Lebanon: A Country Entrapped
By Col. (res.) Udi Evental | June 4, 2020
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| Photo: Shahen books | CC BY-SA 4.0 |
Despite the Cronavirus crisis and social distancing measures taken in Lebanon, at the end of April demonstrators returned to the streets throughout the country in protests that lasted a week, and continued sporadically since. The demonstrations began in Tripoli, spreading to other cities from the south to Sidon and Beirut, and all the way to the Beqaa Valley and the Syrian border.
The demonstrations constitute a 'reminder' that the coals of the great protest that shook Lebanon in late 2019 - are still glowing and are liable to reignite when the Coronavirus dies down. The official estimates of contagion in Lebanon due to the pandemic are relatively low (approximately 1242 persons infected, out of whom 719 have recovered and 27 have died), even if the official numbers are assessed to underestimate the actual gravity of the spread of the disease.
Due to the pandemic, the protests were relatively limited in their scope, but they were more violent than the previous wave when the demonstrators made every effort to demonstrate peacefully. This time the protesters set fire to banks, demolished ATMs and car windows, and throwing stones and petrol bombs clashed with security forces employing teargas, rubber bullets and even live fire. In the clashes, one protester was killed, and dozens of security personnel (army and police) were injured.
As in the huge protest that broke out in October 2019, the recent demonstrations were driven by the economic crisis and the inability of the Diab government (established in January 2020) to solve the problems of the economy and to provide basic services to citizens. Lebanon's citizenry continues to suffer from frequent power outages (against the backdrop of the collapse of the electric grid), breakdown of communication and Internet service, deficient sanitation, water shortages and lack of cash at ATMs and petrol at gas stations, (whipped up further by a 'defective fuel' scandal that has now inflamed the country).
As noted previously, in the wave of protests that swept over Lebanon at the end of 2019, economic protest quickly turned into a rejection of the sectarian power-sharing system. This, in light of the people's general understanding that the present order was bankrupt and no longer able to provide for the needs of the citizenry. The crisis was accompanied by a generational and class-based social rebellion against corrupt elites who had exploited the social and political system to enrich themselves.
These economic, political and social conditions only worsened due to the Coronavirus crisis.
The Lebanese economy is quickly deteriorating. Lebanon's external debt is one of the highest in the world, and continues to balloon—already 170% of the GDP. An International Monetary Fund forecast expects Lebanon will experience a negative growth rate of 12% (compared to 1% prior to the pandemic). In March Lebanon declared that it will default on the first payment of its Eurobonds and ask its debtors to reschedule its payments.
The Lebanese banking system is in freefall. Against the backdrop of a severe liquidity crunch, the banks have imposed limitations on withdrawals from bank accounts, particularly of foreign currency. The banks, that are in the control of high echelon officials in Lebanon's inner political circle, are the focal point of protests against a corrupt regime. The protesters continue to demand that Riad Salamé, the Governor of the Central Bank of Lebanon, be dismissed and face charges and insist on the return of huge sums "plundered" from public coffers.
The Lebanese Lira has lost 50% of its value since October 2019 (on the black market, exchange rates reached 4000 Lebanese Lira against the dollar —compared to the official rate of 1500 Lira). According to forecasts, inflation is expected to reach 30 percent, while even prior to the Coronavirus crisis, the scope of unemployment was high (37% among those age 35 and under). Under such conditions, the CoL and the price of basic commodities and food are spiraling. More and more citizens are dropping below the poverty line (~ 40 percent) complaining of shortages of food during the month of Ramadan. Some of the protesters even dubbed the demonstrations "hunger protest".
The performance of the new government in the shadow of the Coronavirus crisis has further substantiated the charges leveled by young people in the country that the corrupt sectarian system no longer works, and that the government operates on a foundation that is unable to solve the severe problems Lebanon faces.
The Diab government that the protesters called for its resignation, like the previous Hariri government, has been unable to formulate an economic and fiscal reform plan that would be acceptable to the international community and bring implementation of commitments to assist Lebanon (the government has requested 20 billion dollars in international assistance and loans).
The government has lost the confidence of the public. Like its predecessors, the Diab government has approved a series of steps to combat corruption and return stolen money but the measures are perceived by the public as empty of content. The government has failed to utilize the opportunity that the Coronavirus crisis presented to underscore to the public that the State can provide the answer to the problems the pandemic presents.
In practice, lack of foreign currency did not allow acquisition of medical supplies, and the various ethnic groups in Lebanon were drawn into the vacuum to provide solutions (money, food packages) in their respective areas of control. Hezbollah outdid all other ethnic parties in allocating budgets and resources. The organization launched an emergency health program in the framework of which it claimed to have mobilized some 24,000 volunteers (1,500 of them doctors, 3,000 nurses and paramedics), in addition to establishing hospitals, emergency quarantine centers and a fleet of ambulances which Hezbollah put on display for journalists at the beginning of April. Faced with charges that the organization gave preference to the wellbeing of the Shia population, Nasrallah declared that Hezbollah was combating the pandemic "on behalf of all Lebanon".
Under such circumstances, Lebanese citizens, particularly the young generation, watched as the ethnic groups filled the vacuum left by a malfunctioning Lebanese State, receiving additional substantiation that the hated and corrupt sectarian system against which they took to the streets with force towards the close of 2019 is entrenched, and 'isn't going anywhere'.
Despite Hezbollah's high profile in steps to meet the Coronavirus crisis, nevertheless, the organization is in a defensive position. Hezbollah -- that fought for control of the Ministry of Health in the Hariri government established in January 2019, and pressured for the establishment of the Diab government a year later -- is identified more and more with the shortcomings of the Ministry of Health and the regime. Against such a backdrop (among other things), the organization seeks to disassociate itself from the banks, and has adopted a threatening stance towards the banking sector warning 'not to touch the citizenry's money' and meddling in appointments at Lebanon's central bank.
Hezbollah incurred criticism due to its opposition at the outset of the crisis to halting flights from Iran, and later, opposition to declaration of an emergency in Lebanon, that would authorize the Lebanese Army to deal with the crisis on a national level. Hezbollah's opposition to an international assistance 'package' also drew fire. In addition, the organization suffered a blow to its image and its pocket, following Germany's declaration of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization (without any distinction between its political and military arms) and exposure of its deep involvement in Iraq through Hezbollah operative Muhammad Kawtharani (the United States offered up to a 10 million dollar reward "for information about his operations").
Where does all this lead? Lebanon is a country entrapped - that suffers from paralysis and grave instability and turmoil—an end to which isn't even on the horizon. This dismal state of affairs comes against the backdrop of Lebanon's sectarian elites' unwillingness to give up power on one hand, and their inability to run the country in an effective manner under the sectarian system on the other. Thus, realities in Lebanon are very complex, making it very difficult to establish an alternative governing system that could solve the tremendous economic and infrastructural morass and bring about significant change in the quality of life of its citizens.
From an Israeli perspective, repeated demands for the government's resignation and for change in the existing order in Lebanon, embody a positive potential in the form of growing criticism against Hezbollah and its military capabilities; and additional restraints on the organization in its conflict with Israel. At the same time, should Hezbollah find itself with its back to the wall, it is liable to escalate tensions with Israel as a ploy to fend off criticism at home.
Be what may, exposing Hezbollah's problematic role in Lebanon, its standing as the primary culprit 'calling the shots' in the country's failed government, and its negative involvement in the region (in Syria, Iraq and Yemen) provides opportunities to amplify international pressure on the organization.
In this framework, it would be advisable to focus a diplomatic effort to broaden the trend of defining the organization as a terrorist entity (France is the next goal on the list); and to mobilize the international community against the dangers inherent in Hezbollah's force build-up, including precision weapon capabilities beyond state control, presenting a threat to Lebanon's neighbors, first and foremost Israel.
Research has already underscored that the arduous economic situation of Lebanon provides an opportunity to create a linkage between an international rescue plan for the government in Beirut, and a demand that Hezbollah's problematic actions stop. This should be embarked on in a way that will clarify to Lebanese public opinion that the detrimental policy of the organization is holding up rehabilitation of the country. In this framework, Israel should raise again Hezbollah's military presence in the south of the country - a gross breach of Security Council Resolution 1701 - and the threat that the organization presents to UNIFIL forces, while thwarting the UN's mission there.
Authored by Col. (res.) Udi Evental
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