One Hundred Days of War – Key Issues
Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS
Executive Director Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead | January 2024
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| Photo: IDF Spokesperson's Unit | CC BY-SA 3.0 | Spokesperson unit of ZAKACC BY-SA 4.0 |
For the past 100 days or so, since October 7th, 2023, Israel has been engaged in a multifrontal war. At this stage, the endgame of this war is not in sight. Despite the IDF’s remarkable combat in the various arenas, the goals in the south and north have yet to be achieved. The Israeli government is avoiding the formulation of an overall strategy for the “day after”. In the absence of which, the ability to accomplish the goals set for this war as well as address the multidimensional threat posed by Iran may be impeded. The present paper aims to contend with the main questions that emerge in public discourse with regard to the ongoing war and its aftermath.
Three months into the war, can the two overarching goals – ending Hamas rule and returning the hostages alive – be achieved?
It is now clear that two very different, yet not conflicting, timing systems govern the goals set for this war. The destruction of Hamas’ governing and military capabilities is an achievable goal in the medium-to-long range. This goal has several time constraints (operational, political, and internal) that allow for flexibility and durability.
In contrast, the testimonies of released hostages clearly indicate that their time is running out fast with every day that they remain in Hamas captivity. Thus, returning them alive as soon as possible is of utmost importance, even at extremely high costs. It is Israel’s duty to do so, having failed to protect them on October 7th.
Should Israel launce an overall preemptive attack against Hizballah?
Israel is facing a strategic and military “catch-22”. While the events of October 7th require the IDF to focus its efforts on Gaza to return the hostages home and destroy Hamas, the ongoing battles in the north of Israel for the past 3 months, and the evacuation of dozens of thousands of residents from their homes create an impossible state of affairs from both a security and civic perspective.
To date, Israel has fostered an aggressive policy in a specific area in response to Hizballah fire. This policy is designed to enable the major war effort to focus on Gaza, while keeping Hizballah deterred from expanding the conflict by making it pay a certain price and attempting to gradually push its outposts further north, past the Litani River. In view of this policy, one wonders how northern Israel’s residents can regain their security.
Israel’s response should be based on a combination of use of force and the formulating of a new political arrangement, such as the full and effective implementation of UN Resolution 1701. The potential shortcoming of such a solution being the plausibility of Hizballah redeploying its forces south of the Litani River sometime in the future.
The Israeli government must, therefore, prepare a multidimensional option for a comprehensive military campaign against Hizballah, assuming that we are almost certainly on a collision course with this organization. This plan would be put in motion in the event that the current military activity and U.S.-led political initiatives should fail, and the Israeli government should prepare for it from every aspect – political, military, and civil.
On the civil level, the government will have to improve the home front’s preparedness as well as the population’s readiness, since Hizballah’s capacity for causing damage to the Israeli home front is far greater (150,000 rockets, precise missiles, drones etc.). This means, among other things, ensuring that bomb shelters and safe rooms in northern Israel are in place and up to par, as well as providing optimal protection for essential facilities.
On the political and military levels, Israel will have to ensure that it is fully coordinated with the U.S. administration, which plays a crucial role, in two key aspects. The first is guaranteeing its political support for intense military activity and for reaching a binding arrangement for the “day after”. The second is confirming its provision of substantial military aid, as such assistance will certainly be required to engage in such a high-intensity large-scale campaign.
Do the legal proceedings against Israel in the Hague pose a strategic threat to it?
The legal proceedings form an important front with which Israel must contend. The claim filed by South Africa at the International Court of Justice in the Hague could open a Pandora’s box containing a wide range of risks, primarily the issuing of an immediate injunction stopping military activity in Gaza.
Such a ruling could be detrimental in many other areas as well. Bilaterally, various countries could become wary of collaborating with Israel, particularly in areas of security and defense. Moreover, this ruling could be used as grounds for anti-Israel resolutions by other international institutions. Legally, a ruling against Israel could prompt anti-Israel organizations worldwide to pursue claims against Israel and the IDF, including in the Hague’s International Criminal Court. Publicly, such an outcome would have a negative effect on Israel’s image, and enhance manifestations of protest as well as antisemitism.
Thus, the Israeli government should exhibit political wisdom. It is extremely important to continue providing humanitarian aid to the Gazan population and preserve the power of the Supreme Court as means of reducing the multidimensional risks that Israel currently faces.
At the same time, Prime Minister Netanyahu should instruct ministers, MKs and others to retract their provocative and irresponsible statements (such as the suggestion to use a nuclear bomb in Gaza) which serve to fuel arguments made against Israel. He should also make it very clear that such statements do not reflect the government’s policies.
How essential is Israel’s strategic collaboration with the United States to its ability to grapple with these multidimensional threats?
Israel’s Minister of National Security, Itamar Ben Gvir, and other members of the coalition have recently claimed that the United States cannot dictate Israel’s actions in the war against Hamas, and that “Israel is not another star on the American flag”. These statements were made on the heels of U.S. President Biden and his administration’s demands that the Palestinian Authority be included in the Gaza Strip’s governing and rehabilitation processes in the aftermath of the war; their requests that humanitarian aid be provided to the residents of the Gaza Strip; and their claims that the Israeli government is refraining from transferring funds to the Palestinian Authority.
Such statements are in stark contrast with Israel’s extraordinarily important strategic alliance with the United States, which is fundamental to Israel’s national security and resilience.
Since the war began, the United States has been standing by Israel throughout, providing it with the necessary multidimensional steel dome – politically, militarily, economically, deterrently, and publicly. In the absence of President Biden’s unwavering support and willingness to pay political prices for it, Israel could have faced a grave disaster on October 7th, and would later have run into difficulties maintaining the ongoing battles at the required level of intensity for the required duration.
How important is Israel’s integration into President Biden’s “day after” vision?
In President Biden’s view, the Israel-Hamas War (Swords of Iron) serves as an opportunity to reshape the Middle East. The U.S. administration has formulated a “day after” strategy based on the establishment of a political-military-economic alliance with the peace countries and Israel that will serve as a counterweight for the Axis of Evil led by Iran and supported by Russia.
According to Biden, the reshaping of the Palestinian system is a crucial precondition for Arab states’ willingness to become part of this regional pact, including the incorporation of the Palestinian Authority into the Gaza Strip rehabilitation processes. Thus, Biden is setting five Don’ts – the Gaza strip will no longer serve as a terror base; Palestinians will not be forcibly displaced; there will be no reoccupation; no siege or blockade; and no reduction of territory in the Gaza Strip. He views the two-state solution as the ultimate, long-term objective, by connecting the West Bank and Gaza under a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority.
Israel is being presented with a historical opportunity to be part of the regional processes headed by the U.S. administration that are crucial to contending with the range of external threats it faces, first among which is the one posed by Iran. Any other choice would cause detriment to Israel’s overall strategic balance, leading it to sink deep into the Gazan quagmire while reducing the IDF’s operational leeway.
Can the Palestinian Authority be overlooked on the “day after” and are other alternatives implementable?
Contrary to President Biden’s view, Prime Minister Netanyahu is consistently claiming that the Palestinian Authority will not play any role in the Gaza Strip on the “day after” (“neither Hamastan nor Fathastan”). But does Israel have a better alternative?
One possibility is for Israel to remain in the Gaza Strip for an extended period of time, leaving it directly responsible for 2.2 million Palestinians. Such a development would cause significant negative damage from every possible aspect – security, politics, economics, law and Israel’s public image. The international community and Arab states will not be inclined to accept such a state of affairs.
Another option is to hand governance in Gaza over to local family clans. However, this solution is unimplementable. These family clans are likely to wind up in internal power struggles, and will not garner the support of either the international community or moderate Arab states. Although claims have been made with regard to some cities in the West Bank being run by local elements of power, those assertions are inaccurate at best, since, ultimately, the Palestinian Authority provides the governing structure there, and is the one held accountable on the national level.
In our view, assuming that the Palestinians should self-govern and be responsible for their own fates in both Gaza and the West Bank, a Palestinian governing body must be established under the Palestinian Authority. This body will be responsible for governing the Palestinians’ lives in Palestinian territories, while maintaining security and civic work interfaces with Israel, as part of a model similar to the one that currently operates in the West Bank.
Thus, under the current circumstances, the Palestinian Authority is the only possible alternative considered by both the U.S. administration and moderate Arab states. According to President Biden’s vision, its governing capabilities and attitude toward Israel will have to undergo significant changes for it to be allowed to assume responsibility for both Gaza and the West Bank.
What are the implications of a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia, and can it still be achieved?
Up until October 7th, Israel and Saudi Arabia seemed to be heading toward a historical normalization agreement. This agreement would have far-reaching implications for the perceived overall approach toward Iran, inter alia by way of promoting a regional security framework. Furthermore, it would harbor economic prospects through the development of a land route from India to Europe via Saudi Arabia and Israel.
The war that broke out following the events of October 7th has led many to wonder what the chances of realizing this vision are now. President Biden has even argued that one of the reasons for this murderous terror attack by Hamas was to curb the normalization processes. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman strives to turn his country into the leader of the Muslim world. To this end, he is pursuing the forging of a strategic alliance with the United States founded on the following three pillars: U.S. security guarantees; provision of the most advanced weapon systems; and the development of a full civil nuclear program in Saudi Arabia that includes uranium enrichment on Saudi soil. To achieve these goals, the Crown Prince has expressed his willingness to normalize his country’s relations with Israel in an attempt to convince the U.S. administration and congress to approve these highly unusual Saudi demands.
These days it is obvious that the issue of the Palestinians will play a key role in any prospective normalization talks. The Biden Administration views the creation of a new reality in the Palestinian system in general, whereby the Gaza Strip and West Bank will be united under a “revitalized” Palestinian Authority, as a necessary prerequisite to the promotion of normalization.
Similarly, the Saudi Crown Prince understands that, in view of the expected domestic as well as regional pressure, he will struggle to advance toward establishing normalization with Israel unless political prospects are offered and a role given to the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip’s rehabilitation. Therefore, senior Saudis government officials has recently made a direct connection between promoting normalization and the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state.
The outcomes of the war and Israeli government’s political wisdom will have a substantial impact on the possibility of achieving normalization. The United States’ failure to forge an axis based on a peace agreement between Israel and the moderate Arab states serving as a counterweight for the Iranian axis will cause direct damage to Israel’s overall strategic powers, leading to negative implications for its ability to grapple with the host of external threats it currently faces.
Why is the peace with Egypt and Jordan important to Israel’s national security, and how can it be preserved?
Since the war began, ministers and MKs have suggested displacing the Gazan population and resettling it in Egypt in exchange for staggering financial benefits. These notions reflect a flawed understanding of the Egyptian system. The Egyptian government opposes any and all option of taking the Palestinian population in, reiterating that a red line would be crossed in such a case, as it poses a threat to its national and security interests. Egypt will stand by its objection to the realization of this option even if it would lead to a severe crisis with Israel and cause detriment to bilateral relations.
The war in Gaza puts Egypt and Jordan in a profound dilemma, forcing them to navigate between strategic security interests and domestic constraints. While they call for a ceasefire and for stopping the IDF’s actions, going as far as to blame Israel for causing disproportionate harm to the Gazan population, neither country is taking steps that would lead to actual damage to their bilateral and security relations with Israel.
These two countries form a strategic asset and key element in Israel’s national security perception. Jordan provides Israel with strategic depth, and is essential in protecting the eastern border as part of the effort to thwart terrorist infiltrations and weapon smugglings. Egypt is a key regional actor that could play a lead role in rehabilitating the Gaza Strip, and addressing weapon smuggling to Gaza.
Thus, the Israeli government should avoid actions and statements that could harm these two countries, since any damage to them could lead to the destabilization of Israel’s security architecture. Prime Minister Netanyahu should clearly and explicitly say that he objects to any notion of displacing the Gazan population, and that this option is not being considered.
What is the magnitude of the multidimensional and multifrontal threat posed by Iran, and how should Israel address it?
Iran has managed to establish itself over the past 12 months as a nuclear threshold state and thus poses a potential existential threat to Israel.
It is currently in possession of sufficient enriched uranium to make several nuclear bombs, and is capable of starting 90 percent enrichment within approximately two weeks. Recently, Raphael Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, declared that Iran is "galloping ahead" with its uranium enrichment program and putting up barriers to inspections.
The Iranian policy aims to develop the potential that would enable it, subject to its leader’s decision, to break out and obtain weapons-grade nuclear capabilities within the shortest timeframe and with no technological or materialistic constraints.
At the same time, Iran continues to develop a wide range of launching capacities, improving its ballistic missile capabilities, drones, and more. It also continues to provide military and financial aid to its proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, while promoting attempts to target Israeli civilians worldwide, as well as deepening its military and intelligence ties with Russia.
On the “day after”, in view of the realization that the window of opportunity for curbing the Iranian nuclear program is shutting, the Israeli government must formulate an overall strategy based on two underlying fundamentals. The first is on the military level by accelerating force buildup processes with Washington’s help in such a way as to demonstrate that Israel intends to take action, no matter what the cost, and by all means available to it, to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program.
The second is on the political strategic level, and entails collaborations with the United States, Europe, and the Arab peace camp states. Israel must ensure that it is not facing the Iranian threat alone, but that this threat is viewed as a shared challenge posing a risk to the entire international community, and the only way to address it is by joining forces and combining efforts.
A necessary prerequisite to curbing the Iranian nuclear program is preserving Israel’s strategic alliance and special relations with the United States. To this end, the Israeli government will be required to ensure strategic and security coordination with the U.S. administration while insisting on trust building and avoiding oppositional steps.
From a regional perspective, Israel now has the opportunity to tap into the shared concern over Iran’s growing power and take the necessary steps to expand all its security ties with the peace camp states, inter alia by engaging in multilateral collaborations with CENTCOM.
What is the magnitude of the multidimensional and multifrontal threat posed by Iran, and how should Israel address it?
On the civic level
Israel should immediately begin to prioritize the rehabilitation of the Israel Envelope communities, and rebuild the industrial and agricultural areas in Israel’s north and south. Such a rehabilitation process is expected to last over a year, and therefore, Israel will need to prepare immediately for tending to the hundreds of thousands of evacuees, providing them with housing, appropriate educational and social solutions for parents and children, welfare and social services. The government will have to prioritize national missions for all Israeli citizens over projects that only cater to sectors that are close to the regime.
On the social level
The events of October 7th took place at a point when Israel was socially divided and polarized, to a large extent due to the governmental coup led by the government. During the war, Israeli society sobered up and reconnected, and this development could serve as basis for creating a new social and civil reality in this country. The next Israeli government should promote a national strategy for establishing and strengthening a uniting national Israeli identity that would override the different religious and ethnic identities, while reprioritizing national interests so as to provide solutions for all populations and sectors, as well as taking steps to incorporate both Ultraorthodox and Arab societies in all areas.
On the internal security level
Recent events have proven that Israel’s self-defense capacity against external threats projects directly onto its internal security, since the events of October 7th have had considerable negative impact on Israeli citizens’ sense of safety. Once the Israeli borders have been secured and protected, Israel will have to advance the hermetic closing of all border crossings into the Palestinian territories in the West Bank, and substantially bolster the internal security forces, namely the Israel National Police, Israel Prison Service, future National Guard, and civic rapid response units across Israel’s periphery.
On the governmental and administrative level
Israel’s lack of preparedness for the events and their aftermath has proven, once again, that which has been known for years. A flawed governing structure, system of governance and election system have led Israel to a series of unstable, short-term administrations, causing lack of governance and implementation of long-sighted national strategies. Israel’s next leadership must change the system of governance and elections so as to create governmental stability and render elected governments capable of building and implementing long-term strategic plans for Israel and its citizens. The next administration should reprioritize Israel’s national interests, and ensure that the needs of the entire country and all its citizens are met, as opposed to only those of certain populations represented by the parties forming the coalition.
Authored by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS, Executive Director Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
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