# The Impact of the War On Israel's Economy

#### Zvi Eckstein, Sarit Menahem-Carmi, Sergei Sumkin, Idit Kalisher

Co-authors: Amos Yadlin, Giora Eiland, and the Mind Israel team Advisors: Benjamin Bental, Shlomo Dovrat, Kobi Haber, Ronen Nir, Amir Reshef



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# Contents

- 1. Background conditions, the economy's strengths and weaknesses prior to the war
- 2. War scenarios
- 3. Economic effects of the war on the Israeli economy
- 4. Government policy recommendations for 2023-2024, looking forward



### Israel's Macroeconomic Situation at the End of 2022 - Better than any of the preliminary predictions

- High growth rate in 2017-2022: GDP 4.2%; GDP per capita 2.3%
- Growth-driving sectors: high-tech and financial services sectors; main avenues: increase in technological workers, and digitalization

### **Macroeconomic Figures:**





Economic Situation <u>on the Eve of The Attack</u> Signs of Deviation from Growth Trajectory

3.0%

3.5%

**Growth Forecast** 2023-24

Unemployment

3.8%

Inflation (12 months up to 9/23) ILS to USD

3.85

Risk Premium Up from 40 bp

60bb

- Global high-tech crisis
- Significant decline in foreign investments

#### Judicial Reform

- Increased uncertainty
- Fears of impaired institutional quality and growth

- <u>High-interest environment</u> 4.75%
- Lower national revenue and increased deficit
- Fears of credit rating downgrade



Strengths of the Economy on the Eve of the Attack Ongoing Increase in Workforce in the High-Tech Sector (At a More Moderate Rate Than in 2017-2022)

- Substantial share of the investments raised in 2020-2022 will be sufficient for 3-4 years, rather than two
- The strength of investments in the high-tech sector has increased with the devaluation of the Shekel
- Increasing demands in defense industry firms due to Russia-Ukraine war
- However, financing problems among startups in early stages of capital raising

# Assessing the War's Impact on The Economy Requires Assuming A Reference Scenario of the Progression of the War





### **<u>Reference</u>** Scenario of the War's Progression

#### War in Gaza and Limited Military Activity on Northern Border

Aims: Destroy Hamas' Military Capacity, Free Hostages, Eliminate Hezbollah's Threat

	2023	2024			
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Homefront Situation	Red	Yellow	Gradua	l Return	Green
Active reserve personnel, thousands (% of workforce)	220 (5%)	140 (3.2%)	40 (0.9%)	40 (0.9%)	Full Reserve Discharge
Temporarily absent from work (% of workforce)*	310 (7%)	125 (2.8%)	50 (1.15%)	25 (0.57%)	Full Activity

Source: Mind Israel team

\*Temporarily absent from work due to struggling businesses, school system irregularities, evacuees without employment



### War's Impact on Budget, 2024 Assuming Dependable Conduct

#### **GDP Growth Forecast:**

#### 1.0% (Aaron Institute)

0.5% - S&P, 2.0% Bank of Israel (significant amendment from 2.8% in Oct. 2023 forecast), 1.7% Ministry of Finance (Disparity stems from different assumptions regarding rate of return to normalcy)

#### Deficit\*: 5.4%

5.3% in S&P scenario, 5.0% Bank of Israel (amended from 3.5% in Oct. 2023 forecast)

#### **Estimated additional expenditure:**

#### **ILS 73 Billion**

(including decrease in government revenue)

#### Debt-to-GDP ratio: 69%

64% in S&P scenario, 63% Bank of Israel (amended from 62% in forecast from 23.10.23)

#### The 2024 budget must be planned in consideration of war scenarios

**Goal for 2024 budget: immediate resetting of priorities!** 1. Increase government operational capability, 2. Increase national security, 3. Growth-enhancing reforms

<sup>9</sup> \* Including US aid (ILS 20 billion) and utilization of Property Tax Fund resources (ILS 12 billion)



### Second Scenario of the War's Progression

#### War in Gaza, Widespread Israeli-Initiated Offensive on Northern Border

Aims: Destroy Hamas' Military Capacity, Free Hostages, Eliminate Hezbollah's Threat

	2023	2024			
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Economic Activity Status Given State of Warfare	Red	Red	Orange	Yellow	Yellow/Green
Active reserve personnel, thousands (% of workforce)	220 (5%)	220 (5%)	120 (2.8%)	60 (1.4%)	30 (0.7%)
Temporarily absent from work (% of workforce)*	310 (7%)	400** (9%)	100*** (2.3%)	50 (1.15%)	25 (0.57%)

Source: Mind Israel team

\*Temporarily absent from work due to: struggling businesses, school system irregularities, evacuees without employment

\*\*Shutdown of 70% of workers in Haifa and Northern Districts for one month during Q1 2024, \*\*\* Shutdown due to damage to infrastructures during Q2 2024



### War's Impact on Budget in 2nd Scenario, 2024 Assuming Dependable Conduct

#### **GDP Growth Forecast:**

-2.0% (Aaron Institute)

#### **Estimated additional expenditure:**

#### **ILS 111 Billion**

(including decrease in government revenue)

**Deficit\*: 6.8%** 5.3% in S&P scenario, Bank of Israel –

5.3% in S&P scenario, Bank of Israel – over 5%

Debt-to-GDP ratio: 72%

67% in S&P scenario, 65% - Bank of Israel

#### According Mind Israel – the probability of this scenario is less than 40%

**Goal for 2024 budget: immediate resetting of priorities!** 1. Increase government operational capability, 2. Increase national security, 3. Growth-enhancing reforms

\* Including US aid (ILS 20 billion) and utilization of Fund resources (ILS 7 billion)

Reichman Aaron Institute University for Economic Polic Rapid Return of the Economy to Employment and Growth Trajectory Depends on Feelings of Personal Safety, Trust of Public and Investors

- Achieving the war's objectives will restore citizens' sense of personal safety and aid their rapid return to economic activity
- Partial achievement of objectives and/or realization of the second scenario will delay return to growth trajectory and may even cause emigration of high-quality human capital



2024 budget goals: macroeconomic framework Ensuring fiscal discipline is crucial for diminishing uncertainty and fostering economic recovery

- 1. Assumed growth rate: 0%-1%
- 2. Target budget deficit: Up to -5% of GDP
- 3. Funding increased spending primarily by exhausting diversion of distributive funds and utilization of budget deviations in the range of NIS 15-20 billion
- 4. It is recommended to avoid significant tax increases (a recessionary year), with the exception of canceling tax benefits that do not incentivize employment



## 2024 budget goals:

#### Strategizing and implementing reforms designed to enhance growth at low costs. Developing an investment strategy for public infrastructure (specifically

- 1. Developing an investment strategy for public infrastructure (specifically transportation) to attain the 2040 accessibility objectives
  - Sustaining public infrastructure investments in alignment with the Existing budget
  - Implementing an efficacious protection plan for critical infrastructures such as electricity and ports
- 2. Developing programs to enhance work productivity.
  - Digital transformation in the public sector regulation, taxes, business licensing, imports, and more
  - Removing barriers to international competition and investment in the business sector
    - Construction industry removing barriers to the entry of international companies
    - Agriculture industry executing the reform of removing barriers to imports, transitioning to subsidies based on cultivated areas, and incorporating automation (Eckstein Plan 2011)



# 2024 budget goals: Employment

- 1. Enhancing the array of professional and technological training options for individuals not pursuing academic or professional education
- 2. Creating incentives for the reintegration of evacuees or those temporarily absent from the workplace, aiming to restore employment levels to pre-war standards
  - Ensuring that aid programs for businesses and workers are structured to avoid creating disincentives for returning to work

#### 3. Promoting employment within the ultra-Orthodox society

- A consensual reform military/civilian service for ultra-Orthodox men starting at the age of 18
  - Removing restrictions on employment (from age 21) and training (from age 18)
  - Revoking benefits for yeshiva students after a three-year period
- Providing the opportunity to impart knowledge in English and mathematics to young individuals
- 4. Facilitating the return to employment within Arab society
  - Addressing the issue of underemployment of men (particularly among young) and women
  - Removing short-term restrictions and barriers to employment akin to the health sector



# 2024 budget goals:

## **Regulating the employment of Palestinians in Israel\***

Mitigating security risks and minimizing the impact on Israeli employment

- Ensuring daily employment without staying in Israel beyond working hours, with employers responsible for transporting employees to the worksite
- Implementing a digital monitoring system for tracking stay (entry/exit registration, employer affiliation), guaranteeing daily monitoring and reporting on instances of non-exit (in coordination with immigration authorities, police, and the general security service)
- Facilitating payment arrangements through bank transfers instead of cash
- Strengthening enforcement of employment regulations and adherence to permit terms
- Defining parameters and conditions through a professional committee to mitigate any adverse impact on Israeli workers



# 2024 budget goals:

## **Enhancing the efficacy of governmental performance**

- Addressing the evolving economic demands security, internal security, health, and welfare
  - The defense budget assessing the necessary force structure for 2025 and evaluate the imperative for a sustained increase
- Execute a transformation in the organizational structure of the government
  - Consolidate and eliminate offices to achieve a configuration with 15 offices\*
  - Professional appointments within the government and executive mechanisms
- Implementing measures to reduce the cost associated with regulation and bureaucracy
- Empowering local authorities

18

- Promote urban policies that facilitate social mobility
- Providing support for victims and evacuees until they can seamlessly reintegrate into their daily routines

\* Based on the inter-ministerial recommendations for implementing adjustments in the government structure (2018)



# Together We Will Win!





# Appendices





### Reference Scenario Description: War in Gaza and Limited Military Activity in the North

- Fighting in Gaza: destroying Hamas' military capability and freeing hostages
- Limited military activity by both sides along the northern border, while avoiding allout escalation – crippling Hezbollah's capabilities, particularly Radwan forces
- During Q1 2024, fighting in Gaza ends and de-facto ceasefire reached in the north
- Create credible threat on Hezbollah, fears of escalation, aversion to possible regional war, diplomatic pressure – causing Hezbollah to retreat northward in accordance with UN Resolution 1701 and removing threat to northern communities
- Evacuees from Gaza Envelope and northern border may return home after Passover 2024
- Gradual decrease in deployment of reserve forces by Q4 2024



### Second War Scenario Description: War in Gaza, Widespread Israeli-Initiated Campaign Up North

- Widespread IDF offensive against Hezbollah
- Massive rocket fire by Hezbollah on Israel, mainly up to and including Haifa-Tiberias line
- High-intensity fighting lasting around a month during Q1 2024
- Economic activity shut down for a month from Haifa line (including) northward, including Haifa ports
- Infrastructure damage (transportation, energy, hospitals, including power outages and further damages to essential services)
- By Passover 2024, conditions will emerge for a ceasefire on northern border and removal of threat to northern communities (withdrawal of Radwan units as per Resolution 1701)
- Evacuees from Gaza Envelope and northern border may return home after Passover 2024
- Gradual discharge of reservists, some of whom will remain deployed after the ceasefire to help
   infrastructure recovery





## War's Effects on the Economy, 2023 GDP Growth Between Q4 and Q3: Minus 10%

- Temporarily absent from work 530,000\*:
  - Reservists: 220,000, of whom 45,000 (10% of employees at the eve of the war) in high-tech sector
  - Irregular economic activity: 310,000
- Employed: 4,045,000

23

- High-tech sector 388,000\*
- Rest of the economy 3,657,000
- Rest of the economy: 3,712,000 including reservists
- Labor productivity: unchanged
  - <u>Quarterly</u> loss of GDP due to transition of reservists, most of whom are employed in the private sector, to the public sector, and GDP-per-worker differences (high-tech sector ILS 600,000 per year; other employment sectors in business sector ILS 370,000 per year; public administration ILS 177,000 per year) <u>ILS 10 billion</u>

Aaron Institute tabulations of data from Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), Finance Ministry, Bank of Israel.

Estimate of high-tech sector employees in 2023 based on scope of foreign investments spread over 3-4 years, and development of sector's employment by types of firms: startups (9%), R&D centers for multinationals (17%), high-tech services (50%), defense industries (12%)

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### Estimated Additional Cost Due to the War, Q4 2023 Around ILS 70 Billion\*

Defense Expenses: 20 billion

Rehabilitation and support for property damage: **3 billion** 

Economic Plan: Business Damages and Furlough: 23 billion

Civilian Expenses: 13 billion

Loss of Revenue: 11 billion

\* Funds flow for 2023 is lower than costs. Excluding additional interest expenses. Overall additional deficit is ILS 30 billion <sup>24</sup> after budget reallocations and utilization of Property Tax Fund.



# **Ministry of Finance Support for Businesses**

**Businesses in frontier localities** – full reimbursement for all direct and indirect damages (salaries, turnover loss)

Must include additional <u>Envelope</u> cities which were substantially damaged and are not currently included, like Ofakim (approved)

#### Support for businesses and self-employed – ILS 6.5 billion per month

(Up to ILS 400k, given turnover loss of at least 25%) – postponing payments, governmentguaranteed loans and business continuity grants.

Must increase scope of support immediately and ensure rapid, effective, bureaucracy-free response to businesses



Must ensure lack of negative incentive to expand activity during wartime Support for startup firms: ILS 400 million



## **Ministry of Finance Support for Employees**

Aaron Institute endorses the Finance Ministry's furlough scheme Furlough for employees – without changing the standard furlough framework (qualification period, utilizing leave days, eligibility after 30 days)

#### **Objective:** maximum employment across the economy

- Requires shortening qualification period, canceling the utilization of leave days which penalizes employees, and shortening eligibility period in a manner which would allow employers greater flexibility in rehiring employees
  - Scope of furlough should be extended until the end of 2023 (approved)



## War's Effects on the Economy, 2024 GDP Growth: 1.0%

- Temporarily absent from work:
  - Reservists: Q1 140,000; Q2 40,000; Q3 40,000; Q4 0
  - Irregular activity: Q1 125,000; Q2 50,000; Q3 25,000; Q4 0
- Employed (yearly figure, excluding temporarily absent from work): 4,319,000
  - Of whom: high-tech sector 419,000 (Q1 388k; Q2 427k; Q3 427k; Q4 435k)
  - Rest of the economy: 3,900,000
- Labor productivity: unchanged
  - Annual loss of GDP due to transition of reservists, most of whom are employed in the private sector, to the public sector, and GDP-per-worker differences (high-tech sector – ILS 600,000 per year; other employment sectors in business sector – ILS 370,000 per year; public administration – ILS 177,000 per year) – <u>ILS 10 billion</u>

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### Estimated Additional Cost Due to the War, 2024 Around ILS 76 Billion\*

Defense Expenses: 25 billion

Rehabilitation and support for property damage: 6 billion Economic Plan: Business Damages and Furlough: 22 billion

Civilian Expenses: 3 billion

Loss of Revenue: **20 billion** 

\* Funds flow for 2023 is lower than costs. Excluding additional interest expenses. Overall additional deficit is ILS 30 billion
 <sup>28</sup> after budget reallocations and utilization of Property Tax Fund.



#### Estimated Additional Cost Due to the War – Northern Scenario, 2024 Around ILS 111 Billion\*

Defense Expenses: 28 billion

Rehabilitation and support for property damage: 13 billion Economic Plan: Business Damages and Furlough: 37 billion

Civilian Expenses: 3 billion

Loss of Revenue: **30 billion** 

\* Funds flow for 2023 is lower than costs. Excluding additional interest expenses. Overall additional deficit is ILS 30 billion <sup>29</sup> after budget reallocations and utilization of Property Tax Fund.



### War's Effects on Economy – Northern Scenario, 2024 GDP Growth: Minus 2%

- Temporarily absent from work:
  - Reservists: Q1 220,000; Q2 120,000; Q3 60,000; Q4 30,000
  - Irregular activity: Q1 400,000; Q2 100,000; Q3 50,000; Q4 25,000
- Employed (yearly figure, excluding temporarily absent from work): 4,297,000
  - Of whom: high-tech sector 410,000 (Q1 388k; Q2 410k; Q3 410k; Q4 430k)
  - Rest of the economy: 3,887,000
- Labor productivity: unchanged
  - Annual loss of GDP due to transition of reservists, most of whom are employed in the private sector, to the public sector, and GDP-per-worker differences (high-tech sector – ILS 600,000 per year; other employment sectors in business sector – ILS 370,000 per year; public administration – ILS 177,000 per year) – <u>ILS 20 billion</u>



## Establishing a Relief Framework for Evacuees: Relief Budget for Evacuated Families Must Be URGENTLY Created for 2023 With Approval to Commit for 2024

- Cover household expenses (housing, property, income, education, mental care)
- Estimated budget based on expenditure structure of "a typical family", according to age:
  - Family with household head aged 65+
  - Family with household head aged 45-64
  - Family with household head aged 30-44
  - Family with household head aged 20-29



### **Budgets Department Principles for Wartime Economic Activity**

**Agreement Between Positions of Aaron Institute and Budgets Department** 

- There is uncertainty regarding duration and scope of fighting in Gaza, and possibility of additional fronts
- The government will have to amend the Budget Law to expand the budget framework, requiring professional conduct and fiscal responsibility
  - Funding expenses initially by exhausting existing sources in 2023-24 budget
  - Immediate reallocation of at least ILS 16 billion from 2023-34 state budget (ILS 6 billion in 2023 and at least ILS 10 billion in 2024)
  - Enhancing efficiency of government operations by scraping and merging ministries

Budget for 2024 must be ratified by December 15, 2023



### **Recommended Policy to Support Growth Engines**

Long-term reforms with targets, plans, and budgets, to maintain high employment rate while increasing productivity



Investing in human capital below the income median Employment & training targets as per 2030 Committee, human capital improvement targets



Massive investment in public capital 2040 targets for reducing transportation access gaps




Increasing attractiveness of private investment Regulation Authority, innovation & digitalization, competition, cost of housing

Bulk of productivity growth will benefit population below the median, reducing <u>poverty</u>



# Main Goals & Plans for Reforms







#### **Increase efficiency**

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## **Economic & Social Integration of Haredi Society**

Military Service	Army needs to find a way to enable Haredi men to integrate voluntarily, rather than by force
Social Cohesion	<ul> <li>Maintain Haredi volunteering and social contribution, through either military or civic route</li> <li>New, adapted service tracks, providing positive returns for individuals as well as wider economy</li> <li>Onboard Haredi men and women to replace drafted workers, with subsidized brief training and opportunities for part-time employment</li> <li>Impart knowledge and skills required for labor market, acquire experience</li> </ul>
Integration in Wider Society	<ul> <li>All Israeli citizens are fighting for our home together. Aim: preserve social cohesion spirit, which might also contribute to integration in employment</li> <li>Reduce Haredi aversion to integration in heterogeneous workplaces</li> <li>Direct Haredi workers to high-demand occupations, to meet demands of the economy</li> <li>Incorporate Math and English studies for younger population, training for high-quality employment, address swathes of Haredi society who are open and accommodating to change, in collaboration with leadership and with consent.</li> </ul>

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# **Arab Society**

- Absence from workplaces since outbreak of war due to feelings of lack of personal safety, and restrictions by mayors and others
- Low employment rates even before the war among men, particularly young

#### **Recommendations: Encouraging worker return and boosting employment rates**

- Encouraging worker return remove restrictions, reduce tensions among workers, and restore sense of personal safety
- **2.** Integrate the unemployed in vacant positions:
  - Replacing foreign and Palestinians workers
  - Replacing drafted workers
  - Incentivize employers and subsidize short training courses



# **Scenarios for Ending Gaza War\***

### **Complete Victory:**

Destroying Hamas' military and governing capacities, including elimination of leadership (Deif & Sinwar) and substantial damage to their forces (currently 25,000 troops)

### **Partial Victory:**


IDF active in northern part of Gaza, damage to capital

### **Floundering and Unsuccessful:**

Hamas maintains high defensive readiness



# Annual Growth Rates, GDP & GDP per Capita






<sup>38</sup> Source: tabulations by Aaron Institute researchers of CBS workforce surveys

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## **Debt-to-GDP Ratio**

75%



2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024



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
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Source: MoF, Annual Report of the Government Debt Management Unit at the Office of the

<sup>39</sup> Accountant General

## **Development of Government Deficit in Israel (% of GDP)**




Source: MoF (Accountant General Department), Annual Report on the Fulfillment of the Budget, Revenue, and Deficit

40

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# **Annual Inflation Rate**





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
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Source: tabulations by Aaron Institute researchers of Bank of Israel data

41

## **Employment Rate at Primary Working Age (25-64)**





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# **USD/ILS Exchange Rate**



Source: tabulations by Aaron Institute researchers of Bank of Israel data




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43

## CDS – Israel vs. USA




Source: tabulations by Aaron Institute researchers of investing data 44

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# Foreign Investments in Israel (USD millions)



45 Source: tabulations by Aaron Institute researchers of foreign investment data (IVC)

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# Decline in Workforce Growth Rate in High-Tech Sector & High-Tech Occupations

*2022-2023	2017-2021	
3.9%	6.2%	Workers with high-tech skills
6.0%	7.4%	High-tech sector




Data source: CBS workforce surveys, 2012-2023, employees aged 25-64

<sup>46</sup> \* Compared to 1st half of 2022

Employment trend in high-tech sector according to workforce surveys matches the trend indicated by National Insurance data



# Bank of Israel Interest Rate, Bond Yields (%)



47 Source: tabulations by Aaron institute researchers of data from Bol and Investing

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#### **Stimulus Formula**

### Input Component + Salary Component

Damage Rate (Monthly/2-Monthly)	Stimulus Amount	Damage Rate * Salary Costs * 60%
12.5%-20% / 25%-40%	6%	
20%-30% / 40%-60%	9%	Salary Costs –
30%-40% / 60%-80%	12%	Lower figure between (total salary
40%-50% / 80%-100%	18%	paid / number of employees
		multiplied by mean wage)

Stimulus will not exceed ILS 300,000 for businesses with a turnover of up to ILS 100 million, and ILS 900,000 for businesses with a turnover of up to ILS 400 million.

