Shifts and changes beneath the surface

By the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS,

Executive Director Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead | August, 2021

Photo: Staff Sgt. Alexi Rosenfeld, IDF Spokesperson's Unit | CC BY-NC 2.0

Unlike recent years, when pre-summer assessments were predicting it would be "hot" from a security perspective too, this year, relative stability may be maintained, leaving heat levels in upcoming months solely to the weather forecast.

The reason, is that actors in the region, both Israel and its adversaries, are focusing more on force buildup and less on the use thereof. In such a reality – in the absence of an immediate threat of escalation alongside ongoing security at a reasonable level – the Israeli public could lose interest, leading to a reduced sense of urgency and need in the government to address strategic threats, that continue to build up beneath the relatively calm surface.

In the aftermath of the Gaza campaign, Hamas is focused on rehabilitating its military capabilties, which were significantly hit during Operation Guardian of the Walls. Moreover, the organization is also seeking to promote the restoration of civil infrastructure in the Gaza Strip in an effort to improve the population's ability to cope with the tough conditions of a scorching hot Gazan summer.

Israel, on its part, is striving to replenish its offensive and defensive munitions stockpiles following Operation Guardian of the Walls, and is gradually lifting the civil restrictions on the Gaza Strip, including allowing funds to come in from Qatar (albeit under tighter supervision). Thus, Hamas and Gaza are closer to the previous understanding's characteristics from before May 10th.

In the north, Lebanon's accelerated crumbling is confining Hizbollah, which is grappling with internal criticism, and is expected to suppress its appetite to take action against the IDF forces deployed on the border (where the organization has a "score to settle" with Israel), or get involved in conflicts between Israel and Hamas or Iran, least of all get dragged into a large-scale escalation with it.

At the same time, Hizbollah is continuing to build up its force and rearm with Iran's help. Its efforts focus on industrial manufacturing capabilities of precision missiles that pose an unprecedented potential strategic threat to Israel.

Although the domestic situation in Lebanon imposes restraints, the organization displays extreme sensitivity to the possibility that Israel would try to take advantage of the situation to curb its military capabilities. Under such circumstances, the chances of escalation following Israeli thwarting efforts would rise.

Iran is primarily engaged in force buildup efforts – its own as well as those of its proxies in the region. In the nuclear realm, Iran continues to accumulate assets and expand its capabilities (gathering uranium enriched to 20% and 60% purity, developing advanced centrifuges, engaging in uranium metal activity) in an effort to accumulate irreversible knowledge parallel to the negotiations in Vienna, and lever its improved capabilities to extract more concessions as part of an eventual deal.

In the region, beyond Lebanon, Iran is building up the Houthis' force in Yemen and the Shiite militia groups in Iraq while taking measures to entrench itself militarily in these countries as well as in Syria, and building capabilities in them that would allow direct strikes against Israel using cruise missiles and drones.

Unlike other arenas, Iran and its proxies are not only building up their force, but using it too. The Houthis in Yemen and Iraqi militia groups are launching missiles and drones at Saudi Arabia, targeting U.S. bases and interests in Iraq, and even Israel, when an Iranian drone was sent to Israel from Iraqi soil during Operation Guardian of the Walls.

Israel, on its part, according to foreign sources, is also using force and making a military effort as part of the "campaign between the wars" to curb Iran's uranium enrichment capabilities, its entrenchment efforts in the region, primarily in Syria, and its smuggling of components needed to build up the force of its proxies.

Nevertheless, it is still a shadow war beneath the surface (and water, seeing as the friction between the two countries is expanding to the maritime arena), and both parties are emerging as seeking to prevent its development into a large-scale escalation between them.

Implications for Israel

The Israeli government is required to make good use of the upcoming period of relative quiet, should it indeed last, to prepare for addressing the series of threats continuing to grow beneath the calm surface, based on the following set of priorities.

The most urgent challenge is the Iranian nuclear progress. Israel should prepare for a scenario whereby the Vienna talks are long and stalled, while bracing up for a comprehensive campaign, political and other, designed to stop Iran's technological nuclear advancement, based on a tight collaboration with the U.S. and Biden Administration by exhausting existing cooperation channels on the political, military and operational levels.

While addressing this challenge, Israel should demand that the international community refrain from negotiating with Iran "under fire", and condition the next round of the Vienna talks on Tehran ceasing its technological nuclear progress. Moreover, under the current circumstances, it is vital that the United States once more pose a credible military threat to Iran, and make it clear that "all options are on the table" (the last to use this formula was President Obama).

In the event that the parties agree to return to the nuclear deal within the next few months, Israel will gain several years during which to build up its force and prepare for the JCPOA limitations to expire. In such a scenario, Israel should strive for guarantees and quiet bilateral understandings with the U.S. administration in the context of preventing Iran from breaking out to weapons-grade fissile material, and an Israeli force buildup, based on the United States' declared and unequivocal commitment to Israel's national security, and the view shared by the two allies whereby it is vital to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

Vis-à-vis Lebanon, Israel is advised to decide how to address the precision missile threat before Hizbollah and Iran reach industrial manufacturing capabilities. The internal and external pressure that Hizbollah and Lebanon are facing may be utilized in this context; however, militarily, Israel should also prepare for the possibility that thwarting operations could lead to an intense escalation as well as to all the implications of such a development.

In Gaza, it is in Israel's best interest to delay military conflict to address other issues, but it must make good use of the time to accelerate the building of its capability to deliver a surprising multidimensional attack against Hamas' military wing at the time and place of its choosing. The required effect is a harsh blow that would resonate in the Middle East and deter the radical axis, be etched into regional memory, reassert Israeli deterrence vis-à-vis Hamas, and thwart the growing threat this organization poses to the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

Ultimately, assuming that no significant escalation is expected on the ground, Israel should focus on the strategic force buildup and rearmament challenges it is facing. In order to create an environment that would increase its maneuverability and enable it to concentrate efforts, Israel is required, inter alia, to stabilize the situation in Gaza, strengthen the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, restore its relations with Jordan, and enhance its coordination with Egypt.

At the same time, Israel is advised to focus the Prime Minister's upcoming visit in the United States on the Iranian challenge. For this visit to have concrete outcomes, it should be prepared for methodically and comprehensively using preparatory visits to Washington and preliminary discussions between professionals in the National Security Council and defense establishment and their American counterparts.

Authored by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS, Executive Director Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead

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