The Growing Tension in the Palestinian System

An Analysis of the Challenges and Policy Recommendations

By Dr. Michael Milshtein​​ | January, 2023

Image by hosny salah from Pixabay

An ongoing rise in tension has been apparent in the Palestinian system in recent weeks, and seems to stem from three interrelated sources of crisis that impact one another:

1. Increasing violent clashes in several emerging arenas, each projecting on the other. The most prominent among them recently was the clash in the Jenin Refugee Camp (26 January) resulting in the death of 9 Palestinians (most of whom were armed members of terror organizations) that led to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s firing of rockets from the Gaza Strip, followed the next day by a severe “lone wolf” attack in Jerusalem that killed 7 Israeli civilians. Rockets were launched once more the following week - again by the Islamic Jihad - this time claiming it was a response to the restrictions that Israel was planning to impose on Palestinian prisoners.
   
   
2. The deepening detachment between Israel and the Palestinian Authority due to the Palestinians’ promotion of the International Court campaign regarding the status of Israel’s control over the West Bank, which led to economic punishment (the deduction of Israeli collected tax payments used to pay families of terrorists), and was accompanied by insinuations made by senior Israeli officials – primarily Minister Smotrich – that the PA “does not necessarily need” to continue existing. Tension peaked in late January when the Palestinian Authority announced that its security coordination with Israel has been suspended following the severe incident in Jenin.
   
   
3. The growing indications of concern from the international system, particularly the U.S. administration, directed at Israel over a possible shift in the current state of affairs in the West Bank in the vein of a “creeping annexation”, as well as the destabilization of the PA’s status (including voicing concern over the implications of deducting the Israeli collected taxes by some of Israel’s closest friends in Western Europe).

Ostensibly, Israel could take comfort in the fact that more acute threats have not yet developed: No broader riot in the West Bank, since most of the Palestinian public does not partake in violent incidents, and instead focuses on its fabric of life; most of the terrorism is still perpetuated by lone attackers or local teams, and is not part of well-established infrastructures; the Gaza Strip is still exhibiting calm following the unprecedented civil gestures Israel is promoting in the region; and international pressure in the Palestinian context is, at present, still not taking the form of punitive measures on the legal, economic, or political levels.

However, should the current trend persist, it is expected to destabilize the current state of affairs, thereby exacerbating the challenges that Israel faces. The recent terror attacks carried out could lead to copycatting by Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem, or Arab Israeli citizens; the suspended coordination may be interpreted by working levels in the Palestinian Authority as a “green light” for carrying out attacks; the limiting of financial aid provided to the PA could lead to its destabilization in a manner that would require Israel to step in and assume civil responsibilities that it would then struggle to implement; that same limitation, coupled with a possible projection of destabilization on the Israeli economic state of affairs, could harm Palestinian civilians, thereby contributing to the possibility of broad popular protests erupting; and sanctions by states or economic companies could develop against Israel, especially if the argument that the latter is promoting a gradual change in the state of affairs in the West Bank is made.

The key challenge is expected to develop by 22 March – the beginning of the month of Ramadan (although it could manifest itself earlier). In recent years, Ramadan has been coinciding with Passover and the Israeli Independence Day, serving as a backdrop for rising security tension. Most striking in this context are the frictions that develop on Temple Mount, and serve as a “detonator” that projects onto other arenas, as demonstrated in Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021.

In this framework, an exacerbation of the security challenge in Jerusalem and the West Bank, as well as in Arab Israeli society and, perhaps, even the Gaza Strip, is expected. The increasing domestic tumult following the government’s actions in areas such as law, culture, education, and economics would be highlighted behind the scenes, which could make it difficult to form internal legitimacy and consensus as part of a scenario that includes external conflict.

Due to the danger of growing explosiveness in the Palestinian system, as well as the possibility that it would project on other arenas too, including Israeli Arab society, and in view of the risk of jeopardizing the strategic relations between Israel and the United States, and its affinities with the Arab world, alongside the negative projections on the already-simmering domestic system, the current government is advised to prioritize the preservation of the current state of affairs over the promotion of “revolutionary” steps, and certainly over the pursuit of uprooting the current state of affairs in favor of creating another in its stead.

Thus, several steps are recommended, some of which the government has already wisely promoted in recent weeks:

1. Increasing the focused effort on the intelligence and operational levels, alongside lawful punitive measures to effectively address the threats of terror, particularly the kind perpetrated by “lone wolf attackers” that make it harder to identify in advance, and has no point of contact or center of gravity.
   
   
2. Encouraging the Palestinian Authority to renew security coordination, inter alia by activating pressure levers by the U.S. administration and Arab states, primarily Egypt and Jordan.
   
   
3. Stabilizing the civilian state of affairs in the West Bank while cautiously avoiding the creation of a direct link between Israel and the Palestinian population, making the PA redundant. This requires Israel, at present, to refrain from (or restrain) any drastic economic punishment wherever possible that could destabilize the Palestinian Authority’s status or harm the civil fabric of life in the West Bank.
   
   
4. Avoiding actions that would be perceived by the international arena as changing the reality on the ground in the West Bank, as the government did in its resolution to dismantle the "Or Chaim" outpost three weeks ago.
   
   
5. Recruiting external actors to retain the relative quiet in the Palestinian system. In this regard, Jordan’s role is particularly prominent in the context of Temple Mount (during Netanyahu’s visit to Amman in January, the Israeli Prime Minister declared he was committed to preserving the status quo in the compound), as is Egypt’s vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority, and Qatar’s with respect to Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
   
   
6. Curbing Hamas’ growing efforts to set the West Bank ablaze. A considerable part of the effort is being promoted from the Gaza Strip, while forcing differentiation between the latter, where relative calm is maintained, and the West Bank, where an escalation is ongoing, the likes of which have not been seen in a decade, and a large part of which is indeed fueled by Hamas. Israel should look into strictly conditioning the offering of any further civil gestures upon the cessation of terror attempts in the West Bank, as well as abduction attacks, which Hamas continues to plan persistently (while “relieving the pressure” by firing rockets, as it did following the recent clash in Jenin), and a renewed demand for flexibility in the matter of MIAs and POWs in exchange for said gestures.

Such steps, if taken by Israel, could lead to relative quiet during the upcoming month of Ramadan. However, recent years have proven that calm – both in the West Bank and Gaza Strip – is not the kind of strategic accomplishment that guarantees lasting stability, but is, by its very nature, a tactical, temporary goal. Israel should limit its fight over symbolic aspects and direct most of its efforts and attention to a profound discussion on the long-term strategy required in the Palestinian System, which has been absent for many years.

Such a systemwide discussion would allow Israel to realize that it only faces two strategic alternatives from which to choose, preferably in the near future: Being “channeled” into a one-state reality (even if unplanned or wanted) or deciding to opt for a unilateral separation, since the Oslo kind of two-state solution, and other conflict management ideas, are expected to be relatively ineffective. Such a discussion would also make it clear to Israel that it is facing a choice between two evils, and that, at times, it is better to choose to accept the existing one, than uproot it in a way that would leave it with options that are far worse. This insight is particularly relevant in light of the emerging discourse on whether the Palestinian Authority needs to continue existing.

Authored by Dr. Michael Milshtein, a senior researcher at the Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), Reichman University.

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