The Palestinian System Following the Jenin Operation: Is It Headed in a New Direction or Will It Keep Declining?
By Dr. Michael Milshtein | August, 2023
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| Photo: Kremlin.ru | CC BY 4.0 |
Operation "Home and Garden" (July 3-5) more commonly known as the Jenin Incursion, was the most comprehensive military campaign Israel has conducted in the West Bank since Operation "Defensive Shield" back in 2002. The operation attests to the severity attributed by Israel to the ongoing security deterioration in Northern part of the West Bank, and particularly in Jenin, for the past 18 months, with unrelenting attacks carried out against Israeli targets both in the West Bank and within Israeli territory. The operation also reflects Israel’s concern over the incidents in Jenin “spilling over” to other hubs across the West Bank while destabilizing the current state of affairs in the region.
The operation may be crowned a success, especially from a military perspective: Terror infrastructures in the Jenin Refugee Camp were hit after having been enhanced over the past year, as seen in the development and use of charges, rockets (albeit primitive ones), and snipers, alongside shooting incidents against Jewish communities in Northern Samaria and beyond the "Green Line". Nevertheless, these all resulted in very few civilian casualties (preventing any regional or international pressure from being exerted on Israel), and without negative projection onto other arenas, namely the Gaza Strip and northern front.
Yet the conclusion of the operation warrants answers to several fundamental questions beyond its military aspect: Can this campaign ensure lasting quiet in the West Bank? If not, will this pattern be expected to repeat itself, in Jenin in particular and in the West Bank in general – and indicate a dramatic change in the strategic state of affairs in this arena (in other words, Jenin’s “Gazatization”)? Can this military campaign be leveraged for broader achievements, primarily stabilizing the fragile reality in the West Bank? And, most importantly - what is the strategic purpose of this military operation, and what is Israel trying to accomplish in the West Bank in the long range?
The Jenin Incursion was accompanied by Israel’s dual approach to the Palestinian Authority (PA). On the one hand, its very execution was a manifestation of Israel’s recognition that the Palestinian administration lacked the ability and desire at present to regain its governability in Jenin so as to neutralize the security threat this area poses. On the other hand, the operation ended with the recognition that the PA is extremely weak, and therefore, additional anarchy pockets may emerge across the West Bank that are far worse, requiring this region’s immediate stabilization, primarily using economic and infrastructural gestures.
In other words, Israel realizes that, despite its shortcomings and defiance against it, the PA remains the lesser of all evils considering the alternatives of ensuing chaos, Hamas’ filling of the governmental void formed, and, worst of all - Israel having to rush in and fill the gaps, which, in practical terms, means reclaiming its position as sovereign in the West Bank - the same position it had willfully abandoned when the PA was established in 1994 – while getting dangerously closer to a one-state reality.
The strategic decision to strengthen the PA taken by the Israeli cabinet shortly after the incursion was not supported by members of the "Religious Zionism" Party, who view the administration in Ramallah as a bitter enemy that must be toppled, while diligently expanding the Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Their actions are leading to increased fusion between the West Bank and Israel, fueling the security explosiveness, as well as the tension with other countries in the region and worldwide. It demonstrates the two opposing agendas at play within the current Israeli government, which are constantly clashing, and preventing an organized, long-sighted strategy on the Palestinian issue from being formed, and certainly decisive resolutions from being made.
As soon as the operation ended, the PA began to promote steps that had not been taken in a long while, primarily deploying forces across Jenin, including the refugee camp, which has not been governable and was, instead, ruled by various organizations’ military infrastructures (as well as some non-affiliated ones) alongside gangs that spread anarchy throughout it. Abu Mazen had even visited Jenin, as well as the refugee camp, for the first time in 11 years. These efforts reflect Ramallah’s traumatized realization that the developments in Jenin could lead to the recurrence of the events that had taken place in the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007, during which Hamas had taken over the area, forcing the PA out.
However, in order for these first steps to evolve into a change that would entail the reinstating of governmental and public order in Jenin, there is a need for additional dramatic steps: the Palestinian security apparatuses should establish permanent presence in the Jenin Refugee Camp; weapons must be collected and militants - particularly those who are non-affiliated or affiliated with Fatah - recruited to the Palestinian security establishment (similarly to the campaign that helped stabilize the area during the Second Intifada); and, most importantly, the PA should exhibit determination in its conduct vis-à-vis Hamas and Islamic Jihad infrastructures that have taken hold in the area, even if it means engaging in violent collisions.
Israel, on its part, must recognize the fact that stabilizing the PA does not end with a series of civil gestures along the “Economic Peace” Doctrine that ostensibly focus the Palestinians on preserving their fabric of life, and allow the Israeli government to avoid exploring policy issues that require in-depth examination. To substantially strengthen the PA, it must take more dramatic steps, including some that would cause a conflict between the two agendas being promoted simultaneously by the government in this context. Among such actions are suspending or limiting the economic penalties Israel imposes on the PA over the payments made by the latter to terrorists’ families, which also make it harder for salaries to be paid to civil servants, such as members of the Palestinian security apparatuses, but also reexamining the plans for construction in the West Bank, which impede, inter alia, the possibility of advancing normalization (particularly with Saudi-Arabia), and garnering international support for the fight against Iran.
It is vital for the Israeli government to realize that strengthening the PA does not solely depend on Israel. The former’s weakness is also (or primarily) the result of internal Palestinian issues, such as the Ramallah administration’s negative public image (especially that of Abu Mazen himself) due to its corruption, its deep-seated degeneration (elections have not been held in the PA since 2006), the limitations it imposes on free speech and assembly, and the underrepresentation of many sectors of society under Abu Mazen’s rule, especially the younger generation. Improvements that are essentially economic help to calm the public down, and are one of the main reasons why a third intifada has not been waged to date; however, a profound change in the status of the PA also requires a comprehensive internal reform, and is relatively partially affected by the offer of a political prospect.
The 30th anniversary of the Oslo Accords will be marked in about a month (this September), serving as a good opportunity to take a hard look at the future of the relations between these two communities, and form the missing strategy on the Palestinian issue. It could also be an opportunity to refresh the Israeli arsenal of conceptualizations: The yearning for true peace and faith in the power of economics to dissipate historical hostility and change the hearts and minds – in other words, the kind of illusions that have shattered over the last three decades – should be replaced with the sober pursuit of physical separation – whether by agreement or unilaterally. This would be a realistic goal that reflects the understanding that the hatred toward Israel and security threats will not vanish, and that the two-state solution cannot be revived overnight. But at the very least, the unplanned oblivious creeping toward the severest threat to the Zionist vision - fusing the West Bank and Israel together until a single state remains (the One State Reality), filled with tension and violence - must be curbed.
Authored by Dr. Michael Milshtein, Senior Fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), Reichman University.
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