2022 – Intensifying National Security Challenges
By the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS,
Executive Director Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead | January, 2022
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| Photo: Binoculars - maxpixel |
As Israel welcomes 2022, it is grappling with intensifying strategic challenges for its national security, primarily the Iranian nuclear and regional threats, as well as the explosiveness of the Palestinian issue in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The Iranian strategy is consistent and aims to establish regional clout, undermine American stability in the Middle East, and gnaw at the Sunni-Israeli alliance, while turning it de facto into a nuclear threshold state. Thus, the nuclear talks in Vienna that have resumed after the holiday season are nearing an advanced stage during which the parties will be required to make difficult decisions pertaining to the possibility of renewing the JCPOA. The delegates from Iran, Russia, China, and Europe are displaying cautious optimism despite the large gaps that remain between the parties on core issues. Thus, the potential for crisis in the relations between Jerusalem and Washington will grow in the event that an agreement is signed that places Israel's national security interests at risk.
Subsequently, the Israeli strategy is jammed tightly between a rock and a hard place in view of two possible evils: an old-new nuclear deal would provide Iran with international legitimization, strengthening its economy to the point of enabling the regime to enhance its Middle Eastern activity, and tighten the noose around Israel's neck via the establishment of regional fire bases, as well as the strengthening of Iranian militia groups and proxies in Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza; by contrast, if the nuclear talks reach a dead end, such a development could lead Iran to decide to accelerate its nuclear program, whereby uranium would be enriched to weapons-grade, creating a bomb within three short weeks of a government resolution. In this scenario, the tools available to Israel to curb the breakout are limited. Moreover, in any scenario – the leap in knowledge, research, and development made, as well as the building of advanced centrifuges, and the advanced technological capabilities Iran has acquired, have laid the foundation for a developed state nuclear infrastructure that could serve it in either the short or long range.
The United States, for its part, is striving to re-sign the nuclear deal as it seeks to focus on its strategic rivalry with China and Russia, as well as avoid getting dragged into yet another regional crisis in the Middle East. The great power competition is growing, at the center of which is the Ukraine crisis with its implications on world order, as well as the United States' projected power in the Middle East.
Additionally, the U.S. policy whereby it will lessen its involvement in the Middle East, avoid using military instruments, and focus on bolstering regional stability via diplomacy and economic sanctions is weakening its deterrence and clout in the region. The current state of affairs is enabling Iran to increase the pressure it is exerting on American forces in the region, as well as on its regional allies via proxy forces, drone and ballistic missile attacks, without worrying about implications for or any toll paid by Iran itself.
In the present situation, the pro-American Sunni camp that is deterred by Iran is pursuing understandings and a direct dialogue with Tehran. The Gulf's interest in this context is clear: concern over escalation with Iran in the absence of U.S. support, the ongoing campaign in Yemen that is costing heavily, and the desire to maintain security stability and avoid getting dragged into risky adventures at a time of global financial and health crisis. Iran, by contrast, is seeking to establish the stability of its own regime, enhance its regional influence, extract itself from the isolation from which it is currently suffering, gnaw at the Abraham Alliance, and encourage growth in the local economy wherever possible.
In the Palestinian context, the challenges for 2022 are intensifying in view of the Palestinian Authority's increasing weakness, concern over the post-Abu Mazen era, growing lone wolf terror, the younger generation's alienation of the PA establishment, as well as amplified explosiveness due to Hamas getting stronger, and the absence of an overall Israeli strategy.
The visit of the Palestinian Authority Chairman at the home of the Israeli Minister of Defense was the first official state meeting in Israel in a decade. The encounter itself is important in keeping community channels open, establishing the PA Chair's status in the Palestinian arena, and strengthening security stability. However, despite the concrete importance attributed to the meeting, the actual steps taken by Israel do not deviate from the over policy followed in the last decade, at the basis of which is strengthening the PA and managing the conflict.
The foundations of the Israeli perception are: Maintaining security quiet via close coordination with the Palestinian security apparatuses, weakening Hamas and establishing public order with the help of the Palestinian security apparatuses, improving the civilian and financial quality of life of West Bank residents while preserving the distinction from the Gaza Strip, as well as keeping the peace process on hold. This policy has enabled Israel to focus in recent years on the Iranian threat and the war between wars, while keeping the Palestinian issue off the agenda, and postponing the need to promote an overall state strategy with complex political implications.
At the same time, Hamas is attempting to leverage the Palestinian Authority's weakness, and strengthen its own status in the Palestinian arena by means of organized incitement, "winning hearts" in the West Bank and Jerusalem, as well as trying to develop terror infrastructure in the West Bank. Hamas' is a long-term strategy that seeks to take over full control of the Palestinian arena while maintaining the struggle against Israel. Yet the parties' shared temporary interest at this stage to refrain from getting dragged into escalation remains intact, and mostly highlights Israel's disinclination to form a new equation vis-à-vis Hamas in view of the potential price it would have to pay, as well as the need to focus on the Iranian issue. Nevertheless, the situation remains explosive, and the feasibility of escalation due to miscalculation or Hamas' decision to seize a future opportunity to spearhead a Palestinian national topic (such as the prisoners one) should still be considered.
But the glass is still "half full" of opportunities and strengths associated with Israel's economic and security power, human capital, strategic alliance with the United States, growing collaboration with the moderate Sunni camp and other Eastern Mediterranean countries (which is ultimately reflected by relative quiet), and improved quality of life for Israeli citizens in recent years.
At the same time, Israel is required to form a comprehensive national security strategy to address the complex challenges on its borders and in the third circle, and to fully seize the opportunities that present themselves in both the regional and global arenas.
Recommendations
Israel should prepare for a scenario whereby a nuclear deal that does not align with its strategic security interests is signed. In this context, Jerusalem would do well to leverage the deal to increase the military funding it receives from Washington, and acquire the kind of platforms that would establish the IDF's qualitative military edge (QME).
At the same time, Israel should influence the drafting of an effective nuclear deal that would provide sufficient guarantees for halting Iran's nuclear progress, extending the breakout time, and removing the sunset clause. Israel should make it clear to both the United States and Europe that any agreement that fails to address these aspects would merely be marking the beginning of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, impacting the stability in the region and, indeed, in the world.
In the same vein, Israel should accelerate its force buildup process and increase operational competence in preparation for a possible strike against Iranian nuclear sites. Such a step would bolster Israeli deterrence, and, if need be, enable decision-making flexibility.
Israel's strategic cooperation with the United States is crucial to the implementation of the force and power buildup plan, as well as to the bolstering of regional deterrence. Israel would do well to avoid unnecessary friction, and focus on strategic coordination with Washington on the Iranian issue.
The growing crisis in the Palestinian Authority requires Israel to strengthen the security coordination as well as civic-economic assistance, while enhancing the PA's governability, and curbing Hamas' entrenchment in the area (terror infrastructures and Dawa). The regularization process in the Gaza Strip should continue, while preparing for a military campaign against Hamas. In the long range, Israel should formulate an overall strategy that would indicate the future implementation of the separation perception in order to curb the creeping process of the implementation of the "one state" solution under the cover of "conflict management" and "economic peace".
Israel is advised to strengthen its strategic ties with Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf States in view of the aggravated military threat posed by Iran in the region (UAVs, advanced ballistic capabilities, precision, cyberattacks, and more). The strategic ties are crucial to Israel's ability to project regional power, develop strategic depth, as well as form a regional coalition that would curb and isolate Iran. Israel's regional collaboration with the Sunni world should be founded on security-military interests, but also extended to broader economic-cultural contexts in the pursuit of bilateral normalization. However, the Gulf States have also been getting closer to Iran, which demonstrates the "glass ceiling" in the strategic relations between these parties, and the limitations of this regional cooperation.
The war between wars serves as an essential vehicle by which to curb Iranian entrenchment in the region and bolster Israeli deterrence, which must be established as well as developed. In this context, Israel would do well to preserve its strategic ties with Russia, and leverage their shared interest – weakening Iran in Syria in order to continue deepening the impact on the radical axis. In addition, Jerusalem should avoid intervening in the exacerbating crisis between the United States and Russia in the Ukraine as much as possible so that the inter-power rivalry would not cross over into the Middle Eastern backyard and influence operational freedom of action.
Authored by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS, Executive Director Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead
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