The Domestic Crisis Poses A Threat to Israel’s Strategic Power

Written by the Institute for Policy and Strategy Team, IPS

Executive Director - Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilead

September 2023

Negative indications have recently been accumulating and could, during the last quarter of the year, tip Israel’s strategic scales for the worse. The main reason being that Israel is currently at a crossroads where fateful decisions will be made, determining its future and character. In fact, israel may even wind up in a head-on collision between the judiciary, government and Knesset over its democratic nature. Should such a scenario materialize, damage could be caused to Israel’s strategic powers in view of the anticipated weakening in all areas, reflecting negatively onto the emerging agreement with Saudi Arabia and the United States.

Signs of strategic powers weakening

Iran poses the key threat to Israel, and is undergoing multidimensional buildup. First and foremost, it is formulating unwritten understandings with the United States, at the center of which is limiting Iran’s military nuclear program by having it undertake to refrain from enriching uranium beyond the 60% level. These understandings were reached against Israel’s declared policy, in a way that reflects the Israeli government’s limited impact on the U.S. administration these days.

The key implication is that Iran will successfully maintain its overall nuclear abilities, cementing its status as a threshold state. This could enable it to break out to 90% enrichment within a period of two weeks, should its leader so decide. Furthermore, these understandings give Iran the leeway to continue with its military buildup, particularly in areas such as ballistic missiles and armed drones, while deepening its collaborations with the axis of resistance in the region, namely Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Iran is also enjoying improved standing in both the international and regional arenas as a result of the strategic axis formed with Russia (especially in the military field) and China, as well as the reconciliation processes in which it has engaged with Saudi Arabia. Iran's growing self confidence is also expressed in the attempts to promote terrorist attacks against Jews and Isralis around the world. According to the Mossad Director, Barnea, so far in 2023, the Mossad and other intelligence bodies have thwarted 27 Iranian terrorist plots.

The security escalation in the West Bank is aggravating, as manifest in the fact that 35 Israelis were murdered this year (compared to 31 throughout 2022), and the dramatic rise in attempted attacks (more than 400 acts of terror have been thwarted this year). At the same time, the Palestinian Authority is declining, and its governance impeded in various areas within the West Bank. These developments are forcing the IDF to become more heavily involved on the ground, thereby intensifying friction with the local population, and prompting criticism by the international and regional arenas. They may also project onto the potential proceedings against Israel at the international courts in the Hague, particularly if the Supreme Court will be weakened, and lose its international prestige. Iran is also fueling the explosiveness in the West Bank, and even providing support to local terror infrastructures, as it views the PA and Gaza Strip as a convenient setting for its broad anti-Israel campaign.

Signs of the grave internal crisis Israel is in are beginning to show. Social cohesion is weakening, there are indications of potential erosion in the IDF’s overall operational readiness in the near future, economic damage is being caused, and there are cracks in Israel’s relations with the United States. Moreover, Israeli government ministers and Knesset members are lashing out at the heads of the IDF and defense establishment, and going unreprimanded or condemned by the Prime Minister, thereby lessening these organizations’ official status, their ability to function under a broad consensus, as well as the public standing of their leaders. These developments have direct effects on erosion in Israel’s perceived power, and the way that it is currently seen by its enemies.

The obstacles on the road to a normalization agreement

Ostensibly, the likelihood of making peace with Saudi Arabia seems very high in view of the unprecedented alignment of interests between the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Nevertheless, several internal and regional obstacles could lower the chances of reaching an agreement.

The emerging state of affairs in the Palestinian arena may be indicative of the possibility that this issue will become more central than reflected by the trilateral deal being formulated, and that the demands of Israel could pose a considerable obstacle on the road to a historical agreement. One such demand could be to outline a roadmap to negotiations, and secure clear principles for a future accord, primarily the acceptance of the two-state principle, and cessation of the settlement expansion policy. This direction was demonstrated in the appointment of the Saudi Ambassador to Jordan as a non-resident Ambassador to the Palestinian Authority, and Consul General in East Jerusalem, as well as in the Arab world’s commitment to support Palestinian aspirations as manifest in the trilateral meeting held in Egypt between President al-Sisi, King Abdallah II, and Abu Mazen.

It is also likely that Iran and its local proxies will form a united front to stall the signing of this agreement due to its implications for their strategic state of affairs (a “zero sum game” against Israel) by promoting severe terror attacks, especially in the West Bank, in an effort to lead to escalation that would, in turn, disrupt the normalization process.

The Saudi demand to develop an entire civil nuclear program revolving around uranium enrichment on Saudi soil harbors the potential to break barriers, and could lead to a regional nuclear arms race (Egypt, Turkey, and others). In addition, it raises the concern over Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME) being compromised as a result of the kingdom’s demand to purchase advanced weapon systems (such as F35 fighter jets).

Finally, the timeframe available for promoting this deal is limited, probably, to mid-2024 at most due to the last leg of the U.S. presidential and congressional elections.

Implications & recommendations

The processes impacting Israel’s overall power components have been gaining momentum recently. In fact, an affinity between Israel’s power due to its democratic character and the undermining of its democratic foundation as a key factor in the weakening of its strategic power is gradually emerging. This development could have negative implications on the chances of advancing a peace agreement with Saudi Arabia, tip Israel’s strategic scales for the worse, and deepen the infringement upon Israel’s freedom of action in the region in general, and particularly vis-à-vis Iran.

The Israeli government is therefore required, first and foremost, to actively bridge over the divides in its society, restore its image of deterrence, strengthen its economy, and get its relations with the United States back on track. All of the above are necessary conditions if Israel’s strategic powers are to be maintained, and if it is to be properly prepared for a conflict on several fronts with parties associated with the radical axis.

To this end, the Israeli government must stop promoting the governmental coup at once, including the advancement of the conscription bill in its current format. At the same time, it should clearly announce that it will accept any High Court of Justice rulings, and undertake to refrain from any more changes in legislation unless broad consensus is reached over it first. It should also cease all criticism of the leaders of the IDF and defense establishment immediately and, instead, show complete faith in their actions.

Vis-à-vis the Palestinian system, the Israeli government is advised to change its policy and conduct, first and foremost by actively stabilizing the Palestinian Authority while continuing to thwart attacks by targeting terrorists and punishing perpetrators of nationalist crimes. Processes of territory annexation and settlement expansion should be curbed, economic benefits given, and collaborations with the Palestinian security apparatuses deepened. At the same time, especially in preparation for the Jewish High Holidays, the Israeli government should exhibit sensitivity with regard to provocative steps at the sacred sites in Jerusalem that could be viewed as attempts to alter the status quo, and used by terror organizations to spark violence under the cover of a religious war. In this context, the Israeli government should attribute special importance to maintaining the strategic relations with Jordan, as they are essential to security on the eastern border, as well as to the fight against terror and the radical axis.

As for the deal with Saudi Arabia, it is imperative that the Israeli government conduct a comprehensive inquiry with all relevant parties into the implications for national security stemming from the Saudi Crown Prince’s demands, especially those involving the development of an entire nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment, on Saudi soil.

This document was written by the team of the Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS)

Editted by Dr. Shay Har-Zvi.

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