Photo: Kobi Gideon - GPO

The Absence of Strategy Could Erode Military Feats

February, 2024

For the past 4 months, since October 7th, 2023, Israel has been engaged in a multifrontal war, during which the IDF and security forces have exhibited remarkable capabilities. In the absence of a “day after” policy, the military feats achieved to date could erode.

Analysis

The war in Gaza could last many months and, in the absence of an exit plan, Israel could end up in a vacuum that would lead to long-term direct occupation – a heavy multidimensional burden from political, military and economic perspectives. The IDF would be forced to care for the local population, Israel’s international standing would be compromised, its relations with the Arab states would be impacted, and the economic burden too great to shoulder. Moreover, the notions of transferring the Gazan population and rebuilding Israeli communities in the Gaza Strip could serve as ammunition against Israel in the Hague’s International Court of Justice.

Nasrallah has managed to establish a direct link between the ongoing battles in Gaza and the attacks against Israel’s northern communities and IDF facilities, while dozens of thousands of Israeli residents have been evacuated from their northern homes and continue to be displaced with no prospects of returning to them.

The West Bank keeps simmering and is on the verge of boiling over. The processes advocated by government ministers, namely weakening the Palestinian Authority, taking away a large number of Palestinian workers’ livelihood, and denying the Palestinians of any peace prospects could lead Israel to deeper involvement despite the IDF and ISA’s intense efforts at thwarting terror attacks.

Iran has managed to position itself as a nuclear threshold state and continues to develop its long-range missile and attack drone capabilities. At the same time, there is a sharp rise in pro-Iranian militias’ violent activity across the Middle East, inter alia against U.S. targets, that has gone unanswered to date, which could bolster their confidence to persist with their offensive actions.

On the political level, the gaps between Israel and the United States are widening, primarily with respect to the opportunity to establish a regional alliance between Israel and the Arab states headed by the U.S. The chances of such an alliance being formed hinge greatly on Israel’s willingness to allow a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority to play a role in it. The more time passes without an axis being set up under U.S. lead, the stronger the Iranian one will become, and the greater the detriment to Israel’s overall strategic power. At the same time, the U.S. and UK seem to be coordinated in their efforts to pressure Israel. According to media reports, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has begun to look into the possibility of recognizing a Palestinian state as part of President Biden’s vision for the “day after”. Similarly, UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron has declared that his country was considering recognizing a Palestinian state. The two powers therefore seem to be inclined to consider promoting extreme options that bypass Netanyahu should he persist in his uncooperative approach toward partaking in Biden’s initiative.

While the rulings made by the Hague’s International Court of Justice have given implicit tailwind to the IDF’s actions in Gaza, the court did warn Israel not to engage in steps that would imply direct occupation and could place it on a collision course with the international community. It is important to note that the ICJ is still deliberating on this issue, and could reach some difficult conclusions subject to Israel’s conduct and its leadership’s statements.

Some negative impact was also made on Israel’s strategic relationships with the peace and normalization states, particularly Egypt. The notions made by Israeli ministers with regard to the Gazans’ transfer and rebuilding of Israeli communities in the Gaza Strip could cause severe detriment to bilateral relations from a security perspective. Moreover, the Arab states have already begun to engage in strategic coordination in preparation for the reality in Gaza in the aftermath of the war, and in view of Israel’s reluctance to discuss the subject.

On the domestic level, more than 150,000 Israelis living in the southern and northern parts of the country remain displaced, with no prospects for their return to their homes. Prime Minister Netanyahu is failing to mitigate the divisiveness and conspiracy theories against the heads of the defense establishment. The new state budget does not reflect the economy and society’s true needs, or the demand for a reprioritization of national interests while allocating resources on a national basis instead of a sectorial one.

Recommendations

Prime Minister Netanyahu would have to choose between petty politics that harm Israel’s national security and a broad strategy that could get his country back on the track of political, military, and economic power.

The government must prioritize the returning of hostages alive as an overarching goal, for the threat to their lives is growing. It is our national and moral duty to them after having been abandoned by the state once already.

Israel is facing a historical opportunity to take part in the regional processes led by the U.S. administration and supported by the Arab peace camp states. Such integration would enable the establishment of a strategic American-Israeli-Arab axis to counter the Iranian one, providing Israel with the latitude to change the security reality in the north, while legitimizing its military actions directed at destroying Hamas. It would also enable collaboration with Egypt by way of methodically addressing the smuggling through the border area between the Gaza Strip and Egypt known as the Philadelphi Route, while bolstering Jordan’s strategic home front.

Thus, the Israeli government should develop a dialogue with the U.S. administration on the required reforms in the “revitalized” Palestinian Authority, and accept that such a discussion alone can pave the way for the international community and Arab states’ integration into the efforts to rehabilitate the Gaza Strip as a key to countering the Iranian axis.

Vis-á-vis Hizballah, Israel should prioritize a diplomatic arrangement, albeit an interim one, under U.S. auspices, that would enable it to optimally prepare for conflict with Hizballah. To do so, it must take action on two levels simultaneously – improve the home front’s preparedness and population’s readiness, inter alia by ensuring that bomb shelters and safe rooms are up to par, and optimal protection for essential facilities is in place, while insisting on full political and military coordination and collaboration with the U.S. administration.

In the West Bank, in view of the risk of the PA’s collapse and widespread escalation, Israel should avoid weakening the Palestinian Authority, inter alia by transferring the offset tax revenues and allowing a limited and supervised number of workers to enter Israel, seeing as the vast majority of terror attacks in the past were carried out by illegal workers and terrorists, and not by Palestinians whose entry was checked and authorized.

This document was written by the team of the Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS)

Executive Director: Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead

Editted by Dr. Shay Har-Zvi, Senior Fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), Reichman University.

By the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS,

Authored by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS, Executive Director Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead

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