An Overall Exit Strategy is Required

By the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS,

Executive Director Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead | November, 2023

^{Photo: IDF Spokesperson's Unit | CC BY-SA 3.0}

The IDF’s impressive operational capabilities on all fronts and Israeli society’s robustness are contrasted by the lack of an organized Israeli government strategy for the aftermath of war. Several of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s statements indicate that Israel has no exit strategy or long-term plan for this war.

Israel’s power relies on military, technological, and economic capabilities alongside political wisdom and strategic vision. To a large extent, these depend on the strategic alliance with the United States and special ties with the peace and normalization states. Thus, the formulation of such strategy must take the assets at Israel’s disposal into account as well as the constraints imposed upon it.

Strategic Assets

First and foremost, the IDF’s impressive capabilities and civil society’s cohesion as a source of strength by which to achieve the overarching goals of the present campaign – destroying Hamas and bringing every single hostage home.

The 7 October barbaric terror attackunderscores two Hamas weaknesses that run contrary to its earlier plans and expectations. One, the failure to generate a multifront conflict in Israel’s north, the West Bank, as well as within Israel. Two, the atrocities leave Israel with no other option but to destroy Hamas as a combined terror organization and political entity.

The United States’ multidimensional support, as well as that of leading European countries. These provide Israel with broad legitimacy as well as military and political support to destroy Hamas.

The special ties with the peace and normalization states that, despite domestic pressure, refrain from damaging bilateral relations in any substantial way. The resolutions made by the Islamic Summit, which lacked all operative meaning despite being poignantly phrased, reflected the gaps between the peace camp and radical axis. Moreover, the regional military cooperation under the American flag (CENTCOM) has proven effective, reflecting the depth of regional collaborations.

In the war over hearts and minds, the disclosure of the cynical use Hamas makes of hospitals, which serve as military HQs and hostage detention sites.

The IDF’s determined and assertive response vis-á-vis Hizballah targets and operatives forms a crucial factor in the organization’s deterrence from expanding the campaign, and could serve to set the scene for an improved security reality on the “day after” the war.

The defense establishment’s successful thwarting of terrorism in the West Bank and prevention of violent outbreak, while causing significant detriment to Hamas infrastructures in the area (to date, more than one thousand Hamas terrorists have been arrested).

Israel’s impressive air defense capabilities manifest in the interception of missile, rocket and UAV attacks.

Political and Military Constraint

The political hourglass vis-á-vis the need to achieve the strategic goals could form a constraint as the campaign endures and the population’s distress mounts. In possible connection to that, the domestic pressure exerted within the Arab world, particularly in Egypt and Jordan, could form a constraint on these governments’ conduct vis-á-vis Israel.

The violent actions of extreme rightwing activists against Palestinian West Bank residents could spark a full-scale conflict that would project on Israeli Arabs too. Such a development would impact the IDF and security forces, who would be compelled to divert resources and attention to it.

Flawed national priorities and neglection of crucial sectors in Israeli economy and society that currently struggle to provide optimal solutions for difficulties in a wide range of areas, alongside uncertainty pertaining to Israel’s economic resilience.

A lacking sense of security, primarily among border community residents in northern and southern Israel, who could prove to be disinclined to return to their homes unless the threat posed by terror generators has been altogether extricated and removed.

Manifestations of soaring protest and antisemitism worldwide pressure the governments that stand with Israel, projecting onto Diaspora Jews’ sense of security.

Implications & recommendations

The significant achievements vis-á-vis Hamas must be combined with the political steps led by the U.S. administration for the release of every single hostage as soon as possible.

Simultaneously, Israel must formulate an overall exit strategy that prioritizes the destruction of Hamas, while establishing security control that would enable the return of Gaza Envelope residents to their homes. At the same time, Israel should also take part in international efforts led by the United States in full coordination with it to determine who will be responsible for rehabilitating and governing the Gaza Strip on “the day after” the war.

Alongside effective security control, prospects of a combined Palestinian Pan-Arab civil backbone must be generated under U.S. and European auspices, inter alia in order to comprehensively rehabilitate the Gaza Strip.

Harmful initiatives that jeopardize Israel’s security, primarily notions of transferring Gaza Strip residents to Egypt and/or Jordan, should be avoided. Such initiatives are perceived as a tangible threat to these countries’ national security, and taint their crucial strategic relations with Israel.

As for Hizballah, Israel clearly can't allow the current state of affairs to endure, and must create a new reality on the ground that would remove the threat posed to Israel’s northern residents, and allow them to return to their homes. As part of such a reality, alongside the military option, Israel must also demand the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

Israel should formulate an overall strategy for curbing Iran’s multidimensional buildup. Such strategy should be founded on two pillars: one on the military level by accelerating force buildup processes with the help of the United States; the other on the diplomatic level via collaborations with the international community.

On the domestic front, the Israeli government that will be formed following the war will have to restart national priorities. First and foremost, it would need to actively pursue the bridging of divides and polarity in Israeli society, while strengthening a uniting, shared Israeli identity that connects Israeli Arabs and the ultraorthodox to Israeli society, inter alia by radically altering the current division of the budgetary pie.

The new government would have to understand that large sums of money would have to be invested in the rehabilitation of northern and southern Israeli communities, encouraging the residents to return to their homes, healing the businesses that have suffered, and bolstering systems that have been neglected in recent years (such as the Israel Police, psychological services and social workers).

Authored by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS, Executive Director Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead

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