraphrasing George Orwell's *Animal Farm* with regard to equality between men and women in the 21st Century in saying that "all animals are equal but some of them are more equal". This, she believes, is due in part to **the phenomenon of women networking, which, although a generally positive development, inadvertently removes women from the professional fields dominated by men.**

Ms. Ronen argued that the current global trend of women networking is clearly aimed at strengthening women leadership. However, if women want to level the playing field and gain true equality with men, Ms. Ronen claims that **women must bring the game into the same arena and play by the same rules as men.** It has taken years to enable women to achieve positions of leadership in politics and business. It is a fact that all sectors are dominated by males. Therefore the question that must be asked is what is the best method for women to tackle and break the barriers. Ms. Ronen believes that only through male networks can women gain entry into key positions and positions of power. She believes, **in terms of the advancement of women, that it is imperative to develop a common discourse for men and women rather than solely a women's discourse. Women's networks do not enable women to become known among men networks and groups.**

Networking is critical in every sector, but is particularly true in the business one. Since the business sector is more open than any other sector to everything - novelty, gender, etc. – inclusive networking is essential. The more women chose business and management studies and work in the field, the more they will be integrated in high level business positions. As managers they will be in key roles to form other women to achieve these positions, and implement existing laws, de facto providing change on the ground. This has to come with affirmative action, based on merit, that will make sure that women get the same chances.

## Women Empowerment in India

Ms. Indrani Bagchi

Ms. Bagchi is the Diplomatic Editor of The Times of India. She held senior editorial positions in journalism, including Associate Editor of India Today as well as Deputy Foreign Editor and Deputy Features Editor at The Economic Times. Ms. Bagchi previously worked as an Editorial Assistant at The Statesman. She was also a Reuters Fellow at Oxford University. She holds a BA in English Literature from Calcutta University and a Post Graduate Diploma in Journalism from the Indian Institute of Mass Communication in New Delhi.

### Proceedings

At this point in time in India, the head of the largest political party is a woman, the leader of the opposition in parliament is a woman, the speaker of the parliament is a woman, the president of the country is a woman, the minister of foreign affairs is a woman and India ambassador to the US is a woman. One of the largest bio-tech companies is led by a woman. However, there are still areas where girls children are unwanted so foeticide leads to adverse sex ratio etc.

Nonetheless, Indian women have travelled a fairly large distance although Indian women started out with a fairly big advantage in 1947 since women never had to fight for suffrage. From the beginning Indian women had the right to vote which was and still is a highly fought right in many countries around the world. However, women had to fight tremendous obstacles related to family and religious values, not merely in the Hindu society but in the Muslim one as well, where it is even more difficult to get girls and women out into areas of public importance.

The factor that most helped women is the law. For example, there is a law in Indian parliament that has not passed yet but proposes a 33 percent representation for women. But at the ground level, in elections, there is already a 30 percent reservation for women. This leads to an organic empowerment. **Rules and advocacy for women to access an implemented set of laws in critical. It will enable women to seek for political and legal redress.**

**Another factor that has helped is a very strong cooperative grass root movement that not necessarily came from women empowerment but definitely resulted in it.** There is for example a very large cooperative dairy in the western part of India, which resulted in women empowerment and as a result in an increased number of women moving to positions of leadership: self-help group, micro-finance etc. **Although women in India are still not on a confidence trajectory and huge challenges remain, all those changes created a perception that a women can get beyond the family, social or religious constrains, which undoubtedly leads to a growing sense of confidence.** Despite the challenges, a movement has nonetheless started and there icons that women can identify with. This is particularly true for the media sector, which is exploding and washed with young girls. On balance, while there is a woman in leadership positions, in the same place there is also a girl who got her arms shipped because she resisted rape.

## Developing Tools for Social Change

Ms Alona Barkat

Ms. Alona Barkat is the owner and Chairperson of the Hapoel Be'er-Sheva Soccer Club and Chairwoman and Founder of the BRM Institute of Technology and Society at Tel Aviv University. She is a member of the Board of Directors of IVN – Israel Venture Network, a philanthropic organization of high-tech personnel active in the fields of education, society and employment in Israel. Ms. Barkat was an investor and member of the Board of Directors of the American magazine Red Herring. She also was a Member of the Board of Directors of the Jewish Federation of Silicon Valley and represented the Elem organization in this region. Ms. Barkat Earned a BA in Middle East Studies.

## Proceedings

Ms. Barkat's personal experience led her to believe in developing each person's potential. Evolving in a typically masculine world such as football presented a challenge, but a couple of years after taking over the football club, being a woman was no longer an obstacle for running the club.

Women need to believe that no field is unattainable, while those women who achieved leadership positions must help open doors to other.

Although Ms. Barkat believes that **in essence there are no real differences between men and women – as far as skills and capabilities are concerned, she believes women's added value lies in management, for example and in the way women's presence changes the atmosphere in a working place.**

Investing in each child is also leading the philosophy of Ms. Barkat's investment in football club for children in the peripheral town of Be'er Sheva. Football, especially in the periphery, like Be'er Sheva, is used as a tool for social change. Football unites society, and the football club teaches how to play in a team, how to lose, how to gain, how to never give up.

## Women Leadership Belongs to Everyone

Col. (res.) Ahuva Yanai

Col. (res.) Ahuva Yanai is CEO of Matan – Investing in the Community. She served for 28 years in the IDF in a series of senior positions, including IDF Ombudswoman, Head of the Academic Branch, Head of the Basic Instruction Branch and Head of the Family Liaison Branch. Col. (res.) Yanai has been involved in business and social initiatives and activities, as well as in public organizations. She received an MA in Political Science from the University of Haifa.

## Proceedings

Col. (res.) Yanai's personal life passed through two different sectors: the IDF and the third sector-NGOs. While the IDF is inherently a masculine environment, the third sector is an open sector, practically gender-blind.

The army has a key role in the Israeli society, but the number of women in key positions and high ranks is still limited. The army is changing in that sense, opening more combat roles for women, which is almost the only way to climb in the military hierarchy. Society has made advances as well. Women are represented in high ranking command position in the army in very small number - not only in numbers but in the power of those positions. There is a built in problem in the army preventing women from getting to higher ranks positions and this has to be addressed as part of the comprehensive picture of the Israeli society. Moreover, the impact of the army on the civil society is tremendous, and gender issues within the army influence and very often set the tone for women in society as a whole.

In contrast, NGOs are gender and colour-blind. Some women in the third-sector have accomplished major changes in the Israeli society in health, social services, education and more and had a macro-impact on the society.

**Nonetheless, the feminization of the third-sectors is seen as a structural problem in the Israeli society. It is important for women to succeed in business and at the same time have a macro impact on society.**

# Women Executive Power – New Forms of Management

Ms. Efrat Duvdevani

Ms. Efrat Duvdevani is Director-General of the Office of the President. She served in a series of senior management positions alongside Shimon Peres, including Director-General of the Deputy Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry for the Development of the Negev and Galilee, Bureau Chief of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief of Staff in the Ministry for the Development of the Negev and Galilee, and Advisor to the Prime Minister. Ms. Duvdevani also served as Advisor to Yitzhak Rabin during his second term as prime minister and as Head of the Social Branch in the Ombudsman's Division in the Prime Minister's Office. She served in command positions in IDF Intelligence units and received an MA in Public Policy from Tel Aviv University.

## Proceedings

Ms. Duvdevani insisted on the need to develop a work-life balance, but acknowledge that in early career stages, women will have lots of difficulties to develop their personal and family life. Ms. Duvdevani believes **the solution might lie in different forms of management.**

**In order to develop new forms of management, there is a need to understand women executive power** (at the President office for example, there is a majority of women executive). Women in executive positions have a different style of management that involves less personal ego and more cooperation. Women managers emphasize a more systemic, multi-disciplinary view that is essential in today's world. They also give much more room for individual contribution and individual advancement and perspectives;

in order to better manage work-life balance, women are very often more efficient in maximizing work hours and waste less time than men and are more dedicated to their work place. Women management is very well adapted to today's world and technologies.

The solutions for encouraging women to achieve leadership and management positions and grant them access should include: 1. Affirmative action and advancing women in the work place; 2. Adapt work to allow mothers to work (morning meetings, using internet and conference call later at night. It allows women to be full time mothers and career women); 3. Education from an early age.

There is a need for a conceptual change. If in the past women believed they had to adapt to the male management style in order to succeed in the work place, today seems to be the other way around. **Women style of management which is more sensitive and cooperative is a role model for the success in an organization.** This is backed up by studies emphasizing the benefits of women style management.

## Time for a Global Jewish *Sanhedrin*? Toward a New Political Dialogue and Relationship between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora

Tommy Steiner, Maaïke van der Bruggen and Lea Landman

### A Sea Change in Jewish Diaspora Disposition to Israel

The generation of Diaspora Jews that witnessed the creation of the State of Israel and its first insecure decades were firm standard-bearers of Israel, seeing its unconditional support a near holy duty. Endowed by a robust sense of responsibility for the very existence and wellbeing of the vulnerable state, Jews hardly sought a role in dictating policy. While the Jewish establishment has openly disagreed with the Israeli establishment on issues relating to Judaism, such as the question of “Who is a Jew?” it mainly avoided any open debate and criticism on Israel’s national politics and foreign policy. Although Jewish communities have always tended to have organizations of different political hues, they have tended to engage with the broader polity with a more unified voice.

However, Israel is no longer perceived a frail entity facing existential threats that desperately needs all the unconditional support it can muster. Successive generations of Diaspora Jews, particularly in the West, have been affected by a totally different global political culture which does not necessarily positively reflect upon Israel. Raised in liberal democracies that defend minority rights, a growing number of Jewish leaders, and even more so young Jews worldwide, find it increasingly difficult to unconditionally defend Israel’s policies without their critical notes being registered. Studies have shown that young Jews in the Western world support a liberal type of Zionism, whereby values of an open debate, skepticism of military intervention, and human rights are fundamental. The alienation of younger Diaspora Jews is further reinforced by the perceived growingly less liberal Israeli body politic, unproportionally dominated by ultra-orthodox parties and right-of-center political positions.

Most of the “formal” Jewish communal organizations traditionally support Israel “right or wrong” and cannot easily adjust. Consequently, this is alienating a growing number of young Diaspora Jews. Whereas Jewish organizations such as AIPAC officially promote a liberal form of Zionism, in practice they unconditionally support Israel and try to avoid an open debate about Israel’s policy and actions.

Whereas recent polls show that the younger Jewish generation in the North American (and probably throughout the Western world) is increasingly critical of Israel’s actions, they also demonstrate that an overwhelming majority feels very connected to Israel. This might also be related to the mushrooming Israeli experience programs – Taglit/Birthright Israel, MASA, and Lapid. Placed in this context, young Jews are in effect claiming the right to criticize Israel’s action as part of their newfound Jewish identity and affinity. This means there is a potential for deepening the relationship and bond between the newer generation and Israel, but within a new and different context.

The gap between the traditional Jewish establishment and the younger generation can partly help explain the emergence of alternatives organizations such as J Street. Not only does J Street reflect the changed political orientation of younger Jews, it also illustrates the pluralist character of the Jewish communities and the greater diffusion of Jewish organizational life abroad, whereby membership of traditional Jewish organizations could be considered increasingly insufficient. More importantly, these trends serve to underscore the challenge facing both Israel and “formal” communal organizations.

From an Israeli perspective at least, the emergence of J Street and its more controversial actions (allegations that J Street officers suggested a moral equivalence of Hamas and IDF during “Operation Cast Lead” and provided political access in the US for Richard Goldstone) are a source of concern.

Furthermore, the disenchantment with Israeli policies is not only a matter of younger generations, but increasingly involving Jewish leaders in Western communities to the extent that some leading Jewish figures have not been entirely immune to the assault on Israel’s legitimacy in the Western political mainstream. These positions demonstrate how prejudicial “double standard” discourse is setting the agenda even within Jewish communities throughout the Western world.

The mounting assault on Israel's legitimacy, a source of concern for most, if not all, Jewish leaders and Jews worldwide, compounds and accentuates the challenges facing both Israel and the Jewish Diaspora. Israel's international standing is in dire straits, as the legitimacy of its policies, positions, military operations, and even its very existence as a Jewish-Democratic state, are contested and questioned. Out of all proportion to its size or the objective significance of Israel in wider international affairs, the world's increasingly sharp focus and tight scrutiny are applied to all of Israel's actions.

Jewish communities around the world have found themselves on the frontline of the international obsession with Israel, either as proxy target for Israel itself or as (progressively more isolated) counter-advocates. This frontline position excessively burdens internal Jewish debates on the future of Israel, the logic and morality of its actions and the nature of Jewish society in general.

Jewish leaderships and their communities are often called upon to defend Israel. They are directly affected by Israel's decision-making, to which they are neither privy nor partner. This inevitably creates a fundamental tension between a perceived duty to defend whatever policies of the Government of Israel ("Israel right or wrong"), and a perceived obligation for "*tikun olam*" of Israel – to criticize certain policies and advocate specific positions (without being necessarily labeled as 'self-hating Jews'). This tension extends beyond the personal to the communal level – the expectation for a "unified" Jewish communal voice inevitably leads to the stifling of a vibrant pluralistic debate. Attempts to suppress intra-communal debates stem from the fear that internal debate themselves undermine a united front for defending and advocating for Israel by playing into the hands of the enemies.

These debates are ongoing, practical and urgent. Jewish and pro-Israel groups with explicitly left- and right-wing agendas are organizing and seeking to lobby and campaign directly to Governments and wider society, and are prepared to be publicly critical of Israeli government policy, posing a challenge to the position traditionally held by the formal Jewish communal organizations. Within Jewish communities, those holding differing views on the issues are increasingly failing to listen to each other. However, many Jewish leaders are averse to claiming a role in determining Israel's strategic choices and recognize that at the end of the day Israel is a sovereign democratic country and only its citizenry can determine those choices.

These trends are a reflection of a growing body politic of Jewish Diaspora seeking a voice, if not a role, in the course of Israel's strategic direction. This is also reflected in the growing dissatisfaction of leading Jewish individuals with their perceived condition of "taxation with no representation". This sentiment does not only refer to philanthropic endeavors, but also, perhaps even more acutely, to their position vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the growing delegitimization of Israel.

Addressing these untenable trends and challenges is not only a matter of the Jewish Diaspora establishment, but also of the State of Israel.

## The View From Zion: Israel's Attitude to the Diaspora

Israel has been slowly but steadily modifying its approach towards the Diaspora over the past 60 years. The Zionist movement considered a Jewish homeland in Palestine the sole viable solution for the Jewish people. This conception would be at the core of the identity of the newborn state, Israel. The notion of *shellilat ha-golah* (negation of the Diaspora) envisioned the goal of diminishing the Diaspora as a form of Jewish life by bringing all Jews to Israel. Encouraging *Aliyah* (immigration to Israel) was embedded in Israel's national security and strategy. Migration from Israel, *yerida* (literally going down), had a negative connotation. More than three decades later, Late Prime Minister Rabin's quip (during his first term in that position) branding Israelis abroad as "fallout of weaklings" may seem anachronistic, but at the time was considered consensual.

However, the days of massive Jewish immigration to Israel are over and Israel is starting to rethink its position vis-à-vis the world and the Jewish communities worldwide. Israel's integration into the global marketplace seems to have facilitated a new approach to the Diaspora.

To be clear, and as opposed to the vibrant debate in the Diaspora, Israel-Diaspora relations are simply not on the Israeli agenda. At best, one can detect a changing attitude in Israel towards the Diaspora, but most of the leadership and the establishment are not engaged in this debate. An exception to this observation is Opposition Leader Tzipi's recent call for "a new Jewish conversation" and dedicated part of a recent visit to the United States to learn more about the attitude of the young Jewish generation to Israel.

However, a certain 'Israel-centrality' remains in the minds of the Israeli public and decision makers. The concerns of Diaspora Jews have been low on Israel's list of national priorities. Classical Zionist theory would contend that Israel will act in the interest of the Jewish people as a whole, but in practice it predominantly acts on the basis of national interests. There seems to be a broad, although implicit, belief that Israel is no longer strategically dependent upon financial or political support of the Diaspora.

The mushrooming experiential programs of the Diaspora in Israel has however, led to a broad Israeli acknowledgement of the need to reinforce the bonds and attachment of the young generation Jews to Israel. This acknowledgement has led to substantial allocation of government funds to Taglit-birthright Israel and to other programs.

Furthermore, the new strategic direction of the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAFI) is also indicative of a new understanding of Israel-Diaspora relations. JAFI is reorienting its focus of activities in Jewish communities around the world from promoting and facilitating *Aliya* to instilling and reinforcing Jewish identity in Diaspora communities. JAFI's change of course is an important step in Israeli recognition that the bipolarity of Diaspora communities and Israel is permanent and that the two poles are equally important for the future of the Jewish People and the State of Israel.

There is also a growing appreciation in the Israeli establishment of the vital role of the Jewish communities around the world in countering the assault on Israel's legitimacy. Dozens of Jewish organizations around the world have assumed different approaches and different agendas to countering the assault. Recent efforts by the Government of Israel and leading Jewish organization to coordinate these activities are initial, but vital.

In sum, there is a growing understanding in Israel – among political elites, government and the broader public – that there is a need to engage Jewish communities. There is, however, no evidence that the debate in the Diaspora concerning its role in Israeli political decision has been put to any consideration. Notions such as “taxation without representation” are likely to be met with broad nonpartisan opposition in Israel. There might be, however, room for institutionalizing informal political dialogue. If Israel wants to stay the center and homeland of the Jewish people, it must also consider the interests, positions and opinions of Diaspora Jews. Israel is currently losing its centrality in the Jewish world, and if it wants to retain this position, it needs to start a strategic dialogue with the Diaspora Jews.

## A New *Sanhedrin*: Institutionalizing Political Dialogue between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora

Placed in a comparative context one can easily appreciate the challenges of reformulating Israel-Jewish Diaspora relations. These relations are *sui generis* – Israel is predominantly a settler society (like the US, Canada and Australia), but a religious-based one with a large Diaspora abroad of fellow Jews that chose not to immigrate and settle. Most Diasporas in the world are based on ethnic and/or national identity and composed of individuals who emigrated from their shared territories to foreign lands. In the Israeli case, one could therefore argue that the direction of immigration has been largely opposite, bearing in mind that after more than 60 years there is a growing “Israeli” Diaspora abroad.

In the past few years, there has been increasing attention in the Diaspora to the role and influence Diaspora Jewry should have on Israel's foreign policy and legislative initiatives directly bearing upon the Diaspora (Jewish conversion, etc.). Diaspora Jewry has had limited influence on Israeli policy. Notwithstanding, one less noticeable area of influence is through partnerships between major Jewish organizations and selected Israel townships and geographical regions. Through funds and expertise, Jewish organizations are working with the Israeli civil society, and their impact has been locally and on the ground considerable.

However, Diaspora Jews, despite their tremendous support for Israel and Israeli projects, are not Israeli citizens. Granting formal political influence to non-citizens is unacceptable in democratic nations. That being said, Israeli policies need to take into account the repercussions they could have on Jews in the Diaspora.

The increasing need felt by Jews in the Diaspora to be heard on issues that directly and indirectly influence them as Jews, together with the need for Israel to keep the Diaspora involved but not formally so, offers the rationale for a possible course of action: the establishment of a joint framework of Jewish leaders from the Diaspora and Israel to deliberate issues relevant for the Jewish people as a whole (including the question of who is a Jew, conversion, and Jewish education), as well as the more political issues of Israel's domestic and foreign policies (the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and security issues).

A new *Sanhedrin* could be recognized as a consultative body to Israeli decision makers, to the Prime Minister, the President, and the Knesset. This institution should represent the diversity of opinions that exist in the Israeli society and in the Diaspora and should transmit those visions to the senior decision-makers in the only Jewish state in the world.

The appointment of members that are representative of the diverse Jewish communities around the world is crucial, and this in itself will be a challenging task that needs to be thought through. One of the problematic aspects of this debate is the insufficiently acknowledged “democratic deficit” of many Jewish Diaspora organizations. The question of how to represent the different Jewish communities – an equal number of representatives for every country or the number of representatives depending on the

size of the community – is yet to be determined and goes beyond the remits of this policy paper. One should however consider a broad, inclusive “big tent” approach in the composition of such a body.

Past proposals, such as the proposal for a ‘Second House’ by the President’s Office in 2003, or the proposal for a World Jewish Forum by the Jewish People Policy Planning Institute in 2005, suggested similar consultative frameworks, but remained focused on issues of Jewish identity, Jewish education, and anti-Semitism. Letting national issues of security or economy being influenced by non-citizens holds serious dilemmas, but ignoring the impact Israel’s security has on Jews abroad is irresponsible at best. It is the conflict with the Palestinians and Israel’s security in the context of the broader Middle East that occupies the Jewish public opinion in Israel and abroad, and it is on these issues that dialogue is essential. The fact that young Jews say that criticizing Israel’s actions is important for their Jewish identity means that there is room for enhancing their Jewish affiliation by giving those concerns a real platform.

There might be indeed additional or alternative options to be considered. The establishment of such a *Sanhedrin* is only one way of setting a new course in Israel-Jewish Diaspora relations, strengthening the two pillars of Jewish Peoplehood. Yet it would be utterly naïve to expect that such a new framework with a problematic composition at best, and dealing with sensitive issues will constitute a silver bullet, a solution and remedy to the gap among Jewish generations and between Israel and the Diaspora. The idea for such a new *Sanhedrin* is tabled not necessarily as a solution to a problem, but rather as a point of departure for a new dialogue.



## הקשר בין יהודי ישראל ליהדות התפוצות - נדבך חשוב בחוסן הלאומי של ישראל

ציפיקה פארן

### ראש צוות החשיבה:

**מיכאל אלטר**, המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה, הבינתחומי הרצליה,

### חברי הצוות:

**לילך אלמקיים**, אגף בקרה ומערב, משרד ראש הממשלה,

**אייל דגן**, מנהל תחום בכיר תפוצות, משרד ההסברה והתפוצות,

**וונדי כתר**, מנהלת בית הספר הבינלאומי ע"ש רפאל רקנאטי, הבינתחומי הרצליה,

**מיכל וינר**, המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה, המרכז הבינתחומי הרצליה,

**עידן לוי**, המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה, המרכז הבינתחומי הרצליה,

פרופ' **עדה שפיצר**, סמנכ"ל תקשורת וגיוס משאבים, תגלית,

**גדעון שביט**, מנכ"ל לפיד,

**אבי שטיינברג**, מנהל חינוכי, תכנית "מסע

### מבוא:

המסמך המובא בזה, נועד לתת לחברי הצוות בקיצור רב, מידע עדכני ומדויק, על תפוצת העם היהודי, כמאמרו של פרופ' גבי שפר<sup>1</sup>. וכן על מהות הקשרים בין חלקיה של תפוצה זו, לעם היושב בציון, באמצעות מדד העמיות היהודית שפותח על ידי הפרופסורים סטיבן כהן ואפרים יער<sup>2</sup>. הנתונים האלה בצרוף תהליכי שינוי בתפיסה האסטרטגית שמוביל נתן שרנסקי, יו"ר הסוכנות היהודית<sup>3</sup> והשינוי המדאיג שחל במעמדה של מדינת ישראל בעיני הציבור במדינות המערב, כמוצג במאמרו של רוברט ויסטריך<sup>4</sup> הם הרקע לצורך למצוא תשובות לשאלות החשובות שעל הפרק, המובאות בסוף המסמך.

### רקע:

ברצותינו לעסוק בדמוגרפיה היהודית, נדרש להגדיר את השייכות לעם היהודי. לצורך הנתונים במסמך זה נשתמש בהגדרה של פרופ' דלה-פרגולה:<sup>5</sup> ליבת העם היהודי כוללת את אלה שמגדירים את עצמם ככאלה בסקרים + בנים להורים יהודים, שלא אמצו דת אחרת. במחצית הראשונה של המאה העשרים, קרו שלושה אירועים שהשפיעו באופן דרמטי על האוכלוסייה היהודית בעולם: התרחבות עצומה של הקהילות היהודיות בצפון אמריקה, כתוצאה מהגירה אליהן (בעיקר ניו-יורק, לוס-אנג'לס ומיאמי), השואה - בה הושמדו כשישה מיליון יהודים - מרביתם תושבי אירופה וייסוד מדינת ישראל. הטבלה הבאה, מציגה את האוכלוסייה היהודית בעולם בשנים שבהמשך לאירועים אלה (על פי פרופ' דלה-פרגולה):<sup>6</sup>

מספר אנשים באלפים (בסוגרים - באחוזים)			אזור / שנה
2008	1970	1948	
<b>13,232 (100%)</b>	<b>12,662 (100%)</b>	<b>11,500 (100%)</b>	<b>סך הכול בעולם</b>
5,478 (41.4%)	2,582 (20.4%)	650 (5.7%)	ישראל
<b>7,754 (58.6%)</b>	<b>10,080 (79.6%)</b>	<b>10,850 (94.3%)</b>	<b>סך הכול בתפוצות</b>
1,480 (11.2%)	3,241 (24.5%)	3,750 (32.7%)	אירופה
40 (0.3%)	362 (3.9%)	625 (5.4%)	אסיה
77 (0.6%)	207 (1.6%)	700 (6.1%)	אפריקה
6,157 (46.5%)	6,270 (49.6%)	5,775 (50.1%)	אמריקה ואוקיאניה

- המספרים כוללים רק יהודים על פי הגדרת הליבה שלמעלה.
- אתיופיה כלולה בצפון אפריקה
- יהודי חבר המדינות העצמאיות (בריה"מ לשעבר), חולקו על פי ההשתייכות ליבשות.
- לאחר שישראל הפכה למדינה מפותחת, נמצאים 99% מיהודי העולם במדינות מפותחות.

1 שפר, גבי, 2009: ישראל והתפוצה היהודית מנקודת מבט השוואתית כלל-עולמית. בתוך: עמיות יהודית - מתווה מעשי להוראה ולמידה. תל אביב, בית הספר הבינלאומי ללימודי העם היהודי - בית התפוצות. עמ' 144

2 כהן, סטיבן ויער, אפרים 2009: מדד העמיות היהודית. הוצג בכנס הרצליה 3 בפברואר 2009.

3 ברדנשטיין, אלי, 2010: אי אפשר להביא לפה את כל היהודים. מעריב, המגזין 25-10-2010

4 Wistrich, A. Robert, 2004: *Zionism as a racist-Colonialist conspiracy: Deconstructing a Myth*. Herzlia Conference

5 דלה-פרגולה, סרג'ו, 2009: דמוגרפיה ועמיות יהודית. בתוך: עמיות יהודית - מתווה מעשי להוראה ולמידה. תל אביב, בית הספר הבינלאומי ללימודי העם היהודי - בית התפוצות. עמ' 76

6 דלה-פרגולה, סרג'ו, 2009: דמוגרפיה ועמיות יהודית. בתוך: עמיות יהודית - מתווה מעשי להוראה ולמידה. תל אביב, בית הספר הבינלאומי ללימודי העם היהודי - בית התפוצות. עמ' 78

7 בנתונים החדשים שפורסמו על ידי The North American Jewish Data Bank נעשו תיקוני נתונים ועדכון לינואר 2010: גידול של 0.6% בכלל האוכלוסייה היהודית, והקהילה בישראל היא הגדולה ביותר עם 5,703,700 נפש. [www.jewishdatabank.org](http://www.jewishdatabank.org) 11-2010

כדי להבין באופן מלא, את משמעות המספרים ואת התפישה העצמית והקשרים שבתוך האוכלוסייה היהודית, שפיזורה תואר למעלה, פותח על ידי הפרופסורים סטיבן כהן ואפרים יער "מדד העמיות היהודית" או בשמו האנגלי The Jewish Peoplehood index בקיצור PI.<sup>8</sup> המדד בנוי מן התשובות לשמונה שאלות:

- רמת החשיבות שאדם מיחס לזהותו היהודית.
- רמת הקשר שאדם מרגיש ליהודים בקהילתו, ארצו ובכלל.
- רמת ההערכה ההדדית.
- רמת החשיבות שמייחס אדם לקהילות היהודיות האחרות.
- רמת ההכרות הבין-קהילתית.
- רמת קשרי חברה וכלכלה עם חברי הקהילות האחרות.
- רמת הרצון והעידוד לקיים קשרים עם הקהילות האחרות.
- רמת אהדה לנישואין בין-קהילתיים.

המדידה הראשונה נעשתה בתוך ובין הקהילות בישראל ובארצות הברית, ב - 2008 והוצגה בכנס הרצליה ב - 2009. הכוונה היא להוסיף למחקר את יהדות אירופה ולחזור על המחקר לקראת כל כנס על מנת לאפשר ניתוח מגמות.

הממצאים העיקריים היו כדלהלן: בשתי המדינות נמצאה רמה גבוהה למדי של תחושת חשיבות לנושאים של זהות היהודית, קשר בין הקהילות והערכה הדדית, אך רמות נמוכות של ידע, מידע והכרות הדדית. המסקנה העיקרית שקובעי המדיניות צריכים להסיק מכך, שיש חשיבות עליונה, ללימוד והכרות בפועל, בין הקהילות ויש לעודד ביקורים הדדיים.

על מנת להשלים את הרקע לדיון, יש לקחת בחשבון, פן נוסף חשוב להבנה, מדובר בנושא כאוב: בחזרה בגדול של הדה-לגיטימציה והשיח האנטישמי בעולם המערבי.<sup>9</sup> יש קשר הדוק בין הבנת המציאות והבעיות של מדינת ישראל, לבין תחושת הקשר והקרבה של יהודי התפוצה אליה וגם ההפך נכון: ככל שיהודי התפוצה, חשים קרבה למדינת ישראל, כך יקל עליהם להשפיע על תדמיתה בעולם.

## פרוט קצר של תוכניות הקשר הקיימות:

- מסע:<sup>10</sup> הינה תוכנית משותפת של הסוכנות היהודית וממשלת ישראל, המיועדת לצעירים יהודיים ברחבי העולם בגילאי 18 עד 30, המשתתפים מתנסים בחיים בישראל תקופה ממושכת (סמסטר עד שנה) ולוקחים חלק בלמעלה ממאתיים תוכניות התנדבות, לימודים, פיתוח, התמחות מקצועית ועוד, עד היום השתתפו בתוכנית חמישים וחמישה אלף משתתפים, והשנה נמצאים בארץ עשרת אלפים צעירים יהודיים.<sup>11</sup>
- תגלית:<sup>12</sup> זו תוכנית עצמאית הממומנת על ידי מדבנים ועל ידי הממשלה. היא מיועדת לבני 18-26, מתוך הנחה שזה גיל קריטי בקבלת החלטות אישיות על מהלך החיים. הצעירים באים לשבועות אחדים למסע הכרות. עד כה השתתפו כרבע מיליון צעירים. מעקב של אוניברסיטת ברנדייס מראה השפעה גדולה מאוד בכיוון של הפחתת נישואי תערובת. (57%, יותר נישואין עם יהודים בקרב בוגרי התוכנית החילונית)
- לפיד:<sup>13</sup> זוהי תוכנית במימון עצמי של המשתתפים, המיועדת לתלמידי תיכון, שבאים להשלים את חוק לימודיהם בארץ. מדי שנה משתתפים עד כ 15,000 בני נוער.
- בית הספר הבינלאומי ע"ש רפאל רקנאטי במרכז הבינתחומי בהרצליה:<sup>14</sup> לימודי תואר ראשון ושני במקצועות שונים בשפה האנגלית. רוב המימון על ידי הסטודנטים ו/או משפחתם. יש כ - 1,350 תלמידים בכל רגע (כ 400 בכל שנת לימודים לתואר ראשון ועוד 150 תלמידי תואר שני)
- שליחי "בית הלל"<sup>15</sup> מעל ארבעים צעירים ישראלים שיוצאים במהלך לימודיהם האקדמיים או מיד לאחריהם לרכז פעילות לסטודנטים היהודים ו/או התומכים בישראל, תוך השתלבות במאבק על התדמית והלגיטימציה של מדינת ישראל. הם יוצאים למשך שנת לימודים אחת (11 חודש) או שתיים. המימון הוא על ידי הסוכנות היהודית.

כל התוכניות, על פי אייל דגן<sup>16</sup> תורמות באופן משמעותי לצמצום ההתבוללות וטיפוח הקשר של מדינת ישראל עם קהילות התפוצה. רבים מן הבוגרים משתלבים במנהיגות קהילות אלה.

מדינת ישראל השקיעה כשלוש מאות מיליון ₪ בתוכניות השונות.<sup>17</sup>

8 כהן, סטיבן ויער, אפרים 2009: מדד העמיות היהודית. הוצג בכנס הרצליה 3 בפברואר 2009.

9 Wistrich, A. Robert, 2004: *Zionism as a racist-Colonialist conspiracy: Deconstructing a Myth*. Herzlia Conference

10 הוסבר על ידי אבי שטיינברג, המנהל החינוכי של התוכנית בכנס שנערך במרכז רבין ביום 3-10-10

11 על פי אתר הסוכנות [www.jafi.org.il](http://www.jafi.org.il), נבדק 11-2010

12 הוסבר על ידי פרופסור עדה שפיצר, סמנל"ל תקשורת וגיוס כספים של התוכנית בכנס שנערך במרכז רבין ביום 3-10-10

13 הוסבר על ידי גדעון שביט, מנכ"ל התוכנית בכנס שנערך במרכז רבין ביום 3-10-10

14 הוסבר על ידי וונדי כתר, מנהלת בית הספר הבינלאומי על שם רפאל רקנאטי, בכנס שנערך במרכז רבין ביום 3-10-10

15 זמר-ברונפמן, אפרת, 2010: קול הקמפוס. מעריב, המגזין 25-10-2010

16 דבריו של אייל דגן, מנהל תחום בכיר "תפוצות" במשרד ההסברה והתפוצות, נאמרו בכנס במרכז רבין ביום 3-10-10

17 על פי דבריו לילך אלמקייס, אגף בקרה ומעקב, משרד ראש הממשלה, בכנס במרכז רבין ביום 3-10-10

## שינוי בעקרונות מדיניות הסוכנות היהודית :

נתן שרנסקי יו"ר הסוכנות מוביל לאסטרטגיה חדשה של הסוכנות היהודית.<sup>18</sup> המשבר הפיננסי שם מחייב הערכות מחודשת, והיו"ר מציע להתרכז בטיפוח הקשר עם יהדות התפוצה, על חשבון הדרישה לעליה. בדרך זו הוא מקווה להשיג שתי מטרות חשובות: לצמצם משמעותית את תהליך ההתבוללות ולגייס את קהילות התפוצה למאבק על התנדמות ומניעת דה לגיטימציה ציבורית של מדינת ישראל בעולם. אין לדעתו סיכוי ממשי לעודד עליה, כאשר מרבית היהודים חיים במדינות רווחה. פועל יוצא של מדיניות כזו, הוא ביטול מחלקת קליטת עליה בסוכנות. לגישה כזו יש השלכות כבדות:

- מדינת ישראל, תצטרך לשאת לבדה בעול הקליטה (עד כה הסוכנות מחזיקה במרכזי הקליטה!)
- היא עלולה לגרום לייבוש זרזיף העלייה הקיים: השנה צפויים כ - 17 אלף עולים.<sup>19</sup>
- הסוכנות תומכת בפרויקטים חברתיים שונים, יהיה צורך לממן אותם בצורה אחרת.
- האם נסתם הגולל על "שלילת הגולה"?

## דיון:

- כיצד ועל ידי מי, נקבעת מדיניות הקשר עם התפוצה? האם עמדת הסוכנות זהה לעמדת הממשלה ?
- האם תקציב המדינה, נדרש לתמוך בכל תוכניות הקשר באופן שווה? אולי יש לדרג ביניהן על פי עדיפויות? האם יש ערך שווה לתוכניות עבור הגילאים השונים?
- על פי איזה קריטריונים יתוקצבו התוכניות השונות? האם ביטול יעד העליה משפיע על קיבוע הגולה? כיצד הדבר משפיע על המאבק בבריחת המוחות ויצירת מקורות

18 ברדנשטיין, אלי, 2010: אי אפשר להביא לפה את כל היהודים. מעריב, המגזין 25-10-2010  
19 ברדנשטיין, אלי, 2010: אי אפשר להביא לפה את כל היהודים. מעריב, המגזין 25-10-2010

## מדידת ביצועים בשירות הציבורי

אורי סלונים

### ראש צוות החשיבה:

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אהוד פראוור, מנהל האגף לתכנון מדיניות, משרד ראש הממשלה

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תא"ל (מיל.) פנחס בוכריס, לשעבר מנכ"ל משרד הביטחון

ד"ר גל אלון, מנכ"ל תובנות: להחליט חכם; לשעבר לפיתוח תהליכים אסטרטגיים, משרד רה"מ

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המכון למדיניות ואסטרטגיה וכנס הרצליה פועלים למן הווסדס לקדם דיון גם בסוגיות מתודולוגיות הקשורות בעשייה ובחשיבה אסטרטגית. במסגרת זו התקיימו במסגרת המכון והכנס פרויקטים שעסקו בחיזוי, ניהול סיכונים ותכנון על בסיס תרחישים. במסגרת כנס הרצליה ה-11 נערך מושב צד בנושא מדידת ביצועים בשירות הציבורי, נושא התופש נפח גדל והולך בפעילות הממשלית ובעל משמעויות רחבות בהיבטים רבים בהם ניהול שוטף, תכנון ובקרה, שיח פנים-ארגוני ושיח ציבורי. נייר זה מציג את עיקרי הדיון וכן רקע כללי אודות הנושא. אנו מבקשים להודות לאריה מינטקביץ, שנרתם לסייע בארגון המושב ובניהולו, לאהוד פראוור, ראש האגף לתכנון מדיניות במשרד ראש הממשלה, ולמר יקותיאל צבע, סמנכ"ל משרד הרווחה והשירותים החברתיים, שניתן לראותו כחלוץ הפיתוח וההטמעה של תחום מדידת הביצועים בשירות הציבורי הישראלי. תודה מיוחדת לגל אלון, מנכ"ל חברת תובנות, על הסיוע המקצועי ובניתוח הדיון.

### סיכום הדיון

שאלת מדידת התוצאות בעבודת הממשלה מלווה את מרבית מדינות ארגון OECD בשנים האחרונות. הצורך בשקיפות רחבה, לצד בעיית הלגיטימציה של מערכות הממשל באשר הם, הפכה את שאלת הביצועים במגזר הציבורי – והיכולת לתקשר אותם לקהלים רחבים – לשאלה אקוטית. בישראל קיבל הנושא תאוצה בשנים האחרונות. החלוץ היה משרד הרווחה והשירותים החברתיים, אשר הציג בדיון את תהליך העומק שעבר. ראש האגף לתכנון והכשרה במשרד, יקותיאל צבע, הדגיש את החשיבות בעבודה יסודית עם שכבת המנהלים של המשרד, ובצורך להפנים את הנושא – ולא לייצר נתונים לשם הנתונים. מנהלת מחוז תל אביב במשרד סיפרה שלאור התהליך, הבינה פתאום שהשאלה עימה היא מתמודדת אינה כיצד להגדיל את כוח האדם הנדרש כדי לטפל במספר מקרי הרווחה, אלא כיצד להקטין את משך הטיפול בכל אחד ולהגיע לשיפור של ממש בתוך זמן קצר. חשיבה תוצאתית מאפשרת לנהל מערכות בצורה שונה, וזה למעשה האתגר. כמה שנים לאחר התחלת פעילות מדידת הביצועים במשרד הרווחה, החל משרד ראש הממשלה להוביל מהלך כלל ממשלתי להטמעת תרבות ותהליכי תכנון של מדידה, הערכה ובקרה. המהלך כלל מספר מרכיבים, ביניהם בניית מתודולוגיה ממשלתית אחידה ומיסוד תהליך של הכנת תוכניות עבודה מדידות. ראש האגף לתכנון מדיניות במשרד ראש הממשלה, אודי פראוור, הציג את התובנות הראשונות שלו מהמהלך – ביניהם הצורך להתמקד במספר מועט יחסית של מדדים משמעותיים. עוד אמר כי רמת התוכניות אליה הגיעו היום משרדי הממשלה – גבוהה ומרשימה בכל קנה מידה. פראוור הציג את ספר תוכניות העבודה המפורט לשנת 2011, הכולל עשרות רבות של מדדי תוצאה ומאות מדדי הצלחה, והוסיף שעל אף האמונה הרווחת בציבור, מרבית תוכניות העבודה של הממשלה מיושמות. חשש משמעותי שהעלה צבע נגע להפיכת המדדים לכלי פיקוח ובקרה של משרד ראש הממשלה ומשרד האוצר על המשרדים. חשש נוסף הוא בהטמעה מהירה מדי של המהלך, אשר עשויה למנוע שינוי לכיוון של חשיבה תוצאתית. הדברים קיבלו משנה תוקף לאור דברי הפתיחה של אריה מינטקביץ, אשר הדגיש את הצורך בהתייעלות ובאימוץ סטנדרטים של מגזר עסקי בעולם הציבורי. מדובר בכלים ובסטנדרטים שהתפתחו בעולם העסקי והוכיחו בו את יתרונותיהם, ניסיון זה הוא שנתן את ההשראה לשימוש בהם במסגרת הסקטור הציבורי. דברים אלה עוררו דיון ערני, לאור השוני בין שני המגזרים, והחשש הכבד שמדידה שתכליתה פיקוח ובקרה – תוביל בסופו של יום למניפולציות בהצגת הנתונים ולא לשיפור ביצועים. חשש זה מלווה את מדינות OECD כולן, ומלווה גם את המהלך הישראלי. לראיה, כאשר בסוף ממשל אולמרט הציג משרד ראש הממשלה נתוני השוואה של ביצועי המשרדים השונים – הדבר יצר בעיה גדולה בתהליך כולו. ד"ר גל אלון, מנכ"ל חברת תובנות ומרצה למדיניות ציבורית, אמר כי ישנן שלוש מגמות שינוי בתהליכי עבודת הקולקטיב: האחת עוסקת במדידה ושיפור

ביצועים, השנייה בתהליכי שיתוף והשלישית ביכולת להפוך את הדברים לאישיים. כל אלה, לדבריו, מחייבים שילוב של חשיבת ביצועים עם חשיבה של שיתוף, ומכאן שכל מהלך המדידה אסור שייעשה "top down". עוד אמר, שעלינו לשאול עצמנו בכנות מה מדד התוצאה של מדדי התוצאה, ותשובה אפשרית היא שינוי באופן עבודת המשרד השוטפת. יש להבחין בין performance bureaucracy לבין performance management, וההבדל טמון ביכולת של התהליך לשנות את העבודה השוטפת של המשרד. אילולא הצלחנו בכך, כל ההשקעה הרבה במדידה עשויה לרדת לטמיון. עוד אמר ד"ר אלון שצריך למצוא את נקודת האיזון הנכונה בין התהליך המקצועי, המחייב אורך רוח, הטמעה עמוקה וחשיבה - לבין התהליך הפוליטי, המחייב הצגת תוצאות מהירות.

## מדידת ביצועים בשירות הציבורי – סקירה

עיסוק במדידת ביצועי השירות הציבורי התפתח בעולם עוד בסוף שנות ה-70, כחלק מתובנה רווחת באותה תקופה לפיה איכות וכמות המוצרים הציבוריים נמוכים מאד ביחס להשקעה הישירה והעקיפה בהם. תובנה זו התפתחה על רקע משברים תקציביים שאפיינו אז מדינות מערביות רבות, וכגל שני לאופנות בתחום מנהל העסקים שעשו שימוש בכלים כמותיים לבחינת יעילותן של פירמות וביצועיהן. כחלק מתפישה זו הונח כי השקעה בסדרי גודל דומים, או נמוכים, לו היתה מתבצעת בסקטור הפרטי, היתה מניבה תפוקה רבה ואיכותית יותר<sup>1</sup>. ממשלת תאצ'ר היא המקרה הבולט הראשון בו פותחו כלים למדידת ביצועים כחלק מרפורמה כוללת בשירות הציבורי. בדעבד, השימוש בכלים אלה נחשב כאחת ההתפתחויות החשובות ביותר בתחום המנהל הציבורי במחצית השנייה של המאה ה-20. יש לציין כי התפתחות מאוחרת יותר של הרפורמה הבריטית, ובמרכז הפרטתם של שירותים ציבוריים, חיזקה עוד יותר את הצורך במדידת ביצועים, מאחר והקנתה יכולת פיקוח ובקרה על השירותים המופרטתים ועל ניהול מבוזר יותר של המערכת הציבורית. העקרונות והניסיון שהתפתחו במסגרת הרפורמה הבריטית הפכו לבסיס עליו התפתחה מדידת הביצועים בשירות הציבורי ויישומיה הרחבים, המתייחסים לתכנון, ניהול ובקרה.

בשנים האחרונות התמסדה גישה זו במסגרת תפישה רחבה הטוענת כי מדינות צריכות לדעת להעריך את האיכות והכמות של מוצרים ציבוריים אותם הן מספקות, וכחלק מעקרונות הנוגעים לשקיפות שלטונית ולממשל פתוח. הניסיון הצבור והשתכללותם של הכלים והשיטות למדידת ביצועים בשירות הציבורי התרחבו למדינות מפותחות ומתפתחות כאחת. השימוש בכלים אלה נעשה הן מצד ממשלות ביחס לשירותיהן והן מצד גורמים בינלאומיים (א"ם, בנק עולמי, USAID וכד') לפיקוח על תהליכי רפורמה ופעילות מוסדות וארגונים הנהנים מתמיכה וסיוע. פעילות ממשלתית נתמכת מדדי ביצוע הפכה לנורמה דומיננטית במדינות ה-OECD, כאשר הארגון פועל להטמעת סטנדרטיזציה בתחום לצרכי השוואה ולימוד הדדי. היבט מרכזי של השימוש במדדים הוא תכנון, הקשר בין מדידת ביצועים ותכנון נובע מהגדרת התכנית (יעדים, אבני דרך וכד') באמצעות פעולות מדידות א-פריורי. היינו, המהלכים אותם מפרטת התכנית מתוארים כמשרתים מטרה, או מובילים ליעד, בצמוד לפרמטרים המתארים את מידת ההצלחה בהשגתם. פעילות מסוג זה מכונה בשיח המקצועי "תכנון מוטה תוצאות", והיא נתפשת כמסייעת לנסח באופן בהיר יעדים ובה בעת משמשת כמערכת ברורה ומוסכמת לקביעת מידת ההצלחה בהשגתם. גישה זו גם משמשת כבסיס להערכת התהליך ולמידתו לצרכי תיקון והתאמה, וכן לנורמות עכשוויות של שקיפות שלטונית וקשר עם הציבור.

## שיקולי מבנה והרכב המדד

בשונה משירותים בסקטור העסקי, שירותים ציבוריים הם מוצרים מורכבים הכוללים רבדים שונים של תכלית ותועלת ישירה ומיידית וכן עקיפה או ארוכת טווח. במסגרת זו ייתכן מצב בו שירות ציבורי הנתפש כלא יעיל בהשגת תכלית קונקרטית הוא בעל תועלת מאקרו רחבה יותר, למשל קידום הצמיחה, תעסוקה וכיעד חברתי או ביטחוני. מעבר לכך, לשירותים ציבוריים מיוחסת לעתים קרובות תועלת מופשטת קשה להגדרה, למשל בתחום החינוך, הבריאות או חזות של המרחב הציבורי. הבדל חשוב נוסף בין מדידת ביצועים בסקטור הציבורי לזה הפרטי הוא שימוש במדידה ככלי ניהולי לשיפור מיקומו של הארגון בשוק. אבחנה זו מתייחסת למצבים רבים בהם השירות הציבורי אינו חלק מסביבה תחרותית וכן לקושי של שימוש במדידה ככלי תימרוץ ניהולי במסגרת הנורמות התעסוקתיות והניהוליות הקיימות בשירות הציבורי.

הניסיון שנצבר לאורך השנים בהתמודדות עם בעיות אלה מאפשר ניסוח מספר עקרונות שהפכו לקווים המנחים של מדידת ביצועים בשירות הציבורי. התובנה הכללית המרכזית העולה מניסיון זה היא כי הגדרת המטרה של כל תכנית או פעילות ממשלתית צריכה להשתמש במדדים המתייחסים לאיכות תוצרים ולא במושגי תשומות<sup>2</sup>. כך למשל פעילות משטרתית בתחום הפלילי אינה צריכה להימדד עפ"י מספר מעצרים אלא עפ"י מדד איכותי הבוחן את מספר המעצרים שאושרו ע"י ערכאה משפטית.

תובנה נוספת נוגעת להרכב המדדים היא שמומלץ ויהיו פשוטים ככל הניתן. נמצא כי שימוש במדדים מורכבים מוביל לקושי בהבנתם ובכך נפגמת תועלתם כבסיס לשיח פנים-ארגוני וציבורי. מדידת רמת זיהום אוויר באמצעות סולם צבעים במקום באינדיקטורים מקצועיים הוא דוגמה ליישום של תובנה זו. יחד עם זאת המושג מדידת ביצועים מתייחס לקבוצה גדולה של אובייקטים נמדדים ולצד מדידות של ביצועי שירותים פרטניים מתקיימות מדידות לביצועי מדיניות רחבה, למשל ביצועי מדיניות סביבתית ברמה הלאומית. מדידת ביצועים של סוגיות מאקרו דורשת שימוש במספר גדול מאד של אינדיקטורים. חשוב לציין כי מדידות לביצוע סוגייה רחבה מורכבות לעתים קרובות מבדיקה מקיפה או מדגמית של מספר גדול יחסית של פרויקטים נקודתיים, כשבמסגרתם נבדק אופן ומידת ההצלחה בהשגת תוצאה רצויה במובנה הרחב<sup>3</sup>.

בחירת האינדיקטורים והרכבת המדדים צריכה להתחשב באילוצים נוספים, בהם זמינות נתונים במסגרת הזמן אליה מתייחסת התכנית והיעדים המתארים את התקדמותה, וההתאמה בינם ובין היעדים המופיעים בה. היבט נוסף בבחירת האינדיקטורים מתייחס לתקפותם הנורמטיבית. לאינדיקטורים המשמשים במסגרת תכנון מוטה תוצאות ישנה השפעה התנהגותית רבה, במיוחד כאשר הגישה מוטמעת בארגון לאורך זמן וכחלק משיגרה. אפיון זה מחייב בחינה של האינדיקטורים במימד ההתנהגות המשתמעת מהם. בחינת ביצועי משטרה באמצעות כמות הדו"חות שנרשמו היא פעולה המעודדת רישום דו"חות ועשויה להיתפש כפעולה המנוגדת למטרות הארגון. היבט זה מדידה הוא גורם

1 (Pierre Pestieau, Assessing Performance of the Public Sector. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics. Vol. 80/1 (2009)

2 מקובל לחלק מדדי ביצועים לשלושה סוגים: אינדיקטורים המתייחסים לתשומות (משאבים כספיים ומשאבי כ"א), אינדיקטורים המתייחסים לתפוקות (מודדים תוצרים ישירים של הפרוייקט) ואינדיקטורים הבוחנים תוצאות (היינו בוחנים תהליכים או פעולות המובילות את התוצאה הרצויה במובנה הציבורי הרחב).

3 דוגמה מפורטת-אופרציונלית לגישה אינדוקטיבית מסוג זה ניתן למצוא אצל: אור קרסין, "אכיפת דיני הסביבה: יישום אפקטיבי של מדיניות סביבתית". מכון ירושלים לחקר ישראל (2009).

מבחין נוסף בין שימוש במדדי ביצועים בסקטור הפרטי ובסקטור הציבורי, ביקורת רבה מופנית לגבי השימוש במדדי ביצועים מבוססי ROI<sup>4</sup> ביחס לשירותים ציבוריים. ביקור זו טוענת כי בחינת השירות הציבורי באמות מידה המשמשות את הסקטור הפרטי יש בה משום פגיעה בערכי השירות הציבורי ובכך היא מובילה לפגיעה בציבור. יחד עם זאת בהיבטים מסויימים ניתן לראות בשימוש בכלים למדידת ביצועיים רכיב שדווקא תורם לקידום תועלות ציבוריות רחבות, לדוגמה הכללתם של פרמטרים הבוחנים מידת קידומם של ערכים כגון שלטון החוק, שקיפות, שיוויון וכד' במסגרת התכנית או השירות הנתון למדידה.

## קביעת התוצאות

אל הקושי הכללי הכרוך בקביעת הרכב המדד מצטרף קושי הנוגע לתרגום הפרמטרים לכדי "ציון" וקביעת משמעותו. הגישה המובילה להתמודדות עם קושי זה היא גישה השוואתית מסוג BENCHMARK, בד"כ לסטנדרט שהתגבש ביחס לשירות דומה ונחשב כמקובל במדינות אחרות. חלק ניכר מפעילות ארגון ה-OECD בנושא נוגעת לגיבוש מדד תקן למדיניות ציבורית כוללת ולשירותים הציבוריים המסופקים במסגרתה. גישה השוואתית מסוג זה מסייעת בהגדרת סטנדרט ביצועים נומינלי בו אמור השירות הנבחן לעמוד, מסייע באיתור נקודות חוזקה וחולשה, לימוד וחילופי ידע בין ארגונים במקומות שונים המספקים את אותו שירות ומגביר את מידת האובייקטיביות של המדידה. מימד נוסף של מדידה השוואתית מתייחס למדידת ביצועי תקופה נכחית לעומת תקופה קודמת (למשל השוואה בין ביצועי שנה נכחית לבין ביצועי השנה שעברה), השוואה של רמת הביצועים ביחס לקבוצות יעד שונות המשתמשות בשירות (למשל קבוצות גיל או סביבה גיאוגרפית בתחום שירותי בריאות).

לצד המדידה ההשוואתית המתייחסת לשירות מסויים, קיימת רמת מדידה נוספת מסוג PROCESS BENCHMARKING הבוחנת תוצרים ציבוריים שבאספקתם מעורבים מספר ארגונים. בגישה זו נבחנים ביצועי הגופים השונים המעורבים בתהליך תוך ניסיון לאבחן ולהבין האם קיימת שונות ביניהם וסיבותיה. ה-PROCESS BENCHMARKING מתייחס להכרה הגוברת בייחוד של דינמיקה רשתית-מערכתית כגורם מכריע באיכות הכוללת של התוצר הסופי – המוצר הציבורי. גישה זו מניחה כי מדובר בתוצר המשתנה באופן תמידיאך משתנה באופן תמידי ולפיכך קשה לניהול ולמישטור ולכן השימוש במדדים משמש ככלי ניטור והיזון חוזר לגבי המתרחש בפועל כמעט בזמן אמת. מדידה למטרה זו מחייבת גישה שונה שאינה ממקודת בתוצאות אלא במדידת רמת התפקוד של המערכת, מרכיביה והקשר ביניהם.

## שימוש במדדים: הכוונה רכה מול רגולציה

השימוש במדדים לבחינת ביצועים בשירות הציבורי כמעט ואינו נתון במחלוקת והוא נחשב חלק ממינהל ציבורי מתקדם. השיח הביקורתי ביחס לשימוש במדדים נוגע בעיקר למידת הרגולציה הגלומה בהם. מדובר בויכוח בין גישה ממוקדת רגולציה, שרואה במדדים כלי מרכזי בתכנון ובקרה של פעילות הממשלה, מול גישה הטוענת כי רמה גבוהה מדי של רגולציה בתחום מדידת הביצועים תחטיא את אחת המטרות העיקריות של שימוש בשיטה: היותה מנוף לשיפור מתמיד. מצדדי גישה זו טוענים כי הנהגת סטנדרטיזציה תוביל לגישה בירוקרטית "קווית" המתמקדת ביישום חוקים, תקנות והוראות מנהליות.

נטען כי גישה זו מעודדת לאורך זמן הטיה לעבר אופטימיזציה על חשבון חדשנות ומצוינות, ובכל מקרה מכילת את הארגון המבצע להתמקד בקידום הפרמטרים המובילים לציון הנדרש במדד ולא מעבר לכך<sup>5</sup>. חשש זה נובע מראיה לפיה הטמעת תכנון מוטה תוצאות משמעותה ארוכת הטווח היא מישטור החשיבה לכזו המורכבת מאינדיקטורים מדידים באופן המגביל רעיונות יצירתיים.

בחינה של השימוש בפועל בכלי מדידה לשירות הציבורי במדינות שונות מגלה זהירות רבה בשימוש בהם מתוך חשש כי רמה גבוהה מדי של רגולציה בנושא תהפוך את השימוש מכלי עזר התומך בתכנון, בניהול שוטף ובקשר עם הציבור לכלי ניהולי המעודד תופעות לוואי שליליות הקשורות בבירוקרטיה. גם מצדדי הגישה ה"אנטי-רגולטיבית" רואים יתרונות רבים בשימוש במדדי ביצועים אלא שלטענתם הרכבת המדדים צריכה להיעשות ע"י הארגון ספק השירות בהתאם לנסיבות ולסביבה הספציפית בה הוא פועל. ארגון ה-OECD מדווח על גישה מעורבת הנהוגה במרבית חברותיו הכוללת הימנעות מקשירת השימוש במדדים לתיגמול או ענישה מובנים וכן "הכוונה רכה" של היחידות השונות בשירות הציבורי בעת הרכבת המדדים. פעילות זו כוללת הכשרת כח אדם יעודי לנושא ביחידות השונות והדרכה שוטפת הכוללת עדכונים והשתלמויות בהיבטים שונים הקשורים לנושא. יחד עם זאת ישנן מספר דוגמאות למדינות שבחרו לקשור את מדידת הביצועים לרמה גבוהה יותר של רגולציה, בריטניה למשל.

בריטניה, חלוצת השימוש במדדי ביצועים, הנהיגה כלי מדידה כאמצעי בקרה ופיקוח של השלטון המרכזי על הספקים השונים של שירותים ציבוריים באוריינטציה המדמה מערכת ספק-לקוח. מדובר למעשה בהתפתחות היסטורית הנובעת משורשי השימוש בגישה, כתרגום של כלים לבקרה תקציבית שהתפתחו בסקטור העסקי. בניגוד למדינות אחרות, במערכת הבריטית מתקיים קישור הדוק בין מדידת ביצועים מסוג performance management, המתארת פעילות ארגונית, ובין מדידת ביצוע תקציבי performance budgeting העוסק באיסוף נתונים אודות הוצאות תקציביות ביחס לתכנית תקציבית. והביצועים נמדדים גם ביחס לאיכות הביצוע התקציבי. למרות ההיגיון הרב שבשילוב זה מדינות רבות בחרו להימנע ממנו מאחר ונמצא (בין היתר בניסיון הבריטי) כי הוא מעודד את כל אותן תופעות שליליות הקשורים בשיעבוד לנתונים ובעודף בירוקרטיה. בנוסף, נמצא כי הכללת מרכיבים תקציביים במדידת ביצועים מפריעה לתהליך הסוציאליזציה של שימוש בכלים אלה ולרתיעה בקרב העובדים האמורים להשתתף במדידה.

Return on Investment - ROI, Kenneth A. Merchant and Wim A. Van der Stede, Management and Control Systems. FT Pub., Prentice Hall (2003), p. 423 4  
5 מוטי שפירא, "על ביצועים ותפוקות של הממשלה", 7.1.2006, [www.deot.org.il/.../The%20struggle%20to%20measure%20performa](http://www.deot.org.il/.../The%20struggle%20to%20measure%20performa)

## Security in Cyberspace

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### Introduction

A lawyer's toolbox contains, to a large degree, definitions that allow him or her to make sense of human actions and the situations they create; and in the event, to argue for the application of a specific legal norm to human activity. The end result of this activity will for the most part be either a yes or no answer: the act in question is legal, or it's illegal. This constantly evolving process of refining definitions and concepts is a key aspect of the process of legal interpretation.<sup>1</sup>

The new realm of cyberspace challenges international lawyers at this very fundamental level of definition. Where we thought that we had worked out, for the most part, a thorough understanding of the concept of state sovereignty, the limits on the use of force by states on the international plane, and the consequences of breaching those limits – a paradigm shift is now demanded of us. In the words of a leading scholar in the field, "Computer network attack represents a new tool of coercion in the international arena, one that is fundamentally different from those previously available."<sup>2</sup> And a second scholar extrapolates that "new tools require new rules"<sup>3</sup>

The professional troubles of international lawyers notwithstanding, the confusion around definitions and applicable legal norms of for terms such as cyberspace, cybersecurity, cyberattack, cyberterror and cybercrime has immediate, real-world and significant outcomes.

In the various cyber events with which many of us are familiar, and which are occurring now with regularity, nation-states and international organizations do not have an available, credible response. The international system simply does not know what the rules of the game are, nor (yet) what they ought to be, even when pressing issues of national and international security arise. So that the massive disruption and distortion of Estonian government and financial websites in April and May 2007 resulted in the conviction and fining of a single hacker for about \$1,400 – and a promise from NATO to start thinking hard about the cybersecurity problem;<sup>4</sup> China's Operation Aurora in the second half of 2009, which was aimed at appropriating source code and other data from dozens of leading high tech, security and defense companies resulted in notification by Google that it intended to review its business relationship with China<sup>5</sup> and the declaration by US Secretary of State Clinton<sup>6</sup> that allegations of Chinese cyberactivity raised "very serious concerns and questions". Reactions at the international level to the Stuxnet operation have been at the most, muted, although tens of thousands of computers and systems have been affected globally.<sup>7</sup> On the other end of the cybersecurity spectrum, when a state's political leadership imposes an internet and communications blackout, as did President Mubarak last week, official response is also subdued.<sup>8</sup> Beyond declarative protest, the global community does not have a ready response; at least, not a response that is being shared publicly. And this is currently the main challenge of cybersecurity for lawyers – working out these prospective rules of engagement.

### The dilemma of definitions

The initial difficulty with defining cyberattack within the international legal regime, is, of course, that we're not sure that we can actually call it an "attack". In his seminal article on computer network attack (CNA) in 1999, William Schmitt writes that "...[t]o constitute an armed attack [that is, in the meaning of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter], the CNA must be intended to directly cause physical damage to tangible objects or injury to human beings."<sup>9</sup> Cyberattack that remains within the virtual realm, as those mentioned above do, for the most part, does not in fact cross this threshold.<sup>10</sup>

Interestingly, the focus of the international legal community has thus, in the meantime, been to promote what the International

1 H.L.A. Hart, *The Concept of Law*, Clarendon, 1961; G. Paton and D. Derham, *A Textbook of Jurisprudence*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., Oxford, 1972.

2 M. Schmitt, "Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework", 37 *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 885 (1999).

3 D. Hollis, "New Tools, New Rules: International Law and Information Operations", in G. David and T. McKeldin, ed.'s, *The Message of War: Information, Influence and Perception in Armed Conflict*, *Temple University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2007-15*, 2008.

4 R. McMillan, "NATO to set up cyber warfare center", *Network World*, May 15, 2008.

5 Google, "A New Approach to China", January 12, 2010, <http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html>.

6 "We have been briefed by Google on these allegations, which raise very serious concerns and questions. We look to the Chinese government for an explanation. The ability to operate with confidence in cyberspace is critical in a modern society and economy. I will be giving an address next week on the centrality of internet freedom in the 21st century, and we will have further comment on this matter as the facts become clear." Secretary of State Clinton, "Statement on Google Operations in China", US Department of State, January 12, 2010.

7 W. Broad, J. Markoff, D. Sanger, "Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay", *New York Times*, January 15, 2011.

8 D. McCollough, "Egypt's Internet disconnect reaches 24 hours", *CNET News*, January 28, 2011.

9 **Supra note 2, at 935.**

10 See, however the US Joint Forces military doctrine's operational definition of computer network attack, which does not contain this threshold. There, CNA's are defined as "...operations to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves." See Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, as amended through 31 December 2010.

Telecommunications Union (ITU), the UN, the European Community, the OECD and several leading countries in cyberspace have called “a culture of cybersecurity”.

The first international body to attempt a definition of cybersecurity’s parameters was, not unexpectedly, the ITU itself. The doyen of international organizations, founded in 1865, has consistently distinguished itself in forward-looking and consensus-based regulation of communications infrastructures, beginning with the innovative telegraph lines crossing Western Europe in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>11</sup> Thus, in a 2008 resolution of the ITU standardization sector, ITU-T, cybersecurity was defined as:

...the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user’s assets. Organization and user’s assets include connected computing devices, personnel, infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunications systems, and the totality of transmitted and/or stored information in the cyber environment. Cybersecurity strives to ensure the attainment and maintenance of the security properties of the organization and user’s assets against relevant security risks in the cyber environment.<sup>12</sup>

The ITU terminology and broad approach to “organization and user’s assets” has been adopted and adapted by others, notably the OECD and the UN, in more recent years, and the ITU itself has recently resolved to adapt its definition to changing cybersecurity realities.<sup>13</sup> As it stands, this initial ITU does provide a frame of reference for discussing cybersecurity – but in only the most general of terms. For instance, it gives the practitioner no clear sense of what the “cyber environment”, or “cyberspace” might be, for instance. Although one observer has defined this new realm as “the place where your phone call happens”,<sup>14</sup> this important term has yet to be carefully defined. Perhaps the best effort so far has been that of the US Department of Defense, which defines cyberspace as:

A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.<sup>15</sup>

Yet in this definition, the exclusion of human beings - operations personnel, web data producers and consumers, and perhaps especially those who are responsible for the maintenance and repair of the elements of cyberspace – would seem a significant oversight.<sup>16</sup>

## Substantive norms- *a jus specialis*

Leaving aside for a moment the issue of defining our terms, it’s central to the concluding thesis offered below that international lawyers have yet to meet the substantive challenge of elucidating the norms applicable to state and non-state entities when they act in cyberspace. This has not been for lack of initiative: there are presently several separate multilateral endeavors underway to forge a new treaty regime for cyber activity, mostly hostile cyberactivity.<sup>17</sup> These efforts are in addition to tens of working papers,<sup>18</sup> academic proposals,<sup>19</sup> conferences<sup>20</sup> and single state initiatives.<sup>21</sup>

Particular attention should be paid to the behavior of cyber-active states, as well (nearly all of the 193 in existence today), as indications of emerging customary law.<sup>22</sup> Interestingly, state responses to hostile cyber activities at the inter-state level have so far been characterized by restraint, as noted above. One example of a specific response is found in several countries having put the international community “on notice” that hostile acts or threats to their network assets or critical infrastructures would be generate a military response. This mechanism goes to the important issue of cyberdeterrence, discussed in depth in Dr. Libicki’s 2009 paper on Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar.<sup>23</sup>

The single successful treaty effort so far has been that of the Council of Europe, whose Convention on Cybercrime from 2001 has been ratified

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11 A. Noll, *The ITU in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 5 *Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 2001.

12 **ITU-T Resolution 1205.X, 2008, 3.2.5.**

13 Resolution WGPL 9, “Definitions and Terminology relating to building confidence and security in the use of ICT technologies”, Final Acts of the Guadalajara Plenipotentiary Conference, 2010.

14 See also an exploration of continued existence in cyberspace after death, R. Walker, “Cyberspace When You’re Dead” *New York Times*, January 5, 2011.

15 See “Cyberspace”, in Joint Publication 1-02, [US] *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, as amended through 31 December 2010. See also an earlier definition, the 2000 American National Standard T1.523-2001 for Telecommunications, - Telecom Glossary, cited in S. Rosenne, *The Perplexities of Modern International Law*, Hague Academy of International Law, 2002, p.348.

16 The White House’s 2009 Cyberpolicy Review did include this human element, for instance; as did the ITU in its cybercrime legislation white paper. See, respectively, *White House Cyber Policy Review, 2009* +and National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-54/HSPD23); and the ITU Toolkit on Cybercrime Legislation.

17 See the interesting Note by the Secretary General containing the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, A/65/201 of 30 July 2010. The Group, composed of

18 For a recent example, see K. Rauscher and A. Korotkov, *Working Towards Rules for Governing Cyber Conflict: Rendering the Geneva and Hague Conventions in Cyberspace*, The East West Institute, January 2011.

19 For example, see D. Brown, “A Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict”, 47 *Harvard International Law Journal* 179 (2006); and A Proposal for an International Convention on Cyber Crime and Terrorism (2000, “the Stanford Proposal”) at <http://www.iwar.org.uk/law/resources/cybercrime/stanford/cisac-draft.htm>.

20 The Munich Security Conference, held February 4-6 is a recent example. There, British Foreign Secretary William Hague called for an international cyber code of conduct, in revealing a hacker attack on the UK’s Foreign Office, “William Hague reveals hacker attack on Foreign Office in call for cyber rules”, *The Observer*, 6.2.2011.

21 [add note, EWI paper]

22 Customary law is a source of international law, according to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Custom is defined as evidence of a general practice of states accepted as law, once certain criteria of consistency and awareness of a legal obligation are met.

23 Rand, 2009. Libicki concisely writes (at p. 8) that “Deterrence has to work in the mind of the attacker.” Open declarations on the part of states regarding their self-identified thresholds of threat and the response that can be expected promote this aim, although such declarations also serve to expose vulnerabilities.



by 30 countries, including non-Europeans such as Japan, the US and Canada.<sup>24</sup> The Convention is the only binding international instrument on cybersecurity, and has a double aim of providing guidelines for national legislation and a framework for cooperation among State Parties. It addresses, in particular, the costs of global cybercrime, the cost of which has been estimated by President Obama as approximately a trillion dollars annually.<sup>25</sup>

#### Four concluding thoughts

Cybersecurity and its attendant legal issues have raised difficult but fascinating challenges within the international legal community. We are no longer certain that state sovereignty is tied inexorably and nearly exclusively to the physical attributes of territory and population; we have no effective “international organization” model for governing the internet and the world wide web – if, in fact, they ought to be governed in the way that term is presently understood; we’re not sure at what point hostile cyberactivity crosses the Charter threshold of prohibited use of force; and we certainly have no reliable way, at present, to attribute responsibility for activities in cyberspace to a given state, organization, group or individual.

Given these uncertainties, four concluding thoughts:

- We need a carefully-crafted set of cyberspace norms that flow from the deep understanding that the international community has today of permitted and prohibited uses of kinetic force, a *jus specialis* rather than a *jus de novo*.
- The technical means for **user attribution** of cyber activity—including, possibly, user, supplier and system accreditations prior to the initiation of activity, should be developed in conjunction with the legal norms of attribution.
- A better understanding of the interfacing of **dual- and multi- use critical infrastructures**, ICT and otherwise, with the internet and the world wide web must be developed, including mapping of domino effects when a given infrastructure is impacted.
- Finally, agreed **rules of engagement** that allow military systems to act with a high degree of certainty regarding the authorization of the use of military force, either virtual or kinetic; and the elaboration of appropriate rules of war.

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<sup>24</sup> Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, 2001; and Additional protocol concerning the criminalization of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, 2006. Israel is not a party to either document. <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=28/10/2010&CL=ENG>

<sup>25</sup> "War in the fifth domain" The Economist July 1, 2010: "Mr Obama has quoted a figure of \$1 trillion lost last year to cybercrime—a bigger underworld than the drugs trade, though such figures are disputed." At the Munich Security Conference, a figure of 1.6 billion dollars was quoted. See C. Habig, "Cyberspace Presents Complex Global Challenges", Munich Security Conference, 6.2.11 (<http://www.securityconference.de/Program.425+M578c0183589.0.html?&L=1>).

## Keynote Address:

H.E. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General of NATO

It is a particular pleasure for me to be here today addressing the Herzliya Conference, an increasingly prominent event in the international calendar. Over the past few months, most of my speeches were devoted to an issue that is at the heart of European preoccupations: the economic crisis. Today, I'm glad that I won't have to address it, speaking in a country whose economy grew by around 4% last year.

But the last few weeks have seen dramatic events in our immediate neighborhood: in Egypt, Tunisia and across the Arab world. I know many of you in Israel are seriously concerned. Indeed, the situation holds great uncertainties, but I would say also great potential for positive, democratic change.

In times of upheaval such as this, you can count on established partnerships. Indeed, I am here to speak about a better future: the future of NATO's relations with Israel and the other Mediterranean partners. It is my belief that the future depends on three things. Firstly how we define our common threats and challenges. Secondly finding common solutions. Finally, and above all, our understanding that we share a common destiny.

The Mediterranean Dialogue was established in 1994 and since the beginning; Israel has been one of its most dynamic participants. This initiative gathered Israel and its Arab partners around the same table, engaging them in a political and security dialogue, and touching on military cooperation. That was an achievement which we should not underestimate.

However, this dialogue did not appear in a vacuum. It was established soon after the Oslo accords and the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty. You could say that, it was the Age of Optimism in the Middle East. I am an optimist by nature, but I am also a realist. So I attach particular importance to the changing regional dynamics and what they mean for the longer term security of the region.

New threats have become more prominent in the wider region. Issues such as nuclear proliferation, ballistic missile proliferation or terrorism constitute problems for the Middle East and for us all. NATO's New Strategic Concept that we adopted in Lisbon makes it very clear that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, we expect proliferation to be most acute in some of the world's most volatile regions.

The rapid increase in the deployment of conventional ballistic missiles constitutes a clear danger. Currently, over 30 states have or are in the process of acquiring such weapons. And some of them can already strike NATO Allies. The decision to develop a Missile Defence Capability, taken at the recent NATO Summit in Lisbon, underlines the commitment by the Alliance to acquire the necessary means to address these threats.

Terrorism is another common threat, which attempts to undermine our way of life. The recent attack against Moscow's busiest airport is tragic proof that no country in the world is safe from this scourge. Israel knows this threat well, having been itself too often the victim of terrorism.

And, as I said earlier, a new and different challenge is emerging across the region. The need to address the demand of Arab societies for democratic reforms. Just a couple of weeks ago, few would have predicted such a development – and events are still unfolding.

We monitor the situation very closely – Egypt and Tunisia are valued members of the Mediterranean Dialogue. I have urged all parties to engage without delay in an open dialogue, to ensure a peaceful, democratic and speedy transition with full respect of human rights.

For over 30 years, Egypt has played a key moderating role in the region. And it is imperative for all of us that it should remain a force for peace and stability.

We need to continue seeking common solutions. We firmly believe that Euro-Atlantic security in the 21st century is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organisations around the world. This is why NATO has engaged in a fundamental review of its relations with its partners and we hope they will actively contribute in that endeavour.

Though we are only at the beginning, I am confident that our new Mediterranean Dialogue partnership will better address the threats and challenges of tomorrow. I can see three priority areas where there is scope for improvement: political consultations, practical cooperation and operations.

Firstly, political consultations on a bilateral and multilateral basis. The Mediterranean Dialogue provides the tools which allow us to engage in a genuine exchange of views on all the issues of common concern. It is up to us to expand the range and intensity of these discussions. We must take our dialogue further and address those issues that really matter.

Secondly, we have taken the decision to further expand our practical cooperation. We are extending the range of activities that we can offer to all Mediterranean partners from around 700 to more than 1600. When it comes to cooperation projects, there is no longer any distinction between the Mediterranean countries and the Euro-Atlantic partners.

I see several areas where we can work together, for example civil emergency planning, military-to-military cooperation, the fight against terrorism. Concerning, civil emergency, last December several NATO Allies contributed to the Israeli effort to extinguish the fires that ravaged the North of the country. This cooperation could be taken further through joint training, joint exercises and greater connectivity between our emergency centres.

To ensure the protection of its Allies, NATO is developing new capabilities to meet new threats and challenges, such as Missile and Cyber defence. Of course, we want to discuss these issues with partners too, in areas where we face common threats. While at the same time respecting national security policies, and a need for flexibility.

And thirdly, operations. Several Mediterranean partners are taking part in our ongoing operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. These contributions are important in themselves. However, it is also important to set a clear framework, within which Mediterranean partners could further participate in NATO-led operations.

I do not have illusions about NATO's role in providing security in the region: NATO cannot solve all the problems and it never intended to do so. After all, Mediterranean partners never expected such a thing from NATO. But we can still provide a substantial added value in the region.

And ladies and gentlemen, that brings me to my final point: the common destiny which bonds Allies and the Mediterranean. A strong and dynamic relationship between the Euro-Atlantic countries and Israel is a key part of it. We have much in common, not least a pluralist democracy, a robust public debate and a lively media scene.

But stability and prosperity can only come from within the region. And stability and prosperity will only survive if the regional players want to be engaged.

NATO, through its Mediterranean partnership can help the region by acting as a facilitator, building closer ties between the stakeholders and providing a venue for a security dialogue. Our own countries in Europe have set aside their differences to build security mechanisms that allow them to address the challenges of tomorrow. The Middle East does not have to be an exception and I believe that Israel can play a leading role in that endeavour.

Of course, pending a comprehensive Middle East Peace Settlement, this seems almost utopian. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict may no longer be perceived as the only problem in the region, but it still constitutes a major impediment in addressing other issues that threaten regional stability. The lack of a solution to the Israeli – Palestinian conflict continues to undermine the stability of the region.

NATO is not involved in the Middle East peace process and is not seeking a role in it. The three conditions for any possible NATO involvement are well known: if a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians was reached; if both parties requested that NATO should help them with the implementation of that agreement; and if the United Nations endorsed NATO's possible involvement.

Of course, at the moment, those three IF's are far from being met. The lead for the Middle East peace process rests with the parties themselves, with the Quartet and with the UN. But NATO-Allies attach the utmost importance to reaching a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the Syrian and Lebanese tracks, to achieve a two-state solution in which Israel and Palestine live side by side in peace and security.

As the Quartet made clear at the weekend, further delay in the resumption of negotiations is detrimental to prospects for regional peace and security. We do not have all the time in the world.

There is a new dynamic in the region. We must seize the opportunity to build on it.

The foundations of regional cooperation have to be set today, in order to address the challenges of tomorrow.

It is up to us to increase our efforts in order to bring common solutions to common problems, so that our common destiny will be one of freedom, peace and stability.