Normalization with Saudi Arabia -
Interests Vs. Challenges
By Dr. Shay Har-Zvi | September, 2023
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| Photos: Avi Ohayon - GPO |
Israel is currently facing a historical opportunity to promote a peace agreement with Saudi Arabia under American auspices in view of an unprecedented alignment of interests between the three countries. In fact, it involves one big package deal, the full implementation of which depends on each party’s delivery of various components. Yet the road to advancing this deal is long and full of obstacles. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan mentioned recently that the US, Saudi Arabia and Israel have a general idea of the major elements of a potential normalization agreement, but clarified that "we don’t have a framework…there is still work to do”.
One of the major obstacles seems to be related to the demand of the Saudi Crown Prince to develop an entire nuclear fuel cycle in the kingdom while maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME). Other difficulties expected to be encountered are the Saudis’ demands for gestures to the Palestinians, the radical axis’ efforts to sabotage the talks, and the timeframe dictated by the U.S. presidential and congressional elections in November 2024.
The Saudi interest - American security guarantees
Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, seeks to turn Saudi Arabia into a global economic power as part of his vision for 2030 in an effort to ensure that it will not have to rely on its depleting oil resources or be exposed to threats posed by Iran. He hopes to achieve this goal by relying on the United States, which he views as the key to accomplishing all that he has set out to accomplish. To this end, he strives to promote a strategic alliance with the United States founded on the following three pillars: solid U.S. security guarantees for Saudi Arabia’s security; the provision of the most advanced weapons systems (such as F35 fighter jets and air defense systems); and the development of an entire civil nuclear program in the kingdom, including uranium enrichment.
According to the Crown Prince, the agreement is likely to be approved by congress to minimize the risk of another administration actively rolling it back. In exchange, the Crown Prince is willing to promote normalization with Israel, to a large extent due to his realization that this would be the only way for him to convince both Israel and the U.S. administration and congress to approve his far-reaching demands. Moreover, normalization with Israel aligns with his view that regional tensions must be eased en route to economic prosperity. The reconciliation processes with Iran and Syria in which Saudi Arabia has engaged in recent months, as well as the talks with Turkey earlier on, are yet another aspect of this view.
The American interest - Curbing China and regional alliances
The U.S. administration is putting tremendous effort into promoting this trilateral deal, as indicated by the series of high-ranking U.S. officials’ visits to the kingdom in recent months. Various interests drive America’s pursuit of such a trilateral deal. It strives to restore its relations with Saudi Arabia as counterweight to the increasing collaborations between Saudi Arabia and China on the strategic level as well as in areas such as energy and technology. These were manifest in President Xi’s visit to the kingdom (December 2022) as well as the reconciliation agreement struck between Saudi Arabia and Iran with Chinese mediation (March 2023). Moreover, Washington is concerned that rejecting the Crown Prince’s requests would further push Riyadh to deepen its ties with Beijing and Moscow.
From the U.S. administration’s perspective, a peace accord between Saudi Arabia and Israel could lead to the reinstatement of U.S. standing in the Middle East, while demonstrating that it is, in fact, the only great power capable of setting the wheels of significant processes in motion in this region. The agreement also aligns with President Biden’s view whereby promoting multilateral collaborations harbors the potential of changing the balance of powers in the Middle East, inter alia due to Israel’s subsequent forging of diplomatic relations with other countries in the Muslim world, as well as the advancement of large-scale regional economic projects. President Biden announced during the G20 summit plans to build a rail and shipping corridor linking India with the Middle East and Europe.
Furthermore, the U.S. administration views these processes as having direct effects on Israel and the Gulf states’ ability to contend with the aggravating threats posed by Iran, inter alia by forming defense alliances and profound security partnerships. Finally, an Israeli-Saudi agreement could also help Biden before the elections due to its potential impact on gas prices.
The Palestinian obstacle - Not a focal point but a necessary condition nonetheless
Although the approaches to the centrality of the Palestinian issue in both Saudi and American set of considerations vary greatly, even if it is not prioritized by either party, both realize that some form of solution that would align with the Palestinians’ aspirations and Arab peace initiative must be found. Otherwise, any agreement reached would face fierce objection by the Palestinian Authority and other Arab countries, as well as by King Salman and others within the Saudi kingdom. The trilateral meeting in Egypt attended by Abu Mazen, President al-Sisi and King Abdallah has demonstrated the existing tension this topic causes among the Palestinians and Arab states. The appointment of the Saudi ambassador to Jordan to non-resident ambassador to the Palestinian Authority and Consul General in East Jerusalem is probably meant as a signal of the importance that Saudi Arabia intends to attribute to the Palestinian issue.
At present the Saudi demands in this area are shrouded in mist. Possible requests may be that Israel, at the very least, recognize the two-state principle, avoid any further unilateral steps expanding settlements, evacuate illegal outposts, and terminate its economic punishment policy. Saudi Arabia may also demand that Israel hand over territories to PA control, conditioning the advancement of normalization upon Israel’s fulfillment of its commitments on the Palestinian subject.
Nevertheless, the Israeli government’s current policy vis-à-vis the Palestinian system, and primarily the views led by ministers Smotrich and Ben Gvir for settlement expansion and annexation of territories in the West Bank show that, in its current composition, the Israeli government’s ability to comply even with Saudi Arabia’s most minimal demands is highly limited.
The radical axis’ sabotaging efforts
These are joined by the efforts expected on the radical axis’ part to sabotage the normalization process led by Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas due to its direct implications for their own strategic and security state of affairs (a “sum zero game” against Israel). Iran is likely to take action in various ways to disrupt the agreement’s advancement, first and foremost by encouraging acts of terror against Israel within the Palestinian system under the assumption that escalation in defense would make it harder for all parties involved to promote this deal and would, at the very least, delay it.
Breaking nuclear barriers
Allowing Saudi Arabia to develop an end-to-end civil nuclear program, and particularly the ability to enrich uranium on Saudi soil, poses a wide range of challenges. The Saudi precedent could cause other countries in the region, primarily Egypt and Turkey, to demand the development of similar programs on their soil, ultimately leading to a nuclear race in the Middle East. In the long range, the risk that Saudi Arabia would seek to use the knowledge it has acquired to develop a nuclear weapons program is feasible, especially since word of possible ties between the kingdom and Pakistan in this regard has been spread, as well as in light of the Crown Prince’s statements in the past that if Iran were to obtain nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia would also seek to obtain it. What is more, any agreement on nuclear with Saudi Arabia could have repercussions for potential oversight agreements with Iran.
The timeframe available for formulating the deal
President Biden has limited time to invest the necessary political capital to promote the deal, probably until mid-2024 at most, as the United States begins the last leg of its presidential and congressional elections (November 2024). To approve the agreement, President Biden will need to garner the support of at least 16 Republican senators (the approval of two thirds of the senate – i.e., 67 senators – must be obtained), assuming all 51 Democratic senators will support it, including those who have embraced a hostile approach toward the Saudi Crown Prince until now. It therefore seems that, unless the parties will manage to formulate a deal within the upcoming months, the agreement would have to be postponed until the summer of 2025 at least, when the new administration would outline its own foreign policy.
Implications and Recommendations
Israel under Netanyahu’s leadership is at a historical crossroads that presents the opportunity to promote a peace agreement with the most important country in the Arab and Muslim world. Such an agreement would impact the strategic balance in the Middle East for many years to come. Therefore, the prime minister is advised, first and foremost, to announce the absolute braking of all the steps designed to alter the judicial system in order to stop the chipping away at Israel’s overall strategic powers, and get its relations with the United States back on the right track.
In view of the strategic implications of this agreement, the Israeli government must inquire thoroughly into the advantages and risks associated with the Crown Prince’s demands with the help of the relevant Israeli security organizations. From a practical perspective, the government should ensure that the United States will maintain the IDF’s qualitative military edge (QME), and that sufficient defense mechanisms are put in place to tighten the oversight and limitations over the nuclear program that Saudi Arabia seeks to build. In this context, Israel should object to any program that would allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium on the kingdom’s soil due to the considerable risks involved, as well as the concern that such allowances would lead to the breaking of barriers, and a nuclear race in the Middle East.
Authored by Dr. Shay Har-Zvi, Senior Fellow, Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), Reichman University.
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